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President Trump has come to power at a time when a very flexible force able to insert from the sea and rapidly return to the sea has emerged.
This USN-USMC capability has migrated beyond the classic Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) into a very flexible and lethal amphibious task force.
The evolving Marine Corps aviation assets, coupled with the reshaping of Marine Corps concepts of operations for conducting force insertion from the sea, are shaping a new capability and within that capability unmanned aerial assets are playing a key role.
One of the key architects of the Marine aviation revolution has been Lt. General (Retired) Trautman.
During his tenure as Deputy Commandant for Aviation, the Osprey began its first deployments to the Middle East, the H-1 Venom and Viper were introduced to the Fleet and the F-35B was coming to its initial fruition.
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With the continued development of the CH-53E into the K and the addition of unmanned aviation, the mix of flying assets that would work with the Ground Combat Element to shape new MEU capabilities was put into motion.
I had a chance recently to talk with Lt. General (Retired) Trautman about the unmanned element and its role in the evolving way ahead for Marine Corps transformation.
Question: The UAVs going on ships now really had their origin in the land wars.
How did the process get started?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: It goes back to the time General Jim Conway was in Iraq with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and he found a little company that was making the Scan Eagle UAV.
Believe it or not, the Scan Eagle was being used for the Albacore fishing fleets up in the Pacific Northwest at the time.
In other words, Scan Eagle has a shipboard legacy already built right into it.
But, the Marines evolved the Scan Eagle principally as an asset for land based operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
And, in recent years with the focus placed on returning to the sea it became obvious that a similar capability on board our amphibious task force would be quite useful.
That is what led us to make the selection of the RQ-21 Blackjack which is now deploying on our Marine Expeditionary Units and by all accounts it is doing quite well so far.
Question: It is very challenging to operate unmanned air systems onboard ships and could you discuss those challenges?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: Many people who have not spent a lot of time at sea really don’t grasp the inherent challenges that you have when you launch and recover from a sea base.
The Marines over the years, along with their partners in the US Navy, have built an aviation force that’s quite credible from the sea. F-35Bs, MV-22s, H-1s and the evolving CH-53K all come into the force at a very important time as our nation evolves into a better understanding of the value and proper use of the amphibious task force.
In parallel with those developments, we must figure out how to take advantage of unmanned aerial systems.
As we do that operationally, we at the same time have to experiment and learn and use systems from the sea in ways that cause us to understand what new systems we should procure in the coming decade as well.
In other words, the foundation for the future is being built with our experience on board our amphibious ships today as the new aviation assets marry up with the unmanned systems onboard our ships.
Question: And having the UASs onboard allows the Marine Corps commanders to sort out how best to use those assets in operations as well. How might they do that?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: If I’m a task force commander and I’m deployed somewhere around the globe, I want to be prepared to conduct operations at a moment’s notice when the mission dictates.
I also want to have the flexibility to conduct all of my sorties from the sea or if necessary transition to an expeditionary land base for short duration operations that make an impact on the enemy before quickly returning to sea.
I want unmanned aerial systems that enable me to do whatever I need to do in order to accomplish the mission.
That means I need range, speed, endurance, the ability to take off and land vertically, a wide range of payloads, non-proprietary payload “hooks,” and the best Size, Weight and Power (SWAP) advantage I can attain.
To do that, you have to think long and hard about the types of capabilities that you wish to procure.
Whether it’s classic UAS capabilities like intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, the delivery of precision weapons, or electronic warfare, there are a whole host of missions that unmanned systems can do with the right payloads.
The key is to have those systems with me, use them and determine how to get the most effective use from them in the widely varied operations that an amphibious task force will pursue.
Question: When you were DCA you worked the decision to sunset the Prowler electronic warfare aircraft.
That clearly has an impact on the payloads which you want to have on a UAS as well?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: It does.
We made the decision in 2009 to sunset the Prowler a decade out in 2019.
We did that with our eyes wide open knowing that the F-35B would be coming into the force in a more robust way by that time.
There are inherent electronic warfare capabilities resident in the F-35 but our vision also included the need for unmanned aerial systems to proliferate in the battle space to round out the electronic warfare requirements that the force will have.
We’re in our infancy right now in developing those capabilities, but the first step in achieving something is to get started, and to put the capabilities in the hands of young men and women who are in the force and then evolve the capability in a way that makes sense.
I’m confident that we are on that trajectory with our unmanned aerial systems and the payloads that we will develop for those systems in the next few years.
Question: And the experience being gained now and in the next decade will clearly shape the way ahead not only for the amphibious task force but for the unmanned element. In other words, the approach is to experiment by operational use.
What happens next?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: The current Deputy Commandant for Aviation has been very prescient in laying out a requirement for a program called MUX (MAGTF Unmanned eXpeditionary UAS) which the current aviation plan says will be ready for initial operations in the 2025 time frame.
That platform, whatever it becomes, should have the capability to take off and land from the sea base, to take off and land from an expeditionary operating location ashore and deliver long range relatively high speed service to the fleet so that you can use that range and speed to your advantage.
It should also come in with adequate power and non-proprietary “hooks” so that future users can employ whatever payloads make the best sense for the force as it evolves.
This is a very exciting time for the development of unmanned systems in support of the amphibious task force and the Marine Corps.
Editor’s Note: The photos and videos highlight Blackjack training aboard the USS San Diego with the 15th MEU.
The Marines refined their launch and recovery procedures of the RQ-21A Blackjack during COMPTUEX in order to provide reconnaissance for the planning and execution of future missions.
Through a high degree of unit training, the 15th MEU forms a flexible sea-based Marine Air-Ground Task Force capable of mobilizing personnel and equipment to any corner of the globe.
For Todd Miller’s look at the preparation of the 15th MEU see the following:
The Williams Foundation working closely with the Australian Defence Force has provided a public forum for rethinking how to reshape their defense force to deal with 21st century challenges.
This is the sixth Special Report produced in cooperation with Second Line of Defense.
The first report looked at the impact of the coming of the F-35 and the emergence of fifth generation warfare on the force.
In his presentation to The Williams Foundation seminar on air combat in 2025 and beyond, Air Marshal Brown, then Chief of Staff or the RAAF focused on the F-35. He highlighted the centrality of the decision superiority inherent in the systems of the aircraft. But underscored that training and effective concepts of operations were necessary to achieve a latent advantage.Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
The second report took that initial discussion to Copenhagen where the Williams Foundation in cooperation with the Centre for Military Studies (University of Copenhagen) hosted a seminar on airpower innovation.
The conference launched a significant effort to think through the core problem of coalition airpower as seen from the standpoint of the smaller powers or air forces, or in the case of the United States, the role of the USMC in working through transformation correlated with evolving coalition approaches.
Operators from key Air Forces gave the core presentations that then drove the broader discussion.
The third report then looked at the RAAF approach to the transformation of jointness as they prepare to introduce the F-35 into the force.
The Aussies have a modern air fleet, with Super Hornets, KC-30A tankers, the Wedgetail E-7 battle management system Heron UAVs, and C-17s, recently in service and are seeing Growlers, the Triton UAV, the P-8 and the F-35 coming into the fleet shortly.
But no platform fights alone, and the Aussies are looking at how to rework their forces to shape a more interactive and enabled force. The F-35 is seen as not a replacement aircraft, but one which takes the integrated enablement of the force to the next level, but that will not happen without the transformation of the RAAF and with it of the ADF.
The fourth report focused directly on new approaches to air-land integration associated with the evolution of RAAF and Army thinking.
The last decade has seen a significant shift in how airpower has supported ground operations. With the introduction of systems like Rover, the ability of airpower to provide precision strike to the ground forces saw a significant change in fire support from a wide variety of air platforms. Precision air dropping in support of outposts or moving forces introduced new capabilities of support.
Vice Admiral Barrett speaking at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Air-Sea integration. Credit Photo: Second LIne of Defense
Yet this template of air ground is really focused on air support to the ground whereas with the shift in the global situation, a much wider set of situations are emerging whereby the air-ground integration approach will become much wider in character, and the ability to insert force rapidly, as a precision strike capability, and to be withdrawn will be a key tool in the toolbox for decision makers.
Fifth generation enabled operations will see a shift to a distributed C2 approach which will clearly change the nature of the ground-to air command system, and the with the ability of fifth generation systems to generate horizontal communications among air assets outside the boundaries of a classic AWACs directed system, the change in C2 will be very wide ranging.
The fifth report focused on new approaches to air-sea integration. The Australian military is shaping a transformed military force, one built around new platforms but ones that operate in a joint manner in an extended battlespace. The goal is to extend the defense perimeter of Australia and create, in effect, their own version of an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy.
They also recognize a key reality of 21st century military evolution in terms of shaping an integrated information-based operating force. Interactive modernization of the force is built around decision-making superiority and that will come with an effective information dominant force.
Lt General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Army, addresses the question of innovation and modernization for the ADF, Credit: Photo: Second Line of Defence
That makes the Aussies a key partner to the US and other allies in discussing openly a path for force transformation along lines where cutting edge thinking is occurring in the US and allied forces. Put bluntly, they are driving a public discussion of transformation in a way we have not seen in the United States for a long time.
And this key role in providing a public forum to discuss the key challenges of defense transformation have been carried forward with the sixth and latest Special Report, namely on how to build not a joint force but an integrated one. And doing so is especially crucial as we move from the land wars of the past decade towards one in which a faster tempo of operations and higher temp of warfare can be anticipated.
In this latest report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on integrated force design held on April 11, 2017 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well.
Interviews with the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been woven into the evolving narrative of shaping and designing an integrated force.
But the core point is that raising questions, which drive you towards where the force needs to go, is the challenge; it is not about generating studies and briefing charts which provide visuals of what a connected force might look like.
Air Marshal Leo Davies providing the opening address at the Plan Jericho Conference held by the Williams Foundation in Canberra, Australia, August 6, 2015. Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
It is about creating the institutional structure whereby trust among the services and between government and industry is high enough that risks can be managed, but creative destruction of legacy approaches is open ended as well.
It is about empowering a network of 21st century warriors and let the learning cycle being generated by this network drive acquisition, modernization and operational concepts.
It is about innovations within concepts of operations generated by the network to flow up into strategic change.
In short, the Williams Foundation has provided a crucial venue for thinking through the challenges of building a flexible, agile 21st century combat force grounded in a capability to fight and win in a high intensity combat setting.
The background is a real world effort by the Australian government to recapitalize their defenses forces via the acquisition of new platforms, leveraging legacy ones and shaping an integrated force going forward.
Integration is crucial not simply because Australian forces are relatively modest; but with new equipment coming on line, capabilities such as software upgradeability in key platforms and the digital revolution provide a unique opportunity to rethink integration.
Rather than pursuing after market integration or simply connecting stove piped service platforms after the fact with a bolt on network, how might integration be built from the ground up?
The approach being taken is not theological or an application of set of propositions or laws written down in a guidebook.
The approach is to work greater integrative processes within and among the services, and to highlight the need to pose hypotheses along the way concerning how greater integration is achievable where appropriate and ways to achieve more effective outcomes for the development of the force.
It is a quest which is being shaped by realigning organizations, and trying to build from the ground up among the junior officers a willingness to shape interconnectivity from the ground up.
It is about building a 21st century network of operators who are empowered to find force integration solutions, again where appropriate or service specific outcomes appropriate to the different warfighting domains.
Shaping a way to conduct the quest is very difficult; but the ADF is clearly been empowered to do so by Government.
Such a quest inevitably will fail and succeed along the way; but without setting this objective from the ground up, it will be difficult to change the operating concepts and the then the concepts of operations which can drive the transformation of the force.
Lt. Col. “Chip” Berke discussing his F-22 and F-35 experiences with the Australian audience at the Williams Foundation Conference, March 11, 2014. Credit Photo: SLD
The United States may have Joint Forces Quarterly; the ADF has a transformation process underway.
They are definitely following the Nike model: Just do it!
And for the United States, even when the Aussies are adopting out own platforms, they are doing so in a very different context in which force integration is set as a strategic goal, rather than the pursuit of service modernization.
In effect, the Aussies are providing the experimental model which can be quite relevant to others, including the United States.
In the mid 1990s when I worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, one of the tasks on which I worked was for the Roles and Missions Commission. One of the key tasks, which the Congress had tasked the Commission to pursue, was to determine what the United States might learn from allies.
We worked hard on our white paper but when delivered to the Commission we were told by a very senior member of the Commission: “Good work; but why did you really examine the question? We are so much bigger than any of our allies, there is very little we could learn from them or apply to our own practices!”
Unfortunately, not much as changed in the attitude of many defense civilians, but many leaders in the US military do not share such views, notably with allies and the US adopting some of the same key platforms at the same time, like P-8, Triton, and the F-35, and some allies operating more advanced equipment than the US itself.
Obviously this is a work in progress and perhaps always will be.
The challenge is to get in place a template which allows for greater capabilities to shape force integration but in an ongoing manner; more of an directive ongoing inquiry rather than a fixed point on the compass.
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2017-05-15 The President has recently signed a new executive order on cyber security.
According to an article by Brooke Singman published by Fox News on May 11, 2017:
President Trump took aim at the federal government’s vulnerability to computer hacking Thursday, signing an executive order that mandates a top-down review of cybersecurity and holds agencies accountable for safeguarding digital information.
The executive order states that it will “hold heads of executive departments and agencies accountable for managing cybersecurity risk to their enterprises.” White House Homeland Security Adviser Tom Bossert, speaking at the White House press briefing, said the White House took the action because online vulnerabilities at the agency level can put the nation at risk.
“The United States invented the Internet and we need to better use it,” Bossert said. “There will always be risk and we need to address that risk.”
The order seeks to improve the network securities of U.S. government agencies and protect critical infrastructure, like the energy grid and financial sector, from attacks that lawmakers and officials have warned could pose a major national security threat. It follows a turbulent election year in which Russia and other entities were accused of meddling in the U.S. election.
While an executive order is welcome, getting on with the solution is slow in coming.
And Secretary Wynne has hammered home the point that no amount of software fixes are going to solve the cyber security problem.
He pointed to recent extortion efforts as an illustration of the wild west future of the cyber war.
“This is just the beginning of extreme lawlessness, with the introduction of anonymous currency, and as smart as our Cyber industry is, they have not corrected or even definitively identified the root cause for cyber hacking.
“There is a wonderful Russian joke that starts with a Village Pastor offering advice to a chicken farmer to restore health to his flock.
“After several sessions, all the chickens are dead.
“When told, the advisor Pastor says, too bad, I had many more solutions to offer.”
A global cyberattack, unprecedented in scale, had technicians scrambling to restore Britain’s crippled hospital network Saturday and secure the computers that run factories, banks, government agencies and transport systems in many other nations.
The worldwide cyberextortion attack is so unprecedented, in fact, that Microsoft quickly changed its policy, announcing security fixes available for free for the older Windows systems still used by millions of individuals and smaller businesses.
After an emergency government meeting Saturday in London, Britain’s home secretary said one in five of 248 National Health Service groups had been hit. The onslaught forced hospitals to cancel or delay treatments for thousands of patients, even some with serious aliments like cancer.
Home Secretary Amber Rudd said 48 NHS trusts were affected and all but six were now back to normal. The U.K.’s National Cyber Security Center said it is “working round the clock” to restore vital health services.
Security officials in Britain urged organizations to protect themselves by updating their security software fixes, running anti-virus software and backing up data elsewhere.
Who perpetrated this wave of attacks remains unknown. Two security firms — Kaspersky Lab and Avast — said they identified the malicious software in more than 70 countries. Both said Russia was hit hardest.
And all this may be just a taste of what’s coming, a cyber security expert warned.
No executive order is going to wave a magic wand and eliminate this particular problem.
Only a fundamental change will do that.
And we are republishing an earlier piece by Secretary Wynne that would suggest to President Trump that there is an alternative to simply writing another executive order.
2016-11-20 By Michael W. Wynne, 21st Secretary of the Air Force
Summary:
Academics have known since 1934 that Turing computers were and remain inherently vulnerable to hacking as Godel and Keene Mathematically proved, and confidently expressed that proof in the years following.
The times were different; and computers were just aborning, and abandoning a rule of circuit design to firmly comprehend the relationship of every input to every output seemed acceptable when operating in isolation.
As society wallows in the deceit that a software patch can save the Turing Computing Machines that underlay the present Internet, we find even senior security officials such as the Chair and Co-Chair of the Intelligence Committee espousing the thought that protection is simply unavailable.
This is not fact based, but has grown to be the popular myth.
Returning to complex circuit design to mimic the intended digital circuit can and should underpin the ‘Designed in Security’ our society seeks, a proper defense.
Background:
The Internet was developed many years after the underlying flaw of the Turing Computing Machine was both invented and reviled during the 1930’s.
Turing is celebrated for his major contribution of code breaking, and as well the breakthrough in speed, using the phraseology in his topology of ‘this sentence is false’ leading to an acceptance of intent over precision in his computational mathematics.
Later as other mathematicians examined his processes, the fact of the endless recursive nature of the process allowed others to implant errors in this process, which essentially derailed the machine output. This has leading partially to the phrase “Garbage in Garbage out” as students who followed Turing grappled with the flaw.
My first encounter with computational mathematics was in an analog laboratory in junior high school where we were asked by the instructor to construct a difficult equation using classic ‘AND’ and ‘NAND’ logic based systems.
Looking back on that equation, there is no way to alter the setup without invading the circuit design. As well a bad answer would lead immediately to first a low grade, and second to a re-examination of the circuit for correction.
Thus every output had a known input.
Later, as a part of the autopilot design for the AC-130 gunship, which I and fellow Air Force Academy Instructors had compiled into an on board computer, testing at the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory revealed a terrible anomaly was occurring.
Reflecting that they were in the analog world, and tested analog flight control systems, they took many hours of data illustrating a random control output that flapped the flaps, misguided the rudder, and generally was a disaster waiting to happen. With this information, from the digital perspective we were able to immediately discern that a flaw had been introduced into the program, and found a pointer looking at a random number generator, instead of the control table that we had carefully constructed. Thus, the anomaly was discoverd.
Looking back, there was a lesson, and that was that we had non-maliciously introduced this flaw in the digital domain, and it was detected by the rigor from the analog domain.
Thorough testing using solid circuit design requirements was the key to dealing with the anaomaly.
A shift from software patches to analog circuit design provides a way ahead. Source: Getty Images
Later still, my daughter was typing away in the college library, when an old fashioned image of a bomb appeared, counted down, and destroyed all of her unsaved work. This prank was a precursor to the current malicious code that can be introduced from distant locations, though it was local at the time.
As this was not the intent of the university Computer Center, it was an indicator that symptoms of our current problems were evident before the Internet was expanded to a universal norm.
Naturally, a software fix, searching for this particular ‘bug’, was introduced. This was also a precursor to our current fixation to software patches that even come to my home computer (windows based) many times a month.
Years later, as the then National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, advised that the Internet was becoming the wild west; and images from the other side of our placid computer screen were shown to be violent, society began to realize we had a problem.
When I became Secretary of the Air Force, I introduced Cyber into the mission of the Air Force to mobilize for the defense of this new domain; where rested much of our Command and Control.
When the Air Force recruiting headlines for Cyber professionals began to emerge, the Air Force was excoriated by the legislature for being overzealous, and mis-judging the problem with the Internet.
All have since been validated; but the problem of defending the domain remains.
It is time for a serious conversation and shaping a new approach, notably because the President-elect has set a key goal as shaping new civilian infrastructure and strengthening the US military.
Current Situation:
It is often said that doing the same thing, but expecting a different answer to emerge is a sign of insanity, though we are all guilty of this flawed thinking.
Putting a software patch on top of a flawed hardware system to counter punch an invader may be fulfilling, but it is been proven over and over to be fruitless.
None-the-less, as an Eighteen billion dollar industry, not unfulfilling. Even now the National Institute of Standards has essentially declared out loud the futility of the many solutions it has encountered, citing the patience of the Advanced Persistent Threat in many papers. It as well stipulates that many penetrants never realize for many months or years that a penetration has occurred, until it becomes advantageous for the agent to disclose the information, or a separate patch unwittingly discovers the loss of data.
Many times the victim has no idea there was an issue. Corporate Boards are leery of liability, and thus in denial; or becoming part of the herd of software patch payers.
But society is slowly becoming aware that this is a scam, that they are riding an unending strife curve; and the alarms are beginning to sound as if the end of life as we know it is nigh again.
It is seeping into engineering and into design that those that have stayed with Analog are immune to this Internet, distant and malicious, threat. Whether aircraft safety systems, or in some of the most carefully protected areas; suddenly what is old is new again.
I would like to beat the drum for a ‘blast from the past’ and celebrate the re-emergence of computational analog circuit design.
As well; I would raise a ceremonial toast to a systems engineering rule for thoroughly understanding every input and output response before the system goes on line.
This is a marked departure than ‘crowd sourcing’ corrections to flawed software, which by its very nature invites malicious activity, while waving the flag of cooperation and collaboration.
When it comes to National Security; or to Public Infrastructure, this is flawed policy and needs to change dramatically.
Even the Internet of Things (IoT), now popular, requires re-evaluation when public safety in the form of vehicle control, or Grid, or Pipe, or Dam, is at risk.
Forward Look:
I recently gave a presentation in China at a University there, citing the Systems Engineering principles, and identifying the fatal flaw which has been like a virus that has never been extinguished, but instead tolerated for its good parts; but is now becoming a civil defense issue that should be addressed.
I would say for our National purposes, it is time that we followed some prescriptive advice and agree upon a path that will settle down the current rhetoric; and may create a level playing field, where Intellectual Property can easily be protected if desired; and our National Interests can be logically addressed.
For sure, the cited eighteen billion dollar industry is not going away; but can slowly morph into creating useful paths to a safer Internet.
Society is ready; and now the professionals have to decide on priorities, and action.
I would suggest that we should prioritize the goal that USG Web sites immediately be protected using frozen (e.g.; non reprogrammable) complex analog circuitry mimicking and replacing currently installed internet appliances.
Further; that Infrastructure Owners be tasked to put in place protected SCADA Systems, under the watchful eye of the Department of Homeland Security, which again are frozen analog complex circuitry, again mimicking and replacing the currently installed Internet appliance.
Internet Service Providers, router designers, and server designers can provide needed support to the agencies and public corporations to alter our present course, and they should be doing it.
I would further implore Financial Institutions and Corporations to recognize that this must be done to protect themselves, and their customers from the current economic losses.
Why Insurance Companies are not demanding change is a mystery?
Society is not stuck, but thought leaders are, time for a change.
It is Time for Analog as the solution set to deal with the vulnerability challenges associated with software.
This is not only possible, but has been available for a few years–the path is novel, but not unknown.
Vulnerability on the Internet is actually a choice, not a given outcome.
Let’s get on with it!
Editor’s Note: In the following article, published earlier this year by David Sax in Bloomberg Business Week, the author suggested that in the Age of Cybercrime, The Best Insurance May be Analog.
The article is an interesting companion piece to Secretary Wynne’s very clear call for a new way ahead to deal with a strategic vulnerability affecting civil and military defense systems.
Last September, Darpa launched the $36 million Leveraging the Analog Domain for Security (LADS) program, which is attempting to create a set of electronic ears that can detect malicious activity by monitoring the unintentional analog emissions of digital hardware, such as heat, sound, and changed frequencies.
“The advantage of an analog approach is that there’s no way for the malware to directly reach through air and affect the monitoring device,” says Angelos Keromytis, who runs the program.
If you wish to comment on this article you can do so on the Second Line of Defense Forum.
The question of DPRK’s motives for acquiring a nuclear arsenal is central to the current debate about international security.
Motives are ephemeral constructs that are difficult to assess. To wit, historians are still debating the motives of leaders of Germany, Japan, Britain, France, and US as to why they entered WWII.
But without an effort to understand DPRK’s motives, it is impossible to craft a viable set of policies.
Coming just 10 days before the NATO head of state summit meeting, DPRK’s test of an intermediate range Hwasong-12 missile on May 14 was a landmark event that indisputably demonstrated their ability to reach targets within 4,500km. The technical ramifications of this test of a single stage missile based on an indigenously developed engine quantitatively and qualitatively increased the credibility of the North Korean threat.
Studies of the long term behavior of DPRK over decades their behavior across a range of issues ranging from formal DPRK involvement recently in robbing central banks, narcotics manufacture and smuggling, kidnapping of foreign nationals abroad, targeted killings, counterfeit currency printing and distribution, arms exports, missile proliferation, nuclear weapons exports, cyber extortion, and sensitive material exports show the genetic code of the regime see nothing beyond them historically and right up to the present.
DPRK behavior – the long term, sustained and widespread, formal use of military capabilities – for the purpose of extortion by a government that is not a failed state has no precedence in modern history since 1945.
Extortion is the use of force or threat of force to obtain money, property. It is fundamentally and legally distinct from blackmail. (Bracken, 2017). Nuclear blackmail has precedence with Israel’s threat to use nuclear weapons unless they received urgent conventional arms aid during the Yom Kippur War.
Nuclear extortion has no known precedence EXCEPT DPRK.
Reviewing the regime long historical evidence of DPRK behavior, when set in the context of the history and traditions of Northeast Asia, it is as obvious as night and day to all but the priesthood of Korean “handlers” and “arms control advocates” that motives for North Korea’s WMD, Missile, and Nuclear Weapons program since 2011 materially changed.
DPRK’s nuclear arsenal program being explicitly motivated by extortion and economic gain — rather than regime survival like every other nuclear weapons state is alien to the North Korean analyst priesthood.
If we assume that DPRK did not make enormous sacrifices internally to fund their accelerated nuclear arsenal programs (as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said, “Eat Grass”), and we take seriously the indisputable evidence of an INCREASE in the standard of living in DPRK under Kim Jong Un — particularly for the military and security elite in and around Pyongyang, then money had to have come from somewhere.
The question is where?
The default explanation is a significant and material injection of economic resources at least in the USD billions range into DPRK must have happened somehow since about 2013. It is hard to believe that Pakistan, jihadists, Syria, or non-state actors would so fund DPRK at this level. Or that funds of this scale could have been raised by traditional DPRK state sponsored criminal and other enterprises (e.g. North Korean restaurants abroad).
It could have been raised by being a major player in the global narcotics trade, but we are seeing no signs of such mass movements of physical commodities, be it product or cash). There had to be wealthy patrons that most likely, are a middle power state or parts of such a state that have the capacity for such wealth transfers.
Likewise, the “product” or “service” sold by DPRK must be of such a nature as to be readily exportable because it is small, compact, easy to smuggle — like data from simulations and drawings on a flash card.
Nuclear arsenal and missile technology fits this bill nearly perfectly as a sanction buster.
Few in the arms control community have recognized that circa 2014, when the US began to lift sanctions on Iran and enabled them to access USD tens of billions of wealth was, curiously, directly correlated with DPRK acquiring state of the art tooling, equipment, and systems to forward their weapons programs.
And to conduct a series of expensive tests despite the tightening of sanctions.
DPRK motives for acquisition of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and WMDs do not conform to previous nuclear arsenal states. If DPRK’s motives under Kim Jong Un was solely an “insurance policy” against existential threats to the regime, that goal could have been achieved with a modest, but credible nuclear arsenal similar to what Israel or Pakistan developed.
Neither went the next step to developing long range MRBM or ICBMs.
What are the economic & political impetus then?
Sometime after Kim Jong Un assumed power in 2012, North Korea’s behavior, posture, and pattern changed abruptly. Economic reforms that were long stalled by Kim Jong Il was revived, resulted in an explosion of state capitalism similar to what the southern Chinese provinces experienced circa 1978.
Prior “opening” reforms under Kim Jong Il was ad hoc responses to the famine and hardships brought about in the 1990s by the collapse of their Soviet patrons and the unwillingness of Beijing-China to continually expand subsidies.
After Kim Jong Un consolidated power, these initiatives have become a more or less permanent feature — with concomitant benefits no different than the explosion of wealth and incomes seen in PRC, Russia and former Soviet Republics, and everywhere communist regimes based on the early 20th Century model abandoned tightly controlled central planning and severe limits on private enterprise.
Today, the image of a starving, Stalinist DPRK of 1994-98 that staggered under sanctions is no more appropriate than an image of Shenzhen, PRC in 1984 at the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967.
What are the political consequences of the Kim Jong Un economic reforms?
For one, it accelerated the loss of formal control over the regime as officials from top to bottom discovered that their position and power translates into rent-seeking opportunities. That be the case whether it is the border guards that took a fee for letting goods through (both exporting and importing), to the officials that control people, facilities, resources, knowhow, etc. who all of a sudden, are free to flog their resources to anyone willing to pay them or work with them (aka joint venture). P
RC managed this very same transition with the PLA/N going into business for themselves.
That be the case whether it is the setting up of factories in DPRK that are “contractors” for firms in PRC, who are in turn, selling the goods worldwide, or the export of DPRK labor (a traditional cash earner for the regime). Such opportunities, however, are not evenly distributed throughout the DPRK regime.
What about the sectors that are left behind?
The largest and most critical sectors that are left behind are the military and security forces (beside the party and government) upon which Kim Jong Un depend on for his grip on power. The opening up that saw wealth flow to other (formerly less influential officials like border guards and managers of run-on-the-mill state owned enterprises) at the expense of the bureaucracy and military.
Where have we seen this before?
This is virtually a cookie cutter description of what happened in PRC circa 1989 just prior to Tiananmen, when the opening of the economy and inflationary pressures brought on by new found wealth impoverished the traditional privileged class of senior officials who did not have rent seeking opportunities.
Recall that the proximate cause of Tiananmen protests was students who’s elite, privileged parents got them into the most prestigious institution in PRC after they themselves survived grueling exams discovered that, a) they were not getting what they expected in cushy jobs in the bureaucracy; b) even if they did, inflation made the “iron rice bowl job” reward nominal; c) “lesser” people who did not have their connections and paper qualifications are surpassing them in opportunities and outcomes.
The upending of the established pathway to wealth, power, and success by economic reforms in PRC nearly collapsed the regime. It was fortuitous that when the PLA was called to restore order in Beijing, they obeyed and the regime survived.
Kim Jong Un’s DPRK no doubt saw this direct parallel. His father, for the same reasons, resisted economic reforms for these reasons to the very end.
But Kim Join Un is different.
He was Swiss educated in one of the wealthiest countries in the world, where he is exposed to wealth and riches that are unimaginable in DPRK for all but the elite ruling clans. He more likely have some language abilities beyond Korean, possibly English, French, or German. What’s more, as a member of the ruling elite, he had first-hand experience and access to the explosion of electronics, games, communications, and outside influences well before he assumed leadership of the Dynasty.
Kim Jong Un, like his assassinated brother, had no illusions as to how backward and perilous the regime he inherited was and is.
Economic reforms by Kim brought not just newfound riches but also political problems in a Stalinist system. Wealth are expressed in many different ways, from more freedom, more (and deeper) penetration of knowledge about the outside world and culture into DPRK. As recently as 2005, it was a big deal and the height of luxury to have access to old (obsolete / junked) Video Cassette Recorders (VCRs) to be imported from China and Japan, with tapes of South Korean shows smuggled in.
Today, that is largely displaced by the smuggling of portable media players, content on flash memory sticks and SD cards. A significant portion of the population is well within broadcast range for cell phone and data transmissions, let alone other broadcasts, and have easy access to the means to receive and enjoy such “forbidden” content such as the latest K-Pop shows.
No doubt illicit wireless repeaters easily sourced from China have extended the reach of South Korean, PRC, Japanese, and Russian wireless to much of DPRK. DPRK, as of 2011, is no longer a “Hermit Kingdom”.
The greater concern faced by the Kim Jong Un regime is that such opening up not only create new wealth and centers of power outside of the formal state system, but it places the DPRK regime in direct competition with the new “private” enterprises and the couture of state capitalist officials being enriched by new opportunities.
Each of these are a potential threat to his power and regime.
Regime stalwarts in the military, security services and government have to be adequately compensated beyond what can be extracted in monopoly rents or taxes from the economy. Otherwise, Kim Jong Un’s DPRK risk a Tiananmen. The old days of Kim Jong Il when scarce foreign products like imported brandy etc. served as an adequate bribe is over.
Kim Jong Un had to do better, and fast.
KCNA extensively cataloged how Kim Jong Un did inspection tours of facilities once he assumed and consolidated power. Western trained analysts often laughed at these events as crass propaganda exercises of Kim being taken to Potemkin Villages as his father was for decades. But what if there is more to this?
A look at the propaganda and how it changed revealed how Kim initially inspected the standard KWP showcases that made food, etc. and then moving to him inspecting military units. Standard socialist fare until 2013.
A very telling tale was how Kim Jong Un visited a Missile Factory in 2013 and “angrily demanded” that the plant be updated with state-of-the-art robotics, CNC machines, etc. which was promptly done, resulting in a precision metals manufacturing capability that is more than adequate for their missile programs that was evident during his next inspection. It would be farcical to presume that the young Kim would not have the wherewithal and language skills to access the web to see published photos and catalogs of advanced manufacturing facilities of manufacturers like Samsung.
Or to think that the Swiss educated Kim could not recall how a tiny country manufactured a range of ultra-high tech goods and services.
Kim recognize that DPRK economy inherited from his father is well behind the times. And he had the capacity to look, see by just consulting material found on the internet.
Turning to the next problem beyond the absolute priority of holding onto power. Sanctions notwithstanding, if DPRK is to spend on importing high tech equipment, training, expertise, and development, however, must realize a profit in some way shape or form so as to provide rewards and maintain the loyalty of Kim’s power bases.
While no public estimate is available, clearly, the DPRK missile and nuclear programs must have had significant costs at least since Kim’s reign.
In the modern history of costly (and relatively unusable) weapons development programs like ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons by all but the wealthiest, largest nations, financing and funding these programs have proven to be a budget busting burden.
Thus, it is not a surprise that strategic cost sharing partners are sought after.
Is it even plausible that DPRK can undertake such programs without a clear, substantial profit motive and pathway to riches?
DPRK motives for acquiring a credible nuclear arsenal with the capacity to strike anywhere in the world (including the United States and Western Europe) is both current profit (paid by regimes like Iran) that is essential for rewarding the regime loyalists, and almost certainly with that, for purposes of extortion in the future against any and all states.
It changes our calculus as to what is likely to be an acceptable outcome to DPRK if the US and Allies do not develop a viable military option.
Clearly, de-nuclearization in any way, shape or form is off the table for DPRK.
Can DPRK stop at just developing a nuclear arsenal?
What to do when clients like Iran are no longer willing to pay billions for nuclear weapons and missiles from DPRK?
What will they sell then?
What will the Kim Jong Un regime do to bring in cash for the next round?
To see the dangers from DPRK and what policy options must be acquired, we must speculate as to what his next move will be.
If Kim Jong Un failed to raise the living standards of his core power base, he is history.
The question is how?
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The Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) latest maritime surveillance and response capability—the P-8A Poseidon,has assisted with the co-ordination of a search and rescue response, approximately 50 kilometres south of Mount Gambier, Victoria.
While on a training mission from its home at RAAF Base Edinburgh in South Australia, the P-8A Poseidon, call sign Blackcat 20, intercepted a mayday call from a distressed vessel, the MV Port Princes, around 1 pm on Tuesday, 16 May 2017.
Image grab from a Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon aircraft that assisted with the co-ordination of a search and rescue response, approximately 50 kilometres south of Mount Gambier, Victoria.
MV Port Princess was observed taking on water, with four persons on board. Blackcat 20 provided communications assistance to aid the stricken vessel, rescuing the stricken ship’s captain and three crew.
Executive Officer for No. 92 Wing, Wing Commander Brett Williams said the successful search and rescue response by the Poseidon’s crew was a great demonstration of this remarkable aircraft.
“The P-8A Poseidon takes RAAF maritime surveillance and response capability to a new level of interoperability and performance,” Wing Commander Williams said.
“This is the first search and rescue response completed by the P-8A Poseidon since the aircraft’s arrival into Australia last November. The Poseidon is still undergoing test and evaluation activities before a formal introduction into service.
“Search and rescue forms an important part of the operational test and evaluation program which we’ve laid out to bring the Air Force’s P-8A Poseidon into service,” he said.
Images of the rescue event were relayed in real-time from the aircraft to the Rescue Coordination Centre in Canberra.
2017-05-09 During an interview at the Amberley Air Base last month with Air Commodore Lennon and the 86th Wing Commander, Group Captain Adam Williams, we discussed the evolution of the KC-30A into Tanker 2.0.
One aspect of that evolution was the coming of the robotic boom.
According to Air Commodore Lennon: “The best way to think about the new boom capability is that it is an automatic boom similar to how autopilot works in the cockpit. The automatic pilot simplifies the pilot load, but the pilot is still there and can override the autopilot in case of need.
“There will always be an operator monitoring what’s going on with the boom, deciding what the boom should do, and when it should do it, but now he can let the boom do all the work of positioning and marrying up with the receiver.”
The KC-30A is a refuelable aircraft so with a fatigue reducing automatic boom, the crew can stay airborne for longer to generate additional operational impact and enhanced sortie generation effects.
Air Commodore Lennon saw other potential impacts on operations as well from having an automatic boom.
“If it can anticipate and react to movements of the receiver aircraft faster than the boom operator can, then you end up with faster contacts.
You also potentially end up with more consistent contacts when the turbulence level increases, in cloud or when night falls.”
A press release from Airbus Military on May 9, 2017 focused on a recent successful test of this new capability.
Madrid, 9 May 2017 – Airbus Defence and Space has successfully demonstrated automatic air-to-air refuelling (AAR) contacts with a fighter aircraft from a tanker’s refuelling boom – the first time in the world that this has been done.
Airbus’ A310 MRTT company development aircraft performed six automatic contacts with a F-16 of the Portuguese Air Force in a demonstration of a technique which the company believes holds great promise for enhancing in-service AAR operations.
The system requires no additional equipment on the receiver and is intended to reduce boom operator workload, improve safety, and optimise the rate of AAR in operational conditions to maximise combat efficiency.
It could be introduced on the current production A330 MRTT as soon as 2019.
Initial approach and tracking of the receiver is performed by the tanker’s Air Refuelling Operator (ARO) as usual.
“Innovative passive techniques such as image processing are then used to determine the receiver’s refuelling receptacle position and when the automated system is activated, a fully automated flight control system directs the boom towards the receiver’s receptacle.
“The telescopic beam inside the boom can be controlled in a range of ways including: manually by the ARO; a relative distance-keeping mode; or full auto-mode to perform the contact.
In the 21 March flight off the Portuguese coast, the tanker performed the scheduled six contacts, at flight conditions of 270KT and 25,000ft over a 1hr 15min test period. Both crews reported a faultless operation.
David Piatti, Airbus Test ARO, or “boomer”, on the tanker, said: “The most important thing was that the system could track the receptacle. It was very satisfying because it worked perfectly and we could perform the contacts with the automation switched on as planned. It will certainly reduce workload, especially in degraded weather conditions.”
The F-16 pilot, known by his callsign “Prime”, said: “The test mission was pretty uneventful and accomplished with no unexpected issues – which is a good sign. From the moment that the boomer accepted the contact the boom was immediately in the correct spot. For the contact itself, it was very precise and expeditious. You can notice the difference – the less that you feel in the cockpit then the more precise you know the tracking is.”
Miguel Gasco, Head of Airbus Defence and Space’s Incubator Laboratory which coordinated the development, said: “This represents a fundamental advance in boom AAR operations, with the promise of increasing the rate of contacts, notably reducing operator workload, and enhancing safety. The automated boom operation is an important pillar of our Smart MRTT development that is already underway.”
The imaging technology underlying the Automatic AAR technique was originally used by Airbus’ Space division to develop solutions for refuelling satellites in space or for space debris removal and was further developed and applied by Airbus Defence and Space’s Incubator Laboratory for the tanking application.
The modus operadi of extortion (now with Weapons of Mass Destruction) is a feature of the Kim Dynasty and represent a fundamental departure from every previous regime that sought a nuclear arsenal that elude explanations via conventional deterrence theory that focus on regime survival.
Deeper understanding of the DPRK’s perspectives and statecraft traditions is essential to crafting a new DPRK strategy.
A recurring theme in the Northeast Asian region’s history is how a small, cohesive, well organized group (often organized on ethnic lines) was able to time and time defeat the incumbent (and on paper stronger) Dynasties ruling over the Chinese Empire. That was the case for the Mongols, Manchus, First Sino-Japanese war, CCP vs. the ROC.
Overlaid on top of this is the millennium long conflict between the Japanese and Chinese empires and how Korea regimes eked out an existence between two (and then more) great powers. The end of WWII brought a stability to the area enforced by the U.S. which temporarily froze the normal dynamic of the region: except in China where the ROC was unceremoniously run off the continent.
Had the US and allies not intervened, DPRK would likely won the Korean war and Taiwan would have been successfully invaded by the CCP.
Post War stability is now reverting to traditional patterns of conflict and statecraft that have characterized the region for more than a millennium.
This history speak to the dangers of presuming that realist calculations of relative power that so much define European statecraft automatically apply in Northeast Asia. Japan was not deterred in going to war against the much stronger Russia, Imperial or Republican China, or the US. Japan won every war except with the US which could have turned out to have been a draw.
The CCP, similarly, had a tradition of taking on much stronger ROC forces who recognized that they are a greater threat than the Japanese, and ultimately winning.
Similarly, the PRC was not deterred from armed clashes by the nuclear armed Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The historical memory and tradition that a highly organized and cohesive group can defeat on paper established powers that are on paper much stronger is deep in the mindset of Northeast Asians in general, and in the Koreans and their close ethnic brethren the Manchus that dominate the Northeast Asian provinces.
A related feature is the willingness of these groups to coalesce (as Genghis Khan achieved), and willingness to take on allies as they conquered and assimilate technologies from the conquered.
The mindset of DPRK’s key officials are at least 50 years old — still in Cold war, still thinking of winning at “all cost”, very much like the United States prior to the end of WWII.
Few Americans wish to be reminded that toward the end of WWII, the Allies nearly ran out of targets to bomb in both Germany and Japan. Post War, and particularly post PGM Revolution notions of restraint in the use of WMDs (deterrence), limiting collateral damage, avoiding unnecessary civilian deaths, or the revolution brought about by PGMs to achieve war aims with little unintended harm to civilians are alien to the DPRK regime and their military.
What matters to the DPRK is winning. And in such a calculus, they have reverted to the Northeast Asian historical norm.
This perspective suggest that DPRK’s calculus of risk, reward, cost, etc. will be very different from western models.
DPRK propaganda and bravado such as threatening nuclear attacks on CONUS or the sinking of a US carrier should not be automatically dismissed. Nor should their stated goal to force the US out of the Korean Peninsula and compel ROK to “reunify” on their terms.
These threats are at least as credible as the threats Genghis Khan made in 1207 against the Western Hsia Empire. Coincidentally, Genghis Khan’s war aims was to acquire a tribute paying vassal. DPRK is pursuing similar goals today. ROK is a prime and plausible candidate to become a tribute passing vassal to DPRK in the near term, leading to reunification longer term.
The appeal of DPRK “aggressive Confucianism” should not be underestimated in South Korea, who, beneath their public persona, exudes pride at how Koreans are a nuclear power — even if it is in the hands of DPRK.
The US should not automatically take it as a given that ROK will fall into line with allied interests or perceive the ICBM nuclear threat to the US as a threat to the Korean people as a whole. Nor should ROK cooperation to eliminate nuclear weapons post bellum on the peninsular be a given.
The larger question is, can South Koreans resist the siren song of history? Who can the DPRK count on as their supporters beyond significant elements in the ROK?
The involvement of outside powers in the Korean peninsula is another longstanding historical theme. Korean regimes have historically had to balance their relationship with all the region’s powers, which in the post war era, for the DPRK, became a network of anti-establishment powers like USSR, PRC, Pakistan, Iran, Syria, etc.
Thus, it should be presumed that any resumption of conflict with DPRK will very quickly result in participation from outside. Given attitudes, history and preparation, the DPRK has positioned itself to try to take off the table any quick decapitation option off the table. Although given the nature of the regime, there is always concern that intrigue at the top or strikes directed to take down the top leadership might work.
But the West can not necessarily assume that this is the only or the most viable option.
A long war against DPRK will likely be the defining conflict of the century, with consequences similar to either WWI or WWII. The US and Allies is not up against an “isolated” North Korea. North Korea may be presently “isolated”, but once conflict breaks out, it is a foregone conclusion that outside powers will intervene very much like the Spanish Civil War.
Korea will be the testing ground for weapons, tactics, and doctrine by every state and non-state actor that harbor a wish to undermine the incumbent international system dominated by the US and allies. Assessments of DPRK military capabilities without taking into account likely contribution from their allies will end badly: DPRK is not Syria.
Who are likely to be DPRK’s supporters this time around?
North Korea, for all their alleged isolation, have forged an extensive network with numerous “anti” states and non-state actors. What’s more, DPRK is no longer the Stalinist centrally planned and tightly controlled economy (circa 1960 – 2011).
It is now transformed into an economy very similar to PRC’s southern provinces circa 1978. Significantly, the porous border with Russia, China, and the booming illicit sea trade with neighboring states have exploded under Kim Jong Un with extensive participation by both state and non-state actors including many criminal syndicates.
If trade sanctions failed to work against a highly vulnerable Stalinist DPRK economy, it has almost no chance against a mixed economy with plenty of room for non-state actors to participate. That is, in fact, what the NY Times recently reported. That is before the PRC’s explicit refusal to impose “airtight” sanction “humanitarian” trade including food and energy. North Korea consumers fewer than 76,000 bbl/day of oil.
Rather than being the trump card of PRC, An embargo on oil exports to DPRK can be worked around by entrepreneurs with tanker trucks via the land border, or at sea with much larger transfers. Absent air strikes on land shipments and a complete blockade of all shipping that is unlikely to be sanctioned by the UN, it will work.
ISIS did it, why not DPRK?
No doubt the DPRK will do at least as well as Rhodesia under Ian Smith at sanctions busting.
This brings us to the point that supporters of North Korea are not just rogue states (or penniless ones), but major regimes like Iran, Pakistan, the Northeast Provinces of PRC, Russia, and indeed, found within South Korea as well. Over and above these are long term linkages to Syria, Taiwan, Venezuela, jihadists, and global criminal syndicates that DPRK have had dealings with from counterfeit currency, narcotics, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, cigarettes, liquor, to arms.
Any active conflict with DPRK that do not end in regime change within 90 days will result in all these networks being activated by DPRK for the war effort.
During the first Korean War, intervention by Russia and China, after the initial surprise, required physically large, visible transfers of troops, war material like munitions, heavy weapons, on top of food, fuel, and other logistics. Interdiction of these bulk shipments is not a problem. If the Korean war restarts, much of the bulk shipments will be “humanitarian” shipments of food, fuel that the US will find extremely difficult to interdict politically. Smaller shipments of key components, knowhow, etc. that make or break a modern war can virtually slide through any known feasible sanction regime.
It is irresistible for Beijing China and their many “local” authorities, together with Russia, to use a Korean conflict to collect as much intelligence as possible on US and allied militaries. Whether authorized by Beijing China or not, entities from PRC will likely be furnishing DPRK with technical assistance, critical parts, assemblies, knowhow, and ad hoc transfers if not to test out the equipment against the US.
Russia still retains bitter memories of how the U.S. funneled arms like Stingers that played no small role in their defeat in Afghanistan. It would be hard to see Putin restraining many organizations in Russia, especially the criminal syndicates that control the Far East, from intervening.
Assessments suggest that DPRK can acquire a mid-late 1970s capability similar to Canada or Australia, or late 1960s UK in conventional weapons without great difficulties within six months of a conflict. Indeed, a few relative small shipments (e.g. 10 TEU containers) of component parts can substantially increase the lethality of a significant portion of legacy DPRK systems like artillery or short range ballistic missiles, or greatly improve the performance of their existing air defense systems.
This is over and above what DPRK can do to improve their nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities “on the fly” should their supporters like Iran and “local” PRC governments decide to support them.
The U.S. cannot assume DPRK missiles will not work, or be the relative primitive versions seen to date. Once the spigot for aid is opened, it is conceivable that DPRK within a relatively short period of time can field an ICBM force that is close to the sophistication of Pakistan’s, with penetration aids, decoys, and tactics specifically intended to overcome defenses within a matter of months.
Should Beijing China fail to deliver on mitigating the DPRK threat, the U.S. and the allies presently have a an potentially outdated OPLAN 5015, with or without the use of WMDs. Given the rate of advances that DPRK have proven over the past two years, the window for military action with limited WMD risks to CONUS may be closing in as short as 3 or at most 5 years.
That is not enough time for a full scale re-orientation, training and rearmament of US and allied forces who have spent two decades fighting rag-tag terrorist armies.
An urgent program to facilitate better conventional and nuclear military options with deliverables measured in months and at most a couple years need to be on the agenda for the Trump Administration and Congress.
Editor’s Note: We have focused for some time on the need to look at North Korea as it is and is evolving rather than through the lens of the 1953 war.
This means that the Command needs to be led by a USAF general and a high intensity war plan developed with relevant nuclear capability woven into it.
And the thoughts about shifting the Command to South Korean leadership is a virtual non-starter because of the centrality of the nuclear weapons issue to any war fighting and/or deterrence equation.
And dealing with North Korea is the harbinger of things to come in terms of the acceleration of U.S. and allied capabilities to fight a high intensity war, rather than the slow mo wars of the past decade.
This requires a shift in resources, an emphasis on accelerated introduction of new warfighting capabilities and training, training, and training for new operational tempos and challenges.
The template of the last decade is dysfunctional for dealing with threats which are clear and present dangers to the homeland.
In effect, the Trump Administration might be facing a triple transition.
The first is a rapid transition to shifting resources to prepare to fight high intensity conflict.
The second is to position the US and the allies to fight a long war with ISIS, in which insertion forces and intervention without long ground engagement is required.
The third is to recalibrate Afghanistan away from a significant ground war with large numbers of US and allied troops needed for operational control of territory.
As the then NORTHCOM/NORAD Commander put it in our interview with him last year with regard to the revitalized nuclear threat to North America from 10 and 2 O’Clock:
Question: The nuclear dimension is a key part of all of this, although there is a reluctance to talk about the Second Nuclear Age and the shaping of deterrent strategies to deal with the new dynamics.
With regard to Russia, they have changed their doctrine and approach.
How do you view their approach and the challenge to us which flows from that change?
Answer: Both the Chinese and Russians have said in their open military literature, that if conflict comes, they want to escalate conflict in order to de-escalate it.
Now think about that from our side. And so now as crisis escalates, how will Russia or China want to escalate to deescalate?
They’ll definitely come at us through cyber.
And they’ll deliver conventional and potentially put nukes on the table. We have to treat the threat in a global manner and we have to be prepared to be able to deal with these through multiple domains, which include cyber, but that’s not in NORAD or NORTHCOM mission sets.
We clearly need the capacity to have the correct chain of command in order to confront this threat; and if you look at where we are today with NORAD or NORTHCOM, we are only dealing with an air defense threat and managing to that threat.
We are not comprehensive in a manner symmetrical with the evolving threat or challenges facing North American defense.
This is a notional rendering of the 10 and 2 O’Clock challenge. It is credited to Second Line of Defense and not in any way an official rendering by any agency of the US government. It is meant for illustration purposes only.
Question: Clearly, the new leadership in North Korea is working to shape new nuclear and strike capabilities.
There probably is NO homeland defense threat more pressing and clear and present than the nuclear threat from North Korea.
How do you view this challenge?
Answer: I own the trigger to deal with this threat in consultation with the National Command Authority.
We are prepared to shoot in our defense.
We have invested in a ground missile defense system in Alaska; we have 44 interceptors in all. We have a sophisticated system of systems in place, but we need to improve its robustness as the system has been built over time with the fits and starts politically with regard to the system.
I testify along with the head of the Missile Defense Agency with regard to our system and the ways to improve it.
We need the maintenance and modernization of the system and the tests in order to assure ourselves that it’s going to work and I have high confidence in the system at the current time.
Then, we need improvements in the sensors. And we need investments and research and development to get us on the correct side of the cost curve, because both the theater ballistic missile defense and ballistic missile defense of the homeland have been on the wrong side of the cost curve.
We’re shooting very dumb rockets down, inexpensive rockets, with very expensive rockets, and we’re only doing it in the case of ballistic missile defense in mid-course so that the debris doesn’t fall on the homeland.
What we need to do is invest in those technologies that keep them from being launched, detect them, kill them on the rails, kill them in boost phase, start knocking the count-rate down instead of just taking a single rocket and shooting it down in mid-course.
It is about the kill chain, and shaping a more effective missile defense kill chain which is integratable in the overall North American NIFC-CA type capability which can integrate air and sea systems which is important to deal with the evolving threat environment.
But one has to think through our deterrence strategy as well.
What deters the current leader of North Korea?
What deters non-state actors for getting and using a nuclear weapon?
What will deter Russia from using tactical nuclear weapons in the sequence of how they view dealing with conventional war?
It is not my view that matters; it is their view; how to I get inside the head of the 21stcentury actors, and not simply stay in yesterday’s set of answers?
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2017-05-06 Editor’s Note: Ed Timperlake published a story on April 29, 2017 in anticipation of the commemorative dinner to be held in New York City on May 5th, 2017 and that article is republished below.
But we wanted to update the context within which the article was written as the dinner commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea occurred on May 5, 2017.
At that dinner both the President and the Prime Minister spoke and made it very clear how each saw the importance of working with the other in dealing with 21st century challenges.
The Prime Minister both in his remarks in Australia and the United States remembering this historic event underscored how he saw the centrality of the relationship.
In New York he said: “And as we reflect on the Battle Coral Sea we are reminded of how the stability and prosperity of our region over so many decades has been secured and is secured today by the United States.
Prime Minister Turnbull at the 75th Commemorative Dinner remembering the 75th Anniversary of the Coral Sea, May 5, 2017. Getty Images: Brendan Smialowski.
“A commitment to the peace stability, the rule of law in our region renewed by President Trump for which we thank you sir.
“Each of our great nations defines its national identity, not by race or religion or ethnicity as so many others do, but by a commitment to shared political values, as timeless as they are inclusive – freedom, democracy and the rule of law.
“Shared values. A shared destiny.
“Fiercely competitive, we always want to win, but we know we are always more assured of winning when we are fighting together.”
(The PM’s remarks in both Australia and the US are reproduced at the end of this article).
And President Trump hammered home the centrality of the relationship in these words.
The ties between the US and Australia “were sealed with the blood of our fathers and grandfathers.”
“We forged iron bonds between our two countries.
“Few peoples in the world share ties in history, affection and culture like the Americans and the Australians – few, believe me.”
“With love for our two nations, with pride in our shared history and with faith in almighty God, we renew our old friendship and we pledge our lasting partnership in the search for prosperity and everlasting peace.
In his speech, the President went out of his way to praise the navy and contributions to the Navy of graduates from the Naval Academy.
He as well praised one particular veteran who died during the battle and was described by his Academy roommate as tough guy who followed his own path.
In the President’s words: “In other words, a New Yorker.”
He also noted that today US and Australian servicemen and women are fighting side by side against global threats like ISIS and underscored how important he saw that working relationship to the peace and stability of the two countries.
And one of the speakers was the well known actor John Travolta who delivered a simple and eloquent homage to the US-Australian relationship.
2017-04-29 By Ed Timperlake
Recently the Vice President visited Australia and opened the next phase of the long-unktanding relationship between Australia and the United States grounded in mutual meeting the tough global challenges of the 20th century and facing up to the ones of the day.
The past and the future are being brought together when President Trump will meet next week with the Australian Prime Minister and remember a very significant battle defending Australia against Japanese invasion and pushing the Japanese back from their forward assault on the Pacific.
Now we face a new Pacific threat, a North Korean leader who threatens the US and Australia with nuclear attack. He has not factored in that neither Australia or the United States having defeated the Empire of Japan is not about to roll over and give in to the demands of a nuclear gangster.
When one goes back and remembers the history of working together side-by-side or the very close working relationship between the US and Australian militaries (the Marines are currently in Darwin), the firmness of the resolve of these two democracies should not be doubted.
The hospitality and courage exemplified by Australian citizens in being a trusted ally of American forces is unyielding.
Remembering My Naval Academy “Supe”
As a Plebe at the US Naval Academy in 1965, a Navy Grad from the 19th Century, visited who served as an officer in the Great White Fleet.
He and the senior Officers running the Academy, all highly decorated WW II Officers, agreed that stopping in Australia for shore liberty was one of the most delightful and appreciated moments ever in their sea going career
Our Naval Academy “Supe” was Rear Admiral Draper Kauffman who argued that “Those who not create the future they want must endure the future they get”
Draper Kauffman was the father of Navy SEALs. And he embodied how working with allies and being a US servicemen blended over one into the other to shape a much more effective warfighter.
Admiral Kauffman was a living testimony to joint service in time of war.
Here is his bare bones history:
He was awarded two Navy Crosses for his wartime service which included participation in the invasions of Saipan, Tinian, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Draper Kauffman is well known as the US Navy’s Founding Frogman, Father of Navy Special Warfare’s UDT/SEAL. However, less known but equally important is that he is also credited as a Founding Father of US Navy EOD.
His life is a tribute to service as a true American Hero, He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1933. He was then denied commission as a “Regular” officer due to poor eyesight. But following his denied commission, Kauffman joined the United States Steamship Lines in an effort to assist, in what he felt, the inevitable war against Germany.
Then comes the work with the allies bit which bridged his way to the next phase of his career. On 10 May 1940 he volunteered as an ambulance driver for the French Army in a region of Alsace-Lorraine, just 10 miles from France’s “impenetrable” Maginot Line. On 22 June 1940, he was captured by the Germans with his ambulance co-drivers and became a WWII POW. He was then repatriated several months later. For his service in France he became a Holder of France’s Croix de Guerre.
Undaunted, in late 1940, he became a member of England’s Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve and volunteered for the Royal Navy Unexploded Bomb Department. In that role, in December 1941, he was one of the first to defuse a Japanese UXO. For this he was awarded his first Navy Cross.
Then in 1942 Jan 04 LT Kauffman returns to Washington D.C. and established the US Navy Bomb Disposal School. In1942 Jan 23 the first U.S. Navy Bomb Disposal class convened at Washington Navy Yard
In 1944, Kauffman withdrew from the ranks of the US EOD School to begin what would be the predecessor of UDT/SEAL, Naval Combat Demolition Unit
As commander of UDT 5, he participated in the invasion of Saipan, and received a second Navy Cross for leading his team in a daylight reconnaissance of fortified enemy beaches under heavy fire, and on 10 July 1944, leading a night reconnaissance of heavily defended beaches at Tinian island.
There are many other historical examples, but I will highlight two of them here.
First, we can point to the Battle of the Coral Sea, the 75th Anniversary of which will be honored by the President and the Prime Minister next week, for a key milestone in that relationship.
In May 1942 the first air-sea battle in history played out, The Battle of the Coral Sea. This battle was the first air-sea battle in history. It was an engagement in which the lead role was played by aircraft launched from ships at sea. The strategic battle resulted from Japanese efforts to make an amphibious landing at Port Moresby in southeast New Guinea and then eventually on to Australia.
Unknown to the Japanese, Allied code breakers had learned enough about enemy communications to discern Japanese plans in time for Allied fleets to assemble in the Coral Sea. Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher commanded American task forces, including two large aircraft carriers and other ships, and a British-led cruiser force mounted surface opposition. The Japanese used many more ships but divided them into a number of widely separated groups, one of which contained a light carrier. The Japanese covering force also contained two large carriers.
When the main forces traded air strikes, the Americans lost the carrier Lexington, Yorktown was also damaged and later lost the following month at the defining US Sea Service strategic victory The Miracle at Midway. The Japanese suffered damage to the carrier Shokaku. Without air cover, however, the Japanese invasion force turned back, leaving the strategic victory to the Allies.
This was the first air-sea battle in history but that is what the US and the allies face when dealing with contemporary threats and challenges.
And both countries are working hard on modernizing their forces and enhancing their ability to work together even in extreme situations.
The second is one lesson of the Vietnam War, namely the contribution of HMAS Hobart.
The combat firepower of the HMAS Hobart was significant as were many of the other contributions in the US Australian Joint force team.
But at a tragic moment there was a major breakdown in Intel and communications that rested with the American forces.
I was serving as a First Class Midshipman on the USS Great Sitkin, an ammo ship on the ‘Gun Line” off Vietnam in 1968, and we were present when HMAS Hobart took two Aim-7 Sparrow Missiles amidships.
HMAS Hobart, the first warship to carry the new Australian white ensign into action, came under fire nine times, fired 9204 rounds on 1050 targets and steamed 52,529 miles in her first deployment.
It was a nasty and un-necessary friendly fire incident because the two USAF F-4s thought they were shooting down “NVA helicopters.”
It turned out that Air America was running helos up and down the Vietnam coast without keeping the 7th Fleet informed.
But the deadly mistake did not stop the Royal Australian Navy from serving with great distinction.
The rest of the story as the first Assistant Secretary of Veterans affairs for Congressional and Public Affairs I had the honor of representing President Bush (41) and all Americans in Canberra for the dedication of the Australian Vietnam Veterans Memorial.
With a ‘Huey” UH-1 coming out of the mist, and the band playing Waltzing Matilda the dedication parade was led by family members of the fallen all carrying an Australian Flag. Australia was truly a nation that remembered their warrior’s ultimate sacrifice.
Facing 21st Century Threats
And now the two countries are facing 21st century Pacific threats.
Some threats are more immediate than others, but clearly there is an intensifying set of challenges in the Pacific underway and they are not going away anytime soon.
A new and lethal challenge is evident, with the rapid modernization of the PLA, a catch all for Peoples Liberation Army, Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and their 2nd Artillery Rocket forces.
The new Chinese Aircraft Carrier.
However small there is a probability this PLAAN Aircraft Carrier and with Air, surface and sub-surface combatants eventually will have the potential to follow the Imperial Japanese Navy Attack Plan.
But right now today, there is much greater danger in the Pacific. There is an immediate nasty strategic threat against Australia by the Dear Leader of North Korea. Diplomatically the Australian Defense Minister hit a pitch perfect note:
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program poses a “serious threat” to Australia unless the international community stops it, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has warned.
FOREIGN Minister Julie Bishop has spoken of the “grave” threat Australia faces from a nuclear-armed North Korea, as Australia hit back at the latest incendiary comments from the reclusive state.
After North Korea accused Australia of “blindly and zealously toeing the U.S .line” and threatened a nuclear strike on one of America’s closest allies in the Pacific region, Ms. Bishop said the country’s military ambitions could not continue to go unchecked.
Vice President Pence meets with Foreign Minister Bishop during a visit to Australia, April 2017,
And make no mistake about it, Australia is serious about modernizing its capabilities and punching above its weight. It is not just about adding new platforms to the force and enhancing the integration of the force (remember that fratricide caused the damage to the Hobart and its crew) and interoperability with Australia’s allies, it is about shaping cutting edge thinking about that force and its development.
The forward leaning thinking in the Australian Defence Force is about their embracing training tactics and technology to create perhaps the most modern fighting force in the world for their size.
America because of significant contributions to military R&D has the most cutting-edge weapons in the world, from platforms (Carriers, B-2) , munitions and C&C links.
America is the number one military force in the world.
But this does not mean America has an intellectual monopoly of visionary thinking.
The evolving consortium of 21st century military strategists transcends nationalities and makes the current alliance of military forces, country agnostic on understanding the trends of combat forces empowered with 21st Century technology and the ability to fight and win around the globe.
An adversary will cross these 21st century warriors at that nations or terror organization’s peril.
Providing Cutting Edge Intellectual Leadership
The Aussies are not just buying new equipment; they are rethinking how to integrated that force and make a more effective and lethal combat capability.
There are two recent publications that illustrate this rethinking effort.
The first is by the current chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett (“The Navy and The Nation; Australia’s Maritime Power in the 21st Century”) and the second is the publication of the new RAAF strategy (“Air Force Strategy 2017-2027” Royal Australian Air Force).
Australia’s Vice Admiral Tim Barrett has written a brilliant book about maritime power. It is what is known as a “good read” because it is written with great insights presented in easily understandable prose. He shows the reader why “The Navy and the Nation” is a sacred bond.
This passage is one of the most powerful ever written about the role of a Navy and the connection with their citizens:
“Most People think the Navy is something else.
“They know it exists, the may even have a rough idea of what it is for, but they don’t think it’s got much to do with them.
“They’re wrong.
“The Navy is a national enterprise in which everyone is involved and which everyone is involved and which delivers peace and security to everyone in the country.
“This enterprise is a two-way street, and must be a two-way street.
“Going one way, the Navy offers peace and security. Going the other, the people offer support and contribution. Only when the street is a properly mutual two-way exchange between the Navy and the citizens can this bargain, this contract, deliver what it needs to.”
The Royal Australian Air Force strategy is less personal than the Navy book.
It is a forceful statement of an achievable vision.
It builds on today’s headlines about the RAAF in combat to focus on how to build a fifth generation combat force.
The focus for the RAAF is upon shaping a 21st network of warriors and building trust with the other services.
The strategy underscored the following:
Air Force’s future success depends on being a valued and effective part of a much more joint ADF, and of ‘One Defence’ more broadly. For this reason, the strategy explains how Air Force will contribute to the larger Defence change journey.
This transparency is important for building and strengthening mutually beneficial relationships with Defence’s other Groups and Services, Government, industry partners and international allies.
The Air Force Strategy will place significant emphasis on people during its implementation. This is deliberate because our people are just as important to our warfighting effectiveness as are our technical capabilities.
Our success in developing our technical capabilities has not always been matched by how well we have developed our workforce. Air Force must place greater emphasis on ensuring our people are able to exploit the full potential of our future platforms and systems. This requirement will extend to our leaders becoming adept practitioners of operational art in the Information Age.
The end of USS Lexington during the Battle of the Coral Sea. Left; rocked by an internal explosion and right; destroyers in attendance before the carrier was sunk
And the new generation of warriors is growing up in close working relationship with their fellow warriors flying and maintaining theire F-35s, P-8s, Aegis systems, the Tritons and cross learning in shaping a way to defeat the forces which want to destroy the liberal democracies.
It is not just about buying similar platforms; it is about moving out with ways to shape more lethal, survivable and effective alliance combat forces.
In short, the bonding in combat between Australia and America, which was forged by the Australian and American heroes in their strategic victory during the Battle of the Coral Sea, is moving forward in the 21st century.
The best way to remember the contributions of the past is to build upon those bonds and recreate them in a new and dynamic situation facing both our countries.
The meeting next week is not just ceremonial symbolism – it is about shared risks, capabilities and responses to direct threats to our two countries.
Editor’s Note: On the Australian Navy’s web page there is a very interesting overview on the Battle of the Coral Sea which concludes with an interesting comment about working together:
The Royal Australian Navy’s overall contribution to the Battle of the Coral Sea may not have been as spectacular as that of the American carriers, but the work done by the coast watchers, intelligence staff, the cruisers and other support ships and personnel all contributed to the final result, not just at the Coral Sea but throughout the Pacific War.
Whilst Australians today may scoff at the fears of a Japanese invasion during 1942 the fact is that for many Australians during the 1940s that fear was real.
And thank you Mr President and Mrs Trump for your warm family welcome to New York. Lucy and I are honoured to be here. It is always wonderful to be back in this city and it is wonderful to meet your family, to be here with our son and our son-in-law, it has been a great evening and thank you so much.
And well done, congratulations – it is always good to win a vote in the Congress, or the Parliament as we call it.
And I’ve got to say, it is always reasonably satisfying to win a vote when people predict you’re not going to win it too. So keep at it. It is great. Well done Mr President.
There are so many distinguished guests here tonight – I want to thank you all so much for joining us and in such a great cause.
But there none more distinguished than the Veterans of the Battle of the Coral Sea. From the Royal Australian Navy Rear Admiral Andrew Robertson, Norm Tame, Gordon Johnson, Bill White, Derek Holyoake and from the US Navy John Hancock, Wendell Thrasher and Roger Spooner.
Gentlemen we salute you and we thank you. And I have to say you’re all in great shape. You’re all in great shape!
Earlier this week in Townsville we thanked and welcomed Cecil Wizwell, 93 years young, who served on the USS Lexington as a 17-year-old.
Now, 75 years ago the Japanese advance seemed unstoppable.
Their infamous surprise attack on Pearl Harbour had sunk or disabled much of the United States Pacific Fleet – with the notable exception of the carriers.
The impregnable fortress of Singapore had fallen.
The Royal Navy’s battle ship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse had been sunk by Japanese bombers off the coast of Malaya. HMAS Perth and USS Houston had been sunk off Java as had the carrier USS Langley.
Most of Australia’s army was either fighting in the Middle East or were prisoners of the Japanese.
Darwin, as Andrew reminded us, had been bombed. Indonesia, then the Dutch East Indies was taken, as was the north coast of New Guinea and the great naval base of Rabaul.
And Japan’s next inexorable advance was to seize Port Moresby in New Guinea, from which it would isolate Australia, take us out of the war, to be invaded as and when it suited the convenience of the new masters of the Pacific.
And in so doing deprive the United States of the forward base from which to mount its counter attack.
These were dark days indeed.
But then, as so often today, it was signals intelligence that cut through the darkness. From Melbourne, American and Australian code breakers revealed the Japanese plans to the Pacific Commander Admiral Nimitz.
Nimitz sent two carrier task forces led by USS Lexington and the USS Yorktown into the Coral Sea. They were joined by another Task Force led by the Australian cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Hobart and the United States ship Chicago.
For the first time, Australian ships were under the overall command of the United States Commander, Rear Admiral Fletcher, and within Task Force 44 itself, Australian Rear Admiral John Crace commanded American ships.
Unity of purpose, unity of command, shared and collaborative signals intelligence – the Battle of the Coral Sea took to the water and the sky, the mateship that had fought and won the Battle of Hamel 99 years ago.
The victory in the Coral Sea was the first setback to the Japanese in the Pacific War, the Moresby invasion force was turned back and by sinking one and damaging two Japanese carriers, it laid the foundation for the decisive victory at Midway a month later.
Churchill called this time the ‘hinge of fate’ and he was so right. The ‘hinge of fate’ turned to victory for America, Australia and our allies.
But it had a high price. The aircraft carrier USS Lexington was lost, as was the destroyer USS Sims and the tanker USS Neosho – over 600 American and Australian sailors and airmen died to secure that victory.
Our nations’ freedom was secured by the bravery of the men on those ships and the pilots who flew through everything the enemy and the weather could throw in their way.
Now this evening, President Trump and I have discussed the bond our great nations forged in freedom’s cause – from the battlefield of Hamel nearly one hundred years ago to our forces fighting side-by-side in the Middle East at this very moment.
And as we reflect on the Battle Coral Sea we are reminded of how the stability and prosperity of our region over so many decades has been secured and is secured today by the United States. A commitment to the peace stability, the rule of law in our region renewed by President Trump for which we thank you sir.
Each of our great nations defines its national identity, not by race or religion or ethnicity as so many others do, but by a commitment to shared political values, as timeless as they are inclusive – freedom, democracy and the rule of law.
Shared values. A shared destiny.
Fiercely competitive, we always want to win, but we know we are always more assured of winning when we are fighting together.
We are confident and we trust each other – that is why the United States is the largest foreign investor in Australia and the United States is our largest overseas investment destination. And as we have heard from Anthony about to become even larger.
And this relationship is built on the work of millions of Australians and Americans – many of whom here with us tonight – creating thousands of jobs in the USA and in Australia.
Today together we condemn and resist North Korea’s reckless provocation. We fight together in Iraq and Afghanistan to defeat and destroy the terrorists who threaten our way of life.
From the mud of Hamel to the waters of the Coral Sea to the sands of the Middle East today, Australians and Americans stand shoulder to shoulder defending our freedoms.
Recently, I travelled to Baghdad and Kabul to visit our troops and to commemorate Anzac Day.
I brought with me the gratitude of our nation.
And the certain knowledge that we best honour the service and sacrifice of generations past by supporting the servicemen and women, the veterans and their families of today.
I commend the board of the Australian American Association – Chairman Jennifer Nason and President John Berry – for their initiative in launching a new Veterans Fellowship Fund tonight and I thank you all for being so generous.
The proceeds from this evening’s dinner will enable a new generation of Australian and American veterans to be recognised for their service, and rewarded with the experience of earning a degree in either Australia or the United States.
We thank all those Australians and Americans who served— and remember the more than 600 who died—in the Battle of the Coral Sea.
And to all those who serve in the United States and Australian defence forces, we honour you, we thank you, you and your families – with your courage and your service, you keep us free.
Your Excellencies; Premier, Air Chief Marshal Binskin, Chief of the Defence Force, Vice Admiral Barrett, Senator Brandis, Amanda Rishworth, shadow minister for Defence Personnel and Senator McDonald. Mrs Valerie Fowler, the US Consul General, and Chargé D’Affaires James Carouso, Minister Miyashita from the Japanese Embassy, Admiral Scott Smith, Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Mayor Jenny Hill and Mr Williams, President of the Townsville and District Naval Association.
75 years ago the Japanese seemed unstoppable.
The pride of the US Navy had been sunk in a surprise attack at Pearl Harbour.
The great imperial garrison of Singapore had fallen – the worst defeat in British military history, as Churchill described it.
The Royal Navy’s battle ship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse had been sunk by Japanese bombers.
As Admiral Barrett just reminded us, the Australian Navy had lost eight ships.
Most of Australia’s army was either fighting in the Middle East or prisoners of the Japanese.
Darwin was bombed. The Dutch East Indies was taken, as was the north coast of New Guinea and the naval base of Rabaul.
And Japan’s next inexorable advance was to seize Port Moresby, from which it would isolate Australia and take us out of the War to be invaded at the convenience of the new masters of the Pacific.
These were dark times indeed.
The Japanese plans were discovered by American and Australian code-breakers at the Fleet Radio Unit in Melbourne, coast watchers on the Solomons and surveillance flights from Queensland and Port Moresby.
Over four critical days in May 1942, the fate of our island continent hung in the balance.
Australians and Americans fighting side by side, just as they had for the first time 99 years ago at the Battle of Hamel.
Admiral Nimitz sent two carrier task forces led by the Lexington and the Yorktown into the Coral Sea. They were joined by a third task force 44 led by the cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Hobart and USS Chicago and commanded by the Australian Rear Admiral John Crace.
The Japanese were turned back, but not without a heavy price.
The mighty aircraft carrier USS Lexington was lost, as was the destroyer USS Sims and the tanker USS Neosho.
The US Navy’s commitment of two of its precious carriers into this battle, showed a total commitment to the defence of Australia.
And it showed a total unity of purpose. For the first time, Australian ships were under the overall command of the United States Commander, Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher, and within Task Force 44 itself an Australian Rear Admiral John Crace commanded American ships.
For the first time a naval battle was fought entirely from the air. Neither of the fleets saw each other or exchanged shell fire.
The Moresby invasion force was turned back in large part because of Admiral Fletcher’s decision to deploy Crace’s Task Force 44 to block the Jomard Passage and Crace was able and the Captain Farncomb of the Australia were able with superb seamanship and without air cover to dodge the Japanese bombs and torpedoes and avoid the fate of the Prince of Wales and Repulse.
By sinking the light carrier, the Shoho and damaging the two fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku the Japanese navy was materially diminished in advance of the coming Battle of Midway, another aerial sea battle which saw the loss of four Japanese fleet carriers and irreversible damage to their naval forces only a few months later.
The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first setback to the Japanese in the Pacific War, it laid the foundation for the victory at Midway- it was a turning point in the war.
Our freedoms were secured by the bravery of the fighting men on those ships and the pilots who flew through everything the enemy and the weather could throw in their way.
We will never know the grim anxiety of the ships’ companies scanning the skies for incoming enemy bombers, but also hoping and praying to see their own pilots returning safely from raids and reconnaissance missions.
We will never know what it was like to be trapped above deck as enemy aircraft strafed the ship, or to be caught below deck as engines caught fire and explosions shut off escape from the flooding sea.
We will never know the courage of the pilots who spent the last of their fuel in battle, knowing they would never make it back to their ship.
We will never know the anguish of those sailors listening intently to radio communications who heard the heartfelt farewells from these brave men as they prepared to meet their death.
It is a great honour to welcome today the families of the USS Lexington’s crew who have travelled here to pay their respects. I reserve an especially warm welcome for 93 year-old Cecil Wiswell who proudly served on board the Lexington as a 17 year old, Seaman Second Class.
Today, the ashes of his friend and fellow Lexington crew member, Harry Frey and Harry’s wife will be scattered in the Coral Sea.
Today, Australia and the United States continue to work with our allies to address new security threats around the world.
Together, we are taking a strong message to North Korea that we will not tolerate reckless, dangerous threats to the peace and stability of our region, and we are united in our efforts to defeat the terrorists in the Middle East and Afghanistan.
We must be forever grateful to those who have put their lives on the line, and those who do so today, so that we might have a free and peaceful world.
I thanked our servicemen and women in the Middle East for their service only last week, serving like the ships’ companies of Australia and Hobartdid 75 years ago with our American allies in freedom’s cause.
It’s a message I repeat today as we pay tribute to the Australians and Americans who served and the more than 600 who died in the Battle of the Coral Sea.
To each of you, I offer the thanks of the grateful generations which came after you.
And to all men and women who have served in our defence forces—and who serve us today— and the families that support them – we thank you and we honour your courage, your service and your sacrifice.
Lest we forget.
The complete set of speeches and presentations at the dinner can be found below:
In his presentation to The Williams Foundation seminar on air combat in 2025 and beyond, Air Marshal Brown, then Chief of Staff or the RAAF focused on the F-35. He highlighted the centrality of the decision superiority inherent in the systems of the aircraft. But underscored that training and effective concepts of operations were necessary to achieve a latent advantage.Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
Lt General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Army, addresses the question of innovation and modernization for the ADF, Credit: Photo: Second Line of Defence
Air Marshal Leo Davies providing the opening address at the Plan Jericho Conference held by the Williams Foundation in Canberra, Australia, August 6, 2015. Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
Lt. Col. “Chip” Berke discussing his F-22 and F-35 experiences with the Australian audience at the Williams Foundation Conference, March 11, 2014. Credit Photo: SLD
Image grab from a Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon aircraft that assisted with the co-ordination of a search and rescue response, approximately 50 kilometres south of Mount Gambier, Victoria.
In the 21 March flight off the Portuguese coast, the tanker performed the scheduled six contacts, at flight conditions of 270KT and 25,000ft over a 1hr 15min test period. Both crews reported a faultless operation.
This is a notional rendering of the 10 and 2 O’Clock challenge. It is credited to Second Line of Defense and not in any way an official rendering by any agency of the US government. It is meant for illustration purposes only.
HMAS Hobart, the first warship to carry the new Australian white ensign into action, came under fire nine times, fired 9204 rounds on 1050 targets and steamed 52,529 miles in her first deployment.
Vice President Pence meets with Foreign Minister Bishop during a visit to Australia, April 2017,