Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

The Arctic Opening: Co-Opetition in the High North

Posted on June 3, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

06/03/2014

2014-06-03 We are going to look at the challenge of Arctic safety-security-defense and how to understand the dynamics of change in the Arctic.

Based on discussions with Arctic experts and practioners from the US, Canada, Norway and Denmark, how best to understand the relationship among the safety, security and defense demands in the region in the period ahead?

Clearly defense is a contextual issue, not the defining issue. And as such how can the defense challenge within the Arctic best be understood?

What follows in this piece are excerpts from a chapter in our book Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific which deals with the Arctic as one of the four key factors defining 21^st century defense challenges in the Pacific.

The gradual melting of Arctic ice is creating the beginnings of a very different strategic situation affecting the Pacific states, Russia, the United States, Canada, and Europe.

The operational geography for trade, exploitation of raw materials, and military forces is becoming altered by that most powerful of forces— nature.

The opening of the Arctic is an event somewhat parallel to the building of the Suez or Panama Canal. The two great canals of the 19th and early 20th centuries changed the face of the United States and Europe.

North and Sea maritime transit routes. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense

The new significance of the northern routes could well do the same for Russia.

The impact of the Suez Canal was considerable in changing the 19th century.

As one analyst of the geography of transportation has put it:

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 “brought a new era of European influence in Pacific Asia by reducing the journey from Asia to Europe by about 6,000 kilometers.

The region became commercially accessible and colonial trade expanded as a result of increased interactions because of a reduced friction of distance.

Great Britain, the maritime power of the time, benefited substantially from this improved access.” [ref]Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Claude Comotois, and Brian Slack, The Geography of Transport Systems, 2nd ed., Kindle ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), location 1590. [/ref]

With regard to the Panama Canal, the east and west coasts of the United States became part of the same country in a fundamental way. And the U.S. transition to becoming a global power was facilitated by the opening of the “big ditch” as well. The Panama Canal shortens the maritime distances between them by a factor of 13,000 kilometers.

It will take a while for the full impact of the opening of the Arctic to be realized, but the country whose destiny will be most altered will be Russia, an emerging maritime country. Yes, you read that correctly; the great landlocked power will emerge as an important maritime player and with it different roles for Canada, the United States, Asia, and Europe.

The Strategic Opening: Co-opetition at the Top of the World

To get a sense of what is involved one needs to look at a map from the top of the world down.

As the sea lanes in the Arctic-bordered regions become capable of longer periods of transit, the Northern sea routes or the Northwest passage becomes a link at the top of the world that can connect Europe and the northern Pacific in ways that rival the traditional transit routes Southward through the world’s great canals.

But it is not simply about transit.

It is about access to raw materials as well.

The Arctic holds significant oil, natural gas, rare earth minerals, and other commodities vital to global economic development. Exploitation is challenging and costly, but the long-term trajectory is very clear: the region will be a central economic zone for the global economy.

The two trends— transport and raw-material extraction— will become combined.

For example, for states like Japan and South Korea, which have no landward reach to raw materials as does China, these states will now have an alternative path to acquire raw materials and have them transited to their factories. Rather than simply relying on the Middle East, for example, South Korea and Japan can work with Russia and others to gain access to liquid natural gas and then have that product transported directly to their ports.

Russia is at the center of these developments, but the infrastructure investments required for full success are challenging. It can be anticipated that outside engagement and capital will be involved, which in turn will pressure the Russians to be more effective in shaping capital investment and foreign engagement policies more conducive to regularized foreign firm involvement.

Yet the erratic behavior of the Russian state is as important a limiting factor as the harsh climate of the Arctic on the prospects for development in the region.

The impact on Russia on the Arctic opening is really central. The Russian European ports can look forward to being directly connected with the Pacific ports and along the way with the growth of infrastructure, ports, facilities, and shipping.

This transforms the Russian defense and security challenge to one of securing the trade and resource development belt. It also will see a significant upsurge over the next 30 years of traffic, commercial and military, through the area.

Arctic Seaports. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense

It will be in Russia’s interest to build air and naval assets that can provide for the various needs for defense and security in the region. Search and rescue, communications, maritime domain awareness, significant ISR capabilities, bomber coverage, submarine and surface fleet coverage, and related efforts will become prioritized.

This will dramatically change the situation for Canada.

During the Cold War, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was built around close American and Canadian cooperation to defend their territories against various Russian threats, first bombers, then strategic submarines, and then ICBMs. As this threat receded, Canada was able to focus on military operations of “choice” rather than necessity.

The emergence of the Arctic as a strategic zone ends this situation and puts Canada on the front lines. To secure its own claims to resources, and to exploit and protect those capabilities, Canada will itself need to augment its efforts. And along with those efforts will be a need to enhance significantly its relevant security and defense capabilities as Russia is transformed by the Arctic opening and along with it the growing presence of other powers as well.

Russia, Canada, and the Arctic. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense

The other core players in the Arctic opening are members of what is called the Arctic 5 or the core members of the Arctic Council— the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway. These states have the rights to 80 percent of the known Arctic resources.

But as already noted, other powers are increasingly involved in shaping transit and infrastructure projects.

For example, the Chinese are building icebreakers and are engaged in a significant expansion of their engagement in the region.

The Chinese are actively engaged in shaping an Arctic strategy. According to Danish sources, the Chinese have targeted rare earth mineral supplies in Greenland and have used a variety of means to achieve a key role in leveraging these assets.

The Chinese as well are looking at the maritime routes likely to emerge in the Arctic over time. These interests are both commercial and military, and Canadian sources have made it clear that they are concerned about the prospects of enhanced maritime activity by the Chinese by the Chinese navy.

In a very useful input to understanding the Chinese and the Arctic, Linda Jakobson wrote a piece published by SIPRI in 2010:

Because China’s economy is reliant on foreign trade, there are substantial commercial implications if shipping routes are shortened during the summer months each year.

Nearly half of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) is thought to be dependent on shipping. The trip from Shanghai to Hamburg via the Northern Sea Route— which runs along the north coast of Russia from the Bering Strait in the east to Novaya Zemlya in the west— is 6400 kilometers shorter than the route via the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal . . .

Moreover, due to piracy, the cost of insurance for ships travelling via the Gulf of Aden towards the Suez Canal increased more than tenfold between September 2008 and March 2009

The author also cited a Chinese article dealing with the Arctic in briefly discussing the military dimension:

The Arctic also “has significant military value, a fact recognized by other countries.” In a rare open-source article about the Arctic by an officer of the People’s Liberation Army, Senior Colonel Han Xudong warns that the possibility of use of force cannot be ruled out in the Arctic due to complex sovereignty disputes.[ref] Linda Jacobson, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” 2010, SIPRI.[/ref]

With transport over the northern routes becoming part of the global scene with transit of resources as well from within the region, a new center of energy— figuratively and literally— is opened.

With this new dynamic, Russia can become a maritime power able to bridge Europe and the Pacific and redefine the “top of the world” aspect of Pacific and European defense and security. And more to the point, a consolidation of capabilities able to be projected either into the Pacific or Europe is on offer.

A glimmer of the future has been provided by recent agreements between South Korea and Norway.

According to The Barents Observer:

Both Norway and South Korea are major global players in shipping. Norway is home to many of the world’s largest shipping companies, while South Korea is home to some of the largest shipbuilding yards in the world.

Establishing new shipping routes over the Arctic is a key agenda item for President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Norway. Yesterday he had lunch at the Royal Castle in Oslo, while today starts with political discussions with Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, according to the portal of the Norwegian Government.

“New shipping lanes will significantly boost economic exchange between Asia and Europe,” President Lee said to the new-agency Yonhap on his first day in Norway.

“It takes about 30 days to go from South Korea to Europe by ship, but if Arctic routes are created, I think travel time will be halved. If that happens, economic exchanges between Europe and Asia will become very brisk. In particular, if Norway cooperates with us, Asian routes will be established, which will be very good for its future.”[ref]Thomas Nilsen, “South Korea Ties Up with Norway on Arctic Shipping,” Barents Observer, September 12, 2012, http:// barentsobserver.com/ en/ arctic/ south-korea-ties-norway-arctic-shipping-12-09.[/ref]

Another key dimension of map redrawing will be among the Pacific states themselves.

In the focus on the defense of Japan, naturally the attention has been upon the areas west of Japan— Korea and China. But as China comes further out into the Pacific, militarily and globally commercially, the “map” changes. It is east, south, and north of Japan that become part of the security and defense zone affecting Japanese interests.

A vignette of the future along these lines was provided by a piece by Mia Bennett on the Foreign Policy Association website:

An LNG tanker sailing from Hammerfest, Norway to Tobata, Japan is due to arrive today. This is the first time that a ship carrying LNG has transited the Northern Sea Route. Developments in shipping LNG in the Arctic have picked up pace lately. Only recently did Norwegian company Knutsen OAS Shipping receive permission from Russian authorities to begin shipping LNG from Snøhvit to Japan. In October, Gazprom’s Ob River became the world’s first LNG tanker to transit the NSR, sailing from South Korea to Murmansk.[ref]Mia Bennett, “LNG Tanker from Norway to Arrive in Japan Today,” Foreign Policy Association, December 4, 2012, http:// foreignpolicyblogs.com/ 2012/ 12/ 04/ lng-tanker-from-norway-to-arrive-in-japan-today.[/ref]

Even a quick review of likely national responses underscores the co-opetition aspect of the Arctic competition.

“Co-opetition” is a term used in business literature about the need to cooperate while competing to achieve market leadership. “In most of the modern theories of business, competition is seen as one of the key forces that keep firms lean and drive innovation.”

Adam Brandenburger of the Harvard Business School and Barry Nalebuff of the Yale School of Management have challenged that emphasis. They suggest that businesses can gain advantage by means of a judicious mixture of competition and cooperation.

“Cooperation with suppliers, customers and firms producing complementary or related products can lead to expansion of the market and the formation of new business relationships, perhaps even the creation of new forms of enterprise.”[ref] Adam Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff, Co-opetition (New York: Doubleday, 1996).[/ref]

The co-opetition concept seems appropriate to the Arctic engagement.

To facilitate transit and exploitation of raw materials in the region, the major states involved will need to work out arrangements for joint operations. At the same time, rivalries are inevitable in a relatively undefined situation whereby boundaries can be disputed and access routes contested. Hence, posturing for advantage in a situation where cooperation is crucial seems evident.

There will obviously be key collaborative elements.

The Arctic 5 will shape several key collaborative tool sets and agreements. But it will not end there. Conflicts over sovereignty historically can involve more than simply verbal disagreements.

Rather than a contest of soft versus hard power, states will try to combine their assets and press their advantage to gain ascendancy, and the Arctic opening is likely to be part of the emergent global game.

Although a game of diplomacy, it will be characterized by the success of states that are able to combine diverse assets of power into an effective combination of effective global strategy.

Beijing’s and Moscow’s Natural Gas Breakthrough Expands Energy Partnership

Posted on June 2, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

06/02/2014

2014-06-02 By Richard Weitz

China’s ravenous demand for energy and Russia’s huge supply of nearby oil and gas are clearly complementary, but until very recently large Sino-Russian energy agreements proved elusive.

Now their recent mega-gas deal, which follows several important oil deals, suggests that Beijing and Moscow are finally on the road to consummating this relationship.

Exporting energy is the primary driver of the Russian economy and main source of the Kremlin’s revenue and international influence. The Russian Federation has the world’s largest natural gas reserves. Although its natural gas production rates have remained relatively stable if enormous over the course of the last decade, Russia under Vladimir Putin has steadily enhanced and expanded its oil production over that same period. Russia has become the world’s second largest oil producer, after Saudi Arabia.

Chinese policy makers have become more interested over time in acquiring Russia’s oil and gas. China is the world’s largest energy consumer and has recently become the largest net importer of oil. Natural gas covers only 4 percent of China’s total energy consumption, but the government desires to raise this level significantly to help reduce domestic pollution and China’s contribution to global climate change.

The gap between China’s domestic hydrocarbon production and its fast-growing consumption is widening. Domestic resources will not meet China’s growing demand for energy in general, and for oil and natural gas in particular. Although the government has tried to improve energy conservation and expand the use of nuclear and renewable energy sources, the PRC will still need to import enormous quantities of oil and increasingly gas for the foreseeable future.

The Ekaterina drilling rig stands at OAO Gazprom's Bovanenkovo deposit, a natural gas field near Bovanenkovskoye on the Yamal Peninsula in Russia.Photographer: Alexander Zemlianichenko Jr./Bloomberg — The Ekaterina drilling rig stands at OAO Gazprom’s Bovanenkovo deposit, a natural gas field near Bovanenkovskoye on the Yamal Peninsula in Russia.Photographer: Alexander Zemlianichenko Jr./Bloomberg

Using oil and gas helps China burn less coal, currently the country’s main domestic energy source but also a major source of air pollution and carbon emissions. Although coal will likely remain China’s dominant energy source for years, the Chinese demand for oil is expected to continue to grow faster than domestic crude production. As a result, China could import as much as 75 percent of its crude oil by 2035.

China will also import more natural gas over time since its consumption, which is being promoted by the government, is expected to rise from 170 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2013 to 420 bcm in 2020 and then grow by more than 14 percent annually through 2030. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) expects gas consumption for 2014 to amount to 186 bcm, a 11 percent increase over 2013, with imports rising 19 percent over the previous year. China already imports more than 40 percent of its natural gas.

In addition, the government is trying to diversify foreign energy sources to limit China’s dependence on any single exporting country or region. For China, Russian oil and gas is an additional source of energy that, due to its geographic proximately, is cheaper to import. Russia’s overland transportation networks are also more secure compared with the more expensive and vulnerable maritime shipments of hydrocarbons that reach China from Africa, Australia, and the Persian Gulf.

The idea of sending Russian oil and gas to China by pipeline was first mooted in the 1990s. Chinese and Russian energy managers have been actively negotiating possible deals since the mid-2000s. During Putin’s March 2006 trip to Beijing, Gazprom and the CNPC signed a memorandum of understanding about constructing a 6,700-kilometer gas pipeline that would link western Siberia to China’s Xinjiang Province by bisecting Russia’s Altai Republic. At the June 2009 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Kremlin energy czar Igor Sechin said that Russia was prepared to sell China as much natural gas as it required.

Despite these mutual incentives to increase bilateral energy cooperation, Chinese-Russian energy cooperation has until recently been surprisingly limited. The two sides repeatedly announced grandiose oil and natural gas deals that, again until recently, failed to materialize. Many of their declared agreements were simply framework accords, memoranda of understanding, or declarations of intent to cooperate on concrete projects at a later date.

The initial reason for the small volume of Russian oil and gas sold to China was the underdeveloped transportation infrastructure connecting the two countries. During most of the Cold War, the border between China and the various Soviet republics was sealed and heavily militarized. In addition, the Soviet energy pipeline network flowed from east to west since Europeans were the main foreign purchasers of the gas produced in the Soviet republics of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. It has only been in the last decade that Russian energy planners have, joining the newly independent countries of Central Asia, made a comprehensive effort to send gas and oil eastward toward the expanding markets of East Asia.

For the first decade of their new post-Cold War relationship, most Russian crude oil could only reach China via costly and limited capacity rail lines to the Chinese cities of Harbin and Daqing as well as through Mongolia. At the Zabaikalsk-Manzhouli border oil terminal, the rail cars had to be offloaded and reloaded on trucks due to the different rail track gauges used by Russia and China.

Under Putin, the Russian government also limited Chinese as well as other foreign ownership of its major Russian energy assets, using such techniques as rewriting production sharing agreements or otherwise squeezing foreign companies out of important projects over time, even though this tactic often resulted in the projects’ losing foreign expertise and capital. In 2002, the Russian parliament blocked CNPC from acquiring a majority stake in Slavneft, a major Russian oil producer, even though CNPC’s bid was almost twice as high as that of the eventual Russian winner. Russia also declined a Chinese-South Korean bid to help develop the Kovytka Pipeline designed to link the Irktusk gas field to East Asia, favoring Gazprom instead. In June 2006, the Russian authorities did allow Sinopec to buy a stake in oil-producer Udmurtneft, but only on the condition that it resold sufficient shares to give Russia’s state-owned Rosneft a majority stake in the enterprise.

Until a few years ago, the Chinese and Russian governments engaged in contentious negotiations over which pipelines to build, where to locate them, the schedule for their construction, and who would pay to build and maintain them. Beijing has long wanted Moscow to devote resources into constructing immovable pipelines to China as proof of Russia’s commitment to a long-term energy supply relationship. Russians understood that their ability to attract capital and concessions on various issues from other countries would decline if they committed to pipelines supplying only the Chinese market. The repeated delays on the Russian side to conduct “feasibility” studies and “environmental” assessments deepened Chinese suspicions that their Russian interlocutors were trying to leverage the potential energy sales to Beijing to enhance Moscow’s negotiating leverage with Japan and Europe.

Meanwhile, Chinese negotiators had achieved significant success in securing oil and gas agreements with neighboring Central Asian governments, circumventing Moscow’s dominant energy position in this former Soviet region by outbidding Russian representatives. In particular, they built a massive Central Asian Gas Pipeline to convey natural gas more than 1,100 miles from Turkmenistan across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into China. Turkmenistan alone will supply China with 40 bcm for at least 30 years. Even if the recent Sino-Russian gas deal is fully implemented, Turkmenistan will remain China’s main source of foreign natural gas.

The growth of new Asian energy sources such as LNG, shale oil, and gas fracking have further complicated Sino-Russian energy negotiations since the Chinese could envisage acquiring alternative energy supplies at prices lower than Gazprom was demanding while Russian negotiators had to estimate when these sources might become available to China, and in what quantity, in order to reach an agreement before then.

But in recent years Russia and China appear to have overcome these obstacles. On May 21, the China National Petroleum Corporation and Russian energy giant Gazprom finally signed a $400 billion deal that will have as much as 38 bcm of Russian gas follow to China each year ofr 30 years starting in 2018. This mega-gas deal builds on earlier massive oil sales agreements, especially the 2009 and 2013 contracts between China and Rosneft, Russia’s main oil-exporting company. All these deals follow the “win-win” formula by which China loans Russian firms the money, often as large advanced payments, they need to develop new energy supplies and transport them to China. Russian leaders, in turn, guarantee energy deliveries to China through long-term contracts and the construction of immovable pipelines.

The Arctic is emerging as another area for China-Russia energy cooperation. Russia has relaxed its concerns about China’s efforts to acquire a presence in Arctic energy development since Beijing shifted its earlier stance that all countries, regardless of their geographic or historical connections with the Arctic, should have equal access to Arctic riches. Chinese officials have abandoned their call to treat the Arctic as a global commons available to all. They now publicly accept the existing Arctic regime, based on the Arctic Council, which privileges Russia and other countries with deeper Arctic ties.

An employee secures a protective cap to a steel pipe destined for OAO Gazprom, produced by OAO TMK at the company's plant in Volzhsky, near Volgograd, Russia, on Thursday, Sept. 22, 2011. Russia's largest producer of steel pipes for the oil and gas industry, isn't planning a secondary offering this year, its billionaire owner Dmitry Pumpyansky said. Photographer: Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg — An employee secures a protective cap to a steel pipe destined for OAO Gazprom, produced by OAO TMK at the company’s plant in Volzhsky, near Volgograd, Russia, on Thursday, Sept. 22, 2011. Russia’s largest producer of steel pipes for the oil and gas industry, isn’t planning a secondary offering this year, its billionaire owner Dmitry Pumpyansky said. Photographer: Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg

Russian officials have allowed the CNC to obtain the right to join Rosneft in exploring three offshore Arctic territories thought to have hydrocarbon deposits. Last year, the Russian government also permitted CNPC purchase a 20 percent stake in Novatek’s Yamal LNG project, marking the first time a PRC firm will have significant ownership in a Russian gas export venture.

The Yamal project costs $20 billion and involves creating LNG from gas fields north of the Arctic Circle. The deal also specifies that CNPC will purchase three million tons of LNG annually for 15 years, beginning with the first exports from the project in 2016.

Russia’s civilian nuclear industry aims to expand its presence in the PRC’s growing nuclear market by selling additional Russian reactors and other nuclear technologies and services. Besides the financial rewards from China’s growing market, winning more on-going and future Chinese tenders would showcase Russia’s technological prowess outside the defense sector and help convince other countries to buy Russia’s civil nuclear products.

The Russian government is seeking to expand use of nuclear power in Russia, and needs orders from China and other countries to help defray the costs of researching and developing new nuclear power technologies and modernizing its nuclear energy sector.

Given the hydropower potential of the rivers in the Russian Far East, as well as China’s intent to significantly expand its use of nuclear power, Russian energy companies would like to export much more hydro power to China. Since March 2009, China has resumed importing electricity generated by Russian dams and other power plants located near the Sino-Russian border. There are even reports that China will pursue alternative energy projects in the Crimea despite Russia’s illegal annexation of the territory.

Thanks to all these deals, energy has become a core pillar of the bilateral relationship between China and Russia, along with their renewed arms trade, their joint diplomatic relations, and their shared management of Central Asia.

Dr. Weitz would like to thank the following interns at Hudson Institute who have helped with this article: Samuel Chow, Logan Nagel, Dylan Royce, Daniel Urchich, and Melanie Weeks

Editor’s Note: Dr. Weitz has paid extensive attention to the Chinese energy policy and its Russian component.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/chinese-civilian-nuclear-energy-in-their-security-policy-the-russian-dimension/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/china-and-russian-oil-shaping-the-future-of-chinese-energy-security/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/a-shift-from-europe-in-russian-energy-policy/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/chinas-central-asian-energy-strategy-a-central-role-for-kazakhstan/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/chinas-energy-security-strategy/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/sino-uzbek-economic-and-energy-ties-a-growing-partnership/

Army ADA as Key Element of 21st Century Attack Defense Enterprise

Posted on June 1, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

06/01/2014

2014-06-01 In our book published late last year entitled Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21^st Century Strategy we highlighted how various innovations could come together to shape new approaches to deterrence in depth.

A key construct was that of shaping an attack defense enterprise.

The evolution of 21st century weapon technology is breaking down the barriers between offensive and defensive systems. Is missile defense about providing defense or is it about enabling global reach, for offense or defense? Likewise, the new 5th generation aircraft have been largely not understood because they are inherently multi-mission systems, which can be used for forward defense or forward offensive operations.

Indeed, an inherent characteristic of many new systems is that they are really about presence and putting a grid over an operational area, and therefore they can be used to support strike or defense within an integrated approach. In the 20th Century, surge was built upon the notion of signaling. One would put in a particular combat capability – a Carrier Battle Group, Amphibious Ready Group, or Air Expeditionary Wing – to put down your marker and to warn a potential adversary that you were there and ready to be taken seriously. If one needed to, additional forces would be sent in to escalate and build up force.

With the new multi-mission systems – 5th generation aircraft and Aegis for example – the key is presence and integration able to support strike or defense in a single operational presence capability. Now the adversary can not be certain that you are simply putting down a marker.

This is what former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne calls the attack and defense enterprise.

The strategic thrust of integrating modern systems is to create a grid that can operate in an area as a seamless whole, able to strike or defend simultaneously.

This is enabled by the evolution of C5ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and it is why Wynne has underscored for more than a decade that fifth generation aircraft are not merely replacements for existing tactical systems but a whole new approach to integrating defense and offense.

When one can add the strike and defensive systems of other players, notably missiles and sensors aboard surface ships like Aegis, then one can create the reality of what Ed Timperlake, a former fighter pilot, has described as the F-35 being able to consider Aegis as his wingman.

By shaping a C5ISR system inextricably intertwined with platforms and assets, which can honeycomb an area of operation, an attack and defense enterprise can operate to deter aggressors and adversaries or to conduct successful military operations.

Inherent in such an enterprise is scalability and reach-back. By deploying the C5ISR honeycomb, the shooters in the enterprise can reach back to each other to enable the entire grid of operation, for either defense or offense.

A key development last year which added new capabilities to the strategy was the deployment of THAAD to Guam, and with the addition of Army ADA systems, Aegis could be relieved of its defense of Guam duties and allowed to play the multi-mission role for which it is so effective.

And it is clear that this deployment is opening up possibilities for greater innovation in Pacific defense.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., says a THAAD missile defense system maybe deployed to South Korea, and it maybe the system currently stationed on Guam.

Admiral Winnefeld told the American Forces Press Service [AFPS] Wednesday, that the U.S. has already conducted a site survey in South Korea in the event that they need to quickly deploy a THAAD system to the peninsula to counter threats from North Korea.

According to the AFPS posting, “the Admiral identified North Korea, followed by Iran, as the chief threats to the United States, given both countries’ nuclear and ballistic missile programs”.

READ the posting on defense.gov HERE

The “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense” [THADD] system is capable of shooting down short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

A THAAD battery was deployed to Guam last year in the wake of a series of threats from North Korea. The system remains in place at Andersen Air Force Base in Yigo. Guam Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo has asked the Army to commit to keeping the THAAD battery here on Guam, permanently.

However, in a separate interview Tuesday of this week with the Washington Post, Admiral Winnefeld suggested that the THAAD battery currently on Guam maybe deployed to other locations in the region, if necessary.

“There [on Guam] it remains”, said Winnefeld, “readily deployable if necessary to somewhere else in the world if needed, but in the meantime defending U.S. soil from potential threats.”

READ the story in the Washington Post HERE

Earlier this month a group of Guam Senators toured the THAAD battery location at Andersen.

In reaction, Congresswoman Bordallo issued the following statement:

“I continue to assert that the long term deployment of the THADD system on Guam is critical to national security in the region. I have raised the long term deployment of this defense system with Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Martin Dempsey and am confident that the location and future deployment of this unit will be prioritized based on the evaluation of all security threats to our nation and our allies.”

http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45651:adm-winnefeld-possible-deployment-of-thaad-battery-to-south-korea-maybe-from-guam-&catid=45:guam-news&Itemid=156

We have focused considerable attention on the Army ADA opportunities in the Pacific and an expanded role. For some of these stories, along with exlusive interviews with a number of key warriors in crafting the new approach see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/a-missile-defense-commander-in-the-second-nuclear-age-an-interview-with-the-thaad-commander-on-guam/

https://sldinfo.com/the-thaad-system-to-guam/

https://sldinfo.com/the-allies-air-sea-battle-and-the-way-ahead-in-pacific-defense/

https://sldinfo.com/a-key-army-contribution-to-pacific-defense-the-evolving-missile-defense-mission/

https://sldinfo.com/the-evolving-contribution-of-the-army-missile-defense-force/

https://sldinfo.com/plusing-up-the-armys-ada-role/

https://sldinfo.com/the-role-of-ada-in-the-attack-and-defense-enterprise-reinforcing-forward-deployed-defensive-capabilities-in-the-21st-century/

https://sldinfo.com/complex-missile-defense-test-a-system-of-systems-appraoch-in-action/

https://sldinfo.com/pacific-defense-and-the-strategic-quadrangle-the-us-armys-taiwan-mission/

https://sldinfo.com/the-pacaf-commander-and-reworking-pacific-defense-the-aor-will-become-a-caoc/

https://sldinfo.com/the-re-shaping-of-pacific-defense-the-usaf-and-building-out-from-todays-force-towards-tomorrows-capabilities/

The photos below provide a look at the system.

[slidepress gallery=’the-thaad-system-to-guam’]

Credit Photos: DOD or Lockheed Martin

The first photo provides a sense of Guam in relationship to North Korea.
The second and third photos show the TEL for the THAAD.
The fourth photo shows the launcher at rest at sunset.
Photos 5 through 7 show the THAAD being launched.
The eighth photo shows U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Vincent Brooks takes a photo with the A4 THAAD during his visit to the unit at Andersen AFB, Guam on Sunday, Aug. 18, 2013. The A4 THAAD deployed to Guam in April as a part of the 94th AAMDC Task Force Talon Mission.
The ninth photo shows U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Vincent Brooks speaking with soldiers of the A4 THAAD about numerous personnel and operational issues during his visit to the unit at Andersen AFB, Guam, on Sunday, Aug. 18, 2013.
The final photo provides a graphic with regard to how THAAD works.

Harvard University and the US Military: Shaping An Effective Future Relationship

Posted on June 1, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

2014-06-01By Paul E. Mawn

Since the middle of the 20^th century, Harvard has unjustifiably been labeled as a bastion of left wing, anti-military elitists in the forefront of the myopic “Blame America first” radicals.

However, the predominate opinion of faculties & undergraduates at most universities have tended to skew to the left since the Baby Boomers revolted in the late 1960’s against the values and traditions of their “greatest generation” parents who won World War II.

For several recent decades, the decline in patriotism and service to country among many young Americans has been compounded by narcissistic lack of responsibility, the pleasure principle driving promiscuous sex and the growing use of illegal drugs, revisionist history, the breakdown of the traditional family and biased multi-media communications.

In reality, Harvard alumni reflect a bell curve of opinions and many have demonstrated courage, integrity and commitment by serving in the US military from the American War for Independence to the current World War against Islamic Fundamentalist terrorism.

In the past 2 years, Harvard has officially recognized the Army and Navy ROTC based at MIT units serving Harvard cadets and midshipmen which had been tied up in the politics since the Vietnam War and was further compounded by President Clinton’s “Don’t ask, Don’t tell” policy.

However relative to Harvard and the military, “Beachhead secured but mission not yet accomplished.”

The Air Force ROTC unit is still not officially recognized by Harvard which hopefully will be rectified in the near future.

However most importantly, only 0.5% of Harvard undergraduates are currently involved in ROTC programs which is paltry ratio compared to the high levels of ROTC participation in the early and mid-20^th century.

Harvard should reinvigorate its noble tradition of educating patriots who serve our country in the armed forces with great distinction by initiating the following actions:

Lt. Col. Ted Roosevelt Jr. in France -1918

Strive for the official recognition of Air Force ROTC

Initiate a pro-active outreach at Harvard College to admit both military veterans as does Columbia as well as freshmen demonstrating willingness to serve in the military as officers via ROTC

Teach military history and pride in the exceptionalism of the United States

Promulgate the long tradition of military service among Harvard alumni

Recognize military service as the highest form of public service

Acknowledge and promote the value & many benefits of military service to students, the country and Harvard College.

Provide a prominent place of honor for the forgotten Harvard alumni who died serving their country which happened to be the Confederate States of America

The Hall of Heroes hopefully will reinforce a general awareness that freedom is not free and a recognition appreciation by Harvard undergraduates in particular of the sacrifices of many Harvard alumni before them who paid a price in time, blood and restricted earnings to preserve our liberty with their military service from the American Revolution to the present World Wide War on Islamic Terrorism.

All military veterans from Harvard and elsewhere have taken up a challenge beyond their own self-interest and in effect signed a blank check payable to the USA for an amount up to and sometimes including their own lives.

All gave some and some gave all!

While not a contest in a race to “win” the Medal of Honor, all Harvard alumni should be very proud of Harvard’s premier position of Medal of Honor alumni among all civilian universities in the world.

Furthermore, the Advocates for Harvard ROTC fervently hope that alumni of all universities create their own Hall of Heroes website as permanent virtual memorial of their alumni military veterans.

All Harvard alumni but particularly those who are military veterans should strongly encourage Harvard to continue its recently reinvigorated traditional role of educating and training future military leaders.

We hope & trust that the Long Crimson Line of military service continues to preserve our freedom and continue to protect our national security as in the past. With a greater awareness of tradition, more Harvard students will hopefully the follow the advice above the Dexter Gate entrance to the Harvard Yard, “Enter to grow in wisdom!

Depart to better serve thy country and thy kind!

About the Author:

Captain Paul E. Mawn US Navy (Ret.) grew up in Lynn (MA) as the oldest of 7 children of a truck driver father who was a 2^nd class Navy petty officer in the Pacific during World War II.

At Harvard, he was a member of the House hockey team, Harvard Band, House Committee, Pi Eta Club, Hasty Pudding Institute of 1770 as well as serving for 4 years as a midshipman in the NROTC unit.

As a Winthrop House resident at Harvard, Paul graduated cum laude in Geology and was commissioned the same week as a US Navy line office.

After communications and intelligence training, he qualified as a surface warfare officer initially on the USS Spiegel Grove (LSD 32) later on the USS Thaddeus Parker (DE 369) and the USS Albert T. Harris (DE 447).

Upon release from active duty, Paul was in the active Navy Reserve for 2 decades in a variety of surface warfare assignments as well as industrial security and a petroleum logistics billets.

During his last 5 years in the active Navy Reserve, he served on the staff directly reporting to the Chief of Naval Operations on Navy Petroleum issues and other assigned tasks from the CNO.

The author has written a comprehensive look at the relationship between Harvard and the US military which can be downloaded here:

Harvard and the US MIlitary

According to the author:

The prime purpose of this introspection is to proudly promulgate the untold story the long Crimson line of Harvard warriors as a role model for current and future undergraduates at Harvard and elsewhere.

A secondary objective of this paper is to review the positive Harvard policies of the past that have helped to nurture and develop many Harvard heroic veterans and identify what needs to be done for Harvard to again have a preeminent patriotic role in educating and developing future military leaders.

China and Its Neighbors: Trying to Reshape the Neighborhood

Posted on May 31, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

05/31/2014

2014-05-31 By Harald Malmgren

China has apparently become far more aggressive about its legal authority and its power projection in relations with neighboring countries, particularly in the China Seas.

Friction with Vietnam has converged in the Chinese placement of an energy exploration platform in waters, which Vietnam claims as its sovereign territorial zone. The number of Chinese Coast Guard and PLA naval vessels accompanying this energy platform suggests Chinese government assertion of territorial and military authority.

Ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing trawler at 17 nautical miles distance from the platform was clearly meant to emphasize Chinese determination to assert authority over a broader geographic area.

Why confrontation with Vietnam?

The answer partly lies in history of China-Vietnamese tense relations, partly in China’s determination to extend its power projection, and partly as a warning to other nations in the South and East China Sea that China is prepared to act as a belligerent.

Vietnam is not part of any security treaty with other nations, and is therefore a convenient target for Chinese bullying, without likely countermoves by other nations.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (center) talks with members of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force in Beijing. China has been increasingly assertive in Asia, and many U.S. allies want the U.S. to have a strong presence in the region as a counter balancing force. Credit: National Public Radio — Chinese President Xi Jinping (center) talks with members of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force in Beijing. China has been increasingly assertive in Asia, and many U.S. allies want the U.S. to have a strong presence in the region as a counter balancing force. Credit: National Public Radio

The Chinese PLA also covets establishment of surveillance facilities in the East China Sea, and has spoken publicly of the need for sudden, sharp conflict with neighbors to restore Chinese territorial rights. One reason is that Chinese AWACS capabilities are limited, and the PLA wants radar surveillance on the opposite side of the China Sea so as to permit total surveillance over the region as a whole.

China’s announcement of the ADIZ a few months ago was part of this new assertiveness of the PLA in areas remote from China.

There are other signs of Chinese shift to further extensions of capability and power, such as attempts to negotiate facilities in Greenland, and intensive Chinese activities in connection with Sri Lanka.

Chinese efforts to build icebreakers indicate clear intention to extend Chinese transportation security in the Northwest (cross Arctic) Passage.

A question hangs over Chinese intentions, and that is whether this new power projection is primarily driven by the PLA or whether it is part of the design of the Chinese Politburo and Standing Committee of the Communist Party. President Xi has already succeeded in reforming and reconfiguring the power structure of the Party, the Politburo, and the Standing Committee. He has set in motion state charges of corruption involving the Head of State Security, along with many relatives and business relationships.

However, reform and reconfiguration of the PLA leadership is still at an early stage. It is not clear how difficult a power struggle may be involved.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/flipbooks/StrategicInflectionPoints%20May%202012/

However, it must be kept in mind that the PLA does not report to the Politburo or Standing Committee, but only to the Military Committee and the President. Within that framework, it is not known how much discretion is permitted PLA generals to carry out “routine tasks.”

It is doubtful the Chinese leadership wants prolonged violent conflict with any other nation, but it is unclear whether short, sharp military conflicts might be sought or found useful by the PLA in establishing the geographic extent of its power projection – and the commensurate challenge to the US and Indian Navies (and possible Japanese SDF) in their planned areas of potential operation in the future.

Putin’s various maneuvers with regard to US foreign policy responses are likely having impact on Chinese perceptions of US possible responses to greater Chinese assertiveness in its neighborhood. Growing indications of Chinese eagerness to “test” the boundaries of President Obama’s foreign policy tolerance led to pressure on the President to make a major foreign policy address at West Point in May.

Unfortunately, the recent Presidential statement by Obama of his foreign policy was narrowly focused on short-term, practical objectives, particularly on threats of terrorism, and on limits to projection of US military power in faraway places. Most of the traditional Washington foreign policy community of experienced diplomats and security officials were disappointed in the narrowness of the Obama statement.

Notably, important personalities close to Hillary Clinton have been publicly critical of the Obama statement.

Thus, it can be said that Washington is still in transition in seeking redefinition of its global leadership role. As November elections come closer, domestic politics will become more dominant, and foreign affairs will likely have limited attention.

Editor’s Note: The Chinese leadership have gone out of their way to assert their right to redefine the Asian neighborhood in a highly visible Asian security setting.

Chinese defense officials reacted furiously to U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s assertion that China has undertaken destabilizing actions as it pursues its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea.

U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel listening to Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong, deputy chief of China’s General Staff, at the start of their meeting May 30, 2014. Associated Press

Rebutting Mr. Hagel’s remarks, offered in a speech Saturday at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a regional security summit in Singapore, Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu told The Wall Street Journal that the charges are “groundless” and that “the Americans are making very, very important strategic mistakes right now” in their approach to China.

Gen. Zhu, who is a professor at China’s National Defense University, accused Mr. Hagel of hypocrisy in his assessment of the region’s security landscape, suggesting that in his view “whatever the Chinese do is illegal, and whatever the Americans do is right.”

Rather than lecture and accuse China, Gen. Zhu said that the U.S. “should treat China as an equal partner, instead of as an enemy.”

“If you take China as an enemy, China will absolutely become the enemy of the U.S.,” he warned.

“If the Americans take China as an enemy, we Chinese have to take steps to make ourselves a qualified enemy of the U.S. But if the Americans take China as a friend, China will be a very loyal friend; and if they take China as a partner, China will be a very cooperative partner.”

As a two-star general—and a military academic—Gen. Zhu isn’t part of China’s senior military leadership.

But his views reflect the deep sense of mistrust within some parts of the People’s Liberation Army toward the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, and America’s true intentions toward China.

China didn’t send its top-level defense officials to the Shangri-La gathering, instead relying on a number of English-speaking academics and PLA officers to rebuff accusations against Beijing.

http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-making-important-mistakes-chinese-general-says-1401526934?mod=djemalertNEWS

For a look at how Russia and China might well be shaping a similar playbook see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/what-do-latvia-and-japan-have-in-common-coping-with-military-leveraged-power/

Ron Maxwell’s Civil War Classics

Posted on May 31, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

2014-05-31 by Ed Timperlake

During these dangerous times it is important for all enemies and Allies of America to know that we are a peaceful nation until aroused.

Make no mistake there is a fighting thread in America with undaunted battlefield courage. Commanders and troops who fought for both the Blue and Gray understood modern war and many made the ultimate sacrifice.

This defining time in American history is being presented by Ron Maxwell. He is creating an anthology series of Classic tales of the Civil War to be brought to the screen.

Ron Maxwell’s project is reported on “Kickstarter:”

https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/334202292/ron-maxwells-civil-war-classics

Ron Maxwell has been heralded by the Los Angeles Times as our foremost filmmaker of the American Civil War.

His three epic motion pictures – Gettysburg in 1993, Gods & Generals in 2003 and Copperhead in 2013 – are unrivaled in their scope, historical veracity, dramatic impact and depth of understanding of the issues that tore the country apart in the middle of the 19th Century.

No other filmmaker has brought so many Civil War era characters to vivid life on the screen: Robert E. Lee, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, Winfield Scott Hancock, Stonewall Jackson, Meade, Longstreet, Burnside, Hood, Stuart, Pickett, to name just a few.

His battle scenes are unique in their authentic tactical re-creations, their intensity, their drama: Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg.

Ron Maxwell’s Civil War Classics!

Each episode will feature a well-known actor in the leading role, and each will be filmed in the landmark Maxwell style: historically true, first rate production values, fascinating stories, great performances, dramatic action.

And each episode, in the footsteps of the iconic series hosted by Alfred Hitchcock and Rod Sterling, will be hosted and introduced by Ron Maxwell.

The first episode of the anthology series will be developed and produced with additional production funding from Westie Films. Award winning filmmaker McKay Daines will produce the series.

Ron Maxwell’s Civil War Classics archive of titles.

Over a lifetime of reading and research, Ron Maxwell has accumulated an amazing collection of short stories written about the war, a priceless treasure trove of Civil War fiction written by both obscure and famous American authors over the hundred and fifty years since the war was fought.

This is a partial list from the hundreds of titles, novellas and short stories for adaptation to hour-long films for the continuing anthology series to be hosted by Ron Maxwell.

Journey to Shiloh, by Henry Allen

Seven young Texans who set out in 1862 for Richmond are recruited into the Army of the Mississippi and see action under General Bragg at the battles of Corinth and Shiloh.

Action at Aquila, by Hervey Allen

Picture of the war in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864.

Watchfires, by Louis Auchincloss

An upper-class NYC man and his wife aid the Underground Railroad.

The Valiant Virginians, by James Bellah

The Virginia Cavalry in the Army of the Shenandoah under Jubal Early and their defeat by Sheridan.

The Amulet, by Hal Borland

Confederate sympathizers making their way from Denver to join the Confederacy in 1861 become involved in the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, Missouri

Kingdom Coming, by Roark Broadford

Life on a Louisiana planatation during the war.

Salisbury Plain, by Henry C Branson

The experiences of a young Union officer during the war.

Boy in Blue, by Royce Brier

The war in the Cumberland Valley and the Battle of Chicamauga as it appeared to a Union soldier.

Wild is the River, by Louis Bromfield

Life in New Orleans during the occupation by Union troops under General Butler.

Rat Hell, by Peter Burchard

Twenty Yankee officers, captive in Libby Prison, tunnel to freedom.

Banners at Shenandoah, by Bruce Catton

Story of General Phil Sheridan’s Union cavalry operations in the Shenandoah Valley culminating at Cedar Creek.

The Crisis, by Winston Churchill

Hero is an anti-slavery New Englander.

The Red Badge of Courage, by Stephen Crane

A young Union soldier in his first action at the Battle of Chancellorsville.

The Far-side of Home, by Maggie Davis

Moving story of a Georgia soldier and his young bride facing the hardships of war.

The Kays, by Margaret Deland

Experiences of a conscientious objector during the war.

The Border, by Dagmar Doneghy

Picture of the ravages of war on the Missouri-Kansas border.

Shiloh, by Shelby Foote

Centers around the Battle of Shiloh, 1862.

Eight April Days, by Scott Hart

Story of the campaign of Robert E. Lee in the days preceding the surrender at Appomattox.

Seek Out and Destroy, by James David Horan

Based on the raiding trip of the Confederate ship Shenandoah in the last months of the war.

Elkhorn Tavern, by Douglas C. Jones

The Confederate and Union armies destroy a settlement in Arkansas as they wage a battle. The Hasford family watch as the wr rolls over their farm.

Bride of Fortune, by Harnett T. Kane

Story of Varina Howell Davis’s meeting and courtship with her future husband.

City of Two Flags, by Clark McMeekin

The conflict between Union and Confederate sympathizers in Louisville, who refused to accept Kentucky’s neutrality.

No Tears for Christmas, by Helen Topping Miller

Christmas at a Tennessee plantation house used as headquarters by Union troops.

Unvexed to the Sea, by Gerry Morrison

The siege and capture of Vicksburg.

Woman with a Sword, by Hollister Noble

Story of Anna Ella Carroll, newspaper woman and writer who is credited with planning the Tennessee campaign.

Company Q by Richard O’Connor

Hero undertakes an undercover spying mission into besieged Atlanta.

Untold Glory by Cothburn O’Neal

The spy activities of Felicia Shover in occupied Memphis.

Many are the Hearts by Bruce Palmer

Four vignettes with various aspects of the war as background.

The Bright Sword, by Eleanor Perenyi

John B. Hood’s campaign in Tennessee in 1864.

Crescent City, by Belva Plain

A Jewish immigrant family settles in New Orleans where their loyalties are tested by the opposing sides.

When the Music Changed, by Marie R. Reno

Romance set in wartime Washington and New York.

The Unterrified, by Constance Robertson

Copperheads in upstate NY.

Weep No More, by Janet Stevenson

Elizabeth Van Lew, a Southern abolitionist in Richmond, serves as spy for the North.

The Fathers, by Allen Tate

Conflicting ideas in Virginia, just across the Potomac from Washington.

Katy of Catoctin, by George A. Townsend

A romance involving the German-American settlers of the Blue Ridge mountains of Maryland. Story begins with John Brown’s raid.

Wilderness, by Robert Penn Warren

Story of a crippled German Jew who finds his courage on the battlefield.

By Ambrose Bierce:

A Horseman in the Sky, An Occurance at Owl Creek Bridge, A Son of the Gods, One of the Missing, Killed at Resaca, A Tough Tussle, The Affair at Coulter’s Notch, George Thurston, The Coup de Grace, One Officer, One Man, A Resumed Identity, The Damned Thing, The Man and the Snake, Moxon’s Master, The Secret of Macarger’s Gulch, The Moonlit Road, Beyond the Wall, A Jug of Syrup, A Watcher by the Dead, A Vine on a House, The Boarded Window, The Stranger.

The Unvanquished, by William Faulkner

Drusilla Sartoris, disguised as a Confederate soldier, goes to war with the men to avenge her sweetheart’s death.

First Blood at Harper’s Ferry, by James W. Bellah.

The Secret of the Seven Days, by J. W. Bellah

How Stonewall Came Back, by J.W. Bellah

The Lost Soldier, by John Brick

The Crystal Chandelier, by Joseph Hergesheimer

Weep Not for Them, by Clifford Dowdey

Gentleman in Blue, by Laurence Stallings

Jack Still, by John P. Marquand

High Tide, by John P. Marquand

The Rebel Trace, by Joseph Hergesheimer

A Mountain Victory, by William Faulkner

The Duke’s Brigade, by Clifford Dowdey

Beautiful Rebel, by Paul Jones

No Enemy, by MacKinley Kantor

Ambuscade, by William Faulkner

A Preacher Goes to War, by John W. Thomason, Jr

The Stars in their Courses, by J.W. Thomason, Jr

The Die-Hard, by Stephen Vincent Benet

Work: A story of experience, by Louisa May Alcott

Frank’s Campaign, by Horatio Alger

Norwood, by Henry Ward Beecher

The Return of the O’Mahoney, by Harold Frederic

Clarence, by Bret Harte

The Iron Game, by Harry F. Keenan

Tiger Lilies, by Sidney Lanier

Manassas, by Upton Sinclair

Baltic Uncertainties: Lithuanian Concern About Russian Naval Operations in the Baltic

Posted on May 30, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

05/30/2014

2014-05-30 Clearly, Russian actions in the Ukraine have focused the attention of the Baltic states as well as of the Nordics who are intimately involved in the Baltic region as well.

The recent piece by a Latvian researcher suggesting that the Russians are evolving their techniques and approaches to pressuring states via leveraging military power while avoiding direct military combat reflects concerns of states who see their national survival at stake.

The Russians are inventing a 21 Century approach to military power. It is neither hard nor soft power, but the use of hard power as the underwriter of a strategic communication strategy to achieve objectives short of an all out war.

Neither asymmetric nor convention, the Russians are shaping what this researcher calls a strategic communications policy to support strategic objectives and to do so with a tool set of various means, including skill useful of military power as the underwriter of the entire effort.

Now the Lithuanians are raising concerns about a particular form of Russian military harassment.

According to a Reuters story published today, Lithuania accuses Russia of harassing ships in the Baltic Sea.

“The Ministry of Foreign affairs expressed concern due to recurring Russian military fleet actions in the Lithuanian exclusive economic zone, which violate the sovereign rights and freedoms of Lithuania and other countries,” the ministry said after the acting head of the Russian embassy was summoned to the ministry on Friday.

“We encourage Russia to keep to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other international law consistently and ensure that such incidents would no longer occur,” the ministry said.

Lithuania’s defense ministry said Russian warships were found ordering civilian vessels off Lithuania to change course twice this week and once in April, referring to safety concerns due to military exercises in nearby Russian waters.

Modern Russian warships, capable of hitting targets 150 kilometers (95 miles) away, were involved in policing this week. The ships left immediately after a Lithuanian warship arrived on the scene, the ministry said.

A vessel involved in laying an electric cable on the floor of the Baltic sea between Lithuania and Sweden was ordered to move in one of incidents, the ministry said.

Will the European Union Actually Deal with Its Russian Energy Dependency?

Posted on May 29, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

05/29/2014

2014-05-29 When Washington has a problem, it is good to have a study announcing that whatever Administration moving ahead on the problem, which most often has been caused by the opposition party in earlier years, with little or no causative impact from that Administration’s party.

Brussels has a variant of the same approach – issue a policy paper if you have a problem and come up with a complicated statement of the problem and assert that a resolution is on the way, given time and enough money and enough consensus among the national governments.

With the Russians moving rapidly forward on the use of energy as a policy tool, it is not surprising that the EU has now issued a policy paper assuring us that a different future is at hand, in which the EU will be much more effective in deflecting Russian pressures.

Yesterday, the EU issued its latest energy security policy statement.

According to the Press Release accompanying the announcement of the advocacy for a new policy.

The European Commission reacts on the current geopolitical environment and the EU´s import dependence: It advocates a new European Energy Security Strategy. Diversifying external energy supplies, upgrading energy infrastructure, completing the EU internal energy market and saving energy are among its main points. The strategy also highlights the need to coordinate national energy policy decisions and the importance of speaking with one voice when negotiating with external partners. It builds on the progress already achieved since the gas crisis in 2009. The proposals of the Commission, including actions to ensure uninterrupted supplies this winter, will be discussed by EU Heads of State or Government at the European Council on 26-27 June.

European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said: “The EU has done a lot in the aftermath of the gas crisis 2009 to increase its energy security. Yet, it remains vulnerable. The tensions over Ukraine again drove home this message. In the light of an overall energy import dependency of more than 50% we have to make further steps. The Commission has tabled a comprehensive strategy today which will be discussed by EU leaders in June. I count on their strong support, since increasing energy security is in all our interest. On energy security, Europe must speak and act as one.”

European Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger said: “We want strong and stable partnerships with important suppliers, but must avoid falling victim to political and commercial blackmail. The EU and its Member States have a long list of homework in front of them: Collectively, we need to reinforce our solidarity with more vulnerable Member States. We also need to complete the internal energy market, improve our infrastructure, become more energy efficient and better exploit our own energy resources. Moreover, we need to accelerate the diversification of external energy suppliers, especially for gas. Only concrete actions will help.”

To ensure uninterrupted supplies this winter, the Commission proposes comprehensive risk assessments (stress tests). These would be conducted on the regional or EU level by simulating a disruption of the gas supply. The aim is to check how the energy system can cope with security of supply risks and based on that develop emergency plans and create back-up mechanisms. Such mechanisms could include increasing gas stocks, decreasing gas demand via fuel-switching (in particular for heating), developing emergency infrastructure like, for example, completing reverse flow possibilities and pooling parts of the existing energy security stocks.

To address the medium- and long-term security of supply challenges, the Commission proposes actions in several key areas:

Completing the internal energy market and building missing infrastructure links is essential to quickly respond to possible supply disruptions by directing energy flows across the EU as and where needed. The Commission has identified 33 infrastructure projects which are critical for the EU’s energy security. Apart from that, the Commission proposes to extend the target as regards interconnection of installed electricity capacity to 15% by 2030 while taking into account the cost aspects and the potential of commercial exchanges in the relevant regions. (Member States have already committed to ensure interconnectivity of 10% by 2020.)

Diversifying supplier countries and routes. In 2013, 39% of EU gas imports by volume came from Russia, 33% from Norway and 22% from North Africa (Algeria, Libya). While the EU will maintain its relationship with reliable partners, it will seek ties to new partner countries and supply routes, e.g. in the Caspian Basin region by further expanding the Southern Gas Corridor; by developing the Mediterranean Gas Hub and by increasing LNG supplies.

Strengthening emergency and solidarity mechanisms and protecting critical infrastructure. In this respect the Commission will for example review the provisions and implementation of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation.

Increasing indigenous energy production: This includes further deployment of renewables, and sustainable production of fossil fuels.

Improving coordination of national energy policies and speaking with one voice in external energy policy. The Commission aims to be involved at an early stage in envisaged intergovernmental agreements with third countries that could have a possible impact on security of supply. Moreover, the Commission will ensure that all such agreements and all infrastructure projects on EU territory fully comply with the relevant EU legislation.

Further developing energy technologies.

Increasing energy efficiency. As buildings are responsible for 40% of our energy consumption and a third of natural gas use, this sector plays a crucial role.

Background

Recent events have raised EU-wide concerns about ensuring uninterrupted energy flows as well as stable energy prices. At the European Council of March 2014 the Commission committed to conduct an in-depth study on European energy security and to present a comprehensive plan on how to reduce EU energy dependence. The findings and the proposals will be discussed at the European Council on 26-27 June.

On the one hand global energy demand is growing and is expected to increase by 27% by 2030. On the other hand EU domestic energy production has decreased by almost one-fifth between 1995 and 2012. Today more than 50% of the EU’s energy needs are covered by external suppliers: in 2012 almost 90% of oil, 66% of gas and 42% of solid fuels consumed in the EU were imported, representing a bill of more than €1 billion per day.

A recent piece published by the EU Observer provides a perspective on the context in which such an effort is being generated:

Although EU countries import 88 percent of the oil that they use, as well as 42 percent of solid fuel, the main concern of the commission and governments is gas – 66 percent of Europe’s gas is imported at a cost of more than €1 billion per day.

Of the 400 billion cubic metres of gas consumed in the EU each year, around 40 percent comes from Russia’s state-owned Gazprom. The majority of this is piped through Ukraine, currently embroiled in a dispute with Russia over how much it owes Gazprom for its past and future gas supplies…..

“We want to complete the internal energy market … and move away from a monopoly, Russia in this instance,” (EU Energy Commissioner) Oettinger noted.

The commission is also anxious to increase the amount of gas it buys from Norwegian company Statoil, which currently provides 33 percent of the bloc’s gas compared to 39 percent from Russia’s Gazprom.

But while Oettinger said a further 10 billion cubic meters per year could come from Norway in the short-term, EU officials have indicated that a larger increase in long-term supply will depend on whether Norway develops new gas fields in the Barents Sea.

In the meantime, the commission wants to run “stress-tests” over the summer to assess whether European countries could cope if Russia turned off the gas taps during the winter.

The bloc also urges governments to increase their gas storage facilities and agree more reverse flow deals allowing gas to be transferred to needy countries.

“We will look at an energy efficiency strategy for the next decade,” said Oettinger.

The paper confirmed that a terminal to handle imports of Liquified Natural Gas in Lithuania will be completed by the end of 2014.

The Commission paper can be found here:

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/security_of_supply_en.htm

For a study (Ensuring Energy Security in Europe: The EU between a Market-based and a Geopolitical Approach by Raphaël Metais), which questions whether the EU approach currently adopted can actually work, see the following:

edp_3_2013_metais