Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

A400M Common Sustainment: A Step Forward

Posted on December 17, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

12/17/2016

2016-12-17 The A400M is a new fleet asset for a number of Air Forces.

Keeping the aircraft with a common baseline configuration will be crucial to providing for the kind of common sustainment options which can provide for global fleet operational capabilities.

A step in this direction was reached by the recent signing by France, the UK and Spain of a global support service contract.

According to an Airbus Defence and Space press release dated December 7, 2016:

Airbus Defence and Space has signed a long-term Global Support Service contract for the A400M new generation airlifter with the UK, France and Spain.

The new agreement, effective 1 December, runs as a first step for two years and follows previously signed contracts which provided support for France and UK in their early years of operation of the A400M. It additionally forms the basis of support for Spain which accepted its first aircraft on 1 December.

MSN 24, the 7th RAF A400M. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space

This first phase of the agreement paves the way for any other OCCAR nation to join later and benefit from this package as well as additional new services currently under development.

Head of Military Aircraft Services Stephan Miegel said: “The contracts that were put in place to see the A400M into initial service have worked well, but this next stage will provide a sophisticated and highly integrated support service that will further free operators to focus on their mission, knowing that they can rely on robust support for the years ahead. We would encourage other A400M operators to take advantage of these arrangements which we are convinced have the potential to let them operate the aircraft to its maximum capability.”

Under the new arrangement, the three nations will benefit from a spares pool, technical and engineering support, maintenance and flight operations services.

Customer nations will see numerous benefits from the sharing of these resources and assets in a common central services operation including substantial cost savings, increased efficiency of service, and greater flexibility to meet their specific operational requirements.

The contract was awarded by the UK’s Defence Equipment & Support Agency (DE&S), the French Direction générale de l’armement (DGA) and Spain’s Direccion General de Armamento y Material (DGAM) through the OCCAR international programme management organization.

During a visit to the Bricy air base, the squadron leadership provided insights with regard to the French approach to the A400M and the squadron leader highlighted the importance in his view of the inherent upgradeability of the aircraft associated with its software systems as well as the promise of digital maintenance for shaping a new approach to fleet management.

In that interview, Lt. Col. Paillard highlighted the importance of keeping the aircraft common among the A400M users to get the maximum impact from the aircraft operating as a fleet.

“We do not want to end up like the Transall which was a common French and German aircraft but at the end became completely different aircraft.”

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-the-first-a400m-squadron-at-bricy-shaping-a-way-ahead/

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-the-a400m-in-seville-and-in-orleans/

A key potential for leveraging commonality is derived from the digital nature of the aircraft.

The sensors onboard the aircraft and the various software upgradeable systems provide an inherent potential for the A400M to provide for inherent upgradeability and serviceability across the fleet.

Put in other terms, the digital nature of the aircraft is part of every A400M which enters the combat fleet and can provide a significant advantage over legacy aircraft.

The A400M as a Digital Aircraft: Crafting a 21st Century Baseline

Trump’s Indian Opportunity

Posted on December 17, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

In an increasingly competitive global arms market, India has become a key partner of choice for the West and Russia. (Credit: Bigstock)

2016-12-11 By Richard Weitz

President-elect Donald Trump’s decision to appoint South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley as his future UN Ambassador underscores that the incoming administration, which begins on January 20, understands the importance of developing stronger Indian-U.S. ties.

The bilateral national security relationship is critical for realizing both countries’ core defense objectives.

Showing how Trump can set aside political differences for the national interest, Haley initially supported Marco Rubio’s candidacy for the presidency, then that of Ted Cruz, before backing Trump.

If confirmed by the Senate, Haley would become the most prominent Trump political appointee representing the more than three million Indian-Americans in the United States. The Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans represents the largest House caucus focused on a single foreign country.

President elect Trump is appointing new faces who are not simply camp followers. A case in point is the South Carolina governor to the post of US UN Ambassador.

Haley could also help Trump deepen relations with India.

When Trump spoke at the Republican Hindu Coalition in mid-October for a charity concert in New Jersey, he praised the Hindu faith, India as a nation, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strong leadership.

Then and elsewhere, he described India as a vital ally in the fight against Islamist terrorism.

The personal relationship between the two presidents go off to a good start.

Modi was part of the select group of leaders to speak on the phone with Trump the day after his election. The Prime Minister also tweeted to Trump, “We appreciate the friendship you have articulated towards India during your campaign.”

The two men have similarities in their political background—both are outsiders who challenge conventional views by pushing for free-market policies at home and nationalist policies abroad in the face of generally unenthusiastic foreign-policy establishments.

U.S. defense leaders have come to see India as a key U.S. partner.

Leon Panetta called India a “linchpin” of U.S. policy in Asia; Chuck Hagel termed India a security provider “from the Indian Ocean to the greater Pacific”; and Ashton Carter has said that “the U.S.-India relationship is destined to be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century.”

Indian-U.S. defense exchanges have been expanding substantially in number and kind, making the United States the main foreign military exercise partner of the Indian Armed Forces. In particular, the two militaries have participated in frequent bilateral and multilateral exercises during the past decade, with special emphasis on naval cooperation.

The Trump team has opportunities to broaden and deepen the Indian-U.S. defense relationship.

In addition to the single-service drills that they regularly undertake, the United States and India can expand their bilateral military training to include rehearsing large multi-service combined exercises.

In addition, the number of army exercises should increase since India’s army receives more than half of the country’s defense budget while its navy, which has been the Pentagon’s most active exercise partner, receives a much smaller percentage.

On a multinational plane, increasing cooperation with Japan and other third partners—for instance, by following the advice of Admiral Harry Harris, U.S. Pacific Command chief, who called for a revival of the Bush-era “quad” between India, Japan, Australia and the United States—would expand the impact of the Indian-U.S. security partnership.

India may play a key role in regional security assistance as the incoming Trump administration seeks to transition defense and security burdens local partners. For example, the United States should encourage India to provide more extensive assistance to the Afghan and Central Asian security forces. Trilateral Russia-U.S.-Indian security opportunities may emerge in Eurasia if U.S. relations with Moscow improve.

Indian-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation can be strengthened by furthering intelligence sharing, reviving their stalled homeland security dialogue, deepening nuclear and biological security cooperation, encompassing a wider range of narcotics trafficking issues, and signing the planned cybersecurity framework agreement.

India should heed the Trump administration’s likely demand that India join the U.S.-led “Global Coalition against Daesh,” which now includes 68 members.

The Trump administration can better overcome Indian resistance to this step by encouraging India to provide non-combat intelligence, economic, and humanitarian assistance.

In future negotiations with India, the Trump administration may be torn between continuing previous administrations’ policies of developing a strategic partnership to share common security burdens and adopting a more short-term transactional economic focus.

The former approach will be more difficult to achieve, it but should be the objective of the new administration regarding India.

In fact, the latter strategy might work better with Pakistan, where generous past U.S. assistance has failed to attain much U.S. influence over Pakistani policies. Indians might enjoy seeing Trump set aside diplomatic niceties to more explicitly attack Pakistani ties to Islamist terrorism.

By strengthening India’s counterterrorism, homeland defense, and nuclear security capabilities, moreover, the United States can reduce the risks that Pakistani-backed terrorist attacks could escalate into a major Indian-Pakistani military conflict.

In this regard, Trump should continue the recent practice of de-hyphenating India and Pakistan, making aid to Pakistan more conditional and reducing both U.S. security and developmental assistance. While Pakistan is a U.S. regional partner, India is a strategic partner throughout Asia, and increasingly globally.

Meanwhile, India should raise its ceiling on foreign defense investment and relax some offset requirements. For instance, the Indian government should specify when 100% FDI is permissible.

India should also strengthen the barriers against the unauthorized transfer of U.S. military technology to third parties like Iran. These changes will help meet the Trump administration’s goal of boosting U.S. exports and developing more balanced international economic relations without compromising on U.S. security goals.

Enhancing Indian-U.S. security ties along these lines should balance the tensions that might arise during Trump’s presidency over immigration (India has a large Muslim minority), climate change (Indians had expected to receive foreign funds and technology to curtail their carbon emissions), and the possible de-emphasis of democracy promotion and Afghanistan.

While potentially a point of friction with the Indian government, it remains to be seen how the new administration would curtail the outsourcing of labor to India.

Although Trump criticized outsourcing in his book, Time to Get Tough, and said during the campaign that he would give corporations incentives to bring outsourced jobs back to the United States, Trump has spared India by mostly faulting China for predatory economic behavior. Indians will benefit if Trump’s tough approach leads China to treat its economic partners better.

Also see the following:

Trump’s Indian Opportunity

The Moment Pilots First Realized the F-35 was Something Extraordinary

Posted on December 16, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

12/16/2016

2016-12-06 By Todd Miller

Statistics, Milestones, Capabilities, Flight characteristics, Test protocols, Cost, Software blocks. It is easy to get lost in the complexity of the F-35 program.

The combined F-35 fleet now has over 75,000 flight hours, yet for many there remains a lack of understanding. Much of this can be expected given many of the F-35s capabilities are classified.

This is compounded by the reality that many do not grasp the war the F-35 was designed to deter – or fight.

Aerial warfare of the 21^st century is not anticipated to consist of within visual range (WVR) dogfights, but rather the prevailing aircraft will dispatch its adversary without even being detected. 21^st Century Warfare is defined by new terms; “Information Dominance,” “Full Spectrum Dominance,” “Distributed Lethality,” “The Kill Cloud/Kill Web.”

This warfare has about as much in common with wars of the past as your 1970’s land line has to your smartphone.

It is in this battlespace that the F-35 is designed to fight and to do so with a distinctly unfair advantage.

To understand the significance and value of the F-35, and whether “it works” or not, cut through the complexity and noise. Simplify. Put aside the politicians, the ideologues, the self-proclaimed experts and listen to the voice of the pilots.

The pilots will take the aircraft into combat, their own lives in the balance as they penetrate contested space and are likely to be outnumbered by adversary aircraft.

Second Line of Defense and a handful of journalists recently had the opportunity to visit with four such pilots during a “Proof of Concept” demonstration on the USS America, November 19, 2016.

The four pilots are some of the most experienced F-35B pilots in the United States Marine Corps (USMC);

George “Sack” Rowell, Commanding Officer (CO) of VMX-1 (Marine Operational Test & Evaluation Squadron). Prior to the F-35, Rowell spent appx. 3000 hours over 18 years of flying the F/A-18 Hornet. Previously the CO of VMFA(AW)-533
Col. Chad “Mo” Vaughn, CO of VMFA-211. Prior to the F-35, Vaughn spent a couple 1000 hrs over 13 years in the F/A-18A-D Hornet, as well as time in the F-16A-B Fighting Falcon/Viper and F/A-18 Super Hornet at NAS Fallon.
Col. Rich “BC” Rusnok, slated to become the CO of VMFA-121 in March 2017. Prior to the F-35, Price spent appx. 7 years flying the AV-8B Harrier II with additional time in the F/A-18 Hornet.
Col. John “Guts” Price, slated CO for VFMA-122 (2018). Prior to the F-35, Price spent appx. 1200 hrs and 10 years flying the AV-8B Harrier II, and has about 400 hrs in the F-35 over the past 3 years.

The comments have been edited for readability with best efforts made to maintain context and integrity of intent.

As you look at the F-35s combat capabilities, what two things really mark it as either a superior or inferior weapon compared to what you have previously flown?

Mo: The closer you get to the airplane, the more positive you are about it.

The airplane provides awareness of what is going on around you. All around you. It is second to none.

I tell people this all the time.

I cannot tell you how awesome the sensor suite is, combined with the survivability of the airplane.

It’s not just that it is a stealth airplane, it is everything rolled into one.

It makes it unlike any other plane anywhere in the world right now.

BC: Stealth works. Low observability is not a fallacy.

You see it in the airplane and realize what a powerful capability it is.

None of the airplanes we flew prior had that capability.

To echo what Mo said, the situational awareness (SA), the fusion piece of it stands out.

In Gen 4 aircraft the pilot is the fusion engine, what’s in between your ears is what’s making that fusion happen.

To some degree that’s still true, the human is a major part of this weapons system.

However, the aid that the fusion system gives a pilot to make high level decisions, coupled with situational awareness well beyond what was had before – that’s what makes it a game changer.

Guts: Situational awareness and the freedom of maneuver that stealth brings. The workload required to have that unprecedented SA is greatly reduced over previous platforms.

I’m getting all this information, I have freedom to maneuver, and I work significantly less than I did in a previous platform to have that level of information.

That frees up my processor to be able to fight the battle vs. each individual part that I used to have to put together.

The workload is reduced in all aspects of flight, and that enables me to focus on the fight at hand.

Mo: The aircraft allows me to be a tactician, rather than worry about physically manipulating sensors to get information I need.

I have a good picture that I can execute tactically.

It is almost like a chess game.

I can make sure the moves I make in the cockpit are the best moves not just for me, but for everybody out there.

Can you talk a little about the AEGIS Integration?

BC: The synergistic effects of other platforms, especially powerful platforms like the AEGIS combat system not only makes us that much more effective, they have phenomenal SA, phenomenal power and a phenomenal weapons suite.

Sometimes we may not be in the right position, or be the best shooter – but now we can work synergistically with AEGIS and figure out that big picture.

Then we can share all that onboard information to other platforms that may or may not have the same capabilities. The integration makes us that much more effective.

We came in with Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Industry, Big Navy to perform a demonstration in September out of White Sands, NM. The F-35 performed an engagement with that combat system through a gateway that allowed us to talk via Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) to the AEGIS combat system and engage the target.

We talked electronically to the AEGIS combat system, like a remote sensor, and AEGIS engaged the airborne target successfully.

And when I say engaged successfully, it was a metal on metal engagement from a significant range. I’d say more than a tactically significant range. It was a very, very impressive shot.

That was not something we did here at sea, [it was done in September] that was a developmental test, a proof of concept, but it gives us an idea of what we can do to plug the F-35 into the bigger picture.

Can you talk about the interface for that kind of targeting?

BC: It is super simple.

It is targeting the way we target any of our own weapons and it is passed off.

There is really no difference, it is just a battle management issue as to who is going to engage.

Can you describe what the F-35 allows you to do from a tactical perspective that the 4^th Gen platforms could not do?

Mo; The sensors on the airplane are our center of gravity. Our ability to know what’s going on around us in the battlespace and then push that to everybody we are working with.

Not just air to air (A2A), but air to ground (A2G) as well. Add our ability to operate in areas that we have never been able to before such as contested environments.

Physically flying the airplane is extremely easy, that’s the beauty of it, so you just focus on the tactical employment.

It makes you much more lethal.

Is it fair to say that your missions can become more dynamic than with Gen 4 platforms, such as loiter, gather information, be more flexible as a pilot with your mission?

Mo: The F-16 and F/A-18 are extremely capable platforms and they do the swing role /multi role mission very well.

However, they are going to struggle vs Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) or IADS, and in those cases they will be on a dedicated mission. We do have a lot more flexibility to flip flop missions, and we do it a lot in training. We will escort a package on a strike mission and then we will break off do some A2G, or suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), perhaps some Combat Air Patrol (CAP) or dynamic targeting in the target area – then we’ll rejoin the package and come out with everybody.

Especially along with the F-22, we’ll open the door, wait while everyone else comes in and completes their mission, then come out with the package and close the door behind us.

We do some different things.

As Marines we are on call for a number of different missions, close air support (CAS) etc. that we could not have done in one airplane.

The Marines are writing the CAS Manual for the F-35. How are you finding the F-35 in that role compared to what you have now?

Price: In the CAS role it is performing well. Being a new aircraft there are some capabilities we’d like to continue working on, but the basic execution of CAS is “On Time, On Target.”

The jet is more than capable to execute that.

The unique capability it brings is executing CAS in the presence of a wide range of threats (something I could not do with previous platform).

Can you give me an example?

Traditionally (Gen 4) if we are executing CAS and a medium range surface to air missile (SAM) pops up on the battlefield, we are done with CAS.

We immediately transition into a SEAD, destruction of enemy air defense (DEAD), or reactive SEAD mindset. With the F-35, we may continue to execute CAS because of freedom of maneuver (stealth) and the SA I have about the threat, its location and its nature.

I may advise the forward air controller (FAC) that a threat has appeared, but it won’t impact mission execution. If the situation gets more threatening, I have the organic capability to go deal with the threat and then roll right back into CAS. Previously I would have to call in another platform, potentially call in our Prowlers or call in other combined arms to take care of the threat.

The F-35 enables a wide array of CAS execution in a wide array of environments, so from the low-end threat spectrum to the high-end threat spectrum I am capable of executing any of those missions.

Mo: We have greater all weather capability.

The synthetic aperture radar (SAR) maps give the capability to see through weather and deploy ordinance through the weather from a significant stand-off distance (or in proximity).

The ability to employ ordinance through the weather with high quality targeting is impressive.

I know every guy up here and myself included, we take a lot of pride in the fact of our CAS.

There’s been much said about the airplane in the CAS role, some good, some bad, but to us it’s important that a lot of that goes back to the man/woman in the cockpit and the fact that it says Marines on the back of the airplane.

It means the guys in need of CAS are going to get a level of support consistent with what they’ve had out of the Hornets, Harriers and all the airplanes we’ve flown before.

We all take pride in that.

We’re going to give you a lot more capabilities, but it is the fact that we are Marines, and Marines is written on the aircraft – that makes it very important to us up there.

Thinking about the electronic warfare (EW) suite and its ability to detect waveforms and come up with countermeasures.

How do you interface with that as a pilot, is it something you make decisions about, or is automatic?

Mo: Without getting into the technical details it is very, very simple for us.

The way the jet is set up, we make a move to execute electronic attack and the jet will take care of it.

On a personal level as pilots, coming from other platforms and stepping into the F-35, do you have an “aha” moment that you can share?

Guts: My first “aha” moment was a seemingly simple thing.

I was executing a familiarization flight near MCAS Yuma. I was coming back to the airfield and I basically just turned the jet and pointed its nose at Yuma.

Immediately the jet is providing me the information of all the traffic that is out there in the airspace.

When I talk to approach for the first time they are telling me about the traffic that is out there that I already know about and I see it.

I can tell who everybody is that he is talking about and the jet also saw traffic that ATC hadn’t seen yet and I asked about it. And I thought, “holy cow,” here I am coming back to the field from a simple familiarity mission and my jet is telling me everything about the operational environment I am about to go into.

In this case, something very simple, the traffic pattern coming back there, but I didn’t have to do anything to have that level of SA.

I can start making decisions about what altitude I wanted to go to, if I wanted to turn left or right, speed up or slow down.

There’s somebody coming up next to me, I want to get in front of them – or whatever.

It is a very simple example, but I thought WOW this is amazing that I see everything and can do that.

The other was the first time I vertically recovered the airplane. The flight control law that the airplane has is unbelievable and I always tell the anecdote. Flying AV-8B Harrier IIs, I only had one specific aircraft I felt like I could kind of go easy on the controls and it would sit there and hover.

I love the Harrier, love flying that aircraft, but there was work involved to bring it back for a vertical landing. The very first time I hovered an F-35B I thought, I am the problem here, and I am just going to let the jet do what it wants to do.

The F-35 was hovering better than I could ever hover a Harrier without doing a thing. That’s back to that workload comment I said earlier. I am performing a vertical landing, and I have the time to look around and see what is taking place on the pad and around me. It is a testament to the jet.

BC: I was conducting a strike mission and Red Air was coming at me. In a 4^th Gen fighter you must do a whole lot of interpretation. You see things in azimuth, and you see things in elevation. In the F-35 you just see the Gods eye view of the whole world. It’s very much like you are watching the briefing in real time.

I am coming in to perform the simulated weapons release, and Red Air is coming the other direction.

I have enough situational awareness to assess whether Red Air is going to be a factor to me by the time I release the weapon. I can make the decision, I’m going to go to the target, I’m going to release this weapon.

At the same time I pre-target the threat, and as soon as I release the A2G weapon, I can flip a switch with my thumb and shoot the Red Air.

This is difficult to do in a 4^th Gen fighter, because there is so much manipulation of systems in the cockpit.

All while paying attention to the basic mechanics of flying the airplane and interpreting threat warnings that are often very vague, or only directional.

In the F-35 I know where the threats are, what they are and I can thread the needle. I can tell that the adversary is out in front of me and I can make a very, very smart decision about whether to continue or get out of there. All that, and I can very easily switch between mission sets.

Mo: I was leading a four ship of F-35s on a strike against 4^th Gen adversaries, F-16s and F/A-18s.

We fought our way in, we mapped the target, found the target, dropped JDAMs on the target and turned around and fought our way out.

All the targets got hit, nobody got detected, and all the adversaries died. I thought, yes, this works, very, very, very well.

Never detected, nobody had any idea we were out there.

A second moment was just this past Thursday. I spent a fair amount of my life as a tail hook guy – [landing F/A-18s on US Navy Supercarriers] on long carrier deployments.

The last 18 seconds of a Carrier landing are intense. The last 18 seconds of making a vertical landing on this much smaller USMC Assault Carrier – is a lot more relaxed.

The F-35C is doing some great stuff. Making a vertical landing [my first this week] on the moving ship, that is much smaller than anything I’ve landed on at sea – with less stress, was pretty awesome.

Sack: It was my first flight at Edwards AFB Jan ’16. I got in the airplane and started it up. I was still on the deck and there were apparently other F-35s airborne – I believe USAF, I was not aware. I was a single ship, just supposed to go out and get familiar flying the aircraft.

As the displays came alive there were track files and the SA as to what everyone else was doing in the airspace, and I was still on the ground. I mean, I hadn’t even gotten my take-off clearance yet.

I didn’t even know where it was coming from. It was coming from another F-35. The jet had started all the systems for me and the SA was there. That was a very eye opening moment for me.

The second one, took place when I came back from that flight. In a Hornet you would pull into the line and had a very methodical way in which you have to shut off the airplane and the systems otherwise you could damage something.

So you have to follow a sequence, it is very methodical about which electronic system you shut off. In the F-35 you come back, you do a couple things then you just shut the engine off, and it does everything else for you. Sounds simple, even silly – but it is a quantum shift.

The voice of the pilots is clear.

The F-35 is a platform with the ultimate level of sophistication, made simple.

And therein lay the beauty of the F-35, and just why it will be so deadly: it’s simple.

Second Line of Defense thanks USMC pilots; Col. George “Sack” Rowell, Lt. Col. Chad “Mo” Vaughn, Lt. Col. Rich “BC” Rusnok, and Lt. Col. John “Guts” Price; Captain Joseph R. Olson, Commanding Officer of the USS America and entire crew; Sylvia Pierson, Brandi Schiff, JSF/JPO PA; Capt. Sarah Burns and 1^st Lt. Maida Zheng, USMC PAOs; MV-22B pilots/crew and personnel of VMX-1.

The photos in the slideshow are credited to Todd Miller.

Squadron Fighter Pilots: The Unstoppable Force of Innovation for 5th Generation Enabled Concepts of Operations

The Way Ahead for the USCG: The Perspective of Admiral Paul Zukunft, Commandant of the USCG

Posted on December 16, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

2016-12-16 By Robbin Laird

The last time I met with Admiral Zukunft was when he was working at the USCG headquarters in California and responsible for USCG Pacific operations. Later he would become Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area as well.

We had a chance to discuss his perspective on the way ahead for the USCG in his office in Washington DC on November 30, 2016.

Obviously, the election of a new President and the formation of a new Administration will provide a new context for the USCG and its evolving role, but the emphasis which President-elect Trump has put on border security and defense and the decision to appoint General Kelly as head of the Department of Homeland Security could well provide an expanded context for the USCG.

The USCG plays a crucial role in Western Hemisphere security and defense and certainly General Kelly saw on a regular basis the crucial role the USCG has played in the region and shaping extended security and defense for US borders.

For Admiral Zukunft, the USCG’s role in Western Hemisphere security and defense has been significant, specifically as other DOD and security assets have deployed to the Middle East and the Pacific to deal with other global issues.

The USCG today is quite different from 20 years ago as it operates now within an intelligence and operational web which provides a very different approach to deploying assets up against threats.

According To Admiral Zukunft:

“A key requirement for mission success is leveraging intelligence.

“We work intelligence across our agencies and internationally.

“This is crucial to provide risk informed decision-making.

A Coast Guard Cutter Stratton boarding team member inspects the bridge of a self-propelled semi-submersible interdicted in international waters off the coast of Central America, July 19, 2015. The Stratton’s crew recovered more than six tons of cocaine from the 40-foot vessel. (Coast Guard photo courtesy of Petty Officer 2nd Class LaNola Stone)

“We have constrained resources and we need to prioritize threats across the spectrum of operations.

“For example, in dealing with the afloat drug traffic we focus on the transit zones and work our ability to find choke points on the water and ashore to deal with the drug threat.

“We work with a number of key governments in the Western Hemisphere to shape more effective intervention.

“If you look at DOD’s statement of key priorities, they are not focused on the Western Hemisphere.

“We have the responsibility by default and design.

“And a key part of homeland security is the security of the conveyer belt of maritime trade, which translates to about $4.5 trillion per year, which flow through our waterways and ports.”

uscg_whem_2014

Question: Clearly the limitations on resources is a key challenge but your approach allows you to get maximum return on investment by targeting the resources. How would you highlight that challenge?

Admiral Zukunft: “It is a challenge.

“The Navy’s Perry-class frigates have gone away. On the best of days you have three Coast Guard ships in the Caribbean. That is your entire force to deal with threats in that region.

“We have 80% awareness on the best of days, and perhaps we can target 10% of that drug flow.”

Question: A key asset for recapitalization is your new offshore patrol boats.

Could you discuss their role?

Admiral Zukunft: “We have been struggling to get a program of record of the national security cutter across the finish line, and this is really the biggest acquisition for our service to provide the presence and enforcement assets which can provide for enhanced safety in security in our operations worldwide, but notably for extended border security for the United States.”

Question: The USCG has a much greater role in security than generally recognized because of your legal authorities.

Could you comment on this aspect of the USCG role?

Admiral Zukunft: “We operate not just on our own vessels but we have a presence on the vessels of the US Navy and other nations.

“We are the only entity that has authorities to do anything about the security threats which we are prosecuting at sea.

The Coast Guard Cutter Forward returns to homeport in Portsmouth, Va., Monday, Jan. 7, 2013, after a 45-day patrol in the Caribbean Sea in support of Operation Martillo. The law enforcement crews aboard the Forward teamed with crew members from the Coast Guard Cutter Confidence and an embarked aviation detachment from Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron to counter two illicit tracking interdictions leading to the seizure of more than $50 million in narcotics. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Walter Shinn)

“And we deal with a number of foreign governments in the Western Hemisphere who view the USCG as a key partner in shaping more effective Hemisphere security as well.

“When you lay a map of the world flat and you look at where the USCG has authority, it reaches right up to the territorial seas in the countries surrounding the US and, in many cases, inside the territorial seas.

“With the agreements we have now worldwide we do not have to wait till an anomaly in the manifest of cargo ship alerts us to a threat and simply have to wait till it shops up.

“We can intercept at sea and do a security check”

Question: With regard to the Arctic, there is an obvious need to ramp up US presence and the resources to provide for presence.

How do you view the way ahead?

Admiral Zukunft: “We clearly need a new icebreaker.

“We’ve written the operational requirement documents that make the icebreaker a floating command and control platform.

“We can put a skiff on it. It’s also an instrument to enforce sovereignty.

“Rather then ice hardened, you have actually an ice breaking capability up there as well.

“It is extremely hard to predict what that area’s going to look like in 20, 30 years but without a new icebreaker we will be observers more than participants in shaping Arctic safety and security.

“An independent High Latitude analysis confirmed that we need three and three – three heavy and three medium icebreakers.

“We have helped stand up an Arctic Coast Guard Forum based on the Pacific Coast Guard Forum model.

“This allows the key national stakeholders in Arctic safety and security to work together where possible to enhance safety and security in this dynamic region.

“We are looking to do a mass rescue exercise in 2017 around Iceland that will bring in Denmark and other NATO partners for a collective security effort.

“And to be clear, the USCG is the key sea service for the Arctic, the USN has in effect devolved Arctic security responsibilities to the USCG.”

cg_arctic_strategy

Question: It seems your focus on borders is on a broader rather than narrower concept?

Admiral Zukunft:”It is.

“Rather than having a goal line defense concept, we have a Offensive strategy.

“When I think of a border, it begins at the territorial seas of the Pacific and Caribbean nations, which we deal with.

“We have the ability to detect anomalies, we have authorities, and then when it comes down to the resources to be able to target that threat and meet it on an open playing field, rather then a goal line defense.

“You might call this a layered defense strategy, but I prefer to call it an offensive approach whereby the USCG can leverage its authorities as far removed from the goal line as possible and practicable.

“For example, I have discussed with the CNO the concept that we would create a permanent USCG presence in the South China Sea and related areas.

“This would allow us to expand our working relationship with Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan.

“We can spearhead work with allies on freedom of navigation exercises as well.”

Question: Clearly, you need more resources to expand presence, but the sustainability piece is often lost sight of.

What are your thoughts on the sustainment piece?

Admiral Zukunft: “There is usually much less focus upon sustainability but there are serious shortfalls which need to be addressed.

“We see our role as providing a key contribution to national security in dealing with non-state actors, whether is the threat of piracy, transnational crime or drug dealing.

“The USCG provides unique authorities with titles 10 and 14 to provide for a unique instrument of security, particularly when one is looking at a more offensive approach to protecting our borders.”

Question: Clearly, more platforms accompanied with better ISR and C2 is a key requirement moving forward, but what about the potential for robotic vehicles?

Admiral Zukunft: “It would make sense for UUVs to be part of the USCG future, and we would start with the Arctic as a key area for such operations, to gain enhanced situational awareness in the region.”

https://sldinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/PaulZukunft.pdf

Editor’s Note: A harbinger of things to come is suggested by this October 10, 2014 news note from the National Defense University.

“On Tuesday 7 October, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and United States Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) presented “A Conversation on Emerging Challenges in the Western Hemisphere” in Lincoln Auditorium at National Defense University. The event featured a rare discussion between two four-star leaders; Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant, USCG, and General John F. Kelley, Commander, US SOUTHCOM, both of whom highlighted the importance of the inter-agency approach to Western Hemisphere challenges.

Both leaders possess broad career experience coordinating across government. General Kelly comes to United States Southern Command from his previous position as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from March 2011 to October 2012. In 2010, Admiral Zukunft served as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator for the Deepwater Horizon Spill of National Significance where he directed more than 47,000 responders, 6,500 vessels and 120 aircraft during the largest oil spill in U.S. history.”

And with regard to new USCG icebreakers, the official position is laid out here:

https://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/icebreaker/

The Coast Guard requires at least two new heavy icebreakers to ensure continued access to both polar regions and support the country’s economic, commercial, maritime and national security needs.

The operational polar icebreaking fleet currently includes one 399-foot heavy icebreaker (Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star, commissioned in 1976) and one 420-foot medium icebreaker (Coast Guard Cutter Healy, commissioned in 2000). These cutters are designed for open-water icebreaking and feature reinforced hulls and specially angled bows.

Polar Star underwent a three-year reactivation and returned to operations in late 2013. Since then, Polar Star has completed three Operation Deep Freeze deployments to resupply McMurdo Station in Antarctica. The Coast Guard expects Polar Star to remain in service through approximately 2020 to 2023.

The Coast Guard also has a second heavy icebreaker, Coast Guard Cutter Polar Sea, which was placed in commissioned, inactive status by the service in 2011. The Coast Guard is evaluating options to reactivate the ship, parts from which were used to reactivate Polar Star.

Antarctica--USCGC Polar Star (WAGB 10) Polar Icebreaker. U.S. COAST GUARD PHOTO — Antarctica–USCGC Polar Star (WAGB 10) Polar Icebreaker. U.S. COAST GUARD PHOTO

Why this program?

The United States has vital national interests in the polar regions. Polar icebreakers enable the U.S. to maintain defense readiness in the Arctic and Antarctic regions; enforce treaties and other laws needed to safeguard both industry and the environment; provide ports, waterways and coastal security; and provide logistical support – including vessel escort – to facilitate the movement of goods and personnel necessary to support scientific research, commerce, national security activities and maritime safety.

The Coast Guard will need a minimum of two new heavy icebreakers to ensure national year-round access to the polar regions and to provide some self-rescue capability.

How is the Coast Guard addressing the need for more polar icebreaking capability?

The Coast Guard is in the Analyze/Select phase of acquiring a new polar icebreaker, which involves evaluating acquisition approaches and assessing the merits of each approach.

The service’s polar icebreaker acquisition program settled operational requirements informed by 11 interagency stakeholders in January 2016, published the requirements in an industry data package, and in March 2016 held an industry day attended by more than 90 organizations.

Future industry engagement, including solicitation of commentary on a draft request for proposal, is projected as specifications develop and the program progresses.

The service intends to begin production activities in 2020 under an accelerated acquisition timeline.

The PRC’s “Great Wall of Sand:” Remembering Tarawa Atoll

Posted on December 15, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

12/15/2016

2016-12-15 By Ed Timperlake

When reading a recent article on the Chinese illegal build out on islands in the Pacific, I was struck with what the images reminded me of from history.

In an article on “China’s New Spratly Island Defenses,” published by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, several digital globe photos were provided highlighting the build out and its physical characteristics.

One of these photos was of Mischief Reef.

Mischief_markup

This photo is a dead ringer for the Japanese and the Tarawa Atoll.

atoll

The Battle of Tarawa was the first American offensive in the critical central Pacific region.

It was also the first time in the war that the United States faced serious Japanese opposition to an amphibious landing.^[5]

Previous landings had met little or no initial resistance,^[6]^{[N 1]} but this time the 4,500 Japanese defenders were well-supplied and well-prepared, and they fought almost to the last man, exacting a heavy toll on the United States Marine Corps.

The U.S. had suffered similar casualties in other campaigns, for example over the six months of the Guadalcanal Campaign, but in this case the losses were incurred within the space of 76 hours.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tarawa

More than 1,000 U.S. troops were killed in action and some 2,000 were wounded in only three days of fighting at Tarawa.

Word of the heavy casualties soon reached the U.S. and the public was stunned by the number of American lives lost in taking the tiny island.

However, according to “The Pacific War” by John Costello, U.S. commanders learned important lessons from the Battle of Tarawa that would be applied to future atoll wars, including the need for better reconnaissance, more precise and sustained pre-landing bombardment, additional amphibious landing vehicles and improved equipment: Among other advancements, better-waterproofed radios would be developed.

http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/battle-of-tarawa

History in the rear view mirror can be applied to the future as well.

It is important to take the PRC offensive seriously.

Reconsidering Air Force One: Seeking a 21st Century Solution

Posted on December 11, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

12/11/2016

2016-12-11 By Danny Lam

President Trump stunned the aerospace community by calling for the cancellation of Boeing’s program to replace Air Force One with a new pair of modified 747-800s, citing its $4 billion cost. Experts familiar with the program note the cost is not out of line given the requirements and specifications.

However, the concern is always with cost growth, which caused President Obama to “re-initiate” or effectively cancel and rebid the Marine One replacement fleet program after costs doubled.

Thus, the precedent is there for rebooting wayward programs and scrapping partly built airframes when cost estimates exceeded $13 billion with $3 billion spent.

With any defense / national security oriented procurement, the largest element of costs are “baked in” when requirements are initially specified; and second, added to or modified as “bright ideas” for new features, capabilities, or oversights keep coming. Long lifecycles for designs, few units produced, and the requirement to stockpile scarce parts and spares for the project life of 30 or more years add up to high costs.

Civilian acquisitions tend to focus on, “must fix” oversights or errors in designs. Fixes are prioritized to those affect safety, regulatory compliance, usability and costs as it affect liability and warranty claims, then cost reduction ideas. Comparatively short product life cycles also enable issues to be “caught” in the next iteration.

Most commercial products are not required by law to provide parts or support for products beyond the statutory maximum. All this add up to a civilian industrial dynamic that over time, have outpaced the defense / military space, resulting in the anomaly of civilian Android or iPhones that refresh on a 2 year cycle that far exceed the capabilities of most military equivalents procured at many times the cost.

With this perspective, how might the Air Force One Replacement Program be “rebooted”?

First issue to question is whether the requirements from the 1980s are still appropriate today. 1980s era specifications called for 3 or more engines, and featured facilities for travelling journalists, staff, and conference rooms, totaling 100 persons, in addition to the mandatory features of command and control systems, medical facilities, and defense systems.

P-8 in Truman Exercise

The need to accommodate a large travelling press pool is a quaint throwback to the pre-internet era of media dominated by a few large national broadcasters and a handful of papers of record. A large press pool that is traveling with the President and his entourage adds little of value except to give the President and his officials the opportunity to give “candid” in flight interviews. But it adds to the burden of being self-sufficient in food, and other hotel facilities.

This is at the cost of making logistics much more complex, and imposing size requirements on Air Force One that takes away from its primary mission of providing a secure, safe, comfortable transport and enabling the US executive branch of government to function: commanding and controlling US Forces from anywhere in the event of war or disaster.

Likewise, it is an open question as to what is the appropriate number of staff required on Air Force One. Is there is room to shrink the list by methods and means common in industry such as cross training Presidential staffers? Or for the crew, cross training them to (e.g.) eliminate the need for dedicated medical personnel and secret service agents? What about taking ideas common in the RV industry such as fold-away beds, convertible conference rooms, etc.? Or less elaborate galleys?

Shrinking the headcount capacity and size requirement would in turn, allow smaller aircraft to be considered for Air Force One candidates in a new competition.

Should a new competition be run on this basis, it is conceivable that there are at least two viable candidates:

An artist rendering shows the first image of a new Northrop Grumman Corp long-range bomber B21 in this image released on February 26, 2016. REUTERS/U.S. Air Force/Handout via Reuters

A Boeing 737 variant that is presently used in three major military versions (C-40 Clipper, 737 AEW&C, and P-8 Poseidon) that will have most of the features required in Air Force One with a smaller footprint. Features like in-flight refueling, secure communications (at a more rudimentary level), countermeasures and some degree of hardening (which can be augmented) already exist.

By mixing and matching from these three variants, it is conceivable that relatively little non-recurring engineering costs are required to get many of the features required by Air Force One.

Whatever developed for the “airborne White House” will be broadly usable / applicable to the whole fleet. Because the 737 will be a common platform with many more units in service that the 747-800, parts and maintenance logistics will also be simplified going forward.

Alternatively, another option could be to study whether Air Force One’s core missions are better served by a radical departure toward a far more safe and secure aircraft that is more likely to survive as a “command post in the sky” during a nuclear war.

The B-21 Raider presently in development may be limited in capacity and ability to offer creature comforts to POTUS and staff given its tight interior space.

But it is a front line, state-of-the-art combat aircraft with nuclear EMP resistance standard, and its stealthy features will make targeting it more challenging.

A B-21 based Air Force One can be operated in pairs, splitting some of the travel staff into the second craft and have them networked with a MADL like secure link.

The “pair” can in turn be accompanied (if required) by another heavily armed B-21 with extensive defensive equipment on board to protect the fleet.

Air Force One based on the Boeing 747 was a symbol of American power for the 20^th Century.

With the proliferation of threats against large civilian airliner based platforms, perhaps it is time to ask fundamental questions as to how best to protect core capabilities for the “flying White House”.

The Air Force One Replacement program is still in its early stages with only $170 million for design awarded so far. There is no better time to take a second look at the program and see if there are better ideas going forward.

Tanker 2.0: The A330 MRTT Evolving as a Global Fleet

Posted on December 6, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

12/06/2016

2016-11-29 By Robbin Laird

The Airbus tanker is the only advanced tanker in operations and has been so for several years.

Airbus Defence and Space has sold tankers to a number of countries and has done so in what one might call national or serial sales.

Getting the tanker sold, and out in the operational space is shaping a baseline reality.

But with significant operational experience under their belt and with the focal point of Middle East operations, cross-cutting experiences are shaping the way ahead among the nations.

A baseline has been created from which what one might call Tanker 2.0 is emerging.

Tanker 2.0 can be understood in a couple of ways.

The first way is the coalescing of experience to shape a global fleet perspective whereby common experiences and con-ops shape the way ahead for the development of the tanker as well as providing an opportunity for global support.

The 330 Tanker program is not there yet, but with the experience of the nations under their belts and with the forcing function of operating in common in the Middle East, a baseline has been created which clearly can allow for this evolution.

In this phase of Tanker 2.0 the user groups can evolve in their importance.

There will soon be a user group meeting in Madrid. The evolution of the role of the user group was described by one Airbus Defence and Space official as moving in the early days from a brief BY the company to the users to the emergence of genuine interaction AMONG the users to dialogue with the company about the way ahead for tanker modernization and ways to shape a global fleet approach.

The second way would focus on how and paths to upgrade the tanker as a combat asset in the extended battlespace.

Because the plane carries the fuel for tanking in the wings, the internal space of the tanker, which currently is used for passengers or cargo, can be modified in various ways to be much wider combat support asset in the extended battlespace.

There is clearly thinking under way, notably in Australia, about how to take the tanker to this next step from being an MRTT in terms of combining lift and tanking functions to becoming a much wider combat support asset in terms of ISR, and C2 functions.

Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft maintenance crew prepare to launch the jet at dusk, commencing another mission refuelling Coalition aircraft over Iraq. Credit: Australian MOD, 11/24/14

After my recent visit to the Albacete Air Base in Spain, I visited the Airbus Defence and Space facility in Madrid, namely the Getafe facility. I had a chance to discuss the baseline and the way ahead with the head of the tanker program, namely, Antonio Caramazana.

I first met Antonio Caramazana at an Airbus Defence and Space (then Airbus Military) Trade Media brief for the media in 2010. That briefing which he gave only six years ago shows how far the tanker has come in only six years.

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-the-a330-mrtt-2010/

We started by getting an update on the status of the tanker and discussing the baseline.

We then went on to discuss the evolution of the aircraft from a platform to a fleet, with the inherent opportunities to shape a global fleet solution.

Question: Certa 2016, what is the current status of sales and operational experience of your tanker?

Antonio Caramazana: We have delivered 28 tankers to date.

We have delivered 14 to the UK; 5 to Australia; 6 to Saudi Arabia and 3 to the UAE.

These aircraft already integrated into operations.

The fleet is operating and is demonstrating its value added.

And all are operating in the Middle East, which has provided a significant opportunity for the users to gain joint knowledge about the tanker and its capabilities.

They are even doing combined operations in a number of cases.

Question: You have sold the aircraft to several customers, but rather than just serial sales, you are seeing cross learning?

Antonio Caramazana: That is true.

For example, in the case of the clearance of receivers of fuel from the aircraft, the traditional approach would see a case by case national approach.

But there a particular national user is doing clearances, which provide certifications for other national users.

This is a culture shift for the air forces, which is provided by having a common aircraft, which is recognized as such by the air forces.

In effect, we are already seeing a global fleet which broaden the impact of the tanker.

For example, U.S. aircraft are being tanked by the various national tanker due to certification being done by specific nations which then allow the U.S. to tank into other national tankers.

Question: The next phase, which I will call Tanker 2.0, is to shape deliberately a global fleet. What are some of the key building blocks in your view to going down this path?

Antonio Caramazana: We are developing a A330 MRTT advanced which is designed to deliver a common aircraft, with common upgrade paths and solutions.

This will allow nations to get better value for money for their modernization investments.

Common configurations will be better for operations, and upgrades.

It will as well enhance common solutions to training, to parts supplies and to maintenance.

This is a way ahead for what you are calling Tanker 2.0.

This provides for culture change for both the militaries and industry to shape such a global solution.

The more users that buy into a common solution, costs can be contained with regard to upgrades, training and maintenance.

It will also allow tankers from one nation to fly to an area of interest and potentially leverage the support structure of a nation operating the tanker in that region of interest.

And the life cycle costs for such a global fleet will be lowered as well.

Our user groups are discussing paths to upgrades, more effective maintenance approaches, and other ways ahead to shape global solutions.

This is the advantage of already having several years of operations behind us as well as an aircraft with significant room for expansion of onboard systems as well.

Question: But Tanker 2.0 provides for another way ahead, namely to expand the contribution of the tanker to other combat assets in the battlespace.

How would you describe this way ahead?

Antonio Caramazana: From the inception of the A330MRTT, we have put into the market a very flexible asset with multiple capabilities.

You can combine passenger lift, cargo lift and tanking within the same platform, and countries like Australia or operating their C-17s with their tankers in very flexible ways in terms of cargo and passenger lift operating over both platforms while the tanking function allows both to go to the area of interest.

At the same time, with the evolution of militaries look to shape enhanced connectivity in the battlespace, a key way ahead is to rethink how the tanker can support other combat sets in terms of ISR and C2 functions.

This is work in progress, but given the flexibility of the tanker in terms of internal space, there are many possibilities for users.

This is about having a smart tanker able to link assets in the battlespace, air, ground or sea.

It can provide an ISR and C2 node function for the joint force in the battlespace. It is an information age aircraft as well as playing more classical role of a tanker.

Both slideshows highlight the Aussie KC-30A.

The first shows the aircraft during the recent Pitch Black Exercise in Australia.

The second shows the aircraft in Europe this summer for the air shows.

Credit for the photos goes to the Australian Ministry of Defence.

To Whom Do Western “China Experts” Owe Their Allegiance?

Posted on December 6, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

2016-12-06 By Danny Lam

President Elect Trump’s 10 minute phone call with President Tsai of Taiwan was a watershed event that marked the great divide between the Kissinger-Nixon era of foreign policy toward China and the Trump era.

At the beginning of the Kissinger-Nixon era, the US was faced with a heavily armed Soviet Union allied with a nuclear armed PRC with what appeared to be unlimited manpower.

Detaching the PRC from the Soviet orbit fundamentally altered Soviet calculations and accelerated their decline was a prize.

Today, the problem is reversed.

The US and allies are faced with a heavily armed, well financed Communist Chinese regime and a weak, non-communist Russia with little to fall back on except nuclear weapons.

Normalization of relations with the PRC was accomplished through the issuance of three communiques in 1972, 1979, and 1982 that defined the relationship. In those documents, the PRC and US explicitly acknowledged their differences. “There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies.” (para 8, 1972) and made clear that the differences are only papered over temporarily for the sake of peace.

Temporarily is the operative word.

President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan's first woman President. — President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s first woman President.

Detaching PRC from China required more than just diplomacy.

Michael Pillsbury, beginning 1975, initiated relationships with the PRC’s military and intelligence establishment that ultimately resulted in the transfer and sale of torpedoes, helicopters, and fighter upgrades that impressed the PLA of the superiority of the US. During the Sino-Vietnam war, the Carter Administration authorized the transfer of artillery locating radar to the PLA bogged down by determined Vietnamese resistance.

This strengthened Deng Xiaoping’s hand and enabled him to carry out the “opening” reforms that also saw his rivals in the PLA eliminated that enabled the Deng reforms.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union that steadily progressed from 1987, it appeared that it is a matter of time before the tide reached Beijing given the rampant inflation and mismanagement of the economy.

All these efforts came to an abrupt halt as a result of Tiananmen Square in 1989.

The PLA playing a highly visible role in suppressing the uprising resulted in the downgrading of these nascent ties and an arms embargo imposed on PRC by the US and allies that lasted to this day.

As a result of this, it turned the Beijing regime’s military inwards and increasingly hostile to the US.

What was missed by Western analysts and “China Experts” that focused intensely on Beijing is that Tiananmen was not a uniform problem throughout China. Most of the relatively prosperous southern coastal Chinese provinces did not play more than a token part in the opposition to Beijing.

The economic and social forces that resulted in university students in Beijing being mobilized in opposition to the regime were either not present or weak in these areas. Likewise, there was little sign of the kind of unrest in the periphery of the Eastern Bloc that presaged the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The southern coastal provinces were doing quite well in the post-Deng “opening” and content to pay off Beijing to leave them alone.

The way it was always done.

It is fair to say that the US and Allies enacted a post-Tiananmen policy that was flawed from the start by uncritically and gullibly assuming that what they saw in Beijing represented all of China.

The consequence of being misled by events and dynamics in Beijing was dramatic. The formal ties to the PRC regime were strained by Tiananmen, but the commercial ties to the southern provinces continued to prosper uninterrupted. WTO accession negotiations continued and PRC won accession in November, 2001.

Within two decades, southern China became the economic dynamo that made it possible for the Beijing regime to command the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, preside over a dynamic economy second only to the US, and more importantly, fund one of the largest, fastest, and sweeping arms buildup in history.

Western “China Experts”, however, continue to hang onto the Beijing centric view of China in interpretation of the motives, intention, interests and behavior of different parts of China.

This divergence is clearly visible during the past week with the THAAD and Trump-Tsai call issue.

The Beijing based regime and the PLA/N’s Northern and Central Theater commands behavior toward the South Korean and Japanese THAAD behavior is suggestive that this cluster has a Nuclear First Strike Policy and Posture aimed at US and Allied military bases in the Northeast Asian region.

This is evident in their willingness to undertake highly provocative and threatening moves like simultaneously testing 10 DF-21 ballistic missiles prior to the Trump-Tsai call.

On the other hand, PRC’s Taiwan policy has traditionally been driven by the Shanghai clique, who was initially muted and then slow to respond to the Trump-Tsai call.

When the Beijing Regime did respond over the weekend, it was almost perfunctory with obligatory denunciations in People’s Daily and Global Times, but nothing concrete.

This is consistent with the Shanghai clique being far more invested in access to the world market and exposed to trade and economic sanctions being proposed by President Elect Trump.

The disconnect is shown by no mention or concern by the PRC Foreign Ministry with the highly provocative and threatening move last week and an explicit threat to US forces published in Xinhua that stated: “The missiles “can destroy U.S. Asia-Pacific bases at any time” while officially protesting the Trump-Tsai call.

Nor discussion of the campaign against South Korean economic interests.

Aggregating PRC regime behavior into “China” cannot explain these differences in observed behavior within the space of one week on two issues that are so closely and tightly tied to national security and longstanding norms: The US adherence to the “One China” policy being breached, and the PRC explicitly demonstrating a credible nuclear first strike capability at US installations.

“China Experts” had to deal with cognitive dissonance that perhaps, it is not a coherent policy coming out of Beijing after all.

The Priesthood of Western “China Experts” who are quick to denounce President Elect Trump’s call to President Tsai and, accused him of “not very well prepared”, ignorant, incompetence, rash, apparently failed to recognize that the move was long planned, intentionally provocative, and indicative of a substantial change in China policy — largely frozen since Kissinger-Nixon.

The fact that not a single western “China Expert” that publicly critiqued President Elect Trump’s call with President Tsai even mentioned the PRC’s ballistic missile test as provocation and threats to US the same week raises serious questions as to whom they owe their allegiance to? Beijing or America?

The alternative explanation that western “China Experts” were ignorant about the provocation shown on Chinese television and issued in a Xinhua statement, is even more damming.

The Trump Administration began the task of understanding China as a vast civilization of many ethnicities, nationalities, cultures, languages, economic, social and political divisions whose differences are no less dramatic than Europe, or Eurasia or Africa or the Indian subcontinent.

The “provocation” this week exposed Beijing, the master franchisor of the PRC brand, and their collaborators for what they really are.

This is a great beginning to forging a new set of foreign policies toward the Chinese civilization.

By tangibly and visibly supporting longtime allies like South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan as Beijing ramps up their campaign against them can provide a solid way forward.