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The head of United Nations peace-keeping operations Herve Ladsous says the organization will soon deploy unarmed Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) surveillance drones to help the peacekeeping mission in Mali.
Ladsous revealed the details of the surveillance program in a briefing to the UN Security Council on Wednesday: “I take this opportunity to signal to the (Security) Council our intention to deploy unmanned aerial systems in order to enhance the situational awareness of MINUSMA as well as its ability to protect civilians and its own personnel,” he said.
He did not specific the type, numbers and possible deployment date for the UAVs being sought for operations.
Falco UAV already used by the UN in in the DRC. Credit: defenceWeb
A pre-solicitation notice seeking contractors for the Mali UAV program posted on the UN Procurement Division website on April 28 revealed that ‘multiple’ drones will be operated from bases in Gao and Timbuktu.
“The UN-PD is seeking Expressions of Interest (EOI) for the provision of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) with multiple Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in support of peace-keeping operations in Mali with the basing of one system at Timbuktu and (the other in) Gao. The UAS provider will be an independent contractor who remains in control of the system and aircraft and shall be responsible for operation and maintenance of the aircraft.
“The flight operating crew and all maintenance personnel shall at all times remain the servant or agent of the contractor. All staff and equipment necessary for the operation of the aircraft are expected to be self-sufficient for all technical and subsistence requirements, although in some locations, accommodation and meals may be provided within UN compound for security of personnel or lack of alternative. The staff of the independent contractor will operate closely with UN aviation and military personnel and interact with the host nation as and when required,” the solicitation reads.
Further, the contractor will be required to provide staff to track, control, monitor the UAS and provide analysis of data received working closely with UN mission contacts. The required UAVs must have an endurance of 12-18 hours and be able to operate at an altitude of 10 000 feet while sending back real-time camera/infrared video and synthetic aperture radar imagery via line-of-sight communications.
“While the initial deployment of UAS is expected to be based on a particular UN Mission, future deployment could be in any peacekeeping mission. It is expected that contracts will be for a period of 3 years, extendable at the option of the UN to 4 and 5 years and will generally apply to a single mission area. UAV capability should provide long endurance and be able to fly long range missions to a point of interest, loiter on patrol and return to base,” the notice stated.
The deployment of UAVs to Malian operations follows their success in support of the military operations of the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Selex ES Falco UAVs have been deployed there.
Ladsous has already indicated that he would like to deploy UAVs in support of other African peacekeeping missions in Darfur, the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan.
Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop said his government has already approved the UN operation of unarmed drones and hopes they will be deployed as soon as possible. The government is grappling with a national security crisis in which the weak army is battling a resurgent Tuareg separatist rebellion and a host of armed Islamist groups with links to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
The security situation has deteriorated remarkably in the past few months, leading to increased armed attacks and massacres of civilians inside and outside refugee camps, foreign aid workers and UN personnel. In a report analysing the performance of the five Selex UAVs which were deployed to the eastern DRC in December last year, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said the drones have proved useful.
“Since their operationalization, the unmanned aerial systems have provided MONUSCO with a responsive, controlled, and timely source of information, particularly in terms of supplementing the force’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts against the illegal activities of armed groups,” he said.
Republished with permission of our strategic partner defencWeb:
It appears that we are reaching an inflection, if not a decisive, point in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Even as Presidents Putin and Poroshenko are directly communicating with each other about Poroshenko’s proposed peace plan, the level and intensity of fighting has escalated.
On June 18-19 reports of fighting around the town of Krasny Liman described engagements involving over 4000 rebel forces, and fighting on both sides using tanks, armor, airplanes and artillery.[i]
At the same time NATO reported that once again Russian troops were gathering in the vicinity of the border with Ukraine and again conducting exercises.[ii] At least one new Russian tank column has entered Ukraine, as has at least one other mechanized column.
Therefore analysts have reason for suspecting that more forces may be coming.[iii]
Indeed the Russian government and media have confirmed that some troops have moved towards the border.[iv]
Ukrainian defense officials have noted the buildup in recent days, and the National Security and Defense Council said Thursday that Russian military personnel were observed throwing camouflage nets over equipment already in place even as the army moved new troops forward.
The Ukrainian statement identified four Russian units that it said were at the border — two airborne divisions, an airborne assault brigade and a motorized rifle brigade. It also said that a military convoy stretching almost 10 miles was spotted on the road between Moscow and the Ukrainian capital, Kiev. The convoy was not moving, just parked on the roadside.[v]
In another assessment Dmitry Tymchuk who leads the website inforesist.com reports that:
The group “Informational resistance” released the latest data on the deployment of Russian troops along the Ukrainian-Russian border on the territory of the Russian Federation, including in the Rostov region, where were noticed sabotage and reconnaissance groups (SRGs) from the Russian Special Forces units with some Russian military personnel from the SRG wearing uniforms of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Operational data of the group “IR” as at morning of the 17th of June. Russian troops along the eastern borders of Ukraine in the Russian border areas: Opposite Donetsk region – around 6,500 servicemen.
Opposite Luhansk and Kharkiv regions are more than 4,100 servicemen. Opposite Sumi and Chernihiv regions are more than 2,500 servicemen. More than 1,000 troops are ready to be transferred on the territory of Ukraine as a reinforcement to terrorist groups in Luhansk, Stanichn0-Luhanska and Sverdlovsk (Luhansk region, Ukraine). There are more than 600 militants (mercenaries) in the Russian border regions with trucks and 17 military armored vehicles. More than 2,500 people are ready to be transferred to the territory of Ukraine to reinforce forces in Snijne, Torez and Shakhtersk (Donetsk region, Ukraine). A transfer to the border (and following transfer across the border to the Ukrainian territory) of SRG of 22 arr SpN (Rostov region, Russia), units of which are in full combat readiness since June 13.[vi]
And on June 20-21 the Obama Administration reported that Moscow had supplied insurgents with another ten tanks and that, “Russian Special Forces are also maintaining points along the Ukrainian border to provide support to separatist fighters.”[vii]
In Russia’s interior, it should also be noted that the airborne and naval infantry forces were also conducting joint exercises, a sign of Russia’s continuing pursuit of its own brand of jointness as well as a potential preparation for further action in the Ukrainian theater.[viii]
Concurrently the rebels, made up of Russian volunteers, soldiers of fortune or their equivalent, Chechens, Russian paramilitaries, GRU personnel and various members of one or another branch of so called special forces (there are many such forces designated in Russia and no clarity about which ones might be in Eastern Ukraine) are complaining that they are not getting enough help and supplies from Moscow.[ix]
Indeed, Moscow even recruited foreigners, as it has just handed out medals to three Serbian “Chetniks”, a neo-Fascist paramilitary group taking its name from the World War II resistance movement, for the “Third defense of Sevastopol (the first two are the Crimean war and World War II, this being a sign of typical Putinite vainglory and braggadocio).[x]
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin accompanied by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, front left, walks to watch military exercises upon his arrival at the Kirillovsky firing ground in the Leningrad region Picture: Reuters
These complaints take place despite the evidence that over 4000 troops from Russia along with some tanks and air defense weapons have “migrated” from Russia to Eastern Ukraine and that more might be coming as suggested above. Those supplies appear to have taken the form of probes by Russia against Ukraine and the West.
While Western and American threats of new sanctions fill the air to date (June 20) nothing has been announced. In fact major energy companies are still making energy deals with Russia, France, now supported by Germany, remains intent on selling Russia the Mistral and its electronics as well as helicopter engines, there is no sign of the suspension of Italian sales of APC’s or other foreign IFVs to Russia.
And neither the energy industry, the Russian government, nor its defense industrial sector appear to be unduly perturbed by either existing sanctions or the threat of new ones although this may be typical Russian boasting and duplicity to hide anxiety.
Until and unless NATO and Washington understand the necessity of seizing control of the escalation ladder and of the strategic initiative we can therefore expect Moscow to keep opening up new threats and probes to dissuade any Western resistance or meaningful aid to Ukraine.
For that shift to occur there would have to be the emergence of something that has hitherto been utterly lacking in the West, namely an insight into strategy and into Russia and the realization that European security is indivisible. Moreover, continued inaction in Crimea invites further anti-Western probes as we see in the South China Sea and Iraq.
However, these probes have encountered mounting Ukrainian resistance that may well have deterred Moscow from making larger probes though we cannot be certain.
On the one hand, although Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu has said that the regular army will not be deployed in Ukraine; he has also stated that the Red Army (and obviously the air and naval forces) are ready for any contingency involving Ukraine and the Russian Security Council has held two late night meetings in the past week, obviously about Ukraine.[xi]
Moreover, despite Shoigu’s remarks about not using the armed forces in Ukraine, we have heard comparable high-ranking statements before and they have all been lies. Indeed, as this operation has confirmed for Moscow, “mendacity is the system we live in.”
At the same time, it is clear that Ukrainian military capability has grown.
On June 20 Ukraine announced that its forces now controlled the border with Russia although a determined Russian push using its regular forces could probably overturn that situation, albeit at the risk of full-scale rather than small-scale war.[xii]
Similarly, if the rebels’ complaints about lack of supplies are an indication, the Ukrainian army has managed to bring to bear superior air and ground capabilities against them. Certainly the scale of fighting with engagements involving several thousand men and reports of heavy rebel casualties (about 300 killed in Krasny Liman) suggest a ratcheting up of the scale of fighting.[xiii]
Thus on both the political and the operational levels it seems clear we are fast approaching some sort of critical juncture in this crisis.
It seems clear that if Putin wants to keep the pressure on in Eastern Ukraine he will have to double down on his military investment and risk a wider war and more sanctions.
Nothing suggests that he has ever wanted to take the risk of a major war because the nature of the operation, beginning with the seizure by the “little green men’ of Crimea has always been calibrated to keep the level of the operation below the level where either Ukraine or NATO could actually mobilize and deploy forces against Russia.
As former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has observed, this form of hybrid war has, among other objectives, the goal of neutralizing foreign intervention.
There also are those in Russia, like Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council, who are calling for new forms of “non-military pressure”, e.g. gas or economic sanctions, trade boycotts, etc. -– all of which amount to forms of economic warfare – against Ukraine.[xiv]
Therefore there is no reason to believe that Putin’s main objective, the destruction of any genuinely sovereign Ukrainian state that is not wholly within Moscow’s orbit, has changed or that failing a stronger Western response he will desist from his pressures on Ukraine.
In the meantime it also appears that Moscow, as many have observed, did not grasp the potential for the Ukrainian government and armed forces to recover as they have now shown themselves able to do. Neither has there been the slightest sign of local public support for the rebels in the East as Moscow may have hoped for.
Here, despite terrorism, coercion, media blitzes, etc. and despite the genuine socio-economic-cultural differences with Western Ukraine, public support for an integral Ukraine has remained solid.
One would not know this from reading the Russian media or from the claque of pro-Russian analysts in the US and the West who, despite all the evidence to the contrary keep harping on the “two Ukraines” and the need for Washington to emphasize ties with Russia over the issue of a war of aggression against Ukraine.
Indeed all the arguments on behalf of Russia amount to nothing more than pretexts to avoid noticing the obvious threats to international security that Moscow has deliberately but wantonly unleashed.” Had this civil support for Moscow emerged or had the Ukrainian army and government continued to fail to react we might well have seen an even more ambitious campaign to destroy Ukraine’s ability to function as a state and establish a direct land connection from Russia to Moldova that would have occupied not only Crimea but also Odessa, Ukraine’s main port, thereby completely foreclosing any viable foreign economic connections for the Ukrainian economy.
Ukrainian sources report that during this operation, Moscow also widened the airport in Tiraspol, the “capital” of its rump Transnistrian republic to permit landings of flights with heavier forces, stationed 2000 Spetsnaz forces in Transnistria, and planned so called humanitarian intervention exercises here in order to create and then exploit a pretext for intervening in Ukraine form Transnistria. Since Odessa if only 80Km from Transnistria the operation would have aimed to bisect Ukraine and capture Odessa with the attendant strategic consequences.[xv]
Those contingencies harmonize with other Russian initiatives in the Balkans e.g. its request to Serbia in the past for a base at Nis from which to conduct “humanitarian operations.”[xvi]
Thus we cannot lose sight of the fact that Russia’s Ukrainian operation not only threatens Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Poland, it also poses the same threats to the entire Balkan peninsula, a long-standing object of Russia’s undying imperial passion and a theater where Moscow has long played the ethnic card against local governments going back to Catherine the Great.
What can the West do in these circumstances?
It is essential to provide to Ukraine the short-term assistance, such as anti-tank and anti-air systems it has requested.
It also is essential to organize rapidly a Pentagon task force to conduct a short-term needs assessment of Ukraine’s needs alongside of the current medium and long-term assessment programs now underway.
It also is essential to strengthen NATO’s permanent presence in Poland, the Baltic, and Balkan areas, and deploy a naval capability to prevent Moscow from engaging in the “non-military” interdiction of or maritime threats to Odessa.
Beyond that new sanctions on Russian energy and economic capabilities are needed at once rather than having Exxon, BP etc. make new deals with Moscow.
Also, the EU Commission’s hand needs to be strengthened to ensure that the Russian South Stream program never gets off the ground by maintaining pressure on key states like Austria, Hungary, Serbia, and Bulgaria, and Turkey, and we must override the bureaucratic stalling that is preventing the US from sending the full tranche of aid for which Ukraine is eligible to Kyiv. As of today only $77 million of the estimated $200 million has been made available.
Finally there must be not only a change of policy and behavior but of perspective. There are still those who believe this operation was an improvised response to the revolution in Ukraine. They disregard the plain evidence that the training required for the Crimean operation takes years, that Reuben Johnson, this author and Dmitri Trenin all reported that such training was underway by 2008![xvii]
Similarly officials, not to mention Putin’s Western claque neglect the fact that Putin admitted that planning for the Georgian war, using separatists began in 2006, not August 2008.[xviii]
And for those analysts who read Russian, Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov prefigured Russian strategy in a 2013 speech to the Academy of Military Sciences that was published and then publicly summarized.[xix]
Neither can we neglect, the raft of Russian statements going back decades that are a matter of public record that none of the Post-Soviet or for that matter post-Warsaw pact states that emerged after 1989 are truly sovereign or that their borders are bound by international treaty.[xx]
Putin’s demands for self-determination for Russians and diatribes against the post-Cold War settlement indicate that we are dealing with a Russia that believes the post-Soviet settlement is not legitimate.
Stephen Blank is Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council based in Washington DC.
[i] Andrew Roth and Neil MacFarquhar, “Casualties Reported as Ukraine Seeks a Cease-Fire,” New York Times, June 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/world/europe/ukraine.html
[ii] Carol Morello, “NATO Reports New Russian Troop Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border, “ Washington Post, June 19, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/kiev-nato-allege-new-russian-troop-buildup-just-across-the-ukrainian-border/2014/06/19/5002b196-f7c9-1
[vii] Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Roth, “As Ukraine Announces Cease-Fire, White House Points Finger at Russia,” New York Times, June 21, 2014
[viii] “Naval Infantry and Airborne Troops Conduct Joint Exercises, ”Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Jun 13, 2014, Military Intelligence of the Czech Republic Daily Bulletin: 19 Jun 2014, FBIS SOV, June 19, 2014; Moscow, Interfax-AVN Online, in Russian, June 16, 2014, FBIS SOV, June 16, 2014
[ix] Morello,
[x] Belgrade, Pravda Online, in Serbian, June 15, 2014, Open Source Center Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Central Eurasia, (Henceforth FBIS SOV, June 15, 2014
[xiii] Roth and MacFarquhar; Morello, “NATO Reports New Russian Troop Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border,”
[xiv] Moscow, RIA Novosti, in Russian, June 18, 2014, FBIS SOV, June 18, 2014
[xv] Conversations with Ostap Kryvdyk, Washington, D.C. June 19, 2014
[xvi] Visr Ymeri, “Big Brother of Northern Neighbor,” Tirana, Korrieri, in Albanian, November 26, 2009, FBIS SOV December 6, 2009
[xvii] Reuben F. Johnson, “The Expansion Process Has Begun, “ The Weekly Standard, XII, No. 4, October 10, 2006; Stephen Blank, ”Russia and the Black Sea’s Frozen Conflicts In Strategic Perspective,” Mediterranean Quarterly, XIX, No., 3, Summer, 2008, pp. 23-54; Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Goal In Ukraine Remains the Same: Keep NATO Out,” Al-Jazeera America, June 2, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/2/russiaa-s-goal-inukraineremainsthesametokeepnatoout.html
[xviii] “Putin Admits Russia Trained S Ossetians Before 2008 Georgia War – Transcript President of Russia, www.kremlin.ru, August 10, 2012
[xx] Stephen Blank, “The Values Gap Between Moscow and the West: the Sovereignty Issue,” Acque et Terre, No. 6, 2007, pp. 9-14 (Italian), 90-95 (English) is an early example that shows how deeply-rooted this phenomenon is.
2014-06-17 Airbus Defence and Space and ATK have teamed to build a light gunship based on the C-235.
Now the two companies are teaming to build a larger gunship based on the C-295 airframe.
According to a joint press release of the two companies dated 17 June 2014:
Today His Royal Highness Prince Feisal bin Al Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan attended the announcement that the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB), ATK and Airbus Defence and Space signed an agreement to cooperatively work together on a C295 gunship version.
A C295 currently operated by Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) will be converted to gunship by ATK of the USA and join two AC-235 gunships that were delivered to Jordan by ATK at SOFEX.
The AC-295 gunship configuration will be based on the AC-235 Light Gunship which includes integrated mission and fire control systems, electro-optical and radar sensors, Hellfire missiles, ATK’s side-mounted M230 30mm chain gun, an integrated defensive suite and 2.75 inch guided rockets.
With regard to the AC-235 offering ATK provides the following perspective from their website:
ATK’s special-mission aircraft offerings integrate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, fire-control equipment, and an LW30 mm link-fed gun system. These capabilities are controlled by our STAR Mission System, which provides both day-and-night reconnaissance and fire-control capabilities, and the ability to acquire, monitor and track items of interest.
AC-235 light gunship. Credit: ATK
The AC-235 light gunship provides customers with an affordable, enhanced capability to conduct responsive defense, counterinsurgency, and border surveillance and security missions on customer-preferred platforms.
Capabilities:
Robust day/night ISR solution now available with precision-strike/close-air support capabilities
Ownship targeting and weapons employment provided via integrated targeting and fire-control systems
Off-board data links provide full-motion video to ground stations or other aircraft
Defensive countermeasures systems and ballistic protection standard
Night vision goggle (NVG) compatible
Adaptable to multiple platforms
Features:
Proven mission system: compact MPU, dual-color display, integrated fire-control system
EO/IR sensor with integrated laser designator and IMU
Fuselage-integrated weapons pylons support AGM-114M/K Missile and 70 mm rockets
Lightweight 30 mm M230LF
Synthetic aperture radar
AAR-47/ALE-47 defensive countermeasures system
Ballistic panels for cockpit and passenger protection
Line-of-sight (LOS) and beyond LOS tactical communications
With regard to the airframe and its ability to be configured for multiple missions, Airbus Defence and Space underscores the following:
The new generation C295 is the ideal aircraft for defence and civic missions to the benefit of society, such as humanitarian actions, homeland security, and environmental surveillance.
Thanks to its robustness and reliability, simple systems, and optimal cabin, this medium sized tactical airlifter provides wide versatility and flexibility, necessary for personnel, troop and bulky/palletized cargo transportation, casualty evacuation, communication and logistic duties, and air-dropping.
Its flexible design, long endurance and modern systems have made it an outstanding platform for a wide range of ISR roles including anti-submarine and ship warfare, airborne early warning, and maritime surveillance.
The C295 is part of Airbus Military’s family of light and medium airlifters, which also includes the smaller NC212i and CN235 platforms. In the fourth quarter of 2014 Airbus Military will introduce the C295W, featuring as standard winglets and higher engine power ratings, giving increased performance in all flight phases and lower fuel burn.
The current crisis in Iraq reminds one of the need to shape airpower transition strategies for allies seeking to build robust counter-insurgency capabilities.
We argued in a Joint Forces Quarterly piece earlier this year, that such an airpower transition in Afghanistan is crucial to mission success.
In the debate over the acquisition of the light-attack aircraft for Afghan forces, a key opportunity to shape a 21st-century option may be missed. A light-attack aircraft such as the Embraer Air Super Tucano, when combined with several other rugged air assets capable of being maintained in a variety of partner nations, could not only form a core capability crucial to the defense of the partnership nation, but also provide a solid baseline capability for a long-term working relationship with the United States or its allies.
The value of a counterinsurgency (COIN) aircraft versus a more advanced fighter can be lost when the issue is 21st-century higher end warfare. A rugged aircraft such as the Super Tucano can operate for longer periods at considerably less cost than advanced fighters. It can be configured with command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and links and can dialogue with forces on the ground.
Colonel Bill Buckey, USMC (Ret.), the deputy commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Airbase at Kandahar in 2009, explains:
One of the things that the special operations forces, who started the idea of the whole Imminent Fury piece, wanted was the ability to have a partner in that light attack platform; a TAC-A [tactical air commander–airborne] or supporting arms coordinator that would be above them in the air and who, if things got ugly, could then marshal in other aircraft. The guys sitting at Creech [Air Force Base, Nevada] can’t do that. . . .
The individual in the backseat of the aircraft is the one that’s going to be communicating to these jets who are still 30 minutes away—15 minutes away, an hour away—and giving them the target brief and the whole situational awareness piece of what’s going on while they ingress, which is something that your guy at Creech is not going to be able to do. . . .
But now that’s the tactical piece. The operational piece is back to the whole COIN environment. Again, [perhaps what] you’re trying to do in a COIN environment is drive your cost of doing business down as close as you can to the level of the other guy; right now, UAVs[unmanned aerial vehicles] ain’t cheap. . . .
You’ve got a tremendous logistics piece; you’ve got the sophisticated communications infrastructure required to fly them. You’ve got the whole piece back in [the continental United States] in order to operate them. Your cost of doing business is huge and you also have reliability issues. The accident rates are not great with UAVs right now. . . . And in terms of that ability to act as FAC-A [forward air controller–airborne], that’s something that you just can’t get with a UAV.
Even though the acquisition of such aircraft for U.S. forces is not on the table, their use by partners is already prevalent in many parts of the world. Partnerships with allies flying such aircraft provide interesting possibilities.
This is not just an abstraction but has been demonstrated by 12th U.S. Air Force working with the Dominican Republic air force. The 12th provides ISR support to other nations’ combat air capabilities. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the Dominican Republic air force have combined—with USSOUTHCOM providing an ISR input and the Dominican Republic flying the Super Tucano—the same planes that will be used by the Afghans.
This remarkable and replicable success is made possible by U.S. “hi” ISR technology in partnership with the Dominican Republic “lo” technology, the Super Tucano.
The opportunity to further evolve such a model of cooperation is being forged in the period of transition in Afghanistan.
The Air Force, NATO, and other allies have been working for many years to shape an unheralded airpower transition. The core idea has been to provide the Afghans with an integrated air force that can provide for their needs and be robust and easy to maintain, and then partner with this air force. That would allow the United States and its allies to leave a force behind that could provide mobile ground forces supported by correlated ground assets. This sound Western force package would then be able to work effectively with the core Afghan air force as well. A real transition could be forged, one still able to engage in effective combat against the Taliban.
The broad trajectory of change for the Afghan air force has been to move from a Russian-equipped force in disrepair to shaping a mixed fleet of aircraft able to support the various missions that the Afghans need: transport, ground support, counterinsurgency, inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), and strike.
The core fleet of aging Mi-35s and AN-32s will be replaced by a mixed fleet, along with capabilities to replace the battlefield lift provided by the Chinook heavy-lift helicopter.
Shaping the right fleet is crucial to shaping an effective training mission.
Putting a reliable and rugged and easily maintainable lift aircraft with the Super Tucano and the Mi-17 fleet along with Cessna trainers is the core force for the Afghan air force going forward. Interviews with American and French military operators in Afghanistan have hit hard on a key theme: airpower is central to today’s operations, and there is a clear need to arm the Afghan allies with a functional capability along the same lines. The Afghan military population has come to appreciate air support as a key element of future success and security (in particular, a Medevac ability being part of any operation).
As Major General Glenn Walters, USMC, commented when he returned from Afghanistan:
Our role will be to support the Afghan security forces.
You’re going to have to support those guys, and they’re going to be much more distributed. You’re not going to have the battalions out there that you support people on the FABs [forward air bases] have.
It’s going to have to be from a central location. And the QRF [quick reaction force] is going to have to be good, and it’s going to have to be there quickly. In the end, we have to be able to prove to the Afghan security forces that if something happens, this platoon is good enough until we get someone in there. . . . If you ever need more than a platoon’s worth of trigger pullers in a district center, the V-22s [Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft] is how you’re going to get there quickly and decisively enough to matter. . . .
The Afghan National Army and Afghan Security Forces understand, from their perspective, how important air is.
We have made them big consumers. They know that the air is there for them; they’ll go out and operate.
I’ve had more than one brigade commander tell me that if it wasn’t for the medevac, [if] it wasn’t for the resupply, and if it wasn’t for the aviation fires, he didn’t think he could get the battalions out operating like they do.
Because they’ve learned that if they get hurt, we’ll fix them. They know if they run out of bullets, we’ll get them bullets. And if they’re hungry or thirsty, we’ll get them food and water. . . .
As the U.S. looks forward to work with allies worldwide in the years to come on COIN and related operations, the U.S. will not be bringing the entire gamut of capability to the party.
Working with allies in current and projected financial conditions requires a new formula: the U.S. supports allies who can fend for themselves, up to a point.
Western powers are facing the endgame in Afghanistan. If the Afghans as a nation are going to work together to shape a COIN and defense strategy, airpower is a crucial lynchpin. Working together with an air-enabled Afghan force, Washington could continue to influence the necessary outcomes in the war against terror and at the same time pull out most of its troops. That would be a war-winning formula the Army might want to consider for its global future.
Bismarck famously observed that Europe as such represented merely a geographical notion, certainly not a unified political entity. The Western reaction to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea has again validated this acerbic insight.
And amid the absence of any Western or European unity the issue of the sale of the French Mistral to Russia looms large.
The French helicopter-carrier Mistral class ships are all-electric ships with a length overall of 199 meters and displacement of 21,300 tons. The Mistral’s concept combines a landing helicopter deck, a floating hospital, an amphibious assault ship can carry up to 16 heavy helicopters, more than a dozen tanks, and one third of a mechanized regiment, plus two hovercraft or four landing craft.
Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu and president Vladimir Putin at the Tsugol military testing site. Credit: Novosti.
It also could ideally serve as a command vessel. Furthermore, the Mistral class ship could serve as a very powerful anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter vessel to detect enemy submarines. Thus it can contribute to amphibious, ASW, and helicopter operations in any theater.[ref] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/mistral.htm[/ref]
The Mistral’s capabilities help explain why Moscow wants to buy up to 4 Mistral ships to learn how to produce those kinds of ships indigenously.
The key to the deal for Moscow has been acquisition of the technology for the construction of the basic ship for otherwise, its officials say, the deal would be meaningless.[ref] Marina Lipakova, “Russia Wants All Technology on French-built Mistrals,” www.defensenews.com, June 11, 2010; Roger McDermott, “French “Tin Cans” or Technology Transfer, Vysotsky on the Mistral?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 27, 2010[/ref] The Russians are arming the ship themselves and utilizing their own helicopters for the ship.
Russia has been seeking a Western supplier for an amphibious class ship at least since 2008. The Russians have discussed this possibility with many vendors, including Spain and France.
In 2008, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy said that had Russia possessed the Mistral it would have won its war against Georgia in “40 minutes instead of 26 hours”. One need only follow Russian military literature and exercises to see how important amphibious capabilities are for Moscow given that literature and Russian exercises’ significant emphasis on amphibious landing and counter-landing operations.
For example, Mikhail Tsypkin’s analysis of the Russian navy observes that:
A Mistral Class ship is a potent asset for operations in the post-Soviet space, enabling Russia to carry out amphibious landings and serving as an instrument of psychological pressure: this ship is large, and with its ability to project power on land, any small country would feel threatened if such a Russian ship, carrying naval infantry, tanks and helicopters appears in its vicinity during a crisis in relations with Russia.
Moreover, it could do something the Russian politicians craved in vain during the Kosovo war: send a visible signal of Russia’s strong displeasure with NATO and of its ability and willingness to help its friends. [ref] Mikhail Tsypkin, “The Challenge of Understanding the Russian Navy in Stephen Blank and Richard Weitz, Eds. The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2010, pp. 348-349[/ref]
Western observers have also underscored the increased attention, which the Russians are paying to amphibious capabilities. For example, the Swedish security analyst Bo Pelinas pointed out that in the Zapad 2009 exercises Russian forces conducted landings on an open coast, the value of Mistral for such operations being self-evident.[ref] Bo Pelinas, “Stockholm, SvD Online, in Swedish, December 1, 2009, Open Source Center, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia,(Henceforth, FBIS SOV), December 1, 2009[/ref]
But beyond that the Mistral class ship could serve as a very powerful anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter vessel as part of an overall effort to detect enemy submarines in the Baltic.
Fogh Rasmussen: ‘In the Russian military doctrine Nato is considered as an adversary, and I think we should take that seriously’ (Photo: nato.int)
It would not operate alone, as the Russians are looking at various ways to secure their energy resources, and to provide for a broad concept of security. For example, Russia intends to place sensors along the Nord Stream pipeline to detect submarines. So the pipeline is also part of a functioning ASW network.[ref] Stockholm, SR International, in English, January 5, 2010, FBIS SOV, January 5, 2010.[/ref]
Not surprisingly, then, since 2006 Russian military drills in the Baltic appear to be centered on the scenario of warding off threats to Nord Stream and its infrastructure and the Navy has announced that it will deploy if necessary to defend against terrorist attacks in the Baltic. [ref] “Military Drills Target Nord Stream,” www.upi.com, August 21, 2009; Ingmar Oldberg, “The Changing Military Importance of the Kaliningrad Region,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, XX, No. 3, 2009, p. 363.[/ref] Undoubtedly these exercises also involve ASW, not just defense against surface vessels.
The experience of these landing exercises, the renewed focus in Russian military literature on amphibious operations as well as the Nord Stream example, suggest that the Russianized Mistral would be an invaluable combat and C3I asset in amphibious landing operations in the Baltic against the Baltic States or in the Black Sea against Ukraine, Georgia, or in the Balkans.
Much depends upon how the Russians configure the ship and how they develop their concepts of operations once they obtain the ship and begin to shape a 21st century approach. It is not just about getting the ship; it is the ability to leverage the ship, with its automated capabilities, which allow the Russians to learn how to operate a much smaller crew for an amphibious ship as well.
The flexibility of an amphibious fleet integrated into the fleet provides a significant boost in Russian capabilities moving forward into the 21st century. Roles and missions in operations such as Noncombat Evacuation Operations in the Middle East (NEOs) or as manifestations of Russian gunboat diplomacy of which we have seen many examples in Syria and Cyprus are equally valuable. [ref] Stephen Blank, ”Russia Seeks Naval and Air Bases in Cyprus,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 17, 2013; Jean Christou, ”Greece and Russia Rally Behind Cyprus,” Cyprus Mail, October 2, 2011, http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/greece-and-russia-rally-behind-cyprus/20111002; “Turkey, Israel, Greece and Russia Mobilizing Over Cyprus,” www.Asianews.it, October 5, 2011; Moscow, Interfax, in Russian, in English, May 7, 2012, FBIS SOV, May 7, 2012.[/ref]
The Russian Mistral is getting ready to greet its Russian sailors soon in France. Credit Photo: AFP
At the same time in any of these theaters from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, the ASW mission is no less important. In the Baltic Sea, for example, the Nord Stream pipeline too will have attached sensors that will contribute to such an ASW operation.
Russia is proceeding to develop capabilities to pressure the Baltics behind its air, air defense, naval, cyber, and nuclear defenses to make it more difficult for allies and partners of the Baltic States to provide for direct defense.
Even if the objective is not a direct military occupation of the Baltics states, it is clear that military intimidation of local states and deterrence of NATO are part of the overall political strategy to effect a revision of the European status quo and neutralize these states’ effective sovereignty.
Whatever the logic of negotiating a deal with Russia in 2011, the strategic situation has changed dramatically. The seizure of Crimea has returned European direct defense to the table, and the Nordic states in NATO have clearly expressed not only their concern but increased resources for their direct defense and are concerned with Baltic sovereignty.
In 2011, France agreed to produce two Mistrals for Moscow with the participation of the Russian shipyards. It is anticipated that two others are to be built in Russia itself after the transfer of the shipbuilding technology to Russia.
France is also building the landing craft for the Mistrals that will go to Russia. [ref] Moscow, Interfax in English, June 4, 2014, FBIS SOV, June 4, 2014[/ref] The first two, the Vladivostok and the Sevastopol, are supposed to be ready for delivery later in 2014.
France is also building the landing craft for the Mistral, producing helicopter engines for sale to Russia, and is scheduled to host 400 Russian seamen to train on the Mistral.
However, from the start of the Franco-Russian negotiations in 2009 Western officials have pressured France to break off the negotiations, not to sign the contract, and more recently, due to the Ukrainian crisis, not to deliver the ships at all.[ref] Angela Charlton, “Energy, Culture on Tap for Medvedev Trip to France,” Associated Press, March 1, 2010. As viewed at: http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9975137; “Obama Warns France on Russia Mistral Deal.” BBC Online, June 5, 2014;; Moscow, RIA Novosti Online, in Russian, June 3, 2014, FBIS SOV, June 3, 2014; Isabelle Laserre, “No De-Escalation Over Mistrals,” Paris, Le Figaro, in French, June 5, 2014, FBIS SOV, June 5, 2014. [/ref]
But despite protests from the Baltic States, Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, the US Congress, President Obama, and Canadian member of Parliament Hugh Segal’s proposal to buy the ships earmarked for Russia to enforce sanctions upon Moscow, France has held firm, claiming that it cannot break the contract lest it incur serious losses of money and jobs for its naval construction firm STX at St. Nazaire.
And despite everything that has transpired since, President Francois Hollande has yet to reverse that policy.[ref] “Mistral Blows,” The Economist.com, May 17, 2014; Steve Daly, “French Amphibious Warfare Ships For Rusia? Economic Sanctions, Coincident Procurement Opportunities, and the Mistral Class LHDs,” Canadian-American Strategic Review, www.casr.ca, June 8, 2014; Jeff Lightfoot, “Commentary: NATO Should Buy the Mistrals,” www.defensenews.comMay 30, 2014; “Obama Warns France on Russia Mistral Deal,”; Billy House, “Senators Urge French to Scrap Warship Sales to Russia,” www.naitonaljournal.copJune 5, 2014.[/ref]
Neither will France abandon the project to sell Russia helicopter engines.[ref] Moscow, VPK: Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kuryer Online, in Russian, May 21, 2014, FBIS SOV, May 21, 2014.[/ref]
Meanwhile Moscow has expressed its belief that the project moves forward and is to send 400 seamen to France to train on using the Mistral. Indeed, If the contract goes through as planned based on the 2011 agreement, Putin has not ruled out placing more orders with France. [ref] Moscow, Interfax, in English, June 6, 2014, FBIS SOV, June 6, 2014.[/ref]
François Mitterrand’s famous 1983 speech before the Bundestag, Credit: French Government
This is a transparent threat and inducement to divide France from its allies. This is not surprising, for Putin as a German expert, watched carefully and participated in Russian policy in the Euro Missile crisis. And this crisis had at its core, the division of Europeans and between Europe and the United States.
Then French President Mitterrand firmly committed France to resist the Russian divide and conquer strategy. Indeed his speech in the Bundestag in 1983 was a major public statement rejecting Russian pressures.
And Mitterrand worked secretly with President Reagan in the Farewell Affair to shape a key effort to undercut the fruits of Russian efforts to steal technology from both the United States and Europe. Indeed, the Farwell Affairs is an often forgotten key nail in the coffin of the Soviet Union itself.
The Farewell dossier was the collection of documents that Colonel Vladimir Vetrov, a KGB defector (code-named “Farewell”), gathered and gave to the French DST in 1981–82, during the Cold War.
Vetrov was an engineer who had been assigned to evaluate information on Western hardware and software gathered by the “Line X” technical intelligence operation for Directorate T, the Soviet directorate for scientific and technical intelligence collection from the West. He became increasingly disillusioned with the Communist (Bolshevist) system and decided to work with the French at the end of 1980. Between the spring of 1981 and early 1982, Vetrov gave almost 4,000 secret documents to the DST, including the complete list of 250 Line X officers stationed under legal cover in embassies around the world.
As a consequence, Western nations undertook a mass expulsion of Soviet technology spies. The CIA also mounted a counter-intelligence operation that transferred modified hardware and software designs to the Soviets. Thomas Reed alleged this was the cause of a spectacular trans-Siberian pipeline disaster in 1982.
President Hollande, a leader of the same Party as President Mitterrand, might look back at these moments and reconsider. And when Mitterrand was President, France was not part of the integrated military command of NATO; now it is. And indeed holds the post for the NATO transformation commands.
It is not just about France, but the increased gaps which continuing this technology transfer to a resurgent Russia can do to Europe itself.
Northern Europe is a key part of the New Europe, and clearly focused on both Baltic security and Arctic development, safety, security and defense. The Mistral ships will be used for both Baltic and Arctic missions by the Russians, as the Russians are focused on ice hardening the hulls of the Mistral. The Russian Mistral is being optimized for Northern missions. Given the tensions within the Euro zone, setting in motion another set of tensions between those European states in the Euro zone and those who are not, is hardly a prescription for strengthening Europe’s role in the world, saying nothing of its impact on NATO.
For now the Germans are supporting France, stating that since Ukraine’s elections went off without obstruction, Germany is not ready or willing to impose “tier-three” sanctions on Russia that might include the Mistral.[ref] Andrew Reitman, ”Germany Backs France on Russia Warship Contract,” www.euobserver.com, June 5, 2014. [/ref] This unwillingness to impose new sanctions manifests itself despite the fact that Russia has dispatched at least 3-400 men from its forces into Ukraine along with tanks and anti-aircraft missiles, seized border posts to force open the supply route to its clients in Eastern Ukraine and continued to threaten Ukraine by declaring Yanukovych to have been the lawful president of Ukraine, accusing Ukraine of border violations continues to intervene against Ukrainian territorial integrity, and in the process of breaking its energy contract with Ukraine.
Thus the Mistral issue is fast becoming a prime exhibit of the disarray and lack of cohesion that now characterizes NATO and of the utter absence of any European unity on defense issues.
Russian tanks and soldiers storm a Ukrainian air force base in Belbek near the Crimean city of Sevastopol on March 22, 2014. (Viktor Drachev / AFP/Getty Images).
The Mistral controversy also shows that despite Moscow’s acts of war too many important lobbies: French defense industry, German businessmen involved with Russia and who depend on Russian gas, the City of London financial establishment, etc. all fear the loss of investment, trade, and job from antagonizing Russia more than they worry about European security.
This fear that antagonizing Russia, which, after all, is infinitely weaker than Europe, strengthens Russia at the expense of Europe. And this is occurring at the same time, as the Russians have clearly changed their deployment plans for the ships from Asia to Europe and have prioritized their interests in the near-abroad and in the Arctic.
Originally they were to be based at Vladivostok for deployment with Russia’s Pacific Fleet.[ref] Yoshinaki Sakagushi, “Briefing Memo, “Russia’s Military Reform and the Navy,” National Institute for Defense Studies News, Tokyo, January 2013, p. 2[/ref]
There were good reasons for placing the Mistrals in Asia. In 2011 Dmitry Gorenburg of the Center for Naval Analysis observed that Russian naval construction plan at that time did not aim at the U.S. but rather China. As of then the Pacific Fleet was to be the main fleet whose main mission is to defend against Chinese aggression although this may be billed for political purposes (as were Russian exercises then) as being against Japan. But a Japanese attack on Russia or the Kurile islands is almost inconceivable.[ref] Dmitry Gorenburg, “What Will the Navy Do with Its Ships,” www.russiamil.wordpress.com, January 31, 2011 [/ref]
While subsequent developments suggest a somewhat more anti-American orientation, e.g. upgrading Akula-Class nuclear attack submarines, those vessels are also usable against the Chinese Navy as well.[ref] “Mighty China Offers to Help,” www.strategypage.com, March 28, 2013.[/ref] At that time Admiral Viktor Chirkov, Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy, also announced that Moscow is considering forming permanent squadrons in both the Pacific and Indian Ocean, the two areas where China has demonstrated its naval power.[ref] Moscow, Ekho Moskvy Radio, in Russian, March 17, 2013, FBIS SOV, March 17, 2013.[/ref]
A Japanese assessment then also tied Russian naval exercises in the Pacific, including those with Japan in 2012 and 2013, to Russia’s heightened sense of concern over the Chinese naval threat. Therefore Russia was projected to deploy the first two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to the Pacific Fleet as well as Borei class SSBNs with nuclear weapons. These Russian exercises since 2011 also displayed greater ambition to conduct joint air, land, and sea operations. While this desire to conduct joint operations pervades the defense establishment and is recognized as an essential future capability, its prominence in the Pacific is worthy of note. [ref]Your footnote here[/ref]
But the context has changed since 2011.
We now see Russo-Chinese joint naval exercises, clearly targeted against the U.S. and Pacific Allies and partners lies and a deepening coalition or partnership between Moscow and Beijing.
By 2014, the focus for the deployments has shifted. The Russian Navy evidently wants to deploy the Mistrals, at least the first ones, in the Black Sea where they could threaten every littoral state in the Balkans, Ukraine, Turkey, and the Caucasus or then enter into the Mediterranean to join Moscow’s new Mediterranean Squadron.[ref] John C.K. Daly, “After Crimea: The Future of the Black Sea Fleet,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 22, 2014. [/ref]
In the Mediterranean they could conduct amphibious, ASW, and other operations throughout the Levant. This would be building upon previous examples of Russian gunboat diplomacy in Cyprus and Syria to deter Turkish or other Western efforts to counter Russia’s expansive Middle Eastern interests.[ref] John C.K. Daly, “After Crimea: The Future of the Black Sea Fleet,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 22, 2014. [/ref]
Not surprisingly this potential deployment of the first two ships and the potential for their subsequent deployment, or the deployment of the latter two ships in the Baltic Sea has aroused even more protests from Poland and the Baltic States and been met with significant concern from Northern Europe as well.
In short, the Mistral issue is not simply about a ship, but part of the shift in Russian strategy, which might have been anticipated in 2011, but is clearly evident now.
The question is what the successors to Mitterrand will do and will Western governments work with France to shape options to rebuff the Russians, and curtail their military modernization strategy at a time when the direct defense of Europe has returned to the front burner of European history.
Editor’s Note: This Is an Expanded and Revised Version of the Author’s Earlier Article, “Mistral Ship Sale to Russia Will Shipwreck EU,” Published in the Moscow Times, June 11, 2014
Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Washington based American Foreign Policy Council
For a paper on the Russian acquisition published in 2011 see the following:
September 9, 2001 was a beautiful fall day at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as the newly confirmed Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Honorable Michael Wynne prepared to address the Department of Defense Program Manager Community at the Defense Acquisition University.
Secretary Rumsfeld had introduced the audience to the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) – an operational concept that built upon speed, agility, and the U.S. comparative advantage in information technology. RMA included specific emphasis on immediately employable force options, pre-emptive capabilities, net-centric warfare, and focused joint logistics. The Secretary also launched his “War on Bureaucracy” to streamline Pentagon operations.
One benefit of RFID is the ability to track government equipment being used in theaters by contractors. Credit Image: Bigstock
Expanding upon the Secretary’s comments, Mr. Wynne approached the microphone to a hushed audience of program mangers awaiting guidance from their new boss.
“I hate logistics!” Wynne declared and then proceeded to outline the DoD’s $180B in annual logistics expense, 32 day customer response time, lack of visibility and agility, and $70B in inventory.
Wynne accurately and simply defined the limits that the current logistics structure would place on RMA.“I hate logistics!” Wynne repeated and chided the 300 program management audience to join him.
“I hate logistics!” the PMs joined in.
Mike’s logic was impeccable as he explained,
“Whether push or pull, our current logistics are reactive. At best, unless we embrace a new paradigm, we will be still depending on the Warfighters to tell (the logisticians) what they need, then trying to supply it as fast as they can. This amounts to an industrial age vendor struggling to satisfy an information age customer. Reactive logistics-the old logistics-will never be able to keep up with warfare as we know it.”
System of Systems Thinking
At the technical root of this amusing anecdote is the clarity of Mr. Wynne’s focus on developing and fielding critical national security capabilities as systems of systems.
Mr. Wynne accurately characterized a defense capability as both the technical performance AND the availability (sustainment) of that technical performance.
In his view, sustainment within DoD required a major overhaul along two major lines:
First, designing and developing defense systems that designed-out the logistics footprint (to enhance agility):
“We need to design ultra-reliability into the system… Why do we design stuff that’s going to break and need repair? Military capability is the ultimate purpose of the acquisition process, not creating logistics support. “
Second, modernizing the DoD logistics chain to emphasize outcomes and comprehensive asset management (building from best commercial practices)
“I want strategic deployability and mobility. When Geronimo showed up, he had firepower and mobility, not the wagon train. We had the wagon train, and we still do. We need to pester the requirements people and pester the engineers to bring us a reduced footprint.”
This engineering-based, system of systems view, differentiated Mr. Wynne both in strategic thought and in implementation.
“I want strategic deployability and mobility. When Geronimo showed up, he had firepower and mobility, not the wagon train. We had the wagon train, and we still do. We need to pester the requirements people and pester the engineers to bring us a reduced footprint.”
Logistics Innovator
Mr. Wynne led his OSD staff in working with the leadership of the Military Department to define a rigorous life cycle management process and modern logistics system. This collaborative leadership approach resulted in groundbreaking process, business model, and technology advances – simultaneous with executing Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Key advances include:
In August 2003, USD (AT&L) established targets for the percentage of contract dollars awarded using performance- based service agreements. The targets were FY 2003, 25 percent; FY 2004, 35 percent; and FY 2005, 50 percent and drove implementation of outcome based sustainment
In 2004, Department of Defense (DoD) officials initiated efforts to revitalize systems engineering practices in defense acquisition programs. Acting in his role as the Defense Acquisition Executive, Michael Wynne issued policy guidance that stressed the need “to drive good systems engineering practices back into the way we do business”
January 23, 2004 Memo from Acting USD, AT&L Michael Wynne – “PBL is the Department’s near-term strategy to increase weapon system readiness through integrated logistics chains and public/ private partnerships”. Wynne USD (AT&L) issues the 11 “guiding principles” for conducting a PBL business case analysis (BCA). This memo provided the first detailed guidance for conducting BCAs
November 17, 2004, Michael Wynne, approved release of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, that codified program manager life cycle responsibility and authority. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook was an interactive, web-based capability designed to provide the acquisition workforce with an instant on-line reference to best business practices as well as supporting policy, statute, and lessons learned
In 2003-2004 Mr. Wynne led DoD to issue two policy memorandums to modernize its logistics chain:
The Policy for Unique Identification of Tangible Items (UID), was published in July 2003
The Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Policy was published in July 2004
Bottom Line Results
The above efforts enabled Mr. Wynne to lead the DoD and its industry partners to “change the engines on the plane in midflight” – that is modernize their life cycle management practices while executing two major conflicts.
Specific outcomes include:
Re-vitalized engineering workforce in DoD and industry focused on complex systems engineering
Establish clear PM accountability for weapon system life cycle performance and cost
Implemented 200 major systems and subsystems supported by performance based sustainment strategies (PBL)
Achieve unprecedented system availability for major platforms supported by PBL strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan such as C-17, JSTARS, Stryker, F-18 E/F, B-2, and Common Ground Stations
Implement complete visibility into the strategic supply chain through use of RFID tagging
Enabled 25 million parts to be tracked/identified by IUID consistent with commercial standards, that is now being used to further increase reliability and avoid counterfeit parts
These accomplishments enabled DoD to provide superior support to deployed forces in 2 conflicts while driving costs out AND executing the largest humanitarian relief effort since the Berlin airlift.
Michael Wynne – The Logistics Innovator who hates logistics!
Editor’s Note: This is the second part of a series:
2014-06-16 We just released our latest Special Report.
European Defense, the Arctic and the Future: Highlighting Danish Perspectives
In this Special Report, Second Line of Defense looks at the evolving defense and security situation in the Baltics and in the Arctic. Russian actions in Crimea have returned direct defense to the European agenda, a fact not missed by the Northern European powers and the Baltic states.
Put bluntly, one Danish leader underscored:
The Ukraine situation has in fact put emphasis to our own region after having the luxury I would say for maybe ten or fifteen years to see security issues as largely being about national interests in a global setting such as in Afghanistan, Libya or wherever and now suddenly it is not as much a matter of national interest, it is actually a matter of national defense.
This report is divided into three parts in examining the dynamics of change in the region.
The first part is based on interviews conducted in Denmark in May 2014 and provides Danish perspectives on the evolving defense and security situation in their neighborhood.
The second part examines how the Crimean crisis is affecting broader global relations, and the direct defense of Europe, in particular.
The third part then focuses upon the Arctic opening and ways the developmental, safety and security dimensions intersect with Arctic defense.
Russian map making is having its impact on Northern Europe.
This report focuses on some aspects of that impact.
For the third year in a row, Russia and China conducted a major bilateral naval exercise last month, following the previous joint drills off the coast of Russia’s Far East in July 2013 and those in China’s Yellow Sea in April 2012.
The Russians called the maritime drills “Naval Interaction 2014,” whereas the Chinese referred to the drills as Joint Sea-2014.
Sources vary on the specific dates this year’s exercise formally began and ended. Various Chinese and Russian sources have reported the formal exercise as running from May 20 to 24, May 20 to 26, May 22 to 24, and May 22 to 25. The drills’ public location was also vaguely described as taking place in the “northern waters and aerial space of the East China Sea.”
Before sailing there, the Russian ships participating in the exercises first arrived at Usun naval base in Shanghai, where the drills were organized and from which both the Russian and Chinese forces departed for the staging grounds in the East China Sea.
Opening ceremony of the Russia-China Naval Interaction 2014 joint exercises. May 20, 2014. Credit: RIA, Novosti.
On May 19, 2014, officers and sailors of each navy toured each other’s ships in the port. Shanghai was also where Putin met with Xi on May 20 and 21, as both were in the city for the summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia.
The Russian naval squadron included six ships from the Russian Pacific Fleet. It was led by the guided-missile cruiser Varyag, capable of carrying 16 advanced SS-N-12 anti-ship missiles armed with nuclear warheads in a configuration designed primarily to destroy U.S. aircraft carriers.
The Russian contingent also included the fleet destroyer Bystry, the submarine warfare ship Admiral Panteleyev, the amphibious warship Admiral Nevelskoy, and two service vessels, the Ilim and Kalar (a tanker and a tug).
Russian Order of Battle
Slava Class Guided Missile Cruiser Varyag
Sovremenny Class Destroyer Bystry
Udaloy Class Anti-Submarine Destroyer Admiral Panteleyev
Large Landing Ship Project 775 Admiral Nevelskoy
Tanker Ilim
Tugboat Kalar
2-4 Kamov Ka-27PL helicopters (the six ships above collectively have the ability to transport up to 4, and Russia reported contributing Ka-27 “helicopters” suggesting more than one)
2 Su-30MK2 fighter planes
Host-country China made a somewhat larger contribution to the drills.
The participating Chinese vessels in the exercise included the latest-generation Russian-built destroyer Ningbo and the Chinese-built Type-052C Luyang II destroyer: The Zhengzhou is one of the most advanced combat vessels in the PLA’s East Sea Fleet. It can carry 48 HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles, which are based on the Russian-built S-300, to intercept enemy aircraft, as well as C-805 and YJ-62 missiles, capable of attacking enemy ships and land targets. China’s Su-30 fighters and JH-7 bombers provided air support for both fleets. In addition, J-10 fighters took part in the Russia-China exercises for the first time.
Chinese Order of Battle
Type 052 Guided-Missile Destroyer Harbin
Type 052C Guided-Missile Destroyer Zhengzhou
Type 956 Destroyer Ningbo
Type 054 Guided-Missile Frigate Yantai
Type 054 Guided-Missile Frigate Liuzhou
Type 903 Replenishment Ship Qiandaohu
An unspecified number of “new-type” missile boats (possibly 2), probably the Type 022 Houbei Class, the newest model of PLAN missile boat
2 submarines whose class has apparently not been released
2 to 4 Kamov Ka-28 and/or Harbin Z-9 helicopters (the 6 ships above collectively have the ability to transport up to 8 helicopters, typically of those two models, and the Kremlin has reported that it is contributing “helicopters,” suggesting at least 2, leaving China with 3 to 4 out of the 6 total)
7 planes of multiple classes which have apparently not been identified (Russia has reported a contribution of 2 planes, which would leave China with 7 out of the 9 total)
Although Russia and China each contributed six major ships to Naval Interaction 2014, the overall Russian contingent was smaller and played more of a support role.
Russia provided only three of the eight surface combatants (or less, if there were any Chinese missile boats), and none of the submarines, but did supply two of the exercises’ three support ships. Furthermore, while it probably furnished roughly half of the participating helicopters, it only accounted for two of the nine fixed-wing aircraft.
The larger contribution of the PLA Navy was likely simply a function of the exercises’ taking place off the Chinese coast and being based out of a Chinese city.
A naval squadron of Russia’s Pacific Fleet (PF), led by the guided missile cruiser Varyag, sets out from Vladivostok on Wednesday, May 14, to take part in the Russia-China Naval Interaction – 2014 exercises, held in the East China Sea. Credit Photo: RIA Novosti.
When Russia and China conducted their first joint naval exercises in 2012, the drills took place off China, and PLA Navy ships predominated. When the 2013 exercises took place near Vladivostok, the Russian Navy contribution was larger than that from China.
Whichever country hosts the exercises provides the bulk of their participants. If anything, Russia’s contribution this year is somewhat robust, compared to the last time China hosted the exercises in 2012, when the Chinese contingent was considerably larger than the Russian one.
The 2014 exercises consisted of a wide range of missions, including jointly identifying potentially hostile aircraft, combating submarines, providing joint air defense, escorting vessels, engaging in search-and-rescue missions, recapturing a seized ship, and intercepting missiles.
For example, Chinese and Russian ships conducted a drill to fight underwater “frogmen” and stop terrorists on speedboats. In addition, they rehearsed defending ships at anchorage by providing early warning against possible enemy attacks, evacuating the warships under attack, and countering the attack with kinetic and through electronic systems.
On May 24, 2014, the militaries conducted joint anti-submarine exercises. Both navies used live weapons in the drill, with eight ships firing main guns, high-speed guns, and rocket depth charges.
The official line is that the drills aim to improve the parties’ ability to conduct joint operations.
The Chinese Defense Ministry described their purpose as “to deepen practical cooperation between the [Chinese and Russian] militaries, to raise the[ir] ability to jointly deal with maritime security threats.” Chinese experts also state that joint defense can allow navies to cooperate more efficiently in coping with maritime security threats than trying to act unilaterally.
Some of these missions appear geared towards anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations of the type that the Chinese and Russian navies have been engaged in for years, primarily in the Gulf of Aden, though the two fleets do not cooperate closely with each other or the other navies on patrol there.
Chinese researchers note that protecting sea lanes is important for China, which relies heavily on maritime trade. Their May 23 anti-piracy drill occurred under the command of the Varyag, which ordered Special Forces to eliminate “pirates” on a “hijacked” ship. The simulated defense of ships at anchorage is also a skill needed to counter pirate attacks—though the Chinese may also want to remind observers that Imperial Japan also conducted such attacks.
But the exercise also saw much simulated ship-to-ship combat.
The Chinese and Russian forces split into two teams that simulated combat against one another, as they have in previous years, but unlike in previous years, they also formed three mixed groups, commanded by both Russian and Chinese commanders in both languages, that engaged one another, with the result that. Wang Chao, head of a coordinating team from the Chinese Navy, said that the mixed grouping would enhance naval coordination between the two countries.
By assuming responsibility for providing air cover to both fleets during the drills, the Chinese Air Force gained experience in controlling airspace through coordination of fighter and surface vessels. According to Li Jie, an expert at the PLA’s Naval Military Studies Research Institute, “the exercises [would] operate more like a real battle.”
Although NATO and other navies have engaged in joint drills with their alliance partners, this marks the first time that the PLA Navy has engaged in this kind of joint drill with a foreign country, leading to speculation, probably incorrect, that China and Russia are preparing for a possible military alliance.
Even so, Russian Vice-Admiral Alexander Fedotenkov, China and Russia are already beginning to “prepare for drills next year.”
The author would like to thank Emily Gulotta and Dylan Royce for their research assistance on this article.
