The Libyan Challenge to Europe: A Conversation with Marco di Liddo

03/15/2015

2015-03-05  By Robbin Laird

Recently, the Centro Studi Internazionali based in Rome published a report by Marco di Liddo and Gabriele Iacovino on Libya and the fluid situation in the country.

Obviously, the general situation involving ISIL in the region, Egyptian reactions and the general dynamics of the region feed into the Libyan situation, which, in turn, has its more general impact on the region.

I had a chance to discuss the report and the Libyan situation and Italian options during a phone interview on February 27, 2015.

The turbulence in Libya has a direct impact on Europe, notably upon Italy.

The outflow of refugees, the intersection of radicalism in the Middle East within Europe itself, and the dynamics within the region, all drive attention from the Italian state.

The report from Ce.S.I. highlighted the very difficult situation within Libya and its spill over consequences.

The full report can be read in Italian on the Ce.S.I. website or in the English translation provided by the Center which can be downloaded below.

Italian Report on Libyan Situation February 2015

According to the authors the situation in Libya calls for international intervention.

In recent weeks, with the Libyan civil war as a backdrop, we have witnessed the Caliphate of Bayda’s overpowering entrance into the scene, a jihadist organisation based in Derna and officially affiliated to the Islamic State of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Indeed, taking advantage of the serious instability that has characterised Libya since 2011 and in the context of the confrontation between the Operation Dignity secular militia and the Operation Dawn Islamist militia, the jihadist forces launched an unexpected attack aiming to conquer the country, starting from the city of Sirte and with the objective of reaching Tripoli. …. 

For Libya, 2014 was the year of the segmentation of the civil war into two fronts: the secular Nasserite front of General Haftar and the Tobruk Government; and the Islamist one of the Tripoli government, flanked by a collection of local militias, some dangerously close to the jihadist movement.

However, this division appears to be a political ploy to differentiate between the warring parties and does not reflect the political and military realities of the battlefield, with variable alliances and a web of magmatic and flexible agreements.

One of the more troubling statistics is that neither side seems to have the strength required to prevail over the other and, above all, the Tobruk and Tripoli governments are still far from any form of dialogue or confrontation.

It appears unlikely that, in the future, this situation will improve without incisive intervention from the international community….

The authors provide insights into the domestic situation in Libya but have written from the point of view of what outside powers can do, both with regard to the limits and the opportunities.

The birth of the Caliphate undoubtedly forces European countries to reconsider their foreign policy and defence strategy.

The Italian diplomats, in line with the trend that emerged in 2014, should continue the process of creating a united front for stabilising Libya.

In the last months of 2014, during the NATO and G8 summits, the government had opened an important channel of negotiations with the United Kingdom, and then continued intensive talks with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, two leading Arab players engaged in the fight against the Islamic Libyan radical militia.

Libya is, in fact, a theatre where many Middle Eastern actors are developing a role.

The search for stability also involves a close dialogue with these realities.

The Italian government has shown that it fully understands these dynamics thanks to its diplomatic position.

Relations between Rome and Abu Dhabi, for example, have grown in intensity in recent years and today the UAE is one of the most important Italian partners in the region.

Furthermore, the Italian government’s attitude to the new path taken in Egypt, with Prime Minister Renzi being one of the first European leaders to give support to President Sisi, creates improved dialogue with Cairo, increasingly pronounced in its influence in Libya.

All this in light of the fact that, thanks to its role in international diplomacy, Italy could have the strength to also engage Qatar in a diplomatic process.

Qatar is currently firmly supporting the Libyan Islamists, as opposed to the secular forces, which receive aid from the Emirates and Egypt.

The involvement of Doha in the search for a compromise to stabilise Libya seems inevitable at this time because of the role played by the Qatari authorities and the need to find a compromise, or at least some common points among all the actors in Libya.

In this context, the role of Italy as a negotiator could be crucial with possible positive effects for the future.

The interview with Marco di Liddo built on this foundation and he discussed ways in which Italy might broker an opening into the Libyan situation. 

The basic idea was to sponsor a conference in Rome, which would invite major Libyan factions to in effect sort out, with which the West could work to move ahead.  The challenge from the ISIL-identifiers is clear; but the West did not have a clear ally who could control the situation.

The challenge is to help foster the emergence of a center of power in Libya with whom the West could work and who would be able to provide enough stability to roll back the jihadist forces.

A pure military solution was not going to help for the jihadists would like nothing better than to use a Western intervention to mobilize local opposition and to provide hostages for you tube and other more lethal activities.

The challenge is to bring together Western organizing efforts with appropriate military instruments, and not to fall back onto military instruments as the first entry point.

The EU was obviously important, but the challenge was to launch an effective process to deal with Libya.  Here a lead role for Italy along with France could generate a process for change.

In short, to deal with an explosive security situation on the borders of Europe requires more than a military solution or a repeat of Odyssey Dawn.

Military means are part of the solution, but only to work with a coalition able to roll back the jihadist radicals.

This requires political initiatives as well as aid approaches.

The challenge is to shape an approach, one, which can combine the various aspects of power, and to make hard choices on who to work with and who to not. 

The report clearly provides an American audience with a better understanding of the situation in Libya and the challenges which need to be met.

Marco Di Liddo is the Analyst in charge of the Africa Desk at Ce.S.I. – Centre for International Studies. Moreover, he is also responsible for the Desk covering the former USSR. He holds a degree in International Relations at University of Trieste and a Master in “Peacekeeping and Security studies” at the University of Roma Tre (Rome).

In 2011, he was teaching assistant in Contemporary History at University of Trieste. As an expert on Africa as well as the former USSR, Di Liddo has been frequently interviewed as commentator on national TV and Radio programmes aired by public broadcaster RAI, Radio Vaticana and TV2000. 

Background

Several recent actions by Italy highlight their concerns with developments in Libya.

In a recent article in The Guardian the challenge of refugees was highlighted.

More than 1000 refugees have been saved in the Mediterranean north of Libya in the past two days but 10 people died at sea, Italian officials have said.

A flotilla of rescue vessels, including from Italy’s coastguard and navy, and three cargo ships saved 941 people in seven separate operations on Tuesday. On Wednesday, the coastguard and two cargo ships rescued 94 migrants whose motorised dinghy was in distress 40 miles (65 km) north of Libya.

Survivors were ferried to southern Italian ports. The migrants rescued on Tuesday had been aboard five motorised dinghies and two larger vessels. One of the larger boats capsized and 10 people were later found dead.

For months now, hundreds – sometimes thousands – of migrants fleeing conflicts or poverty have been reaching Italy every week on smugglers’ boats from Libya.

 Italy’s interior ministry said 7,882 migrants arrived in the first two months of this year, compared to 5,506 over the same time in 2014. A total of 170,000 migrants and asylum seekers were rescued at sea by Italy’s coast guard, navy and other vessels including cargo ships last year. It is believed the tally will be higher this year.

And concern over the direct security threat from the turbulent situation in Italy has lead to deployments off of Libya by the Italian navy.

According to a March 1, 2015, Reuters story Italy began their annual naval exercises focused on Libya.

Admiral Pierpaolo Ribuffo, the officer in command of exercises, said the operation was not directly connected with the crisis in Libya, where Italian energy group Eni has significant offshore oil platforms and other assets.

But he said the presence of naval vessels in the area could help improve security.

“We’re training our ships and our men, that’s all. Our activity has nothing to do with other scenarios,” he told Italian news agency ANSA in comments that were subsequently released by the navy.

“Obviously the presence of ships at sea also means security, deterrence and dissuasion,” he said. “But that’s normal, it’s like police patrolling the streets.”

Italy, whose southern islands are only around 300 kilometers from the Libyan coast, has led calls for a global diplomatic push to stabilize Libya, where two rival governments are fighting for control and where Islamist militants have gained a growing foothold.

It has also offered help in training a regular Libyan army but has ruled out any peacekeeping mission for the moment.

Concern over attacks on targets in Italy has been heightened by video messages from groups associating themselves with the Islamic State movement, stating that Rome was a target and by press reports that militants could reach Italy on migrant boats.

In effect, what is happening under the pressure of the ISIL movement and other dynamics in the region, the Euro-Med region is becoming a highly interconnected zone within which security is increasingly important. 

The EU has been good at giving aid; not so good at providing security imported from turbulent regions in the neighborhood.

And that is increasingly true for the Euro-Med region. The dynamics of change in the region intersect with internal dynamics in Europe to create a fluid situation.

This has led in part to the European Union trying to revitalize its so-called Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to deal with its neighbors in the East and the South.

According to an article by Eric Maurice published in the EU Observer on March 5, 2015:

EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini and neighborhood commissioner Johannes Hahn launched Wednesday (4 March) an ideas paper on the EU strategy towards its neighbors in the east and south.

The EU member states, the 16 ENP partner countries and civil society in the East and South of Europe will be involved in the assessment of the actions undertaken so far.

A first consultation with the southern neighborhood will take place in Barcelona in April. The Eastern Parternship will be reviewed at a summit in Riga in May.

A full proposal for a renewed strategy to spend will be presented next autumn. Over €15 billion have already been budgeted for the period 2014-2020.

Whereas the Neighborhood Policy has until now mainly been about projecting EU soft power to help develop democratic standards and free trade, the focus now is set to be more on protecting Europe from the consequences of its neighborhood instability.

In future, the EU should put “a new emphasis on energy security and organized crime”, as well as terrorism and the management of migration flows, said Hahn.

The EU is also considering co-operating with “the neighbors of the neighbors”.

In a clear reference to energy issues, the consultation paper mentions “Russia and partners in Central Asia”.

The paper also suggests that the ENP could conduct “post-conflict actions as well as related state-and institution-building activities”.

In a neighborhood which is “less stable than ten years ago”, the EU will shift from generic policies to differentiated approaches with its Eastern and Southern neighborhoods as well as between countries in these two regions.

“In a number of areas, the reform agenda has stalled, in part due to competing interests, in part because not all partners seem equally interested in a special partnership with the EU under the model of pluralism and integration”, says the paper.

The EU “needs to move from an approach very much based on the evaluation of progress to a more political approach”, said Mogherini.

But it is difficult to have a neighborhood policy, if the neighborhood is in flames. 

This is in effect the challenge with regard to Libya.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Spain Takes Over Air Policing Mission in Baltic States

03/12/2015

2015-03-12 Spain took over the rotating command of NATO’s air policing mission in January 2015.

The Spanish Air Force is flying its Eurofighters in this role.

According to an El Pais article published on February 19, 2015:

Planes from Group 11 of the Spanish Air Force have been in control of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission (BAPM), based in Ämari, since January 1 and will continue there until May 4.

So far, the Eurofighters have conducted 108 patrols, clocking up nearly 200 hours of flight time.

Only one flight had to be canceled because of technical problems.

 A Spanish pilot in one of the Eurofighters dispatched to patrol the Baltic. / JUANJO MARTIN (EFE)
A Spanish pilot in one of the Eurofighters dispatched to patrol the Baltic. / JUANJO MARTIN (EFE)

Eurofighters have conducted 108 patrols, clocking up nearly 200 hours of flight time

“It has been better than we thought,” said Lt. Col. Enrique Fernández Ambel, who is heading the team of 115 Spanish officers of the Ambar detachment.

But the fears are real and the tension exists. NATO is concerned that the conflict may spill over from Ukraine, where the Kiev government has been fighting pro-Russian separatists.

Along the icy waters of the Baltic, two old Cold War adversaries can look directly into each others’ eyes at distances sometimes as close as 300 meters – that is how near Spanish Eurofighters have come to Russian aircraft during the interceptions that have taken place.

These testy encounters have occurred about half-a-dozen times when Russian Ilyushin and Antonov transport planes – modified for spying or electronic warfare – fly from St Petersburg to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad Oblast, which is sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland.

Although the Russian jets have not violated Baltic airspace, they ignore international air navigation rules by not filing a flight plan, turning off their transponders so they can’t be identified, or refusing to communicate with civil aviation authorities.

The Spanish Eurofighters usually intercept and escort them under the orders of NATO’s Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), based in Uedem, Germany.

Commander Eladio Daniel Leal said the tensest moments usually occur when the alarm goes off and “you just don’t know who you are going to encounter, or how they are going to react.”

NATO has been helping the Baltic nations patrol their airspace since 2004 as none of them has an air force of their own. Member countries take turns leading the mission.

And in a story published on January 30, 2015 on the NATO Allied Command Operations website:

Fighter aircraft from Italy, Poland, Spain and Belgium took over NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission on January 1, 2015 and will continue to patrol the skies over Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia with a total of sixteen aircraft over the next several months. 

NATO has quadrupled the number of NATO fighter jets monitoring the airspace over the Baltic states since early 2014. 

This is one of several prudent and defensive measures taken by NATO in response to the security challenges posed by Russia’s recent destabilising actions and use of hybrid warfare in Eastern Europe.

Spanish Typhoon on the platform in winter conditions during their Baltic Air Policing mission. Photo courtesy of: Spanish Air Force.
Spanish Typhoon in winter conditions during their Baltic Air Policing mission. Photo courtesy of: Spanish Air Force.

The Alliance has observed a steady increase in Russian military air activity near its borders and the overall nature of Russian air activity has changed.

It is now more assertive and frequent compared to previous years.  Allies have voiced concerns about the timing, locations and composition of Russian flights, particularly in the context of a dramatically changed security environment. 

Last year, NATO aircraft assigned to the Baltic Air Policing Mission conducted over 150 interceptions of Russian military aircraft, which is about four times as many as in 2013.

“We are concerned about these numbers because it represents a higher than normal amount of Russian air activity close to our borders,” said Lieutenant Colonel Riivo Valge, Chief of Staff of the Estonian Air Force.

“Specifically the amount of transport and fighter air activity has been increased,” he said.

Preserving the integrity of NATO airspace is a collective task.

For member nations not having the full range of Air Defence assets in their own militaries (Albania, Luxembourg, Iceland, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), agreements exist to ensure a single standard of security within NATO’s Area of Responsibility.

The air policing mission above the Baltic States illustrates the ability of the Alliance to share and pool existing capabilities. 

It started in April 2004 and has been executed continuously ever since. So far, 14 NATO nations have participated in this mission. 

This is an important confidence building measure to demonstrate the Alliance solidarity and resolve not only to current members, but also to our partners and future potential members.

Air Policing has been, and remains, the cornerstone of Alliance solidarity and cohesion.

The video below shows Spanish air force planes in operation.

And the video was released by the Spanish Ministry of Defense on February 20, 2015.

Sweden and Nordic Defense: Stepping Up Their Game

03/11/2015

2015-03-11 With the return of direct defense considerations for the Balts and the Nordics, key states like Sweden are rethinking their approach to defense.

In an interview in Copenhagen last year with Hans Tino Hansen, the founder and CEO of Risk Intelligence, the shift was the focus of attention:

Question: I would like to start by discussing Sweden and its reactions to Russian actions.

The Swedes clearly are taking Russian actions quite seriously.  For example, they announced recently that they are increasing their defense budget by nearly $900 million per annum and adding new cruise missile capabilities to their aircraft.

What is your sense of the Swedish dynamic?

HTH: I think that what has happened in Sweden is like with any other Western European country.

They have been reducing their defense to such an extent that they are at the lowest level possible to actually withhold or maintain a credible defense – or even below.They got their first wake up call last year when Russian air exercises were targeted against Swedish installations.

And they didn’t actually have the 24/7 Quick Alert Reaction (QRA) fighter capability to show sovereignty against the Russians.

Ironically, the Russian planes were intercepted by Danish F16s operating from Lithuania during the NATO Air-Policing mission in the Baltic countries.

The second wake-up call is of course Ukraine and the Crimea. They have increasingly been talking about building a defense that can actually, interact with NATO in defending the Baltic area. Not only the Baltic area as a sea area, or a region, but also actually within the Baltic Republics. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania themselves.

Of course, Sweden is not a member of NATO. Sweden has always said that they are not necessarily neutral, but they are alliance-free, and that is not necessarily the same thing.

We also know from the Cold War that they actually worked very closely together with the Danes, and the Germans, and the Americans, and the Norwegians. We could say that it’s actually going back in some ways to how it was before.

This year Sweden is chairing the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) group.

According to the Swedish MoD website:

The Nordic countries agree that much can be gained from defence and security cooperation. The aim of NORDEFCO is to strengthen participating nations’ national defence and improve their defence capability.

“Nordic defence cooperation is a priority for Sweden. NORDEFCO aims to strengthen each nation’s defence capability and promote common security,” says Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist…..

The scope of Nordic cooperation is increasing each year. The Swedish Armed Forces estimates that Sweden is currently participating in more than 130 cooperation activities with one or more Nordic countries.

200

The objective of the Swedish Chairmanship is to deepen security policy dialogue between the Nordic countries and strengthen the joint Nordic voice in security and defence policy.

In addition to this, Sweden wants to seek further cooperation concerning international operations, review the potential for closer cooperation on air and maritime surveillance, review the potential for cooperation concerning equipment, and expand cooperation regarding Nordic military exercises and training.

“International developments have demonstrated the necessity of close Nordic security policy dialogue and concrete military cooperation. Increased cooperation will enable us to strengthen our common security and the military capability of each country and find cost-effective and practical solutions,” says Mr Hultqvist.

Sweden’s priorities during its Chairmanship of NORDEFCO in 2015 are in the following four areas:

Policy – strengthen Nordic cooperation through increased information sharing and deepen cooperation with the Baltic States.

Capability development – enhance cooperation between the Nordic countries by e.g. strengthening air and maritime surveillance.

Armaments – identify common systems and legislation concerning armament purchasing and develop guidelines.

International operations – establish a common approach at political and military level to facilitate joint Nordic contributions.

There is broad political consensus in Sweden to further intensify and broaden Nordic cooperation with the aim of strengthening Sweden’s military capabilities for national and international crisis management. Developing cooperation with the Baltic countries is another political objective.

“Sweden is taking over the Chairmanship of NORDEFCO in 2015 with the ambition of deepening both Nordic and Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation,” says Mr Hultqvist.

A practical task being pursued by Sweden is an improved working relationship with Finland in defense cooperation as well.

In February 2015, a new report was issued by the Finnish Defence Forces and the Swedish Armed forces exploring ways to deepend the defense relationship between the two countries.

For example, the report highlights the importance of enhanced airpower integration.

The Finnish and Swedish Air Forces’ vision is to form a mutually supported and partly integrated Finnish-Swedish air force able to enhance regional security by providing air power.

Deep cooperation would confer on both air forces improved capabilities for operations alone and together under all circumstances as well as capabilities for close cooperation during peacetime.

The activities cover all air force functions and branches, joint efforts and cooperation requirements to support land and maritime operations, and conversely, the means of army and navy contribution to air operations and an integrated air defence capability.

Three mutually supporting capability aims have been identified.

These capability aims mirror tasks and milestones in the respective functional areas.

The aim of a common air operations capability is defined as the full spectrum of air operation capabilities in order to achieve air supremacy, contribute to providing joint effects and provide air support to land and maritime operations within an Area of Operation (AO).

The aim of a common base operations capability is defined as an ability to use main and forward operating bases and provide cross service to support quick force deployment and dispersed operations within an AO.

“Partly integrated or integrated” means that both air forces are interoperable and able to work together to build up common air operation or combined unit for international operations.

Both air forces are able to give neighbour nation support for other nation’s aircraft and it’s possible to build up common operational picture.

The aim of a common command and control (C2) capability is defined as ability to command and control air and base operations and manage sensors and communications in order to provide situational awareness and support for analysed decisions at different levels.

A key enabler of these aims is a secure communications network and associated information exchange equipment.

To reach the desired aims and objectives described above several areas or actions for cooperation were identified (including secure communications).

These areas consist of education, training and exercising, and some are enablers while others are milestones that boost operational capabilities.

However, all areas lead towards the aims and end state, either alone or linked together.

Finish and Swedish Defense Cooperation, 2015

 

A Dutch Frigate as the Platform for Swedish Command of the European Counter-Piracy Mission, 2015

03/10/2015

2015-03-10  The Dutch Ministry of Defence recently highlighted the role of HNLMS John de Witt in the European counterpiracy mission.

In a piece published on February 3, 2015 on the Dutch MoD website the role of the ship was highlighted:

Since today, Admiral Jonas Haggren of the Royal Swedish Navy is Commander of the EU counterpiracy operation Atalanta.

Admiral Jonas Haggren, the new commander of the Atalanta counterpiracy operation.
Admiral Jonas Haggren, the new commander of the Atalanta counterpiracy operation.

During a change-of-command ceremony in the port of Djibouti, he took over command from Rear Admiral Guido Rando of the Italian Navy in the presence of a delegation from the Royal Netherlands Navy vessel HNLMS Johan de Witt.

In the coming four months, Haggren and his international staff will lead the mission from HNLMS Johan de Witt.

“During our command, the Netherlands and Sweden will work together in the fight against piracy.

HNLMS Johan de Witt is equipped with multifunctional capabilities and has various options on board for supporting other operations.

That could entail escorting a World Food Programme ship, for example”, remarked Admiral Haggren after assuming command.

This event was discussed earlier in an interview with the Dutch captain aboard the HNLMS John de Witt during Bold Alligator 2014.

Captain Rene Luyckx:  The ship was built in 2006.  It is built more or less along commercial standards; there is a lot of room for operations.  It is a small village. 

There is an airport, a garage, a hotel, and a port in effect involved with the ship. 

The difference with our ship compared to most ships of its class is that we have a large C2 area.

Question: Where have you operated the ship?

Captain Rene Luyckx: on the bridge of his ship during Bold Alligator 2014. Credit: Second Line of Defense
Captain Rene Luyckx: on the bridge of his ship during Bold Alligator 2014. Credit: Second Line of Defense

Captain Rene Luyckx : We have been on Exercise African Winds; twice we have operated as the command ship for anti-piracy operations off of Africa; and in the Caribbean as well.

Question: The kind of operations we need to do now require flexible C2. 

How have you used it so far?

Captain Rene Luyckx: This ship was the flagship for the EU task force off of Africa. 

We will go again in January where Sweden will be in charge but they will operate off of our ship because of our C2 capabilities.

We intend to use the ship for a larger national force but it has become a very effective coalition asset.

And sea basing is crucial for you can operate independently, and provide support logistics aboard the ship rather than having to push them ashore.  And we can do C2 for the entire force we might support ashore as well.

 

 

Countering China’s Missile Defense Options: Shaping a Way Ahead

03/09/2015

2015-03-03 By Richard Weitz

Recent weeks have seen China reenergize its campaign against the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea.

The reasons for Chinese concern is puzzling, since the U.S. and South Korean governments have not held any formal talks on such a deployment. Even if the U.S. deployed a THAAD battery in South Korea, it could hardly threaten Chinese enormous missile arsenal—not even its limited number of ICBMs, whose fast speed, dispersed location, and mobile launchers would make an elusive target.

Perhaps the Chinese are using the issue as a Red Herring to divert attention from their own missile defense programs.

China has been researching BMD for years, though on a low-key basis and with no clear commitment to deploy a national missile defense system like the United States.

Still, it is possible that China might eventually deploy strategic ballistic missile defenses to defend the Chinese homeland from a limited number of adversary long-range missiles.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is studying the issue, while U.S. government officials have begun to address the question of Chinese BMD in public.

On February 20, 2015, Frank Rose, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the State Department, discussed the issue at a FAS workshop.

In his presentation, Rose correctly argued that limitations on technology and resources would prevent China from developing defenses sufficient to make the Chinese homeland from a U.S. nuclear strike. He therefore addressed the issue primarily from the perspective how China’s interest in BMD policies could affect general strategic stability between China and the United States.

 China's HongQi-9 (HQ-9) launcher was part of China's 60th anniversary parade, Oct. 31, 2009. The HQ-9 is the domestic version of the FD-2000 missile that Turkey appears to be having second thoughts about purchasing.  (photo by Jian Kang)

China’s HongQi-9 (HQ-9) launcher was part of China’s 60th anniversary parade, Oct. 31, 2009. The HQ-9 is the domestic version of the FD-2000 missile that Turkey appears to be having second thoughts about purchasing. (photo by Jian Kang)

In particular, Rose hoped that China would engage in a comprehensive and sustained dialogue on the issue with Washington.

U.S. officials have long sought such strategic security discussions with China to promote military transparency and reduce misperceptions and mistrust. Until recently, the focus on the China-U.S. strategic dialogue has been on both countries’ nuclear forces and policies.

But U.S. officials have begun briefing the Chinese about U.S. BMD plans and programs, and are eagerly awaiting Chinese reciprocation.

Rose said that the administration wants to discuss other capabilities that could affect mutual strategic stability, to include “space-related issues, conventional precision strike capabilities, and nuclear weapons.”

The Chinese military has been improving its capabilities in all these areas.

In this context, Rose expressed most concern about China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) program, which can escalate crisis and threaten the long-term space security. China’s 2007 ASAT test created an enormous debris field that still endangers space satellites and astronauts. The United States, China, and other countries rely heavily on access to space for communication; navigation, intelligence, meteorology, and other critical military and civilian functions.

He warned that Sino-American space cooperation would remain limited as long as China pursued ASAT capabilities.

Yet, the United States would probably have to make some military response should China deploy even modest strategic missile defenses. The Congress and some media commentators would demand some countermeasures, and any administration would therefore find it politically challenging not to respond.

In addition, U.S. allies in Asia that perceive a threat from China would expect a U.S. countermove and would likely communicate that to Washington, at least in private.

The United States has pledged to defend Japan and other U.S. allies from a foreign military attack by China or other countries, with U.S. nuclear weapons if necessary.

A Chinese BMD system could, along with other factors, deepen worries about the credibility of such extended deterrence guarantees.

These assurances are generally less credible than threats to retaliate for a foreign attack on the United States itself.

In some cases, even limited Chinese missile defenses could enhance China’s ability to threaten neighbors close to the United States. For example, a Chinese BMD shield that extended over Taiwan would facilitate PLA offensive military operations by reinforcing its multi-layered anti-access strategy, which tries to thwart any U.S. effort to come to the island’s defense.

The U.S. has tried to make its security guarantees more credible by making official statements reiterating these pledges, placing U.S. conventional forces in these countries, and taking other measures. For example, the United States has kept U.S. forces in South Korea to deter a North Korean attack against the Republic of Korea.

Among other concerns, if U.S. allies came to doubt the credibility of U.S. deterrence guarantees, they would more likely pursue unilateral measures to assure their defense, such as developing their own nuclear deterrents, or try to reduce foreign threats by distancing themselves from the United States.

The United States could take a number of measures to decrease even the theoretical threat from Chinese missile defenses to the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

For example, the Pentagon could add more penetration aids to U.S. ballistic missiles, such as decoys, balloons, chaff, flares, and cooled shrouds placed over warheads.

The United States is also planning to deploy a new long-range strategic bomber whose cruise missiles and other weapons systems might be optimized for attacking Chinese BMD systems.

The U.S. might also develop novel ways of delivering warheads against China that could overcome standard BMD systems—these might include faster burning missiles, hypersonic delivery systems, or maneuvering warheads and reentry vehicles. The U.S. might also be able to disrupt Chinese missile defenses through cyber attacks.

Another U.S. response option is to deploy more U.S. missiles capable of hitting China.

Adding more ICBMs would prove difficult given Russian-U.S. arms control treaties, which restrict their number, though China’s refusal to accept similar limits weakens this barrier.

However, the United States might decide to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Forces (INF) Treaty in order to place more missiles within range of China and thereby more easily saturate any Chinese defenses.

This option has become more credible given that Russia has been violating the Treaty, which bans missiles having ranges of 500-5500km.

Although the United States would need at least one Asian country to agree to host such missiles, they could more easily overcome Chinese defenses from their launch sites in Asia than can ICBMs based in the United States.

The Chinese undoubtedly know of these countermeasures, since they and the Russians have been researching most of them to overcome U.S. missile defenses.

Still, discussing them is useful to remind Beijing of the risks of developing any military systems that can threaten the United States and its allies.

Editor’s Note: Photo Credit:

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/turkey-nato-anti-missile-defense-system.html##ixzz3TNTySSoO

According to a piece published by the George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes:

The Hongqi-9 (HQ-9) is a long-range, high-altitude, surface-to-air missile system developed and manufactured by China.

It is designed to track and destroy aircraft, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. It incorporates technology from the Russian S-300P (NATO: SA-10 Grumble), the U.S. Patriot missile, and preexisting Chinese systems.

The HongQi 9 is currently used in both the PLA Air Force (SAM corps) and also in the PLA Navy in the form of ship-based HaiHongQi 9 (HHQ-9).

Ironically, Beijing has ranked among the most vociferous opponents of U.S. missile defense, having denounced various U.S. initiatives during the Clinton administration, and more recently, the Bush administration’s decision in 2002 to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Yet in recent years, China has followed a comprehensive two-track plan to bolster its own air and missile defenses:

  • The purchase of Russian surface-to-air missiles
  • The development of its own missile defense systems.

 

An Update on the Dutch in the Anti-ISIS Operations

2015-03-09 The Dutch have been an important contributor to working with the NATO and Arab partners in trying to role back the ISIS threat and to help in the stabilization of Iraq.

On the Dutch Ministry of Defense website are a number of updates on Dutch engagements in the operations.

http://www.defensie.nl/english/topics/iraq

The Netherlands has made a number of F-16 fighter aircraft available for carrying out air strikes on Iraqi territory.

This military support will complement the political and humanitarian support the Netherlands is already providing in the international fight against the ISIS terrorist organisation in Iraq.

As of February 5, 2015: Dutch F-16s have so far carried out almost 300 strikes against ISIS.
As of February 5, 2015: Dutch F-16s have so far carried out almost 300 strikes against ISIS.

6 Dutch F-16s and 2 reserve aircraft will be deployed, along with 250 military personnel.

In addition, a maximum number of 130 military personnel will lend support to Iraqi and Kurdish forces in the areas of military training and advice.

Materiel and personnel

In total, the Netherlands will contribute:

• 6 F-16s (plus 2 reserve aircraft);

• 250 military personnel (flight personnel and personnel for maintenance, weapon and communication systems, mission planning and logistics);

• 130 military personnel (trainers, advisers and security and logistics personnel);

• Staff and liaison officers at various headquarters.

In this first phase of the operation, deployment is scheduled to last a maximum of one year.

F-16s for air strikes

Air strikes aim to disable the tactical locations, such as command posts and camps, of ISIS by using precision weapons. The exact locations of targets will either be ascertained in advance or identified by military personnel operating on the ground or in the air. The Dutch F-16s will also provide air support to Iraqi and Kurdish ground troops fighting against ISIS.

The actions of the fighter aircraft will be coordinated from the Joint Forces Air Component Command in Kuwait. Dutch officers are among the staff working at this joint command post.

Training Iraqi and Kurdish soldiers

Dutch military trainers will assist in training Iraqi and Kurdish armed forces for the fight against ISIS on the ground. Training will take place at a number of barracks and other training locations in Iraq. Dutch military personnel will not be involved in the fighting on the ground.

Training will be conducted by a brigade training team, a Special Operations Forces training team and support personnel. These units normally train regular military personnel and special forces.

American command and control

Good coordination of the mission is essential, owing to the fact that there are a large number of countries taking part. Several Dutch personnel will carry out duties at the diplomatic, political and military levels during the course of the operation. The overall operation will be conducted on the basis of the American command and control structure.

A Dutch planning team is at the American command centre CENTCOM to assist with the strategic planning of the operation. In addition, the Netherlands will post staff and liaison officers to operational headquarters in Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, thus allowing Dutch involvement in the detail of the planning process.

 

Beyond Crimean Annexation: The Russians Look to the Wider Mediterranean

2015-03-09 By Stephen Blank

One year after the Russian occupation of Crimea we are beginning to see the see some of the consequences of the militarization of Russian policy.

It is not an aberration but part of a larger policy.[i]

The most recent examples of an expanded policy into the Mediterranean are the recent announcements of a Russo-Cypriot military agreement giving Moscow rights of entry to  the ports of Cyprus and the discussion of using  an air base  in Cyprus for so called humanitarian interventions.”[iii]

Since Moscow has defined its wars against Georgia and Ukraine as constituting humanitarian interventions and has asked Serbia for a base at Nish for the same purpose the implications of this agreement and the ongoing discussions concerning the air base at Paphos immediately become apparent.

In remarks to Russian news agency Tass, the Cypriot leader (l) voiced "deep gratitude" to Russia for its economic help (Photo: kremlin.ru)
In remarks to Russian news agency Tass, the Cypriot leader (l) voiced “deep gratitude” to Russia for its economic help (Photo: kremlin.ru)

This deal also has political implications in demonstrating that Moscow can make the most consequential agreements with EU members and suggesting its ability to break the EU’s tenuous united stand against Russian aggression in Ukraine.[iv]

Beyond Cyprus Russia has announced that it will sign a military cooperation agreement with Egypt to define “the long-term vector of our collaboration in the military field.”

Thus this document sums up the arms sales agreement reached earlier with Egypt and an agenda for future expansion of bilateral military ties.[v]

According to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu Moscow has in mind specific contents of this agenda pertaining to the  fight against terrorism.[vi]

Russia has been using this rubric of cooperation in the anti-terrorist struggle to promote and signal its deepening military interventions and presence in Central Asia and it is likely that in regard to Egypt and other Middle Eastern states where this slogan is being promoted it will mean a substantially enhanced Russian military presence.[vii]

One form of such a presence is a planned Russo-Egyptian naval drill in the Mediterranean and a joint rapid-reaction forces drill ostensibly against terrorists later this year.[viii]

Another such manifestation is the arms agreement between Rusia and Egypt whereby Egypt will receive $3.5 Billion worth of MiG-29 fighters, anti-tank systems, air defense systems and attack helicopters.[ix]

Moscow evidently wants a renewed presence in Alexandria and even Montenegro to have permanent bases on the Mediterranean on top of the base at Taurus in Syria and the new agreements with Cyprus.

Indeed, the new Egyptian government has said they were ready to franchise Russia to build a military base either in the Red Sea or the Mediterranean.[x]

Since “power projection activities are an input into the world order,” Russian force deployments into the greater Middle East and economic-political actions to gain access, influence and power there represent competitive and profound, attempts at engendering a long-term restructuring of the regional strategic order.[xi]

Although the agreement with Cyprus does not technically constitute a base it amounts to much the same thing, another regional  port of entry for purposes of sustaining  Russian power projection missions throughout the Levant.

The existing agreements with Cyprus and with Egypt clearly mark major steps towards the realization of Russia’s pre-established objectives for its permanent Mediterranean  Squadron (Eskadra).

Specifically, this Squadron’s “presence will allow Russia “to secure shipping access to the Suez Canal and extend its influence in the Middle East.”.[xii]

The accord with Cyprus also presents interesting potential problems to Turkey.

What remains unclear is how Turkey – a major Russian economic partner and a NATO member – will react if Greek Cyprus becomes a key logistical node for the Russian  navy in the Mediterranean.

Ultimately, however, Moscow doesn’t need much from Turkey beyond its treaty-based access to the Mediterranean; Ankara,  by contrast, genuinely needs Russian natural gas and Turkey’s role in NATO imposes sharp limits on its ties to Russia anyway, as does Cyprus’ EU membership.[xiii]

This material strengthening of Russian capabilities in the Black and Mediterranean Seas is, however, part of a larger global strategy that has gradually taken shape concurrently with the occupation of Crimea and of other parts of Ukraine.

https://www.ceoe.udel.edu/blacksea/geography/index.htm l
https://www.ceoe.udel.edu/blacksea/geography/index.htm 

At the same time as Moscow was first occupying Crimea, Shoigu proclaimed on February 26, 2014, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced progress in talks with eight governments to establish a global network of air bases to extend the reach of Russia’s long-range maritime and strategic aviation assets and thus increase Russia’s global military presence.[xiv] ”

Shoigu stated, “We are working actively with the Seychelles, Singapore, Algeria, Cyprus, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and even in some other countries. We are in talks and close to a result.”

Shoigu cited Russia’s need for refueling bases near the equator and that “It is imperative that our navy has the opportunities for replenishment.”[xv]

And in May 2014, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov announced that Russia is negotiating to establish support facilities in unspecified Middle Eastern countries, although we can guess that Syria, Cyprus, and Egypt are the most likely ones.

These moves show why Russia’s domination of the Black Sea is critical for power projection into the Mediterranean and Middle East.[xvi]

Thus Russia’s activities in and around the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean comprise parts of a larger, even global anti-American and anti-NATO ambition where naval forces and contingencies play a significant role.

In a recent speech the CINC of the Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov referred to the Navy’s “ocean strategy” and the large-scale procurement  campaign underway to realize this vision.[xvii]

According to Chirkov, the aim of this strategy is “to ensure the state’s interests and he security of its maritime economic activity in the various regions of the seven seas.”[xviii]

Clearly the aspiration is for a global ocean-going naval capability.

While the first mission might be homeland defense, naval task obviously will far transcend that requirement which is all the Russian  navy could effectively do after 1991.

And along with the invocation of this strategy Chirkov outlined a program to build the  capabilities and infrastructure necessary to sustain it: a new carrier, nuclear powered destroyer,  frigates and corvettes, and air capabilities.

Russia will  supposedly deliver 50 or more ships to the  Navy this year, including submarines as well as multipurpose corvettes and frigates.

Meanwhile the  Russian air force and Navy will get over 200 airplanes and helicopters in 2015 as well.[xix]

According to Chirkov the  carrier is not only to  provide a platform for airplanes or aerial vehicles of all  kinds but also to fight as a part of a combined arms approach if necessary.[xx]

Adm. Viktor Chirkov. /RIA/Novositi The defense minister has ordered us to form a task force that will operate in the Mediterranean Sea on a permanent basis."
Adm. Viktor Chirkov. /RIA/Novositi “The defense minister has ordered us to form a task force that will
operate in the Mediterranean Sea on a permanent basis.”

But here it is necessary for us also to look at the Russian UAV program which has clearly been spurred on by our extensive use of UAVs.

Russian analysts grasp that UAVs have become one of he most important categories of weapons for use in  naval contingencies for ships of the main classes, even,  if possible for  carriers just as we are doing.[xxi]

One possibility is to deploy UAVs on board ships that need to use their weapons to provide air support and thus make them independent of support from coastal aircraft..

In anticipation of anti-ship; activities all the way  up to attacks on carriers and carrier battle groups using long and medium anti-ship missiles based on surface ships, submarines, naval aviation aircraft,  and perhaps coastal batteries the UAV is essential to provide  accurate target detection and conduct reconnaissance while evading the enemy’s anti-air assets..

Similarly UAVs are essential to provide reconnaissance support for combating enemy light forces operating in littoral areas or conducting landing operations.

Third the UAV can detect enemy aviation groups at distances beginning at 600-700KM and help integrate the combined arms  anti-air  operation.[xxii]

In other words, Russian naval planning does not restrict itself to areas around the Russian littoral (including Crimea) but is thinking as well beyond the confines of anti-terrorist operations to include large-scale combined  arms  operations against NATO and the US at  sea.

Moscow’s new position in the Black and Mediterranean Seas facilitates the acquisition of the flexibility Moscow and its navy need to conduct or prepare for a wide range of contingencies from small-scale operations and  noncombatant evacuations all the way up to large-scale combined arms  missions.

Accordingly as a result of Moscow’s Ukrainian campaign NATO must step up its naval and air capabilities as well as ground and air   capabilities.

We cannot let the Black Sea become a closed Russian lake or permit the Mediterranean to become, as it was during the heyday of the Cold War, the cockpit of strategic rivalry between NATO and Russia,  both armed with nuclear weapons.

But it is a mark of our strategic neglect that only now has awakened to the threat implicit in Russia’s Ukrainian campaign.

Notes

[i] Stephen Blank, “The Black Sea and Beyond: Naval and Strategic Consequences of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Forthcoming

[ii] Matthew Bodner, “Crimea Annexation Boosts Russia’s Deep Space Capabilities,”  Moscow times Online, March 5, 2015

[iii] Sami Kohen, “Russian Influence in East Mediterranean, “Istanbul, Milliyet  Online,  in Turkish, February 28, 2015, Open source Center, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia, February 28, 2015

[iv] Paul J. Saunders, “Cyprus Port Deal Gives Russian Navy Alternative to Tartus,”,  Al-Monitor, www.al-monitor.con, March 3, 2015

[v] Moocow,  TASS,  in Russian, March 3, 2015,  FBIS SOV, March 3, 2015

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Stephen Blank, “Russian Military Policy in Central Asia,” Paper Presented to the  Conference Assessing the Capabilities of  Central Asian Armies, Central Asia Program,  George Washington University, Washington, D.C., January 12, 2015

[viii] Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 3, 2015,  FBIS SOV, March 3, 2015

[ix] “Russia,  Egypt to Hold joint Naval Drill in Mediterranean,” RT, March 3, 2015, www.r.com

[x] “Egypt Turns to Russia to Buy $4 billion Weapons Supplies,” Middle East Monitor, November 9, 2013, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/8246-egypt-turns-to-russia-to-buy-4-billion-weapons-supplies-; Theodore Karasik, “Arms to Egypt, From Russia With Love,” Al-Arabiya, November 20, 2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/11/20/Arms-to-Egypt-from-Russia-with-love.html; “Government refuses Russia’s request to set up a military base in Montenegro,” Independent Balkan News Agency,  December 20, 2013, http://www.balkaneu.com/government-refuses-russias-request-set-military-base-montenegro/

[xi] Henk Houweling and Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, “Introduction,” Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling, Eds., Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2004, p. 15.

[xii] Saunders

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] Bruce Jones. “Russia searches for strategic airbase partner” HIS Jane’s Defense Weekly. March 4, 2014 http://www.janes.com/article/34916/russia-searches-for-strategic-airbase-partners.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] Moscow, Interfax, in English, May 20, 2014, FBIS SOV, May 20, 2014; Stephen Blank, “Russian Strategy and Policy in the Middle East,” Israel Journal of Foreign Relations, VIII, NO. 2, May 2014, pp. 9-25

[xvii] Moscow, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in Russian, March 2, 2015,  FBIS SOV, March 2, 2015

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] Ibid; Moscow,  Interfax-AVN Online,  in Russian,  February 3, 2015,  FBIS SOV,  February 3, 2015

[xx] FBIS SOV, March 2, 2015

[xxi] Konstantin Sivkov, “The Russian Navy’s Drones: What Kind of Unmanned A3rial Vehicles  Does the Domestic Navy Primarily need,?” Moscow,  VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kuryer Online,  in Russian, October 30, 2013,  FBIS SOV, November 3, 2013

[xxii] Ibid.

Another aspect of the seizure of Crimea of note is upon deep space capbilities.

Another factor in this enhancement of Russian capabilities that is not commonly understood is that by occupying Crimea Moscow has also substantially enhanced its capability to monitor deep space strengthening its capability to maintain communications and  keep track of the International  Space Station but also other vehicles traversing deep space,  including satellites.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia's space program lost control over the Crimean deep space communications station to Ukraine. Credit: Wikipedia
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s space program lost control over the Crimean deep space communications station to Ukraine. Credit: Wikipedia

Moscow has already announced its intentions to upgrade these facilities beginning in 2016.[ii]

Historically Russia’s occupation of the Crimea and of Ukraine has permitted a vast enlargement of Russian capabilities and ambitions towards the entire Eastern Mediterranean basin comprising both the Balkans and the Middle East and current events beyond the ongoing buildup in the Black Sea show that Russia is re-enacting this history.

Stephen Blank is Senior Fellow American Foreign Policy Council

For another discussion of the issues raised in this article see the following:

http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/west-doesnt-see-russia-naval-threat-mediterranean-0

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/connecting-the-dots-russia-shapes-a-military-infrastucture-for-influence-in-the-mediterranean/

 

Italian Air Force 32nd Wing RPA Engagement in Task Force Air Djibouti Concludes

03/08/2015

2015-03-08 The Italian Air Force deploys a Remotely Piloted Aircraft Wing, namely the 32nd Wing.

The 32nd wing of the Italian Air Force, operates the remote controlled aircraft known as Predator, and completed their first tasking with the EU Naval Force in September 2014.

According to a September 2014 story:

The Italian Predator team, which is based in Djibouti, carried out a successful 11 hour check test flight and was able to highlight its effectiveness in carrying out long-range surveillance and reconnaissance patrols.

In the coming months the remote controlled aircraft will be used to monitor the seas off the coast of Somalia where pirates have been known to operate and give an early warning of a possible attack.

As is the case with EU Naval Force warships and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft, the remote controlled aircraft can also be used to monitor the safety of World Food Program vessels as they transit the Indian Ocean.

More recently, the 32nd Wing deployed with Task Force Air Djibouti within the frameowrk of the EUNAVFOR mission in the Horn of Africa has concluded.

Italian Air Force 32nd Wing at Djibouti. Credit: Italian Ministry of Defense
Italian Air Force 32nd Wing at Djibouti. Credit: Italian Ministry of Defense

According to a story published on the Italian Ministry of Defense website on March 3, 2015:

Task Force Air deployed to Djibouti on 6 August 2014. It has operated within the framework of EUNAVFOR  mission “Atalanta”,  the European Union counter-piracy operation implemented in the Somali Basin and Horn of Africa to protect merchant and World Food Program ships.

Various European countries provided naval and air assets to the Operation which, over the last 6 months, was  implemented by  Combined Task Force 465 under Italian lead. 

Italian Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft, provided by AF 32nd Wing,  have been employed for over 300 flight hours in information collection, surveillance and reconnaissance activities within the framework of Task Force Air Djibouti. The mission’s objective was to protect Navy and merchant ships in transit in the Gulf of Aden from piracy threats.

RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aircraft) intrinsic capabilities allow conducting high-value operational missions. This time, Line-Of-Sight and Beyond Line-Of-Sight modes were used. The latter involved personnel and vehicles from  Amendola Airport (Italy) via satellite connection, while the former was managed on a local basis by air crews stationed in Djibouti.