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For the third year in a row, Russia and China conducted a major bilateral naval exercise last month, following the previous joint drills off the coast of Russia’s Far East in July 2013 and those in China’s Yellow Sea in April 2012.
The Russians called the maritime drills “Naval Interaction 2014,” whereas the Chinese referred to the drills as Joint Sea-2014.
Sources vary on the specific dates this year’s exercise formally began and ended. Various Chinese and Russian sources have reported the formal exercise as running from May 20 to 24, May 20 to 26, May 22 to 24, and May 22 to 25. The drills’ public location was also vaguely described as taking place in the “northern waters and aerial space of the East China Sea.”
Before sailing there, the Russian ships participating in the exercises first arrived at Usun naval base in Shanghai, where the drills were organized and from which both the Russian and Chinese forces departed for the staging grounds in the East China Sea.
Opening ceremony of the Russia-China Naval Interaction 2014 joint exercises. May 20, 2014. Credit: RIA, Novosti.
On May 19, 2014, officers and sailors of each navy toured each other’s ships in the port. Shanghai was also where Putin met with Xi on May 20 and 21, as both were in the city for the summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia.
The Russian naval squadron included six ships from the Russian Pacific Fleet. It was led by the guided-missile cruiser Varyag, capable of carrying 16 advanced SS-N-12 anti-ship missiles armed with nuclear warheads in a configuration designed primarily to destroy U.S. aircraft carriers.
The Russian contingent also included the fleet destroyer Bystry, the submarine warfare ship Admiral Panteleyev, the amphibious warship Admiral Nevelskoy, and two service vessels, the Ilim and Kalar (a tanker and a tug).
Russian Order of Battle
Slava Class Guided Missile Cruiser Varyag
Sovremenny Class Destroyer Bystry
Udaloy Class Anti-Submarine Destroyer Admiral Panteleyev
Large Landing Ship Project 775 Admiral Nevelskoy
Tanker Ilim
Tugboat Kalar
2-4 Kamov Ka-27PL helicopters (the six ships above collectively have the ability to transport up to 4, and Russia reported contributing Ka-27 “helicopters” suggesting more than one)
2 Su-30MK2 fighter planes
Host-country China made a somewhat larger contribution to the drills.
The participating Chinese vessels in the exercise included the latest-generation Russian-built destroyer Ningbo and the Chinese-built Type-052C Luyang II destroyer: The Zhengzhou is one of the most advanced combat vessels in the PLA’s East Sea Fleet. It can carry 48 HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles, which are based on the Russian-built S-300, to intercept enemy aircraft, as well as C-805 and YJ-62 missiles, capable of attacking enemy ships and land targets. China’s Su-30 fighters and JH-7 bombers provided air support for both fleets. In addition, J-10 fighters took part in the Russia-China exercises for the first time.
Chinese Order of Battle
Type 052 Guided-Missile Destroyer Harbin
Type 052C Guided-Missile Destroyer Zhengzhou
Type 956 Destroyer Ningbo
Type 054 Guided-Missile Frigate Yantai
Type 054 Guided-Missile Frigate Liuzhou
Type 903 Replenishment Ship Qiandaohu
An unspecified number of “new-type” missile boats (possibly 2), probably the Type 022 Houbei Class, the newest model of PLAN missile boat
2 submarines whose class has apparently not been released
2 to 4 Kamov Ka-28 and/or Harbin Z-9 helicopters (the 6 ships above collectively have the ability to transport up to 8 helicopters, typically of those two models, and the Kremlin has reported that it is contributing “helicopters,” suggesting at least 2, leaving China with 3 to 4 out of the 6 total)
7 planes of multiple classes which have apparently not been identified (Russia has reported a contribution of 2 planes, which would leave China with 7 out of the 9 total)
Although Russia and China each contributed six major ships to Naval Interaction 2014, the overall Russian contingent was smaller and played more of a support role.
Russia provided only three of the eight surface combatants (or less, if there were any Chinese missile boats), and none of the submarines, but did supply two of the exercises’ three support ships. Furthermore, while it probably furnished roughly half of the participating helicopters, it only accounted for two of the nine fixed-wing aircraft.
The larger contribution of the PLA Navy was likely simply a function of the exercises’ taking place off the Chinese coast and being based out of a Chinese city.
A naval squadron of Russia’s Pacific Fleet (PF), led by the guided missile cruiser Varyag, sets out from Vladivostok on Wednesday, May 14, to take part in the Russia-China Naval Interaction – 2014 exercises, held in the East China Sea. Credit Photo: RIA Novosti.
When Russia and China conducted their first joint naval exercises in 2012, the drills took place off China, and PLA Navy ships predominated. When the 2013 exercises took place near Vladivostok, the Russian Navy contribution was larger than that from China.
Whichever country hosts the exercises provides the bulk of their participants. If anything, Russia’s contribution this year is somewhat robust, compared to the last time China hosted the exercises in 2012, when the Chinese contingent was considerably larger than the Russian one.
The 2014 exercises consisted of a wide range of missions, including jointly identifying potentially hostile aircraft, combating submarines, providing joint air defense, escorting vessels, engaging in search-and-rescue missions, recapturing a seized ship, and intercepting missiles.
For example, Chinese and Russian ships conducted a drill to fight underwater “frogmen” and stop terrorists on speedboats. In addition, they rehearsed defending ships at anchorage by providing early warning against possible enemy attacks, evacuating the warships under attack, and countering the attack with kinetic and through electronic systems.
On May 24, 2014, the militaries conducted joint anti-submarine exercises. Both navies used live weapons in the drill, with eight ships firing main guns, high-speed guns, and rocket depth charges.
The official line is that the drills aim to improve the parties’ ability to conduct joint operations.
The Chinese Defense Ministry described their purpose as “to deepen practical cooperation between the [Chinese and Russian] militaries, to raise the[ir] ability to jointly deal with maritime security threats.” Chinese experts also state that joint defense can allow navies to cooperate more efficiently in coping with maritime security threats than trying to act unilaterally.
Some of these missions appear geared towards anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations of the type that the Chinese and Russian navies have been engaged in for years, primarily in the Gulf of Aden, though the two fleets do not cooperate closely with each other or the other navies on patrol there.
Chinese researchers note that protecting sea lanes is important for China, which relies heavily on maritime trade. Their May 23 anti-piracy drill occurred under the command of the Varyag, which ordered Special Forces to eliminate “pirates” on a “hijacked” ship. The simulated defense of ships at anchorage is also a skill needed to counter pirate attacks—though the Chinese may also want to remind observers that Imperial Japan also conducted such attacks.
But the exercise also saw much simulated ship-to-ship combat.
The Chinese and Russian forces split into two teams that simulated combat against one another, as they have in previous years, but unlike in previous years, they also formed three mixed groups, commanded by both Russian and Chinese commanders in both languages, that engaged one another, with the result that. Wang Chao, head of a coordinating team from the Chinese Navy, said that the mixed grouping would enhance naval coordination between the two countries.
By assuming responsibility for providing air cover to both fleets during the drills, the Chinese Air Force gained experience in controlling airspace through coordination of fighter and surface vessels. According to Li Jie, an expert at the PLA’s Naval Military Studies Research Institute, “the exercises [would] operate more like a real battle.”
Although NATO and other navies have engaged in joint drills with their alliance partners, this marks the first time that the PLA Navy has engaged in this kind of joint drill with a foreign country, leading to speculation, probably incorrect, that China and Russia are preparing for a possible military alliance.
Even so, Russian Vice-Admiral Alexander Fedotenkov, China and Russia are already beginning to “prepare for drills next year.”
The author would like to thank Emily Gulotta and Dylan Royce for their research assistance on this article.
Inside the Beltway is a tough place to get real changes done.
And innovation within the confines of the Pentagon is notably challenging.
This decade will see significant innovation generated by the strategic and combat challenges facing American and allied forces and the introduction of several new systems, ranging from the F-35, to new combat cloud capabilities, to new ships like the USS America and the USS Ford, which will not operate like their predecessors.
And yet much of this innovation will not be recognized by the Inside the Beltway crowd until it actually has happened.
Wynne with the CO of the 33rd Fighter Wing, September 2013. Credit Second Line of Defense
The Osprey is a classic example where the long period of ridicule, and derision became a cottage industry which dominated any consideration of what the emergence tiltrotar enabled ground forces could do in a dangerous world.
Now that it has, the cottage industry has moved on to other new systems, failing to learn the core lesson — why not focus on change which can occur as innovations PULL the force forward?
This was never Wynne’s problem: he always looks for how the force can be continually transformed by realistic innovations.
In fact, a key reality is what we came to call the Wynne Doctrine.
The Mission of the US Military is to dominate the foe, first with deterrence, and then, with the dominant, “unfair” fight.
The Wynne Doctrine, after SECAF21 Michael W. Wynne: “If you are ever in a fair fight, senior leaders have failed you.”
“If you are in a fair fight, someone has failed to shape the force we needed.”
This means that technology needs to be combined with platforms and systems by forces with battle hardened and well trained concepts of operations to prevail.
And in order to do this, the Department clearly needs to have leaders who recognize the possibilities and set in motion the processes of inevitable change but with the clear goal of strategic dominance.
If DOD is in a holding pattern when it comes to combat dominance, the war has already been lost.
Secretary Wynne sitting in the F-35 cockpit at Eglin AFB, September 2013. Credit Photo: SLD
Secretary Wynne as a leader in the military, industry and in government has been and continues to be clearly one of those leaders.
Late last year, Ed Timperlake and I travelled with Secretary Wynne to visit the 33rd Fighter Wing to provide Wynne with the opportunity to meet the pilots and maintainers for the F-35.
Given his commitment to the changes associated with what Lt. General (Retired) Deptula refers to as the non-F fighter – namely a flying combat system and not simply an iteration in sequential fighter numbers – it was gratifying to watch the interaction with the maintainers and pilots of a new fifth generation fighter with the man who invented the term.
And especially enjoyable was bringing Lt. Col. Berke, the only qualified F-22 and F-35 pilot in the world, together with the man who created the billet in the Air Force for him to become an F-22 pilot.
Many people have read the discussion between the two and the video at the top has been viewed and downloaded by tens of thousands of readers on Second Line of Defense.
But what is not generally realized, unless you experienced it, the Wynne leadership style and the need to continue it in order to have real innovation rather than cosmetic change.
If Wynne were a professor, his colleagues at his 80th birthday might write a book honoring the professor.
He is neither 80 nor a professor but we are proceeding along these lines anyway.
What this series will be about is writing our equivalent.
I have asked those who have worked with Wynne to provide insights with regard to the man and his work, and how his leadership facilitated their own ability to innovate.
Unleashing the power of effective, realistic and critical innovations requires leadership and implementors.
I have asked some of those who have worked with Wynne and have unleashed innovation to write pieces, which will provide some insight into the Wynne legacy of fostering innovation for strategic dominance.
The first piece is by Louis Kratz, the well-regarded and well known expert on logistics.
Kratz worked for Wynne when Wynne was Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics).
2014-06-15 The Saudis brought an air combat package from Saudi Arabia to this year’s Red Flag 2014 which represented a step change in capability.
The Saudi F-15s came to the United States to train in one of the premier air combat training exercises in the world, Red Flag.
A Saudi A330 MRTT being delivered at Getafe in Spain earlier this year. (Airbus Defence & Space)
They self-deployed as a unit: supported by two of their new tankers.
According to an Airbus Military press release:
Two A330 MRTTs were used to enable the deployment from Saudi Arabia to Nellis AFB in the USA on a three-leg journey of some 9,000nm (16,600km). After three weeks of highly realistic combat training in the USA, the fighters were returned home by the same means.
Staging through Moron AFB in Spain, and McGuire AFB in the USA, the A330 MRTT demonstrated its ability to support long-range oceanic deployments through the type’s first ever transatlantic deployment of fighters.
The two tankers were operated by the RSAF’s first combat-ready tranche of boom-qualified crews (pilots, air refuelling operators, mission operators) who successfully offloaded around a million pounds of fuel through the fly-by-wire boom during the mission despite challenging weather and light conditions.
Using the advanced planning systems of the MRTT, the crews were able to ensure complete safety of their respective formations through detailed real-time monitoring of the fuel state and diversion points of all the aircraft.
Airbus Defence and Space has been working with the RSAF since October last year to support the RSAF in the definition and accomplishment of the associated logistics – providing additional flight training, delivering spare Flyaway Kits and deploying technical specialists to the Main Operating Base as well as to fly on the missions. Philippe Galland said: “It was enormously satisfying to play our role in supporting this complex mission. “We greatly admire the RSAF’s accomplishment of this major deployment at a relatively early stage in their operation of the A330 MRTT.”
With the Middle East in flux, training for air combat is hardly an idle exercise.
Saudi F-15 Red Flag 12. Credit: USAF
And Red Flag is as good as it gets for realistic combat training.
RED FLAG provides realistic combat training in a contested, degraded and operationally limited environment.
Red Flag is a realistic combat training exercise involving the air forces of the United States and its allies, and is conducted on the vast bombing and gunnery ranges of the 2.9M-acre Nevada Test and Training Range.
This provides pilots with real-time war scenarios and helps their ground crews also test their readiness capabilities.
Gen. Robert Dixon, then commander of Tactical Air Command, established RED FLAG in 1975 to better prepare Airmen for combat missions. The concept of RED FLAG was developed by Maj. Moody Suter to simulate the first 10 combat missions pilots would face.
RED FLAG has expanded over time to incorporate all spectrums of warfare to include command and control, real-time intelligence, analysis and exploitation, and electronic warfare. Night missions have also been added to each exercise.
More than 30 countries have participated directly in a RED FLAG exercise with other nations as observers.
More than 440,000 service members participated in RED FLAG since 1975, including more than 145,000 aircrew members flying more than 385,000 sorties and logging more than 660,000 flight hours.
Recently, the Aussies have demonstrated the RAAF’s longer legs based on the use of their new Airbus tanker as well.
In an interview conducted at the tanker base in Australia with Squadron Leader Chetan Takalkar, Executive Officer of the No. 33 Squadron, the self-deployment capability for the RAAF enabled by the new tanker was highlighted.
I am departing tomorrow to support a trans-Pacific deployment of our Hornets.
We’ll meet our fighters just off the West Coast of America and then transit to Hawaii and thence Guam.
Then they’ll move from Guam back to Australia, all done in a matter of days For us, the KC-30 is a significant increase in capability and this deployment is an excellent demonstration of RAAF airpower.
Tanking can facilitate self deployment, but can lead to sustained operational capabilities as well.
The A330 MRTT tanker as a fleet provides the possibility for a network of flying air support systems engaged for a long time in an operational setting.
Much depends on how these assets become configured.
With the fuel carried in the wings, the large deck of the A330 can be used to host a variety of air support capabilities: routers, sensors, communication nodes, etc.
Such a configuration along with the fuel re-supply capabilities of the A330 tanker makes this a flying air operational support asset.
If the model selected is similar to the model down selected initially by the USAF, it is refuelable in flight.
With the space available in the aircraft – again because of the fact that the fuel for refueling is carried in the wings – a crew rest area can be provided.
This means that the air tankers can stay aloft for a significant period of time as the refuelers are themselves refueled.
This in turn means that the refueling aircraft as a fleet can have a strategic impact.
Once the planes are airborne and they have access to refuelers for their own operational autonomy, the fleet can tank a variety of national or coalition partners operating from dispersed or diverse airfields.
And the discretion possible airborne can allow nations to tank a variety of coalition partners, some of whom might not be favorite candidates if seen on the ground.
Nowhere is this more important than in areas with very constricted geography.
And the GCC states operate with very little strategic depth nation by nation.
On the eve of the 100th Anniversary of the beginning of World War I, there is a word describing German Army doctrine employed in their advance into neutral Belgium that resonates to this day: “Schrecklichkeit”.
The word means “terror” or “frightfulness” a doctrine employed by the advancing German Army to subdue any opposition:
German army doctrine in force at the time called for such reprisals to be performed immediately and severely in any case of civilian resistance.
Press reporting coming out of Iraq read like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has, much like the Khmer Rouge taken the concept of Schrecklichkeit to an entirely new level of fanatical viciousness against all their enemies.
There will be a lot of posturing from both left and right on what created this advancing army of death loving fanatics. Both camps will have some with very strong positions that the U.S. has done enough so the concept of never fight harder for something that those directly affected are willing to fight comes into play.
For those Americans who think we have a global moral obligation, or as the Obama Administration called it when triggering Odyssey Dawn, “the responsibility to protect” (R2P) there are various military options for Iraq.
Currently, it appears airpower maybe employed to some significant effect in stopping the ISIS in advancing any further into Iraq. American airpower is a long way from our total war WWII strategic bombing raids, which created huge firestorms that killed many civilians.
ISIS Convoy in Iraq as Pictured by ISIS twitter lead.
However, sadly the issue of innocents being killed from the air is still with us today.
The ISIS are current truly world-class bad guys, as fanatical as the Khmer Rouge and their Killing Fields. They are using the brutality of the horror of psychological terror as a weapon to their advantage in their 21st Century way of war. This is just like Khmers and WWI and WWII German Army.
US airpower cannot only level the fight but can tip the balance but there is a significant PR factor always in play.
The US has developed a real sensitivity for killing innocents and avoiding collateral damage, it is a very sincere doctrine that probably cost some US and allied troops their lives by withholding an air attack because of lack of intelligence with complete assurance innocents will not be killed.
The book and movie “Lone Survivor” makes our current way of modern war very clear. The SEALs at the cost of their own life spared Afghan goat herders.
These bad guys know as bombs fall and precision cruise missiles are launched many in the world press will pounce on “what does difference does it make” by having one’s head cut off vice an innocent Iraqi being vaporized in a bomb explosion, which especially in the fog of war will happen.
So accuracy is everything.
A powerful headline announces an air campaign can begin literally overnight:
U.S. Aircraft Could Strike Iraq Tomorrow
That’s why a number of retired high-ranking U.S. Air Force officers, including Lt. Gen. David Deptula, who served as the Air Force’s first deputy chief of staff for intelligence, say any strikes, if ordered, could begin almost immediately.
If you can provide me with the appropriate intelligence we can start doing (air strikes) within 24 hours,” he told The Daily Beast.
“There are a variety of means do this, whether you are talking about long-range, high-payload aircraft or smaller aircraft. With the requisite intelligence information you can start again in 24 hours.
Separating the evil from the innocent in Iraq will be a real challenge.
Hence, the critical importance that Lt. General Deptula places on “appropriate intelligence” which is the key dimension to using airpower to effectively stop a murderous rampage.
President Obama has dictated no troops on the ground as a principle; consequently the current reported state-of-play is that England is considering putting in their famed SAS on the ground.
In London, William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, said Britain was considering its options.
While also ruling out direct intervention by troops, he said Britain was “looking urgently at other ways to help”. He proposed “counter-terrorism expertise”, which would mean advisers from British Special Forces such as the SAS and intelligence agencies.
Eyes on marking targets by trained Special Forces will always help mitigate collateral damage.
And it has been done in the past in Iraqi operations by the British as well as the United States.
With respect to US “boots on the ground” President Obama better be very careful with his wishful posturing because there is one combat problem that might be developing that needs airpower supplemented by troops on the ground:
If US and allied nationals are cut off by known killers regardless of current statements coming out of the White House, the world may soon see the horror of beheading of our innocents.
This would never be forgotten nor forgiven.
So the faster air strikes occur is a very good thing on moral and geopolitical grounds.
But “no boots on the ground” may fade quickly if American and allied citizens are being in danger of being overrun.
There are about 5,000 American contractors remaining in the increasingly dangerous country, including a team that was bailed out Thursday from a base in Balad, an hour north of the threatened capital, Baghdad.
A call to “land the landing force” of a Marine ARG-MEU specifically, the 22nd MEU on the USS Bataan, is a US combat force that can save lives. Combine a Marine battalion, an MV-22 enabled force with combat air cover from the USS George Bush and it will be truly a lifesaving force.
If the ISIS wants to take on a USN/USMC Air Ground team then those who advance will cease to exist.
2014-06-13 The USS America is going to sea mid-July 2014.
During a visit to the ship on June 12, 2014, Captain Hall, the CO of LHA-6, discussed the ship and its contribution.
Leadership of LHA-6. Credit: Second Line of Defense
A key way to look at the ship is to understand that it is the first large deck amphibious ship designed to support 21st century USMC aviation and integrated Ground Combat Element innovation.
As such, it is a 21st century assault ship, and able to operate as the lead ship in an assault or presence operation.
The USMC is the only tiltrotar-enabled assault force in the world; and the USS America has been designed to support such a capability and to prepare for the introduction of the F-35B as a key element for doing 21st century style presence and assault operations.
A key way to understand the ship is that the flight deck is of the same size as LHA’s before it.
But the next two decks are very different.
The hangar deck immediately below the flight allows maintenance to be done out of the weather and to prepare aircraft for flight deck, to enhance operational tempo.
Given the ship is going to operate in the Pacific, this is no small change!
And directly below the hangar deck is the intermediate area, which has been designed to support the two decks directly above it.
The USS America as seen from the park across from the shipyard. Credit: Second Line of Defense
There are four aviation elevators capable of carrying 12,000-pound loads; and passageways designed for pallet-sized loads, to enable standard pallets to be moved around the ship; and the work areas are very large for maintenance and operations.
The ship is designed for a very different ops tempo than earlier LHAs and to be able be able to operate much further from the shore to engage in amphibious assault.
The ship can operate with its long-range aviation assets to influence events much further than the Navy-Marine Corps team could operate before.
And the fleet contribution of the LHA-6 will be significant in others ways.
The Osprey is at the heart of modern USMC assault operations; the USN in acquiring Ospreys for their large deck carriers can leverage the at sea repair and maintenance facilities aboard the USS America class of ships as well.
The ship carries more than twice the fuel of a traditional LHA, which allows it support, its self and its ARG-MEU group more effectively; has fuel available to support ashore operations for embarked Marines or to support forces ashore working in humanitarian or disaster relief operations.
In this video slice from the interview, Captain Hall focuses on the support aspects of the ship.
The full interview will be published in the near future.
The ship plus the aircraft provide a very different environment within which the USN-USMC team will build out innovation across the spectrum of operations, but able to operate at greater distance away for objectives areas.
There is a “lot of synergy here,” added Captain Hall.
As the Middle East moves further from an Arab Spring congenial to Western interests, the tinderbox returns.
In the tinder box, one rarely gets to choose the folks one likes; one has to work with whomever one can to achieve one’s strategic interests.
It is not about likeability; it is about strategic success.
When there was the chance to negotiate an agreement with the Iraqis to leave a residual force able to execute air strikes working with Iraqi forces, the difficulties with the Malki government, based largely on how unlikeable this chap truly is, meant that no status of forces agreement was reached.
What could have been done is not a termination to the mission but a significant transition in the mission where the air component of power could evolve in Iraq under US and/or Western influence.
(We wrote a series in 2010, which looked at the prospects of Iraq withdrawal and considered the options, and those articles can be found at the end of this article.)
This was not done, so when the moment came when the insurgents (who are even more unlikeable) started ripping through Iraqi forces, there was no ready set way to strike the insurgents.
One could note that the French in Mali used air strikes without hesitation when going after the insurgents in order to restore enough order on the ground to help the Mali government.
When using airpower, time is of the essence to ensure effectiveness; waiting until the insurgents have grabbed the centers of power makes it a full blown operation or nothing.
Iraqi Developments
One of our colleagues provided this report received earlier this week from an American in Iraq about the situation seen from is vantage point in the country.
The last two days I got stuck on the main road between Kirkuk and Baghdad due to car bombs and gun fights in Kirkuk province.
I had no choice but to come back to Erbil last night. As of yesterday, Mosul province is under total control of Sunni armed group called Daish
Over 50 thousand (4 divisions) of Iraqi army and IP forces that were in charge of protecting and defending Mosul province, threw their guns and changes their uniforms with civilian clothes and ran away from fighting Daish forces that entered Mosul city yesterday.
Now, Daish armed forces are fighting to take over big cites in Salaheldin, Kurkik and Diyala provinces.
PM Maliki asked the Parliament to prove his request for “emergency law” all over Iraq as of tomorrow.
Yesterday, Jabar Yawar the minister of Peshmerga in Kurdistan called all 13 peshmerga brigades to report to their posts of duty. Peshmerga forces surrounded Kurdistan provinces to prevent any attacks.
Iraqis in general are hoping and calling for the immediate present of American soldiers in Iraq because they lost trust and hope in IA & IP forces. Iraqis are blaming President Obama for pulling American soldiers from Iraq and leaving Iraqis under the mercy of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the armed groups they support.
It is a big bloody mess….
According to a recent New York Times report, the Iraqi government had earlier requested from the White House airpower support.
As the threat from Sunni militants in western Iraq escalated last month, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki secretly asked the Obama administration to consider carrying out airstrikes against extremist staging areas, according to Iraqi and American officials.
But Iraq’s appeals for a military response have so far been rebuffed by the White House, which has been reluctant to open a new chapter in a conflict that President Obama has insisted was over when the United States withdrew the last of its forces from Iraq in 2011.
Iraq is Not a Solitary Issue
Not only could airpower make a difference, Iraq is part of the Tinder Box.
Rather than the piecemeal, one issue at a time Middle East policy being followed by the West, it is crucial to think about the region as a whole.
And please stop the PLO versus Israeli interpretation of what is going on. That is so 20th century!
Western governments are following an a la carte policy in the Middle East policy, pursuing whatever is the easiest and lowest hanging issue; for dealing with hard issues takes time effort, and money and creates cultural tensions.
Ostriches, not Eagles seem to be resident in the Middle East, at least from the Western side.
Turkey is facing Syria and Iran; Iraq is facing Iran and Syria, the Egyptians are being affected by Muslim fundamentalist threats (yes they are a military government but….) and the Israelis are dealing with chaos.
It would be interesting to know if the White House consulted Turkey with regard to Iraq because spill over from either Syria or Iraq is an Article V contingency for NATO.
This means that the Crimean seizure and Iraqi implosions are indirectly affecting NATO’s direct defense and security interests, even before we get to a broader policy question of Middle Eastern developments.
The Direct Impact on Afghanistan
And then there is the DIRECT impact on Afghanistan.
The benediction to the Afghan withdrawal has had a giant question mark over it.
I doubt telling the Afghans that our withdrawal will end up just like Iraq falls into the domain of policy reassurance.
Earlier this year, we argued for shaping a transition not a termination policy for Afghanistan, which would highlight airpower transition.
The events in Iraq have only reinforced our perspective that such a transition is indispensable.
We published our argument in the journal Joint Force’s quarterly in January 2014 and we underscored the following:
In the debate over the acquisition of the light-attack aircraft for Afghan forces, a key opportunity to shape a 21st-century option may be missed. A light-attack aircraft such as the Embraer Air Super Tucano, when combined with several other rugged air assets capable of being maintained in a variety of partner nations, could not only form a core capability crucial to the defense of the partnership nation, but also provide a solid baseline capability for a long-term working relationship with the United States or its allies.
The value of a counterinsurgency (COIN) aircraft versus a more advanced fighter can be lost when the issue is 21st-century higher end warfare. A rugged aircraft such as the Super Tucano can operate for longer periods at considerably less cost than advanced fighters. It can be configured with command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and links and can dialogue with forces on the ground.
Colonel Bill Buckey, USMC (Ret.), the deputy commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Airbase at Kandahar in 2009, explains:
One of the things that the special operations forces, who started the idea of the whole Imminent Fury piece, wanted was the ability to have a partner in that light attack platform; a TAC-A [tactical air commander–airborne] or supporting arms coordinator that would be above them in the air and who, if things got ugly, could then marshal in other aircraft. The guys sitting at Creech [Air Force Base, Nevada] can’t do that. . . . The individual in the backseat of the aircraft is the one that’s going to be communicating to these jets who are still 30 minutes away—15 minutes away, an hour away—and giving them the target brief and the whole situational awareness piece of what’s going on while they ingress, which is something that your guy at Creech is not going to be able to do. . . . But now that’s the tactical piece. The operational piece is back to the whole COIN environment.
Again, [perhaps what] you’re trying to do in a COIN environment is drive your cost of doing business down as close as you can to the level of the other guy; right now, UAVs[unmanned aerial vehicles] ain’t cheap. . . . You’ve got a tremendous logistics piece; you’ve got the sophisticated communications infrastructure required to fly them. You’ve got the whole piece back in [the continental United States] in order to operate them. Your cost of doing business is huge and you also have reliability issues. The accident rates are not great with UAVs right now. . . . And in terms of that ability to act as FAC-A [forward air controller–airborne], that’s something that you just can’t get with a UAV.
Even though the acquisition of such aircraft for U.S. forces is not on the table, their use by partners is already prevalent in many parts of the world.
Partnerships with allies flying such aircraft provide interesting possibilities.
This is not just an abstraction but has been demonstrated by 12th U.S. Air Force working with the Dominican Republic air force. The 12th provides ISR support to other nations’ combat air capabilities. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the Dominican Republic air force have combined—with USSOUTHCOM providing an ISR input and the Dominican Republic flying the Super Tucano—the same planes that will be used by the Afghans.
This remarkable and replicable success is made possible by U.S. “hi” ISR technology in partnership with the Dominican Republic “lo” technology, the Super Tucano.
The opportunity to further evolve such a model of cooperation is being forged in the period of transition in Afghanistan. The Air Force, NATO, and other allies have been working for many years to shape an unheralded airpower transition. The core idea has been to provide the Afghans with an integrated air force that can provide for their needs and be robust and easy to maintain, and then partner with this air force.
That would allow the United States and its allies to leave a force behind that could provide mobile ground forces supported by correlated ground assets. This sound Western force package would then be able to work effectively with the core Afghan air force as well. A real transition could be forged, one still able to engage in effective combat against the Taliban.
The broad trajectory of change for the Afghan air force has been to move from a Russian-equipped force in disrepair to shaping a mixed fleet of aircraft able to support the various missions that the Afghans need: transport, ground support, counterinsurgency, inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), and strike. The core fleet of aging Mi-35s and AN-32s will be replaced by a mixed fleet, along with capabilities to replace the battlefield lift provided by the Chinook heavy-lift helicopter.
Shaping the right fleet is crucial to shaping an effective training mission. Putting a reliable and rugged and easily maintainable lift aircraft with the Super Tucano and the Mi-17 fleet along with Cessna trainers is the core force for the Afghan air force going forward. Interviews with American and French military operators in Afghanistan have hit hard on a key theme: airpower is central to today’s operations, and there is a clear need to arm the Afghan allies with a functional capability along the same lines. The Afghan military population has come to appreciate air support as a key element of future success and security (in particular, a Medevac ability being part of any operation).
As Major General Glenn Walters, USMC, commented when he returned from Afghanistan:
Our role will be to support the Afghan security forces. You’re going to have to support those guys, and they’re going to be much more distributed. You’re not going to have the battalions out there that you support people on the FABs [forward air bases] have. It’s going to have to be from a central location. And the QRF [quick reaction force] is going to have to be good, and it’s going to have to be there quickly. In the end, we have to be able to prove to the Afghan security forces that if something happens, this platoon is good enough until we get someone in there. . . . If you ever need more than a platoon’s worth of trigger pullers in a district center, the V-22s [Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft] is how you’re going to get there quickly and decisively enough to matter. . . . The Afghan National Army and Afghan Security Forces understand, from their perspective, how important air is. We have made them big consumers. They know that the air is there for them; they’ll go out and operate. I’ve had more than one brigade commander tell me that if it wasn’t for the medevac, [if] it wasn’t for the resupply, and if it wasn’t for the aviation fires, he didn’t think he could get the battalions out operating like they do. Because they’ve learned that if they get hurt, we’ll fix them. They know if they run out of bullets, we’ll get them bullets. And if they’re hungry or thirsty, we’ll get them food and water. . . .
As the U.S. looks forward to work with allies worldwide in the years to come on COIN and related operations, the U.S. will not be bringing the entire gamut of capability to the party. Working with allies in current and projected financial conditions requires a new formula: the U.S. supports allies who can fend for themselves, up to a point.
Western powers are facing the endgame in Afghanistan. If the Afghans as a nation are going to work together to shape a COIN and defense strategy, airpower is a crucial lynchpin. Working together with an air-enabled Afghan force, Washington could continue to influence the necessary outcomes in the war against terror and at the same time pull out most of its troops. That would be a war-winning formula the Army might want to consider for its global future.
Is it Worse to be an Enemy than an Ally of the United States in an Unpopular War?
Beyond the crucial policy issues of American credibility as an ally, there are moral issues as well.
With Iraq and Afghanistan in quick succession perhaps demonstrating that working with US and Western forces is a ticket to death than to stability in one’s country, the lesson will be learned for the period ahead and have broader consequences for US policy.
On the heals of NSA determining who is friend or ally, coupled with yet another failure to anticipate a crisis, the performance in reinforcing allies in “stability operations” will become part of the threat environment facing the United States.
Ed Timperlake wrote some time ago about his fears with regard to moral abandonment based on his own experience during the Vietnamese War.
Since we are getting ready to drawdown in Iraq and to leave Afghanistan, what about those villagers and people in enclaves that trust us? A MEU is a 9/11 force in readiness that can make sure that we can demonstrate that we have not forgotten the Vietnam result or the Cambodian Holocaust.
Insertion of an offshore MEU to defend a village or evacuate threatened allies to safe havens is a lasting debt. And this obligation becomes part of our staying power in a region, which will remain central to the U.S. even after significant removal of ground forces. The MEU allows us to have available a combat blocking force on the ground as an enemy begins to mass and concentrate forces and have a lift as necessary to relocate them to safe havens.
A MEU backed by a Carrier Battle Group (CBG) can easily bring enough firepower and Marines on the ground and lift so innocents are not massacred. This debt of honor backed by an ever ready Navy/Marines afloat and AF Air Power on station can and should last as a key element of the regional calculation.
The next Congress should view a strong and agile military power projection force of a MEU, CBG and expeditionary USAF assets as a legacy force for good. U.S. power projection in the Gulf can and will save lives and demonstrate the presence of tools to support friendly forces and elements in the region.
If not, we would see once gain an old cliché coming into play: even worse than being America’s enemy is being our ally in an unpopular war.
And as Mike Wynne commented in 2010as part of our Iraq 2012 series:
Already, the thinking part of Iraq is asking the US: ‘Don’t put Iraq in the rear view mirror’.
Since they really mean watch over us, as we have in the past, this has implications to our aging and shrinking Air and Naval deterrent capability.
With our seeming blindness to deterrent capability while we pursue ‘balance and the current war we are in’ could prove costly in the multi-polar era we are entering.
One continues to hope for ‘Peace in our time’, but what we have seen work for the past peaceful period, is ‘Speak softly; but carry a Big Stick’.
For the Iraq 2012 series published in 2010 see the following:
Airbus Defence and Space is still hopeful South Africa will buy A400M strategic transport aircraft and is promoting it and the C295 light transport to the South African Air Force (SAAF).
According to Antonio Rodriguez-Barberan, Vice President Commercial at Airbus Military, the company is “absolutely interested” in offering the A400M as a replacement for the SAAF’s C-130 Hercules, which are due to be retired in 2020.
“We want to be back in South Africa. Yes, there is a need for maritime patrol and a certain need for tactical and strategic transport
He told defenceWeb Airbus is keeping its work packages with Denel and Aerosud in place not just because they do a good job manufacturing A400M components but because Airbus is hoping for an order from South Africa.
Ghanian C-295. Credit: Airbus Defence
Airbus kept South Africa’s A400M workshare in place even after the government cancelled an order for eight A400Ms in 2009. Denel and Aerosud manufacture parts for the A400M, including the wing to fuselage fairing and other large components.
Barberan said South Africa has a need for an aircraft like the A400M, especially since its diplomatic and regional ambitions require it to move cargo and equipment to places like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for peacekeeping missions or to places like Sudan for humanitarian missions. Rather than chartering aircraft like the An-124 and Il-76, an A400M could fly supplies directly to where needed most, even if only an unprepared airstrip is available.
He said the A400M was not competing on price but on capability terms. Barberan estimated South Africa would need four A400Ms as a first step to establishing a modern airlift facility.
The first export production slots for the A400M will become available in 2017 and it will be around three years after an order is placed that aircraft could be delivered so if South Africa is to retire the C-130 in 2020, it needs to make a decision within the next few years.
Barberan said he hoped to have an A400M export customer by the end of this year. Airbus began actively promoting the aircraft for export last year and hopes to sell between 300 and 400 on the export market over the next 30 years, capturing a 50% market share.
Airbus is also promoting the CN235/C295 to the SAAF to meet its maritime surveillance requirements. The company brought out a C295 in 2012, which was demonstrated to the local air force.
However, Barberan could not say when the SAAF might place an order for a new maritime surveillance platform, especially as funding is problematic.
His company is aiming to sell the maritime patrol variant to South Africa, which features sensors such as a radar and electro-optical pods as well as a roll on/roll off mission suite that would allow the aircraft to be used purely in the cargo role as well.
Guy Martin is in Spain as a guest of Airbus Defence and Space.
Reprinted with permission of our partner defenceWeb.
2014-06-09 Our new strategic partner, the Centre for Military Studies, Department of Political Science of the University of Copenhagen, published two pieces earlier this year addressing the question of the potential role of large unmanned aerial vehicles for Danish security and defense forces in the years ahead.
The reports provided an especially useful look at evaluating the actual performance of larger UAVs seen from the perspective of a smaller ally who needs to be concerned with both effectiveness of anything they buy and value proposition.
The reports shed important insights on both aspects: effectiveness and the value of larger UAVs. It is not a question of smaller UAVs, which the Danes have been using since 1958; it is a question of Predator or Global Hawk class drones.
Although Denmark is a small country, its forces are expeditionary in character. And when the Kingdom of Denmark is considered, the ISR and C2 coverage is a significant challenge as well.
Denmark’s territory is 16,639 sq. miles (43,094 km²). But the Kingdom of Denmark is of a different character entirely: 2,210,579 km² or 853,509 sq. miles.
And with the Arctic opening, ISR and C2 over a vast area is a significant consideration for the Danes. And the area in question is largely a maritime domain with little land-based infrastructure to provide ISR and C2 compensation for what can be generated from air, sea and space.
Clearly one issue to be sorted out is how Denmark which is responsible for security and defense for the Kingdom is going to pay the costs for such as the Arctic opens. Clearly, money needs to be generated from the various commercial ventures in the region and the increased revenue, which the Faroe Islands and Greenland will receive.
An illustration of one Global Hawk UAV refueling another (Credit Photo: Kent Rump, LA Times)
The reports take a hard look at the actual cost and performance of Predators and Global Hawks to determine their relevance to Denmark of procuring and operating a similar capability on their own. The authors of the reports do not buy into UAV-mania whereby unmanned is the future of airpower; rather they look at how large UAVs actually have fit into the kinds of operations Denmark needs to do.
The reports underscore that large UAVs are costly, manpower intensive to operate (notably when data exploitation is added in), crash at a significantly higher rate than manned assets, require significant training of the forces to use the UAVs, and have been successfully largely because they have operated in an air dominance environment.
The Danish experience with the Sagem UAV was also a benchmark for how not to acquire UAVs. The experience led Denmark to sell their systems to the Canadians, and to exit from the French provided assets. A main reason for the failure was buying a developmental system, but also significantly underestimating the importance of a trained cadre of UAV operators and users.
But what about UAVs for Denmark’s Arctic mission?
The problem here is the question of the durability of UAVs in such a harsh environment.
The conclusion is pretty clear-cut: Buying and operating large UAVs does not make a lot of sense for Denmark.
But working in a coalition is a better alternative.
Denmark is now participating in the NATO AGS system, and the authors of the report recommend leveraging this experience. There is also a clear interest in shaping a coalition consortium where data could be leased from Global Hawks, e.g.
Lt. General (Retired) Deptula, a major force in US ISR innovation, has argued for some time that the U.S. needs to shape a coalition enabled data sharing and leasing strategy. This way the costs of the platforms are amortized across a coalition without any individual coalition partner having to pay up front for the UAV.
The report is really about UAVs, but another consideration for the Danes might be looking at a package of ISR and C2 assets within which UAVs might operate.
Leasing assets from space such as with the RADARSAT, leveraging the ISR and C2 capabilities of the F-35 (if Denmark procures the aircraft), augmenting patrol craft capabilities, such as roll-on-roll off ISR and C2 packages on their C-130s, and leveraging a Nordic or Arctic coalition set of UAVs might make a lot of sense for Denmark.
The reports can be found here on the Centre for Military Studies website:
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are being integrated into the military forces of Western states, including Denmark. How should the Danish government proceed when considering investments in UAVs? Although airpower and UAVs have substantially shaped the Western paradigm for the use of force, the American, British, French, and Danish experiences highlight difficulties developing, acquiring, and operating UAVs. The Danish government should consider the tasks that UAVs are best-suited to perform, the costs associated with the entire UAV system, and the operational, doctrinal, and other challenges that must be addressed to integrate UAV capabilities into the Danish armed forces.
These are not trivial considerations.
Larger UAVs are very complex systems with which the Danish armed forces have limited experience, and introducing radically new technology always comes with substantial risks. Should Denmark decide to procure larger unmanned systems, such as Reapers or Global Hawks, it should cooperate with Allies to purchase, operate, and integrate these capabilities as smoothly as possible and mitigate these risks.
It should also establish a joint unit dedicated to house, train, educate, and operate UAVs within the armed forces, cooperate with domestic agencies that may desire the information that UAVs can provide, and consider shaping the domestic and international regulatory environment that will constrain UAV use for the foreseeable future.
An MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle launches for a night flight mission over southeastern Iraq, July 29, 2009. The aircraft serves in a surveillance and reconnaissance role but is also capable of firing two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles (Credit: 407th Expeditionary Group Public Affairs, 8/15/09)
The key recommendations of the report for Denmark is as follows:
Preparing for a Decision
• Stand-up a dedicated UAV-unit in Danish Defence Command—perhaps dovetailing the “Future Fighter Aircraft” team, to consider the role of unmanned systems in Danish airpower.
• Maintain or increase participation (in terms of personnel) in NATO’s AGS system as it becomes operational to expand the Danish knowledge base.
• Follow UK and NATO attempts at certifying systems for wider use in civilian airspace to facilitate their peacetime and dual-use roles.
• Actively support efforts by national and international aviation authorities to establish solid regulations for the use of UAVs in civilian airspace.
• Engage potential partners for procurement and/or operations early and informally, but in detail.
• Piggyback to the widest possible extent on experiences and lessons of comparable partners and allies already operating UAVs.
• Considering modularity—more potential configurations—means more kinds of missions. This is currently how the manned Challenger system works. But modularity also incurs higher expenses and system risk.
• Continue tests and experiments—both in the Arctic and non-Arctic parts of the Kingdom—and involve potential partners in these to create the basis for discussing future joint requirements.
• Software and sensor-packages are crucial for the capability a system will be able to deliver. These are equally expensive and can account for a substantial part of the price of a system.
In Deciding
• Have a clear definition of tasks and consolidated concepts of operations ready.
• Ensure a clear command structure for procuring, certifying, manning, and operating the system.
• Engage other government agencies. UAVs can produce data for many potential users.
• Will Danish UAVs only be a military capability? With expected regulative changes, civilian governmental demand will rise, and with that also the potential for sharing expenses.
• Continue to seek partners and work for synchronicity in when and what to procure, even if it might mean compromising on system requirements or the defence planning process.
In Initial Operations
• Contemplate whether, for an initial start-up period, operations should be conducted from an experienced Allied user’s facilities to reduce risk and increase everyday access to knowledge and expertise (as the UK has done).
• Trained personnel, infrastructure, and organization must be in place and be robust at an early stage.
The report has a number of good insights: we are highlighting some of those insights below:
UAVs are costly:
By 2009, for instance, “more than a third of … Predator spy planes … [had] crashed.”30 Accident rates have been high for the entire US UAV fleet.
The Air Force in a 15-year period through Sept. 30 [2012] recorded 129 accidents involving its medium- and high-altitude drones: the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk. The figures include accidents that resulted in at least $500,000 in damage or destroyed aircraft during missions around the globe.
When compared to manned aircraft in the USAF fleet, Northrop’s Global Hawk and General Atomics’s Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles have had a combined 9.31 accidents for every 100,000 hours of flying. That’s the highest rate of any category of aircraft and more than triple the fleet-wide average of 3.03, according to military data compiled by Bloomberg…..
As these systems mature, their mishap rates will likely decline, but it is unlikely they will ever reach the level of comparable manned aircraft.
Why did Denmark fail in its efforts to integrate the SAGEM UAV?
There are several reasons for this highly publicized failure.
First, the system was still at a developmental stage, and very few operational experiences existed. The manufacturer, Sagem, had not completed its own system integration at the time. This led to high failure rates in many parts of the system and a critical lack of spare parts, which the producer could not meet.
Both issues increased the risks associated with the system, which were compounded by how the system was integrated and operated. First, the project was organized with unclear lines of communication and responsibility, which made decision-making and oversight complicated.
Secondly, it proved very difficult to recruit, train, and maintain a sufficient number of qualified personnel to operate the system. Accordingly, the unit responsible for operating Tårnfalken was never fully manned and lacked qualified personnel.75
There are several reasons for this, one being that the Army was responsible for defining the structure and number of positions in the unit, whereas the Air Force was responsible for recruiting and hiring personnel. Thus, no single command was solely responsible for properly manning the unit.
Because of the unreliable system, the aircraft would often be grounded due to technical failures, which disrupted the training and certification of the unit. At other times, the aircraft would be airworthy, but there would be no qualified staff available to operate it—again making it difficult to certify the system for operational use. The lack of skilled personnel and high numbers of accidents created a vicious circle, multiplying the significance of both problems.
In sum, a very complex and accident-ridden aircraft without sufficient service agreements and reliable spare-parts deliveries combined with a shortage of qualified staff and a complex project organization with unclear responsibility rendered it difficult to reach operational status. Together with the financial costs, this led to the ultimate termination of the project.
In analyzing the project, Rigsrevionen (The Danish Government Auditors), concluded that the Danish defence forces did not fully appreciate the complexity of operating an advanced UAV system or the resources and personnel required to operate it.
Operational Realities are Specific
UAVs have only recently matured as a military capability—and then only for the first mover (the United States), a nation that has spent over six decades working on the problem of integrating various advanced technologies into working systems.
Still, they have not been designed with longevity in mind.
As noted in the history of UAV use by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Denmark, UAVs are far more prone to accidents, equipment failure, communications glitches, and hostile fire than most manned aircraft—even when controlling for the maturity of the platform in its development cycle.
Aeronautical engineering can be complicated, and removing the man from the cockpit also removes the ability to instantaneously assess and adjust to environmental conditions and malfunctions.
These craft operate best in ideal conditions: fair weather that is neither too hot nor too cold, nor too windy, and where there is no enemy fire attempting to destroy it.
It must be accepted that when conditions are not ideal, UAVs will currently be lost at a rate that is disproportionate to that of manned aircraft performing the same sorts of missions.
The Utility of UAVs for Denmark
For all of the current types of international military operations undertaken by Danish armed forces, the ISR capabilities provided by UAVs are an important asset provided either indigenously or by allies; and that the capability provided by additional UAV systems would present a significant additional operational asset for the Danish armed forces…..
In addition to its international tasks, the Danish armed forces conduct a number of national operations. The 2013–2017 Defence Agreement mentions surveillance, the enforcement of Danish sovereignty, and search-and-rescue operations as significant. In addition to these tasks, the Danish military conducts a number of civilian tasks in cooperation with other government agencies.109
Significantly, and with increasing importance, these national operations include the Arctic region in the Danish Realm. Whereas the tasks are largely the same, the conditions in the Arctic and non-Arctic regions in the Danish Realm differ radically. The potential requirements for UAVs to be used in Denmark or in the Arctic therefore differ.
The relatively small Danish territory means that sea, air, and land are relatively well-monitored via air and naval presence as well as satellite and radar coverage. In turn, this makes it possible for stand-by naval and air assets to counter potential violations of Danish territory or sovereignty. These functions could be strengthened by introducing a range of UAVs to enhance situational awareness over Danish territory and supplement existing capabilities. Important to bear in mind, however, is that the current unmanned systems primarily provide ISR. A UAV therefore cannot enforce Danish sovereignty in the same manner as a manned navy or air asset.
Another important task for the Danish Navy and Air Force is search and rescue. The increased situational awareness provided by UAVs can be employed to search for ships and/or persons in distress on water and land. As with anti-piracy operations, UAV use in combination with ships and helicopters would increase capacity. The persistence of UAVs would also enable search operations of a longer duration and a wider geographic area. Their presence could help reduce response times and get personnel to the right location faster when coordinated with manned rescue platforms.
Depending on the system and number of platforms, unmanned systems can maintain a continuous, 24/7 operational presence. Combined with their sophisticated surveillance capabilities, this also makes them well suited to support other government agencies with broader responsibilities for public safety, security, and environmental protection. In case of an emergency in Denmark, UAVs could significantly supplement existing monitoring capabilities. Moreover, they can be used to monitor suspected polluters, smugglers, and other forms of unlawful or unwanted activity.
Numerous systems could increase the capability of Danish national operations. In October 2013, for instance, the Italian Air Force deployed its Reapers to the Mediterranean to increase its search and rescue capabilities in response to the loss of life of migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe.110 A comparable system would increase Danish capabilities—but so too would a smaller, perhaps ship-launched, tactical system.
In the Arctic territories in the Danish realm, the Danish armed forces face very similar tasks but under very different circumstances. The Danish territory in the Arctic covers vast distances, which are imbued with very little physical infrastructure (civilian or military), very fragile, often not non-existing, communication facilities, and harsh environmental conditions.
Therefore, while there is a significant and widely acknowledged current and future demand for increased ISR capabilities in the Arctic, the region presents other and more significant challenges to the employment of unmanned systems than operations in the non-Arctic part of Danish territory.
First, a UAV system to be used in the Arctic would need to be able to overcome the challenges associated with the harsh climate, meaning a system able to cope with high winds and possessing a well-developed de-icing system. Many smaller systems are slow and built for a temperate climate, making them vulnerable to both wind and temperature.
This, secondly, makes it logical to consider a larger MALE or HALE system. One such system is the US Global Hawk, which the Canadian Forces have experimented with for Arctic operations.
Given its longer range, such a system would also make sense with respect to the vast territory. A larger system, on the other hand, requires substantial physical infrastructure and is expensive to procure and costly to maintain.
Thirdly, large long-range UAV systems are over-the-horizon systems, and operating them therefore requires satellite coverage with substantial bandwidth. Establishing such communications architecture, especially for real-time data transmission, requires substantial investments.
Real Costs and Personnel Demands
Should Denmark decide to acquire a MALE system like the Reaper or a strategic HALE UAV like the Global Hawk to patrol Arctic regions, it is important also to consider the issues of manpower, pricing, logistics, and organization.
UAVs may be “unmanned,” but they are manpower-intensive systems. For example, manning five Global Hawk airframes would require approximately 500 personnel.121 NATO’s organization for operating its AGS-system—also based on the Global Hawk—is approximately 600 people. Consequently, and based on a rough calculation, operating three HALE UAV units—the number of air frames Canada deemed necessary to be able to patrol Canadian territory 24/7—would require roughly 280 personnel.
While requiring fewer personnel to operate than a Global Hawk, a MALE tactical UAV such as the Reaper would also be manpower-intensive, especially if it is to provide continuous coverage.
Moreover, it is also necessary to consider the operational differences between the two systems. A Reaper would need to deploy (including ground-station crew and so forth) to Greenland in order to operate there, leaving it vulnerable to the local weather. A Global Hawk, on the other hand, could fly from Denmark (or other locations) and remain above hard weather. Furthermore, it covers substantially more ground, thus providing more coverage per airframe. Additionally, the systems are expensive both in acquisition and operating costs.
Determining the actual costs of such systems is inherently difficult. However, to name a couple of examples, France expects to pay $874,000,000 for 12 Reaper UAVs, the Dutch are in the process of acquiring four Reapers at a cost of “up to” €250,000,000, and a House of Commons report has referred to the cost of procuring and operating UK UAVs in Afghanistan from 2007 until December 2011 as amounting to £729,000,000…
It is important to note that approximately one-third of the staff needed is involved with processing the data produced by the system. These are highly trained personnel, and they must be recruited, educated, and trained before the system can be put to use….
It does not require a lot of personnel to fly and operate UAVs. It is the supporting personnel—and especially those needed for the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of data for intelligence—that increases requirements.
Exploitation of the data captured by the UAV is, after all, the primary purpose of acquiring them. Drawing again from the lessons associated with Tårnfalken, where the lack of highly specialized and well-trained personnel was deemed pivotal to the ultimate failure of the system,this underlines the pivotal significance of establishing a well-functioning, well-educated, and robust organization for operating the system.
