Shot Down: A Son Honors The Greatest Generation

06/13/2017

2017-06-13 By Robbin Laird

I had the opportunity to participate in a ceremony in France honoring B-17 crew members.

The families of the 10-crew members who crash-landed onto the waters of Noirmoutier Island, France on July 4, 1943 were invited to attend the unveiling ceremony honoring their World War II combat crew members.

Thousands of French joined the ceremonies on Sunday June 30, 2013.  It was indeed a festive occasion.

For the families and the participants in the ceremony, the event was a two-day experience.

The first day focused on visiting various parts of the American presence in France story and notably, the areas targeted by the B-17 raid on July 4, 1943.  It was a chance to come into contact with the reality of the physical quality of the terrain and location of the B-17 bombing effort.

To a person, the members of the families were clearly moved by the level of attention provided to the B-17 memory and to Americans more generally.

As Colin Clark, editor of Breaking Defense entitled my piece on the event: “French Gather by the Thousands to Honor US Pilots Downed on July 4 – 1943.”

Indeed, that aspect of the event came through in wandering through the village and experiencing the vintage cars, the World War II vehicles, the many French dressed in World War II uniforms or outfits and the re-enactment on the beach of the return of the allies to France.

I prepared background materials for the event and spent a good deal of time doing research on the B-17 story.

And ended up producing several articles and a Special Report on the B-17 and its crews.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Remembering-June-2013.pdf

It was with significant interest that I read a recent book by Steve Snyder entitled Shot Down: The True Story of Pilot Howard Snyder and the Crew of the B-17 Susan Ruth.

Howard Snyder is the father of the author.

The book is written as a remembrance of his father in the broader context of the B-17 crews and their European combat and war experiences.

What is striking about the stories about the B-17 crews is how diverse and simply regular guys these folks are.

They are not born as unique heroes and born to destiny kinds of folks.

They are regular Americans who served the cause of freedom; did their duty and fought against the tyranny of one of the nastiest regimes in the history of the world.

It is the way they did it as well as what they accomplished which make them the “greatest generation.”

But what can be forgotten is that the current generation of warriors carry the same attitude and perform at significant levels of courage for their country, and remain the bedrock of freedom against the rising influence of the illiberal powers.

In other words, Howard Snyder and his generation are an inspiration but not the end of the story of American courage and contribution to making the world safer for democracy.

Steve Snyder walks us through the training of his father and his deployment to England.

He provides the historical context for the Mighty 8th and its operations from the United Kingdom.

I have visited many of the sites from which the Mighty 8th operated and have had lunch in the dining room near where one can find “Bomber” Harris’s bust and his office.

Notably, it has only been in the past few years that the UK finally erected a memorial to the crews and their contribution in London and it is located not far form the RAF Club in London.

The author then takes us on the missions his father flew, notably arriving after the costly raids on ball bearing plants deep inside Germany.

His father’s own missions are described vividly and we can fly with him on those missions.

During his last mission, his plane was shot down over enemy territory and the narrative now shifts to the fate of the crew and their efforts to remain uncultured and alive.

Unfortunately, three members were captured and executed with little regard to the Geneva Convention or any other rules of civilized behavior.

His father was hidden by brave resistance fighters and the author does an especially nice job of talking about those resistance fighters and the high cost they paid for aiding the downed American pilots.

Those fighters had a choice to make; they could have done nothing and focused on survival.

But they did not – they aided those fighting the Nazis with their own support and active efforts. Civilian courage combined with military efforts were certainly a powerful combination that would eventually put the Nazis where they belonged – on the dust heap of history.

I would highly recommend reading this book and enjoying this tribute by Steve Snyder to his father and the greatest generation.

He put the challenge for the B-17 crews rather well in these words:

The men who made up the crew of a B-17 Flying Fortress were each specially trained for their position.

Nonetheless, on every combat mission they faced possible death and destruction.

The challenges each crew member faced on every mission was formidable: enduring the physical strain of using oxygen in an unpressurized aircraft at an altitude where the temperature dropped to minus 60 degrees; suffering the heartache of watching a buddy’s aircraft suddenly blow up and instantly disappear in a cloud of grey smoke; seeing the tail, wing, or engines break off and the plane then drop like a stone; witnessing a bomber slowly rolling over and begin its slow plunge to the earth below; and watching for parachutes to see how many men got out, if any.

If a plane went down too fast, the crew would be sealed into what would become their coffin. Worse yet was the sudden horror when a crew’s aircraft was hit by flak or enemy fighters five miles above the earth. Many men would be reported missing or killed after only one or two missions, while others might survive only to be killed on their final mission.[1]

https://www.amazon.com/SHOT-DOWN-story-Howard-Snyder-ebook/dp/B00N5CL5XG/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1497379755&sr=8-1&keywords=shot+down

[1] Synder, Steve (2014-08-29). SHOT DOWN: The true story of pilot Howard Snyder and the crew of the B-17 Susan Ruth (Kindle Locations 1254-1262). Sea Breeze Publishing. Kindle Edition.

 

The Challenges of Responding to North Korea with Missile Defense

06/08/2017

2017-06-08 By Danny Lam

The successful test of an interceptor by the Missile Defense Agency May 30 caused Vice Adm. James Syring to claim that CONUS is “safe” until 2020, or at least 3 years ahead of DPRK ICBMs.

Let’s begin by taking this claim at face value.

VAM Syring’s assuring statement only applies to CONUS and Alaska, which exclude Canada, Japan, South Korea, US bases like Guam, Australia, New Zealand, all of Europe and the Middle East if an ICBM is launched from DPRK’s axis partner Iran or from DPRK.

Testing ICBM Intercept from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

With the exception of Japan, there are minimal defenses in South Korea and Poland (limited coverage that faces South against Iran) and effectively none elsewhere.

For American allies, VAM Syring’s statement is a veiled and stark warning that America First is the de facto missile defense policy for any ally who don’t avail themselves of the means to defend themselves like Germany and Canada (i.e. NATO Article 3 obligations).

The May 30 BMD test in no way address the proven ability of DPRK to overwhelm defenses with SRBM and MRBMs of Japan and South Korea by the sheer force of numbers. DPRK’s recent multiple simultaneous missile launch exercises confirmed this doctrine.

Presently, DPRK is known to have sufficient quantities of Short and MRBM missiles to inundate the deployed missile defense in much of Japan, S. Korea and nearby US bases.

In other words, the May 30 test provide no comfort to US allies.

American priorities for extension of BMD coverage will begin with states like Hawaii, extending to Pacific major US bases like Guam and Diego Garcia, and then to allies that carry their fair share of the defense burden which exclude a majority of NATO members.

The question is, how might DPRK defeat the CONUS US BMD?

The weakest link in the US BMD is in sensors and communications.

Continuous and extensive monitoring of launch sites by airborne and space based sensors worked well against liquid fueled rockets that require large convoys of trucks to support each launch and a long setup / fueling / launch preparation time.

Solid fueled missiles, however, require just a few — though distinctive TELs — that can be moved about quickly. To pick out a relatively small S/MRBM canister TEL moving about in the area the size of North Korea, with many hills and terrain clutter, is a difficult feat before consideration of the likely deployment of decoys or active interference with sensors and platforms (e.g. by shooting down airborne radar platforms).

If DPRK to adopt a “launch on warning” or “launch under attack” doctrine that pre-emptively attack both the US and allies by striking first, and bet that a mass attack will defeat any BMD.

Alternatively, there is the option of an offensive first strike that takes advantage of their plentiful supply of liquid fueled missiles by using it first. The first warning of launch we may have may be from the SBIRs spotting the missile plume.

The May 30 test show this can be handled up to the saturation of the BMD system.

Who says NORKs will play this game?

NORKs can use their nuclear devices for combination high altitude EMP and sensor blinding purposes.   The present policy of US and allies is to not shoot down DPRK missile launches that do not appear to threaten to land on their territory even if they see the launch preparations over days.

This plays right into DPRK hands if they were to loft a sensor blinder / EMP device that detonates just outside of territorial waters of nearby allies. TYP-2 radars in Japan and Alaska can conceivably be blinded by a single nuclear device while another tackled Wake Island’s TYP-2 and the SBX radar.

Once the sensors are blinded, a strike on CONUS or allies can proceed with the BMD system down or severely degraded with their next volley of liquid fueled missiles.

Solid fueled mobile missiles can then be retained as deterrent against retaliation.

Did the May 30 test consider this?

DPRK have other options besides using nuclear weapons on land targets. There is an implicit assumption that DPRK will adhere to the Outer Space Treaty and not deploy or use nuclear weapons in orbit or space.

Suppose if DPRK were to launch “peaceful” satellites that orbits over CONUS that contain a thermonuclear device optimized to generate EMP?

How would the US be able to determine in a short timeframe if the “satellite” do not contain a nuclear device?

Would the US pre-emptively destroy it?

Or take the time to examine, inspect it first?

Should we presume that DPRK will play “fair” or “by the rules”?

Can we take the chance based on what we know about DPRK now?

A nuclear detonation with a combination EMP / sensor blinding function could be used as a prelude to an ICBM launch from DPRK. Exo-atmospheric nuclear detonations will be devastating to vital communications links in orbit and terrestrially for a time.

Since the vast majority of electronic devices are civilian and not shielded, their disruption by EMP will lead to, at least in the short term, a collapse of the civilian economy in the footprint affected. If the device is thermonuclear, the EMP pulse generated can readily overwhelm any conceivable defenses and have a footprint exceeding CONUS.

Have the US military thought about how something as simple as tens of thousands of disabled cars blocking choke points like bridges, roads, ramps, etc. will impede their ability to mobilize?

Or dissipate resources for aiding civilians faced with a collapse of all essential services including food, water, medical, etc.?

Imagine if the commute to a radar site that once took 35 minutes became impossible unless crews are fetched by helicopter?

Assuming that the helos did not have their electronics knocked out and are not grounded by something as simple as lack of fuel because the pumps don’t work. Or the technicians that know how to repair it and source parts cannot be found?

Would the US order a nuclear retaliatory strike against DPRK immediately after an EMP strike that disabled most of the US civilian economy but yet caused few civilian casualties?

Such a strike against DPRK will no doubt cause massive contamination and casualties throughout northeast Asia.

What would be the consideration if DPRK retains a capacity to launch a “counter value” strike against civilian targets of US and allies?

Could the US conceivably back down and sue for peace? Japan? South Korea?

VAM Syring based his estimate of a 3 year lead on the intelligence community’s consensus forecast and projections of where DPRK’s will be with respect to DPRK reentry vehicle, countermeasures, and rocket motor technology.

No doubt that VAM is acting in good faith when he assured the Trump Administration and Congress that MDA’s interceptors will work.

And no doubt they will work against the anticipated threat based on the IC’s assessment.

But what if the threat is not a nuclear ballistic missile strike on CONUS population / military targets?

What if NORKs decided to target the electronics infrastructure of the US?

What the IC have not done, however, is to think like a North Korean rather than a Soviet or PRC military.

NORKs are not constrained by the abhorrence of war that Russians and Americans have, or squeamish about striking first even if it cause hundreds of millions of casualties, as long as they can prevail in a war termination situation.

Or to target the highly vulnerable, fragile monoculture of electronics based technology in the US.

The above analyses illustrate how one might consider defeating the rudimentary missile defense of CONUS if one thinks like North Korea, and not a traditional First Nuclear Age power.

Let’s err on the safe side.

We may not have a 3 year lead.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, see the following:

Thinking Like North Korea: How to Defeat US BMD?

The Evolution of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force: Leveraging Unmanned Systems

06/07/2017

2017-05-26 By Robbin Laird

The USMC is changing significantly as it shifts from the land wars to its evolving role as the nation’s key full spectrum insertion force.

An entire generation of Marines has fought ashore and become a flexible land force; with the drawdown in the land wars in the Middle East, the Marines have returned to the sea and are for a new generation learning how to operate from the sea base.

But under the twin impact of the Osprey and the F-35B this is unlike any Navy-Marine Corps team to operate from the sea.

The Marines can operate at distance and with greater lethality from the sea.

And also, crucial to the reworking of the Navy-Marine corps team operating from the sea has been the evolution of the amphibious task force itself.

The classic ARG-MEU operating within a 200-mile operational box dictated by the rotorcraft onboard has changed dramatically as the Osprey has liberated the ships to operate at much greater distance from one another.

A new generation operational capability of the disaggregated force able to operate from the amphibious task force has emerged.

The amphibious task force is a work in progress as new capabilities are added to the force, such as the CH-53K, the new heavy lift element and unmanned systems.

The Blackjack at Sea from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

These systems are being incorporated into the most flexible and lethal insertion force built in history.

For the Marines, unmanned systems have been utilized significantly during their participation in the land wars.

The Marines have operated the Shadow unmanned systems along with the Army in the Middle East; this UAV requires land basing and as such goes against the grain of the return to the sea and the evolution of the amphibious task force.

It is their other unmanned system – namely the ScanEagle, whose origin was at sea – that has formed to core experience being taken to sea.

And along with it the next round of unmanned development for the Marines, namely the Blackjack or as it is known in its commercial variant, the Integrator.

To understand the role of these systems within the overall evolution of the Marine Corps, I had a chance to talk with Art Crowe, a former Marine, now working with Insitu, the company responsible both for ScanEagle and Blackjack.

Civilian contractors from Insitu Inc., launch a Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle from the flight deck of the amphibious dock-landing ship USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44). Credit: Navy Media Content Services, 4/28/12

Art Crowe is a former Harrier pilot who was the Operations officer of VMU-2 in 2003-2004.

He participated in the first battle of Fallujah and his combat experience clearly guides his thinking on how remotes can provide a combat edge for Marines as they build out their amphibious capabilities.

UAS’ for the Marines are to be understood in the context of the overall evolution of the amphibious task force and the flexibility the commander of the force will be looking for.

He may operate the UAS from the ship to assist Marines inserting force for a short duration mission.

He may take that UAS from the ship and operate it ashore with deployed Marines.

It is the flexibility of the overwatch asset and evolving payload flexibility of the UAS that will be important to that commander going forward.

But this is a work in progress, much like the core system being deployed, the Blackjack is a work in progress.

Question: What was the origin of the coming of ScanEagle to the Marine Corps?

Crowe: General Conway, later Commandant of the USMC, was in Iraq in 2004 and was looking for support for his maneuver force.

He wanted a way to get support from an effective UAS without having to wait for a long acquisition process.

He got that through a services contract with Insitu whereby the company provided ISR services but operated the assets.

The Marines provided security and operational support; the company operated the asset and delivered the product to the Marines.

Question: This was the origin then of a company operated and company owned system. What was the advantage to both company and the Corps of such an approach?

Crowe: The company could evolve the capabilities of ScanEagle in concert with the feedback from their UAS Operators and Marines on their operational needs.

Rather than going through a long requirements generation process, the company could evolve the capabilities of the aircraft and the payloads to provide for the services the Marines required.

This allowed for rapid innovation and adaptation to customer needs.

The payloads then evolved over time to provide data to meet the evolving needs of the USMC, with the service contract delivering the payoff for the company.

ScanEagle’s latest generation of infrared/electro-optical sensors is the 900 series of turrets.

https://insitu.com/information-delivery/unmanned-systems/scaneagle/imagers#2

And this evolution of capability has been driven by the company in interaction with the USMC, the US Navy and other DoD and foreign customers.

ScanEagle has become a product and capability deployed worldwide.

The genesis of ScanEagle was in fact to support weather reconnaissance and commercial fishing fleets, so it has been a maritime-proven platform from the beginning.

The return to the sea for the Marines has provided a venue within which ScanEagle has returned home so to speak.

Question: One of the other deployed UAS from Insitu is the RQ-21A Blackjack.

How was this procured and how is it being used?

Crowe: The Navy and Marines procured The Blackjack through the traditional procurement model.

The Navy approved acquisition in 2010 and operated the first Early Operational Capability (EOC) Blackjacks in 2014.

The Program achieved Initial Operational Capability in 2016.

PACIFIC OCEAN, Calif., — Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 (Reinforced) attached to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit load the flight deck of the USS San Diego (LPD-22) with several air assets, April 11, 2017. The 15th MEU uses the air assets provided from VMM-161 to transport personnel and equipment from ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore efficiently. The 15th MEU’s rapid ability to mobilize people and equipment makes the amphibious force uniquely postured to respond to any mission around the globe. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Timothy Valero)

The Blackjack is different from ScanEagle.

While it operates with similar launch and recovery equipment, it is larger and designed to be an air vehicle that can operate a variety of payloads.

The aircraft is built around a center of gravity payload bay.

It is a modular set up where you can configure a variety of payloads.

There is room on the air vehicle for up to 39 pounds of payloads, which operate with up to 500 watts of power.

As long as you can meet those requirements and operate with the interface control, you can integrate various payloads.

The Marines have operated ashore and have now brought it to the amphibious force.

Blackjack is configured to operate off of San Antonio class L ships. It first deployed last year with the 22nd MEU and is currently operating with deployed forces.

Operating a UAS off of a ship can be more challenging than ashore.

Integrating the air platform within the workflow of the ship is one challenge; operating with the different operational impacts of the air fleet is another.

And working the launch and recovery can be more challenging in a dynamic shipboard environment. This continues to be a focus of effort for the Blackjack team.

Question: The sun setting of the Prowler has set the stage for another key development for the Blackjack, namely providing support for the MAGTF along with the F-35 for electronic warfare.

How do you see this challenge?

Crowe: The sun setting of the Prowler in 2019 is a key driver of needed capability.

The payload flexibility of the Blackjack means that it could be part of the EW capability for deployed Marines and because we are working the shipboard integration it could be part of that package as well for the at sea force.

It is a work in progress but a key part of the way ahead for the Marines and Blackjack.

Editor’s Note: With regard to the Scan Eagle and its coming to the Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan, then head of 2nd MAW, General “Dog” Davis, underscored that combining UAVs with Harriers at FOB Dwyer created a powerful combat capability:

From the time they left station and the time they were back overhead in about 30, 35 minutes. 

That kind of performance and capability is unique for a TACAIR platform. 

By investing up front in FOB Dwyer, we could take 10 STOVL attack aircraft and make 10 airplanes perform like 40 anywhere else.

FOB Dwyer was more than just a Harrier strip. 

It was a combat strip. 

We based some of our VMUs down there flying both Scan Eagle and Shadow UAVs.

We initially sized the length of Dwyer based on what it took us to get a fully loaded C130 with a full bag of gas and full logistics load in there. 

And on a hot day, and at the filed elevations we are dealing with in that part of Afghanistan that comes out to about a 4,000 foot strip.

The template for the Marine Corps in the future should allow us to operate at full capability wherever we can put 4,000 foot strip.

We published a four part video series in 2013, which shoed the Scan Eagle from preparation to flight, to flight, and return as well as operators comments about the use of the Scan Eagle in Afghanistan.

 

Sec Def Mattis at Shangri-La Security Conference: Reinforcing Alliances and Partnerships in the Pacific

06/06/2017

2017-06-06 By Richard Weitz

At last weekend’s 16th annual Shangri-La Asia Security Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis focused on reassuring U.S. allies anxious about the sustainability of security commitments in the face of North Korean threats and China’s security ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.

In his keynote speech, Mattis stressed that geography, ideology, socioeconomic ties, and concrete mutual economic and security interests invariably position the United States as an Asia-Pacific power.

He noted that he and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had earlier made critical trips to the region to underscore that point.

The Defense Secretary affirmed that the administration would “work together with our long-time, steadfast allies to maximize regional security. … we will not use our allies and partners, or the capabilities integral to their security, as bargaining chips.”

SINGAPORE (June 3, 2017) Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis delivers opening remarks during the first plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue 2017 June 3. The Shangri-La Dialogue, held annually by the independent think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), is an inter-governmental security forum which is attended by defense ministers and delegates from more than 50 nations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Fulton/Released)

Mattis clearly described alliances as a positive good rather than as a security burden: “Alliances provide avenues for peace, fostering the conditions for economic growth with countries that share the same vision, while tempering the plans of those who would attack other nations or try to impose their will over the less powerful.”

He also reviewed how the administration was strengthening ties with key allies, noting that, “Our combined interoperability with allied forces – enhanced through force posture initiatives – ensures we are prepared to cooperate during real-world crises.”

With Japan, the Pentagon would continue to execute the 2015 defense guidelines, which expanded the functional and geographic scope of bilateral security cooperation.

Even as Mattis spoke, large-scale Japanese-U.S. military exercises were taking place in the Sea of Japan, with the participation of two carrier strike groups, from the USS Carl Vinson and USS Ronald Reagan, and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) destroyers Hyuga and Ashigara.

At the forum, Japan’s Defence Minister Tomomi Inada said Tokyo would take other measures to strengthen alliance ties and back whatever response the United States would pursue to end the DPRK threat.

With Australia, Mattis highlighted how Australian and U.S. forces have fought together in in every major battlefield over the past century and remained critical to contemporary regional stability.

With the Philippines, the United States would continue “to train, advise, and assist” the Philippine armed forces against common threats such as violent extremist organizations.

Mattis even expressed intent to sustain ties with Thailand, “our oldest ally in the region,” as the Thai military returned the country to civilian governance.

In terms of non-allied partners, Mattis singled out “India’s indispensable role in maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean region” but also noted that the United States was “conducting the first-ever transfer of a coast guard cutter to Vietnam, and we just completed the inaugural US-Singapore air detachment in Guam, which will help build interoperability between our forces.”

When a questioner said that Trump seemed like an “unbeliever” in a rules-based global order given his withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and from the Paris Climate Agreement as well as his critical tone at the most recent  NATO summit, Mattis cited the President’s successful meetings in the Middle East, where he mobilized a massive coalition against terrorism, and his “standing with the NATO allies 100 percent” while in Brussels.

Another theme of Mattis’ presentation was “the deep and abiding [U.S.] commitment to reinforcing the rules-based international order… [and the] principles underwrite stability and build trust, security, and prosperity… like equal respect for international law, regardless of a nation’s size or wealth; and freedom of navigation and overflight, including keeping shipping lanes open, for all nations’ commercial benefit.”

In 2016, Ashton Carter called for a “principled security network” to build multilateral cooperation among individual and states to address shared security problems.

Carter promoted the pooling of Asian military resources “more effectively and efficiently than ever before” to build a “Asia-Pacific security network” that “weaves everyone’s relationships together – bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral – to help all of us do more, over greater distances, with greater economy of effort.”

Mattis neither repeated Carter’s formulation nor offered his own security architecture concept, but overtly welcomed allied and partner cooperation, with as well as independently of the Pentagon.

He stated that U.S. policies aimed to “empower countries in the region so they can be even stronger contributors to their own peace and stability.”

The Secretary acknowledged Americans’ historical reluctance to engage in global affairs and frustrations at having to bear the biggest burden in sustaining the current world order and existing security alliances, but said the administration was eager to pursue bilateral trade deals and sustain multiple forms of global security cooperation.

Mattis was surprisingly blunt in criticizing Chinese policies.

He singled out his concern for China’s construction of “artificial islands ….and indisputable militarization of facilities on features in international waters undermine regional stability for its “blatant disregard for international law” … “contempt for other nations’ interests; and its efforts to dismiss non-adversarial resolution of issues.”

Mattis dismissed Chinese objections to the U.S. THAAD deployment against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It was not done “to protect the South Korean people from an imaginary problem.”

If China does not want to see “more (U.S.) military capability into the Northwest Pacific, then we have to address the [DPRK] problem that “is driving regional defensive buildups.

However, Mattis did not spell out how the United States and its allies would induce China to change its disruptive regional policies, especially while concurrently seeking Beijing’s cooperation to pressure North Korea to change its own behavior.

There was also a difference in tone from previous secretaries regarding Taiwan.

Rather than ignore the question like previous secretaries at Shangri-La, Mattis overtly stated that, “The department of defense remains steadfastly committed to working with Taiwan and with its democratic government to provide it the defense articles necessary, consistent with the obligations set out in the Taiwan relations act, because we stand for the peaceful resolution of any issues in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan strait.”

In concluding, Mattis reviewed the steps the Trump administration strengthening U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and insisted that U.S. freedom of navigation operations would continue.

Mattis noted the critically of U.S. military power for achieving these deterrence, defense and diplomacy-related goals.

The Pentagon, he explained, wants to enable “our diplomats to address tough issues from a position of strength.”

Mattis related that the Pentagon now has 60 percent of all its ships in the Pacific Command’s AOR, as well as slightly over half the Army and proximately two-thirds of fleet marine forces.

By his reckoning, 60 percent of U.S tactical aviation assets deployed oversees will soon be in the Pacific as well.

However, Mattis might have shown more enthusiasm for Congressional initiatives to increase U.S. defense spending in the region rather than just expressing an openness to work with those members, such as Senator John McCain and Representative Mac Thornberry, who are pushing to reinforce U.S. military capabilities in Asia with a multi-billion dollar spending boost.

The Boeing Entrant into a USAF Competition to Buy 84 Helicopters for the Contingency Response Mission

06/02/2017

2017-05-26 By Todd Miller

The Air Force plans to replace their aging UH-1N Huey fleet with up to 84 new helicopters.

The UH-1Ns are utilized for a continuous contingency response for the security of the nation’s ICBM complexes throughout Wyoming, Montana & North Dakota as well as the continuity of government mission in the Washington D.C. area.

The UH-1Ns age is showing, and they are unable to meet the key requirements for speed, range, payload and operations in a compromised environment.

Driven by urgency the replacement was initially sought as a sole source contract extended to Sikorsky for their state of the art HH-60U “Ghost Hawk.”

The contract is now open to manufacturers to bid platforms that meet the requirements outlined to date in the RFP.

However, the requirements and bid philosophy appear to be evolving, with a second draft RFP and industry discussions taking place to dial in the details.

MH-139- for USAF Competition from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

It is anticipated requirements will be finalized this summer.

The Air Force plans to move quickly to award a contract in FY18, and take deliveries of the new helicopter in 2020.

While the list of contenders for this contract has not yet been finalized, two players have stepped forward.

Sikorsky has proposed their HH-60U, the latest version of their HH-60 line of military helicopters utilized by all 5 service branches.

Boeing has teamed (as prime contractor) with AugustaWestland to propose a militarized version of very commercially successful AugustaWestland AW139, namely the MH-139.

Given the military services widespread use of the Sikorsky military aircraft, there would appear to be obvious advantages to utilize the Sikorsky, such as fleet commonality and already established depot structures. These aspects would seem to sway the decision most naturally to the HH-60U.

Yet in the contract competition the Air Force does not allow an advantage to Sikorsky of offering a widely supported military aircraft already in service.

This means that the competition allows a commercial derivative that meets the performance requirements to have a place in the competition for the 84 helicopters which the contract envisages.

Boeing is offering such a derivative and projects savings from such.

According to David Koopersmith, Vice President and General Manager at Boeing’s Vertical Lift Division the selection of the MH-139 will provide a savings to the Air Force of $1 billion over its 30 year lifecycle.

The challenge for the USAF is to ensure that indeed any Sikorsky alternative meets the Air Force performance requirements and the bid meets the American content and any other specified requirements.

During a visit to Philadelphia I had a chance to take a closer look at the MH-139 platform and substantive aspects of the Boeing/AugustaWestland collaboration.

Origins

The AW139 originated from a Bell Helicopters and AugustaWestland joint development to replace none other than the Huey itelf.

The first helicopters manufactured were AB139s (Augusta-Bell).

Bell subsequently sold their share in the venture to AugustaWestland, and the helicopter become the AW139.

Subsequently AugustaWestland has been rebranded “Leonardo Helicopters” a division of the parent company Leonardo.

Rather than a design that has evolved and been upgraded over 40 years, the AW139 is a completely modern helicopter designed from scratch starting in the late 90s.

According to J.D. Clem, Director of AugustaWestland’s USAF Division, the AW139/MH-139 “does everything the Huey does – better.

“It flies 50 percent faster, it has a larger cabin, carries 5000 lbs more payload and it has much greater range.”

Featuring a modernized glass cockpit the MH-139 utilizes advanced autopilot, avionics, navigation systems and configurable MFDs.

Commercial Success

With over 900 aircraft delivered in 10 years, the AW139 is a resounding commercial success.

It is a type-certified FAA FAR Part 29 helicopter.

Clem notes that the model has now accumulated over 1.7 million flight hours.

Users include Military, Police, Fire, Search & Rescue, Security, Oil & Gas, VIP Transport and more.

The helicopter is widely used in the United States by such groups as the Maryland and New Jersey State Police, Los Angeles Fire Department as well as customers who provide VIP transport and services to the Oil and Gas industry.

The helicopter is quiet, smooth and fast.

With a smaller footprint (landing gear and overall dimensions), and relatively tall, spacious cabin it makes an excellent transport.

Given the current customer base the helicopter is frequently seen in the skies over and around Washington, DC.

Maintainability

Clem notes that the AW139 has been the leader in its segment since introduction.

Notching 1000 sales to 250 customers (many with small fleets) speaks to helicopters low operating costs and high maintainability.

Per Clem, the AW139 was “designed from the start to have condition based maintenance and designed from the start to have long MTBF on components.”

He continued, “In the commercial world, customers don’t make money if it is not flying.”

And it is flying. Clem noted several airframes that have very high hours, such as “a particular AW139 servicing the oil rigs that is 10 years old and has 12,000 hours. 1100 hours per year for 10 years straight.

“You can’t do that unless you’re very reliable.”

More specifically Clem noted that from a maintenance perspective, “The basic airframe does not go back to a depot.

The main gearbox is rated to 6000 hours, the tail rotor box to 7500 hours, the engine to 5000 hours.

The big components stay on the machine, and the machine keeps flying.”

Citing an example of the Maryland State Police Clem noted that every day they pull a 24 hour alert in 7 locations, with one machine in each location.

The relative small crew of pilots (2) paramedic and rescue technician push the helicopter out of the hangar and have it airborne in 7 minutes.

The helicopter is extremely reliable, and is doing it in all manner of climates all around the world.

Production Capability

If the Air Force selects the Boeing MH-139, all 84 aircraft will be built at the 275,000 ft2 AugustaWestland facility at Northeast Philadelphia Airport.

AugustaWestland has already built some 250 AW139s at the Philadelphia facility and per William Hunt, CEO of Leonardo Helicopters, Philadelphia, everything is already in place to handle the production of the 84 machines.

As it stands today, customers utilize reconfigurable interiors, and a wide variety of equipment for the helicopters specific use.

All integration is done right on the production line, according to well established process.

Per Hunt, the helicopter could be rolling off production lines quickly once the contract is awarded, and would support 500 jobs in the United States.

Boeing Experience

The MH-139 “model” of the AW139 will ultimately be Boeings contract to fulfill.

“Boeing has tremendous expertise overseeing military-unique procurements, logistics support and support for equipment, test hubs and flight line maintenance,” said Rick Lemaster, ‎Director, Global Sales and Marketing, Vertical Lift Programs, The Boeing Company

Boeing has supported Air Force platforms for 80 years, and is currently doing so with the V-22 Osprey, CH-47 Chinook, AH-64 Apache, and AH-6 Light Attack Helicopter.

Performance, Reliability, Track Record, Cost, Production, Management expertise, Check.

Given the USAF approach to the competition, the MH-139 is clearly a compelling contender for the Air Force contract.

In any case, given the widespread utilization of the current contenders, a large body of data is available to evaluate the merits of each airframe.

Granted, the outcome may hinge on the final RFP released by the Air Force, but from the outside looking in – the Boeing MH-139 could be well positioned to win the competition.

Editor Note 1: Our colleague Colin Clark of Breaking Defense looked at the Sikorsky offering in the competition earlier this year:

Sikorsky Unveils HH-60U For Air Force Nuke Response 

By COLIN CLARKon February 28, 2017 at 5:32 PM

WASHINGTON: The day before the Air Force Association’s annual winter conference begins, the newest wrinkle in the years-long saga of deciding what aircraft the Air Force would buy to secure America’s nuclear missile fields was announced.

Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky will offer — surprise! — an updated version of the Black Hawk helicopter, the HH-60U.

Last May, the Air Force dropped its plan to just pay $1.4 billion in a sole-source deal to buy the upgraded Black Hawks to replace the aging UH-N1s now in its fleet. Air Force Global Strike Command has said the Hueys are too slow and lack the necessary range to handle the critical nuclear security mission.

The helicopters are used at all three missile bases, Malmstrom, Minot and Warren AFBs.

A key requirement for the competitors to meet is the ability to carry a full load of nine combat-ready airmen. Lockheed says their HH-60U can carry indeed transport nine fully outfitted Security Forces specialists, special equipment and two special mission aviators for the Continuity of Operations mission, which is all about getting senior leaders out of harm’s way in a disaster or attack. Lockheed says that mission requires transport for eight. The company also says the HH-60U can carry 9,600 pounds “of useful load.”

The continuity mission is in addition to keeping the missile fields secure and responding to any threats to them or to their nuclear payloads. 

Lockheed noted in its release that the HH-60U “shares 85 percent commonality with the service’s incoming fleet of HH-60W Combat Rescue Helicopters, and it will share the existing infrastructure that supports the Air Force’s retiring fleet of HH-60G Pave Hawks.” 

There are already three HH-60U Black Hawk aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory.

Finnemeccanica’s subsidiary Leonardo (formerly AgustaWestland) pressed hard last year for the Air Force to open the competition to a traditional competitive acquisition. It wanted to offer its American-assembled AW139.

Editor’s Note 2: This competition for 84 helicopters as well as the competition set up for 17 JSTARS replacement aircraft both raise fundamental questions about the Obama legacy inherited by the Trump Administration with regard to USAF procurement.  

Competition to get lowest price regardless of the logic of the mission dictated choice needs a serious relook, and the new Secretary of the USAF needs to look hard in this direction.

Boeing recently protested a USAF contract and the USAF response actually underscores the need for some serious strategic change in USAF procurement.

The contract in question is for the Compass Call aircraft completion where the USAF claims it does not have the relevant expertise to pick the aircraft for the mission!

According to an article published by Defense One on May 24, 2017 about the Boeing protest:

Boeing is formally challenging a U.S. Air Force decision that allows L3 Technologies to choose a new plane to replace the EC-130 Compass Call intelligence aircraft.

The firm’s protest is a public rebuke of the Air Force, a measure rarely taken by America’s largest aerospace manufacturer.

“The Air Force’s approach is inconsistent with Congress’s direction in the 2017 NDAA and seems to ignore inherent and obvious conflicts of interest,” Caroline Hutchinson, a Boeing spokeswoman, said in an email Wednesday.

“We believe that the U.S. Air Force and taxpayer would be best served by a fair and open competition, and that the Air Force can still meet its stated timeline of replacing the aging fleet of EC-130Hs within 10 years.”

Boeing filed the protest with the Government Accountability Office on May 19. The nonpartisan office is expected to make a ruling by Aug. 28.

Company sources said the conflict of interest stems from L3’s unique relationship with airplane manufacturer Gulfstream, maker of the G550 business jet. L3 modifies G550s for foreign air forces.

U.S. Air Force officials had wanted to buy the G550 in an earlier attempt to replace the Compass Call, and Boeing alleges that in choosing L3, the Air Force is implicitly picking the G550 again.

Boeing would much rather the Air Force to hold a competition in which the Chicago-based company could pitch one of its jetliner-based aircraft to hold the sophisticated Compass Call electronics…..

The Compass Call program is the first of an expected string of programs to replace various fleets of decades-old Air Force intelligence planes based on the 707 jetliner. Winning the EC-130 replacement job would allow Boeing to argue the merits of commonality in future contests…..

Earlier this year, the Air Force gave L3 the responsibility for selecting a new plane for the Compass Call mission, saying that the service’s own acquisition officials lacked the expertise to make the decision.

L3 is the company that installs the sophisticated intelligence equipment on the current Compass Call aircraft, 42-year-old C-130s. The Air Force says it urgently needs to replace the EC-130H with and aircraft that can fly further and higher and offer better reliability.

Boeing argues that it, too, has the expertise to be put in charge of the project.

OK let us repeat that USAF comment: “the service’s own acquisition officials lacked the expertise to make the decision.”

It is time to drain the swamp and reset the entire acquisition approach. 

 

The TrumpQuake at NATO

05/31/2017

2017-05-28 By Danny Lam

NATO members excluding the United States account for 21% of world GDP with a per capita income of $31,000. It is a wealthy collection of democracies that is very much a creation of the post war US grand strategy.

As such, NATO (x USA) is more than able financially to look after themselves in terms of security if they want to – at least since the 1970s when NATO members UK and France both fielded their own nuclear deterrent.

A century of dependence on the United States to come to the aid of Europe, beginning with World War I and II, and then post-war, have however created a dependent, parent-child relationship where NATO members continued to look to the United States to provide their security and solve all their problems.

NATO have become a spoiled child that is very much a product of the US nuclear umbrella mixed with the dominant social-democracy ideology of Europe.

Like NATO citizens looking to their social-democratic governments to solve their problems, NATO allies look to the United States and American taxpayers and expect Uncle Sam to provide.

Successive US Administrations have to deal with several NATO allies (e.g Canada, Germany, etc.) that behave like petulant 2 year old children, stamping their feet, shedding crocodile tears, or raising their voices when asked by the US to abide by their NATO commitments made to the Obama Administration most recently in 2014.

To be clear, not all of the NATO allies act in this manner — there are those who take their Article III commitments seriously, but the problem is that NATO as the Article V club does not. 

Everyone cut back defense spending after the cold war was won, and in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crash, but a decade later, when the crisis is past and urgent new security challenges loom, there is no excuse but to raising defense spending back to at least normal historical levels.

President Obama (2014 Wales Declaration) and Trump both expended considerable political capital to exhort NATO members to do so.

Instead of doing so, several NATO leaders greeted President Trump with a temper tatum on his first visit to NATO headquarters.

President Trump presided over the dedication of the new NATO Headquarters and the 9/11 memorial. NATO leaders decided to make the centerpiece of the visit the fact that the United States was the sole and only member to invoke Article 5 after 9/11.

While this fact is true, the repeated nagging of the United States on this point reeks of a Leni Riefenstahl production more appropriate a century past. Or the kind of guilt trip that Israelis lay on Germans, or Beijing China heaps on Japan.

Seventy years after WWII, this is getting old.

US President Donald Trump, right, reacts as he sits next to Britain’s Prime Minister Theresa May, centre and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as they participate in a working dinner meeting, during the NATO summit of heads of state and government, at the NATO headquarters, in Brussels on Thursday, May 25, 2017. US President Donald Trump inaugurated the new headquarters during a ceremony on Thursday with other heads of state and government. (Thierry Charlier/Pool Photo via AP) THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

President Trump showed extreme restraint and diplomatic tact to not, in his speech, publically placed this fact (US invocation of Article 5) in the context of all the times that the US came to the aid of Europe before and after NATO without waiting for Article 5 being invoked.

Should President Trump have mentioned the Greek Civil War, Berlin Airlift, Hungarian Revolution, Cuban Missile Crisis, Invasion of Czechoslovakia, to name a few?   Or enumerate the cost of each intervention?

In each and every one of these cases, the United States mobilized troops, put Americans, and CONUS civilian populations at risk to defend NATO and Europe without the formalities of Article 5 being invoked by a fellow NATO member.

What about the present and immediate future?

Presently, the United States is fully shouldering the burden of defense against Iranian & DPRK ballistic missiles in Europe and North America with only token participation from European partners and nil from Canada.

With the explosively growing nuclear ballistic missile threat from Iran via their collaboration with North Korea, might NATO allies have woken up from their willful blind eye and slumber and realized that a new, (non-Russian) existential threat is nearly upon them?

Do they need to wait for the equivalent of 1940 to rearm?

Will NATO “allies” like Germany (Defense: 1.2% GDP) or Canada (1% GDP before it is Sajjaned) honestly expect Uncle Sam to pay for the full bill of providing a Ballistic Missile Defense for them for free?

Indeed, the nuclear threat and its growing complexity in the Second Nuclear Age is a core element of what Article V really is all about, and Britain and France already possess nuclear weapons because they wanted to include nuclear weapons within Article III and not hope for the US to do an Article V commitment.

What about reciprocity?

What capacity do NATO allies except the US have to provide for “collective defense” obligations to Canada?

What aid can NATO provide the United States in the event of a North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile attack on North American cities?

Conversely, what capacity do Canada have to aid European NATO allies in the event of an Iranian ballistic missile attack — which was amply demonstrated during the past week by the North Korean proxy missile test.

NATO’s ceremony laid bare the fatal flaw of the organization:  It is too much of a one way relationship. NATO Europe is not even taking care of problems in their own backyard (e.g. Russia, Middle East, Southern Flank, or Missile Defense against Iran) let alone pretend to offer all but a token expeditionary capability to aid the US, Canada, or non-NATO allies in a crunch.

Europeans and Canadians (who couldn’t care less about defending themselves adequately) argue that Russia’s territorial annexations / incursions are the top priority.

And with Brexit and the general crisis in Europe deepening, the future of European defense does not revolve around President Trump but devolves to the key European states to enhance their own defense capabilities as could be understood within an Article III context.

If it is so important for NATO allies to beat back Russia in the Ukraine “on principle”, please explain why the identical principle do not apply to the PRC’s “sea grab” of the South China Sea — unilaterally violating a signed and ratified treaty (UNCLOS) by Beijing China and grabbing a territory about the size of Europe from the Channel to Eastern Poland.

This is all the more puzzling as NATO member Canada seem to have no objection to Beijing China’s claims, or care enough to protest, let alone participate in FONOPS, even though all NATO allies, including Canada is dependent on freedom of navigation of SCS for trade.

President Trump could have affirmed his support for Article 5 and then publically invoked Article 3 in front of his NATO peers and pointed out that their failure to provide for their own self-defense is a necessary pre-condition for seeking aid under Article 5.  

That would have sent a clear message that the mythical 2% GDP defense spending target is necessary, but not sufficient.

What good is 2% GDP spending that do not result in bona fide, credible, deployable, usable capabilities held at high levels of readiness for military contingencies and as deterrent?

The assembled NATO dignitaries did not take a hint when President Trump took note of the headquarters and pointed said he did not once ask about cost.

Or the inevitable compare with costs of similar facilities in the US.

And the tradeoff between lavish HQs staffed with REMFs and useable NATO defense capabilities.

America’s NATO “allies” like Germany, rather than address this point, resorted to farcical arguments that spending on foreign aid, development, and others should be counted in NATO “defense” spending.

Canada, similarly, resorted to fictitious and fraudulent accounting “alternate numbers” to claim inflated defense spending and “contributions”.

While such arguments might have merit if ALL NATO members are given the same opportunity to apply the same rules once the rules are changed by consensus, which was not the intent of Canada or Germany: Effectively unilaterally implementing “new math” rules that only apply to them.

Brazenly defrauding allies with lies is in turn operationalized by the Trudeau regime’s tactics against the Trump Administration: organizing multilateral coalitions, intense lobbying of American interests, exploiting legally and politically dubious relationships with Administration officials, threats, persistently and routinely reneging on government-to-government commitments, withdrawing from signed and ratified treaty, etc.

By making public Canada’s stratagem ostensibly to help NATO allies and Mexico reign in the Trump Administration, Canada opened the door for the same game being played by Russia, Beijing-China, Iran, North Korea, Jihadists, etc.: A consequence that may not have been anticipated by the Trudeau regime.

Ultimately, the US Administration and Congress will have to respond by blocking these moves that constitutes interference by foreign agents in domestic US politics.

Dishonesty of lobbyists and abrupt reversals, or tumbleweed like policy by touts is to be expected.

President Trump could have addressed this issue of persistent dishonesty by unilaterally initiating the preparation of a semiannual annual report by US-DoD on every NATO member that rates their performance on meeting Article 3 obligations.    

A report that would publically identify the threats facing each NATO member, and assess what they have done and actual readiness and preparedness to mitigate the threat. These facts, independently compiled by DoD, can be considered as a factor like progress toward 2% GDP spending in any consideration of Article 5 obligations beyond the requirement for “consultations”.

A semiannual Article 3 Report on every NATO member would be a much better gauge now that members have taken the lead in using Arthur-Anderson accounting. If exhortations to do the right thing have no effect, perhaps public shaming semi-annually to their electorate can do better.

At some future point, the Article 3 reports might delve into the capacity, readiness and willingness of NATO members to come to the aid of the United States, e.g., in the Pacific theater.

Wouldn’t it be a revelation and revolutionary for NATO obligations to be truly mutual?

NATO leaders began the meeting with barely disguised contempt for President Trump, whom they regarded as “someone with a short attention span and mood who has no knowledge of NATO, no interest in in-depth policy issues”.

The indisputable fact is that NATO xUSA, rather than President Trump, revealed themselves to be so described:   An organization that is incapable of paying attention to the imminent threat from Iranian nuclear ballistic missiles (sent via proxy DPRK) days before. (Short attention span.) Unable to recognizing the importance of upholding UNCLOS / Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea. (No interest in in-depth policy issues.) Willfully blind to the imminent existential threats from DPRK to NATO allies USA and Canada.  (No knowledge of NATO, esp. Article 3).

Should we even mention the dangers of jihadists or Syria obtaining nuclear weapons / missiles from DPRK?

The unabashed expression of European elite arrogance at the NATO summit toward the American leader of the untermensch could have been resulted in a less restrained and diplomatic President Trump walking out.

Instead, the statesman President Trump, rather than feed this self-serving elite’s demand for continued welfare payments from the American taxpayer, diplomatically told them to get on with investing in their own defense.

Or should the United States look for more credible bilateral relationships within Europe rather than having a running argument with those European states that are self-satisfied and preoccupied with their own economic development and social welfare rather than their own defense and use NATO as a club to protect themselves from the Russians with a low cost insurance loan?

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

Tough Love for America’s NATO Allies

Here are the comments made by President Trump to NATO during his visit:

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Thank you very much, Secretary General Stoltenberg.  Chancellor Merkel, thank you very much.  Other heads of state and government, I am honored to be here with members of an alliance that has promoted safety and peace across the world.

Prime Minister May, all of the nations here today grieve with you and stand with you.  I would like to ask that we now observe a moment of silence for the victims and families of the savage attack which took place in Manchester.  (A moment of silence is observed.)  Thank you.  Terrible thing.

This ceremony is a day for both remembrance and resolve.  We remember and mourn those nearly 3,000 innocent people who were brutally murdered by terrorists on September 11th, 2001.  Our NATO allies responded swiftly and decisively, invoking for the first time in its history the Article 5 collective defense commitments.

The recent attack on Manchester in the United Kingdom demonstrates the depths of the evil we face with terrorism.  Innocent little girls and so many others were horribly murdered and badly injured while attending a concert — beautiful lives with so much great potential torn from their families forever and ever.  It was a barbaric and vicious attack upon our civilization.

All people who cherish life must unite in finding, exposing, and removing these killers and extremists — and, yes, losers.  They are losers.  Wherever they exist in our societies, we must drive them out and never, ever let them back in.

This call for driving out terrorism is a message I took to a historic gathering of Arab and Muslim leaders across the region, hosted by Saudi Arabia.  There, I spent much time with King Salman, a wise man who wants to see things get much better rapidly.  The leaders of the Middle East have agreed at this unprecedented meeting to stop funding the radical ideology that leads to this horrible terrorism all over the globe.

My travels and meetings have given me renewed hope that nations of many faiths can unite to defeat terrorism, a common threat to all of humanity.  Terrorism must be stopped in its tracks, or the horror you saw in Manchester and so many other places will continue forever.  You have thousands and thousands of people pouring into our various countries and spreading throughout, and in many cases, we have no idea who they are.  We must be tough.  We must be strong.  And we must be vigilant.

The NATO of the future must include a great focus on terrorism and immigration, as well as threats from Russia and on NATO’s eastern and southern borders.  These grave security concerns are the same reason that I have been very, very direct with Secretary Stoltenberg and members of the Alliance in saying that NATO members must finally contribute their fair share and meet their financial obligations, for 23 of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying and what they’re supposed to be paying for their defense.

This is not fair to the people and taxpayers of the United States.  And many of these nations owe massive amounts of money from past years and not paying in those past years.  Over the last eight years, the United States spent more on defense than all other NATO countries combined.  If all NATO members had spent just 2 percent of their GDP on defense last year, we would have had another $119 billion for our collective defense and for the financing of additional NATO reserves.

We should recognize that with these chronic underpayments and growing threats, even 2 percent of GDP is insufficient to close the gaps in modernizing, readiness, and the size of forces.  We have to make up for the many years lost.  Two percent is the bare minimum for confronting today’s very real and very vicious threats.  If NATO countries made their full and complete contributions, then NATO would be even stronger than it is today, especially from the threat of terrorism.

I want to extend my appreciation to the 9/11 Memorial and Museum in New York for contributing this remnant of the North Tower, as well as to Chancellor Merkel and the German people for donating this portion of the Berlin Wall.  It is truly fitting that these two artifacts now reside here so close together at the new NATO Headquarters.  And I never asked once what the new NATO Headquarters cost.  I refuse to do that.  But it is beautiful.

Each one marks a pivotal event in the history of this Alliance and in the eternal battle between good and evil.  On one side, a testament to the triumph of our ideals over a totalitarian Communist ideology bent on the oppression of millions and millions of people; on the other, a painful reminder of the barbaric evil that still exists in the world and that we must confront and defeat together as a group, as a world.

This twisted mass of metal reminds us not only of what we have lost, but also what forever endures — the courage of our people, the strength of our resolve, and the commitments that bind us together as one.

We will never forget the lives that were lost.  We will never forsake the friends who stood by our side.  And we will never waiver in our determination to defeat terrorism and to achieve lasting security, prosperity and peace.

Thank you very much.  It’s a great honor to be here.  Thank you.

Russian-U.S. Relations: Opportunities and Obstacles for Trump and Putin

05/28/2017

2017-05-22 By Richard Weitz

One issue President Trump will need to clarify at next week’s NATO summit is his strategy towards Russia.

To take one example, the NATO allies are divided over whether to focus on counterterrorism, as the President would wish, or on strengthening collective defenses against Russia.

Based on a visit by SLD to Moscow last month, which involved meetings with Russian foreign and defense policy officials, and a trip earlier this month to Italy for a conference with Russian academics, the opportunities and challenges of Russian-U.S. relations have become clearer following the uncertainties of the first hundred days of the Trump administration.

Russian officials and analysts are experiencing some “buyers’ remorse” regarding Trump.

They see him as pursuing traditional U.S. policies that make Moscow uneasy: unilateralism, aversion to international institutions, propensity to use force, and refusal to accept international constraints on U.S. freedom of action.

They also depict Trump as embattled at home by forces hostile to Russian-U.S. reconciliation–attacked by Democrats who used Russia as a political weapon against the incumbent President the same way that the Republicans employed the “Reset” against the Obama administration.

As a result, Russians view Trump as focused on other foreign relationships and has become preoccupied with securing his contested domestic initiatives like health care.

Furthermore, they complain about not knowing who runs Russian policy in the United States, due to the vacancies in the U.S. national security establishment, and the lack of clarity concerning Trump’s specific long-term goals regarding Russia.

Finally, they are upset by his reversal of his campaign rhetoric and reversion to conventional U.S. stances regarding NATO, Ukraine, and other issues.

In light of these developments, they have discounted the possible net gains from a Trump presidency.

In general geopolitical terms, proceeding in concentric circles, Russian goals regarding the United States are to limit U.S. involvement in Russian domestic affairs, attaining Russian security primacy in the former Soviet republics, and receiving U.S. recognition of Russia as a major player in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

When these goals are thwarted, the Russian government directly constrains U.S. involvement in Russian politics and society, challenges the U.S. presence in neighboring countries, and plays a spoiler role in nearby regions.

Initially following the November election, Trump advisors were arguing that one reason that they wanted to improve ties with Moscow was to wean Russia away from Iran and China.

For instance, they hoped Russia would curtail weapons deliveries to these two countries.

But Russian officials have now concluded that most of gains that Trump would bring Moscow would be limited, contested, and transient.

Given this calculation, Russian policy makers have ruled out making major concessions regarding Iran, China, or other issues.

The Trump administration’s changing policies towards Beijing are also affecting Moscow’s calculations.

Before his inauguration, Trump’s team were describing China as the main long-term threat to U.S. security. Russian analysts were looking forward to positioning themselves as a swing state in an intensified Sino-American struggle for global primacy, seeing it as an opportunity to sustain Russia’s status as a third pole in a global triangle.

But Russian policies watched the successful Xi-Trump summit with envy and unease.

They saw how Trump’s rhetoric with China subsequently improved and the U.S. suspended pressure on China’s foreign economic policies in return for Beijing’s pledges of support to curtail North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests.

Not only has this Sino-American reconciliation weakened Moscow’s leverage over both countries, but Moscow’s irritation at the long-delayed Trump-Putin summit has heightened.

Russian policy makers now see such a meeting as their best hope of breaking the stalled Russia-Trump connection.

The upcoming G-20 summit in Hamburg provides a logical venue for the first direct Putin-Trump meeting since neither president seems likely to visit the other country any time soon.

During Tillerson’s visit to Moscow, the parties agreed to create a Russian-U.S. working group to deal with bilateral issues that could be resolved below the level of presidential decision making.

However, Russian officials view the body skeptically, arguing that the format has not worked well in the past, with both sides exchanging points without making much progress.

They do however concur with U.S. assessments that for now the two sides can best focus on making small steps to improve the relationship rather than seeking to make grand bargains, which they see as unrealizable due to the deep distrust between the two countries.

Because of the continuing divide, they see such possibilities excluded such as extensive intelligence-sharing even against common terrorist threats, with continuing divergent Russian-U.S. views of a desirable world order, and the current Russian-U.S. preoccupation with whom is to blame for their poor bilateral relationship rather than addressing what is to be done to make the world better.

Another issue that concerns Russians is the diverging stances of President Trump and other senior administration officials.

Trump continues to say that he wants to improve ties with Moscow. However, his senior national security appointees are considerably more critical of Russia and openly skeptical of improving ties.

These discrepancies could reflect a deliberate strategy of having the President play good cop while his aides take a tougher public line.

Or they may reflect Trump’s encouraging his team to express their different opinions regarding Russia. These likely exist due to the different backgrounds of Trump, whose ties with Russia have focused on the business sector, and his senior advisors, who have a national security perspective.

But these divergences may also be due to poor management of the interagency process, with the White House failing to enforce a common policy line in the bureaucracy, which should be corrected.

Russian analysts still think Trump is a better partner for Moscow than any conceivable alternative U.S. leader.

They appreciate that Trump, unlike Obama, speaks about Russia and Putin with respect, has national rather than global ambitions, and is indifferent towards Russia’s domestic system (seen when Secretary Tillerson declined to meet with Russian opposition leaders during his visit to Moscow).

They also welcome what they perceive as Trump’s ending the Obama administration’s policy of trying to contain Moscow’s influence in neighboring countries—seen in decreased U.S. opposition to Japanese-Russian reconciliation, Trump’s aversion to siding with Ukraine against Russia, the U.S. participation in the Moscow-led Syrian peace process in Astana, and the paucity of Trump statements regarding Crimea.

Russian preferences were evident when Sergei Lavrov met with President Trump in the Oval office—the first visit by a Russian foreign minister to Washington in four years.

Lavrov praised Trump’s pragmatic, “businesslike” approach towards addressing Russian-U.S. differences, contrasting it with what he termed the destructively ideological stance of the previous administration.

Though Russian analysts recognize that American domestic politics make it improbable that Trump will soon remove sanctions on Russia, they hope that the Trump administration will not enforce them vigorously, limit their practical scope, and not engage in supplementary supporting activities such as discouraging other U.S.-Russian business ties.

Russian analysts have likely downplayed the U.S. approval of Montenegro’s accession to NATO and even the U.S. missile strikes in Syria as unavoidable and limited steps given U.S. alliance and domestic considerations.

Russian officials say that Moscow will eschew public confrontations with Trump, such as retaliating for the sanctions the Obama administration imposed on Moscow as it was leaving office and other steps that could further hamper the possibilities for Russian-U.S. reconciliation.

Russian officials are also looking for opportunities to give Trump some perceived quick wins (which could boost his domestic standing) in ways that won’t cost Moscow much concretely—though getting rid of Assad is excluded, a step like expelling Snowden from Russia may not be.

Editor’s Note: There is probably no issue more in play than US policy towards Russia.  

The Trump Administration is under scrutiny for “ties” with the Russians, Washington critics are largely focused on the Trump dimension than the need to have a realistic approach to dealing with Russia in both Europe and the Middle East, and the lack of bench strength in the Administration makes unclear who would actually implement a Trump policy when there is one. 

The disarray in Washington clearly provides Putin with an opportunity to shape some policy initiatives.

What might those be is a very good question for the policy community to puzzle over.

One recent action of note which seems to have been missed is an example of what needs to be noted and puzzled over.

North Korea’s increasingly frequent ballistic missile tests may have raised tensions globally over the country’s nuclear ambitions, but in neighbouring Russia, entrepreneurs are eyeing another prospect: tourism.

On Thursday, a ship that departed from the North Korean port of Rajin on Wednesday arrived in Vladivostok in Russia’s far east, marking the start of the first regular cargo and passenger ferry service with the “hermit kingdom”.

The Man Gyong Bong, which is owned by the Russian company InvestStroyTrest, was carrying Russians and representatives of Chinese tourist companies. The firm has said future passengers could include Chinese and Russian tourists, as well as North Koreans who work in Russia.

Russia is already one of North Korea’s most important economic partners, and the president, Vladimir Putin, said this week that the west should negotiate to end Pyongyang’s nuclear programme rather than threaten it.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/18/ferry-service-between-north-korea-russia-starts-weekly-service

 

The Coming Canadian Defense Policy: Another Gander Airport Initiative?

2017-05-24 By Danny Lam

The Trudeau regime promised Canadians a defense policy update on June 7 after PM Trudeau visit with his counterparts at NATO and G7.

Meanwhile, North Korea tested two ballistic missiles, (May 13&21, 2017), one that demonstrated a re-entry vehicle for nuclear warheads, and the latter a solid fuel MRBM that directly threatens much of Western Europe and the Middle East when launched from DPRK’s Axis collaborator Iran.

The following analysis of what is likely to be in the forthcoming Defense Policy Update is based on analysis of submissions and pubic consultations, public statements by officials in Canada and allies, and discussions with defense industry experts and suppliers.

The “updated” Canadian defense policy will go down in history as the Gander Airport of Canadian Defense:  Gander airport was the largest, busiest mid-North Atlantic refueling stop until the jet age.

Ottawa invested to upgrade the airport in 1971 even as longer ranged jet aircraft began to dominate air travel in the 1960s and bypassed Gander, creating a white elephant that only was used to full capacity exactly once: 9/11.

Canada is about to repeat the Gander story in Defense Policy with the “update” that will be shown by 2018 to have failed in identifying the main, imminent existential threat to Canadians, and with it, how the Canadian Armed Forces can address the challenges and what it will cost in 2017 and 18, not by 2030.  

What are the failures?

North Korea under Kim Jong Un is a clear and immediate existential threat to Canada and allies. This is now generally recognized by Pacific allies like South Korea, Japan, Australia and the US but not Canada.

European NATO allies are in the process of joining the consensus after the most recent DPRK missile test that was a proxy for their financier and Axis partner Iran.

Yet, the Liberal regime of Canada put forward a Defense Policy that ignored the near term threat from North Korea’s nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles beginning 2019. By then, DPRK will be a credible thermonuclear ballistic missile threat to Canadian population centers like Vancouver.

Furthermore, Canada’s defense and foreign policy establishment failed to recognize the motivations that is driving the Kim Jong Un regime, preferring to be concerned with softwood timber tariffs and milk quotas.

DPRK is not arming with WMDs that can threaten Canada just for the sake of deterrence, but for the purpose of extortion. Extortion is the use of force or threat of force to obtain money, property. It is fundamentally and legally distinct from blackmail.   (Bracken, 2017).

Nuclear blackmail has precedence with Israel’s threat to use nuclear weapons unless they received urgent conventional arms aid during the Yom Kippur War.     Nuclear extortion has no known precedence EXCEPT DPRK.

If sanctions and military action failed to prevent Kim Jong Un’s North Korea from successfully practice nuclear extortion, it will be devastating to the existing world order. It is a matter of time before states like Canada become tribute paying vassals if DPRK prevails.   Or nuclear blackmail will be applied to other issues like genocide, imposing religions by force, or other purposes that Anglo-Europeans abhor.

Canada need to urgently evaluate the extent and scale of threat in the Second Nuclear Age where Canada cannot solely rely on American extended deterrence as sufficient to deter regimes like North Korea in the near term.

The Defense Policy review is silent on what needs to be done in 2017 to have a deterrent and/or defensive capability in place by 2019 or sooner.

Allies like Australia, Japan, S. Korea, and the United States are giving Beijing China a last chance to curb the DPRK threat this year.   Should that fail, Canadian Defense Policy must prepare for military options in concert with allies.

This is not a problem for the next decade or 2030, but a problem in 2017.

Near term military action against North Korea will strain resources from every NATO and Pacific ally including Canada.  A prescient defense policy update would have recognized that on this short a timeframe, urgent action and expenditures need to be undertaken today to bring existing Canadian forces to a high level of readiness.

That is to say, everything from training, maintenance, to having adequate stockpiles of costly precision munitions.

Plans need to be put in place to rapidly improve and update capabilities ahead of a major, high intensity and long duration conflict that Canada has not fought in since World War II.    Orders need to be placed yesterday for missile defense systems, which will be in short supply. To date, Canada’s DND have not even initiated a formal request for information to manufacturers of missile defense systems when they are within a year of being swamped with priority orders from other allies.

Canadian warfighting systems are not just underfunded, poorly equipped and antiquated that successive governments pay lip service to improve – and then break the solemn government-to-government pledges.

What the Policy Review does to improve Canada’s credibility (or lack thereof) in the short run (2018-2020) without concrete, irreversible action is an open question. If it is to happen, it should already be in the public record like the Canadian Federal Budget released in March, 2017.

Defense Minister Harjit Sajjan the Trudeau regime loyalist, within the span of one year, went from sounding the alarm about a fighter “capability gap” in June 2016 that must be immediately met by a no-bid purchase of 18 “interim” F/A-18 Super Hornets, to have the deal being reconsidered in May 2017 by Liberal regime loyalist colleague Foreign Affairs Minister Freeland.  This abrupt change in defense policy against the Boeing made F/A-18 in retaliation for the ITC investigation against Bombardier – with Boeing calling for countervailing duties and antidumping charges of 80% – strains what little credibility the liberal regime has left.

Expeditiously acquiring 18 F/A-18s was an important enough issue to have Prime Minister Trudeau press President Trump during their February 2017 meeting for “immediate acquisition”.     When the deal is questioned in May (not even 100 days later), no alternative was proposed to meet the former “capability” and credibility gap by Sajjan, Freeland, or the PMO.

Would Canadian commitments to NATO presented by Prime Minister Trudeau in Brussels May 25 do any better than his track record with President Trump?

Beyond the chronic problem of underfunding of Canadian Armed Forces, decades of engaging in low level conflicts and peacekeeping primarily against poorly equipped irregulars have weakened Canadian’s ability to fight in a high intensity war. A war against North Korea will not be a replay of Gulf War I or II against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.   Or a fight against rag tag armies in Afghanistan or Rwanda or Mali: It will not be a slow motion “war” that Canadian Armed Forces presently excel at.

Yet, Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia “free riderFreeland apparently have no inkling that traditional Canadian Forces missions like UN Peacekeeping will be the least of Canada’s concerns once allied consensus crystalize about the DPRK-Iran threat.

War on the Korean peninsula is unlikely to be a limited war of high tech stand-off strikes touted by planners. Or a short duration war with Canadian troops “home by Christmas”.

Canadians and allied forces cannot automatically count superiority in quantity or quality (technology, doctrine, training, logistics, or anything else) taken for granted since World War II.   Or the security of unprotected supply lines from Canada. Nor can Canada count on immunity from nuclear strikes against the Canadian mainland for which Canada presently have no defense.   Will the Defense policy update talk of fielding a missile defense by 2030 when credible threats exist beginning 2019?

In order to have a missile defense in place by 2019, orders should have already been placed. None is known to be placed or planned for 2017.

In a likely high intensity conflict in the Korean Peninsula where DPRK will be supported by other peer competitor belligerents, Canadian and Allied Armed Forces will quickly discover that the cumbersome doctrines, tactics and rules of engagement built up over the half century of peace are not only an impediment, but have fatal consequences against first rate enemies with no such concerns.

A review of these quaint, outdated legacy codes, archaic as the Code of Chivalry, need to be urgently be undertaken and contingent doctrines and ROEs devised.

Canadian Forces have apparently learned nothing from the training mission with the Ukraine: at least in the urgency of revising ROEs and doctrine for high intensity multi-dimensional warfare.

Finally, the Defense policy update failed to recognize that reform of the cumbersome, outdated, obsolete and costly procurement system that Canada (and most allies) operate is an urgent priority with or without the looming threat of a high intensity, long duration war in the Korean Peninsula.

Canadian defense procurement systems in its present form will collapse within months of a high intensity conflict; but not before failing to deliver Canadian forces in the field up-to-date gear needed to survive. Just how will the Canadian public react to Canadian Forces being outmatched 10:1 by DPRK precision munitions that are superior when it happens?

There is still time to sketch out contingency plans for the issues and eventualities and append it to the Defense Policy Update before it is released on June 7.

Or alternatively, to suspend release pending an update that address these contingencies in the Appendix.

Canada will have the opportunity to listen very carefully to allies at the NATO summit and consult with Pacific allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea to ensure that the draft Canadian Defense Policy is consistent with the consensus view about the DPRK threat before the document is finalized.

Canada cannot field a credible missile defense against without the participation of non-NATO allies Japan, South Korea, working with the US nor participate in a high intensity war in the Korean peninsula in their present condition.

The Trudeau regime need to act now lest we end up with another Gander Airport.

Note: The Liberal regime did not see fit or necessary to issue a statement, comment, tweet, or any other expression of Canadian government views after the most recent North Korean Ballistic Missile test on May 13th and 21st.

A curious omission for an aspiring member of the UN Security Council.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

The Gander Airport of Defense Policy Update: Awaiting Canada’s Defence Policy Review