Visiting Williamtown Airbase: The Wedgetail In Evolution

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/30/2016

2016-08-22 By Robbin Laird

Recently, I revisited Williamtown airbase, where I earlier visited the Wedgetail Squadron and the F-18 squadrons.

And during the last visit did a site visit and looked at the infrastructure modernization approach being implemented on the base.

This time, I had a chance to talk with Group Captain Stuart Bellingham, the Officer Commanding 42 Wing.

During this visit as well I was able to talk with senior Army and Navy officers involved in the evolution of Wedgetail as well and will discuss their perspectives in forthcoming interviews.

The Wedgetail is often referred to as an Aussie AWACS, but clearly is not.

The AWACs is an AIR battle managements system with the customers being largely the fighter community.

The Wedgetail is evolving towards a ground and naval engagement capability with naval and army officers onboard and with virtual Wedgetail becoming part of the officer training for the Army and Navy this process will deepen in the years ahead.

In many ways, what is being experienced with Wedgetail is what the ADF hopes to bring to the process of overall force design and greater operational integration.

It is also part of the new air combat systems, which are software upgradeable and capable of multi-tasking.

When I interviewed 2nd Squadron at Williamtown Airbase during my first visit to Williamtown, the squadron operating Wedgetail, the Squadron Commander underscored the challenge of understanding software upgradeability:

“This is a software upgradeable aircraft with a defined launch point (IOC) but no fixed end point (FOC).  The system will always be evolving and growing as the software code gets rewritten to reflect events and demands from the squadron.

The squadron works through its experience and shapes change orders, which get sent to the procurement authorities to sort out priorities for the next round of upgrading the aircraft.”

The difference between older and such a new system was outlined by one participant during the visit as follows:

“We have in the same time frame bought a CRC system full up which will look pretty much like it is in 20 years; with Wedgetail it will look nothing like it does now in 20 years.”

This process of upgrading means that the software engineers work closely with the operators in shaping the evolution of the aircraft.

This is a very different approach from legacy systems.

As Paul Kalafos, Vice President of Surveillance Systems at Northrop Grumman has put it:

“We are getting significant feedback from the RAAF on deployment and requests to automate tasks where possible to enhanced the capability of the machine part of the man-machine relationship to shape a way ahead.

“A lot of the input is through the ARCS working group, which is a collaborative study environment involving Boeing, Northrop Grumman, MIT/Lincoln Labs, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC), CEA Technologies, Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and the Common Wealth of Australia (CoA).

“Operational requirements come out of that process and shape the next increment of software development.

“The ARCS is focused on problems and their resolutions.

“These are software updates.

“We get a software refresh out about once a year.

“Six months are spent doing the study to shape the plausible change; and the next six months are spent doing the integration and then getting it out the door.

“We shed the specs in favor of resolving problems, which the operational community identified.

“They can even write recommended change requests as well which provides part of the demand side process.”

Question: When I last visited Wedgetail you had not operate it in combat. Now you have.

How has it performed?

Group Captain Bellingham: “We flew to the Middle East and almost instantly began operations. Since September last year we haven’t dropped one mission due to systems on the aircraft, and we’re at 99 point something percent success.

“It’s able to deliver everything plus more to the coalition forces.There’s a lot of potential in in the Wedgetail system.

“You’ve got a twin engine jet, it takes a lot less fuel to keep it over the battle space. We’ve got 13 crewmembers on board rather than 20 plus crewmembers on board (on an AWACS) who need food and shelter and clothing and sustainment. The footprint comes down.

“And it is very reliable. It’s a relatively new jet, so our reliability is high in terms of the green aircraft systems. That may change as it gets older, but right now you turn it on and it works.

“From my perspective, I think not just the US but other nations are looking at E7 going, “You know what? That’s working.” Whereas where we were four or five years ago it was, “Seems like we’ve got a bit of work to do.”

Question: It is clearly a system in progress with the capability to evolve into what the US CNO calls a key capability to operate in the electromagnetic battlespace, and to do so for the joint force.

Could you talk about the joint evolution?

Group Captain Bellingham: “Army and navy officers are part of the Wedgetail crew. . We are not just extension of what the air defense ground environment or the control reporting units do from the ground. We take our platform airborne and we do air battle space management.

“Recently, in the Army led Hamel exercise, we pushed the link piecutre down to the ground force headquarters. Their situational awareness became significant, compared to what they have had before.

“And since the Williams seminar on Air-Land integration, several senior Army officers have been to Williamtown to take onboard what we can do and potential evolution of the systems onboard the aircraft.

“We are seeing similar developments on the Navy side. A key example is working with the LHD. My opinion is that the Wedgetail will be critical to making all the bits of an amphibious task group come together. And not just that but as the P-8 joins the force, we can broaden the support to Navy as well. And the new air warfare destroyer will use its systems as well to pass the data around to everyone, and making sure everyone’s connected.

“The E-7 is a critical node in working force integration and making sure we’re all seeing the same thing at the same time, and not running into each other, and getting each other space. We’re not on a ten second scan. We are bringing the information to the war fighter or to whoever needs it right then.”

Question: During the visit, we have been in the squadron building, the hangar and in the System Program Office collocated with the squadron.

What advantages does that bring?

Group Captain Bellingham: “It facilitates a close working relationship between the combat force and the system developers.

“We can share our combat experiences with the RAAF-industry team in the SPO and to shape a concrete way ahead in terms of development.

“The team is very proactive in working collaboratively to get to the outcome we’re looking for.”

Question: In the SPO facility, you have a Virtual Wedgetail, which is the currently configured Wedgetail systems but located on the ground.

How as that worked for you?

Group Captain Bellingham: “It is crucial for reaching out to the warfighting community. We have plugged into both Army and Navy officer training courses.

“We are using it to work closely with the Army and Navy getting ready for our Fall exercise with the LHD to shape a task force concept of the amphibious ships.

It provides a realistic way for Army and Navy officers to see what we contribute to their warfighting tasks.

“We need a crew in the Virtual Wedgetail to make it work because they have to have the right experience and background to provide that level of reality to the force which then the warfighters can experience what we can bring right now to the fight.

“We are also working with 7th Fleet. We work with the PACAF as well. We sent two planes to Pitch Black 2016 and are participating as well in the current Red Flag Alaska. This allows for Australia and the United States to shape synergies in the force.

“We put three layers of officers into the AOC that was running the Pacific Thunder exercise to ensure the success from our perspective and get people to understand it.

“We’ve definitely been invited back so we’ll be there again beginning of next year doing it again which will be great.”

Question: The software upgradeability aspect of the plane means that you have to inform the broader warfighting community of what the evolving aircraft is now capable of. We saw those concerns when we visited Jax Navy and talked with the P-8 and Trion squadrons.

How are dealing with this challenge?

Group Captain Bellingham: “Until we stop flying the E7, it will keep getting better. The challenge is as you fairly eloquently stated it is making sure people understand the capability as we’re progressing.

“It’s not just one community, the fighter force, with whom we need to communicate.

“We need to work with and communicate effectively with the joint force.

“Which affects our training as we move ahead as well.

“We must make sure that our communication is effective within the joint force.”

Question: Where is the future evolution of the system likely to go?

Group Captain Bellingham: “One aspect is the people aspect, namely that Army and Navy officers are not simply replicating what they have done in legacy systems. Once they become that mission commander they are that all-seeing, all-knowing, joint integrator who is a vastly different person to what they were in the ground system and they know an awful lot about joint integration and how to make that work.

“Another aspect is the evolving technology of the systems, which are clearly moving down the path of providing significant electronic-magnetic warfare capabilities as well.

“We are not just a classic flying radar.

“When we’re looking forward ten years from now, that’s where we’re looking.”

Question: The P-8/Triton dyad is coming to the force.

How will that affect Wedgetail?

Group Captain Bellingham: “Significantly.

“One aspect is that we will be operating a larger 737 fleet with six Wedgetails and 15 P-8s. We can’t afford not to look for opportunities in this space.”

https://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Future-Acquisitions/Boeing-P8-A-Poseidon/?RAAF-Z4PUOpGXH/eLtWmc6qxYl9xYycb+rKng

The first slideshow highlights Wedgetail in the recently completed Pitch Black 2016 exercise and the photos are credited to the Australian Ministry of Defense.

The second slideshow shows Group Captain Bellingham and the Wedgetail being worked in the hangar for deployment later this year and the photos are credited to Second Line of Defense.

For earlier overview pieces on Wedgetail, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/from-troubled-to-trailblazing-program-the-wedgetail-and-21st-century-combat-innovation/

https://sldinfo.com/recrafting-the-surveillance-response-group-for-the-extended-battlespace-an-interview-with-air-commodore-heap-commander-of-the-srg/

And for our special report on the P-8/Triton dyad, see the following:

The Arrival of a Maritime-Domain Awareness Strike Capability: The Impact of the P-8/Triton Dyad

 

Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead Focuses on the Way Ahead for the Royal Australian Navy

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-08-30 By Robbin Laird

Prior to attending the Williams Foundation Seminar on air-sea integration, I had the opportunity to sit down with Rear Admiral Johnathan Mead in his office in Canberra to discuss his perspective, on the way ahead with regard to the Navy within the evolution of the ADF.

Rear Admiral Mead is the Navy’s joint capability manager and is clearly focused on the cross-cutting dynamics of maritime modernization within the context of the overall evolution of the ADF.

Although the Head of Navy Capability since 2015, Rear Admiral Mead is part of the transition set in motion since April 1, 2016 to shaping a new approach to shaping joint force capability. As he put it:

“The way the department was structured previously was capability development was centralized in a group led by joint three-star.

“One of the recommendations of The First Principles report was to bring those accountabilities from the center back out to Navy, Army, Air Force.

“Whereas previously the services had de facto a third party working it for them, now as of the first of April, it’s all come back directly to the services.

“The Chief of Navy is accountable for all naval capability across the board from building to life cycle support to disposal of assets.

“We’re only about five months in that transition.

“The services led by the Vice Chief, is now accountable for the investment program and also for the force design and bringing the alignment capabilities of the three services together into a joint force.

“That’s where we are today.”

With the launching of the White Paper, a significant modernization of the ADF was put in motion with a major build for the Australian Navy, including new submarines, air warfare destroyers and frigates.

This build will unfold within the evolving context of the overall transformation of the Australian Defence Force, which highlights shaping an integrated force able to operate in the extended battlespace.

Question: A key element of the rethink clearly is with regard to how you are thinking about the new assets in terms of task force operations.

 Could you discuss the new amphibious ships from this perspective?

Rear Admiral Mead: “The ship itself provides the government an enormous array of options and flexibility, but we have no intention of deploying the ship by itself. Our philosophy is to deploy in task groups, but in a flexible manner.

“The amphibious ships are clearly going to anchor any amphibious task force, but those task forces will employ a mix and match capability of air, land and sea assets.

“And we are looking beyond a classic understanding of an amphibious task force role for these ships, for they could operate as C2 ships in an ASW effort with embarked helos on board, and integrated with the P-8s, Tritons and other assets as well.

A United States Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey aircraft lands on board HMAS Canberra off the north east coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2016.
A United States Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey aircraft lands on board HMAS Canberra off the north east coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2016.

“And that will be true of how we will use the new air warfare destroyers as well, providing C2 and support capabilities for integrated air-land-sea missile defense or be the lead in such an effort.”

Question: As you build the new submarine and its combat system, clearly there is an interest for that submarine to tap into the information network which the ASW force can provide for it, such as the P-8/Triton dyad might provide.

How do you view that process?

Rear Admiral Mead: “Obviously, the silent service wishes to operate in such a manner that two-way communication does not compromise its operations.

“But equally obvious, is that the new submarines will operate in such a manner that they can tap into the evolving ASW network and have its combat systems benefit from that data input to maximize its mission success.

“The new submarines and their combat systems will clearly be designed effectively.to tap into the maritime warfare network.

“The task will be moving that information around so it won’t duplicate and so there’s no gaps in the coverage.”

Question: How do you bring coherency to the diverse programs you are managing?

Rear Admiral Mead: “It is clearly a challenge.

“In my front hallway, there is a large diagram — it’s about three meters in length and about one half meters wide — and it articulates all the major capability programs we’ve got on the way now and how they’re connected.

“My job is to try and bring a sense of coherency to that program. I do drill down to individual projects and some have very short timelines.

“But in the main, we are adopting a programmatic approach to navy capability.

“We are looking to maximize efficiencies and to work effectively in partnership with industry to do so.  It is a challenge.”

Question: When I visited Williamtown, I was impressed to see the System Program Office located next to the squadron so that that software developers could work directly with the squadron on shaping a way ahead.

 I understand the Navy has something similar in mind.

 Could you talk to that approach?

Rear Admiral Mead: “We do and we call it the “Ship Zero” approach.

“As we build our new ships, we are going to do so around a common structure, which brings together the sustainment, the training, command and management, land-based test bed, simulation the software development and importantly industry, into a common facility in order to provide the horsepower and genius necessary to support the capability at sea..

“We are trying to bring all the key elements into a building wherein that building is located close to where the platforms we’ll be operating from.

“This is a new concept for us.

“It’s about shaping an approach to proper asset management, maximizing the capability the ships can get through 30 to 40 year life.”

Biography of Rear Admiral Mead

Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead, AM, RAN joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1984 and proceeded to sea in 1986. He specialised in Mine Clearance Diving and Explosive Ordnance Disposal and after serving as Executive Officer of Clearance Diving Team One he undertook Principal Warfare Officer (ASW) training. A succession of warfare postings then followed, including: Anti Submarine Warfare Officer in HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Arunta, Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer and Executive Officer of HMAS Arunta.

In 2005, he commanded HMAS Parramatta and saw active service in the North Arabian Gulf as part of Operation CATALYST; for this his ship was awarded a Meritorious Unit Citation and he was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia.

He undertook studies at the Indian National Defence College in 2007 after which he assumed the appointment as Australia’s Defence Adviser to India.

Promoted to Commodore in July 2011, Commodore Mead deployed to the Middle East where he commanded Combined Task Force 150, responsible for maritime counter terrorism. Upon his return to Fleet Headquarters in 2012, he served as Commander Surface Force. In January 2015, he was promoted to Rear Admiral and assumed the position as Head Navy Capability.

Rear Admiral Mead holds a Masters Degree in International Relations, a Master’s Degree in Management and a PhD in International Relations. He has published a book on Indian national security.

The slideshow above shows Rear Admiral Mead earlier in his career.

These photos highlight a visit by General Zhao Keshi, Chief of Central Military Commission of People’s Republic of China, Chief of the General Logistics Department, People’s Liberation Army on HMAS Tobruk at Sydney’s Garden Island naval base when then Commodore Jonathan Mead was the Commander Surface Force.

Also shown is then Commander Jonathan Mead when he was captain of HMAS Parramatta on the bridge of the frigate with the Maritime Commander Australia, Rear Admiral Davyd Thomas, in the Persian Gulf

What exactly does the 2016 White Paper say with regard to Government commitments to new maritime capabilties?

The following is taken from the 2016 Defence White Paper with regard to the general discussion on the way ahead with regard to maritime capabilities:

Highly capable and versatile naval and maritime forces are vital to our defence strategy.

Australia’s naval and maritime forces must be able to undertake a wide range of activities in support of the Strategic Defence Objectives and operate across huge distances.

The area of Australia’s maritime zones, including our Exclusive Economic Zone, is one of the largest in the world, with a total marine area of around 10 million square kilometres.

Australia is also responsible for covering one of the largest search and rescue areas in the world, some 53 million square kilometres of the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans.

Our naval and maritime forces deploy around the world for training, exercises and to participate in coalition operations to support the rules-based global order.

Modernising our maritime capabilities will be a key focus for Defence over the next 20 to 30 years.

Our maritime forces will become more potent through the acquisition of more capable submarines, ships
and aircraft and better integration of combat and supporting systems across Defence. These forces will help to protect our maritime borders, secure our immediate northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication and enable us to project force in the maritime environment Increasingly, these capabilities will provide an ability to undertake anti-submarine warfare throughout the maritime environment.

Defence’s ability to contribute to border protection will be enhanced with the introduction of larger, more capable offshore patrol vessels with greater range, endurance and improved carrying capacity and a new large-hulled multi-purpose patrol vessel, the Australian Defence Vessel Ocean Protector.

The Government will invest in enhancements to multiple layers of the maritime surveillance system including new manned and unmanned aircraft.

Submarines

Submarines are an essential part of Australia’s naval capability, providing a strategic advantage in terms of surveillance and protection of our maritime approaches.

The Government has determined that regionally superior submarines with a high degree of interoperability with the United States are required to provide Australia with an effective deterrent, including by making a meaningful contribution to anti-submarine warfare operations in our region.

The key capabilities of the future submarine 
will include: anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and support to special operations.

The Government will increase the size of the submarine force from six to 12 boats. The doubling in size of the submarine fleet recognisesthat Australia will face a more challenging maritime environment in the decades ahead.

By 2035, around half of the world’s submarines will
be operating in the Indo-Pacific region where Australia’s interests are most engaged. Australia has one of the largest maritime domains in the world and we need the capacity to defend and further our interests from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans and from the areas to our north to the Southern Ocean. Submarines are a powerful instrument for deterring conflict and a potent weapon should conflict occur.

Australia’s new submarines will be supported by upgrades to enablers and facilities such as wharves and port facilities, as well as simulators, training and submarine rescue systems. The key strategic requirements for the future submarines include a range and endurance similar to the Collins Class submarine, sensor performance and stealth characteristics which are superior to the Collins Class, and upgraded versions of the AN/BYG-1 combat system and Mark 48 MOD 7 heavyweight torpedo jointly developed between the United States and Australia as the preferred combat system and main armament. The new submarines will have advanced communications systems to link with other Navy ships and aircraft to conduct anti-submarine warfare operations.

The acquisition of the 12 future submarines will commence in 2016 with the first submarines likely to begin entering service in the early 2030s. Construction of the 12 new submarines will extend into the late 2040s to 2050 timeframe. The length of the construction process will mean that Australia will need to be planning the follow-on submarine well before the last new submarine enters service.

To ensure no capability gap and the ability to progress development of a replacement submarine in the 2050s, the Government has decided to implement a rolling acquisition program for Australia’s submarine fleet. A rolling acquisition program will ensure that Australia is able to maintain a fleet of 12 regionally superior submarines as submarine and anti-submarine technologies develop over the coming decades.

During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence.

The future submarine program is the largest defence procurement program in Australia’s history. The Government has already committed to maximising Australian industry involvemen in the submarine program, without compromising cost, capability, schedule or risk. The Government will announce the results of a Competitive Evaluation Process in 2016

The Government will also continue to make appropriate investments in the existing Collins Class fleet, including priority capability enhancements, obsolescence management and fleet sustainment, to ensure Australia’s potent and agile submarine capability is maintained until the introduction of the future submarine fleet. This will include upgrades to the Collins Class communications and sensor capabilities.

This investment will build on recent improvements to Collins Class availability In 2011–12, Collins Class availability was about half that
of the international benchmark and in the past there had been up to three submarines undergoing long-term maintenance. Following the 2012 Coles Review and implementation of a comprehensive and innovative transformation plan, there has been a major improvement
in the availability of the Collins Class, and Defence is on track to reach the international benchmark for submarine availability by mid-2016.

By mid-2016, the submarine HMAS Farncomb will have completed the first two-year full cycle docking in Adelaide – a maintenance activity that formerly took over three years to complete. From then onwards only one Collins Class submarine will be in Adelaide for full cycle docking Defence will continue to work closely with industry to implement reforms to optimise Collins Class availability, reliability and capability.

Surface Vessels

Surface vessels will continue to play a critical role in protecting our sovereignty, maintaining presence and projecting force into the region and beyond. They are an important component of our joint force and will operate as a highly integrated part of our force with enhanced situational awareness, communications and data sharing between maritime, air and land-based systems.

Our surface vessels must be capable of independent Australian operations, as well as operating in coalition taskforces They must also contribute to a wide range of whole-of-government priorities, including border security, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Key elements of new naval capability will include 12 major surface vessels. The three Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers to enter into service in the early 2020s will provide Australian or coalition maritime task groups with defence against air and missile attack. The Hobart Class will be equipped with new advanced surface to air missiles to enter service by the middle of the next decade. Nine new future frigates optimised for anti-submarine warfare will be introduced into service from the late 2020s to replace the existing fleet of eight Anzac Class frigates, with construction to start in 2020.

The Government will acquire 12 new offshore patrol vessels that will provide greater reach and endurance than the existing Armidale Class patrol boat fleet. The new vessels will be capable of undertaking several different roles including enhanced border protection and patrol missions over greater distances than is currently possible with the existing patrol boat fleet, with construction to start in 2018. All 12 offshore patrol vessels will be delivered by 2030 The Armidale Class will be supplemented by additional patrol craft as required until they are replaced by the offshore patrol vessels, to ensure there is no gap in Navy’s border protection capability.

The mine countermeasures and military hydrography capability will be updated to support the future force. The life of four of the current Huon Class mine hunters will be extended while new technologies are developed to counter the threat of maritime mines Defence will seek to replace the hydrographic capability with an efficient combination of military and commercial hydrographic and oceanographic survey capabilities.

Capability priorities

Eight P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and response aircraft will
be introduced in the early 2020s, with seven additional aircraft to be acquired in two tranches to bring the total to 15 aircraft by the late 2020s. These aircraft have a range of over 7,500 kilometres, and can
be refuelled in the air by Australia’s KC-30A air-to-air refuelling aircraft, extending their range even further In addition to being able to undertake sophisticated surveillance operations at great distances, the P-8A can undertake offensive operations against submarines and ships, as well as supporting search and rescue operations.

To complement the surveillance capabilities of the Poseidon, the Government will acquire seven high altitude MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft from the early 2020s as part of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability stream. The Triton is an unarmed, long-range, remotely piloted aircraft that will operate in our maritime environment, providing a persistent maritime patrol capability and undertaking other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks Short-range maritime tactical unmanned aircraft will be acquired to improve the situational awareness of our ships on operations.

Currently entering into service, 24 MH-60R Seahawk naval combat helicopters will enhance the anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare operations undertaken by our destroyers and frigates Navy will also employ MRH-90 utility helicopters, and will work closely with Army for amphibious operations.

Rear Admiral Manazir in Australia: Allied Convergence on the Kill Web

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/29/2016

2016-08-29 By Robbin Laird

The lead off speaker at the Williams Foundation seminar on air-land integration was Rear Admiral Manazir.

Rear Admiral Manazir currently serves as the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems (OPNAV N9) on the staff of the chief of naval operations. In this capacity, he is responsible for the integration of manpower, training, sustainment, modernization and procurement of the Navy’s warfare systems.

His presentation focused on the strategic context for the U.S. and allied maritime forces and shaping a convergent way ahead.

FD8A1064

His presentation highlighted both the significance of the maritime domain for commercial operations and the emergence of peer competitors within that domain.

The U.S. and its allies are clearly concerned that the freedom of the seas, and rule of law be exercised by the global maritime nations.

Equally obvious is the concern that rival maritime powers are committed to their own interpretation of the rules of the road and are building capabilities to seek to implement their will in the maritime domain.

The question is how can the allies shape convergent capabilities to ensure that the global commons remain open, and not controlled by powers seeking to enforce their will against the allied powers?

Rear Admiral Manazir highlighted the kill web approach as a way to shape more effective integration of force and convergence of efforts.

The kill chain is a linear concept which is about connecting assets to deliver fire power; the kill web is about distributed operations and the ability of force packages or task forces to deliver force dominance in an area of interest.

It is about building in integration from the ground up so that forces can work seamlessly together through multiple networks, rather than relying on a single point of failure large network.

Later in the seminar, both the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Barrett, and Rear Admiral Mayer, Commander Australian Fleet, underscored similar approaches to the one introduced by Rear Admiral Manazir.

In his presentation at the conference, Vice Admiral Barrett underscored that “we are not building an interoperable navy; we are building an integrated force for the Australian Defence Force.”

He drove home the point that ADF integration was crucial in order for the ADF to support government objectives in the region and beyond and to provide for a force capable of decisive lethality.

By so doing, Australia would have a force equally useful in coalition operations in which distributed lethality was the operational objective.

Vice Admiral Barrett noted that it is not about massing force in a classic sense; it is about shaping a force, which can maximize the adversary’s vulnerabilities while reducing our own.

Rear Admiral Mayer focused specifically on the networking aspect of the kill web and how to make it work.

He highlighted that the Navy was returning to a task force concept but one which was 21st century in character, whereby Navy was tapping into ground and air assets as “part” of the task force, rather than simply focusing on Navy operated assets.

This evolution of the task force, clearly in the mode of what the US Navy is referring to as the “kill web,” will require the evolution of capabilities, both in terms of connectivity, and training. During the seminar he characterized as the network as a weapon system with “no single master.”

It was important to shape a way ahead for the joint force to work within the evolving networks in order to effectively operate in a distributed task force sense.

“Each service is underpinning its platforms with elements of a common network.

“There is increased overlap thereby for the air and sea forces. How should we best develop our joint concepts of operations and joint capability?”

And later in the seminar the perspective of the Royal Navy was provided by Captain Nick Walker, Royal Navy, with regard to the coming impact of the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers.

His presentation highlighted that the impact of the new carriers was joint through and through and was about empowering the British defense force to operate throughout the spectrum of conflict.

It was about not simply adding a new ship, but shaping a networked enabled capability able to operate to serve national interests or to support coalition operations.

Captain Walker quoted the most recent Strategic Defence Review with regard to the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers as follows:

DSC00457

Captain Walker highlighted as well the Royal Navy’s own approach to the kill web concept in terms such as the Type 45 destroyer could operate as the wingman of an F-35B coming off the Queen Elizabeth carrier.

DSC00475

In short, Rear Admiral Manazir was part of an Australian and Allied re-think about the way ahead.

When asked after the seminar about his reactions to the seminar and his meetings in Australia, he underscored that he found a significant among of innovative thinking going on generated by the Williams seminar.

“The Williams Foundation is coalescing around a lot of the issues that we’re trying to solve.

Most often the public discussions are mostly about resources.

That conversation is important but the discussion, which Williams set in motion, is about how to develop a different kind of navy.

The conversation has got to be along the lines of what we had today if we are going to get it right. For this, I thank the Williams Foundation.”

When asked what he thought about the presentations of his Australian peers, Rear Admiral Manazir had this to say:

“I thought the Fleet Commander was very, very good. He understands his trade and he speaks comfortably about his trade. And he understands where the Navy needs to go. What I took from Vice Admiral Barrett was his vision and his passion about that vision. He’s obviously a bold leader.

I see great examples in the Australian Navy of the kind of bold and competent leadership necessary for us collectively succeed.”

When asked about the UK presentation and perspective, Rear Admiral Manazir underscored that what impressed him most was the emphasis on the strategic role which Air and Naval modernization was being accorded by the UK government.

“The new carrier is being viewed as a government strategic asset, not simply a new platform, in and of itself. The British government is clearly investing in the Queen Elizabeth class of aircraft carriers.

And I’m so very happy that we still are committed to an aircraft carrier force; that we don’t have to go back and reaffirm our commitment to that force but can move ahead with re-shaping its role and capabilities in the period ahead, in the period of building the kill web.”

Finally, he highlighted what he sees as a key leadership role exercised by the Royal Australian Air Force and its Plan Jericho approach and mentality.

“Let me add my admiration of the approach that the RAAF has taken over the last 7-10 years.

“They have bought their platforms with an eye to interoperability inside the ADF, and with coalition partners, with key regard to the United States as well.

“RAAF leaders, energized by Geoff Brown’s forward-thinking approach, have already moved past the platform replacement approach and are focusing on capabilities delivered by networked combat power.”

The slideshow above highlights the uniformed presenters at the seminar as well as the leadership of the Williams Foundation.

For our earlier interviews with Rear Admiral Manazir and related materials, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/the-sea-services-prepare-to-prevail-in-the-extended-battlespace-an-interview-with-rear-admiral-manazir/

https://sldinfo.com/admiral-manazir-on-the-impact-of-global-partnerships-for-deterrence-in-depth/

https://sldinfo.com/focuspublications/reach-and-punch-the-sea-services-prepare-to-prevail-in-the-extended-battlespace/

https://sldinfo.com/the-sea-services-transform-their-reach-punch-and-impact-in-the-extended-battlespace/

https://sldinfo.com/the-uss-america-cvn-78-and-hms-queen-elizabeth-crafting-capabilities-for-21st-century-operations/

Progress and the Way Ahead in the Transformation of the Australian Defense Force: An Interview with former RAAF Chief of Staff, Geoff Brown

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-08-25 By Robbin Laird

I first met Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, when he was the head of the Royal Australian Air Force.

At that time, he was focused on ensuring that the F-35 became a key element of the modernizing RAAF.

Since his retirement, he joined the Williams Foundation and has been a key leader in the continuing look at joint force transformation, first at the seminar earlier this year on air-land integration, and just recently, in the air-sea integration effort.

I had a chance to discuss his look back and forward on the process of transformation, after the latest Williams seminar.

Question: Looking back, how do you view the progress so far on force modernization and transformation?

Brown: I am pretty pleased with the progress so far.

When we were able to add the JSF as a key piece of the evolving RAAF, we then could open the aperture and start to think more directly and fully about what a fully modernized air force not only would look like but could achieve for the ADF.

Question: You have been intimately involved with the Wedgetail project from the beginning.  It is clear now that this air battle management system is evolving into a joint battle management capability. 

Indeed, for both Army and Navy it is seen as an Air Force platform which is fostering the kind of cross service transformation which is desired across the force.

But such a development was not all that evident at the outset, was it?

Brown: Not at all.

But being a small air force, means that we don’t have the luxury of having specialty platforms; we are not going to have an AWACS, a Joint Stars, a Hawkeye, etc..

We have to leverage our platforms as multi-mission and with a fifth generation focus right from the start.

The ability to  multi-task all of our platforms is the key to producing the required combat power.

Geoff Brown during the Williams Foundation Seminar on Air-Sea Integration, Canberra, Australia, August 10, 2016. Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
Geoff Brown during the Williams Foundation Seminar on Air-Sea Integration, Canberra, Australia, August 10, 2016. Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense

Wedgetail has very much given us a very different capability that certainly has appealed to the Navy as a force enhancer to the fleet but I think Army’s starting to see what it can do for them too, as well.

And we have taken the same mentality with our C-17s and C-130s in terms of adding ISR and C2 capabilities to the airlift fleet, and this really is a work in progress for the joint force.

Question: The Army presentation at the Air-Sea presentation clearly was good statement about progress in the public discussion as well.

How do you view that?

Brown: The statement by the head of Army modernization about the intent and focus on Army’s role and approach to integrated air and missile defense clearly is a statement of progress in how we are thinking about the way ahead.

His focus as well on how Army capabilities can then unleash other capabilities for Air Force and Navy was a clear statement of the kind of joint leadership we need for the ADF to get the force transformation which we need for Australian defense.

Question: It is not always clear to folks that what you are focused on is not simply a new variant of network centric warfare.

How would you describe the difference between then and now?

Brown: We are a long way away from network centric warfare.

NCW was focused on getting the platforms simply more connected.

I think the difference is now that we have connected the platforms ,we’re actually exploring the possibilities of that connected force.

I believe that’s the difference and it provides the foundation for the next phase which is building an integrated force from the ground up.

We’ve still got to work towards more open architecture designs in all our platforms that allow the sort of flexibility with what I’d call the app application.

The ability to make small changes that actually give you significant combat power differences via apps on top of the software architecture and then to proliferate that app across the force where appropriate.

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/seminar-presentations

 

Shaping an Integrated Australian Defense Force: Crafting an Australian Anti-Access and Area Denial Strategy

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/28/2016

2016-08-20 By Robbin Laird

The Aussies are shaping a transformed military force.

It is one which is built around new platforms but working together across services to achieve a joint effect and able to operate in a joint manner in an extended battlespace.

It is about extending the defense perimeter of Australia and shaping, in effect, their own version of an anti-access area denial strategy.

They also recognize a key reality of 21st century military evolution in terms of shaping an integrated information-based operating force.

Interactive modernization of the force is built around decision-making superiority and that will come with an effective information dominant force.

As such, the Aussies are a key partner to the US and other allies in discussing openly a path for force transformation along lines were cutting edge thinking is occurring in the US and allied forces.

Put bluntly, they are driving a public discussion of transformation in a way we have not seen in the United States for a significant period of time.

The goal was put clearly by the Commander of the Surveillance and Response Group in the Royal Australian Air Force in an interview, which I did with him earlier this year. According to Air Commodore Craig Heap:

“We are small but we want to be capable of being a little Tasmanian Devil that you don’t want to play with because if you come at us, were going to give you a seriously hard time that will probably not be worth the effort; deterrence in its purest form.”

https://sldinfo.com/recrafting-the-surveillance-response-group-for-the-extended-battlespace-an-interview-with-air-commodore-heap-commander-of-the-srg/

Recently, the Williams Foundation of Canberra, Australia held its latest seminar on force integration, this one focused on air-sea integration. As Chief of Navy, Vice-Admiral Tim Barrett put it: “As we add new platforms, and modernize those we have the goal is not to build a joint force but an integrated one.”

This theme was reinforced later in the day (August 10, 2016) by the head of Australian Army modernization, Major General McLachlan, when he told the audience why he was there: “We are clearly committed to enhancing the capability of the ADF to provide for missile defense for the defense of Australia.

We are working to shape a lower tier missile defense system.

And let me be clear: we see our system as under the control of a sister service and we are seeking to enhance the capability of Air Force and Navy to shed some defense of Australia missions to work further out into the region.

This is part of our contribution to what one might call an Australian Anti-Access and Area Denial strategy.”

What the Aussies are doing is interactively modernizing their services and shaping a force that can expand the perimeter of the defense of Australia and provide, in effect, their version of an anti-access area denial strategy.

The defense of Australia is not what happens solely on the territory of Australia but the is delivered by an extended perimeter force.

This started with the shift from the C-130 enabled and circumscribed force to one defined by the reach of a C-17 and K-30A dyad.

As the 86th Wing Commander (Group Captain Adam Williams) who is located at Amberley Airbase and has the KC-30As and C-17s under his command put it:

“The ability to reach out and affect the world has changed significantly for Australia. The idea a decade ago that we could effectively lodge a force anywhere in Europe and operate at short notice was unimaginable.

For example, in our response to the downing of Malaysian airlines Flight 17, the KC-30 and C-17 force, in terms of seat miles and ton miles, did more lifting in 15 days than Australia did in the Berlin Airlift and we were in the Berlin Airlift for a significant period of time.”

The question of reach that can sustain an air force at greater distance is crucial for the perimeter defense of Australia.

And the Aussies are “informationizing” their C-17s, KC-30As and C-130s to provide for integrated support to their force operating in extended defense.

They are adding new communications capabilities and are thinking about how to use the large tanker and its internal space as storage and or transfer capability in the battlespace.

Added to this, the Australian navy has added large deck amphibious ships and is adding new air warfare destroyers and is working closely with the Army and Air Force to ensure that the force is integrated and able to deliver effects in an extended operational area.

Shaping a more integrated force is about having a more capable force in the defense of Australia, which can only come through close allied collaboration in a deterrence in depth strategy.

But the way ahead in the thinking of the senior ADF leadership is to have a more integrated force.

This means that as new platforms are added in one service, they are being added with interactive modernization with the other services in mind, and with an eye to shaping a more effective and lethal force package overall.

As former Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Air Force, Geoff Brown, put it recently: “We are not going to win the race for mass; we have to prevail in terms of force integration or an our ability to deliver what Rear Admiral Manazir has referred to as kill webs.”

It should be noted that the first allied force, which actually discussed the kill web concept, was the RAAF.

Two days after Rear Admiral Manazir had introduced the concept at a Mitchell Institute audience in Arlington Virginia earlier this year, the Air Combat Commander in the RAAF was taking it onboard.

In an interview with Air Commodore Roberton conducted at his office in Williamtown air base, he argued that there is a three-phase process underway and “we are only at the first step.

“We need to be in the position where our maritime surface combatants are able to receive the information that we’ve got airborne in the RAAF assets. Once they’ve got that, they’re going to actually be trying to be able to do something with it….

But we need to get to a level, where they too can provide information and weapons for us in the air domain.

That is how you will turn a kill chain into a kill web.

That’s something that we want in our fifth generation-integrated force.”

American military leaders clearly recognize the contribution which the ADF is making to innovation in thinking about the evolution of the integrated force, as seen by the key role which current Air Combat Commander, Hawk Carlisle played when he was PACAF, from the participation of Lt. General Davis, Deputy Commandant of Aviation at the seminar earlier this year on air-land integration and most recently by Rear Admiral Manazir who has been promoted to Deputy Chief Of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (OPNAV N9) and who provided a keynote address at the recent air-sea integration seminar in Canberra.

As Rear Admiral Manazir put in an interview after the seminar: “the Williams Foundation is coalescing discussion around issues we are trying to solve.

We are moving towards “informationized war, “and the Aussies clearly understand and are preparing for the strategic shift.

It is important to be in Australia and to discuss with the Australian military how to get our minds around the key issues of military transformation.”

In part, the rethink, which the Aussies are doing, is driven by concurrent platform modernization across the ground, air and sea domains.

Illustrative of the difference with the United States was this response to a question posed to a senior RAAF uniformed capability manager: “It is often said that we have 80% of the force which we will have in 20 years, so that the challenge is about how to leverage the new platforms and systems to get innovation.”

His response: “That is not exactly our problem as within the decade ahead our Air Force’s oldest platform will be a C-130J. Our problem is different: how to get maximum warfighting value out of the force we are building.”

There are two examples of the kind of interactive modernization, which the Aussies are pursuing, which are evident from my various visits to Australia and interviews with the ADF.

The first is Wedgetail and its evolution.

Americans often call the Wedgetail the Aussie AWACS; but it is not. An AWACs is an air battle management system whose major client is the fighter community. The Wedgetail is an air platform which does battle management; army and navy officers onboard the Wedgetail are working with the Air Force to shape a joint capability.

The scanning and tracking capability of the aircraft is unique and makes a significant contribution to air battle management; but the Aussies are building in Wedgetail to army and navy transformation as well.

The Virtual Wedgetail system which is a ground based replica of the current flying Wedgetail system is being connected to both Army and Navy training, and the RAAF and the Navy are working towards exercises this fall when Wedgetail will support the new amphibious ships.

Because the aircraft is software upgradeable, and the squadron is collocated with the system program office at Williamtown Air base, the combat team is the driving force for software change. What this will mean over time is that as the demand is broadened to the sea and land domains, the software will need to be rewritten with this in mind.

A second example is the LHD itself.

When the Aussies purchased the LHDs, they chose the Spanish Juan Carlos class ship, which is a large ship with a ski jump, which can provide significant capability at sea. But what capabilities do you want on the ship?

Because it was purchased at a time which a virtual revolution was about to happen in the amphibious domain with the coming of the Osprey and then the F-35B, the answer to that question is a work in progress and is a joint effort.

In effect, the LHD is being used by the Army as a forcing function to drive further integrative innovation with the Navy and the Air Force, notably in the digital domain.

Next year the Army will operate with the Navy in deploying a digital system aboard the LHD, which can support the force ashore.

In other words, the services are working interactive modernization as they shape new capabilities.

The challenge remains of how best to shape force structure in the years ahead in which a culture of joint force design can lead modernization.

But this is the topic for the next Williams seminar next year, and certainly U.S. military and industry will be there to contribute and to learn.

The first slideshow highlights the KC-30A during the recent Pitch Black 2016 exercise.

The second slideshow highlights the MV-22 landing on HMAS Canberra.

The third slideshow highlights Wedgetail and its engagements.

The photos are credited to the Australian Ministry of Defence.

The initial version of this article was published by Breaking Defense on August 19, 2016.

 

Moving From a Connected and Layered Force to an Integrated One: How to Shape a Way Ahead

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-08-28 By Robbin Laird

When I first became involved with the Williams Foundation, the initial focus was upon discussing, analyzing and explaining fifth generation aircraft and what they could bring to the force.

This meant in part discussing two platforms which are described as fifth generation, namely the F-22 and the F-35.

This could descend into a platform discussion in which the focus would be upon contrasting legacy (i.e. platforms which came before) and the latest combat aircraft.

Over the past three years the Williams Foundation has conducted a series of Seminars that explored the opportunities and challenges afforded by the introduction of 5th generation air combat capabilities.

Topics that have been explored to date included:

  • Air Combat Operations – 2025 and Beyond
  • Battlespace Awareness – The Joint Edge
  • Integrating Innovative Airpower (held in Copenhagen)
  • Training for an Integrated ADF: Live, Virtual and Constructive
  • Design-Led Innovation
  • New Thinking on Air-Land
  • New Thinking on Air-Sea

The range of seminars has cast the net much broader to discuss what a fifth generation enabled force will look like. 

The latest seminar of the Williams Foundation really brought out into the open the core challenges understood from a maritime warfare perspective.  The senior Navy leadership – US, UK and Australian – all focused on a 21st century concept of task forces, modular capabilities, and shaping the network as a weapon system.

We have successfully connected key platforms in shaping a more effective “joint” force in which air, sea and land capabilities can be mutually supportable.

But the fifth generation perspective is not that; it is about operating key force structure elements in terms of interactive, interconnected, and integrated operations.

It is about C2 built into the force which allows the force elements closest the area of interest to provide lethal effect and for the strategic leadership to assess that effect and reconfigure force up against strategic objectives.

Put in other terms, we can assume we can connect platforms and operate as a “joint” force.  But that simply gives us layers of connected support to lead forces or platforms.

That is not enough for where information rich platforms such as the F-35 are headed – it is about taking a first generation information dominant platform and welding it into a broader transformation which the US Navy calls the kill web, that is how interactive and integrated task force elements can be welded into survivable clusters of capabilities which can deliver lethal effect.

It is what Chief of Navy in Australia called creating a sovereign Australian Defence Force capability for lethal effect executed in coalition in terms of distributed lethality.

It is what Commander of the Fleet calls enhancing the vulnerabilities of the adversary whilst reducing our own.

In the last formal presentation of the Williams Seminar on air-sea integration, John Blackburn, the former Deputy Chair of the Williams Foundation and a past Deputy Chief of the RAAF, addressed the challenge of building from the ground up a truly integrated force.

To do so, requires more than the significant efforts the services are each doing working to shape cross modernization; it required a new approach to force structure design.

He then announced that on 6 March 2017, the Foundation will run a one-day Seminar on the topic of Integrated Force Design, stepping beyond the focus on airpower, sea power and Land power to one of integrated power.  He also announced the Foundations plan to run a case study Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) in order to explore how Australia could achieve an Integrated Force Design.

In an interview after his presentation, I had a chance to talk with the former Air Vice-Marshal who was also a key participant in shaping the Plan Jericho effort of the RAAF.

Question: Clearly, the services are making progress in what one might call interactive modernization.

But this is not enough to get to a truly integrated force which can operate with the flexibility which the senior navy leadership discussed earlier in the seminar.

What needs to be done to get there?

Blackburn: “What we’ve seen in the last decade is the services focused on each doing their transformation or modernization programs in their individual domains.

“There has also been significant efforts to address force integration of existing force platforms or systems.  However, such integration is primarily an “after market”activity.

“In other words we are trying to integrate force components after they have been designed or acquired as single service assets.  Integration after the fact means that we are always in lag of the threat.  As any fighter pilot will tell you, you win by “pulling lead” on the target, not by following in “lag.”

“Whilst this approach may have served us well to date, the changes in technology afforded by 5th Generation capabilities present a unique opportunity to integrate the future force in the design phase of force definition and acquisition.

“A force integrated by design would be far more operationally effective than one integrated after acquisition.  Given the threats that we anticipate over the next decades, we have no choice but to take the integrated approach if we are to win.

“The benefits from integration at the design level are becoming more and more evident. However, teaming the three services to work together in the design phase is not in our DNA.

“We are born and bred in single service cultures and, whilst we fight in a joint force, most people don’t think of that integrated force design as being about war fighting, they refer to it as a “process.”

“It’s not a process, it’s about a change in mindset, it’s a change in culture, and it’s all about teamwork before we get the equipment and go to war with it.”

Question: How has the Plan Jericho experience highlighted the importance of this shift in effort?

Blackburn: “The problem became clearly evident when I talked to officers involved with bringing on line the new platforms, such as P-8 or JSF.  When I spoke to them I asked them a question, “Okay, you’re working on your project, it’s coming along, it’s looking pretty good.

“How will your capability affect the other parts of the defense force, and what could you do in your area to make sure that your capability is more effective supporting other elements of the force or becoming more integrated with them in operations?”

“The general answer I got when I asked this question was, “Listen, I’m just too busy managing the acquisition of the new platform, we will worry about that once we have it … we have to make sure we get our project right.”

“What I saw was a work pressure and cultural issue: there is no imperative in people’s mind to say, “We’re spending billions of dollars on this capability; how do I talk to my peers who are looking at other projects and make sure collectively we achieve the best results?”

Question: The next Williams seminar is being crafted to deal with this challenge.

How are you going to go about it at Williams?

Blackburn: “What the integrated force design seminar is intended to do is to explore with Defence and Industry people the reality that the technology will enable a very different way of building and fighting the future force.

“By “designing” a capability as a team, we will have a far more effective integrated war fighting capability. This is about war fighting and reducing operational risk, and that is a mental change, it’s not just a technology change.

“My premise is that part of the problem of the integrated force design is a cultural and behavioral one.

“We want to explore this opportunity by selecting a capability such as IAMD, a capability that requires Army, Navy and Air Force and the Joint Staff to sit down together with industry and with academia to explore how we can shape a new capability for Australia.

“The Americans have been there for a while, but this is going to a new space for us.

“What it requires us to do is to sit down and say collectively, “How we’re going to take all the assets that we have, and those that are coming in the future, and make sure we’re going to produce an integrated force with a superior war fighting capability in the extended battle space that will result in lower operational risk.”

“We will explore a new way of working together at the integrated level and we intend to some analysis with force characteristics of this future integrated force. We aim to help the project officers think beyond their own projects to design in greater capability to leverage one another from the outset, from the design level.

Air-Sea Seminar

“In fact, the challenge is to ensure that the aperture is wide within individual projects to have the kind of interactive dynamic developments which a joint force design process can unleash.

“Unfortunately, many projects often narrow the aperture to a replacement mindset in order to save time.

“We want the project officers of individual projects to be able to say: “Okay, in my project as well as replacing what I had today, I’ve got to make sure that the capability I’m designing be a part of the future kill web rather than a force component networked or connected in an after-market after thought.

“We see that as the main challenge and the opportunity to design the future force, integrated at birth.”

The slideshow above shows the uniformed speakers at the latest Williams seminar along with the leadership of the Williams Foundation.

 

The US Congress and the Reshaping of US Missile Defense to Deal with the Evolving Technological and Threat Environment

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-08-28 By Garth McLennan

The United States Congress is contemplating changes to the standards it uses to define its defense architecture against ballistic missile threats. Any such changes are likely to be more symbolic than substantive in the short term, but over time will create more political space for the development of new ballistic missile defense systems (BMDS).

At the same time, any moves to strengthen Washington’s ballistic defense posture will be met with opposition from Russia and China.

A key element of cross domain synergy is F-22s and then F-35s cuing up the strike fleet whereby Aegis becomes a wing man for the airborne sensor and strike fleet. The photo is of a Tomahawk launch in the Pacific from the USS Sterett in 2010. Credit Photo: USN
A key element of cross domain synergy is F-22s and then F-35s cuing up the strike fleet whereby Aegis becomes a wing man for the airborne sensor and strike fleet. The photo is of a Tomahawk launch in the Pacific from the USS Sterett in 2010. Credit Photo: USN

More immediately, real revisions to the way Washington defends against potential missile threats will develop as facts on the ground outpace existing structures more so than through congressional mandate.

Regardless of any rhetorical changes made or considered to America’s ballistic defence architecture today, the future of missile defense more generally is in for significant change.

This dynamic will be driven by technological advancement, particularly in the domain of hypersonic missiles capable of traveling as fast as Mach-10.

The United States and China have been successfully conducting experimental hypersonic tests for several years, and both are aiming to test a fully field-ready prototype by 2020, and Russia is not far behind[1]. The introduction of such weapons, which follow different, far less predictable flight patterns that exceed the capacity of existing missile defence systems designed to counter incoming ballistic targets, will change how countries organize, structure, and resource their defence strategies.

Politically, these manifestations are already becoming apparent; with Beijing testing its DF-ZF hypersonic platform a full seven times in the last two years, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) included amendments to the 2017 NDAA tasking the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with building the doctrinal frameworks needed to guide and regulate America’s approach to defending against such hypersonic attacks, as well as to bolster US space-based interception capabilities[2].

Financial changes have and will continue to come as well with significant investment in the development of directed energy weapons; the House’s NDAA bill passed on May 18 included $15 million for the stalled directed energy low-power laser demonstrator, and another $25 million for joint research work with Israel[3].

The imperative of organizing and maintaining a layered dense in depth against a multitude of threats will nonetheless ensure the continued prominence of ballistic defense systems (sky-high development and acquisition costs will leave hypersonic missiles beyond the reach of many American adversaries for years to come), but the unique threat of hypersonic weapons equipped with nuclear warheads could lead to new doctrines built around ideas of pre-emptive military action before an enemy can use, or possibly even acquire, them. The likelihood of such a scenario will only increase if effective tools in countering hypersonic missiles are slow to develop.

A key element forging an effective aerospace combat cloud is the ability to combine defensive and offensive capabilities into an attack and defense enterprise. THAAD working with Aegis and with “Aegis as the wingmen” or the F-35 fleet is an important building block.THAAD being fired as part of exercise. Credit: Lockheed Martin
A key element forging an effective aerospace combat cloud is the ability to combine defensive and offensive capabilities into an attack and defense enterprise. THAAD working with Aegis and with “Aegis as the wingmen” or the F-35 fleet is an important building block.THAAD being fired as part of exercise. Credit: Lockheed Martin

The proliferation of precision-guided, medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly to state and non-state actors across the Middle East, is a viable rationale for stronger BMDS networks[4]. The spread of precision-enhancing terminal guidance technology has lowered the previously prohibitive cost of obtaining such weapons.

As these and other technologies proliferate, US and allied defense frameworks must keep pace; existing structures like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) may find their bandwidth taxed. The spread of medium-range ballistic missile capability could result in more countries armed with smaller quantities of such missiles, resulting in a lowered threshold for conventional combat.

For core US allies like Israel, this is a principal national security threat (something that should be factored in as well when determining the scope of American missile defense in Washington). Ten years ago, when the Jewish state went to war with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the inaccurate nature of Hezbollah rockets prevented them from posing a major strategic threat.

HTV-2 (Credit: http://www.parabolicarc.com/2010/04/18/darpa-falcon-htv2-hypersonic-vehicle-launch-vandenberg-tuesday/)
HTV-2 (Credit: http://www.parabolicarc.com/2010/04/18/darpa-falcon-htv2-hypersonic-vehicle-launch-vandenberg-tuesday/)

Today, however, with a battle-hardened Hezbollah now possessed of offensive organizational experience in support of the al Assad regime in Syria[5] and in control of an increasing stockpile of Iranian-provided missiles, the threat of precision-guided rockets raining down on cities and critical infrastructure like power plants anywhere in Israel is both terrifying and very real.

Likewise, the evolution of direct-ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite missiles capable of threatening Washington’s C4ISR infrastructure will mean new priorities, with the attendant funding that comes with them.

With China having conducted extensive testing in this domain, showcasing an ability to reach targets into the High Earth Orbit (35,700 km and up) in the process[6], and with Russia, North Korea, and Iran all aggressively working to augment their own space-based launch capabilities, proposed countermeasures have included calls for the development of a space-based interceptor (SBI) platform that can destroy targets in their ascent and boost phases over enemy territory[7].

In opposition to threats emanating from countries like Iran, which attempts to thinly cloak its efforts at ballistic missile development under the guise of testing for its national space program, an SBI system can be viewed as a particularly attractive solution.

Guidance from documents like the 1999 Missile Defense Act, which calls for defense against limited ballistic missile attack, also serves as an acknowledgement of the fact that no system capable of offering a perfect defense against long-range ballistic missile threats exists, but that reality does not diminish the potency, depth, and absolute strategic necessity of America’s BMDS.

Comprised of formidable Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) platforms, Aegis SM-3 missile interceptor systems like the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) deployment to eastern Europe, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in conjunction with the road-mobile PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptor recently sent to South Korea, the depth of America’s ballistic defense shield should not be in dispute.

If anything, the requirement of a “limited” ballistic missile defense capacity affords Washington a greater degree of political and diplomatic flexibility. The Obama administration found this beneficial when it felt the need for room to maneuver on the EPAA deployment and a Bush administration-led initiative for a GBI site in Poland.

That said, at a time of great uncertainty amid unprecedented military aggression by Moscow in multiple theaters, few signs would be stronger in response than strengthening American missile defense networks.

The removal of “limited” and the adoption of “robust layered” from US missile defense doctrine would provide the conceptual underpinning that allows for the political space needed to accelerate SBI development, but shaping an effective way ahead requires investments in key technologies, deployment decisions and commitments by the next Administration.

Garth McLennan is a strategic affairs analyst who has written previously for Second Line of Defense and 38 North. He graduated from Arizona State University in 2015, and currently resides in Vancouver, British Columbia.

[1] Omar Lamrani, What the Next Arms Race Will Look Like”, March 21, 2016, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/what-next-arms-race-will-look

[2] Press Release, “National Defense Authorization Act Amendment Victories for EMP Protections, Missile Defense, and the Fight Against ISIS”, May 5, 2016, United States Congressman Trent Franks Representing Arizona’s 8th District, https://franks.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/national-defense-authorization-act-amendment-victories-emp-protections

[3] Thomas Karako, Missile Defense Project Newsletter – May 2016, May 31, 2016, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/missile-defense-project-newsletter-may-2016

[4] Max Singer, “The New Threat of Very Accurate Missiles”, August 9, 2016, The Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/research/12727-the-new-threat-of-very-accurate-missiles

[5] Lee Smith, Reuven Azar, Michael Doran, & Tony Badrin, “Israel and Hezbollah: The Prospect of Renewed Hostilities Ten Years after War”, July 26, 2016, The Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/events/1359-israel-and-hezbollah-the-prospect-of-renewed-hostilities-ten-years-after-war72016

[6] Analysis, A Test of China’s True Intentions in Space”, July 6, 2016, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/test-chinas-true-intentions-space

[7] Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, “Space and the Right to Self Defense”, June 27, 2016, The Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/research/12593-space-and-the-right-to-self-defense

Post-Olympics Brazil: 13 Medals for Brazil as an Omen?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/23/2016

2016-08-22 By Kenneth Maxwell

The most negative expectations for the Rio Olympic Games did not materialize.

Zika did not impact tourists or athletes as expected (at least not so far). The number of foreign visitors was less than anticipated, though those that came to Rio enjoyed the competitions. Many stadiums were often only half full, but the spectators who did make it applauded noisily.

And the direst warnings over security, health threats, polluted sea water, and generalized disorganization, did not come to pass.

Despite rain and high winds the games ended spectacularly with a joyful and colorful festival of Rio Carnaval and fireworks at the famous Maracana stadium. The “Cariocas,” as the residents of Rio de Janeiro are known, certainly know how to organize a very good party.

And they did so.

Great Britain came in second in the medal count, after the United States, and ahead of China. It was an amazing performance. It was the best for Great Britain since 1908.

And it owed much to allocation of British Lottery funding to elite British sports. At the closing ceremony the British team wore flashing footware, their shoes with sparkling soles which flashed red, white and blue. A spokeswoman for British prime minister Teresa May, said there would be no limit on the honors given for the Olympic champions.

A time perhaps when the British honors system will be used to actually reward talented sporting achievement and not political cronies!

The US triumph, however, which saw 121 medals won, was tarnished by the behavior of drunken members of the US swimming team, who got involved in a fracas on their way back to the Olympic park after a late night party. They lied about what happened. They claimed armed robbers held them up. In fact they had vandalized a gas station bathroom.

But the one thing Brazil is good at is surveillance.

It quickly became “l’Affaire Lochte” and fed into Brazilian preconceptions about the (bad and arrogant) behavior of the US in general.

CCTV cameras soon revealed the truth about the whole sorry affair. But this was not before damage had been done to the reputation of the US contingent as a whole, despite the later apologies.

And it tended to overshadow the major achievement of Michael Phelps for example, and the overall successes of the US team in Rio.

The great multiple gold medal winning Jamaican sprinter, Usain Bolt, however, endeared himself to Brazilian public with his athletic success, his grace, and his good humor. This will be his last Olympic Games, and international athletics will miss him mightily.

But on the whole the Rio Olympic Games were a success.

The upcoming para-Olympic games may be a different story.  Already promised funding has been cut. Stadiums promised are already being “de-commissioned.” Tickets have not sold. And currently it is doubtful even if some of the para-Olympic participants from the poorer nations will be able to afford to attend.

Fireworks came at the end of the Olympics but this weekend fireworks of a political nature will occur. Credit Photo: © Ricardo Moraes / Reuters
Fireworks came at the end of the Olympics but this weekend fireworks of a political nature will occur. Credit Photo: © Ricardo Moraes / Reuters

For Brazil the Olympics have certainly produced some benefits. There was improved infrastructure in Rio in terms of transportation links for example in the down town area, and a new metro link, and the reconstruction of the old port area into a new tourist destination with the new museum of the future.

And in the soccer competition, Brazil won on penalties against Germany, erasing their humiliating loss to Germany in the World Cup by seven to one two years ago. Though Neymar, the Brazilian star (who like many Brazilian soccer stars plays abroad for Barcelona), and who was the captain of the Brazilian national squad, got into a bad tempered contretemps with spectators as he left the pitch. And he wore a prominent “Jesus” bandana, which broke Olympic rules against the overt profession of faith.

Overall Brazil came in thirteenth in the medal count, which was not a bad result.

That is if it were not for the ominous number “thirteen.” Brazilians tend to be superstitious. And unfortunately as the euphoria evaporates, as it undoubtedly will, there are very hard political, and economic, and fiscal realities ahead, not only for Rio, but also for Brazil as a whole.

And, as has been the pattern with Olympic Games elsewhere, including in London four years ago, the euphoria is likely to be ephemeral.

Public finances remain fragile, especially in Rio, where the salaries of many public employees have not been paid, and are likely to be further delayed. The billionaire who built the Olympic park and “village” expecting to cash in by selling off the apartments in what he calls his new “Isla pura” (“pure island”), is struggling to make sales in his now empty buildings.

And without an improvement in the real economy, the last months of 2016 are also likely to be difficult.

The ever-widening corruption scandals enveloping the state petroleum giant, Petrobras, and the workers party, and the leading construction companies, and numerous politicians, and businessmen, will continue to expand, as judge Moro’s anti-corruption operation continues to uncover and convict more culprits. None of which will soon help Brazil find its feet again in the near term.

And this coming weekend after three months and 13 days since her temporary suspension from office, the impeachment trail of Dilma Rousseff will begin in the Brazilian senate under the chairmanship of Supreme Court chief justice Ricardo Lewandowski.

This coming Thursday, (August 27th) the Senate will hear witnesses. The final judgment will then take place on Saturday (August 28th), or into the weekend if need be.

On Sunday demonstrations by “social movements” in support of Dilma are scheduled for Brasilia. It is very unlikely she will be exonerated. There needs to be a vote of two thirds of the senate and already the pro-impeachment forces think they have sufficient votes to carry the day.

But it will be a very messy and complicated outcome.

Dilma, whatever her faults as a political leader, and they are many, will not go away quietly, and she can claim, with some justification, that she is the victim of a “constitutional coup.”

She intends to appear personally to defend herself. But her successful impeachment will remove the workers party (PT) entirely from power. Ending in effect their rule over two terms under president Lula, and one and a half terms under president Dilma Rousseff.

Acting president Michel Temer, who will then become president, is an old time political operator from the centrist PMDB. But he is not much more popular than the president he replaces.

And in a shift of alliances he will have to work closely with the PSDB which lost the last presidential election to Dilma, and which now provides Temer’s very ambitious foreign minister, Jose Serra, a previous presidential candidate for the PSDB, who is the former São Paulo governor, and is a politician notorious for his own perennial presidential ambitions.

But there will at least be some political clarity after the impeachment vote in the Brazilian senate next weekend.

And with the formal removal of Dilma Rousseff from the office, the newly installed President Michel Temer, will be able to travel abroad while the president of the lower house of congress, Rodrigo Maia, will substitute for him while he is out of the country.

President Temer will have two years to make good on his promises of economic and political reform before the next presidential elections.

But one thing is certain: With the Olympic Games over, Brazil still faces a very rocky political and economic road ahead.

And while the old problems have been temporarily on hold: Now they will be back with a vengeance.