2014-09-22 In our series looking back at the achievements of Secretary Wynne in DOD, we are highlighting key aspects of acquisition innovation.

We are both highlighting specific accomplishments, but highlighting more general lessons to be learned about how to foster innovation.

In this interview with “Raleigh” Durham, a veteran of the Pentagon acquisition “wars,” this senior acquisition official discusses the challenges of innovations and provides a specific case study of how Secretary Wynne’s insights, experience and vision aided and abetted the process.

In his interview, Durham highlighted Wynne’s role in breaking the logjam surrounding shaping a joint USN-USAF JUCAS program, and getting the program back on track.

Durham focused on several key elements in shaping innovation.

One has to start with the innovators themselves.

With regard to the UCAV effort, innovation started with “the pure innovators, a couple of bright folks working in Air Force advanced research.

As the process began, they focused on the task of neutralizing mobile SAMs deep in enemy territory.

They came up with the concept of a highly survivable unmanned combat aircraft along with the concept of cooperative autonomy in attacking the SAMs because the required level of survivability was difficult to achieve.”

According to Durham,

Air Force and DARPA ran cooperative autonomy tests simulating an attack on a mobile SAM with regard to X-45 before Mike Wynne came into the Department.

The UCAV was designed as a deep SAM killer.

If sent it in as part of a 3-ship wolf pack they knew how to autonomously, cooperate, develop time to target, and determine which UCAV would jam over the target, which would attack the target and which would cover retrograde or re-attack.

You did not need a lot of power to jam from the UCAV because of its proximity to the target, which is also why the F-35 will be a highly capable in-close EW capable platform as well.

Durham highlighted that the capability was evolving but could not find a program home within the services. OSD PAE had supported the UCAV program with funding but it needed a service home to fully develop the capabilities. And this is when Wynne entered the picture.

Sec Def Rumsfeld decided to support the program but how do you get the program to the next step, shaping requirements for the services? Someone like Wynne was needed to see the promise of the innovation, assemble a team and press. There were many subjects worthy of Wynne’s touch and this is one of them.

“History will record that Mike Wynne became the guardian angel of highly survivable, fully autonomous unmanned combat air vehicles.”

Even though Durham was working at PA & E at the time, and Wynne was at A T & L, Wynne reached into the system to heist the program forward. The challenge was how to transfer the program to the services from DARPA.

“If it is going to live, it needs to be transferred to the services.”

A joint program office was set up between the USN and the USAF with a Navy captain initially in charge.

“We had been given money to provide for the joint program office, but we needed to know what they were going to do with the money. Wynne’s leadership at this point proved essential.”

The initial response from the office was less than enthusiastic and to ensure that the program did not deliver a combat capability too quickly, the office focused on the range issue and postured that without air refuelability, the UCAS as then conceived and operational, would not have the range to be useful.

The Joint Program Office focuses on putting their money up against the challenge of making the vehicle refuelable at the expense of anything else.

Development of the vehicle was to stop, until the challenge of refuelability was solved.

This position was conveyed at what Durham called the “high noon” meeting with regard to the program itself.

We were seated around a large table in the AT and L work area, and Marv Sambur (the AF Acquisition Executive at the time) was there with John Young, the Navy acquisition head, expected.

The JCS was there, the program manager, and senior officers and OSD officials.

The briefing officials did not provide us with pre-brief materials and had placed a brief on the table in front of the participants.

Durham then described Mike Wynne’s entrance into the room, providing his often-gregarious entrance to meeting participants. In front of him is a three-ring binder, an inch thick, which provides the brief which he now sees for the first time.

The briefer launches into his brief, and as he does so, Wynne is flipping through the briefing book.

Wynne stops the briefer and asks: let me get this straight: you guys are going to stop development of the vehicle while you spend our money trying to figure out how to do air refueling?

The briefer responded that Wynne was essential correct, and this was being done because air refueling was that important.

After further attempts to “correct” Wynne and explain while solving refueling was more important than evolving air vehicle and its systems, Wynne stands up to his full height, grabs the one-inch binder, now folder, and throws it down on the table and it moves along the table Frisbee style and bumps into one of the principals.

And Wynne states: Come back when you have something to say, and walks out of the room.

The story underscores the importance of not letting normal Departmental processes simply bury an innovation when it is more about processes than capabilities.

According to Durham:

Wynne functioned as a protector of innovation, and the lengths to which an innovator sometimes has to go to protect the effort and overcome the process.

Wynne certainly did that in many cases, and he also represents the kind of leadership one needs to ensure that innovation can succeed.

This was part of breaking the logjam to clear the way for the success of the AF/DARPA/Boeing team to develop and fly the X-45.

Editor’s Note: During the period discussed in this article, J.M. “Raleigh” Durham was working as Director Joint Advanced Concepts in AT&L.

Currently, he is the Director, PMO (Production Management Office) in December 2010. As the “Supply Chain Chief Operating Officer”, the Director of PMO provides Navy Total Force (NTF) wide visibility into the enlisted accession supply chain and develops, collects and displays standardized corporate level enlisted accession metrics.

As Director of Joint Advanced Concepts (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) he was the senior AT&L representative to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and had purview over a broad portfolio of defense programs with responsibility for identifying system-of-systems impacts on potential acquisition decisions.

“J-UCAS is a key transformational program within the Department of Defense’s portfolio. The capabilities offered by this family of systems can have profound implications on the Department’s future warfighting capability and force structure.” Mr. Michael W. Wynne, USD(AT&L) (Acting), 23 June 2003

This is the fifth part in the series. For the previous parts see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-wynne-legacy-generating-and-diffusing-innovation/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/michael-w-wynne-i-hate-logistics/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/innovation-inside-the-bureaucracy/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/innovation-in-the-usaf-a-look-back-by-dr-mark-lewis/

2014-09-21 By Gordon Chang

The United States has not had to confront two peer competitors since the end of the Second World War.

We have not faced a united China and Russia since the last days of the 1950s. Today, however, Beijing and Moscow, standing together, challenge us.

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping refer to the “uniqueness of China-Russia relations.”

Their ties, as both now perceive them, are truly one-of-a-kind. They view themselves in the same terms; they see their interests converging; they are, in short, like-minded.

As a result, the Russians and the Chinese have embarked on a grand project, challenging the American-led international system. They are grabbing territory from neighbors and taking on America at sea and in the sky.

They are both threatening nuclear war and thinking of waging conflicts they believe will stay limited, even if they use nukes.

Many say they will remain wary of the other and will never form a durable partnership, but even if these propositions prove to be correct, the Dragon and the Bear, acting provocatively at the same time, can nonetheless shake the world and make it worse.

The Russian Dynamic

We begin with the junior partner in this dangerous combination, Russia.

Russia is fundamentally a weak state. Its economy last year underperformed every estimate, growing only 1.3%, well down from 2012’s 3.4%. Growth rates have been falling for three years, signaling structural problems. Consumption is sagging as is manufacturing.

And there is one more negative factor. The mild sanctions imposed on Russia are already causing a major disruption to the economy, with money hemorrhaging out of the country, so far more than $200 billion this year.

No surprise then that the economy is near recession. The official forecast is for 0.5% growth this year, but even that is unlikely. This year, Russia will be lucky to stay above zero.

Russia sustains itself by selling oil and gas, but thanks to the fracking revolution in the good ole USA, we, not the Russians, are the world’s top energy producer and energy prices should, absent geopolitical turmoil, trend lower.

Vladimir Putin may have outsized ambitions, but he does not have the means, at least over the long run, to implement them.

Yet as we know, he can invade his neighbors and remain a disruptive force in the short run because he has the will to exert Russian power.

That’s why he came in at No. 1 in the most recent Forbes ranking of the most powerful figures in the world.

But to make matters worse, it almost does not matter that Russia is fundamentally a weak state.

The China Dynamic

Putin, after all, has another regime behind him. The People’s Republic of China backs his troublesome ambitions, giving the Russian leader the strength to do at least some of what he wants.

According to the global narrative, Beijing is the owner of the 21^st century. It is only a matter of time before China has the largest economy in the world. Analysts used to talk about the Chinese overtaking us in the 2030s or at the end of the 2020s. Now, however, the date is two years away according to some.

A fast-expanding economy, according to this storyline, will allow China’s leaders to achieve their ambitions. So many Americans and others think the West and the rest of the world must either accede to Beijing’s wishes or at least accommodate the Chinese.

I disagree. In reality, China has a sluggish economy, growing at about 2%.

The country looks to be on the edge of a debt crisis and property meltdown.

China’s technocrats are postponing a reckoning. They are preventing the inevitable correction with massive amounts of stimulus, but now stimulus is not working well, so the economy is slowing.Because they are preventing the economy from adjusting, the underlying imbalances have become too large to unwind without a crash. We are almost at that critical point when the Chinese economy goes into freefall.

At the same time, China’s political system is showing signs of distress, torn by infighting at the top of the Communist Party. At a June 26 meeting of the Politburo, Xi Jinping talked about how his signature initiative—his anti-corruption campaign, which is really nothing more than an old-fashioned political purge—was stalemated. Then, in melodramatic fashion he talked about his own death.

Given all the coup rumors in the last three years—including some of very recent vintage—maybe he was being serious.

But in any event, while Xi struggles to consolidate control, flag officers are gaining political influence, becoming powerbrokers in the Communist Party’s faction-ridden system. They may not make policy on their own, but they are undoubtedly gaining latitude to do what they want nonetheless.

And we can see that senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army are squaring off against each other. There have been the purges of generals and the series of public loyalty oaths made to Xi this year, a sure sign that China’s supremo knows that not all flags are loyal.

Chinese leaders would never admit this, but I think they know they are playing a weak hand.

And that’s why they are, at this moment, lashing out, taking on many nations—including us—at the same time. That makes no strategic sense, but it is an understandable tactic for desperate leaders.

Fragility and Global Disruption

So Russia and China are fragile.

Does this mean we don’t have to worry about them? No. It means we have to worry about them more.

In decline, Russia and China are finding the alliance that has long eluded them.

Last decade, when both nations looked hardy, it appeared as if the “strategic partnership” they talked about was mostly a mirage. Then, China and Russia thought they did not need each other. Moreover, in both capitals, there were thinkers who perceived the other to be the “ultimate strategic threat in the long-term.”

Putin, on his way to establishing the Russian Federation as a major power, made it clear there was little room for the Chinese at the heart of the global order as he conceived it. After all, in late 2011 he proposed the “Eurasian Union,” a grouping of nations once comprising the Soviet Union. He spoke of it as only “one of the poles of the modern world,” but in reality he saw it as closer to the center of the international system, “serving as an efficient link between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region.”

China, in effect, would be merely one part of one end of the world, at least as Putin imagined it.

High prices for Russia’s hydrocarbons gave its willful leader the resources to pursue his great ambitions, and the resulting geopolitical competition with China essentially ensured that relations with Beijing remained troubled. Not only did the two countries intensify their rivalry in Central Asia and the Middle East, they faced off on Russian territory, in Moscow’s Far East, the most fundamental irritant in Sino-Russian relations.

Moscow’s deep-seated insecurity over the border with China is why the tie-up between

Russia’s state-owned Rosneft with China National Petroleum Corporation, reached last October, was truly the “breakthrough” dealit was announced to be. Putin, after years of intransigence, broke down and agreed to Beijing’s demand for an equity stake in a lucrative oil field in Eastern Siberia. It was not the first time that Russia had agreed to give the Chinese an ownership interest in an energy field—that occurred in 2006—but it was by far the most significant. The Rosneft-CNPC arrangement, in all probability, will accelerate China’s penetration of the sparsely settled Far East and perhaps give Beijing a platform to reach into the Russian heartland itself.

Why the Russian change of heart?

The Wall Street Journal reported that the arrangement was “a sign that Moscow is overcoming its fear of Chinese encroachment on Russia’s Far East.” That could be true, but it’s more likely the Kremlin saw it had no alternative but to give the Chinese what they wanted. In short, the Rosneft-CNPC oil contract and the subsequent Gazprom-CNPC gas deal signal a turning point in which Beijing has gained, now and for the foreseeable future, the upper hand.

Russia realizes it has to work with China.

Significantly, Moscow and Beijing, at the time of the announcement of the Rosneft deal in October, agreed to greater diplomatic coordination, best symbolized by the signing of 21 cooperation agreements.

At the same time, the Chinese, for their part, will value the Russians more as time progresses.

A China that finds it hard to form alliances nonetheless realizes it needs friends. President Obama’s critics may see his “pivot” to Asia as “unresourced” and “hollow,” but for the Chinese it is real and an unmistakable warning that Washington is beginning to re-assess overly generous China policies.

In the Russian strongman, Beijing’s policymakers see not only someone who shares their general outlook and a fighter willing to take on Washington, but also a pliable junior partner.Beijing can see that Putin no longer keeps them at arm’s-length. In the last couple years, the Russian leader has adopted a far more conciliatory attitude. As he said in April 2012 about Beijing, “We do not have a single irritating element in our ties.” It appears that Chinese leaders are beginning to believe they can, when it counts, control Putin.

We may think China should seek to fortify its relations with us and not a sinking Russia, but that is not in fact how Chinese leaders see the world or calculate their interests.

And we should not forget that they are choosing Russia over America because their internal politics are inhibiting better relations with us. There is a strain of anti-Americanism in current Chinese Communist political thought, unmistakably evident in the pages of People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s flagship publication, and in the writings of senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army.

As nationalism replaces prosperity as the Party’s primary basis of legitimacy, it becomes increasingly difficult for its leaders to embrace their counterparts in either the liberal democracies or the many neighbors with which China has territorial disputes. Beijing maintains expansive land and sea claims against an arc of nations from India in the south to South Korea in the north.

Furthermore, its ambitions to close off the international waters of the South China Sea bring it into conflict with seafaring nations, especially the U.S., which has for more than two centuries protected freedom of navigation.

On the other hand, there is virtually no strand of anti-Russian political thought in Beijing. With Xi Jinping’s public campaigns promoting both Marxism and Maoism, the fashion is to lament the passing of the Soviet Union and express pity for a Russia that has, in the view of the Chinese elite, fallen from superpower status to a power of second- or third-rank.

Shaping Cooperation

With America essentially identified as China’s geopolitical opponent, it is only natural that Beijing’s recent foreign policy initiatives show increasing coordination with the Kremlin.

On Syria, for instance, the pair cooperated on four vetoes of Security Council resolutions.

They are also working together to protect the theocratic Iranian regime, a sign that in the

Middle East and Persian Gulf the pair is moving from competition to cooperation.

In Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing are still engaged in their version of the Great Game, but that rivalry is increasingly taking place within the confines of the Beijing-launched Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which the Chinese see as their own NATO or, more to the point, as their own anti-NATO.

Moreover, it is in East Asia where Beijing and Moscow are beginning to cement their loose alliance. Last October, Xi Jinping asked Moscow, in the words of the official Xinhua News Agency, to help China “guarantee security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”

At a time when Russia is in obvious long-term decline, the invitation to play a broader role is significant. Xi’s overture, even if insincere, is noteworthy because Beijing has almost never asked others to cooperate in such a way. If nothing else, it reveals that China sees Moscow as “the ideal candidate” to be its “global partner.”

As a sign of partnership, Russia is helping China build an air force significantly larger than the one the Pentagon foresees. The 2014 Pentagon report on China noted that country is pursuing “unprecedented” modernization. It mentioned that 600 of China’s combat aircraft are “modern.”

Not everyone agrees with the estimate of 600. Jane’s ran an article putting the current number of Chinese 4^th generation aircraft at 946.

By 2020, you will face 1,562 of them, according to analyst Rick Fisher, who has a far better track record than the Pentagon when it comes to matters Chinese. Included in Fisher’s 2020 figure are 24 Su-35s.

And soon China will have the S-400 air-defense system.

Russia appears set to begin a whole new round of weapons sales to China, something apparently agreed at the time of the Rosneft-CNPC deal. China, according to what some believe are secret side agreements made then, will not only get the good stuff, it will get the rights to manufacture it at home.

This suggests to me that ending the production of the F-22 was a mistake of the first order. We are headed to an era where we have to assume that, at least in the first days of Asia’s next conflict, Russia and China if acting together will control the skies.

To many people, region-wide conflict seems unlikely, impossible even.

But as Enoch Powell remarked, “History is littered with wars which everybody knew would never happen.”

But we don’t need to rely on left-wing British politicians for geopolitical advice. A year ago, who in this room thought that, in just the space of months, Russian tanks would cross a national border; Moscow would annex the territory of a neighbor; and Russian allies, using Moscow’s missiles, would shoot down a civilian jetliner.

And who here would have thought that Putin would publicly threaten to use nuclear weapons to hold onto his conquests, as he did at the end of last month, on August 29?

We have to view these words in the context of his promise on August 14 to unveil what he called offensive nukes; Moscow’s clear violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a cornerstone of the Post-Cold War peace; the large-scale Russian strategic nuclear exercises this month; and Russian long-range bombers practicing cruise missile attacks on the U.S. a few weeks ago.

At this moment, some of the worst trends of 1914 and 1939 Europe and 1937 Asia are evident.

This time, however, the weapons in the hands of aggressors are so much more destructive. And at the same time, the concept of nuclear deterrence, which kept the peace since the Cuban Missile Crisis, is breaking down.

A Russian analyst recently wrote that Putin thinks he can employ a limited nuclear strike on a Baltic capital and get away with it.

And if Putin manages to intimidate the West with his not-so-veiled promises to incinerate Ukraine’s defenders, other aggressors may think they too can employ his threatening tactics. For instance, both North Korea and China have recently talked about unleashing Armageddon.

Perhaps we can ignore the ranting of the Kim regime, but Chinese nuclear threats are particularly worrisome.

China’s flag officers have, for two decades, been issuing belligerent warnings about Beijing’s willingness to use nukes to seize Japan’s outlying islands and Taiwan. And in August 2011 a retired Chinese general, still working for Beijing, inadvertently blurted out that his country was planning surprise missile attacks on the U.S.

Chinese threats took on an especially belligerent tone last October.

With no apparent provocation, the main outlets of Chinese state media—People’s Daily, China Central Television, and PLA Daily, among others—ran identical articles about how Chinese submarines launching ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear warheads could kill tens of millions of Americans in Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Portland in Maine, and the Navy towns of Annapolis and Norfolk. Those Chinese reports also talked about radiation deaths in Chicago.

Let me point out that these articles were not the work of rogue journalists. They were splashed across state media at the same time, a clear indication they were directed from the top of the Chinese political system, the Politburo Standing Committee.

A nuclear exchange is, at least for most people, inconceivable. For more than a generation, nukes were thought to be defensive in nature, instruments of deterrence.

Today, they look like just another appliance of aggression.

Today, two men, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping of China, are makers of history, with grand ambitions and the will to pursue them.

These ambitious figures are now disturbing peace and tranquility, one in Asia and the other in Europe. American policymakers are loath to call this a new Cold War, but this we can say: Russia and China are now acting at the same time, challenging us, making this moment especially consequential.

So if we want to continue living in a world that is free, we will have to defend it against them.

They are the New Axis.

History, from time to time, picks men and women to fight for all that is good. Due to the challenge from Russia and China, we are at one of those moments.

Editor’s Note: Gordon Chang made this presentation at the US Air Force Association at their 2014 Air & Space Conference and Technology Exposition held at the Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center in National Harbor, Maryland on September 16, 2014.

It is republished with the permission of Gordon Chang and AFA.

2014-09-02 by Harald Malmgren

Xi Jinping has already successfully reconfigured China’s Politburo and its Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). He has also set in motion a massive corruption purge of the Chinese domestic state security apparatus, starting with its head, Zhou Yongkang, and including several hundred other national and local officials.

This corruption purge also extends to an unknown, growing number of personnel of China National Petroleum Corporation, where Zhou had previously been CEO while amassing great wealth and a vast personal power structure.

It is widely believed that Zhou had tried to use his seemingly limitless knowledge of weaknesses and corruption of much of the entire Chinese leadership to place his own choices in positions of power throughout the Chinese government during the transition of leadership to Xi.

Thus, Xi’s crackdown on Zhou is seen as an unexpectedly bold consolidation of Xi’s new power structure.

It also demonstrates Xi’s zero tolerance for independent personality power networks.Corruption most likely reaches every nook and cranny in China’s elaborate, overly centralized public-private economic structure. Xi will have to draw some boundaries for how far he wants to reach, balancing the purge of some while permitting fear of purge to limit non-compliant behavior of others.

At the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, Xi not only took over Communist Party control but also appointed Wang Qishan, known as Xi’s “fix it” man, to the PSC. Wang was appointed head of the PSC watchdog committee, with increased numbers of investigators and a public warning that no corrupt official was safe.

Although world news and media consider Premier Li Keqiang the second in command of China, after Xi, insiders consider Wang to be the second most powerful official in China today. No doubt his power to purge motivates many officials when asked to do something.

After the 18th Party Congress, questions remained about what changes Xi would execute in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The role of the PLA in Chinese national decision-making is somewhat murky in Western press and media reports on events in China, and in the PLA’s interactions with the militaries of other nations, notably with the US.

Under previous Chinese leaders, the PLA operated through the Central Military Commission (CMC) reporting directly to the party chairman, without formal communication with the PSC and with minimal bureaucratic interaction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies involved with China’s relations with the rest of the world.

The CMC had its own autonomous authority, with its own foreign policy apparatus of committees and think tanks. Generals in its membership had much liberty to express harsh, aggressive remarks about the policies or military actions of other countries, without regard to China’s declared foreign policies.

However, the CMC did not openly dispute or challenge PSC decisions, accepting the basic premise that civilian party control ultimately must prevail.

Technically, the PLA was subject to PSC oversight, PSC approval of PLA personnel, and the Communist Party apparatus operating within the armed forces. In practice, this meant the PLA kept a distance from questions of national strategy. Conversely, the ministries, bureaucratic apparatus, and PSC avoided intrusion on PLA daily operations. In practice, this meant PLA had significant “operational discretion” in response to external challenges.

No member of China’s diplomatic corps is a member of the Politburo. Conversely, all members of the CMC are treated with the same status as members of the Politburo, and even some generals treated as equals to the PSC.

Before Xi’s ascent, domestic stability was the primary priority of the government. Thus, in case of PLA friction with foreign military, as in the downing of US reconnaissance aircraft over Hainan in 2001, a step back was taken to introduce greater caution towards external forces, thus avoiding diversion of attention from domestic stability.

An important, fundamental principle from Deng onwards was that China should avoid direct conflict or war with the US until the PLA was “ready”, which was expected to take until 2020 or possibly longer.

This projection was of course based on China’s economic growth in prior decades, and expectation that China would become an economic equal to the US by that time.

Although not publicly admitted, the PSC’s economic growth outlook in 2014 has clearly changed, with internal PSC expectations that China’s growth rate would be entering a slower phase of growth, and “equality” with the US an objective postponed to some future date.

In essence, the PLA view remains now to delay direct conflict with the US until some later time when the PLA would be relatively better positioned to cope with what are currently considered to be greatly superior US military capabilities.

The PSC believes losing confrontations with the US military would endanger domestic confidence and stability and should therefore be avoided at this moment in history.

Under Xi, domestic stability and war avoidance remain guiding principles, but a more aggressive assertion of sovereignty over China’s territory is encouraged.

Whether this is a result of a more aggressive way of thinking by Xi, or a reevaluated perception of US reluctance to act decisively abroad, or a gesture to consolidate PLA support for Xi will remain discussed by historians in the future.

It has become evident that some senior Chinese have been closely attentive to President Putin’s evident agility and the slow pace of President Obama’s responses to multiple Russian probes in differing geographic locations.

Whatever the reason, the decision to go ahead with a new ADIZ was a decision of the CMC with approval of Xi, and with minimal consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Similarly, recent more aggressive behavior of PLA aircraft and naval vessels in close proximity to US aircraft and ships is definitely intended by the CMC.

From a purely military perspective, probing US military responses has continuously been practiced for several years. Now, at a time of apparent heightened caution, the PLA is probing not only what US responses might be, but how long it takes for the US to respond, and what the operational discretion accorded to the US military might be.

The PLA still operates under the principle that direct conflict should be avoided, so the PLA and US military have opened new direct discussions with each other on the “rules of engagement” in close proximity to each other, and to the area the PLA deems to be the sovereign territory it must defend.

Clearly, Xi and the PLA prefer these questions to be worked out military to military, avoiding the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US State Department in broader, more politically charged issues of national interest.

Xi appears to have recognized that his own power requires the support of both the state security apparatus and the PLA. By July this year, he had appointed 11 new four-star generals, and by 2017 more than 22 of the 33 current four stars will have to retire and be replaced by Xi’s appointees.

To get a grip on the entire personnel process, Xi and Wang seized on the opportunity to accuse retired General Xu Caihou of corruption and remove him from the Party. Xu had been a Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the CMC. He was accused of controlling the entire personnel promotion process of the PLA for 13 years in exchange for favors and financial gains. This was the first time someone of such high military standing had been caught up in prosecution for corruption.

Xu Caihou’s prosecution enabled Xi to reach into the very core of the promotion system to tear up the loyalty system Xu had laboriously built and replace it with a system directly ruled by Xi. Within the PLA, a new anti-corruption, whistle-blower general was put in charge of housecleaning and rebuilding the loyalty structure.

Again, no one can yet know how far the anti-corruption purge in the PLA will go, as it will depend upon a judgment of the right balance between prosecutions and continued toleration of formerly corrupt officers who show allegiance to Xi.

Under the guidance of Xi and Wang Qishan the power structure of China and its Communist Party are being reconfigured. Complex maneuvers of Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai to establish their own personality networks were identified and deconstructed (although both remain alive, so far).

Other national and sub-national personality networks are most likely still functioning under this highly centralized system of governance, but Xi has shown unexpectedly vigorous actions to alter the expectations and ambitions of many other aspirants for future Chinese leadership positions.

Under Xi, foreign policy has been adjusted, with a hardened policy approach to protect China’s territorial integrity and a gradual effort to reshape the regional security order with a mix of diplomacy and provocations.

A question remains as to how Xi will channel deliberately heightened tensions with Japan in connection with China’s economic, security, and territorial intentions in the future.

The present configuration of seven military districts is likely to be changed in the near future. It was established in the conflict of the CCP with the Kuomintang in the 1940’s and is essentially obsolete now.

For example, only a small fraction of the PLA’s capabilities lies in proximity to India, where armed confrontations are frequent and long-term interests of India and China are likely to conflict (e.g. Himalayan watershed, passage through the Indian Ocean).

To improve PLA capabilities on the border with India, the PLA has built the second-longest aviation runway in the world in the Himalayas to enable quicker shifts in PLA resources from the heavily concentrated Northeast to the far less concentrated Southwest.

Most likely, Xi will continue to follow Deng’s dictum that China should behave like a big power but avoid involvement in world affairs that do not have direct relevance to Chinese interests.

This narrow focus of international behavior may gradually change as China becomes increasingly dependent on interaction with Africa, energy supplies from the Middle East, and exploitation of the Arctic Passage to Europe and Northwest Russia.

A gradual shift of budget priority to Chinese naval and air force capabilities will undoubtedly take place, opening yet other opportunities for Xi to develop new lines of loyalty alongside gradually extended Chinese military reach.

The lesson for the US to be drawn from this reconfiguration of the PLA is that foreign relations of other nations with China will be heavily influenced by the PLA.

Military to military contacts will likely prove to be increasingly important, especially with the evident “operational discretion” afforded the PLA.

This may prove to be a difficult challenge for President Obama, who evidently strongly prefers direct White House control of confrontations and conflicts with other nations, and reliance on the US diplomatic apparatus, while China depends much more heavily on the CMC in moments of potential critical encounters.

Keeping military to military lines of communication open will likely continue to be a Chinese priority.

The US NSC decision apparatus would be well advised to take this into account.

2014-09-11 By Robbin Laird

Recently, the French government has suspended delivery of the Mistral amphibious ship to Russia.

In a story published by France 24 on September 9, 2014:

France on Wednesday suspended the first of two controversial Mistral-class warship deliveries to Russia, saying “conditions” were not in place as the crisis in Ukraine deepens.

The announcement comes a day before the start of a NATO summit and after months of pressure on France from allies to suspend the sale amid tensions between Russia and Ukraine.

President François Hollande’s office, in a statement after he met with top defence advisors, called the fighting in eastern Ukraine “grave”, and said Russia’s recent actions harm “the foundations of security in Europe”.

Despite talk on Wednesday of a possible ceasefire in Ukraine, Hollande said, “the conditions for France to deliver the first warship are not to date in place”.

Following the presidency’s statement, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was careful not to close the door entirely to the possibility of France delivering the warship. 

“The decision that the president had to take was: Are the conditions there today for the delivery. No, but we hope that they will be in the future,” Fabius said on BFMTV.

But to be clear, the deal is in limbo and not cancelled. 

This means that the issue remains to be resolved.

French domestic politics are not to be ignored, nor the economic impact of terminating the deal. 

Indeed, a coalition of trade unions and the Far Right are supporting the continuation of the deal.

Not unlike the 1930s, when the Far Right supported the Nazis, the Far Right is now supporting Putin.

“The crisis in Ukraine is all the European Union’s fault. Its leaders negotiated a trade deal with Ukraine, which essentially blackmailed the country to choose between Europe and Russia,” Le Pen told Le Monde daily in an interview.

Le Pen has been a long-standing critic of Europe’s foreign policy and does not see how Ukraine could join the bloc.

“The European Union’s diplomacy is a catastrophe,” Le Pen told RT’s Sophie Shevardnadze in an exclusive interview in June.

“The EU speaks out on foreign affairs either to create problems, or to make them worse.”

“Ukraine’s entry into the European Union; no need to tell fairy tales: Ukraine absolutely does not have the economic level to join the EU,” Le Pen told RT.

In her fresh interview with Le Monde, the National Front leader had a positive attitude towards Russian President Vladimir Putin and the economic model he builds.

“I have a certain admiration for the man [Putin]. He proposes a patriotic economic model, radically different than what the Americans are imposing on us,” said Marine Le Pen.

As for France’s decision to suspend the delivery of the first of two Mistral helicopter carrier ships to Russia, it only shows Paris’ obedience of American diplomacy, Marine Le Pen said earlier.

Protestors have come out against the suspension of the sale on various grounds, loss of jobs, the need to honor the contract, or directly supporting the Russians and their actions in the Ukraine.

The president and his government are subordinated to the diktats of Washington and of NATO.

This president has become the dog of Obama, Cameron, and Merkel.

France is a big country – proud and independent – who must decide on its destiny on its own,” Saint-Nazaire city council member Jean-Claude Blanchard told Ruptly news agency.

The two ships were commissioned by Russia in 2011 at a cost of US$1.6 billion.

The first of these, the Vladivostok, was due to come into service at the end of this year.

The second, the Sevastopol, is due to be completed in 2015. 

”If we fail to deliver the ship on time, or not deliver it at all, our penalty for not adhering to the contract might exceed 10 billion euros ($13 billion). That will be a disaster – both to the economy and the reputation.

The contract is important for France, and for Saint-Nazaire in particular,” Blanchard said.

Ignoring the historical context in which you live is not unique to the protestors against suspending the sale, but it is very troubling when apologia becomes analysis.

But it is clear that the French government needs to find a way out with the ships it has built and are building.

In a rare piece of analysis on the subject of options, Dirk Steffen has looked back at historical lessons which might be applicable to the Mistral case.

Dick Steffen is a Commander in the German Naval Reserve and is Director Maritime Security for our partner Risk Intelligence.

Rewind 100 years: on 2 August 1914 the Ottoman Empire ratified an alliance with the German Empire setting in motion a chain of events whose effects can still be felt today.

This step had not been entirely unavoidable for the Entente powers.

Unfortunately, the government in Istanbul had placed orders for two dreadnoughts with British shipyards (or rather: it had taken over a Brazilian contract in one case), one in 1911 and the other in 1913 (as well as one in 1914, but work never began on that order).

As war loomed large the British government, at the behest of the First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Winston S Churchill, pre-emptively seized the two Ottoman battleships named Sultan Osman-ı Evvel and the Reşadiye after having stalled delivery of the already completed SULTAN OSMAN-I EVVEL for several weeks.

The Admiralty offered a fixed payment per day for their usage in war, but this did not mollify the Ottoman government or public.

The situation then was, of course, quite different from that of today, since France and Russia are not as war (as the British and Ottoman Empire would soon be after this episode)….

So what is to be done about the MISTRALs due to be delivered to Russia? Just like the dreadnoughts would have been valuable to Ottoman sea control in the Black Sea, the MISTRALs would be just the tool for Russia’s new “ambiguous warfare” and a valuable addition to re-asserting its sea control over the Black Sea rim….

Steffen raises the important point that a sale of a major weapon system, which a class of ships represents, is not simply a financial transaction but part of the strategic equation and certainly can affect a strategic calculus and balance. 

This is certainly true of the Mistral and its use in the Baltics, the Arctic, the Black Sea or in the Far East.

To the point this class of ship – a new build amphibious ship – has become one of the most dynamic security and defense assets in the 21^st century as aviation, C2, and ISR capabilities evolve under the impact of the digital and electronics revolution.

The ship is defined by what operates off of the deck and the combat group of which it can become a part.

As such, it is an extremely flexible security and defense asset or power projection or influence asset.

To give a sense of the value of the ship in evolving French operational experience, the ship was part of Bold Alligator 2012.

And in an interview with a French officer involved in what the US called Odyssey Dawn, he outlined how the ship was used.

The BPC Mistral was the key sea platform which allies brought to the Bold Alligator 2012. 

The Mistral was recently involved in the Libyan operations and part of the French use of sea bases in a Mediterranean engagement context.

In a key interview with a senior French leader, SLD focused on the role of this element to the Libyan operations.

SLD: The amphibious ships were an important part of the air operation.

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: They were. On the Mistral, it was very interesting because when we are conducting the night assault with the helicopters, a few hours before the helicopter runs, we were sending Rafale, downloading the imagery on the Mistral or on the Charles De Gaulle, and then the intel officers were preparing the targets for the helicopters and they were taking off with very fresh information on their targets.

The evolution of the amphibious ship and its capabilities is a key part of the challenge and why the Mistral transfer must stop.

Due to many changes, notably in military aviation, the amphibious ship is undergoing a renaissance and also able to deliver “boots” on the ground 21st century style in terms of power projection and withdrawal.

In the US, the old amphibious ships of the Gator navy, are becoming key elements for a sea base insertion force enabled by Ospreys and other aviation assets and with the coming of the F-35B, a formidable strike asset as well.

The Russians have not missed the point of the importance of the amphibious ship to 21st century operations, and opened a bidding war in Europe to find a best value deal for themselves to become equipped with modern amphibious  ships.

Steven Blank has highlighted ways in which this ship is important in building out relevant capabilities for 21^st century operations.

The Mistral’s concept combines a landing helicopter deck, a floating hospital, an amphibious assault ship can carry up to 16 heavy helicopters, more than a dozen tanks, and one third of a mechanized regiment, plus two hovercraft or four landing craft.

It also could ideally serve as a command vessel.

Furthermore, the Mistral class ship could serve as a very powerful anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter vessel to detect enemy submarines.

Thus it can contribute to amphibious, ASW, and helicopter operations in any theater. 

The Mistral’s capabilities help explain why Moscow wants to buy up to 4 Mistral ships to learn how to produce those kinds of ships indigenously.

In the return of direct defense of Europe challenge posed by Russian actions and strategy, the Russian Mistral would be part of shaping the threat environment for Europe directly and indirectly in terms of serving Russian interests in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and in the Far East.

[slidepress gallery=’the-mv-22-operates-off-the-dixmude’]

Notably, the Nordic and Baltic states see the Mistral is part of the evolving direct threat capabilities against their interests.  An ice-hardened Mistral would be very useful in both Arctic and Baltic operations and for putting pressure in the 21^st century style of prick and poke, which Putin is following.

According to a piece in the Polish press published June 13, 2014, the Poles see a direct threat to their Baltic coast from the Russian military and clearly the Russian Mistral could be part of enhanced capabilities to execute such a threat.

The Russians are capable of landing a battalion-sized force from Baltiysk on the Polish coast within an hour and a half.

The modernization of the Polish Navy will cost 17 billion zlotys. This is a small sum compared to, for example, the costs of the air and missile defense program. The procurement plans do not provide for new submarines to be equipped with cruise missiles.

Meanwhile, the Russians are developing the most cutting-edge offensive methods and maintaining the highest concentration of military forces in the entire Russian Federation in the Kaliningrad enclave. The Russians began another round of warship exercises in the Baltic on 10 June.

A key aspect in understanding 21^st century conflict is to understand the synergy about Information Warfare, non-kinetic and kinetic capabilities in shaping favorable political outcomes in the ongoing process of conflict.  There is no end of history, but there are trend lines, which are decidedly unfavorable or favorable to peoples, cultures and states.

And to that end military tools sets are directed; encouraging favorable outcomes and attenuating those unfavorable to national interest.

Reversing the Mistral buy for Russia would have impacts on all fronts.

In terms of Information War, it would be a clear statement that actions matter and simply deceiving the West is not going to get a positive result.  The ship can be purchased for the use of NATO forces; in fact, it can be the flagship for the new Spearhead force.  As such it can support Arctic ops, Baltic ops and Med ops.  It can be renamed for a capital city in the Baltics to make the key IW point.

In terms of non-kinetic, the ship can be a major Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief asset to support operations such as those necessary to support those suffering from ISIS.  The ship can be worked as a key HA/DR asset to support NATO operations.

In terms of kinetic, the ship can be built out over time as new aviation, C2 and ISR assets become available to NATO forces.  The Osprey has already landed aboard the Mistral and is a harbinger of things to come.

NATO funds can be generated to buy the ship and attach it directly to the Spearhead force, or the Norwegians, Italians, or Germans can buy it separately or together.

Now is not the time to underwrite the adventures of Admiral Putin.

For a France 24 story on the Russians and Mistral see the following:

http://webdoc.france24.com/mistral-france-russia-warships-saint-nazaire/

And for a broader look at reversing course with Russia see the following:

http://www.spacenews.com/article/opinion/41085us-needs-to-get-real-about-russia

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/reshaping-us-space-policy-let-us-get-real-about-the-russians-and-ourselves/

Credit Photos for Slideshow of MV-22 Operating Off of the Dixmude : French Navy

In January 2014 a United States Marine Corps (USMC) V22 Osprey landed for the first time onboard the Dixmude, a French Navy Mistral class LHD.

The Mistral was part of the Bold Alligator 2012 exercise and the French were well aware of the role of the Osprey in the exercise. 

There was a clear recognition of the advantages of preparing to land the Osprey on a Mistral class amphibious ship and the French and US navies worked the challenge and have demonstrated the capability.

Two French Navy test pilots (one from an experimental squadron, CEPA/10S, the other from the French Procurement Agency DGA) were present onboard the V22 to observe and assist the USMC crew in the maneuvers. According to the commander of CEPA/10S and flight test engineer, “with this first phase we validated the location, refined procedures and performed environmental measures primarily of wind and temperature. Although we had little concern about it, these experiments confirm the ability of Mistral class LHDs to accommodate the V22 in acceptable security conditions from the vessel perspective as well as from the aircraft perspective.”

The MV-22 late last year landed on a Japanese amphibious ship and the way is opening up to included several allies amphibious ships as key elements of encompassing the Osprey as part of an allied expeditionary enterprise.

2014-09-19 By Atle Mesoy

The civil wars raging in Syria and Iraq have created a new situation for global security. One of the most critical challenges is the effect of foreign fighters involved in the war who have been fighting in support of the Islamic State (ISIS).

The foreign fighters come from more than 80 countries, the majority from Arab and Asian countries. South East Asia, with its recent history of terrorist attacks, is perhaps one of the most vulnerable areas and there are security concerns with foreign fighter returning to the region and finding support from sympathizers to ISIS.

This article republished with permission of our partner Risk Intelligence appeared in the September 2014 issue of Strategic Insights.

The article evaluates the potential terrorist threat from these developments, in particular the threat to maritime security, in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

ISIS as the new center of militant power

The Arab Spring and the civil wars in Syria/Iraq have opened possibilities for militant groups in South East Asia to send members for training together with the largest jihadi organizations, such as Jabaat al-Nusra (JN) and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), the latter now having become the IS.

In addition, the militant Islamists of South East Asia are using the Internet as a channel for propaganda, agitation and communication. At the end of March this year, a message on Twitter said the ‘Lions from Indonesia’ had come to support the jihad in Syria. The twitter message included a YouTube video showing jihadi fighters in training.

Two of the spiritual leaders, Amman Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar Bashir, have also posted messages to support the jihadi groups and fighters in Syria. Notably, both of these leaders were writing their messages from prison. In his message to the fighters in Syria, Abu Bakar Bashir did not support one particular group, although he now supports the “caliphate” declared by al-Baghdadi, the leader of the IS. Amman´s message was in support of IS, and he said he would prepare his “children” to participate in their fight.

Recent history has demonstrated the porous borders of Indonesia (as well as other South East Asian countries).

Therefore, it can be expected that militant Islamists will use the opportunity to join the IS and possibly other groups and will gain contacts, battle experience, and be energized and inspired by the idea of a new caliphate.

Mujahidin Indonesia/Timur (MIT) has already pledged an oath to the IS caliphate and to al-Baghdadi and issued a In an online posting from the “news and Islamic media” outlet Waislama, Abu Wardah released a YouTube video with a message directed at the ‘brothers’ fighting in Poso.

He encourages their fighting against the Indonesian counter terrorism forces, Detachment 88, and lauds the fighters for being brave. He also underscores there is only one way forward, and that is jihad. In his five minute speech he encourages the brothers of Poso to continue their fighting and says the path of jihad is tough and demanding. The video ends with a caption: Eastern Indonesian Mujahidin of Timur.

It is always difficult to verify the authenticity of the statements on the Internet. However, there is no reason to believe they are not authentic, compared to what is known of publishing by the jihadi groups and organizations.

Still, it might be questioned if a person such as Santoso can speak on behalf of all militant Islamists in Indonesia.

The near and far enemy

Both JN and IS have been fighting against the Assad regime in Syria and IS has also been fighting the Shia regime in Iraq to re-establish an Islamic state, something al-Baghdadi has now declared. The war is viewed by many Islamists as a sectarian battle: the battle between Shias and Sunnis, which resonates in one of the texts in the hadiths (stories and sayings from the Prophet Mohammed).

JN is an affiliate of al-Qaeda and the group may therefore have long-term goals of attacking Western targets. IS’s primary goal is to gain control of Iraq and Syria and to attract Muslims from every corner of the world.

Their secondary goal is to destabilize the countries surrounding countries Syria and Iraq, such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan.

A critical success criterion for IS and al-Baghdadi will be the number of groups and individuals supporting the new Islamic State.

Complicating the picture is the rift between JN and IS. JN is a branch of al-Qaeda so this is a significant division. There have been rumors of al-Qaeda branches joining ISIS, although of dubious veracity. Nonetheless, some of the al-Qaeda branches have leaders who have stated their support to IS and some Salafist leaders have done the same. Islamist groups in Libya and Tunisia, such as Ansar al-Sharia, are also supporting IS and fighters have come from these countries and others – some of them being former al-Qaeda members.

Apart from jihadi groups, Islamist organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir have rejected the caliphate claimed by IS, despite having the reestablishment of a caliphate high on their agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood has also denounced the IS, claiming that the timing is not right and it lacks legitimacy. At the time of writing, Jamaat Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) in Indonesia, for example, had not made a final decision on the question of giving its support to al-Baghdadi.

Humanitarian volunteers or jihadi fighters?

Authorities in Indonesia and Malaysia have cracked down on foreign fighters departing for Syria and Iraq; the government in Indonesia estimated at the beginning of 2014 that 50 Indonesians had gone to Syria. A representative for the Islamic Defenders Front said that they had sent two of their volunteers together with thirteen others from Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and JAT. These are all groups known for supporting the use of violence, even if JAT has stated their denouncement of terrorist attacks.

Within Islamic voluntary aid organizations there is a grey area where some of the organizations are linked to groups or organizations using terrorism. The leading group for sending volunteers to Syria from Indonesia is HASI, the humanitarian wing of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

It is impossible to say how many of the volunteers have only been providing aid and how many are jihadi fighters; nonetheless, it would be naive to believe none of the volunteers will be using the organization as a cover for their violent jihadi activities.

Within terrorism research and counter terrorism organizations there is a thesis and fear of blowback from the foreign fighters in the Syria/Iraq wars.

The terrorism researcher Thomas Hegghammer wrote a paper on the blowback effect where he measured the ratio of foreign fighters returning and becoming involved in terrorism. According to his calculations, one of nine foreign fighters have become involved in violent actions in the countries they departed from. Following the large response to his article, Hegghammer warned of extrapolating the figure to the current conflicts, so there are many uncertainties of the blowback effect.

One organization, CAGE in the UK, provided a report discrediting much of Hegghammer´s findings and in general the blowback thesis. They make valid points, such as Hegghammer not having the total number of foreign fighters in his calculations: in other words, how many did fight in a foreign country and did not engage in violent actions when they returned.

The CAGE report also points out most of the volunteers traveling to Syria and Iraq are only supplying humanitarian aid.

Although the one-in-nine figure is not absolute and cannot be extrapolated to the Syria/Iraq conflict, it does give an idea of the potential risks that foreign jihadi fighters represent.

Some of these risks are: firstly, it cannot be excluded that the IS (as well as JN/al-Qaeda) have an interest in spreading the jihad and using violence as a tool in locations outside Syria and Iraq; secondly, these countries have seen long-standing conflicts where foreign fighters have been involved; and, thirdly, there is a significant sectarian element that has spread with the Arab Spring, and the power games between Iran and Saudi Arabia competing for influence in the Middle East.

For countries in South East Asia, they seem to be particularly vulnerable for returning jihadis. This is due to the deep roots of militant Islamism and the many groups waiting for training opportunities to increase their capacity.

Recent statements from leading clerics and ‘terrorism ideologues’, as well as public gatherings, have demonstrated a degree of support to spread of an ‘Islamic state’ to Indonesia and the region.  In one protest in March this year more than 1000 gathered to support (then) ISIS.

Returning foreign fighters can travel to their country of origin, but they might also travel to neighboring countries to stage attacks or join different militant groups. They will be trained in the use of many types of weapons and explosives, and even in some cases counterintelligence.

IS and international operations

Although the IS has its focus on Syria and Iraq, there are indications that it is behind or at least has inspired international operations already to date. In July 2014 there were terrorist plots against Morocco and Norway.

In the plot against Morocco, Moroccan foreign fighters in the IS leadership were thought to be behind the plans. Two of the larger Norwegian newspapers reported that four persons connected to IS were on their way to Norway in July. It is not clear if the attack plans against Norway were conceived by a group of loosely connected foreign fighters or the leadership in the IS.

However, the two cases demonstrate how foreign fighters may also be part of the leadership in the IS; in the Norwegian case, fighters are known to be part of the ‘middle management’ in the IS.

There was also a threat made against a famous Hindu temple, Borobudur, in Central Java; the threat was posted on one of the IS´s Facebook pages on 15 August. Between April and June, 19 suspects were arrested in Malaysia with plans to bomb discos and pubs in Malaysia.

One of the targets was a licensed Carlsberg brewery. The plot was described by Malaysian law enforcement as an IS-inspired plot; although poorly conceived and only at the planning stage, it was reported that some of the arrested persons in this operation were intending to travel to Syria to join the IS. These international plots demonstrate how the IS can effectively expand its international reach through the linkages with foreign fighters.

Indonesia

Since the Bali bombings in 2002 security organizations have cracked down on militant Islamist organizations in Indonesia, especially on the leading terrorist organization; Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

Nonetheless, militant Islam never disappeared from South East Asia, something demonstrated through the numerous terrorist attacks and alleged plots uncovered. Some of the most well known are the attack on the Ritz Carlton and the Marriott Hotels in 2009, the attack on the Australian Embassy in 2004, and the third Bali plot in 2012.

Currently some of the groups are small, and shadow like, while others have a clear profile. In Indonesia the most known active groups are: JAT, Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), KOMPAK, and Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad (TQJ). Most of the groups are small and have been decimated by counter-terrorism operations, although it is essential not to underestimate the threat and to note the history of political violence in Indonesian history: Darul Islam was established in 1948 and JI was founded on the NII Movement, Negara Islam Indonesia, (The Islamic State of Indonesia) in 1993, growing out of the Darul Islam movement.

In 2010 a training camp in Aceh was discovered and dismantled by the government security forces, Detachment 88. Of the 77 persons that were arrested, the key elements were ex-members from JI and KOMPAK; four had roots to the Aceh Movement, and the rest were a mix of militant Islamists, including the Islamic Defenders Front.

The project was led by Dulmatin, a veteran from the Bali bombings. Dulmatin´s idea was to create a regional training center to uphold sharia law in Indonesia, and the planned targets seem to have been mostly local officials.

Although the training camp was dismantled, and Dulmatin killed, there are believed to be several other smaller training camps still remaining.

Malaysia

Although Indonesia is the country of main concern for the impact of returning fighters, Malaysia has groups advocating terrorism. JI has established itself and because of the porous borders and proximity to Indonesia, the two countries have much in common security-wise.

Since the weakening of JI, other groups have taken over, such as KMM (Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia). However, there is now information about a new branch of JI that has rejuvenated the brand and may contain some 3,000 members.

The latest counter-terrorism arrests, as well as the plot linked to the IS noted above, have focused on connections to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines as well as a link to India. Bomb maker Zulkifli Abhir or “Marwan” is linked to the KMM and believed to be hiding in the southern Philippines. The person arrested with connection to India was suspected of attacking consulates in Bangalore and Chennai.

Some new terror related groups have been referred to as BKAW, BAJ, Dimzia and ADI and these are said to be foreign fighter groups with links to Syria and Iraq,likely sending fighters to the Middle East after training with the ASG. Some 19 people had been arrested by law enforcement in Malaysia by the end of June this year for terrorist connections and authorities were also investigating reports of Malaysian nationals having been killed fighting with the IS.

Philippines

In June one of Australia´s notorious Salafist preachers, Robert Cerantinio, was arrested in Lapu-Lapu city and deported to Australia, and in the beginning of September Bilal Philips, another Salafist preacher, was arrested and deported to Canada for inciting and recruiting people to conduct terrorist activities. A video showed Cerantino had been gathering support for the IS. He is known as one of the most popular preachers for young Muslims to become jihadis in Syria/Iraq. There have been reports of 100 foreign fighters travelling to Syria/Iraq from the Philippines. A small militant Islamist group, Khilafa Islamiyah Mindanao, seems to have a presence and was first reported in August 2013.

The ASG is still active in the Philippines, and has regional connections in South East Asia as noted, but is now mainly involved in domestic robberies and kidnappings, as well as running militant training camps. Nonetheless, in June the ASG pledged their allegiance to IS. Another militant group Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

(BIFF) has connections to JI in the region. It is also reportedly working with the ASG on training fighters to travel to Syria/Iraq and both groups have made statements in support of the IS. However, it was also reported that a BIFF spokesperson had claimed that the group was not recruiting fighters and had no plans for an IS style government in the Philippines.

The operations of these groups have been typically focused in the southern parts of the Philippines, notably with the goal of independence for Mindanao. The

Philippines government has pursued a carrot and stick approach, securing a peace deal with the largest of the Islamic groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), this year while continuing operations against the groups that fight on such as BIFF and the ASG.

It should be noted that the US this June ended one of its counter terrorism missions by pulling out its JSOTF-P (Joint Special Operations Task Force, Philippines). This is probably not a good time for weakening security, especially due to the declaration of support from ASG to the IS and its caliphate.

Scenarios

There are two competing scenarios that have a relatively high probability, based on recent developments and information available.

In the first scenario, if the IS continues to prosper, there is a risk that the jihadi environment in South East Asia would be energized through the training of foreign fighters in Syria/Iraq and support from the IS (and possibly JN) leadership. 

Not only the jihadi environment would be energized, but the sharia movements might also be strengthened, with implications for international business, especially in Indonesia. Terrorist attacks of a larger scale would be anticipated, especially against foreign interests. These attacks would likely come from foreign fighters, small individual groups, solo actors inspired by foreign jihadi successes, or the larger terrorist groups.

Under this scenario, maritime targets might be ports and oil/gas transport, or even symbolic Western targets such as large cruise ships. Hub ports such as Singapore, or busy port areas in Indonesia, would be of likely interest.

Shipping in the Straits of Malacca is often mentioned as vulnerable but there are no groups in South East Asia that are considered to have an agenda and the capacity to stage a terrorist attack against maritime traffic there currently. Developing capacity would be the first step for a group inspired by the IS to attack shipping targets.

In the second scenario, if the IS does not continue to succeed on the battlefield, and loses territory due to the lack of support from partners and the military campaigns led by the US. 

The IS would be expected to lose face and influence with foreign fighters and Islamist organizations (militant and non-militant). Militant groups in South East Asia would probably still continue to grow, although at a slower pace.

Instead of being inspired by the IS to target Western interests, their focus would be on establishing local sharia zones. Although groups such as JI would want to establish their own large-scale Islamic state, they would meet resistance from governments and wider civil society. International maritime interests would therefore probably not be affected to the same extent.

Conclusion

There can be no doubt of the recent support for the IS and its leader al-Baghdadi from some groups in South East Asia.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to gauge the numbers and the potential effect of foreign fighters returning to the region. If it turns out to be a relatively large support for the IS among militant Islamists in South East Asia, it could have a huge effect. There is a risk of old ideas being re-energized with the new ones, perhaps will goals of a South East Asian caliphate or the targeting of foreign interests in the region.

Ultimately, it can be expected most of the jihadi groups in Indonesia will support either JN or the IS and it seems like the latter is in the ascendency. Foreign fighters have left to engage in what they see as a jihad in Syria/Iraq.

They will gain military training, have battle experience and return to their countries with new energy, capacity and goals. Some might re-join their groups or become involved in other militant groups. It is likely they will strengthen the contact between the Middle East and local militant groups.

The militancy of jihadi groups in South East Asia will be strengthened and will represent a higher risk to national security and international business. The nature of this risk might well depend, however, on the continued successes of the IS on the battlefield.

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