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Recently, the Williams Foundation held their latest seminar on 5th generation enabled combat. This one focused on new approaches to air-sea integration, and featured two key foreign military perspectives.
The first was provided by Rear Admiral Manazir, who currently serves as the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems (OPNAV N9) on the staff of the chief of naval operations. In this capacity, he is responsible for the integration of manpower, training, sustainment, modernization and procurement of the Navy’s warfare systems.
His presentation focused on the strategic context for the U.S. and allied maritime forces and shaping a convergent way ahead. How can the allies shape convergent capabilities to ensure that the global commons remain open, and not controlled by powers seeking to enforce their will against the allied powers?
Rear Admiral Manazir highlighted the kill web approach as a way to shape more effective integration of force and convergence of efforts.
The kill chain is a linear concept, which is about connecting assets to deliver fire power; the kill web is about distributed operations and the ability of force packages or task forces to deliver force dominance in an area of interest.
It is about building in integration from the ground up so that forces can work seamlessly together through multiple networks, rather than relying on a single point of failure large network.
The second major presentation by a foreign military leader was by Captain Nick Walker of the Royal Navy, who is on the Naval Staff. Earlier, we interviewed Captain Walker as part of a RN and RAF team discussing the carrier and strike aviation during an interview conducted at Whitehall in the first quarter of 2014.
He was then Commander Nick Walker and serving as the Chief of Staff Carrier Strike in the Carrier Strike and Aviation Division within Navy Command Headquarters in Portsmouth.
Captain Nick Walker, Royal Navy, presenting at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Air Sea Integration, Canberra, August 10, 2016
During that interview, Captain Walker underscored a key point about the new capability for the national decision makers:
Question: How does this evolving capability affect a possible rethink about the way ahead for the forces?
Walker: This evolving capability will give the decision maker a lot of flexible tools to respond or prepare for crises.
The Maritime Task Force can be well integrated with land based air but does not need a lot of forward ground presence to generate combat effects.
This can give decision makers significant flexibility with regard to a crisis or to have the ability to move to crises rather than having to generate force build up in a particular place in order to intervene.
Captain Walker certainly picked up on that theme and wove the carrier discussion within a broader emphasis on how it both triggered and reflected the transformation process for the UK power projection forces.
He underscored that both the F-35 and the carrier are being brought into service together, and together they are key definers of the new power projection approach for an information age.
The carrier is being introduced from the ground up as a joint asset; not simply a maritime asset.
“The carrier strike journey is driving significant cultural change in the forces as well.”
He started by focusing on the core point that the carrier is coming into service as part of the overall transformation of UK power projection capabilities. Indeed, the CEPP or Carrier Enabled Power Projection statement of intent highlights the way ahead:
“An integrated and sustainable joint capability, interoperable with NATO, that enables the projection of UK Carrier Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre power as well as delivering humanitarian assistance and defence diplomacy, enabling joint effect across the maritime, land and air environments at a time and place of political choosing.”
He noted that the role of Special Forces has been highlighted since this original statement and will be folded into the revised statement of intent with regard to the role of the carrier within the UK forces.
CEPP has been maintained within the Ministry of Defence. This is in distinction to most other capabilities, which have been given to the front line commands. This allows joint forces command and the services to focus on CEPP as a joint capability.
The deck of the Queen Elizabeth carrieris 85% of the size (i.e. area) of a Nimitz class carrier; which can carry up to 36 F-35Bs along with a Merlin Crowsnests and a Merlin Mk2 ASW helo. Alternatively, the ship can be used in the projection of land forces from the sea in terms of Marines and helo insertion capabilities as well.
But it is the carrier strike focus which is definitional for the new carrier.
The ship has been designed from the ground up to support F-35B, in terms of weapons, C2, and ISR integration.
“We have also built from the ground up interoperability, and have worked closely with the USN and USMC with regard to this capability. And we are working on a broader approach to NATO interoperability as well.”
He provided an overview of the timing of the build out of the ship and the process of marrying it with the movement of the UK F-35Bs being prepared and trained in the United States to its permanent location in the UK at RAF Marham.
The initial carrier IOC is projected to be December 2020 with the fully integrated F-35 and carrier having full operational capability by 2025.
Much like the leadership of the Royal Australian Navy focused on in their presentations at the seminar, Walker emphasized new approaches to task forces as key part of their transformation approach.
Clearly, the UK is looking at the evolving impact of introducing carrier strike upon the overall change in the RAF and Royal Navy as well. And a key aspect of this transformation is working the evolving integration of fifth gen upon legacy capabilities.
Captain Walker highlighted the shift from a legacy mindset, which focused on thinking of maritime versus air environments to an integrated information dominance environment.
“A key cultural change is that we are looking at air and maritime as an integrated domain; and we are looking at the interaction among the environmental seams of our forces driven by a kill web approach and capability.”
A clear challenge is reworking C2.
“We need to shape a more mission order vice a directive Air Tasking Order approach to the use of an integrated air-maritime force.”
Putting the new carriers in play completely integrated with the F-35 will provide the foundation for shaping the way ahead for the UK power projection forces.
Put bluntly, shaping the way ahead will be defined by the operational experiences entailed in operating and deploying the new carrier strike force and leveraging that capability will be crucial in thinking through future procurement decisions as well.
“We are focused on being more platform agnostic; and ironically, the F-35 can be looked at as a new platform an keep in the old platform-centric approach but we are looking at it as lever of change for next generation thinking and capabilities.
“We are taking the kill web concept very seriously, and examining how best to shape the desired outcome from nodes in the operational force, rather than focusing on specialized platforms.
“How do we generate operational tasks to be delivered from the integrated force?”
“How do we bring the Typhoon which is a key air asset into the kill web?
“Rapid reprogramming of platforms is a crucial way ahead for sure.
“The ability to exploit the intrinsic ISR capability of the force, rather than simply relying on specialized ISR platforms is a key way ahead as well.
“The ability to deliver effect throughout the force with data-link capabilities such as in the future the wingman of an F-35 could well be the Type 45 destroyer”
In short, Captain Walker saw significant commonality in terms of the Australian rethink about the way ahead for their navy and how the UK was thinking about the transformation of its power projection capabilities.
The Williams Foundation seminar on air-sea integration provided an opportunity for both uniformed officers as well as industrial participants to provide some practical suggestions and recommendations with regard to the way ahead to craft a more integrated combat force
In this piece, I will look at the comments made by the final panel, which featured key officers from the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Australian Air Force and the United States Navy as well as the industry presentations in the seminar.
Perspectives of the Panel at the Closing Session of the Williams Foundation Seminar
Air Marshall (Retired) Geoff Brown was the moderator for the final session of the air-sea seminar.
He oversaw a panel, which then engaged with the audience and discussed a number of practical challenges, which needed to be addressed to effectively shape an integrated force capable of prevailing in the extended battlespace of the period ahead.
The panel consisted of Rear Admiral Manazir, Rear Admiral Stu Mayer, Air Vice Marshal Warren McDonald, and Rear Admiral (Retired) James Rapp.
The challenge of shaping an integrated force is enhanced in part by an acquisition process, which buys platforms and not capabilities. And acquisition processes which are long and drawn out.
The focus of the panelists was on leveraging industry to shape fixes to gaps which then allowed broader force structure change, upon non-capital investments which drew upon needed cultural changes which the military leadership could identify and put investments against, and leveraging new opportunities posed by the introduction of new platforms, to shape new joint opportunities.
Air Vice Marshal Warren McDonald participating in the panel at the Williams Foundation seminar on air-sea integration, August 10, 2016.
Rear Admiral Mayer underscored the need to focus on non-capital investments as a way ahead.
“We are focused on platform purchases to solve problems; but many of those problems can be solved with better and more effective ways to work together. And we need to identify them, train to them and operate with them to make a difference in the joint force.”
Air Vice Marshall McDonald highlighted the opportunity to leverage the new capabilities provided by Wedgetail and P-8 to shape a new approach to work with navy.
He also highlighted the opportunity inherent in integrated and air and missile defense.
“I do not meet with industry in this area without an Army officer present, because we are going to work the problem together.”
He added the sage comment that we need to focus on the practical opportunities and leverage points rather than trying to get a full-blown integrated force solution at once.
“We need to build from to in order to shape an effective way ahead.”
Another key theme was working the training area more effectively.
Here suggestions ranged from shaping more targeted training, which focused on key tactical innovations to the use of LVC to train the command elements in ways to actually leverage a joint force in a high-end fight.
And LVC was seen as key to working the training towards the high-end fight, and training warriors in how to do cooperative engagement, to get the kind of sensor to weapons hand offs which the new technologies was generating for the combat force.
A key issue is that of information sharing among national or coalition forces.
Here Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown asked Rear Admiral Manazir if we were making progress in this area.
Rear Admiral Manazir highlighted that in the evolving machine-to-machine relationships, technology was providing a way ahead. For example, targets could be identified and shared without disclosing the source of that information or the classification level.
The practical problem is to move classified data around the battlespace to empower the war fighters without compromising classification methods.
According to Rear Admiral Manazir:
“Machines talking at multi-level and multi-channel encrypted security levels can exchange data without compromising the sources and methods whereby the data has been generated.
“Thereby an F-35 with US markings and an F-35 with Australian markings can share data effectively in the combat space.”
In effect, the broad problem is one of parsing information and solving the problem posed by Air Vice Marshal Gavin Turnbull at the last Williams Foundation Seminar:
“How do we get the right information to the right people at the right time?”
The Perspective of John Conway, Raytheon Australia: Reshaping the Industrial-Government Working Relationship to Support 21st Century Force Integration
John Conway focused on what he sees as a key role for industry in Australia, namely working with the Commonwealth to ensure that the ADF has sovereign control over its combat technologies.
“Integration should be viewed from the outset as an essential force multiplier in the air-sea domain, with the Australian defence industry playing a fundamental role in supporting the design, building and sustainment of a potent and agile joint force capability.”
Clearly, the latest Defence White Paper and associated documents called for a new working relationship with industry and throughout his remarks Conway underscored the importance of reworking the relationship to achieve greater force integration and cohesion.
John Conway addressing the Williams Foundation Seminar on Air Sea Integration, August 10, 2016.
“With Australian industry now formally acknowledged as a fundamental input to capability, this places a significant responsibility upon us to synchronise with Commonwealth intent, contribute to the development of effective and efficient time-sensitive solutions, and act as a cooperative and value-adding partner within the emerging framework of the first principles review.”
He highlighted that the addition of the new platforms provides key opportunities for working the partnership towards greater force integration.
“The possibility of adding complementary networked sensors, targeting systems, kinetic and non-kinetic weapons to as many of these new platforms as possible adds significant density and resilience to the ‘kill web’ described earlier by Admiral Manazir.
With a strong Australian industrial base, enabled by efficient international supply chains, we are able to integrated these new systems swiftly into our environment, as well as keeping their important training systems in lock step.”
The Perspective of Patrick Winter, BAE Systems, Australia: Reworking Systems Integration to Shape an Integrated Force
Winter focused on ways to enhance the integration of forces, with among other approaches shaping a more open systems architecture approach.
“From an industry perspective, open systems architectures, support to collective air and sea training, and enterprise level C4ISR capabilities are the key areas where we can really make a significant contribution to air and sea integration and interoperability.”
He underscored that it was important for platform builders to buy into the new approach so that “industry can deliver a sensor as a service across a platform and the wider integrated air/sea enterprise.”
But to achieve integration there have to be agreed upon standards with regard to data exchange and security. “We need a continued focus on consistency in our data links and communications in contested environments, our multi-level security and data exchange systems, and this is where industry and the services need to work together to define and agree to approaches to interoperability in Australian and coalition environments.”
And although he did not use this term, he focused on “Big Data” management challenges to get to where integrated forces can achieve operational advantages and superiority.
“We need to finally embrace the technical and security challenges posed by large volumes of data being collected, processed and disseminated in Australia and in deployed environments. We need to work with Defence to identify innovative solutions to ensure data is available when, where and in the form it is needed.”
He sees approaches such as the use of system integration labs as ways to shape more effective integration.
“Our approach is to work as an industry team to deliver the outcomes needed by Defence through initiatives such as our systems integration labs – housed at BAE Systems, but used by RAF, other UK services and our broader industry partners.
And this is a model which we believe the ADF could adopt for future platforms and systems.”
He hammered home the point that a new industry-government working relationship was crucial to achieve the force integration possible in a software development and data-sharing world.
“The depth, breadth and unrivalled global access of the major defence primes will be critical to Defence achieving the best air and sea integration outcomes – and we would like to work more closely and more collaboratively with Defence in the planning phases.
“It’s great to see First Principles, the Defence Industry Policy and the White Paper address this very issue – but we need to ensure we maintain momentum and truly work together in a partnership moving forward.”
WF_AIRSEA_160810_Winter
The Perspective of Rob Slaven, L-3 Communication Systems, Australia: The Challenge of Data Security in Coalition Operations
In both Williams Seminars this year on force integration, first on air-land, and the second on air-sea, L-3 has provided solid presentations on the communications side of the challenge.
At the air-land seminar earlier this year, Victor King, L-3 Mission Integration, provided an overview on ways to shape seamless situational awareness.
In that presentation, King talked to the question of how to balance substantial government investment in existing military systems designed to remain operational for decades with rapidly changing technology?
His answer focused on three key elements:
Integrated commercial technology and standards with current military systems;
Allow the market to drive technology and provide infrastructure;
Utilize both military and commercial networks for an end-to-end solution.
In the air-sea integration seminar, Captain Rob Slaven, DSM RAN (Retired) and now from L-3, provided a look at the communications side of the challenge for shaping and operating an integrated force.
Slaven’s briefing was entitled: “Joint Force Information Exchange and Data Integrity in a Coalition Environment.”
He emphasized that coalition operations are essentially come as you are warfare and requires working the interoperability piece is very challenging.
“For a Coalition finding a common cause is hard, speaking one language is harder, whilst using common systems and equipment configurations would seem to be the hardest challenge of them all.”
As difficult as the challenge is, it needs to be addressed for coalitions to be effective. He focused on a multi-step approach to sorting through a solution.
“Internationally agreed interface standards and programming languages are a first step. A next step is to initiate a cyber secure program environment from project initiation.”
Clearly, one would like to get to the point of having a shared common operational picture.
But there is a broader problem raised by Slaven’s presentation, which needs to be addressed.
Which allies for which coalitions for which tasks and solutions? The countries which have core security and data sharing arrangements such as the US, the UK and Australia can seek ways to share data, that will not simply work within a broader political coalition environment.
How to best two tier solutions but with reasonable commonality as well? And this will clearly affect the training and exercise side of the equation, a subject addressed in part by the CAE briefing.
The Perspective of Rear Admiral (Retired) Rapp, Senior Naval Advisor, CAE: The Crucial Role of LVCT in the Crafting of an Integrated Force
Rear Admiral James Rapp is Senior Naval Advisor to CAE. His final operational appointment in the Royal Navy was as Flag Office Sea Training. Employing a staff of 600, he was responsible for the operational sea training of all the Royal Navy’s hips, submarines and auxiliaries, and ships from 19 other foreign navies.
Rear Admiral (Retired) Rapp focused on the increasingly dynamic and transformative role of training systems in shaping the way ahead for the joint force.
Live Virtual Constructive Training would see a greater role in the evolution of the joint force as it forged greater opportunities for force integration.
In addition to reviewing the advantages of LVCT, he underscored how essential it was in terms of operating in a training environment where security can be maintained for the fifth generation-enabled force.
He argued that “security constraints are a key barrier to integration” and highlighted ways in LVCT could assist in providing practical ways to seek solutions rooted in the training environment.
He used the example of CAE’s support to the UAE Navy as an example of how an integrated training solution can provide benefits both to industry and the client in terms of enhanced training capabilities, and learning curves.
“In the UAE case, having a single training systems provider has reduced costs, risks and enhanced the training schedule as well.”
He presented a clear case for an effective industry-service partnership in the training area to get efficiencies, flexibility and effectiveness in the training domain.
The Perspective of John Thompson, Northrop Grumman: Shaping Capabilities to Prevail in the Electronic Magnetic Warfare Maneuver Space
John Thompson is director of business development for the Force Protection business unit in Northrop Grumman’s Mission Systems sector. As the senior business development representative for the Mission Systems sector’s electronic business area, Thompson leads the development and acquisition of advanced electronic warfare programs.
His presentation focused on the way ahead in the non-kinetic warfare area and its implications for full spectrum maneuverability in the air-sea battle space.
He started by focusing on a Growler being flown by an Australian pilot firing an anti-radiation missile. He saw that pilot as a node in the network, rather than simply seeing it as a plane. He saw that pilot both as a supported and supporting element in a combat network.
He suggested resetting the electronic warfare approach to understand that it is really about connectivity within the network and the ability of the network to function.
It is part of the operation of the network, rather than being a stove-piped functional capability.
He highlighted as well the CNO’s concept of operating in the electronic maneuver warfare space. And a key goal of the attack side of such operations is to create chaos in the adversary’s operational space.
He argued that it was crucial as well to shape redundant systems to be able to defend against electronic threats as well. For combat success, agility is crucial for the forces, and in that regard EW is a crucial capability, which needs to be built into the integrated force.
How do I engage at range?
In the example cited by Captain Walker of the Type 45 destroyer as the wingman for an F-35, the task is highlighted whereby target identification then pushes the choice of weapon to the appropriate capability in the battlespace.
“How will I generate a weapons quality track at range and distribute that track to the best available shooter?”
The Perspective of Lowell Shayn Hawthorne, Mitre Corporation: Evolving Approaches to Integrated Air and Missile Defense
The Mitre executive started his presentation by articulating how he saw the Australian situation.
The future will find Australian Defence Forces (ADF) conducting global operations
In a variety of environments from low intensity up to Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) conditions
Requiring IAMD to protect joint forces.
His presentation then went on to discuss the evolving threat environment, which requires more flexible and enhanced integrated defense.
He argued that the strategic direction of the effort needed to ensure that “every asset is part of the IAMD net.”
The rest of the briefing set out how he thought this goal could be achieved or put differently, what needed to happen in order to achieve this objective.
He noted, “All systems must work together to achieve common goals in coalition and sovereign operations.”
This might well be a too hard to do issue, and perhaps can happen for a small subset of states but more difficult across coalitions.
Indeed both Chief of Navy and the Commander of the Australian Fleet, both highlighted the importance of sovereignty operations and the need to shape their integrated force obviously with close connections with the United States.
Where best to fit in IAMD into the Australian picture?
The background of Lowell Shayn Hawthorne highlights in many ways the nature of the presentation.
Mr. Shayn Hawthorne has served as the Technical Director of the OSD/MDA Program Division since March 2014 where he has developed excellent relationships with his two Portfolio Directors and Division Leadership while leading the Division through significant workforce shaping activities and helping both Portfolios achieve significant growth.
Previously, Shayn led the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Space Knowledge Center as the Technical Director, which performs independent technical assessments and evaluates experiments related to MDA space programs currently being executed. There, Shayn worked with MITRE, other FFRDCs/UARCs, and the MDA to achieve mission success. In previous MITRE work efforts, Mr. Hawthorne has been by-name requested to lead Advanced Development efforts for Air Force space situational awareness, missile warning, and missile defense sensors, as well as Command and Control (C2) systems and correlator/tracker systems.
The US built a missile defense agency, precisely to do missile defense. The problem is that in a warfighting sense dealing with an adversaries’ missiles is even more of an offensive challenge than a defensive one, and clearly what is on offer is shaping an offensive-defensive enterprise that engages to kill adversary forces, with whatever means are necessary.
The General discussed the role of ADA within Pacific defense as part of the support to airpower and to strategic decision-making.
He emphasized that the capabilities of ADA helped provide time to determine how to both generate more air power and how to use airpower and provided the national command authority time to determine how best to respond to a crisis.
There are three ways to deal with an incoming missile defense.
There is passive defense, but there is only so much hardening and dispersal one can do without degrading your combat capability, and their many soft targets, which cannot be hardened.
You can use air strikes to take out the adversary’s missile strike force, but you may not wish to do that right away or have not fully mobilized your capability.
The role of having active defense or an interceptor force is to buy time for [Lieutenant] General [Jan-Marc] Jouas (7th USAF Commander in the Pacific) or General [Hawk] Carlisle (the PACAF Commander) to more effectively determine how to use their airpower.
It also allows the National Command Authority to determine the most effective way ahead with an adversary willing to strike US or allied forces and territory with missiles.
This is very close to the view articulated by the head of Australian Army Modernization, Major General McLachlan, concerning how he saw the evolving role of the Aussie Army in the defense of Australia through what the U.S. Army would call Air Defense Artillery (ADA) or shaping the lower tier to a missile defense system engaged with the power projection forces.
From his perspective, the more effective the territory of Australia could be used to shape effective defenses, the more the Air Force and Navy could focus on extended operations. He characterized this as shaping an Australian anti-access and area denial force.
Clearly, integrated air and missile defense for Australia was really not that; they are too small a force to execute the mission in these terms.
They need to shape a capable integrated force, which can execute seamlessly operations in an offensive-defensive enterprise.
They will never have enough defensive capability to deter the most likely adversaries; but with potent extended reach with some integrated defensive capabilities, they can provide for deterrence.
The way Air Commodore Heap put the goal: “We are small but we want to be capable of being a little Tasmanian Devil that you don’t want to play with because if you come at us, were going to give you a seriously hard time that will probably not be worth the effort; deterrence in its purest form.”
What Australia does in the air and missile defense regime will flow from this strategic goal and not provide for an independent capability. The American solution cannot be easily morphed to Australia.
Hawthorne’s excellent presentation introduces a number of key elements for a solution set; the question is how Australia can best leverage some of his suggestions?
On August 31 Dilma Rousseff was impeached by the Brazilian senate.
The vote was 61 to 20 to convict her for violating budget and fiscal responsibility laws.
The outcome was unambiguous.
Yet the Chief Justice of the Brazilian Supreme Court, Ricardo Lewandowski, who presided over the senate impeachment trial, unexpectedly introduced a second vote on removing Dilma Rousseff’s political rights for eight years.
The Senate then voted by 42 to 36 that these political rights should not be removed.
It was an unanticipated interpretation of the Brazilian constitution.
And it caused immediate confusion and suspicions of back room deals.
Lewandowski was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Lula da SIlva, and some commentators in Brasilia were suspicious that Lewandowski, together with Renan Calheiros, the president of the senate, and many politicians caught up in the anti corruption “Lava Jato” (“car wash”) investigation of federal judge Sergio Moro, were thinking of creating a precedent for softer penalties.
And the second vote set of a new round of appeals to the Supreme Court, led by Fernando Holiday, on behalf of the “Movimento Brasil Livre” ( Brazil Free Movement ), which was one of the principal organisations promoting Dilma’s impeachment.
They now called for Lewandowski’s impeachment, as well as the impeachment of Renan Calheiros.
In all 10 appeals have been filed with the Supreme Court, the strongest from the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), and former PT senator Delcidio do Amaral, expelled from the senate, has asked the Supreme Court to reinstate his eligibility for public office.
Lewandowski will be succeed as president of the Supreme Court on the 10th September by Supreme Court justice Carmen Lucia, who has a reputation for toughness and has little tolerance for corruption. Dilma, meanwhile, has the right to remain in the presidential residence, the Alvorada Palace in Brasilia, for thirty days. But she decided to leave on Tuesday afternoon for Porto Alegre. She will later apparently move to an Ipanema beach-front apartment in Rio de Janeiro.
The Supreme Court could still declare Dilma ineligible to hold public office.
The circle around Temer certainly hopes so. Though Temer, the constitutionalist scholar, had argued that two penalties in a case of impeachment were in fact constitutional. But that was some time ago in his text book.
And it was in theory.
On the day the senate voted to impeach Dilma Rousseff, Michel Temer, who has been acting president, was inaugurated in the senate chamber as the new president of Brazil.
He will serve in theory until the next presidential election scheduled in two years time. President Temer then left for Hangzhou, China, for the meeting of the G-20. Rodrigo Maia, the president of the lower house of of Congress became president during Temer’s week-long absence, as is the Brazilian tradition.
In fact Brazil had three presidents in one day: outgoing president Dilma, incoming president Michel Temer, and acting president Rodrigo Maia. Protests against Temer (“fora Temer” ) erupted over the weekend in Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo and in other Brazilian cities.
The demonstrations on the Avenida Paulista in São Paulo were initially banned by Geraldo Alckmin, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) governor of the state. There had been violent attacks on bank branches in the downtown São Paulo by anarchist “black blocs.”
Hangzhou:Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, South African President Jacob Zuma and Brazilian President Michel Temer posing for a group photo before the BRICS meeting in Hangzhou, China. PTI Photo
In China, Michel Temer, said that the pro-Dilma demonstrators were “a handful of car wreckers” which provoked a massive demonstration of 100,000 on the Avenida Paulista.
The anti-Temer demonstrators revived the demand for “Diretas Já” (direct elections now), a battle cry of huge demonstrations against the military government in 1984. The situation on the streets of São Paulo was aggravated by the violent reaction of the military police which attacked peaceful demonstrators. Images were quickly and widely circulated on social media. Brazil after all has the second largest number of users of Facebook in the world.
President Temer returned to Brazil from China in time to attend the 7th of September Brazilian Independence Day celebrations in Brasilia before flying to Rio for the opening of the Paralympic Games.
He is unlikely to receive a warm reception at either event.
He remains deeply unpopular.
The latest opinion polling show him with only 8% to 19% approval ratings in Brazil’s major cities. In Rio he has 12% of those polled thinking he is “excellent” or “good” and 42% thinking he is “bad” or “péssimo”.
In São Paulo 13% think he is excellent or good, and 41% believe he is bad or useless. In Belo Horizonte, the capital of Minas Gerais state, 13% approve of him while 47% rejected him.
Temer is a 75 year old “paulista.”
Both former Worker’s Party (PT) president Lula, and former Brazilian Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), are also São Paulo-based politicians, though both had their origins elsewhere. Lula came from the poor backlands of the North Eastern Brazil. FHC is originally from Rio de Janeiro.
But they each made their political career in São Paulo, which is Brazil’s financial and industrial capital. The city’s population is expected to reach 12 million next year.
Dilma, on the other hand was originally from the south central inland state of Minas Gerais, though she had made her political career in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul.
Michel Temer is a constitutional law professor and a long term politician and a member of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), which is a centrist coalition of regional bosses that has been a permanent and critical bloc in Congress since the end of military rule in 1985, supporting whoever was in power, but prepared to shift sides as the winds political sentiment have moved over time.
The PMDB supported the PSDB of FHC during his two terms as president, and then supported Lula and the PT during his two terms. And the PMDB then provided Temer as the Vice President for president Dilma. Previously Temer had been three times elected president of the lower house of congress.
He is a man who knows the intricacies, the betrayals, and the deals which grease the wheels of the political system in Brasilia.
In this sense Temer is infinitely better prepared than Dilma was to work within the system.
Dilma, who had never been elected before she was chosen by Lula to become the PT’s presidential candidate, dramatically and fatally lost the support of congress, and then lost the presidency, when the former speaker of the lower house, Eduardo Cunha, organised the campaign, that led to the vote in the lower house, which began the process that ended in her impeachment by the senate.
Eduardo Cunha although now “afastado” (removed from office) on corruption accusations, is a determined and unscrupulous operator, and a skilled long term denizen of the murky backrooms of Brazilian politics, and he still has many “friends” and “allies” in the lower house, and he has not yet been definitively removed from office. Like Michel Temer, he knows where the bodies are buried, and he will not hesitate to use this knowledge in his own defence. Cunha’s allies are attempting to preserve his political rights.
If the House of Representatives votes against him by a majority he will not be eligible to hold office for eight years.
While there is now some political clarity in Brazil, and Temer is now the president, the political circus in Brasilia is far from over.
The PT has been removed from power after 13 years in government, but the legitimacy of the new government is contested on the streets, and by the PT, as well as by many union members, intellectuals and artists, as well as by powerful “social” movements, which have been relatively quiet during the years of PT rule but can still provide serious opposition on the streets and in the countryside.
And the economic and financial crisis continues.
The Brazilian economy declined by 4.6% in the first semester of 2016 in relation to the year before, and Brazil still faces its most profound recession in almost 50 years. And already inflation is impacting the poor much more than the rich. For those with 1 to 2.5 minimum salaries, inflation rose to 9.29% in August. The average rise was 8.48%.
And the corruption scandals have not gone away either.
Petrobras-related cases continue. There is a major new investigation of state and private pension funds (“operation greenfield”) where the federal police have already seized thousand of dollars, euros, works of art and luxury automobiles. The federal prosecutors are investigating JBS, the greatest meat processor in the world.
And renewed investigations are underway into bribes paid in the São Paulo metro and the World Cup stadium in Bahia involving the construction company OAS.
But policy changes are already profound.
The PT alliance of left wing South American regimes is in tatters. Cuba, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, have all recalled their ambassadors, and Foreign Minister José Serra has made his views abundantly clear about the regime in Venezuela. His relationships with Brazil’s partners in Mercosul have been difficult.
And a diplomatic revolution is underway in South America with an closer ties with Peru, Columbia, and with Argentina under president Mauricio Macri.
Michel Temer met with the leaders of the BRICS on the sidelines of the G-20 meeting in China and he is due to attend the next summit of the BRICS in India, but it is unlikely that Temer (and most particularly Serra) will be as enthusiastic as Lula or Dilma were for the putative alliance of developing world powers.
But the China-Brazil relationship is more complicated.
China is Brazilian largest trading partner.
And while president Temer was in China, Chinese state grid corporation agreed to a US$1.8 billion purchase of a 23.6% stake in CPFL Energia, and is expected to take a majority control of Brazil’s largest private electric sector company.
This CPFL deal was one of nine corporate deals between companies that were signed during the Temer visit. Ironically, the CPFL deal arises from the consequences of the Lava Jato investigation into corruption at Camargo Corrêa, one of the electricity company’s main shareholders.
The political horizon in Brazil, however, remains very clouded.
The “tucanos” as the PSDB are called after the Brazilian bird, have three major figures in competition for the next presidential campaign: Geraldo Alckmin, the governor of São Paulo, senator Aécio Neves, former governor of Minas Gerais, and foreign minister José Serra, former governor of São Paulo.
All three are former presidential candidates. Dilma Rousseff allegedly called Temer a “Decorative” Vice President. He certainly now has a decorative “First Lady” in Marcela Temer, 42 years his junior, and who has esconced on a third floor office close to his own in the Planalto Presidential palace in Brasilia, where she will run a new “happy child” program.
The Brazilian literary magazine “Piaui” summed up the new Brazilian regime succinctly on its September cover. It showed a happy president Temer, dressed in the presidential sash, arriving home at the family cottage, to be greeted by his young son, and by his smiling wife. She is standing on the cottage doorstep wearing apron embroidered with the logo “Lar, Doce Lar” (“Home sweet Home”).
But overall very deep divisions remain in Brazil.
There has long been a visceral hostility to the PT among the middle class in Brazil.
And it has only been aggravated by the corruption scandals and the economic recession. The PT and its acolytes are no less hostile to those they believe robbed them unfairly of the presidency in a legalistic and constitutional coup.
Someone is supposed to have said you should not get what you wish for.
Temer and his acolytes will have their work cut out for themselves now they have inherited the Brazilian mess.
And they will have no one else to blame for it now but themselves.
I first visited the 33rd Squadron at Amberley Airbase in the first quarter of 2014 and had a chance to talk to the squadron about their new tanker. At the time, the KC-30A was “project of concern,” but now is a proven combat asset. What a difference 2 ½ years can make in the life of an aircraft!
During my visit in 2014, I highlighted a number of key developments.
During my time at the squadron, RAAF officers took me through the simulators and let me try my hand at lowering the virtual boom to tank an F-16.
Two of the five planes were at RAAF Base Amberley during the visit.
Three of the five Aussie tanker aircraft are currently involved in maintenance, upgrade, testing, and residual acquisition activities in Madrid and Australia. The squadron fleet should be at full strength in 2015.
Last year, in combination with Australian C-17s, the KC-30A squadron supported several F/A-18 deployments to Guam as well as Darwin and Tindal in Australia’s Northern Territory. This activity demonstrated the ability of the RAAF to move an air wing and support it at extended range with a tanker, while also providing airlift support.
This year the squadron has supported movement of Aussie F/A-18s from the United States across the Pacific and back to Australia.
Both operations underscore capabilities, which are part of shaping a 21st century Air Force.
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From discussions at RAAF Base Amberley and in Canberra, it is clear that the squadron is a work in progress that represents a significant boost in capability for the RAAF. The tanker’s potential is a clear advantage as seen by senior RAAF officers.
Standing up the squadron, finishing the procurement and getting initial use of the tanker underway is a prelude for what comes next – working through the best ways to use the tanker with the RAAF, and to work out its interoperable role in the region and beyond.
While the squadron provides support to Defense, it is still very much involved in finishing the acquisition process for the tanker. The RAAF has really the world’s first operational squadron of the MRTT, and as the launch customer is working through the launch point for the foundational capabilities of the tanker.
This visit was quite different, and most of the squadron was out and about supporting exercises or operations.
It is a high demand asset and delivering effectively to that demand.
My earlier interview with the 86th Wing Commander, Group Captain Williams, underscored how significant the dyad of C-17 and KC-30A has become for the Australian Defence Force.
By providing sustainable global reach, Australia can protect its global interests more effectively.
According to Group Captain Williams: “The ability to reach out and affect the world has changed significantly for Australia.
“The idea a decade ago that we could effectively lodge a force anywhere in Europe and operate at short notice was unimaginable.
“For example, in our response to the downing of Malaysian airlines Flight 17, the KC-30A and C-17 force, in terms of seat miles and ton miles, did more lifting in 15 days than Australia did in the Berlin Airlift and we were in the Berlin Airlift for a significant period of time.”
I also had the chance to talk with Squadron Leader Ben and Wing Commander Robert Williams, the Officer Commanding 33rd Squadron.
That conversation highlighted both the progress made with the KC-30A and earmarking a way ahead from the Squadron perspective.
Question: How has the plane and crews performed to date in operations in the Middle East?
Answer: “In the Middle East, we’re seeing reliability, or mission dispatch rates, up near 96%.
“Some months it’s 100%. From a maintenance perspective, we’re probably looking at a serviceability rate of about 97%-98% for our MER ops.”
Question: In your view, why has the plane performed as well as it has?
Answer: “I haven’t really considered that before but it is an aircraft built on a proven and mature platform, an A330-200.
“It’s been around for many years. It retains much of its green aircraft architecture.
“That’s why we see those dispatch rates.
“It largely provides almost airline-like dispatch rates.”
Question: In talking to your crews and senior RAAF leadership, one key feature, which has been highlighted, has been the capability of the crew to operate in the battlespace by moving to the customer, rather than flying classic tanker tracks.
Could you comment on that aspect of your con-ops?
Answer: “That is a good point.
“When you were here last we were in the process of getting the planes into service and we were not focused on the operational change part of the equation.
“But it is clear that the crews are operating in the MER by servicing the fighters in the battlespace and trying to shape a con-ops of service to the point of need, rather than operating as a rotating gas station in the sky.
“Obviously, this has worked in large part because of permissive airspace, and our con-ops will adjust to the situation.”
Question: What is your sense of growth within the squadron?
Squadron Leader Ben: “This is my 10th year with the squadron. I have been here since 707 times. I was on the initial crew for this aircraft when it arrived here and then moved elsewhere and have now come back.
“The difference between when I left in 2012 and now is black and white.
“There were a lot of issues with the aircraft several years ago, mainly related to the pods and pod refueling. Cobham has largely remedied these issues, and we see ourselves in a position where our rate of effort is five or six times what it was several years ago.
“The pods are now a very reliable piece of equipment.”
Question: It is not widely realized outside of the tanker community that the KC-30A is a software driven aircraft unlike earlier tankers.
Could you talk to that aspect of the platform?
Answer: “The 707 was a totally mechanical aircraft. This aircraft is a fly by wire aircraft, which means that effectively computers control each system.
“For example, there are two refueling computers controlling the refueling equipment.
“The green aircraft side of the plane means that the systems used by commercial Airbus drives upgrades to basic flight capabilities of the aircraft.
“We’ve got military modifications, and software and computers operating in conjunction with the green Airbus computers and software.”
Question: What is the next big shift in your tanker community?
Answer: “Clearly, the coming of the boom.
“Our Air Force has been largely a hose and drogue force. With the C-17 and Wedgetail we are using booms and as the JSF comes on line we will become predominantly a force being refueled by the boom.”
Question: Where do you see the most progress over the past 2 ½ years?
Answer: “Our people are being recognized as contributing significant new capability to our air force and our nation. That is the most satisfying result.
“And the shift to boom operations is a big change and an exciting one.
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“We are shifting from moving the hoses out for refueling to a more hands-on effort required for doing the booming.
“The job is changing from a managing one and flicking switches to actually managing a flight control and using a boom.
“It is satisfying for our crews to actually put their hands on something that is totally new for the Australian Air Force and to be successfully doing so.”
For earlier pieces discussing the KC-30A and the 33rd Squadron, see the following:
And for two pieces published by the RAAF which discuss the F-35 and Wedgetail as demand side assets for the KC-30A boom, see the following:
AFHQ, 18 June 2015.
Air Force has completed air-to-air refuelling trials between its KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport and E-7A Wedgetail aircraft.
Conducted in airspace off the coast of northern New South Wales from 1-13 June 2015, the trials marked the first time the Wedgetail has refuelled from the KC-30A.
Wing Commander Christian Martin, Commanding Officer of Number 2 Squadron (2SQN), said air-to-air refuelling was a ‘force multiplier’ for the Wedgetail fleet.
“Air-to-air refuelling considerably increases the Wedgetail’s range and endurance, allowing us to provide Command and Control, and Air Battlespace Management over longer periods,” Wing Commander Martin said.
“This has been demonstrated in the Middle East Region under Operation OKRA, where RAAF Wedgetails have used foreign air force tankers to fly extended sorties.
“Once the trial results are assessed an initial clearance is expected to be granted to allow Wedgetail crews to begin refuelling training flights with the KC-30A.”
The trials were conducted by Air Force’s Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) with a 2SQN Wedgetail and Number 33 Squadron (33SQN) KC-30A.
Squadron Leader Ben, Executive Officer of 33SQN, said air-to-air refuelling required both aircraft to fly in close formation at more than 500 kilometres per hour.
“The KC-30A deploys the 17-metre-long Aerial Refuelling Boom System (ARBS) from the aft fuselage, which is guided by an Air Refuelling Operator on the KC-30A into a refuelling receptacle on the Wedgetail,” Squadron Leader Ben said.
“Each KC-30A has a fuel capacity of more than 100 tonnes, and can offload fuel via the ARBS at up to 4500 litres per minute.
“The ARBS on the KC-30A represents a completely new capability for Air Force.”
The KC-30A has already been cleared to refuel Air Force’s fleet of Hornets and Super Hornets using its hose-and-drogue refuelling pods. Since September 2014, KC-30As deployed to Operation OKRA in the Middle East Region have used these pods to deliver more than 10,800 tonnes of fuel to RAAF and Coalition aircraft.
First Refuel for RAAF KC-30A Refueler to F-35A
29 September 2015
The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has completed the first fuel transfer with the air refuelling boom from a RAAF KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) to a US Air Force (USAF) F-35A Joint Strike Fighter at Edwards Air Force Base in California. A total of 59 contacts were conducted of which five contacts transferred 43,200 pounds of fuel during the four hour sortie.
Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Leo Davies AO CSC, described the trial as a significant step in the development of the KC-30A’s capability.
“Our KC-30A is an essential force multiplier. Mid-air refuelling is critical to ensuring global reach for our aircraft, our people and our equipment,” Air Marshal Davies said.
“Refuelling between the KC-30A and F-35A is an important step towards the KC-30A’s achievement of Final Operational Capability (FOC) and represents continued progress in the development of the F‑35A.
“This achievement is significant because the future of Australia’s air combat capability is reliant on the successful partnership between these two aircraft and our ability to be interoperable with our international partners,” Air Marshal Davies said.
The KC-30A has two refuelling systems – the hose-and-drogue and Advanced Refuelling Boom System (ARBS). The two different refuelling systems allow RAAF to support a wide range of coalition aircraft on Operation OKRA where a KC-30A is currently deployed to support combat operations against Daesh in Iraq and Syria.
The five KC-30As are based at RAAF Base Amberley (QLD) and Air Force will receive an additional two in 2018. A single KC-30A can carry a fuel load of more than 100 tonnes and remain 1800 kilometres from its home base with 50 tonnes of fuel available for offload, for four hours.
Australia has committed to 72 F-35As for RAAF Bases Williamtown and Tindal, with the first aircraft arriving in late 2018. The F-35A will replace the ageing F/A-18A/B Hornet with a 5th-generation networked fighter aircraft.
At the recent Williams Foundation Air-Sea integration seminar, the sole Royal Australian Air Force presentation was given by the Chief of Staff of the Surveillance and Response Group, Captain David Hombsch.
The Commander of the SRG, Air Commodore Craig Heap was scheduled to speak so Group Captain Hombsch had the twin challenge of presenting another person’s briefing and inserting his own operational experiences throughout to explain how the SRG fit into the broader air-sea, or multi-domain integration effort.
Group Captain David Hambsch presenting to the Williams Foundation Seminar on Air-Sea integration.
I have visited SRG specifically a couple of times as well as visiting the Wedgetail squadron which is part of SRG twice as well.
What I have learned from my visits is that this is a dynamic part of the transformation process. As Air Marshal (retired) Geoff Brown explained when introducing the speaker, SRG was formed from merging two capabilities, namely the maritime surveillance group (P-3) with the air surveillance group which supported fighters.
This was already a step in the right direction but the transformation of technology where ISR and C2 become blended deliverables has challenged SRG to rethink how it is organized, trains and operates.
The briefing provided an overview on how this change is coming about.
In my interview earlier this year with Air Commodore Heap indicated that he was dual hatted and was heading the Jericho Maritime warfighting program, which makes SRG a key point of working the air-maritime piece for the ADF.
In that interview, he discussed the coming of P-8 and Triton specifically as new platforms, which were both redefining capabilities and part of the transformation of the approach taken by the ADF and the SRG.
He clearly was looking forward to adding the Triton to the fleet whereby the Remotely Piloted Aircraft could do wide area surveillance as an asset which could allow for better use of manned assets, or to support the initial assessment of HADR scenarios, or low intensity operations.
“What that means for our highly capable Naval surface forces is that before, where they could have an effect based principally on their organic means, which was limited by the range of their sensors and weapon systems, they now can have an effect at much greater distance, courtesy of support from a suite of state of the art RAAF assets in terms of integrated ISR, strike and C2.
As the lead for the Jericho Maritime warfighting program, we will leverage off the key Jericho tenets of maximizing combat effectiveness, facilitating innovation at the lowest level and speeding up and simplifying acquisition.
And then the question will become where is the best place to do the operational C2 in the battlespace, which will vary by mission to be on the ground, at sea or in the air, critically with full, degraded or denied enabling space capabilities such as SATCOM and GPS.
That is where we want to go with the evolving SRG,.”
Air Commodore Heap has led the process of rewriting the mission statement for SRG reflecting the integrative path on which the training, technology and operations are driving SRG as a key element in the multi-domain ISR and C2 capability of the ADF is taking it.
Group Captain Hombsch drew upon his own P-3 experience to highlight the transition. He noted that he had just returned from RIMPAC 2016, where the Aussie P-3 made its last appearance.
The P-3 has made significant contributions to Australian security, but would fly to the point of interest based on intelligence provided to it and the pick up the tracks on a platform or set of assets of interest.
With the P-8 and Triton, it was a whole new game as the planes operated in the battlespace from take off and were working from the outset with a variety of SRG and ADF assets to shape a maritime domain awareness strike capability which would become pervasive in the extended battlespace.
Indeed, one of the more interesting parts of the briefing was the discussion on strike, because classic ISR is separated from strike in terms of understanding its role, largely understood in terms of specialized platforms informing specialized strike platforms of targeting options.
With the new ISR platforms, not only did they carry strike options, but the strike platforms like F-35 were also ISR platforms which meant that a significant rethink of how to operate these platforms in an integrated manner was required.
Group Captain Hombsch underscored that Link 16 was now present on all key SRG platforms which meant that they could operate as a connected force.
Clearly, it was important not to just rely on a single network, and indeed he focused on the way ahead in shaping network redundancy and training the operators ways to operate in a multi-domain network environment, including a dark one.
Training was a key theme in which the shift from operating singular platforms supporting singular tasks to mult-tasking missions required new skill sets and new approaches to training.
He underscored that the focus was increasingly upon training operators to work in a world of integrated force TTPs.
Throughout the day, the coming of the new amphibious ships was a background theme on how a new platform could be leveraged to shape a way ahead for new approaches to force integration.
Group Captain Hombsch provided examples of how the evolution of SRG was bringing capabilities to the LHDs and, in turn, the LHDs provided a new demand signal for SRG contributions.
One example was how the Triton would provide area coverage and information for an area of interest to where the LHD and related assets would be sent on deployment. The asset could provide key information shaping the picture of the operational environment long before the ship would show up.
Put in other terms, the Triton would become a modular member of an amphibious task force.
In short, SRG is a key part of the transformation of the RAAF and the ADF overall.
Many challenges lie ahead, but the key opportunity of introducing new capabilities like P-8 and Triton and evolving the role of the Wedgetail from an air battle management system to a joint battle management system can be leveraged to shape an effective way ahead.
2016-09-07 By Dr. Norman Friedman and Dr. Scott C. Truver
A new epoch––autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs)––promises a radical change in undersea warfare at just the time when conventional technology is becoming less and less affordable throughout the naval world.
The greatest threat to warships and commercial shipping is not anti-ship missiles or torpedoes, but rather mines.
Potential adversary navies have on the order of 386,000 naval mines––China 80,000; Iran 6,000; North Korea 50,000; and Russia 250,000––facilitating anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies, while U.S. Navy assessments indicate that a million mines are in the inventories of more than 50 navies world wide.
The nub of the problem is keeping up with the global threat, which today includes weapons of some 300 different types, from rudimentary but still-dangerous World War I-era contact mines to highly sophisticated, multiple-influence, programmable weapons, many available on the open market.
Insurgents throughout the Middle East have been attacking Western forces with improvised land mines––IEDs––and surely the naval equivalent is coming. Indeed, underwater IEDs can be fashioned from 50-gallon drums, and even discarded refrigerators. Defeating the terrorist UWIED threat was the focus of the April 2016 International MCM Exercise in the Persian Gulf, which brought together 30 countries’ MCM and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) forces.
And minelaying is unfortunately relatively easy.
In 1984, Libya mined the Red Sea, with as many as 19 commercial vessels damaged by mines. In 1991, in preparation for operations in the Arabian Gulf, the U.S. Navy tried to monitor Iraqi minelaying. The Navy knew that its mine clearance force was limited, so it hoped to avoid areas that had been mined. The Iraqis had specialized minelayers, which were monitored, but they were not sufficient, so the Iraqis also used all sorts of small boats, which proved difficult to monitor. The two U.S. ships that were mined in the Gulf, the helicopter carrier Tripoli––ironically, the mine countermeasures (MCM) flagship––and the guided missile cruiser Princeton, were in areas believed not to have been mined at all.
The problem navies face is that mines and mine-like objects have to be detected, examined and, if a mine, neutralized one by one before a harbor, waterway or naval operating area can be declared safe.
Not only is such examination tedious, but also it is dangerous and requires considerable specialized technology.
How long would a report (which might be false) that a merchant ship had dropped a string of mines in, say, Rotterdam or Los Angeles/Long Beach, close that port?
Given the shrinking number of super-ports in the world, what would be the impact of closure for, say, a month or two?
Once the port reopened, how confident would anyone be of its safety?
Limited Intelligence
It takes human intelligence to decide whether an object on the bottom of the sea, which might be covered in marine growth, is a mine or junk or something natural.
The world’s minehunting ships deploy underwater robots that use sonars and underwater cameras to examine objects on the seabed detected by short-range sonars on board the ships.
Even the robots often cannot come very close to the objects, which might be triggered by their presence.
Once the humans on board the minehunting ship decide that an object seen by the robot is a mine, the robot is withdrawn, a charge is laid near the supposed mine, and it is detonated.
The minehunting ship cannot proceed to the next object until the last has been dealt with.
The robot cannot go far from the minehunter because the short-range sonar on board the minehunter guides it and in most cases the robot is tethered to the ship.
Even worse, the charge often neutralizes the mine without visibly destroying it, so that minehunting demands automatic charting of what objects have and have not been detected and neutralized.
None of this would be a great problem if minehunters (and their expert crews) were inexpensive and therefore numerous.
Once virtually every navy had large numbers of minesweepers, after all, the sweepers were more or less expendable. Minehunters are not. They have to be built so that they do not set off the mines they are hunting.
Their mine-recognizing personnel are difficult to train, so there are not many of them.
No navy in the world can afford a large fleet of minehunters, but the technique of mine hunting is slow, on the order of days if not longer depending on the nature of the threat and the marine environment.
It would not take many mines to paralyze a large port or close a strategic strait.
Many minehunters working together could clear such an area quickly––but there is no way that many minehunters of the current type can be fielded by any navy, even the wealthiest.
The Autonomous Solution
AUVs are a proven way out of this problem, which is likely to increase as navies and terrorists alike realize the potential of sea mines.
They are already well aware that the lifeblood of the regimes they hate is the oil moving on tankers. The Iraqis and Iranians certainly understood as much during their “tanker war” in the 1980s, as did Libya in the 1984 mining of the Red Sea. Mines were a horrific problem.
The “A” in AUV means that the device operates essentially on its own and carries sensors and data recorders. It is so small that it is most unlikely to set off a mine, and it can range far ahead of the ship employing it.
The ship does not assign the AUV to examine a target of interest it has detected.
MK 18 Mod2
VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Nov. 17, 2015) Sailors from Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit (MDSU) TWO launch the MK 18 underwater unmanned vehicle (UUV) during a training evolution at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story. The training helps provide MDSU TWO Sailors with famililiarization of the MK 18 UUV for future missions. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Benjamin Wooddy/Released)
Instead, it orders the AUV to search an area, which can be far from the ship. It may have sufficient intelligence to classify objects, filtering out the mass of objects on the seabed and simplifying the task of the humans who must ultimately decide whether an object is worth attacking.
AUVs can now navigate well enough that they can effectively report where these objects are.
Once the human on board the controlling ship decides that a particular target of interest, some other device can be vectored to attack it.
Unlike an unmanned aircraft, it cannot easily communicate continuously back to a controller, because underwater communication is limited (and in a coastal area it may also be limited by underwater terrain).
When it encounters obstacles, for example, the AUV must decide what to do (that has been an obstacle to rapid AUV development). The AUV must incorporate sufficient intelligence that it need not be embedded in a complex shipboard combat system. All it needs is a mission-planning system, which can reside on a laptop computer, and initial alignment of its navigational system. The memory that contains the commands also contains whatever data the AUV collects.
Typically the data gathered during the mission is downloaded once the AUV is recovered.
As an alternative, the AUV can transmit back what is on board as part of the mission and continue searching.
Because the AUV, and not the control ship, goes into the minefield, there is no need to build a special low-signature (i.e., brutally expensive) ship; any ship that can deploy an AUV will do and, in practice, has done. Importantly, the ship does not have to proceed through a potential danger area step by step. It can launch several AUVs, and they can explore different parts of the area at the same time.
It is as though there were many minehunters, working in parallel, each working much faster than in the past. This is the thinking behind the MCM mission modules embarked on the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ships.
Fast and relatively inexpensive clearance operations can have enormous tactical and strategic consequences.
Leading the Revolution
The AUV revolution is being led by Hydroid, a U.S. company now owned by Kongsberg of Norway.
The Office of Naval Research began the program with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in 1991 with at-sea tests using the REMUS 100 (the number indicating maximum depth in meters) carried out in 1993. (Hydroid was spun off from Woods Hole in 2001 and began developing and producing REMUS AUVs. Kongsberg acquired Hydroid in 2008.)
It entered combat in the Middle East in 2003 as REMUS 100 (a 7.5-inch diameter man-portable AUV the U.S. Navy now calls the MK18 Mod 1). This was the first AUV to be proven in combat and in mid-2016 was being used by 19 navies, with more than 250 systems fielded.
The U.S. Navy adopted the AUV because its experience in the 1991 Gulf War (Desert Storm) demonstrated that conventional minehunting could not possibly clear areas rapidly enough. Very shallow water was an even more difficult proposition, typically requiring divers.
The U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps formed a Very Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures detachment (Naval Special Clearance Team 1) consisting of SEALs, EOD personnel, and Marines. They bought MK18 Mod 1s. Typically they were launched by hand from RHIBs (rigid hull inflatable boats) with minimal adaptation. The 80 lb Mod 1 offers 6- to 8-hour endurance and a maximum depth of 100m, so it proved useful for inshore work.
The operations in Iraq showed what AUVs could do, and they revealed a need for a longer-range version, which used off-the-shelf components. This larger Mod 2 (REMUS 600) has the same 12.75-inch diameter of a lightweight torpedo but greater length and hence greater weight (800 lbs), has an endurance of 20 to 24 hours, and can dive to 600m. The greater size of this AUV was dictated by its larger lithium-ion battery, which offers 11-17 Kw-hours, compared to 1 KwH for Mod 1.
This version inspired a 2011 U.S. Fifth Fleet JUONS (Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement) for this capability to augment its existing, aging MCM Force.
The MK18 systems were proven as highly successful with greater than 98% availability, low maintenance and easy operation. As a result the Navy opted to return four of the Avenger Class MCM ships to the United States, replaced by a very small but effective team of AUVs, 11-meter RHIBs and their operators. In the two years since the first MK18 Mod 2s arrived in Bahrain they have carried out more than 900 missions.
Based on this experience, the U.S. Navy created an Expeditionary MCM Company (about 25 personnel, a mix of hydrographers and EOD divers) equipped with multiple MK18 Mod 1 and one Mod 2 AUVs.
Real-world performance has been so good that in November 2015 the Navy asked for additional MK 18s to be delivered by September 2017, at a cost of about $8.7 million.
Several other navies are now using REMUS 600s to equal effect. In all, more than 90 REMUS 600 models have been delivered as of mid-2016.
Like Mod 1, Mod 2 can be deployed from an adapted 11-meter RHIB. A surface ship using a variety of launchers and recovery devices can also deploy it. One such device (“Stinger”) can fit into a standard MilVan, and thus can be emplaced on board many ships not normally used for mine countermeasures.
The RHIB and its hardware can be transported anywhere on board a cargo aircraft, such as a C-130. That is far better mobility than a slow minehunter, which can deploy over long distances only on board a heavy-lift merchant ship.
Moreover, the RHIB and the AUVs need far less port support than a minehunter, and they absorb far fewer personnel. They reduce minehunting to the really crucial personnel, the ones who examine sonar images to decide whether an object on the bottom is or is not a target of interest.
All of these AUVs are modular, accommodating various alternative sonars such as forward-looking sonars, small synthetic aperture sonars, and side-scan sonars, and also low-light-level cameras (and underwater lights).
Many of these AUVs are carried by minehunters and deployed using their cranes. However, the important point is that they can be deployed far more flexibly. The minehunters already cost far too much and their numbers are accordingly shrinking in every navy.
Many navies have used larger ships such as survey ships as minehunter mother ships in major clearance operations, placing key command and control systems on board the unspecialized ship.
Now the AUVs make it possible to eliminate the minehunting ships completely, the mother ship handling multiple AUVs to cover areas much more quickly (not to mention, far more safely and covertly).
RIMPAC Success
During the 2016 multi-national RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise, the Navy deployed MK18 Mod 2 Kingfish AUVs on board the littoral combat ship (LCS) USS Freedom. The Royal Canadian Navy deployed the Norwegian Hugin 1000 (operated by a Norwegian crew) aboard HMCS Sasketoon and Yellowknife.
The dock landing ship Pearl Harbor was used as a staging base for coalition divers, unmanned vehicles, and marine mammals. Unmanned vehicle teams from Australia, Japan, and Germany were on board. The mine countermeasures part of RIMPAC, conducted off Southern California, involved 77 missions by autonomous unmanned vehicles (mainly Swordfish, Kingfish, and Hugin).
The previous RIMPAC 2014 had employed MK18s; this one used AUVs on a larger scale. This RIMPAC was the first to employ the LCS to operate an expeditionary AUV system, and it was also the first time the dock landing ship functioned as a base.
“This was the LCS’s first major exercise with the MK18s,” an industry official noted. “We tracked 77 successful Kingfish sorties and experienced no issues.”
The LCS operation was particularly significant. LCS was conceived as a modular ship, but that generally meant developing mission modules that had to be integrated into the ship’s combat system. In this case the expeditionary mine countermeasures detachment and its AUVs simply came on board. No integration was needed; the LCS happened to be a platform of convenience.
The stand-alone mission system easily launched and operated the AUV. A stand-alone computer displayed and compared data from a series of missions to enable human operators on the ship to decide whether an object was a mine. Mine-like objects were investigated further by clearance divers. The operators, moreover, were able to maneuver their AUVs around the crowded ships and piers of a harbor.
The Revolution Continues
The success of surface-deployed AUVs has inspired the U.S. submarine force to conceive an underwater constellation of linked AUVs and fixed devices on the sea floor. AUVs turn a submarine from an extremely capable platform operating on its own into a mother ship for multiple unmanned vehicles that enormously expand its effective footprint.
As in minehunting, they capitalize on a few extremely capable and valuable humans by giving them the maximum automated capacity.
That is the revolution––using automation where we can and saving people for the creative jobs, the jobs involving judgment that only humans can do. Nothing can change the sheer vastness of the sea, even of a littoral area.
It seems that only AUVs can make up for the rising cost of the people and the ships we deploy.
Educated as a theoretical physicist, Dr. Friedman is concerned primarily with the interaction between technology and strategic, policy, program and tactical dynamics. Dr. Truver directs Gryphon Technologies TeamBlue National Security Programs group.
For other pieces on meeting the mine warfare challenge, see the following:
A key speaker at the Williams Foundation seminar on air-land integration was the Chief of the Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett.
Barrett’s speech focused on the opportunities and challenges of the largest recapitalisation of the Australian Navy since World War II.
New submarines, destroyers and amphibious ships and associated fleet assets are being built in Australia to shape a new maritime capability for Australia.
But this force is being built in the time of significant innovation in the Pacific whereby new force concepts are being shaped, such as kill webs, distributed lethality, and fifth generation airpower.
Barrett made it very clear that what was crucial for the Navy was to design from the ground up any new ships to be core participants in the force transformation process underway.
In his presentation at the conference, he underscored that “we are not building an interoperable navy; we are building an integrated force for the Australian Defence Force.”
He drove home the point that ADF integration was crucial in order for the ADF to support government objectives in the region and beyond and to provide for a force capable of decisive lethality.
By so doing, Australia would have a force equally useful in coalition operations in which distributed lethality was the operational objective.
He noted that it is not about massing force in a classic sense; it is about shaping a force, which can maximize the adversary’s vulnerabilities while reducing our own.
And he re-enforced several times in his presentation that this is not about an ‘add-in, after the fact capability’; you need to design and train from the ground up to have a force trained and equipped to be capable of decisive lethality.
He quoted Patton to the effect that you fight war with technology; you win with people.
It is about equipping the right way with right equipment but training effectively to gain a decisive advantage.
The recapitalisation effort was a “watershed opportunity for the Australian Navy.”
But he saw it as a watershed opportunity, not so much in terms of simply building new platforms, but the right ones.
And with regard to the right ones, he had in mind, ships built from the ground up which could be interoperable with JSF, P-8, Growler, Wedgetail and other joint assets.
“We need to achieve the force supremacy inherent in each of these platforms but we can do that only by shaping integrated ways to operate.”
He highlighted that the Navy was in the process of shaping a 21st century task force concept appropriate to a strategy of distributed lethality and operations.
A key element of the new approach is how platforms will interact with one another in distributed strike and defensive operations, such as the ability to cue weapons across a task force.
After his presentation, I had the chance to sit down with Vice Admiral Barrett and to expand the conversation.
Clearly, a key element in his thinking is how to get the new build of ships right for an age in which one wants to build an integrated, but distributed force.
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Question: It is clear that you are taking the long view of getting the ship building piece of this right in terms of ensuring that ships are not built simply as separate platforms, but as building blocks in an integrated force.
How do you do that?
Vice Admiral Barrett: “I am taking a very long view, and believe that we need to build our ships in Australia to generate naval capabilities integrated within the ADF.
“We need agility in the process of changing ships through life—continuing to evolve the new ships depending on how the threat is evolving.
“This means that we need to control the combat system software as well as build the hulls. We will change the combat system and the software many times in the life of that ship; whereas, the hull, machinery in the plant doesn’t. That might sound like a statement of the obvious.
“But it’s not a statement that’s readily understood by our industry here in Australia.
“We need to organise ourselves to have an effective parent navy capability.
“We need to manage commonality across the various ship build processes.
“That will not happen if we build someone else’s ship in Australia which is designed to operate in separate classes.
“I don’t want an individual class to be considered in isolation. I want to cross-learn and cross-operate throughout our various classes of ships, and notably with regard to software integration and development.”
Question: Clearly, building a sustainable navy from the outset is crucial to your design effort.
How do you view the challenge of building a more sustainable navy from the outset?
Vice Admiral Barrett: “It is crucial to deterrence. If your ships are not operating at sea they will have little effect.
“For example we have changed our approach to the Collins submarine largely around sustainment and working more openly with industry to achieve much greater at-sea operational tempos.
“We have put in place an enterprise approach, which focuses on availability of submarines; Industry and Navy are working closely together now to achieve that core objective.
“I’ve got industry keenly interested in the results of what the submarines do when they leave port and go on operations. And we’ve had a dramatic turnaround in submarine availability as partnering has improved.
“For me, deterrence, lethality, availability, sustainability, and affordability are highly interrelated for a Navy and its combat performance.
“And clearly as we design new ships, designing in more sustainable systems and ships is crucial.”
Question: Wedgetail shows an interesting model, namely having the combat squadron next door to the Systems Program Office.
This facilitates a good working relationship and enhances software refresh as well.
You have something like this in mind for your ship building approach.
Could you discuss that approach?
Vice Admiral Barrett: “We do and are implementing it in our new Offshore Patrol Vessel program. And with our ‘ship zero’ concept we are looking to integrate the various elements of operations, upgrades, training and maintenance within a common centre and work flow to get greater readiness rates and to enhance an effective modernization process as well.
“We are reworking our relationship with industry because their effectiveness is a key part of the deterrence process. If I have six submarines alongside the wharf because I can’t get them away, they are no longer lethal and they are no longer a deterrent force.
“Again, as an example we have dramatically improved availability by building maintenance towers alongside the submarine—rather than the previous way that it was done, where people arrived into that one gangway under the submarine then dispersed to do their maintenance work—is an example of how we need to work.
Question: In your presentation, you mentioned working with various air systems.
Could you discuss, Navy’s role in Wedgetail?
Vice Admiral Barrett: “We have Navy officers onboard who already provide a key communication role to the Air Force officers onboard the Wedgetail. They can inform those officers of the decision process on the ship and, conversely, explain later to those onboard the ships, what Wedgetail can do for them.
“Put in other terms, by such a work flow, augmented by the growing engagement of Virtual Wedgetail in navy training, Wedgetail becomes part of the maritime warfare system within the ADF.
“Wedgetail is an example of the way ahead for air-naval integration.”
For a biography of Vice Admiral Barrett, see the following:
According to Vice Admiral Barrett in a speech delivered earlier this year, the Chief of Navy provided this overview to the transformation approach:
PELORUS recognises the need for technologically-advanced ships to combine in the modern fleet system, and to integrate seamlessly in the joint and networked environment.
This is a plan which recognises the need for ships to be capable of delivering the lethal force on which deterrence depends. It is a hard-nosed plan; one that recognises the need for ships to be affordable, adaptable and available—and ready to serve the nation’s needs.
But Plan PELORUS looks beyond individual ships. It recognises that in the future, ships will only be entirely capable when they operate in fleet systems.
In the future, the whole will be massively greater than the sum of its parts. PELORUS is also about our people.
They remain what they have always been— the greatest single factor in our success in operations. PELORUS addresses those serving now and those we need to recruit.
The slideshow above shows Vice Admiral Barrett performing some of his various functions. Credit photos: Australian Ministry of Defence.
The photos shown are as follows:
In the first photo, Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN with Rear Admiral Adam Grunsell, AM, CSC, RAN (left) and Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Stuart Mayer, CSC and Bar, RAN (right) spent three days in the west this week conducting Navy’s day to day business from HMAS Stirling.
In the second photo, Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, Deputy Chief of Army Major General Rick Burr, DSC, AM, MVO and Deputy Chief of Royal Australian Air Force Air Vice-Marshal Warren McDonald, AM, CSC, salute after laying wreaths at the Stone of Remembrance during the 2016 Anzac Day National Ceremony held at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra.
In the third photo, the Royal Austalian Navy celebrated its 115th birthday at Russell Offices with the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett cutting the cake with Able Seaman Musician Maria Smith.
In the fourth photo, Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN helps cut the grand opening ribbon at the new ‘Action Stations’ exhibit at the Australian National Maritime Museum, Darling Harbour, Sydney.
In the fifth photo,Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN holds the floor, during the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs. Australia then held the Chairmanship of IONS. The regional forum was held during Sea Power 2015.
In the sixth photo, (Left to right) Chief of Air Force Air Marshal Leo Davies, AO, CSC; Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC; and Chief of Army Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, DSC, AM, at the opening of The Spirit of Anzac Centenary Experience travelling exhibition in Wodonga, Victoria, in September 2015.
In the seventh photo, Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN and CEO Prodrive Racing Australia Mr Tim Edwards and Warrant Officer of Navy, Warrant Officer Mark Holzberg discuss the upcoming race while in Blamey Square, Canberra.
In the eighth photo, the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN; HMAS Stirling Executive Officer, Commander Brian Chase, RANR; Commodore Bob Trotter (Rtd) and Commander Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Stuart Mayer, CSC and Bar, RAN, at the HMAS Stirling 100th Anniversary of Anzac Mess Dinner.
In the final photo, then Commander Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Tim Barrett (left) and Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, at Parliament House, Canberra.
After an extensive competition, the Australian government downselected the French firm DCNS to build a new class of advanced-capability conventional (diesel/electric-powered) submarines.
The decision was announced on 26 April 2016, in a press release that stated: “The decision was driven by DCNS’ ability to best meet all of the Australian Government’s requirements.
These included superior sensor performance and stealth characteristics, as well as range and endurance similar to the Collins-class submarine. The Government’s considerations also included cost, schedule, program execution, through-life support and Australian industry involvement.”
Less obvious in the press coverage around the decision was the innovative nature of the program and the significant opportunity to leverage evolving technologies that will be utilized in shaping the largest conventional submarine to date.
In many ways, it is a “hybrid” submarine in the sense that it leverages the innovative technologies of the new nuclear-powered Barracuda SSN being put to sea next year by the French Navy.
Did Australia choose DCNS as a way to keep the SSN option open? According to an article in The Diplomat citing a government Financial Review, “Cabinet ministers and defence officials have already discussed the possibility of switching from diesel engines to nuclear power part-way through the construction contract.” Credit Graphic: DCNS
It also leverages extensive experience that French shipbuilder DCNS has in working with other countries. A good example is the Scorpene-class of conventional attack submarines (SSK). To speed up delivery for the Chilean Navy, initially one boat was built in France by DCNS and a second in Spain by Navantia – these were delivered to Chile in January and December 2006.
The same scenario transpired for the contract for two Malaysian submarines. Orders for India and Brazil are being built at shipyards in those countries with technical assistance and equipment from DCNS and, in Brazil’s case, a joint venture between DCNS and Odebrecht.
The Australian contract takes advantage of the extensive working relationship between DCNS and the French Navy along with the extensive experience between the French, U.S. and UK navies.
Australia’s new conventional boats will, for the first time, include a U.S. combat system, which will be shaped to operate at range, speed and distance in the challenging waters of the Pacific.
The experience DCNS has in working in a variety of infrastructure situations in other countries, means there is a clear capability to leverage the already extensive industrial experience in Australia.
“DCNS will build a new mega submarine construction facility in Adelaide which will rival any other in the world,” said a document used in the winning bid.
Australia has existing capabilities that can be tapped for the infrastructure upgrades as well as for building the new submarines. New capabilities will clearly be stood up as well, as the program takes shape and construction with life-cycle support is put in place.
With the Royal Australian Navy’s Collins-class boats scheduled to begin leaving service beginning in 2025, a replacement project got underway. Although nuclear propulsion was ruled out due in part to public opposition to nuclear technology, the vessels must be capable of transiting long distances to deployment areas. In April 2016, the Australian government chose the Shortfin Barracuda, a conventionally-powered variant of the Barracuda-class nuclear submarine by French firm DCNS. (RAN PHOTO: LSIS Nina Fogliani)
For example, Thales (a 35% stakeholder of DCNS) has worked closely with France and the UK for many years on common sonar technologies.
In an interview I did in Australia in early 2014, the CEO of Thales Australia, Chris Jenkins, highlighted the sonar business as an example of the Thales approach in Australia. The business started with the transfer of French technology to Australia in the early 1980s.
The technology was used by the Australians to support their submarine program and, as the sonar systems were integrated into Aussie platforms, a team was created to support the technology, which basically meant an ability to upgrade the system and develop new intellectual property along the way to shape the modernization of that capability.
As indigenous capability was forged, the evolving technology was Australian and available for export – resulting in use by the UK Astute submarine program as well as oil and gas platform support systems.
In discussing the company’s path towards this innovative approach, he noted that “the Australian government, in its approach to defense products, recognizes that it does might not have a large domestic infrastructure for defense production, and is looking for companies that can position themselves for a global engagement.”
He went on to explain that “the approach is to amortize cost by not simply building up a domestic industry, which needs to be fed by domestic acquisition, but rather one that can work effectively abroad and help the Australian government amortize the cost of its core acquisitions.
“The business model is very different here from what Brazil has done with SAAB. After the Gripen acquisition is over, it is over. You are not going to get exports and your growth abilities are limited. In the F–35 case, our investment allows us to participate in a global supply chain for a global aircraft,” he said.
DCNS will follow a similar approach whereby the Australian program will be able to leverage the global partners and experience for conventional submarines, and the upgrade programs shaped.
The new American combat system, conjoined with the new DCNS submarine, will also provide extensive upgrading capability.
As the transformation of the force is shaped and with regard to submarines, the Australian MoD is very interested in shaping cross-cutting convergence among the services.
There is a clear interest that the submarine can leverage the extensive air modernization strategy being put in place by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).
This means that DCNS and the winning American provider for the combat system can partner with the overall transformation of the Australian forces.
The track record and approach of DCNS is a crucial part of why they were selected by the Australian government.
To get a better sense of that track record and approach, I had a chance to discuss leveraging capabilities with Xavier Mesnet, Marketing Director for submarines and surface ships international sales at DCNS.
Mesnet served for 30 years in the French navy, mainly in the operational domain. He has been a commanding officer of nuclear attack submarines Perle and Amethyste, of the nuclear ballistic submarine Le Temeraire, and of the command center of the French nuclear submarine force in Brest.
He spent some time as the Head of Planning for Middle East operations in the Command Center of the French joint forces in Paris, and as vice-director of the Center for Shaping Doctrine for the French joint forces, particularly in charge of evolving new approaches to deal with conflicts.
Mesnet underscored the long-range commitment of the French government and Navy to building both a nuclear and conventional submarine force. This means not simply technology, but a large group of users with many years of operational experience who drive innovations over time.
It also means benefiting from the French upgrade approach and cycle. The 30-year operational cycle of any particular class of submarines is complemented by ongoing efforts to shape the next class of submarines. This is an evolving process whereby long-range submarines are built for the nuclear class, which has its impacts on the evolution of the conventional class.
The French navy has “vast experience in operations, in maintainability and sustainability for the force,” says Mesnet, who notes that “80% of the nuclear and conventional classes have convergent parts and underwater technologies. This means that the new SSN-class Barracuda which goes to sea trials next year is a driver for change for the conventional class as well.”
He discussed at some length their global experience in building conventional submarines.
What was most interesting in the discussion was how each client has different indigenous capabilities and infrastructure, and yet DCNS has been able to shape a customized solution for each of them.
The Franco-Spanish Scorpène diesel-electric AIP attack submarine (SSK) has been chosen by Chile, Brazil, Malaysia (above) and India.
The Scorpène submarine program mentioned earlier is the perfect example. Purchased by Chile, Malaysia, Brazil, and India, the existing workforce, infrastructure and upgrade requirements were different in each case.
Chile had a mature structure, and DCNS worked with them to insert the Scorpene into their extant infrastructure and then build out to support the new vessel. “After 10 years, the Chileans were very independent in terms of sustaining the submarine.”
With Malaysia, they had to standup a completely new capability on a relatively isolated facility on Borneo Island. “They really started from scratch and we stood up the infrastructure with national companies. Nowadays, the Malaysia Navy caught up with the highest standards of the region.”
The contract for India required a standup of new infrastructure, skills and training. The first Indian submarine is now undergoing sea trials. “The first one has been about standing up new capabilities in India, but with the next five their involvement is growing in the build and maintenance processes.”
In Brazil, “we went one step further. We helped them design their new submarine base. We assisted them with the construction of the base; and in process, they have stood up their own design and maintenance capabilities.”
It is obvious that the global domain knowledge base being shaped and developed by DCNS is a key asset.
And also new with the Australian opportunity, there is an opportunity to work with the US Navy in a new and innovative way.
The combat system will be American. “The French Navy has worked extensively with the UK and US Navies, and it will be a major positive milestone and collaborative work to interface with a US combat system onboard a French submarine.”
In short, DCNS has brought a variety of historical experiences, and evolving technological capabilities seen in the new variants of both the nuclear and conventional submarines, which can be leveraged by Australia.
It makes a great deal of sense for Australia to have chosen DCNS and to shape a new conventional submarine capability which will blend new technologies into an advanced submarine able to operate throughout such a challenging ocean as the Pacific.
As my colleague Ed Timperlake has put it: “Naming the Pacific Ocean as Pacific is one of the great branding mistakes of all time.”
And adding new conventional submarine capabilities to the evolution of the US Navy in the Pacific will enhance coalition capabilities in a challenging strategic environment.
This article first appeared in Front Line Defence Issue 4 (2016) and is republished with their permission.
“It looks like a case of hacking,” Manohar Parrikar, the Indian defense minister, told reporters outside an event in New Delhi. The report is being investigated by military officials, his ministry said in a statement, adding that the source of the leak appeared to be “from overseas and not in India.”
The Farewell Affair. The French come to the aide of the Americans to deal with significant data breaches.
The impact of the lost data, and particularly whether it would affect the Indian naval fleet’s capabilities, was not immediately clear.
“It’s troubling. It is a challenge, but we don’t have to assume that the adversary has everything,” Robbin F. Laird, a military and security analyst, said.
That the plans date to 2011 meant the data would be of limited use to India’s opponents, he said. “You could have grabbed the answers to the exam for five years ago, but the exam has changed since then.”
The latter point has frequently been made with regard to software enabled programs by Ed Timplerlake and certainly applies to this case.
With regard to France, one should remember the hard line the government takes with those who try to steal its secrets and remember the debt owed by the United States evident during the Farwell Affair, one of the greatest espionage stories of the 20th century which most Americans seem completely unware of.
With regard to the Farwell Affair, there is a chance to read the best book on the event on Kindle.
Ronald Reagan and François Mitterrand are sworn in as presidents of the Unites States and France, respectively. The tension due to Mitterrand’s French Communist support, however, is immediately defused when he gives Reagan the Farewell Dossier, a file he would later call “one of the greatest spy cases of the twentieth century.”Vladimir Ippolitovitch Vetrov, a promising technical student, joins the KGB to work as a spy. Following a couple of murky incidents, however, Vetrov is removed from the field and placed at a desk as an analyst. Soon, burdened by a troubled marriage and frustrated at a flailing career, Vetrov turns to alcohol. Desperate and needing redemption, he offers his services to the DST. Thus Agent Farewell is born. He uses his post within the KGB to steal and photocopy files of the USSR’s plans for the West—all under Brezhnev’s nose.
The USSR was stealing American’s military technology as fast as the US was building it and all with the complicity of senior US intelligence and industrial officials.
And the Mitterrand Administration helped President Reagan plug the leak and then counter-attack with the launching of Star Wars.
