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During my recent visit to Denmark, I had a chance to discuss the Arctic challenge with a Danish naval officer with many years of Arctic experience.
Rear Admiral (Retired) Henrik Kudsk has 41 years of experience in the Danish Navy with much of that in the Arctic, including being the commander at one time of the Greenland-based Danish forces.
Question: How important is Arctic experience to understanding the Arctic challenge?
Rear Admiral Kudsk speaking at his time of departure for Commander of the Greenland Command in the Fall of 2012.
Kudsk: It is very important because of how unique the terrain actually is. In many parts of the world, one can forget how dominant nature is in reality; you cannot forget that a single day in the Arctic.
In the Arctic your mentality changes because you know that nature sets conditions, in quite a different way for normal Western life.
Operations are challenging as well. When you sail your ship, when you fly an aircraft, there are times in which you have to apply power.
You have to push forward. Whereas, other conditions, if you do that, even a small mistake will kill you.
With several years of operational experience, you can become attuned to how best to survive and persist in the Arctic.
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus speaks with Royal Danish Navy Rear Adm. Henrik Kudsk, Island Commander of Greenland, aboard the Royal Danish Navy arctic patrol vessel HDMS Ejnar Mikkelsen. USN Media Content Services, 10/10/10
Question: What is the challenge for the Danish Navy to operate in the Arctic?
Kudsk: Our presence is 365 days a year. That means a ship up there will meet the monster wave, will meet the perfect storm. You will experience both.
Also, you will have the very beautiful nature. You will have the sunny day in the high Arctic, but also you have extreme weather that exceeds hurricane force winds, with deep chilling temperatures that will exceed what you’re experiencing in temperate parts of the world.
If you’re not prepared, and if you’re equipment is not designed to operate in the Arctic, you’ll flounder.
I can give an example of the design aspect.
For instance, our patrol frigates weigh around 3,500-4,000 tons; helicopter carrying, and looks like a frigate. They are double-crewed: they swap the crew, like an A and B team.
We fly people up to a relevant harbor and then swap crew every 2nd or 3rd month.
For the daily work, you will need Coast Guard-type equipment. You have a relatively small crew for the size of the ship as well.
The other point is that our ships are geared low.
They have a lot of power, relative to their size. They are more like a Jeep than a Ferrari. That means that our ships up there have a maximum speed of around 20-21 knots and they are the fastest ships you can employ in the Arctic.
Our ships are designed to propel in even the most severe weather. They can propel through ice and ice-filled areas as well.
Question: What is the most basic need to operate in the Arctic in the decade ahead as the Arctic opening proceeds?
Kudsk: Clearly, the most basic need is to build out ISR and, in effect, build out a communications and sensor grid to provide for the kind domain awareness most central to development, safety and security in the region.
And this is doable, because compared to other regions; there is significantly less traffic and human habitation. This makes it easier to identify the anomalies and threats, which need to be monitored.
You have a pristine environment up there where human activity is relatively visible, when compared to the rest of the world, where you can disappear in a crowd. But you still need systems, which can help you, see over vast distances and in difficult communications conditions.
The crew of Coast Guard Cutter Tiger Shark, home-ported in Newport, R.I., pulls alongside the Vaedderen, a Royal Danish Naval ship, in Cape Cod Bay, Mass., March 26, 2008. The Tiger Shark hosted the Royal Danish Navy for a damage control exercise as part of a two-day exercise to enhance teamwork between the Coast Guard and Royal Danish Navy. USCG District 1, 10/21/07
For example, I believe that leasing capability from the Canadian Radarsat system might make sense for Denmark as we build out the grid, which we will need to operate in the region as it opens up.
There are major challenges for communication systems in the region as well.
Today, most systems are designed to operate always on and always connected. This is impossible in the Arctic where you have only windows where you can communicate, not a constant capability to do so.
Question: We have had agreement by the Arctic five about working together to deal with the Arctic opening. The Russians are key member of the Arctic council, and how do you see the way ahead in shaping operative collaboration?
Kudsk: The key is to push collaboration down to the operational level and to get the safety and security capabilities of the key players in the region able to work together. This requires exercises as well as enhancing ability to share data and communications as well.
It also has to be remembered that the Artic is not Antarctica. Antarctica is a land mass and can be divided up as such.
The Arctic is dominated by the sea and requires cross-national cooperation in providing for the safety and security required as the Arctic opens up.
The Russians are the largest stakeholders in the Arctic with roughly 50% of the known resources under their control; obviously, cooperation with the Russians is part of the way ahead.
Editor’s Note: This command brief dating from 2012 provides a good overview of how the world looks from Greenland, seen by a commander in charge of the security and defense of Greenland.
The book provides a number of key elements whereby one can puzzle over the approaches which the Russians are pursuing in the High North as well as to shape an understanding of what one might call the “policy culture” which will shape Russian approaches.
The author looks at the dynamics of cooperation which are crucial to success in the region and which encourages the Russians towards a cooperative policy agenda. But at the same time, the Russians are pursuing a Russian-centric policy of inclusion of the Arctic in a nationalist agenda.
The author suggests that the Russians are pursuing two differing Arctic strategies.
The first one “focuses on a “security first” reading of the region while the second is a “cooperation first” policy shaped by Russian economic interests.
“The Arctic could see the emergence of a new Russia, or a resurgence of the old” (page 202).
This hydra-headed approach to shaping its Arctic policy is at the heart of what one might call the “policy cultural” approach which the Russians bring to the Arctic mission.
Each of the five key players in the Arctic which have control over 80% of the known Arctic resources brings a different “policy cultural” approach to the Arctic opening.
And conflicts are inevitable given these different perspectives.
Co-operation is also inevitable given the nature of the Arctic environment and the nature of the Arctic opening as discussed in an earlier piece.
Prime Minister Putin Addressing the Arctic Forum in Moscow, 2010 (Credit: SLD)
But the words “co-operation” and “sovereignty” or “national interest” do not all have the same meaning for Americans, Canadians, Danes, Norwegians or Russians.
And the question of forging a consensus in the midst of diverse understandings of the proper mix of approaches is a key aspect of the challenge in managing Arctic safety, security and defense.
The Russian “policy culture” with regard to the Arctic clearly is rooted in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the return of Russia. It is part of Putin’s reassertion of the role of Russia in the world, the most recent manifestation of which has been the incorporation of Crimea and the expansion of Russian energy resources.
The Russian state’s renewed interest in the Arctic is also part of a larger context – the reassertion of patriotism as a tool fostering political legitimacy….From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, the return to a great power status materializes via Russia’s reassertion of its role in the international arena, and via the revival of sectors that classically define a great power, such as the military-industry complex, in particular aviation and the navy. This Soviet style “great power” model goes hand-in-hand with the domestic legitimacy strategies put in place by Putin since the start of the 2000s. (p. 9)
The author also highlights the Russian effort to shape a brand with the Arctic context. “The creation of this Arctic brand is part of a more general reflection on the question of nation-building. In Russia the general feeling is that formerly the Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation, has systematically lost the information war….The Russian official narrative (with regard to the Arctic) has evolved toward a celebration of the Arctic region as a space of international cooperation. (p. 13).
A good manifestation of this was seen in 2010 with the Russian sponsorship of the international arctic forum. Caroline Mükusch attended the forum and highlighted the nature of the Russian branding effort.
The International Arctic Forum was Russia’s first high-level international platform for scientific discussion, expert exchange of opinion and issuing recommendations on the Arctic region. Russia held this international Arctic event of such high level to set up the stage for further engagement.
Although the Arctic ecosystems have undergone enormous change in recent years due to the effects of climate change and anthropogenic activity, which are the main threats to the region’s sustainable development, Sergei Shoigu, Emergency Situations Minister and President of the Russian Geographical Society, emphasized that the Arctic is and will remain a “zone of peace and cooperation.”
According to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin peace and cooperation are proven crucial in the race for Arctic resources. He underlined: “We think it is imperative to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation”.
Also clear from the Forum, that Russian territorial claims in the Arctic underscore their legitimate role in shaping the Arctic future. Russia builds its territory claim over the Arctic on the following key arguments:
Russia is a northern country. Seventy percent of its territory is located in northern latitudes.
History and geography posed the challenge of developing these territories before our people.
Russia has played a leading role in charting the Northern Sea Route also founded the Arctic icebreaker fleet, polar aviation and created an entire network of stationary and drifting stations in the Arctic.
And, finally, Russia has gained the unique experience of building major cities and industrial facilities above the Arctic Circle.
Russian speakers made clear some Russian priorities in the Arctic, notably the development of the Yamal Peninsula, the Shtokman deposit in the Barents Sea, the northern sector of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the Yakutia and at hundreds of other production and infrastructure facilities in the region.
Russia’s top priorities in the Arctic as articulated at the Forum include:
The creation of top-quality, comfortable living conditions for local people and the pursuit of a frugal attitude towards the indigenous and small Arctic nations’ socio-economic infrastructure and traditions;
The support for new economic-growth points and incentives for large-scale domestic and foreign investment – currently about 20 percent of Russia’s GDP and 22 percent of Russian exports are produced in the Arctic;
Substantial investment in the scientific and nature-conservation infrastructure.
Russian speakers underscored that Russia, as one of the claimants, is responsible for the sustainable development of the Arctic. The Arctic will become a major source of energy resources and a key global transport hub in the next 50 years…..
Putin declared in his speech to the Forum that he was in no doubt whatsoever that the existing problems of the Arctic, including those of the continental shelf, can be resolved in a spirit of partnership, through negotiations, on the basis of existing international legal norms. Russia will prove its claims with the required scientific data.
Clearly, this “branding” effort of Russia the collaborative and cooperative reflects some fundamental underlying realities, namely the need for significant cooperation for the development and security of the Arctic. And Russian efforts to do so are real and part of the fabric of the Arctic opening.
At the same time, the “policy culture” is not defined by the collaborative dynamic: it is part of the more nationalistic dynamic. A key element of this nationalistic dynamic is that rooted in the demographic pressures in Russia, the declining numbers and the significance of the Arctic region to what many Russians believe is a key element of a nationalistic revival.
In an interesting section of the book entitled “The Nationalist Reading of the Arctic: Russia’s New Lebensraum,” the author underscores a core aspect of current Russian thinking, with deep roots in the Russian past. Russian authors have also highlighted the “lost” Alaskan and Californian territories and the “idea of a former Russian Empire stretching from Finland to California fuels nationalist resentment, focused as it is on the importance of geography in the assertion of Russian great power” (page 42).
There is a strong “white” racial element of the narrative as well, as the Russians with the largest Arctic population (3/4 of the total) and this population are Russians, not indigenous people. There is also a strong statement of concern about the “yellow peril” from China to Siberia as well.
Whereas Russia was withdrawing into itself territorially for the first time in a millennium, the Arctic seems to revive an expansive, and no longer retractive, vision of the country: a potential new space is opening up to it.
This reading of the Arctic is particularly operative in military circles, which see this region as being Russia’s most important “reserve of space. (page 49).
Clearly, safety and security are dominant elements in an Arctic development strategy, and capabilities such as search and rescue (and cooperation with other Arctic powers is crucial. Yet the military dimension is central as well and is clearly being blended in by the Russians.
Russia has 2/3 of populations which currently live in the Arctic. Credit: Russia’s Artctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North,.
Notably, the region is important in and of itself to the Russian forces. “The Arctic Oceans guarantees access to the Atlantic Ocean and is therefore vital to the Russian Navy” (page 113). It is also a crucial region for the nuclear deterrent, notably the installations and forces positioned on the Kola Peninsula.
The author makes an interesting case that for the Russian military it is important to adapt its forces to the nature of the diverse challenges in the Arctic and not simply straight line from past capabilities. In so doing, she makes a forceful argument for Russian military modernization as part of the Russian Arctic future.
Most oil facilities are not mobile, and this will force the Ministry of Defense to put in place the infrastructure to ensure their protection in the event of interstate conflict.
Even if the Russian military considers these risks minimal, the potential for localized conflict must be taken into account.
The securing of the platforms, pipelines, and ships against possible terrorist attacks accentuates the role fo the special services deployed against non-traditional threats.
It entails that defense be reoriented around mobile units able to react rapidly and equpeed with high-technology hardware”(page 124).
She adds that:
“The Arctic theater will be more subject to non-traditional threats than to classic military-centered conflicts. Security will have to be assured at least in part in a collegial manner through international cooperation” (page 129).
A source of conflict as well cooperation is managing shipping the context of the Arctic opening as well. There are sovereignty disputes in the area among the Arctic powers, and clearly the Russians will be keen to project their sovereign claims on a regular basis.
Russia, Canada, and the Arctic. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense
Yet there is a fundamental tension between the powers transiting the region, and the Russians using the region as an integral part of their national development.
“The actors that will specialize in Arctic traffic will chiefly be Asian companies as China, Japan and South Korea seek to become less depend upon the southern straits and diversity their supplies, even at a higher cost. Their concerns are thus more geopolitical than purely commercial…..
For the Russians, the stakes are of an entirely different nature: the NSR (Northern Shipping Route) is above all a domestic route, and a driving part of its strategies devised for developing the Siberian regions…. Destinational traffic is indeed bound to play a growing role in the energy-based revival of the Arctic regions….
Although the NSR is highly unlikely to become a very busy trade route, the high potential for accidents, the fragile ecosystems, and the increasingly international character of shipping will force Moscow to emphasize soft security issues alongside growing international cooperation, the latter mainly focuses on search and rescue systems” (page 190-191).
In short, the Arctic is a key region for national assertion, national identity and national development for Russia. At the same time, international cooperation is crucial for development, safety and security in the Arctic.
As the largest stakeholder in the Arctic opening, how Russia forges these potentially conflict elements into a common approach will shape a key region in 21st century global completion.
For a look at the book, see the following:
Description: This book offers the first comprehensive examination of Russia’s Arctic strategy, ranging from climate change issues and territorial disputes to energy policy and domestic challenges.
As the receding polar ice increases the accessibility of the Arctic region, all the northern countries are maneuvering for geopolitical and resource security.
Geographically, Russia controls half of the Arctic coastline, 40 percent of the land area beyond the Circumpolar North, and three quarters of the Arctic population.
In total, the sea and land surface area of the Russian Arctic is about 6 million square kilometers. Economically, as much as 20 percent of Russia’s GDP and its total exports is generated north of the Arctic Circle. In terms of resources, about 95 percent of its gas, 75 percent of its oil, 96 percent of its platinum, 90 percent of its nickel and cobalt, and 60 percent of its copper reserves are found in Arctic and Sub-Arctic regions.
Add to this the riches of the continental shelf, seabed, and waters, ranging from rare earth minerals to fish stocks.
After a spike of aggressive rhetoric when Russia planted its flag in the Arctic seabed in 2007, Moscow has attempted to strengthen its position as a key factor in developing an international consensus concerning a region where its relative advantages are manifest, despite its diminishing military, technological, and human capacities.
Selected Contents:
Introduction
1. Russia’s Arctic Policy and the Interplay of the Domestic and International
Discursive and Bureaucratic Production
Russia’s Decision Making Regarding Arctic Affairs
The Arctic as a Flagship for Putin-Style Statehood
An Internationally Recognized “Brand” for Russia
The Arctic: A Soft Power Tool for Bilateral Relations?
2. A Territory or an Identity? The Far North in Russia’s Statehood
The Imperial and Soviet Memory of the Arctic
What Administrative Status for Arctic Regions?
Indigenous Peoples as Marginalized Stakeholders?
The Nationalist Reading of the Arctic: Russia’s New Lebensraum
3. Russia’s Spatial and Demographic Challenges
“Archipelago Russia”: A Fragmented Territory
Russia’s Demographic Puzzle
Evolving Patterns of Arctic Demography and Mobility
Is Migration the Future of the Arctic Workforce?
4. Climate Change and Its Expected Impact on Russia
Framing Climate Change Debates
Climate Change in the Arctic
Climate Change in the Russian Federation
Calculating the Impact of Climate Change on the Russian Economy
Russia’s Domestic Actors on Climate Change
Russia’s Hesitant Climate Change Policy
5. The Russian Stance on Arctic Territorial Conflicts
The Soviet Historical Referent: The 1926 Decree
Russian Claims on the Arctic Continental Shelf
The Russian-U.S. Agreement on the Bering and Chukchi Seas
The Issue of the Barents Sea and Its Resolution
The Dispute over the Svalbard Archipelago and Spitsbergen
6. Projecting Military Power in the Arctic
The Russian Army Still Lost in Transition
Upgrading the Northern Fleet and the Nuclear Deterrence
Russia’s Renewed Security Activism in the Arctic
7. Resource Nationalism vs. Patterns of Cooperation
Beyond the Metrics of the “Arctic Bonanza”
Russia’s Oil and Gas Strategies in the Arctic
The Costs and Risks of Arctic-Based Energy
Foreign Actors and the Russian State: Competition or Cooperation?
The Arctic as a Mineral Eldorado?
Hopes for Reviving the Fishing Industry
8. Unlocking the Arctic? Shipping Along the Northern Sea Route
Sovereignty Issues in the Russian Straits
Hopes for an International Trade Lane via the Northern Sea Route
Ice Without Hype: The Harsh Realities of Arctic Shipping
A More Realistic Future: The Sevmorput’ as a Domestic Route
Modernizing the Fleet and the Shipyard Sector
In the most recent Russia DirectMonthly Memo (#11 June 2014), Vassily Kashin, Senior Research Fellow at the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies focuses on what he terms “Russia Reorients to the Orient.”
The Ukrainian crisis marks an important moment in Russian-Chinese relations, catalyzing the creation of a unique collaborative relationship between the two countries. Throughout the crisis, China has been careful not to express its direct support for any side. Despite the restraint of the country’s official statements,
China’s steps in forging closer practical ties with Russia, as well as Chinese media coverage of the Ukrainian situation, have left no doubt that Beijing’s sympathies lie strongly with Moscow.
Varying degrees of support for Russia’s position have been expressed by other BRICS nations, including in some cases, condemnation of the sanctions against
Moscow. But Brazil, India, and South Africa do not have highly developed external economic relations with Russia and, consequently, their ability to provide real support under economic pressure from the West is limited.
Among Russia’s major trade partners, only China has sided with the Kremlin, acquiring in the process a unique opportunity to address a backlog of bilateral economic and trade issues on its own terms.
According the author, Russia is reorienting Russian commodity exports towards China in the wake of Western actions which could well lead to lower energy dependency of the West on Russia.
But interestingly, in the article, the author includes a graphic, which shows that the twin pillars of Russian trade actually are China and Germany, with the former at 89 billion dollars for 2013 and the latter at 77 billion dollars for the same period.
Russian Trade Partners. Credit: Russia Direct
Whether Russia “rebalances” or not really depends on what the European Union actually does. The Chinese move can be part of Putin’s global game or a strategic shift.
Certainly, Russian military cooperation is greater with China than Europe, although the Mistral deal remains in place in France.
By 2011, military-technical cooperation between Russia and China had successfully overcome the dip of the mid-2000s. As of today, the annual volume of Russian arms exports to China is worth around $2 billion, comparable to that of the 1990s. China is the second largest market for Russian arms (after India).
In contrast to finished products, which dominated Russian exports in the 1990s, today Russia mainly supplies China with engines and other high tech components for Chinese weaponry, and also carries out research and development work for the Chinese…..
It also seems that joint space exploration will get a boost. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russian space technology was widely transferred to the Chinese. This allowed China to achieve a breakthrough in the development of its space industry and become the third country in the world, after the U.S. and Russia, to have its own manned space program.
After that, cooperation declined somewhat, but now the talk is of activating the partnership, especially in the field of planetary exploration in the solar system, in which Russia possesses a rich legacy from the Soviet period.
More practical areas of cooperation are also on the table, including the proposed transfer to the Chinese of technologies to build space nuclear reactors. Such systems can be used for both research space stations and radar reconnaissance satellites.
The author warns that there are “risks” to cooperation with China and suggests that the Russians will be vigilant in their evolving relationship. In spite of this, the US pivot to the Pacific is failing but the Russian one is succeeding in the view of the author.
While the U.S. pivot to China has been largely unsuccessful, Russia’s pivot to China shows promise of building the foundation for the nation’s long-term economic development.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to ignore the conflict of interests in China’s global aspirations with those of the Russians.
Cover for Russia Direct Monthly Memo (#11 June 2014).
The PRC sees itself as an ascendant global civilization with global economic reach, growing military power and shaping a vibrant global presence over the next thirty years. Russia is viewed as a commodity supplier, which is a descending, not ascendant power, and useful tactical ally in dealing with the US and the West. The Russians are useful in dealing with American and European speed bumps on the way to global ascendancy for the Great Han civilization.
And it is clear that one global area of ascendant significance is an area for significant competition, namely the Arctic. And here Russian views on Chinese threats to Siberia and the Russian Arctic are clear and more akin to 19th Tsarist views than to a 21st century “collaborative” soft power “mutually beneficial” project.
In an earlier piece, we looked at Russian strategies in the High North by reviewing Marlene Laruelle’s recent book entitled Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North. In that piece we looked at the Russian “policy culture” with regard to the Arctic clearly and highlighted that it is rooted in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the return of Russia. It is part of Putin’s reassertion of the role of Russia in the world, the most recent manifestation of which has been the incorporation of Crimea and the expansion of Russian energy resources.
The Russian state’s renewed interest in the Arctic is also part of a larger context – the reassertion of patriotism as a tool fostering political legitimacy….From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, the return to a great power status materializes via Russia’s reassertion of its role in the international arena, and via the revival of sectors that classically define a great power, such as the military-industry complex, in particular aviation and the navy. This Soviet style “great power” model goes hand-in-hand with the domestic legitimacy strategies put in place by Putin since the start of the 2000s. (p. 9)
The author also highlights the Russian effort to shape a brand with the Arctic context. “The creation of this Arctic brand is part of a more general reflection on the question of nation-building. In Russia the general feeling is that formerly the Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation, has systematically lost the information war….The Russian official narrative (with regard to the Arctic) has evolved toward a celebration of the Arctic region as a space of international cooperation. (p. 13).
Clearly, this “branding” effort of Russia the collaborative and cooperative reflects some fundamental underlying realities, namely the need for significant cooperation for the development and security of the Arctic. And Russian efforts to do so are real and part of the fabric of the Arctic opening.
At the same time, the “policy culture” is not defined by the collaborative dynamic: it is part of the more nationalistic dynamic. A key element of this nationalistic dynamic is that rooted in the demographic pressures in Russia, the declining numbers and the significance of the Arctic region to what many Russians believe is a key element of a nationalistic revival.
In an interesting section of the book entitled “The Nationalist Reading of the Arctic: Russia’s New Lebensraum,” the author underscores a core aspect of current Russian thinking, with deep roots in the Russian past. Russian authors have also highlighted the “lost” Alaskan and Californian territories and the “idea of a former Russian Empire stretching from Finland to California fuels nationalist resentment, focused as it is on the importance of geography in the assertion of Russian great power” (page 42).
There is a strong “white” racial element of the narrative as well, as the Russians with the largest Arctic population (3/4 of the total) and this population are Russians, not indigenous people.
There is also a strong statement of concern about the “yellow peril” from China to Siberia as well.
Whereas Russia was withdrawing into itself territorially for the first time in a millennium, the Arctic seems to revive an expansive, and no longer retractive, vision of the country: a potential new space is opening up to it.
This reading of the Arctic is particularly operative in military circles, which see this region as being Russia’s most important “reserve of space. (page 49).
Clearly, such perspectives provides an important brake on Russian-Chinese collaboration, and a similar look at Chinese cultural and policy attitudes towards the Russians would also highlight significant gaps that will fuel tensions.
In short, there may well be a pivot associated with the Ukraine crisis, but how profound will depend on whether Germany shifts course with regard to Russia or not. And the cultural gaps, and different sense of global destinies between Moscow and Beijing, will fuel conflict in the period ahead, as well as collaboration when useful.
2014-06-06 Today is the 70th Anniversary of D-Day.
When visiting the various sites of Normandy, it is impossible not be moved and to remember the valor and courage of those who came to roll back the NAZI tyranny over France and Europe.
The assault was originally planned for June 5th. However, due to poor weather General Dwight Eisenhower decided to move the date of the invasion to the 6th. It was among the largest amphibious assaults ever attempted. Following are some quotes from that historic day.
Visiting a German Bunker on the Normandy Beaches. Credit Photo: SLD
“We want to get the hell over there. The quicker we clean up this Goddamned mess, the quicker we can take a little jaunt against the purple pissing Japs and clean out their nest, too. Before the Goddamned Marines get all of the credit.” ~ General George S. Patton, Jr.
(This politically incorrect speech was given to Patton’s troops on June 5, 1944.)
“There is one great thing that you men will all be able to say after this war is over and you are home once again. You may be thankful that twenty years from now when you are sitting by the fireplace with your grandson on your knee and he asks you what you did in the great World War II, you WON’T have to cough, shift him to the other knee and say, Well, your Granddaddy shoveled shit in Louisiana. No, Sir, you can look him straight in the eye and say, Son, your Granddaddy rode with the Great Third Army and a Son-of-a-Goddamned-Bitch named Georgie Patton!” ~ General George S. Patton, Jr.
(This speech was delivered to Patton’s troops on June 5, 1944)
“Rangers, Lead The Way!” ~ Colonel Francis W. Dawson on the occasion of the Normandy Invasion, 1944
You will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world. Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped, and battle-hardened. He will fight savagely….The free men of the world are marching together to victory. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full victory. Good luck, and let us all beseech the blessings of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.”
General Dwight D. Eisenhower giving the D-Day order on June 6, 1944.
2014-06-05 Although Norway and Canada are very engaged in the Arctic area, the policy stage is still set by the Cold War superpowers Russia and the United States.
Russia has a proactive policy; the United States has a reluctant policy.
In 2008 after Canada, the United States, and Denmark criticized Russia’s territorial claims to the continental plateau of the Arctic, Russia set out training plans for military units that could be engaged in Arctic combat mission, extended the “operational radius” of its northern naval forces, and reinforced its army’s combat readiness along the Arctic coast— just in case of a potential conflict.
Russia, Canada, and the Arctic. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense
In its new national security strategy, Russia raised the prospect of war in the Arctic Ocean if Russia’s interests and border security were threatened by neighboring nations, likely considering the current circumstances of pending border agreements and disagreements between Russia and those nations.
To secure and guarantee its overall energy and security interests, Russia stated that “in a competition for resources it cannot be ruled out that military force could be used to resolve emerging problems that would destroy the balance of forces near the borders of Russia and her allies.”[ref] “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020,” May 12, 2009, http:// rustrans.wikidot.com/ russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020.[/ref]
According to authoritative Russian sources, Russia is willing— and able— to use the entire spectrum of instruments to settle legal status problems in disputed regions such as the Arctic, Caspian, and South China seas.
Russia’s 2007– 15 rearmament program plans to rebuild the submarine force, recommending building several dozen surface ships and submarines, including five Project 955 Borey nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines equipped with new Bulava ballistic missiles, two Project 885 Yasen nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines, six Project 677 Lada diesel-electric submarines, three Project 22350 frigates, and five Project 20380 corvettes.
With the end of the Cold War, the United States steadily closed some northern military bases, including the naval base on Adak and Fort Greely. These developments reflected the United States’ perception that a significant military presence is— since Soviet Union submarine force collapsed— no longer needed in the Arctic. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to make the challenges easier to resolve, the challenges in the Arctic facing now U.S. policy makers are much more complicated than expected in 1991. Threats are much more nebulous, long term, and complex.
Given the importance that Putin assigns to maintaining control of Russia’s energy resources, it is unsurprising that he has already outlined ambitious goals to develop Arctic hydrocarbon resources in coming years.
Indeed, the Arctic can be seen as to be part of the overall expansion of Russia’s role in providing global energy and shaping its influence via these means.
The Russians have issued several key policies on the evolution of their Arctic policies. For example, on January 14, 2011, the Russian newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta published an interview with Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Russian Security Council, on what he called an issue of “an enormous strategic and economic significance.” Patrushev stated that the council had directed that the government approve a long-term program to extract the mineral resources, especially oil and natural gas, located on Russia’s Arctic shelf by the end of 2011.[ref] Vladimir Baranov, “Russia to Draft Program for Arctic Shelf Exploration by 2012,” RIA Novosti, January 14, 2011, http:// en.rian.ru/ russia/ 20110114/ 162137002. Html.[/ref]
That same day, two of the world’s giant oil companies, Russia’s Rosneft and BP, announced an unprecedented partnership that will see them exchange shares and expand their joint ventures, including launching a new Arctic oil-drilling project. Both companies bring important assets to their new alliance, but the deal has alarmed foreign governments and environments due to its potential commercial, security, and ecological implications.
The deal also raises interesting questions related to the Russian government’s economic modernization program.
In terms of Arctic and energy security issues, the new partnership could mark the commencement of a major Russian government drive to develop the energy resources that fall within the boundaries of Moscow’s territorial claims in the Arctic. In recent years, the Russian government has set forth ambitious territorial claims in the Arctic reinforced through recent scientific research expeditions and military measures.
Despite losing considerable territory with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation still has the world’s longest Arctic border at over 17,500 kilometers, which amount to one-third of the entire length of Russia’s national frontiers.
The Russian Federation also possesses several Arctic archipelagoes, including Franz Josef Land and Wrangel Island.
Furthermore, the Russian government claims its continental shelf extends up to the North Pole— and is taking steps to strengthen and enforce this claim in the face of opposition from Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States. For example, the Russian government believes that the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, which lies on the North Pole’s seabed, along with the Mendeleev Ridge and Alpha Ridge, are part of Russia’s continental shelf.
Comparing the Northern and South Maritime Routes. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense
As with the case with Canada and the Northwest Passage, Russia also seeks to exercise exclusive control over a burgeoning shipping lane of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR is a system of sea-lanes from the straits between the Barents and Kara seas (south of Russia’s Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site) to the Bering Strait, a distance of approximately 5,000 kilometers.
This route connects Asia and Europe and when navigable saves transportation time and costs as compared with using the Suez Canal. Russia’s Arctic policy defines the NSR as a core national interest. In contrast, the U.S. government considers the NSR as an international shipping route.
In an effort to bolster its claims of ownership over the NSR, the Russian Ministry of Transport announced on March 18, 2010, that it is drafting legislation to define the route’s precise dimensions and to create a federal agency that would regulate and collect fees from foreign vessels using the NSR.
During the Cold War, the Arctic region was a place of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both operated nuclear vessels, long-range bombers, and tactical aircraft in the region. Following the USSR’s collapse in 1991, Russian government interest in the Arctic decreased considerably.
During the 1990s, Moscow’s concerns were maintaining the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation in the face of secessionist threats in the North Caucasus and elsewhere. During the 1990s, Russian military overflights and naval patrols in the Arctic declined significantly as the Russian military faced drastic funding and fuel shortages. The Russian army withdrew from many Arctic bases. The inward concentration of the Russian government’s attention and resources hampered the development of a comprehensive policy toward the Arctic. Furthermore, the economic problems that Russia confronted in the 1990s also made it difficult for Russians to conceive of resource-intensive plans to exploit the Arctic region’s mineral wealth.
But the rise in world oil and gas prices that began in the late 1990s simultaneously provided the Russian government with increased revenue and renewed Russian interest in developing the increasing valuable energy resources in the Arctic region. The renewed attention was evident on September 18, 2008, when the Russian government issued a “Framework for the Arctic to the Year 2020 and Subsequent Perspectives.”
More recently, the “Russian National Security Strategy for 2020” illustrates the growing importance that Russian strategists attribute to exerting control over the maritime domains around Russia, especially the resource-rich Arctic Ocean, Barents Sea, and Caspian Sea.
After a series of incidents in the late 1990s, in which several foreign research ships allegedly trespassed into Russian territorial waters, the Russian government began taking steps to secure its northern border. In recent years, Russia has taken more concrete measures than any other country to assert its Arctic claims. Russian warships and warplanes have increased their military activities in the region. The Russian government also began sending more scientific research expeditions to the Arctic.
In the past, Russia relied heavily on military personnel and equipment in its Arctic expeditions, but now is using primarily civilian technologies since these can be more readily detailed to the United Nations and other international bodies to justify Russia’s Arctic claims. Russia’s earlier submission to the UN regarding its territorial claim to the Lomonosov Ridge was rejected due to a lack of supporting evidence, which Moscow declined to provide for fear of revealing military secrets.
The 2007 Arktika expedition represented a dramatic, high-profile assertion of Russian interest in the region. In August the research expedition climaxed when ship Akademik Fedorov and icebreaker Rossiya sent two specially designed submersible vessels, Mir-1 and Mir-2, 4,300 meters deep to the North Pole seabed. After collecting soil samples and further mapping the Lomonsov Ridge, the expedition planted a Russian flag made of titanium on its floor. Reacting to foreign criticism of the flag ceremony, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “The aim of this expedition is not to stake Russia’s claim but to show that our shelf reaches to the North Pole.”
Russian government claims and actions regarding the Arctic stem not only from economic and domestic political considerations but also from offensive and defensive strategic considerations that encourage a greater Russian military presence in the Arctic. The Eurasian landmass of Russia is effectively “walled in” by Siberia and the Pacific to the east, Asia and the Middle East to the south, and Europe to the west.
The Arctic has for centuries served as the “fourth wall,” restricting Russian maritime activity to areas largely controlled by other powers. As the Arctic climate changes to open more waters to navigation and exploration, the Russian Federation can extend the range of its military operations. Russia’s Northern Fleet, the largest element of the Russian navy, is based in the port city Severomorsk on the Barents Sea.
Although the Northern Fleet maintains year-round access to the north and south Atlantic, its mobility could be strictly limited to the Barents Sea by a Western naval power in the event of unrestricted warfare. An ice-free Arctic would negate this advantage but also present new strategic challenges to Russia.
The opening of the Arctic Ocean makes vulnerable Russia’s northern ports, particularly those in the Kola Peninsula that house the majority of Russia’s ballistic-missile submarine fleet. Furthermore, the opening of the NSR could serve as a maritime link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through which warships could pass. At present warships in the NSR are susceptible to structural damage from floating ice, weather conditions, and icing. These conditions will become less severe on a seasonal basis as climate change progresses.
Russia is partly able to address the issue of Arctic maritime conditions by maintaining a fleet of icebreakers. There are 18 icebreakers of various sizes in Russia’s military fleet. Seven of these are equipped with nuclear reactors, rather than conventional diesel engines, allowing them to break through ice twice as thick as can be breached by standard icebreakers.
The most capable Russian icebreakers are operated not by the Russian navy but by privately owned mining giant Norilsk Nickel. Its icebreakers can penetrate ice up to 1.5 meters thick. But Russia needs to rebuild its icebreaker fleet since all the existing ships except one are scheduled for decommissioning in the next decade. Russia’s economic troubles have delayed the construction of new, third-generation icebreaking vessels.
Russia must acquire at least three new vessels of this type in the next several years in order to maintain adequate icebreaking capabilities. Russia must also expand its coastal border guard to better accommodate increased commercial and military traffic.
In addition to Arctic regions, the coastal border guard patrols the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas as well as Russia’s Pacific coast. Changing Arctic conditions could double this area of responsibility. The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 includes provisions to strengthen and upgrade the coastal border guard. In 2009 border guard units based on the Barents Sea began patrolling the NSR for the first time since the Soviet era.
Arctic Seaports. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense
Russia is also expanding its military presence in the Arctic region. The Russian Presidential Security Council has called for establishing a military force and several new bases in the Arctic, while the Federal Security Service will use its coast guard ships to collect maritime intelligence in the region.
The Russian government is moving swiftly to expand its sea, ground, and air presence in the Arctic.
Russia has resumed air patrols over the Arctic, and in June 2008, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that it would increase submarine operations if Russian national interests in the Arctic were ever threatened.
In October 2010, Navy Commander Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said that Russian naval ships and submarines had already conducted about a dozen military patrols in the Arctic during the first three quarters of that year. Vysotsky explained that “in accordance with the Russian Armed Forces’ plan of strategic deterrence we take measures aimed to demonstrate military presence in the Arctic.”
Russia’s strategic ballistic missile launching submarines use the North Pole region because the ice helps shield them from U.S. space satellites and other overhead sensors. In addition, launching a missile from the Arctic can reduce the flight time to U.S. targets. In July 2009, the Russian navy boasted that it had succeeded in launching two long-range ballistic missiles from under the Arctic Ocean without the Pentagon detecting their preparations.
Supposedly, Russian attack submarines prevented U.S. surveillance ships from learning of the arrival of two Russian strategic submarines before the missile launches. The state-run RIA Novosti news agency quoted a high-ranking navy source as saying that the successful drill disproved skeptics in Russia and elsewhere that the Russian navy had lost its combat effectiveness: “We slapped these skeptics in the face, proving that Russian submarines are not only capable of moving stealthily under ice, but can also break it to accomplish combat tasks.”
Russian officials have sought to downplay the prospects of military conflict in the Arctic region. In late 2010, the special representative of President Medvedev, Anton Vasilyev, stated that “Russia does not plan to create ‘special Arctic forces’ or take any steps that would lead to the militarization of the Arctic,” which contradicts provisions stated in Moscow’s security doctrine.[ref] “Russia: The Non-Reluctant Arctic Power,” Expedition2012. org, February 13, 2011, http:// expedition2010org.blogspot.fr/ 2011/ 02/ russia-non-reluctant-arctic-power.html.[/ref]
In his year-in-review press conference, Foreign Minister Lavrov said that all Arctic border disputes could be settled through negotiations and that “ rumors that a war will break out over the resources in the North are a provocation.” In 2012, after 40 years of negotiations, Russia and Norway signed a deal to delimitate their maritime border. The two countries have been disputing the 175,000 square kilometer area in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean since 1970. The disputed maritime border has resulted in both parties seizing fishing vessels in the area.
Then President Medvedev and Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg signed an agreement dividing the contested area into two equal parts. Meanwhile, while Russia still contests ownership of the Lomonosov Ridge with Canada, both countries have agreed that the United Nations would be the final arbiter of who owns title to the ridge.
And as part of improving Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, the Russians have moved two motorized infantry brigades to the region. Moving a Polar Spetsnaz to the Norwegian border is apparently in the Russian perspective part of a broader cooperative Arctic strategy:
By 2020, Russia will have increased the number of brigades from today’s 70 to 109, said General Colonel Aleksander Postnikov at a meeting in the Federation Council’s Committee for Defense and Security yesterday.
One of the new brigades is to be located in the settlement of Pechenga, some 10 kilometers from the Russian-Norwegian border and 50 kilometers from the Norwegian town of Kirkenes, Nezavisimaya Gazeta writes.
This brigade will be specially equipped for military warfare in Arctic conditions. It will be set up with DT-30P Vityaz tracked vehicles, in addition to multi-service army equipment, other armored vehicles and tanks.[ref]Trude Pettersen, “Russia to Establish Polar Spetsnaz on Border to Norway,” Barents Observer, March 16, 2011, http:// barentsobserver.com/ en/ sections/ topics/ russia-establish-polar-spetsnaz-border-norway.[/ref]
One analyst has underscored that the Arctic opening could well see the emergence of an anomaly in Russian history— Russia as a maritime power. According to a perceptive article by Caitlyn Antrim:
Russian geopolitics of the 21st century will be different from the days of empire and conflict of the nineteenth and twentieth. The increased accessibility of the Arctic, with its energy and mineral resources, new fisheries, shortened sea routes and shipping along the rivers between the Arctic coast and the Eurasian heartland, is both enabling and propelling Russia to become a major maritime state. [ref]Catilyn Antrim, “The New Maritime Arctic,” Russia in Global Affairs, October 15, 2010, http:// eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/ The-New-Maritime-Arctic-15000.[/ref]
This means as well augmenting the role of the Russian navy, coast guard, and various air assets over time. The augmentation of the maritime reach of Russia— through ships, submarines, C2, ISR, and air means— can be anticipated.
2014-06-04 The large engagement in Afghanistan is coming to an end.
What comes next depends upon events and agreements.
But for now, the US is shifting the logistics support system for its engagements in the region.
In the case of airlift and air refueling, there is a shift in part from Kyrgyzstan to Romania.
According to a story by Jeff Schogol of Navy Times:
The last U.S. personnel are expected to leave the Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, by the end of the week, a spokesman for Air Forces Central Command said Tuesday.
The Air Force held symbolic ceremonies Tuesday transferring back the facilities to the Krygyz government, said Lt. Col. Tadd Sholtis. The transfer and inactivation become official after the expiration of the current lease next month and departure of military personnel in a few days.
“There are no U.S. military aircraft remaining at Manas,” Sholtis said in an email to Military Times. “The facilities at the center — along with approximately 65 pieces of excess equipment or vehicles ranging from de-icing machines to pickup trucks — will be included in the transfer. Serviceable military equipment was transported back to the United States or other military installations overseas; unserviceable equipment was disposed of through a certified disposal facility that was established at the base.”
For most of the war in Afghanistan, Manas had been a major transit hub for U.S. troops headed to and returning from Afghanistan, but the U.S. lease on the base expires this month because the Kyrgyz parliament voted last year to end the lease. The last passengers flew from Manas to Afghanistan on Feb. 28.
Credit Photo: Airmen stand at parade rest during the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing inactivation ceremony at Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, June 3, 2014. For more than 12 years, the American military has operated out of Transit Center at Manas. It served as the premier transportation and logistics hub supporting operations in Afghanistan.
The US will now use the new transit center in Romania instead of the Kyrgyz base at Manas.
Flights will now be routed through the Mihail Kogalniceanu airbase on the Black Sea, Pentagon officials said. Known as Forward Operating Site MK, the site provides garrison support for up to 1,350 rotational forces and is now manned by five military members and 20 contractors, officials said.
Romania did not agree to host the air refueling flights currently run out of Manas, however. Those operations will be moved to a facility in Southwest Asia, officials said.
Although the Romanian base is more than three times as far from Afghanistan as Manas, officials said the increased distance would make little logistical difference, and that MK’s proximity to the Black Sea coast would be a benefit.
The United Nations will move more into the use of high technology including UAVs and EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) robots in peacekeeping operations to confront new challenges and offer the best value for funding in future.
UAVs have been deployed by MONUSCO in the DRC since late last year to provide added eyes to UN forces there in an ongoing quest to protect civilians.
“The UN is improving logistics and administrative practices, strengthening infrastructure and taking other steps to harness the power of our personnel. Our goal is to ensure peacekeeping is a cost effective, valuable investment that brings benefits and, above all, saves lives,” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said.
There are currently over 116 000 UN military, police and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries serving in 16 peacekeeping missions worldwide. They perform a variety of tasks, from stabilizing communities torn apart by conflict to protecting civilians, promoting the rule of law and advancing human rights.
Falco UAV. Credit: defenceWEb
To assist in these duties, UN peacekeeping is on a mission of its own. This will see modernisation and innovation to ensure it can tackle the peace and security challenges ahead and to be “a force for peace, a force for change and a force for the future,” the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations said.
One example of new technology being utilized beneficially came last month during a ferry accident on Lake Kivu. A UN Falco UAV spotted the craft in distress and UN personnel in the DRC were able to immediately despatch speedboats and a helicopter, rescuing 15 people.
“From the second it spotted the sinking ship, the UAV stayed at the scene searching for survivors and providing situational awareness,” said Ameerah Haq, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support.
“This illustrates the flexibility and the ability of UAVs to greatly enhance situational awareness and aid life-saving operations by the provision of real-time imagery to support reaction to incidents.”
The UN has also enhanced its use of thermal imaging, closed-circuit television, night vision abilities and GIS (geographic information systems) data to improve situational awareness to provide better for the safety and security for its peacekeepers.
As part of the ongoing effort by the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and of Field Support (DFS) to take advantage of emerging technologies and innovations, a group of five experts is being tasked with advising on how best to use these capabilities.
The group, led by seasoned peace and security expert Jane Holl Lute, will examine how these technologies can be leveraged to enable peacekeepers to respond more effectively to an increasing number of complex, multi-dimensional tasks in challenging field environments.
It will also look at how technological innovations can improve operational effectiveness, multiply impact and enhance safety and security of both peacekeepers and host communities.
In Mali UN personnel have and are making use of robots to disarm improvised or unexploded ordnance devices.
UN blue helmets are also aiming to “go green” through the responsible use of limited resources, in a bid to leave mission areas in better shape than when they arrived. Among other steps, GIS data is being used to help find water sources for missions so as not to compete with the local water supply.
Missions are also including waste water treatment plants designed to drastically reduce the need for water and generation of disposable waste, as well as exploring alternative sources of energy such as solar panels.
“The world is changing. The threats are changing. The levels of conflict are changing in many places in the world. So we have to adapt and we have to evolve and we have to learn how to deal with these new challenges” said Edmond Mulet, assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping operations.
This article has been republished by permission of our strategic partner defenceWeb:
New Delhi. China’s deployment of a deep-sea oil rig in the disputed waters of the South China Sea in early-May 2014, has further destabilized the precarious security situation in the region. The Vietnamese Prime Minister said China was acting dangerously. The US Secretary of State described the development as ‘provocative’. China warned India and ASEAN to stay out of the dispute.
The security environment in the Indo-Pacific region has been vitiated by territorial disputes on land, in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as well as terrorism, the proliferation of small arms and piracy in the Malacca Strait.
Freedom of navigation on the high seas is of critical importance for the economies of most Asian countries.
Maintaining peace and stability and ensuring the unfettered flow of trade and energy supplies through the sea-lanes of communications will pose major challenges for the Asian powers as well as the United States. Only a cooperative security architecture can provide long-term stability and mutual reassurance.
Through its forward military presence and its abiding military alliances, the US has played a key role in providing stability in the Indo-Pacific region through many decades of turbulence during and after the cold war.
The Indian P-8 during the search for the Malaysian airliner. Credit: India Strategic
The US is now re-balancing or ‘pivoting’ from the Euro-Atlantic zone to the Indo-Pacific in tune with its changing geo-strategic priorities and the rise of emerging powers. It is also simultaneously downsizing its forces and will need new strategic partners to help it maintain order and stability.According to Rory Medcalf, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, “the choreography of this geopolitical interplay will depend on the quality of leadership and decision-making in Beijing, New Delhi and Washington.”
As analyst C Raja Mohan has averred in his book “Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific”, the major powers in the region, including Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and the US, need to work creatively to frame acceptable rules for the commons in the Indo-Pacific.
Unless such realization comes about, subterranean tensions will continue to hamper stability. China, which is working on creating energy routes through Pakistan, has so far been ambivalent in seeking to join a cooperative framework and has preferred to stand apart. It has failed to realize that its growing trade and massive dependence on energy imports through the Indian Ocean make it imperative for it to join the efforts being made to establish such a framework.
It would be in India’s interest to readily join cooperative efforts aimed at maintaining stability.
India has acquired robust military intervention capabilities and is formulating a suitable doctrine for intervention. Though India has a pacifist strategic culture rather than a proactive one that nips emerging challenges in the bud through pre-emption, it has not hesitated to intervene militarily when its national interests warranted intervention, both internally and beyond the shores.
The Army was asked to forcibly integrate the states of Goa, Hyderabad and Junagadh into the Indian Union soon after Independence as part of the nation-building process. The Indian armed forces created the new nation of Bangladesh after the Pakistan army conducted genocide in East Pakistan in 1971.
India intervened in the Maldives and Sri Lanka at the behest of the governments of these countries and was ready to do so in Mauritius in 1983 when the threat to the government there passed. India had airlifted 150,000 civilian workers from Iraq through Jordan during Gulf War I in what became known as the largest airlift after the Berlin airlift. Also, almost 5,000 civilian workers were evacuated by ship from Lebanon in 2006. After the 2004 South-East Asian tsunami, 72 naval ships had set sail within three days to join the international rescue and relief operations even though India’s eastern seaboard had itself suffered extensive loss of life and damage.
Notably, India’s limited military presence overseas has been benign.
According to former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, “…most South-East Asian countries and Japan welcome a larger presence of Indian naval assets in the region.”
As part of the Indo-US defence cooperation, joint patrolling of the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean is already being undertaken up to the western mouth of the Malacca Strait as part of joint naval exercises.
Other military exercises have led to a broad understanding of each other’s military capabilities and limitations and many interoperability challenges have been ironed out. India also deployd ships and aircraft recently to assist the Malaysian authorities in the search for the missing Malaysian Boeing 777-200 airliner.
Two newly acquired Boeing P8-I maritime patrol aircraft and an Indian Air Force C 130J Super Hercules aircraft were part of this team.
The Indian Army has designated one infantry division as a rapid reaction division, with an amphibious brigade, an air assault brigade and an infantry brigade. The Army also has an independent parachute brigade that can be deployed at short notice.
The Indian Navy now possesses INS Jalashva (formerly USS Trenton) that can carry one infantry battalion with full operational loads and is in the process of acquiring additional landing ships. Besides long-range fighter-bomber aircraft with air-to-air refuelling capability like the SU-30MKI, the Indian Air Force has acquired fairly substantive strategic airlift capabilities, including six C-130 Super Hercules aircraft (one lost in accident) for the Special Forces. A permanent corps-level tri-Service planning HQ with all-weather reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities needs to be set up under the aegis of the HQ Integrated Defence Staff to monitor emerging situations on a regular basis and act as a control HQ for intervention operations.
In future, India may undertake joint military operations in its area of strategic interest if the country’s major national interests are at stake.
Such a campaign may take the form of an intervention under the UN flag – something that India would prefer – or even a “coalition of the willing” in a contingency in which India’s vital national interests are threatened.
There will naturally be several caveats to such cooperation, as India will not join any military alliance.
It will also be necessary to work with other strategic partners and friendly countries in India’s extended neighborhood and with organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and, when possible, even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
The aim should be to establish consultative mechanisms through diplomatic channels for the exchange of ideas, and conduct joint training and reconnaissance.
Small-scale joint military exercises with likely coalition partners help eliminate interoperability and command and control challenges and enable strategic partners to operate together during crises.
The writer is a distinguished strategic affairs analyst and a Member of the India Strategic Editorial Board.
