The Nordics, the Russians and Defense: The Baltic and Arctic Security Convergence

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/25/2014

2014-04-25 by Robbin Laird

The Russians have been map-making in Crimea.  With the Ukraine in play, close observers of Russian behavior are taking their measure of what such behavior might mean elsewhere.

Clearly, an area of note is the Baltics. 

With Putin’s emphasis on Russian ethnic solidarity trumping international borders, the Baltic area is an area ripe for scrutiny.

For the Danes, Norwegians and Swedes what this means is that Baltic defense comes into focus.

Notably, if one would look at the map, the Russian challenge in the Baltics and the Arctic requires integrated air and naval forces to defend Nordic interests, whether in NATO or not.

The map below provides one with a clear view of the confluence of challenges:

Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense
Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense

Certainly, the Baltic States have gotten the Russian message.

The demand side on the Nordics and NATO is shaped in part by Baltic expectations.

And those expectations are clear: to up the capability to defend the Baltic States.

Already in February of this year PRIOR to the seizure of Crimea, the President of Estonia underscored the reality of what needed to be done:

Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who congratulated the Baltic Defense College for its 15th anniversary on Thursday, Feb. 27, said in his speech that the current events in Ukraine prove that the Baltic States have to do more in the state defense sphere, reports Public Broadcasting.

“The events in Ukraine show that this fight goes on inside Europe, too. This sends a clear message to Estonia and the Baltic Sea region: we have to do more in the state defense sphere. Sufficient defense expenditures continue to be very important from the point of view of our security – this is valid for both Estonia as well as Latvia and Lithuania,” said Ilves.

The president stressed as his main message that NATO is trustworthy only as far as the member states of the alliance are trustworthy and responsible. “NATO’s credibility in our region depends both on the readiness of other allies to defend us as well as the efforts of the Baltic States to spend money on their own defense,” said Ilves.

He called the Baltic Defense College to speak up more in the regional security issues and increase the share of cyber and IT topics in the military education curriculum.

The Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) is a multi-lateral cooperative military college which educates officers from not only the three Baltic States, but also from NATO and EU states and other European states.

It was founded in 1999 by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania together with supporter states Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.

The reaction of one state – Sweden – captures the sense of importance in shaping an effective defense to deal with Russian maneuvers in Europe.

According to an AFP report, Sweden has decided to arm its Gripen fighters with a longer-range missile capable of operating across a wider area of interest.

“In the future the ability to combat longer range targets can be important,” Defence Minister Karin Enstroem told public broadcaster Sveriges Radio, adding that the missiles would have “a high precision which acts as a deterrent.”

“So it would raise our collective defense capabilities and thus raise the threshold effects of our defense.”

On Tuesday the center-right government announced plans for a 5.5 billion kronor (€604 million, $835 million) rise in annual defense spending by 2024 — on top of the current annual budget of close to 50 billion kronor — including an additional 10 Swedish-made Saab Gripen fighter jets, bringing an air force fleet upgrade to 70 planes.

In a statement the government referred to the “deeply unsettling development in and around Ukraine” and Russia’s occupation of “parts of a sovereign state.”

The Swedish defense forces have argued for longer range missiles to deter Russia from destroying Swedish weapons from a distance. The new missiles — to be fitted on Gripen jets — would double the current range at 1,000 kilometers (620 miles).

“It shows a potential opponent that we can fight at long distances and therefore we believe it is a deterrent,” Colonel Johan Hansson told Sveriges Radio.

“If we are detected early we must be able to have a firing range that is much longer than what we’ve previously been used to.”

A Swedish analysis of the shift highlights its importance.

Defence Minister Karin Enström said the high-precision missiles would chiefly act as a deterrent to other countries that might be considering an attack on Sweden.

“They would give new capabilities by offering a longer reach, but also the ability to fight targets that are further away,” she told Sveriges Radio (SR) on Thursday.

She said the move would “increase the effectiveness” of Sweden’s defense.

The cruise missiles would be added to the next generation of Gripen jets, and would be able to cause severe damage to targets 1,000 kilometers away. Current cruise missiles can only travel half that distance. The new missiles can fly at low altitude, have GPS guidance, and can maneuver like an aircraft.

And a Swedish analyst added:

“It’s not just a defense thing. In fact, the perception that weapons are ‘defense or attack’ is old-fashioned,” Hult told The Local.

“There is no static front these days. Modern Russian doctrines say that if war starts then they will strike at depth into any enemy territory.”

Norway and Denmark are also in the throes of sorting out their way ahead given the challenges to both the Arctic and the Baltic states and the need to ensure integrated air and naval capabilities to operate throughout the region.

Crew members of Norwegian minesweeper Otra stand on the bridge as they set sail together with Dutch minehunter Makkum, background, and three other ships of Belgium and Estonia from Kiel, Germany, Tuesday, April 22, 2014. The warships are part of the standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group ONE, one of NATO’s four standing Maritime Forces, deploying to the Baltic Sea to enhance maritime security and readiness in the region. The maritime Group was reactivated by a North Atlantic Council decision to enhance collective defense and assurance measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. (AP Photo/Gero Breloer)The Associated Press
Crew members of Norwegian minesweeper Otra stand on the bridge as they set sail together with Dutch minehunter Makkum, background, and three other ships of Belgium and Estonia from Kiel, Germany, Tuesday, April 22, 2014. The warships are part of the standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group ONE, one of NATO’s four standing Maritime Forces, deploying to the Baltic Sea to enhance maritime security and readiness in the region. The maritime Group was reactivated by a North Atlantic Council decision to enhance collective defense and assurance measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. (AP Photo/Gero Breloer)The Associated Press

In the current crisis, Norway is spearheading a modest NATO naval task force operating in the Baltic sea.

Five NATO mine-hunting ships set off Tuesday on a deployment in the Baltic Sea, part of the alliance’s efforts to strengthen its presence in Europe’s ex-communist east as members there worry about Russia’s intentions in Ukraine.

The ships — a minesweeper and a support ship from Norway and one mine-hunter each from the Netherlands, Belgium and Estonia — left the German port of Kiel for an exercise that will continue under Norwegian command until the end of May. Germany will then take command of the deployment.

Ironically, the 10th anniversary of Baltic membership in NATO was commemorated this month by a conference in Denmark at the Royal Danish Defence College, which simply amplified the impact of the Crimean seizure.

The Crimean crisis added a disturbing gravity to the conference entitled “10 Years After NATO Membership”, which was jointly organized by the Royal Danish Defence College, The Danish Atlantic Treaty Association, and the three Baltic embassies in order to mark the tenth anniversary of Baltic membership of NATO. Speakers at the conference included, among others, the three Baltic defense ministers, Danish Defence Minister Nicolai Wammen and NATO’s Deputy General Secretary Alexander Vershbow.

The Baltic defense ministers did not hesitate to underline the gravity of the situation and strongly urged that NATO increase its focus on territorial defense. Their intent was not to detract from NATO’s efforts outside its borders over the past 20 years, but, as Lithuatian Defence Minister Juozas Olekas put it, the time has come for NATO to engage with Europe once again.

“NATO’s Article 5 is more important now than it was at the end of the Cold War, he continued, referring to the confusion that Russia’s activities have created in the international security arena.”

The rhetoric was no less solemn with Estonian Defence Minister Sven Mikser, who compared the Crimean crisis to a ghost whom all had hoped to be a mere dream, but who now had turned real.

“9-11 changed our perception of security – the entire world spoke of a new threat, about asymmetric threat assessment. This promoted an illusion that traditional threats no longer existed.

The world has become more complex, but it would be wrong to ignore security threats, including those that threaten the territorial security of NATO countries,” said the Estonian defense minister, and added that just a few months ago a statement like this would have been labeled as paranoid.

However, the situation between Russia and Ukraine is exactly this type of ghost that also NATO must prepare for in the future.

And Russia being on both sides of the Nordics as a Baltic region power and an Arctic power focuses one’s attention.

The Russian European ports can look forward to be directly connected with the Pacific ports and with it the growth of infrastructure, ports, facilities and shipping, along the way.

This transforms the Russian defense and security challenge to one of securing the trade and resource development belt.  It also will see a significant upsurge over the next thirty years of traffic, commercial and military, through the area.

It will be in Russia’s interest to build air and naval assets, which can provide for the various needs for defense and security in the region.

Search and rescue, communications, maritime domain awareness, significant ISR capabilities, bomber coverage, submarine and surface fleet coverage and related efforts will become prioritized.

A new Arctic activism by Russia may well be part of the resurgence of Russia seen in recent Ukrainian developments.

A recent piece on RT (previously known as Russia Today), the international multilingual Russian-based TV network created in 2005 underscores a Russian perspective on the heating up of the Arctic competition.

But actions often speak louder than words. As the icecaps are melting, a military race is also building up in the region.

The US Navy recently debuted a revised roadmap focused on expanding America’s muscle in the world’s coldest ocean over the next decade, increasing the number of personnel trained in Arctic operations, advancing technical equipment and surveillance needs.

The ultimate goal appears to be establishing international order under US leadership.

“They want to be a leader and they see themselves as a driving force in the future planning of the Arctic,” Canadian journalist Ed Struzhik told RT.

Earlier this year, NATO countries participated in a Norwegian-led Cold Response exercise in the Arctic, rehearsing high intensity operations with 16,000 troops deployed in extreme conditions. Non-NATO participants, Sweden and Switzerland, also took part.

“The United States is anxious to militarize the Arctic Ocean. It has to do it via its relations with Canada and it is also seeking to do it via NATO, through the participation of Norway and Denmark in NATO. And now it is calling upon Sweden and Finland to essentially join NATO with a view to establishing a NATO agenda in the Arctic,” Michel Chossudovsky, from the Centre for Research on Globalization in Montreal, revealed.

Meanwhile, Canada has been staging its own independent drills with hundreds of soldiers participating in cold-weather winter warfare exercises.

Not to be left out, last year Russia announced the resumption of a constant armed presence in the Arctic, which was abandoned by the military after the fall of the USSR.

The Russian Navy’s task group headed by the country’s most powerful battleship and the flagship of the Northern Fleet, cruiser Peter the Great (Pyotr Veliky)went on a long-distance cruise in the Subarctic along the Northern Sea Route, which became a flagship mission in the region.

The group was accompanied by four nuclear icebreakers facilitating the passage through areas with particularly thick ice.

Now the once deactivated infrastructure will resume operation, with Russian strategic bombers patrolling the Arctic on a regular basis.

Last month, Russia’s Airborne Troops parachute-landed on drifting ice flows in the Arctic Ocean near the North Pole in a first-ever daredevil training search-and-rescue operation.

Moscow has been calling for tighter security along the country’s arctic frontiers and along its maritime transportation routes in the polar region…..

After highlighting that international cooperation in the Arctic was the best way to proceed for the use of Arctic resources, the piece then noted the following:

Back in 2012, Russia’s former envoy to NATO and current Vice Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, said that by the middle of the 21st century the fight for resources between various states will become “uncivilized.”

In about 40 years, Russia may lose its sovereignty if it fails to clearly set out its national interests in the Arctic, Rogozin said.

“It’s crucially important for us to set goals for our national interests in this region. If we don’t do that, we will lose the battle for resources which means we’ll also lose in a big battle for the right to have sovereignty and independence,” Rogozin stated at a Marine Board meeting in Moscow.

But the Arctic is clearly not a pure hard or soft power domain.

The area needs significant cooperation to work. This does not imply that military means are not part of the equation in assisting in core ISR, C2, Search and Rescue and other tasks.

Nor that having military means when others do not can clearly be useful when interpreting the map and interests in the fluid and dynamic region at the top of the world.

In short, the Crimean land grab opens up questions at the heart of Europe and in the Arctic opening at the same time.

And the Nordics are at the center of any Western response.

Social Media in Defense Intelligence Gathering: A South African Perspective

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2014-04-25 by defenceWeb

Last year South African soldiers deployed in the DRC as part of MONUSCO came under fire from rebel groups they speedily resorted to social media to let family and friends know they were safe.

This is one of the myriad uses of social media, which an SA Air Force (SAAF) intelligence officer sees as being a not so far-fetched tool in intelligence gathering.

Lieutenant Colonel QS Dickson writes in the SAAF publication, Ad Astra, that “the Internet has always been the savvy intelligence organization’s most valuable resource.

Social media is part of the perishable, time urgent information appropriate to the SA for military operations. Credit: defenceWeb
Social media is part of the perishable, time urgent information appropriate to the SA for military operations. Credit: defenceWeb

“A good intelligence analyst can use suitably vetted information from the Internet for many purposes and many significant finds, among them pictures, text and video. All have yielded valuable intelligence input. There are vast amounts of relevant information out there, just waiting to be discovered.

To properly exploit this wealth of information, intelligence organizations need to know how through the use of well trained, technologically literate personnel who are properly versed in the use and integration of various disparate sources.

One of these is twitter and the colonel maintains it is not as preposterous as many might think.

“Twitter has become known as the ultimate source of near real-time news. A breaking story, a natural disaster, a military coup. More often than not the first information of this will be on twitter, often hours before news agencies run the story.

“A large international user base, near real-time reports from all over the world, an effective search and indexing system? Sounds like a valuable overt collection resource for intelligence purposes if properly leveraged.”

 He points out twitter was used to determine when and where attacks were being launched against Libya (operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector) hours in advance of official notification.

“Additionally, the top secret raid on Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan was, if unwittingly, reported by Sohaib Athar(@reallyvirtual) while it was in progress.

“More recently the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) gave live tweets of its controversial Gaza operation (Operation Pillar of Defence) in near real-time.

“Closer to home, in Africa, twitter is also a factor to consider as the Internet becomes available in more and more areas, particularly via mobile phones. Among others, M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) gained notoriety for their use of Twitter (M23 Congo RDC@23congordc).

“The fact is intelligence strategies of the future cannot afford to ignore the new domains opened up by Internet social media.

As a form of overt collection it must be considered and exploited.”

It is likely most intelligence organisations are already including it in their strategies.

“The United States Naval Postgraduate School, for instance, has developed a new way to gather intelligence using the twitter application programming interface (API) and software called Dynamic Twitter Network Analysis (DTNA). This allows analysts to process large amounts of real time twitter data by hashtags, keywords, location and other parameters and utilise this to generate information of potential intelligence value.

“It becomes obvious twitter, is in fact, a bona fide overt source of intelligence gathering and that it is one of many opportunities to leverage the use of social media.”

After the surge in use of social media by South African soldiers in the DRC, the SA National Defence Force’s (SANDF) top communications team in its directorate: corporate communication held a workshop to look at ways of utilizing it to the advantage of soldiers and their families.

As far as can be ascertained recommendations from this workshop have been passed to Defence Intelligence for further input but no further information has yet been made available.

This piece has been republished by permission of our partner defenceWeb,

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=34477:social-media-in-defence-intelligence-gathering&catid=111:SA%20Defence&Itemid=242

Editor’s Note: The speed of information is a crucial aspect of modern life, including on the battlefield. Unfortunately, older concepts of information management dominant the classic security, defense and intelligence structures.  

There is a need to rethink considerably how information is collected, used and disseminated.

As Secretary Mike Wynne commented recently: “NSA wants to write  a book; the warfighter wants to fight a war.”

 

The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits: A Turkish Perspective

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/24/2014

2014-04-24 By Cem Devrim Yaylalı

The Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the Turkish Straits was signed on 20 July 1936 in Montreux. With this convention, the Republic of Turkey managed to end the issue of Straits, which was resolved temporarily with the Treaty of Lausanne, so as to protect its own safety and interests.

Considering the historical developments, Turkey had to allow the Straits as a gun-free zone to be administered by the Straits Commission under the Treaty of Lausanne. This situation which threatened Turkey’s absolute sovereignty and the security over its territory had to be corrected due to the increasing political tensions in Europe in the late 1930s. The Montreux Convention was the result of the political and diplomatic efforts that were made in this direction.

Through this convention that was signed by Australia, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Japan, France, Romania, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, Turkey’s limited rights were given back. Turkey gained sovereignty over the Straits Zone. The USA was also invited to the conference that was held before the convention. However, the Washington Government preferred not to participate and thus couldn’t become a signatory.

Northwestern Turkey is divided by a complex waterway that connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean Sea. The channel passing between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara is named the Istanbul Bogazi, more commonly called the Bosporus. Istanbul is positioned at the south end of the Bosporus. The Sea of Marmara is connected to the Aegean Sea by a channel called the Canakkale Bogazi, also known as the Dardanelles. The Turkish Straits, comprising the Strait of Canakkale, the Strait of Istanbul and the Sea of Marmara and, are unique in many respects. The very narrow and winding shape of the strait is more a kin to that of the river. It is an established fact that the Turkish Straits are one of the most hazardous, crowded, difficult and potentially dangerous, waterways in the world for marines. All the dangers and obstacles characteristic of narrow waterways are present and acute in this critical sea lane.
Northwestern Turkey is divided by a complex waterway that connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean Sea. The very narrow and winding shape of the strait is more akin to that of a river. The Turkish Straits are one of the most hazardous, crowded, difficult and potentially dangerous, waterways in the world for mariners.

The Montreux Convention guarantees free passage of civilian merchant ships without any restriction through the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus in peacetime. Therefore, the adoption of the Turkish Straits Vessel Traffic Services System, which was put into practice by Turkey when the number and tonnages of vessels passing through the straits increased dramatically, became possible after serious diplomatic negotiations between the signatories of the Montreux Convention.

Six out of 29 articles of the Montreux Convention were related to the civilian merchant ships while 16 of them were related to the war ships and aircrafts. Provisions regarding the passing of war ships through the Straits vary depending on whether these ships belong to a country with or without a shore on the Black Sea. Also, these provisions vary depending on whether Turkey is belligerent or sees itself under a close war threat.

The countries with a shore on the Black Sea have the right to transit their war ships and submarines through the Straits without any tonnage restriction provided that Turkey is notified eight days prior to the transit passage through diplomatic channels.

Ships that have a greater tonnage than 15.000 tons may pass through the Straits one by one and escorted by not more than two destroyers. The submarines are required to navigate on the surface and singly when passing through the Straits.

The definition of “ton” in the Montreux Convention, unless otherwise specified, refers to the long ton, which is equal to 1016 kg (2240 pounds) instead of the metric ton that is equal to 1000 kg. Moreover, the tonnage calculation of a war ship is made by taking into account the well-constructed and ready-to-sail ship’s fuel, all machineries, weapons and ammunition, its equipment, all its crew and their provisions and fresh water as well as all the tools and equipment that will be carried during a war.

Entry into the Black Sea

There are some restrictions in terms of type, number and tonnage for the transit through the Straits of war ships that belong to the countries without a shore on the Black Sea. These countries are required to notify Turkey eight days, but preferably 15 days, prior to the transit through diplomatic channels.

The Bosphorus (red) and the Dardanelles (yellow) are known collectively as the Turkish Straits. Credit: Wikepedia
The Bosphorus (red) and the Dardanelles (yellow) are known collectively as the Turkish Straits. Credit: Wikepedia

The countries without a shore on the Black Sea have the right to transit a naval force, which is not prohibited by the convention and whose total tonnage does not exceed 15.000 tons, from the Straits to the Black Sea. Even if the total tonnage does not exceed 15.000 tons, the number of ships cannot be more than nine.

The countries without a shore on the Black Sea cannot keep their war ships more than 21 days in the Black Sea. The total tonnage of war ships belonging to a country without a shore on the Black Sea cannot exceed 30.000 tons while the tonnage of war ships that can be kept by all of the countries without a shore on the Black Sea at the same time cannot exceed 45.000 tons.

Due to its date of signing, the Montreux Convention does not have a clear statement with regard to nuclear-powered vessels.

In fact, in the convention there is not a statement with regard to the engine types of the ships that will pass through the Straits. In theory, the transit of a nuclear-powered ship through the Straits is not restricted.

However, today the nuclear-powered war ships are either the submarines or aircraft carriers with huge tonnages. The transit of a submarine or an aircraft carrier belonging to a country without a shore on the Black Sea is not possible. Therefore, a nuclear-powered war ship has not passed through the Straits officially so far.

Straits during a War or Crisis

In the event that one of the countries with a shore on the Black Sea enters into a war, the rules of the Montreux Convention that are applicable during peacetime change naturally. If Turkey is neutral in the war, the transit of war ships belonging to the belligerent countries is prohibited.

The peacetime rules apply for the war ships belonging to other countries. The only exception of this is that if the war ships belonging to belligerent countries with or without a shore on the Black Sea have already left the ports that they are affiliated to before the war, they have the right to transit in order to return to their ports.

In the event that Turkey is a party to the war, the transit of war ships belonging to foreign countries through the Straits is left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government.

Similarly, if Turkey considers itself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, the transit of war ships belonging to foreign countries through the Straits is left to the discretion of the Turkish Government.

By means of this authority, Turkey can prohibit the transit of war ships belonging to the countries that cause Turkey to consider itself to be threatened with danger of war while it can allow the transit of war ships belonging to countries that do not cause such situation.

Montreux on a Global Scale

With the Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the straits, which we have tried to summarize above, the number, type and size of the war ships that can reach the Black Sea have been restricted. These restrictions increase the security of the countries with a shore on the Black Sea. However, the same restrictions prevent the desire of countries with powerful naval forces to be present and cruise in all seas all around the world.

Turkey has been trying to implement the Montreux Convention with great precision since 1936. Therefore, occasionally Turkey is exposed to criticism from countries both with and without a shore on the Black Sea.

The first big test of the Montreux Convention was, no doubt, the Second World War.

Turkey closed the Straits to the war ships of the belligerent countries during this war in which Turkey remained neutral. This situation served to the purpose of the Soviet Union since the transit of German submarines and war ships through the Straits was prevented. Axis countries couldn’t bring new war ships to the Black Sea except for those that were already in the Black Sea before the war. Submarines were transferred in pieces by land or through the Danube River so that they could be assembled in Romania.

The Truxtun passing through the straits. Credit Photo: C4Defence
The USS Truxtun passing through the straits. Credit Photo: C4Defence

However, in the following process Moscow’s perspective changed. The main reason of this change was the fact that the military aid convoys coming from its allies, the UK and the USA, could not pass through the Straits.

During the Cold War, Turkey was exposed to criticism of the Soviet Union and the NATO allies from time to time due to its way of implementation of the Montreux Convention.

The fact that in 1976 Turkey allowed the transit of Kiev, which was launched in the Nikolayev Shipbuilding in the Black Sea in 1972, through the Straits caused the protests among the NATO allies, including the USA.  Kiev was the first aircraft carrier constructed completely by the Soviet Union according to the Westerners. However, having been quite aware of the fact that violating the Montreux Convention would not be good for its own benefit, the USSR classified the Kiev as a heavy anti-submarine cruiser instead of an aircraft carrier.

Moscow couldn’t solve the problem with a simple change of name.

In the Montreux Convention, the aircraft carriers were defined as surface war ships, regardless of their tonnage, constructed mainly to carry aircrafts and enable the operation of these aircrafts in the sea or designed for this purpose. If a war ship was not designed or arranged with the purpose of carrying aircrafts and enabling them to operate in the sea, having a suitable deck for the aircraft’s take-off and landing was not enough for its inclusion in the aircraft carrier class.

In Kiev and the ships that came after her in this class, there were long-range anti-ship and air defense missiles as well as anti-submarine warfare rockets. Thus, the Soviet Union was able to classify these ships as a heavy anti-submarine cruiser. Today, having been taken out service by Russia, the Kiev, Minsk, Novorossiysk and Baku that was constructed afterwards passed frequently through the Straits while on duty.

A similar crisis happened in 1991 when the RFNS Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov, which still serves in the Russian Army, passed through the Straits. Although this ship looked like a classical aircraft carrier in terms of its structure, the Soviet Union classified it as a heavy cruiser due to some weapon systems deployed on the ship. Some NATO member countries put serious pressure on Turkey not to allow this ship to pass through the Straits, but they didn’t succeed in this effort. Unlike Kiev-class ships, the RFNS Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov didn’t pass through the Straits again after leaving the Black Sea in 1991.

The second ship belonging to this class was launched in 1988 with the name of Varyag, but no studies had been carried out on this ship for many years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This ship, as the flagship and first aircraft carrier of the Chinese Navy, passed through the Straits in 2001 with the name of Liaoning. Since its construction was not completed at that time, it wasn’t categorized as a ship and thus its transit wasn’t subject to the provisions of the Montreux Convention.

Montreux in the New World

After the terrorist attacks happened on 11 September 2001, the U.S. Government requested for help from the NATO countries within the scope of Article 5 of NATO Treaty. According to this article, an armed attack against a NATO country is considered as an attack against all of the NATO countries.

In this context, on 26 October 2001 the Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) that was the first anti-terror operation of NATO was launched. The operation that began with the patrols of the war ships belonging to NATO countries in the Eastern Mediterranean was later on expanded so as to search the suspicious ships and their loads.

Upon the success of the OAE in the Eastern Mediterranean, the operation was expanded to whole Mediterranean area in March 2004. On the same date, the Turkish Naval Forces launched the Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH).

The purpose of the operation, in which surface ships, submarines and aircrafts belonging to the Turkish Naval Forces were used at first, was to ensure the security in the Black Sea, create situational awareness and control the suspicious ships.

Aerial view of the Bosphorus from north (bottom) to south (top). Credit: Wikepedia
Aerial view of the Bosphorus from north (bottom) to south (top). Credit: Wikepedia

The OBSH actually had the same purpose with the OAE. The recognized maritime picture obtained within the scope of the operation, which is still ongoing, is shared with the NATO authorities and headquarters.

The Turkish Naval Forces invited all littoral countries in the Black Sea to participate in the operation that was launched with its own initiative, and Romania, Russia and Ukraine responded positively to this invitation.

The most important effect of the OBSH was that all the pressure exerted to modify the Montreux Convention and expand the OAE coming from the NATO countries without a shore on the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea could be resisted.

If the Turkish Naval Forces hadn’t launched the OBSH and made it accepted by other NATO countries, the OAE that was launched by the joint efforts of all NATO countries would have expanded to include the Black Sea. Therefore, they could have been in this sea and the war ships belonging to NATO countries without a shore on the Black Sea would have made it impossible to implement the Montreux Convention.

The Montreux Convention became a current issue after the Russia-Georgia War in 2008. Turkey didn’t allow the transit of the 69.552-ton hospital ship named USNS Comfort with the bow number of T-AH-20 that was desired to be sent to Georgia due to the Article of the Montreux Convention that read as: “In the event that one or more countries without a shore on the Black Sea desire to send naval forces into the Black Sea, for a humanitarian purpose, the said forces cannot exceed 8.000 tons.”

The U.S government did not welcome this development, which was neo-conservative during that period. Many American war ships that were carrying aid for Georgia had to shuttle back and forth between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea due to the restrictions of the Montreux Convention.

Another crisis broke out during the missile shield program which was established by NATO in order to protect Europe against ballistic missiles originating from the Middle East. Some of the Ticonderoga-class and Arleigh Burke-class ships in the U.S. Navy were fitted with the capability of ballistic missile prevention.

The Black Sea provides the most convenient location to these ships for hitting the enemy ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere.

Washington’s desire to deploy these ships, which represented the floating team of its missile shield program in the Black Sea, brought great discussions together.

However, the articles of the Montreux Convention that restrict the tonnage and duration of the ships passing through the Straits made it impossible for the American war ships to be deployed in the Black Sea within the framework of the missile shield program of NATO.

And 2014 Crimea

The presence of the foreign war ships passing through the Straits during recent Crimean events brought the Montreux Convention to the attention of the public once again.

When the Montreux Convention was signed, its duration was determined as 20 years. However, the freedom to pass through the Straits is unlimited. Termination of the convention can be only brought to the agenda by one of the signatory countries.

The USA, which will be able to bring its war ships for a time period depending on its own will with the repeal of the Montreux Convention cannot directly request the termination of the convention since it is not a party to the convention.

The countries with a shore on the Black Sea that have acquired rights by signing the convention prefer the continuation of the convention in consideration of their national security.

The fact that the convention hasn’t been terminated as described in the convention at the end of the 20 year-period and that this issue has never been raised until today shows that the Montreux Convention still has an important role for the signatory countries.

This article first appeared in our partner C4Defence in their March issue and is reprinted with their permission. 

Editor’s Note: Clearly a key question is the impact on Turkey of Russian naval and air power modernization in the region. 

With a likely upsurge in use of the Black Sea by a modernized Russian navy operating from an expanded infrastructure in a reconstituted Russia, how will Turkey respond?

For a look at the challenges of operating militarily in such a region see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/meeting-the-challenges-of-the-beaten-zone-at-sea-shaping-a-way-ahead/

 

 

Africa, Defense and Development: Why A Relevant Defense Capability is Important

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2014-04-24 By staff writer from defenceWeb

A pertinent illustration of why South Africa needs a capable and well-equipped defense force comes from a discussion by the chairman and three members of the Defence Review committee.

Taking the example of South African losses suffered in the Battle for Bangui last year, Roelf Meyer, Nick Sendall, John Gibbs and Tefo Koketsi said the country needs to stand aside from the emotions generated by events in the Central African Republic (CAR) and clearly assess the strategic purpose of its military commitments.

“Such commitments, with the potential to put South African soldiers in harm’s way, must always be measured against a clear understanding of both the role, which South Africa wishes to play on the continent, as well as its own national interest. The national interest must be determined amidst the collective aggregate of those indispensable political, economic, social and often intangible factors that advance South Africa’s democracy, freedom, security, well-being, prosperity and continuance.

Why Defense Capabilities Matter

“From a domestic perspective, the South African national interest focuses on the inter-related priorities of sovereignty, constitutional order, the security of its institutions, the upliftment of its people and the growth of the economy. Significant growth of the economy requires accelerated inbound and outbound trade (in particular higher-value products) as well as attracting significant volumes of foreign direct investments. Sustained value and volume of exports to traditional markets must be sustained and other high growth emergent markets must be accessed in Africa and beyond.

“The IMF projects that between 2013 and 2017, Africa will have 10 out of 20 fastest growing economies in the world. South Africa must penetrate these markets and enhance its share of intra-African trade by negotiated market access for South African exports through the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.

The growth of the South African economy is thus intrinsically dependant on enduring peace, stability, economic development and deepened democracy on the continent.

Security and development go hand in hand; the two are inter-linked and intertwined; and both are the continent’s biggest challenges.

SANDF troops in the field. Credit Photo: Guy Martin, defenceWeb
SANDF troops in the field. Credit Photo: Guy Martin, defenceWeb

“From a regional perspective, the South African national interest hinges on the recognition its own future is inextricably linked to the stability, unity and prosperity of the African continent.

The African Agenda is rightly at the center of South African policy. Africa however faces the enormous challenge of ‘rooting’ democracy. Of the 15 countries where leaders remain in power after coups d’états; 12 are in Africa, including the CAR with its own unique history of successive coups.

History demonstrates stability is seldom achieved through dialogue and negotiation alone.

Sometimes robust action, or at least the threat thereof, must be applied to resist threats to democracy and constitutional order.

“Africa cannot continue to expect the rest of the world to solve its problems; it has to become the architect of its own destiny.

The Challenge of South African Defense Modernization

South Africa is undeniably a major power in Africa, with the leading economy accounting for 24% of African GDP before it was overtaken by Nigeria earlier this year and as such, has a vested interest in contributing to the rooting of democracy, the promotion of economic advancement and the pursuit of peace, stability and development on the African continent.

“South Africa must further, both in terms of its continental leadership role and its own national interest and in partnership with other like-minded African states, play a leading role in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform.

“This will manifest in contributions to UN, AU and SADC security, democracy and good governance initiatives, as well as the conclusion of specific bilateral partnerships with other African states in the political, economic, social and security realms.

“Consequently South Africa’s future military capability must be commensurate with South Africa’s international status, its strategic posture and its inescapable continental leadership responsibilities. South Africa’s military capability must ultimately be able to support and enable this leadership role, as well as the pursuit of its own national interest.

“As South Africa increasingly assumes this leadership role, it will similarly increasingly assume the obligation to provide experienced military leaders and proficient and well-led military forces for peace missions and other military operations on the African continent.

“These may range from non-combat operations (where the use of force will be absent or restricted to self-defense) to major combat operations potentially utilizing extreme and deadly force. All deployments will require appropriate command and control, intelligence, firepower, protection, maneuver and sustainment. Notably, an operation in a complex post-conflict environment may be just as dangerous as any major combat mission.

“The future South African National Defence Force (SANDF) design, although informed by the primary object of the defense force as prescribed in the Constitution, must also be sufficiently robust and flexible to project and sustain special, land, air and naval forces over long distances and for protracted periods on the African continent.

“The focus of its future force generation must extend to: enhanced early-warning, intelligence and domain awareness; increased capacitation of Special Forces and Special Operating Forces; projectable medium landward forces with enhanced fire power, maneuver and protection for a range of complex contingencies; versatile littoral maritime forces with credible deep water abilities; comprehensive close air support, air combat and air mobility abilities; multi-role lighter forces for border safeguarding and other protection tasks; a core of mechanized forces which can be expanded as required; layered and deployable military health support and the support of a viable and responsive defence industry.

“But the persistent disconnect between the defense mandate, South Africa’s growing defense commitments and the defense allocation has eroded its defence capabilities to the point where the defense force is unable to fully fulfill its constitutional responsibility to defend and protect South Africa and its people, and is hard pressed even to maintain its current modest level of domestic and international commitments.

“The current balance of expenditure between personnel, operating and capital is both severely disjointed and institutionally crippling.

“There must be either a greater budget allocation or, a significantly scaled-down level of ambition and commitment aligned to the current budget allocation.

“In short, there are two strategic options available for government: budget must be determined by policy or, budget must drive policy. The reality will most probably lie somewhere in between the two. Nonetheless, the fundamental principle remains that force design must match the level of commitment and a balanced expenditure ratio must be achieved.

“South Africa is a developmental state with competing economic and developmental priorities that have seriously limited the resources available to maintain the defence force as a balanced and combat capable force capable of supporting South Africa’s strategic posture and its inescapable continental leadership responsibilities.

“However, the key question is not whether South Africa can afford to play a significant leadership role in Africa, but rather, can it afford not to? “

This piece has been republished with the permission of our partner defenceWeb:

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=34469:why-south-africa-needs-a-capable-and-properly-equipped-defence-force&catid=111:SA%20Defence&Itemid=242

 

 

Special Purpose MAGTF-CR: The Juba Operation

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/22/2014
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2014-04-22 By Murielle Delaporte

In a recent article published in Leatherneck, Murielle Delaporte provided an overview of the Crisis Response unit with a focus on the effort in South Sudan.  Interviews conducted in December 2013 at the Morón de la Frontera Air Force Base in Spain, where the SPMAGTF–CR temporarily has been deployed since April 2013.

In the following excerpt taken from the article, the author discusses the Juba Operation.

According to the Commanding Officer of the SP-MAGTF-CR in December 2013, Col. Scott Benedict:

The Operational Reach of the SP-MAGTF SR in miles. Credit Graphic: SLD
The Operational Reach of the SP-MAGTF SR in miles. Credit Graphic: SLD

“This force provides new capabilities where there has been a gap,” said Col Benedict.

Historically, we would provide this kind of capability of a Marine expeditionary unit [MEU], i.e., the Marine forces that are on ships.

Where there have been some gaps in the coverage of these ships, the Marine Corps created this force and intends to create others like it in order to fill those gaps.

So in that sense, it is a new capability, but the skills that we bring as a SPMAGTF are the same types of skills that Marines have always brought to the fight. In terms of comparing what we are doing now with what we have been doing in the past, my experience over the years has been that this is more the type of missions that Marines have done historically…..

However, what we have historically done is operate small units like this and provide very flexible and agile capabilities to respond to crisis. We have done it for years off amphibious shipping, and now we do it with the extended range capability of the V-22 which allows us to provide some very similar capabilities over the vast areas that we are responsible for.

The ACE commander, LtCol Freeland, who has been trained as both a CH-46 and a MV-22 pilot, said there is a paradigm shift due to the juxtaposition of the expeditionary vertical-landing capability of the V-22—especially useful if a runway or an airfield is not available or if it is necessary to land near the target—and the long legs brought by the KC-130J is able to generate on the theater.

“Both the MV-22 and KC-130J have worked together before in the past, but the way we are teaming them here is a little different: I think one of the best analogies is the tank-infantry team concept,” said Freeland.

We now share the whole mission together: It is shared mission management, shared functional responsibilities within the same flight.

Such a change is not overly difficult, but it is different, and we are expanding tactics, techniques and procedures to leverage the unique capabilities of each airframe.

You have, on the one hand, one V-22 aircraft going a distance, a good one but nothing incredible—let’s say 350 miles—and land vertically anywhere, and you have, on the other hand, one KC-130J which can fly thousands of miles, but [has] to land on a runway.

Now you put the two of them together, and you can take this team thousands of miles away and land anywhere.

This is a very significant paradigm change.

We bring agility and task organize the Ground Combat Element to go anywhere we need to quickly.

“The work we have been doing traditionally in Africa has been done off amphibious shipping,” Col Benedict added.

We would send a ship up and down the coast, and we would operate.

So, this is the same idea that we would not have a permanent presence, but different aircraft.

The capability that we have now is unique, as this pairing of the MV-22 and the KC-130J gives us the type of ranges that is necessary to be able to operate in Southern Europe, while still being able to reach all the operational areas that are necessary in Africa.

That is what I meant by bringing together the old and the new, because when the Marine Corps was envisioning bringing the V-22 forward as a capability, we envisioned this kind of distance to employ the force.

The operational reach in kilometers of the SP-MAGTF CR in recent operations or training. Credit Graphic: SLD
The operational reach in kilometers of the SP-MAGTF CR in recent operations or training. Credit Graphic: SLD

We just have not been [until now] in a position to take advantage or to have to use that capability.

In this particular mission and with this particular force in the area we are responsible for, we are employing the V-22, the KC-130J and a task-organized ground force at the distances we envisioned when this aircraft was designed.

That is revolutionary.

The Marines also are going back to some geographic roots as well, since they have had a long history in West Africa during the Cold War and in the ’90s and early 2000s.

Benedict added,

Well before the current ‘post 9/11,’ it has been episodic because we do exercises and theater security cooperation where we partner with nations, so we learn from them and they learn from us, keeping in mind that we might work together in the future for a common goal.

However, we have not based there.

We have been doing these operations for years, and it has paid dividends when we had to do ‘provide support’ for different countries on the continent.

Another MAGTF, called SPMAGTF Africa, is, in fact, more dedicated to training and partnering with African forces and has been building those relationships for several years on the continent.

This long-lasting effort has proven an essential part in the success of the recent evacuation of U.S. and non-U.S. citizens from South Sudan, with the ability to rely on neighboring partners such as Uganda, which at the time of the crisis actually was involved in a pre-planned small logistics exercise with SPMAGTF Africa, while USAFRICOM also was overseeing an aircraft mission flying 850 Burundians as peacekeepers in Central Africa.

Juba, South Sudan, also has been a case in point demonstrating the revolutionary capability of the pairing between the MV-22B and the KC-130J with the longest-range insert ever accomplished by the SPMAGTF–CR.

As the domestic situation worsened in South Sudan on Dec. 15, 2013, a decision was made to evacuate part of the personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Juba. The mission was given to USAFRICOM, which assigned its execution to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa based in Djibouti. It was under the authority of the CJTF-HOA commander, Brigadier General Terry Ferrel, USA, that on Dec. 22, 2013, SPMAGTF–CR repositioned about a third of its force—160 Marines and sailors—from Morón de la Frontera to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.

Approximately 12 hours later, a platoon-size element (about a third of that very force) was flown by a KC-130J to Entebbe, Uganda, in order to be better postured to support operations at the U.S. Embassy in Juba.

“Within 60 hours of receiving the execution order, SPMAGTF–CR inserted forces more than 4,000 nautical miles from Spain to Djibouti, Uganda and South Sudan,” said Capt Sharon Hyland, SPMAGTF–CR public affairs officer.

“The distance from Spain to Djibouti is equivalent to a flight from Anchorage, Alaska, to Miami, Florida. This was the longest-range insert to date for this force and was a testament to the organic aviation assets and our task organized force which enables us to accomplish our mission.”

On Jan. 3, 2014, a squad-size element of Marines from SPMAGTF–CR successfully evacuated more than 20 personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Juba, via a KC-130J in coordination with the East African Reaction Force (EARF).

For the full article please go to the Leatherneck website:

https://www.mca-marines.org/leatherneck/2014/04/filling-gap

It should be noted that there are currently three Special Purpose MAGTFs currently, not all operating with the KC-130J and Osprey combinations, in part due to limitation of numbers of assets.

The three are the Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF), SP-MAGTF CR described above and SP-MAGTF Africa.

The deployments for operations, training or exercises by the three SP-MAGTFs through mid-April 2014 can be seen in the table below and in the next table the aircraft used in the various deployments of SP-MAGTF-CR are identified as well.

Credit: USMC
Deployments of SP MAGTFs Through Mid-April 2014. Credit: USMC

 

Credit: USMC
Aircraft used by SP-MAGTF CR Through Mid-April 2014. Credit: USMC

 

Lt. General Robling, MARFORPAC Commander, in Darwin: Honors Australian Vietnam War Hero

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2014-04-22 by Robbin Laird

Lieutenant Gen. Terry Robling, commanding general of US Marine Corps Forces Pacific, speaks in front of Marine Rotational Force – Darwin about the relationship between the Australian Defence Force and the United States Marine Corps and the honor Brig. Michael Harris displayed on behalf of both forces in Vietnam, in Darwin April 22, 2014.

The Brigadier Was given the title of “Honorary Marine,” which can only bestowed by the Commandant of the USMC and has been given to less than 100 people in the history of the USMC.

Harris received the Bronze Star Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device for his heroic actions in Vietnam while serving as the commanding officer of Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. Harris was the first non-American to lead Marines in combat during the Vietnam War.

Marines with Marine Rotational Force – Darwin and Australian Soldiers with 1st Brigade stand in formation during an award ceremony aboard Robertson Barracks, April 22, 2014. Brigadier Michael Harris received the Bronze Star Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device from Lt. Gen. Terry Robling, commanding general, Marine Corps Forces Pacific, for his heroic actions in Vietnam while serving as the commanding officer of Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. Harris was the first non-American to lead Marines in combat during the Vietnam War. Read more: http://www.dvidshub.net/image/1263406/australian-brigadier-receives-bronze-star-service-during-vietnam. Credit: MRF-D, 4/22/14
Marines with Marine Rotational Force – Darwin and Australian Soldiers with 1st Brigade stand in formation during an award ceremony aboard Robertson Barracks, April 22, 2014. Brigadier Michael Harris received the Bronze Star Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device from Lt. Gen. Terry Robling, commanding general, Marine Corps Forces Pacific, for his heroic actions in Vietnam while serving as the commanding officer of Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. Harris was the first non-American to lead Marines in combat during the Vietnam War. Credit: MRF-D, 4/22/14

The ADF has served alongside the USMC in every major conflict since World War II and remains one of the strongest allies of the United States.

Recently, Brigadier Gen. John Frewen, commanding officer, 1st Brigade, Australian Army welcomed the Marines to Australia for their first rotation under a new agreement between Australia and the United States.

In the welcome, the CO provided an overview of the deep relationship between the Australian forces and the USMC, but reminded other powers in the Pacific, that the Australians were working closely with the USN-USMC team and would work hard to protect their regional interests.

“Our nations and militaries have very long standing relationships…. We have operated under your command and you have operated under ours in the First World War as well as in Afghanistan… The Marine Corps presence today in Australia is a very tangible symbol to our region that we stand together committed to peace and stability in the region.”

Credit: Marine Rotational Force Darwin

4/22/14

Background Note:

The 6 month rotation in Australia is an important part of the distributed laydown and building convergent capabilities among core allies and partners in the region. Notably, a key element in shaping a 21st century Pacific defense structure is working convergent or cross-cutting modernization between the United States and key allies like Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Australia.

And those allies are working their own cross cutting convergence often in multinational exercises sponsored by the United States in the Pacific or US training ranges. For example, the Australian Wedgetail commanded and controlled allied aircraft in a recent Red Flag exercise with South Korean and Japanese F-15s as part of the force. And this was after the South Korean F-15 crossed through Japanese airspace to get to the exercise.

At the end of my visit to Australia, I discussed the upcoming MRF-D rotaton with Lt. General Robling, the Commanding Officer of the Marine Forces in the Pacific or MARFORPAC. According to Robling:

It’s not about just building relationships in the region. It is about collective security in the region. Building collective security requires, in part, a process of building partner capacity, and working convergent capacities to shape effective and mutually beneficial relationships which underlie the evolution of collective security.

Our working relationship with Australia is a case in point. Even though they see themselves… rightly… as an island continent, they’ve really got to be part of the entire region’s ability to respond to crisis, both natural and manmade.  To do this, they can’t stay continent bound, and must engage forward in the greater Asia Pacific region.

By becoming part of a collective Pacific security apparatus, they get the added benefit of defending their nation away from their borders.  The Australian military is small in comparison to the US, but it is a lethal and technologically sophisticated force. In the face of a large-scale threat, they, like the US and others in the region, wouldn’t be able to defend by themselves.  They would have to be a part of a larger collective security effort and ally with the US or other likeminded nations in the region in order to get more effective and less costly defense capabilities pushed farther forward.

The MRF-D rotation comes at an important point in the Australian modernization effort itself. 

The Marines are viewed as important contributors to working with the Australians to enhance their own joint force operational approach as new capabilities are added, notably the F-35. And Australian modernization benefits the USN-USMC team in the region as well as the Aussies add important new capabilities to their forces which can contribute directly to enhanced coalition operational performance.

 

Shaping a New Approach to Force Insertion: The San Clemente Island Exercise

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/21/2014

2014-04-21 The evolution of USMC concepts of operations under the influence of the proliferation of the numbers and experience with the Osprey has been significant.

It is clearly to be anticipated that a similar experience will unfold, as the F-35B becomes part of the MAGTF in the decade ahead.

For the Marines, air power is part of the MAGTF, or put in simple terms, a key force allowing force insertion – built around the ground combat element – to occur in a diversity of settings and situations.  The reach and range of the Osprey has redefined operational dynamics at sea, from the sea and for land operations, including rethinking basic functions such as CASEVAC ops.

A key way to understand the difference between legacy approaches and evolving ones is to contrast a rotocraft enabled ground force with a tiltrotor and fast jet enabled force.

A rotorcraft enabled ground force is operating within the operational box of the rotorcraft range as well as the operating bases to support the operationsof the helicopter.  At sea this meant that the USN-USMC team operated within a 200 square mile operational area with a three ship task force.

With the tiltrotor and fast jet combination, the capability to disperse and aggregate force over a much larger area has become a reality. 

At sea, this has meant that the USN-USMC team can now operate with a disaggregated three ship task force covering more than 1000 miles in operational reach.

The addition of the F-35B will add “tron warfare” capabilities as well as new ISR capabilities to the USMC insertion force as well, and the Marines are preparing for the initial introduction of such capabilities next year.

The SP-MAGTF-CR

The impact of the reach and range of the pairing of Ospreys with KC-130Js has led to the emergence of a new force construct, the Special Purpose MAGTF Crisis Response capability.

We have followed the SP-MAGTF CR from its inception to recent operations in South Sudan.

As the ACE Commander of the SP-MAGTF commented in December 2013:

The ACE commander, Lt. Col. Freeland, who has been trained as both a CH-46 and a MV-22 pilot, said there is a paradigm shift due to the juxtaposition of the expeditionary vertical-landing capability of the V-22—especially useful if a runway or an airfield is not available or if it is necessary to land near the target—and the long legs brought by the KC-130J is able to generate on the theater.

“Both the MV-22 and KC-130J have worked together before in the past, but the way we are teaming them here is a little different: I think one of the best analogies is the tank-infantry team concept,” said Freeland. “We now share the whole mission together: It is shared mission management, shared functional responsibilities within the same flight. Such a change is not overly difficult, but it is different, and we are expanding tactics, techniques and procedures to leverage the unique capabilities of each airframe.

The Operational Reach of the SP-MAGTF SR. Credit Graphic: SLD
The Operational Reach of the SP-MAGTF SR. Credit Graphic: SLD

“You have, on the one hand, one V-22 aircraft going a distance, a good one but nothing incredible—let’s say 350 miles—and land vertically anywhere, and you have, on the other hand, one KC-130J which can fly thousands of miles, but [has] to land on a runway: Now you put the two of them together, and you can take this team thousands of miles away and land anywhere. This is a very significant paradigm change. We bring agility and task organize the Ground Combat Element to go anywhere we need to quickly.”

The work we have been doing traditionally in Africa has been done off amphibious shipping,” Col Benedict added. “We would send a ship up and down the coast, and we would operate. So, this is the same idea that we would not have a permanent presence, but different aircraft. The capability that we have now is unique, as this pairing of the MV-22 and the KC-130J gives us the type of ranges that is necessary to be able to operate in Southern Europe, while still being able to reach all the operational areas that are necessary in Africa. That is what I meant by bringing together the old and the new, because when the Marine Corps was envisioning bringing the V-22 forward as a capability, we envisioned this kind of distance to employ the force.

“We just have not been [until now] in a position to take advantage or to have to use that capability. In this particular mission and with this particular force in the area we are responsible for, we are employing the V-22, the KC-130J and a task-organized ground force at the distances we envisioned when this aircraft was designed. That is revolutionary.”

A notional understanding of the impact in terms of operational reach can be seen in the following graphic which correlates missions – training or operational – which the SP-MAGTF based for now in Spain has undergone and the operational reach which the force has demonstrated to date.

This operational dynamic obviously has nothing to do with a traditional rotorcraft enabled force.

But it is not just about reach and range; it is about empowering the insertion force to become much more effective as well.

The Marines are engaged in a series of exercises to re-shape the capability of the ground combat element to operate with much greater situational awareness prior to disembarking from the Ospreys for a mission. 

This is also required because of the amount of time the GCE might have on the Osprey prior to disembarking compared with the much more limited time scale for a rotorcraft insertion.

Talon Reach: December 2013

We reported on a raid exercise performed in December 2013 which tested out new ways to engage the force.

The exercise was called TALON REACH and was the culminating event for IOC Class 1-14.  This event was conducted under one period of darkness between 29 Palms California and Ft Hood Texas.

According to Lt. Col. Bill Hendricks, a Cobra driver, and currently assigned to USMC Aviation Headquarters as the air-ground weapons requirements officer, the exercise is built around innovation being generated by the working relationship between the infantry and aviation communities in the USMC.

Hendricks focused on  how mission planning can change significantly with the new configuration of insertion forces and how that approach can, in turn, significantly shorten the time from launch to operating in the objective area. Rather than several hours on the ground planning the mission and then launching the force mission, now the time associated with the Rapid Response Planning Process can be significantly reduced.  A new process is being developed.

The insertion force takes off and then does the planning en route (given the range and time in transit) and provides real time information to the GCE and ACE commanders aboard the Osprey prior to going into the objective area.

And this most recent experiment is really only the tip of the iceberg so to speak.  Given that the Ospreys are paired with KC-130Js there is no inherent reason that the bigger planes cannot carry mission planning and management support systems. And as the Harvest Hawk configured C-130s return from Afghanistan, these planes could be used as the lead element in the insertion of a long-range insertion package as well.

The next iteration of the exercise took place last month.

Operating from the training base in Twentynine Palms and landing on San Clemente Island off of California, approximately 100 students from the Infantry Officer Course in Quantico flew aboard Ospreys to the simulated test area to eliminate cruise missile threats and take back an airfield from enemy forces.

The exercise was conducted by the Infantry Officer Course paired with Ospreys from VMX-22 and multiple 3D MAW squadrons.

The Ospreys were accompanied by a specially configured Osprey with an airborne communication gateway with a Wi-Fi network that linked the tablets carried by the squads riding in the Ospreys.  The KC-130Js flew as facilitators of the raid and in support.

Finally, the Cat Bird, the F-35 surrogate sensor aircraft, which operated its sensor sent real time information about the objective area to the Marines en route to the objective area. The information shared included maps, images from the strike aircraft, as well as text messaging among the ground force element aboard the Ospreys.

The F-35s provided the capability to eliminate the ground missile threats and allowed a distributed company to be inserted to do their job.

In other words, the Osprey carried the force; the F-35 surrogate providing the cover which could insert the force more effectively. 

Such an approach has NOTHING to do with the classic thinking of how a rotorcraft force would approach the challenge of ground force insertion into air enabled contested areas.

Col Orr on the San Clemente Exercise

To better understand the approach and the way ahead in USMC innovation, we spoke with the CO of VMX-22, Col. Michael Orr and will be following up with the head of the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) as well.

Orr underscored that the organizational innovation of VMX-22 working with the IOC was a key element in shaping an approach to technological innovation in shaping an insertion force operating at greater distance than before. As mentioned above, the Cat Bird, the F-35 surrogate, as well as KC-130Js for tanking and Harriers and F-18s for close air support operated with the force.

According to Orr, a key question being addressed by the series of exercises is the following:

What technology is out there today that could easily and inexpensively solve some of our connectivity challenges? 

Is there smartphone and tablet technology that can be leveraged to re-shape situational awareness for the ground force?

The technological evolution – which is in effect a combat cloud empowering the force – carries with it changes in decision making as well.

According to Col. Orr:

We are pushing the concept of providing situational awareness to a much lower tactical level than we have ever done before. 

We are empowering decision makers at a much lower level while shaping a robust ground and air picture for the overall force. 

You would be amazed at what can be achieved as we move forward along these lines. And we are just beginning to understand the art of the possible.”

Orr added that:

“We take an aggregate air picture which traditionally would be only available to an air operations center and push it down to the users at platoon or squad level.

My background as a Link-16 enabled aviator has taught me the benefits of increased situational awareness.

We are trying to take the increased situational awareness picture down to a junior level. 

As General Mattis likes to say, we push information to the ‘point of discomfort’. 

Amazing things can happen when we act this way.

Another way to look at this is re-shaping how the force is inserted to give it a higher probability of success or to provide for better risk management for the insertion of force itself. 

The Osprey has an extraordinary capability to operate in a variety of ways in an objective area to perform the basic landing zone task.  What the enhanced SA linked with its operational flexibility is to enhance the ability to manage the risk of the initial insertion of force.

Col. Orr highlighted that the evolving approach is correlated with the changing strategic environment as well.

We are overlaying this technology capability over some difficult challenges we face with area denial weapons. 

How do we empower a distributed force  to operate in a disputed force area characterized by significant area denial weapons?

Col. Orr discussed how the various elements in the exercise worked together.

“he F-35 surrogate opened the door to provide the initial cover for the force insertion. 

We data linked the information from the F-35 through secure Wi-Fi technology to the ground and air assets.

The raid force had access to tablets where the information was presented in a “user friendly” graphical format. 

They could see what was happening in real time and react to in the changing tactical situation to enabled ecision-making and changes in the scenario.

With streaming video and real time interactive chat, we are changing significantly the threat information upon which the insertion force is operated.

We have an Osprey-enabled force of a small company empowered by information directly from the F-35 or other airborne sensors, and can make decisions directly from that information.

Marines conduct patrols through the night during the Infantry Officer’s Course aboard San Clemente Island, Calif., Mar. 24. The Marines patrolled a total of 23 km before taking the final objective during the course. Credit: Marine Corps Air Station Miramar / 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 3/24/14
Marines conduct patrols through the night during the Infantry Officer’s Course aboard San Clemente Island, Calif., Mar. 24. The Marines patrolled a total of 23 km before taking the final objective during the course. Credit: Marine Corps Air Station Miramar / 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 3/24/14

In effect, one is trying to maximize decision-making superiority for the initial insertion of force into a fluid battlespace.

Notably, the Marine Corps is preparing for its entry into service by the F-35B and building technology out into the direction of the inclusion of the F-35B into the MAGTF itself.

Col. Orr noted that the innovation they are pursuing through the exercise is also very cost effective.

We are using tablet technologies to display the data and connect the force visually. 

Rather than radios, tablets provide a very good way to connect the force in route.

We are looking to get away from proprietary and single mission technology to an applications based approach.

These C2 tools are becoming much more user friendly, and working via a tablet helps in that process.

With regard to security, Col. Orr emphasized the time urgent nature of the information being generated in flight to support the mission.  The security question is important but not should be confused with the security of long term data in servers supporting an intelligence community.  This is perishable, rapidly changing data and as such the security challenge is SIGNIFICANTLY different than the security of a data farm.

The cluster within the air combat cloud is the operative element enabling the insertion force.

Col. Orr argued,

Our thinking on information assurance is changing. 

We assume that we don’t have 100% long term security of the data. 

Security is a relative term; I need accurate information for the most critical phase of the operation and have to operate on this more rapidly than the adversary or his ability to operate on that data.

Much of the information being provided is fleeting and temporal. 

Our understanding of information assurance needs to consider this basic combat reality.

Note: The video above is credited to Marine Corps Air Station Miramar / 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing and is dated 4/9/14.

 [slidepress gallery=’san-clemente’]

Credit: Marine Corps Air Station Miramar / 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing:03/24/2014

  • In the first photo, Marines conduct patrols through the night during the Infantry Officer’s Course aboard San Clemente Island, Calif., Mar. 24. The Marines patrolled a total of 23 km before taking the final objective during the course.
  • In the second photo, Marines employ the Wasp Micro Air Vehicle to scout ahead to inform the Marines of potential threats during the Infantry Officer’s Course aboard San Clemente Island, Calif., Mar. 24.
  • In the third photo, 2nd Lt. Kyle Olson, an Infantry Officer’s Course student, utilizes a tablet to communicate with his Marines in real time during the Infantry Officer’s Course aboard San Clemente Island, Calif., Mar. 24. Olson patrolled with his Marines 23km before taking the final objective.

For earlier pieces on Talon Reach see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/talon-reach-shaping-a-combat-cloud-to-enable-an-insertion-force/

https://sldinfo.com/thinking-beyond-the-osprey-magtf-innovation-and-coalition-capabilities/

https://sldinfo.com/innovation-in-long-range-21st-century-magtf-operations-the-gce-and-ace-work-the-challenges/

 

Russia Annexes Crimea: A Turkish Perspective on the Way Ahead

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2014-04-21 By Ardan Zentürk

The banner hung by the demonstrators who occupied the regional government building in the center of Donetsk, a city in eastern Ukraine, where the Russian population is dense, can be characterized as the symbol of the new era in Eurasia: “Russia! Save us from slavery!”

The period, which began with the demonstrations that were held by the pro-Europeans in the popular square of Kiev, the Maidan, and led the president Yanukovich, who was elected with votes cast from the regions where the Russians live predominantly in Ukraine, to run away, shows that we are now facing a different Russia.

Yanukovich was a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and therefore fled to Russia.

The Russian population was peaceful and at ease in Ukraine in times when Yakunovich objected to the will of the Ukrainian people to integrate with the European Union and followed the path paved on the course of the Eurasian Economic Community led by Russia…

However, now Yakunovich has gone and Kiev is under the control of the pro-Europeans, and maybe, the forced marriage that has been pushed along since 2004 has finally come to an end.

From a realistic perspective, Ukraine actually can be defined as a country de facto split into two along the Dnieper River.

On the west side of the river, there are Ukrainian people who long for Europe while on the east side there are Russian people and those who opt for Moscow.

Nevertheless, the grandchildren of the Russian population domiciled by Stalin since 1944 in place of the Tatars that were exiled to Crimea have adopted this preference without much difficulty. They represented 65 % of the Crimean population and as the majority, they took over the control and annexed this peninsula, which used to belong to Ukraine, to Russia by means of referendum and constitutional amendments.

This development caused tensions to arise all around the world and everybody reacted to this in some way or other; however, the reactions were softer than estimated and the reason was lying in the history of Crimea.

Crimea was annexed to the territory of the Russian Empire in the late 18th century and the early 19th century. Fending off first the Crimean Khanate and then the Ottoman Empire from the region, the Tsarist Russia had thus initiated the Russianization program in the region long before Stalin.

Crimea became a part of Russia during the period of the Soviet Union.

In 1954, Crimea was annexed to Kiev by Moscow as a gesture of two close neighbors in the Soviet Union. Of course in 1954, nobody could ever imagine that the Soviet Union would be dissolved one day.

In 1991, with the dissolution of the USSR, Crimea naturally remained as a part of the independent Ukraine.

Considering these historical facts, the world regarded the annexation of Crimea as taking back the Russian territory given by the Soviet authorities to Ukraine as a gesture. Nobody ever thought that the real owner of this territory was actually the Tatars who had suffered great pains and exiles…

Now, “New Russia…”

The statements of the Russian leader Vladimir Putin in the face of these developments indicate that we are now facing a new Russia.

Putin clearly stated that the Russian people had suffered great injustice during the dissolution of the Soviet Union and they had had to put up with this at that time, but that they didn’t have to put up with such injustice anymore.

This approach stressed that a Russian, no matter where he/she lives, was under the protection of his/her homeland.

The reaction of this state, which has turned into Russian Federation with its present borders following the dissolution the Soviet Union that was derived from the Tsarist Empire, tended to see the regions where the Russians live within its own borders.

Russia forcibly annexes Crimea and then holds a referendum for inclusion. Photo Credit: C4Defence
Russia forcibly annexes Crimea and then holds a referendum for inclusion. Photo Credit: C4Defence

Although this situation could not be tolerated easily by the world, it was somehow accepted in the case of Crimea.

However, it is a clear fact that things will be very different when the Ukraine’s east regions, where the Russian people live, come into the question…

The world did not ignore Crimea, only told Putin to stop there.

However, the incidents occurred in the eastern cities of Ukraine, especially in Donetsk and Kharkiv, show that Putin is not planning to stop.

Otherwise, how could it be explained that the fully armed Russian militia gained control in the streets of eastern cities while the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned the Ukrainian administration sternly about not using weapons against the Russian population living within its borders?

The first policy of Russia was to keep the republics emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union under a single roof and to strengthen its own presence in the new order. Convincing Armenia to join the Eurasian Economic Community, which was formed by Russia along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, has been the biggest success achieved so far.

Turkmenistan tries to be the independent and non-aligned Switzerland of Eurasia. Azerbaijan and Georgia seem to have taken sides with Europe and NATO while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan try to stay away from Moscow’s guardianship as much as possible, and all these happen in a period when a powerful country like Ukraine was on the brink of siding with Moscow.

Actually Putin sees that the Shanghai Five, established by Russia and People’s Republic of China, is no more the equilibrant in the world strategy and the peoples with whom they got along during the period of the Soviet Union are increasingly drawing away.

The solution is to secure the present borders of the Russian Confederation, take control of the new separatist tendencies that may arise such as Chechnya from the beginning and include, if possible, the Russian people living outside the borders…

A big problem would emerge…

Considering the world map that has come out after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, three big countries seem to be at the target of the Vladimir Putin’s cross-border nationalist movement. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine…

Since Belarus and Kazakhstan are now close friends with Moscow, they may not see themselves as a target, but they will absolutely think that this tendency that has begun in Ukraine could threaten their own borders one day.

Also, Moldova has to think that it may be inevitable one day for Transnistria region to become Russia’s territory as in the example of Crimea, because Transnistria shares a similar destiny to Crimea that began in 1944. In 1944, the Red Army that repelled the Nazi armies and took the control in this region blamed people living there for being Nazi collaborators just like Tatars, and in 1949 exiled these people to Siberia and Central Asia and brought Russian people instead of them.

While Moldova moved towards its independence in 1990, the people of Transnistria entered into an independence war that would last until 1992 and then wanted to be annexed to Russia. Transnistria appears to be within the borders of Moldova, but its desire to be annexed to Russia still continues. Therefore, nobody can guarantee that Putin would not include this region like Crimea into its borders and surround Ukraine from the west.

In the territory of Kazakhstan that was exposed to a serious Russianization policy in the period of the Soviet Union, the Russian people constitute 40 % of the population. In the event that Putin annexes the territories where Russian people live in Ukraine to its borders, it would be a matter of time for the northern region where Russian population is dense in this country to be separated…

Russia gives a clear message to the whole Eurasian region by means of the annexation of Crimea: Now all borders can be questioned and if necessary all borders can be changed…

 How can it be stopped?

The fact that Ukraine is on the brink of a civil war and the possible emergence of a country with different borders after a blood bath would be a quite difficult development for Eurasia to handle…

Also, in the event that the powers in the Maidan of Kiev that have taken control of the country become captive of the ultra-nationalist Ukrainian activists, this scenario for Eurasia would become quite impossible to settle…

Although the world regards the fights in Maidan and the emerging political entity as pro-European and pro-democracy, one of the facts behind the scenes is that the ultra-nationalist elements have gained more power from their social base through this movement.

Now, we are faced with a movement that excludes the Russians and tries to drive the Ukrainian communists, socialists and liberals into a corner.

Perhaps the high risk posed by this movement towards Ukraine has been better understood today because the decision taken by the Ukrainian parliament after the Yakunovich’s escape with regard to the abolishment of the Russian from the official language has already left a mark in history as a big mistake.

If Ukraine turns into a country where ultra-nationalists are too powerful and rule over everything, the conflicts will occur inevitably.

However, if the Ukrainian people can control the ultra-nationalists and agree on a new federative constitution, Eurasia and thus the whole world will be able to overcome a major tension.

Allowing the Russian people living in the east of the country to regulate their daily lives more autonomously and use their mother tongue as the official language would be an important development for alleviating the tension.

Moreover, in order to prevent Putin from repressing the borders of countries where Russians live predominantly, federative structures should be encouraged in those countries.

“New Russia” is a concept as explained above…

We will stop it by means of present democratic mechanisms or everything will get out of control and we will witness great sufferings..

This article first appeared in our partner C4Defence in their March issue and is reprinted with their permission.