Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

Meeting the Challenges of “The Beaten Zone” at Sea: Shaping a Way Ahead

Posted on March 18, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

03/18/2014

2014-03-18 By Ed Timperlake

A recent news event triggered some thinking about the challenges of working within constrained waters. The news event was that the USS Tuxtun was crossing the Dardanelles en route to the Black Sea.

According to a Russian news source (with a video contained within of the ship underway):

The Dardanelles is a narrow stretch of water in Turkey that separates Europe and Asia.

The Truxton still has to pass through the Bosphorus Straights in Istanbul before it reaches the Black Sea.

The Truxton is part of the Arleigh Burke class of destroyer and is among the largest destroyers ever built for the US navy.

It is designed as a multi-role warship with anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and anti-surface capabilities.

The ship is a very capable naval platform.

“The 53rd Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, Truxtun will be able to conduct a variety of operations, from peacetime presence and crisis management to sea control and power projection.

Truxtun will be capable of fighting air, surface and subsurface battles simultaneously and contains a myriad of offensive and defensive weapons designed to apply maritime power to protect U.S. vital interests in an increasingly interconnected and uncertain world.” (http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=44599)

This is a distinct improvement on earlier times where the previous Navy ship in the Black Sea,a Frigate, the USS Taylor ran aground and the Captain appropriately relieved of his command. Ironically the USS Taylor and USS Mount Whitney were in the Black Sea to support Russia in their Olympic moment.

The Black Sea and the potential steaming area for the USS Truxtun to exercise “freedom of navigation is depicted on the Black Sea map below.

The ship is being sent on a peaceful mission.

But it is a warship.

Anywhere a Navy Ship goes it would be prudent for any adversary to know that there is the high probability the character of US Navy World War II Fleet Admiral Nimitz goes with it.

There is a great quote about Nimitz’s personal leadership in World War II. His chief of staff Raymond Spruance said of Nimitz, that he “… never knew what it ment to be afraid of anything.” (Neptune’s Inferno, The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal’ James d. Hornfischer).

The Challenges of Operating in the Black Sea

The Black Sea, Area is 168,496 sq miles ringed by the following countries:

Bulgaria, Size of Tennessee with 6.9 million people

Romania, slightly larger than Oregon with almost 22 Million People

Ukraine, slightly smaller than Texas with 44 million people

Russia largest country in the world (1.8 times size of US) 142 Million people

Georgia (Remember them from 2008?), slightly smaller than South Carolina with population of 4.9 Million

Turkey, larger than Texas with a population of 81 million

(Compiled information with CIA fact book population estimates 2014)

The Black Sea as an enclosed body of water and narrow passages of sea can rapidly become a “Beaten Zone” for surface ships.

Such a constrained operating area reminds one of the importance of no platform fights alone; no ship should be sent along without a clear understanding of the threats it might face, and notably, the specific character of threats in constrained operating areas.

There is a blunt direct use of words in ground combat that can signify the possibility of a military disaster, it is up to commanders to determine through their actions that the words mean a battle field defeat or a challenge to be fought through on the way to a victory. The words are “The Beaten Zone” and it is defined in the US military dictionary as “the area on the ground upon which the cone of fire falls.” From Infantry Squad leaders up the Chain-of-Command all engaged must never allow the enemy to establish a “beaten zone” and if trapped in one rapid action is required to evacuate the area while trying to destroy the enemies weapons it is the difference between life and death.

It is a ground term but can also be employed at sea because of the increasing accuracy and lethality of modern weapons.

There are several high traffic strategic waterways and confined seas around the globe that an enemy can create a “beaten zone” for surface ships.

Ships going through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea give us a lesson from history on this very point of what a Beaten Zone can look like for the surface navy.

The Lessons from WWI

Early in the 20^th Century, The Battle of Gallipoli, in which the British and French Fleet tried to fight through the Dardanelles captures the problem of war at sea in a confined space that can lead to a military tragedy ashore.

The lessons of Gallipoli resonate to this day, a lot of current military technology had it’s early application in combat during that fateful campaign-(historical reporting taken from wiki):

The use of airpower for the fleet:

On 17 February 1915, a British seaplane from HMS Ark Royal flew a reconnaissance sortie over the Straits. Two days later, the first attack on the Dardanelles began when a strong Anglo-French task force, including the British battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth, began a long-range bombardment of Ottoman artillery along the coast. The British had intended to utilise Ark Royal‘s eight aircraft to spot for the bombardment, but harsh conditions rendered all but one of these, a Short Type 136, unserviceable

Blinding the enemy:

On 18 March 1915, the main attack was launched. The fleet, comprising 18 battleships with a supporting array of cruisers and destroyers, sought to target the narrowest point of the Dardanelles, where the straits are 1 mile (1.6 km) wide. Despite some damage sustained by ships engaging the Ottoman forts, minesweepers were ordered to proceed along the straits. According to an account by the Ottoman General Staff, by 2:00 p.m. “all telephone wires were cut, all communications with the forts were interrupted, some of the guns had been knocked out in consequence the artillery fire of the defence had slackened considerably

The impact of Mines:

The French battleship Bouvet was sunk by a mine, causing it to capsize with her crew of over 600 still aboard. Minesweepers manned by civilians, under the constant fire of Ottoman shells, retreated, leaving the minefields largely intact. HMS Irresistible and HMS Inflexible were critically damaged by mines, although there was confusion during the battle about the cause of the damage—some blamed torpedoes. HMS Ocean, sent to rescue the Irresistible, was also damaged by an explosion, and both ships eventually sank. The French battleships Suffren and Gaulois were also damaged; the ships had sailed through a new line of mines placed secretly by the Ottoman minelayer Nusret ten days before. The losses forced de Robeck to sound the “general recall”

Authors note almost eight decades later:

On the morning of 18 February 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, Princeton was patrolling 28 nautical miles (52 km) off Failaka Island in the Persian Gulf, on the west side of the decoy U.S. Marine and naval invasion forces afloat. Two Italian-made MN103 Manta bottom-mounted influence mines detonated, one just under the port rudder and the other just forward of the starboard bow, most likely a sympathetic detonation caused by the first explosion. The blasts cracked the superstructure buckled.three lines in the hull, jammed the port rudder, flooded the #3 switchboard room through chilled water pipe cracks, and damaged the starboard propeller shaft.

A reactive enemy ground commander can seize the moment:

“Men, I am not ordering you to attack. I am ordering you to die. In the time that it takes us to die, other forces and commanders can come and take our place.” Mustafa Kemal Ataturk LtCol commanding. All agreed that the most effective form of defense was to hold the high ground on the ridges of the peninsula but there was disagreement as to where the enemy would land and hence where to concentrate their forces. Mustafa Kemal, a 34-year-old lieutenant colonel familiar with the Gallipoli peninsula from his operations against Bulgaria in the Balkan War, believed Cape Helles (the southern tip of the peninsula) and Gaba Tepe would be the two most likely areas for landing. In the case of the former, Kemal believed that the British would use their navy to command the land from every side, which the tip of the peninsula would allow; at Gaba Tepe, the short distance to the eastern coast meant forces could easily reach the Narrows.

A Raid can have significant tactical consequences:

A period of bad weather slowed the initial phase but by 25 February the outer forts had been reduced and the entrance cleared of mines. After this, Royal Marines were landed to destroy guns at Kum Kale on the northern Asian coast and at Sedd el Bahr on the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, while the naval bombardment shifted to batteries between Kum Kale and Kephez.

Undaunted individual courage was the code regardless of leadership bungling:

Gallipoli casualties (not including illness)
	Dead	Wounded	Missing & Prisoners	Total
Ottoman Empire^[5]	56,643	107,007	11,178	174,828
United Kingdom^[223]	34,072	78,520	7,654	120,246
France^[224]	9,798	17,371	–	27,169
Australia^[225]	8,709	19,441	–	28,150
New Zealand^[225]	2,721	4,752	–	7,473
British India^[225]	1,358	3,421	–	4,779
Newfoundland^[225]	49	93	–	142
Total Allies^[223]^[225]^[224]	56,707	123,598	7,654	187,959

Every nations can honor their veterans and recognize the tremendous sacrifice:

The defeat of the British fleet had given the Ottomans a morale boost the day would later come to be celebrated in Turkey as a great victory

The campaign is often considered as marking the birth of national consciousness in Australia and New Zealand and the date of the landing, 25 April, is known as “Anzac Day“. It remains the most significant commemoration of military casualties and veterans in those two countries, surpassing Remembrance Day (Armistice Day)

Greatness is recognized by one’s words, a tribute to those ANZACs who died in Gallipoli, this is inscribed on the Atatürk Memorial in Turakena Bay, Gallipoli and at the Kemal Atatürk Memorial, Canberra:

“Heroes who shed their blood and lost their lives! You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and Mehmets to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours. You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well.”

“Centuries rarely produce a genius. Look at this bad luck of ours, that great genius of our era was granted to the Turkish nation.”
David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom speaking about Kemal Ataturk

Closed Water Operational Challenges

Fortunately, for the US Navy in the Asian Pivot, the quest for finding Malaysia Air Flight MH 370 has given the world a vivid example of the size of Oceans. Combining the Pacific, South China Sea, East China Sea and the Indian Ocean and there is significant at sea maneuvering space for fast ships going in harm’s way.

However, like the Gallipoli campaign there are several vital relatively closed bodies of water around the globe in which ships can be easily found and attacked.

Thankfully with the focus of the US Navy on being the best “Blue Water Fleet” in the world, (with the exception of the budgetary and combat draining diversion of the Littoral Combat Ship), the Peoples Republic of China, creating a ‘Beaten Zone” against US and Allied ships is a difficult if not impossible task.

This is especially true if an Air/Sea Battle plan uses the expanse of Pacific Ocean for our Carrier Battle Groups (CBG), Gator Navy air assets and Asian Ally air bases to launch attacks from many distributed vectors employing proven weapons to “turn out their lights” and then sink the Peoples Liberation Army Navy and shoot down any PLAAF aircraft “feet wet” and take out all the ground tracking and launch pads.

It takes a leap faith to not understand that the US Navy/Air Force/Marine and Allied teams would be ruthless enough, and technologically capable to blind an enemy taking out their satellites, and air and surface target acquisition systems.

Silly drawings of untested PLA IRBMs (e g DF21 et al) showing it’s extended range with the assumption that it knows where a maneuvering Carrier Battle Group is let alone where it will be is way overly simplistic. Yet even at the US Naval War College some Professors argue that PLA over water ISR capability is absolute.

Many have argued about the end of the Navy in the Pacific because of a theoretical application of the famous Net Assessment’s Revolution in Military Affairs which is:

Precision guided munitions with remote sensors, along with the other revolutionary way ahead, Information war. Take out the sensors and a lot of PLA “precision” threats are not very accurate but rather simply untested capabilities and asserted not proven arguments

However it is true that when ships are constrained in maneuvering space, or forced to approach a coast then an enemy has a much better chance of bring precision guided munitions to the fight.

An enemy can create a “Beaten Zone” and in that situation it is even more critical to know where when and how to avoid the threat or if necessary blind and then attack an enemy.”

Whatever side has the better pre-hostilities information has a higher chance of victory.

Right now this the fundamental military challenge of sending the USS Truxtun into the Black Sea.

One of the great lessons from the US Navy Top Gun program was the saying “you fight like you train.” Combining that insight with Secretary Rumsfeld’s statement that “you go to war with the Army you have,” events in the current perilous world situation between Russia and Ukraine come into focus, because it is also true that the Russians and Ukraine military may go to war with the armies they have.

First principle, just like the saying avoid ground wars in Asia, the US must stop way short of any consideration of ground combat in the Ukraine V Russia fight. The American people, get this to their very core as reflected by many polls that indicate around 12% support boots on the ground. Even if the if the US was manipulated into combat by some with a hidden agenda without a declaration of war

it is still not a US “Big Army” fight independent of what the Chairman has said:

“Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States General Martin Dempsey has claimed that in the case of an escalation of unrest in Crimea, the U.S. Army is ready to back up Ukraine and its allies in Europe with military actions. “

It will be left to future historians to figure out why a few days after the US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff postured over US Army support for Ukraine that a prominent Russian TV host (backed by the Putin Administration) lashed out on a prominent TV show.

Russia is the only country capable of turning the United States into “radioactive ashes.”

This is not an idle threat by Russia especially with the possibility of Tac Nukes in their Black Sea Fleet;

The current Ukraine crisis is the worst of both worlds. Combining significant threats with the failure of strategic intelligence about Russian capabilities and intentions is of significant concern.

It has been widely reported that there was a breakdown in US Intelligence Community on US strategic warning of Russia making a move on Ukraine. Regardless of DNI Clapper’s public statements some very good reporting is coming out about a strategic intelligence failure of the first order. It will take time to see the real facts of the IC’s performance.

Overtime, Congress is fully capable of seeing that if NSA can read the private e-mails of the Presidents of Brazil and Germany what did they do in the case of Russian and Ukraine leaders?

This should be a very high priority work in progress to bring disclosure to the American people; after all they paid for all this. With the revelations of the overzealous and highly inappropriate attack on world leaders by NSA, and early strategic miscalculations about Russian intentions a continuing bi-partisan serious effort by Congress to address “all things NSA” is important.

Finally, one point, for the DNI, if you are explaining you are losing and if you have to go on a local DC radio show to say “not”…well enough said

Crafting a Combat Response

As a practical matter with American forces possibly in harm’s way up close real time intelligence is need by military forces not analytical papers from the CIA and NSA ineptitude. Consequently with events moving quickly sending the USS Truxtun, a Burke class destroyer, into the Black Sea must focus some important 21^st Century military capabilities while remembering some of the lessons learned from the last Century

Since the IC breakdown in strategic warning the USS Truxtun will have to rely even more on US and Allied ISR assets and reach back to airpower to address any potential threats in the area depicted on the map. The need for ISR linked to offensive air is critical and not intrusive, until it can be very intrusive. There are many ways to “look and listen” to collect real world information on the actual movement of all air, land and sea military forces of both Russia and Ukraine.

From World War I forward America and our Allies have gotten better and better in overhead collection efforts, from aircraft to UAVs all integrated with existing Satellite coverage.

In addition to the inherent combat capability of the Truxtun, the situation depends on what the US Combat Commander, Air Force General Phillip Breedlove wants to focus on as his core warfighting assets.

There can be F-22s, F-15s and F-16s, from land bases with F/A-18s on the USS George Bush all available to help. In addition to aerial refueling tanker support, the US and allies can have AWACS, Navy E2-Cs, and other patrol planes along with Satellites, and ships (Aegis) and land based surveillance systems with all the data being sent back to his command center.

This entire panoply of combat capabilities spread out over thousands of miles can be brought together as required. It is actually doubtful it will all be necessary and events hopefully will not spiral out of control.

Combat Capabilities in Transition

But it is evident of a large data fusion problem to be both accurate, timely and reactive if any threat to the USS Truxtun is picked up. This is the state of art for the current situation. Let all hope the situation stabilizes.

However, very soon the entire way of thinking and commanding a fighting force will have a game changing aircraft introduced. The F-35 flying with the USMC, the USN, the USAF and allies can make a huge difference in protecting the fleet by both mapping the threat and targeting key elements of the threat as well as part of meeting the challenge of a “beaten zone” at sea.

For the first time in history a single aircraft will have extensive 360 degree reach for the Air-to-Air, Air-to-Ground and EW mission. Each F-35 pilot will move from having situational awareness in the cockpit to situational decision making. This is revolutionary and instead of the current “hub-spoke” air battle management combat engagement it will become a networked distributed system. Each F-35 is a combat “nodes” in a distributed system of nodes that no longer will need fused data coming top down from the command center to update threats. Rather, each F-35 can generate real time threat intelligence up and out from the cockpit.

This capability was demonstrated three years ago in the largest and toughest EW exercise in the world, Northern Edge. It took place over the Gulf of Alaska a very harsh environment it is much like the Black Sea but also larger in scope also the Black Sea has much better weather providing a warm water port for Russia.

Gulf of Alaska, broad inlet of the North Pacific on the south coast of Alaska, U.S. Bounded by the Alaska Peninsula and Kodiak Island (west) and Cape Spencer (east), it has a surface area of 592,000 square miles

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/12286/Gulf-of-Alaska

The F-35 is the combat answer to stopping any “Beaten Zone” at sea and if can survive and perform better than any other aircraft in Northern Edge it can survive and bring a 360 AA.AG.EW fighter to the Black Sea and the Islands in the Pacific along the China coast.

Northern Edge 2011 provided the focal point for the restructuring of U.S. power projection forces.

In a robust jamming operating environment, the F-35 radar and distributed aperture system (DAS) separated themselves from the pack, and have initiated a new era in thinking in combat operations.

In short, the Black Sea as a pop up event in the Crimean crisis reminds one of the need to operate effectively in close quarter naval operating areas.

And rather than having to aggregate a gaggle of 20^th century capabilities, the F-35 can facilitate a more agile, smaller footprint and more effective shutdown response in such potential combat conditions.

Thus, the national command authority can operate with greater flexibility especially when the USS Gerald R. Ford, CVN-78 can maneuver in Blue Water while reaching out over closely confined sea lanes with F-35Cs on board.

Addendum:

As a Joint Program Office release underscores this is not only about the ability of airpower to operate in a robust EW environment in which cyber conflict is a key dimension but it is about the ability of an airborne capability to support maritime operations.

Participating in Northern Edge for the second time, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter sensor capabilities were tested in Alaska’s premier multi-operational environment from June 13-24, 2011. Hosted by Alaskan Command, Northern Edge is a biennial U.S. Pacific Command exercise that prepares joint forces to respond to crises throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

This year provided an invaluable opportunity to observe the performance of the F-35 JSF systems in multiple robust electronic warfare scenarios.

The AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array radar (AESA) and AN/AAQ-37 distributed aperture system (DAS) were mounted aboard Northrop Grumman’s BAC 1-11 test aircraft. Making its debut, the AN/AAQ-37 DAS demonstrated spherical situational awareness and target tracking capabilities. The DAS is designed to simultaneously track multiple aircraft in every direction, which has never been seen in an air combat environment.

A return participant, the AN/APG-81 AESA demonstrated robust electronic protection, electronic attack, passive maritime and experimental modes, and data-linked air and surface tracks to improve legacy fighter situational awareness. It also searched the entire 50,000 square- mile Gulf of Alaska operating area for surface vessels, and accurately detected and tracked them in minimal time.

Navy Cmdr. Erik Etz, Deputy Mission Systems Integrated Product Team Lead from the F-35 JSF Program Office, said the rigorous testing of both sensors during NE 2011 served as a significant risk-reduction step for the F-35 JSF program. “By putting these systems in this operationally rigorous environment, we have demonstrated key war fighting capabilities well in advance of scheduled operational testing,” Etz added.

Having the exercise in June had its seasonal weather challenges for system operators to adapt and overcome. Inclement and cloudy weather hampered in-flight visibility. The DAS was significant in providing clear and discernable horizons, and views of ground features and nearby aircraft. It also wasn’t dark enough for testing night vision functions. A surrogate test visor was used for displaying DAS imagery to the operators. “The implications of F-35 JSF sensor systems for air-land-sea battle are immense,” said Peter Bartos, Northrop Grumman’s Test Director.

http://www.jsf.mil/news/docs/20110627_NORTHERNEDGE.pdf

https://sldinfo.com/the-northern-edge-difference-re-structuring-the-strategic-debate/

For an historical look at the land campaign on the Crimean peninsula see Professor Ken Maxwell’s article.

https://sldinfo.com/the-impact-of-crimean-history-the-danger-of-playing-one-upski-with-putin/

Editor’s Note: The source for the Black Sea map is below:

https://www.ceoe.udel.edu/blacksea/geography/index.html

PRC Strategy in Asia: Impose “Prohibitive Costs” To Opposing Their Will

Posted on March 18, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

2014-03-18 While attending the Williams Foundation Seminar on Air Combat Operations: 2025 and Beyond, Dr. John Lee of the Kokoda Foundation provided a base line brief on how to understand the Chinese challenge, military and non-military to the region.

The contribution of Aussie airpower and associated military capabilities was to be understood in both national and coalition terms as a contributor to deal with such challenges.

Dr. Lee highlighted several key elements of the PRC challenge, which were included in his presentation, which is provided below.

The key points with regard to the PRC strategic view were as follows:

All things being equal, and assuming no disruptive developments to regional trends, America is here to stay strategically and militarily for the reasons that I gave.
China’s enduring vulnerability is not its sovereignty territory but its inability to secure unfettered access to the commons by itself, and inability to defend its unfettered access to the commons.
These vulnerabilities will persist whilst America and its system of alliances and security relationships remain in Asia. And these relationships seem to be robust and enduring.

Dr. Lee then underscored how he believed the Chinese were seeking to achieve their objectives in the period ahead:

You create the reasonable expectation that any significant military conflict with China will cause severe disruption to economic prosperity in the region – thereby lowering the political will in Washington or other regional capitals to contemplate military intervention in the first place.
You improve your military capacity to seize disputed islands before an organised and effective military counter-response is possible. In doing so, you raise the chances that any counter-response once territory has already been seize will be prohibitive.
You gradually exercise de facto sovereignty and control over disputed areas in the East and South China Sea in a manner in which each individual move is never extreme enough to provoke a military response.

Now to the presentation itself:

My brief here is to speak about how China thinks about the region, why it has the strategic doctrine and operational concepts that it does, and how the PLA Air Force fits in.

My talk is NOT about what the true state of its military capabilities might be, or how they will fare against those of the U.S. and other powers; whether it can actually execute its operational concepts; or whether its civilian and military institutions are up to the task of modern, high-intensity warfare.

There are many of you who will know a lot more about these issues that I do, so I won’t pretend otherwise.

Let’s begin in the period when the Cold War ended. I know this may seem a little historical but bear with me because it is directly relevant to how the Chinese think about the region today.

Remember what has just happened to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They have survived their own revolt in 1989 when there were protests in about 350 out of 450 cities involving millions of people. The CCP hung on by a fingernail. For the regime to survive, it needed to tap into the regional and global trading system to modernize its economy – this from the background of a country that had spent most of the post-WWII period alienating the majority of powers in the region.

So the Chinese were forced to consider their place in the modern, somewhat wary liberal order from a position of some ignorance. But they began badly. Throughout the 1990s, when the Chinese surveyed the outside environment, they made two assumptions that proved to be fundamentally incorrect.

The first was that Asia and the world would become far more multi-polar if not polarized. With the Cold War ending, there was near consensus in Beijing that American allies would move in a more independent direction, and that the US might even be forced to wind down its presence in Asia.

Dr. John Lee Presentation on PRC Strategy from Second Line of Defense

In doing so, China misread the drivers and psychology of American foreign policy, one of which is to maintain its preeminent strategic role in Asian maritime domains essential to its economic interests.

China also misread the psychology and strategy of the rising Asian economic states. States like Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore basically wanted a peace dividend – to get rich and to largely outsource security to America.

So to the amazement of Beijing, even as American spending went up in absolute terms and as a proportion of global military spending in the post-Cold War period, and the capability gap between America and the rest of the world widened, few rising states in Asia seem particularly concerned about it all.

In fact, they encouraged it. And except for incidents such as the Filipinos kicking the Americans out of Subic Bay in 1992, most allies seem happy to facilitate a robust American presence on their sovereign territory.

In other words, rather than balancing against America as China expected, countries were maneuvering to keep America on top in Asia.

The second mistake that China made, which follows on from the first, was that they had a fairly narrow view of national interest and security. In particular, they viewed national security as protecting the sovereignty of their continental territory, including holding on to Tibet and Xinjiang. Of course, there was always Taiwan, but that is more a political and emotive issue for the CCP.

Dr. John Lee during his presentation to the Williams Foundation, Canberra, Australia, March 11, 2014.

In particular, it took them awhile to understand that modern, open economies in Asia depended on maritime rather than continental trade – a difficult realisation for a country that has been a continental power for thousands of years.

Even when China became a net oil importer in 1993, it took a while for Beijing to realise that one’s national interest depended on unfettered access to the regional and global commons, and that one’s core national interests were fundamentally threatened if one were ever denied free access to these commons.

If China understood this, it would have immediately realised why so many countries were prepared to outsource security to the Americans – since only the U.S. could offer stability and guaranteed access to the commons.

Of course, it is now clear to Beijing that the commons is more than just sea-lines-of-communication (SLOCs) – it’s also air, space and cyber.

Finally, one important realization has finally dawned on the Chinese. If we put aside arguments based on the greater attractiveness of American political values over Chinese ones, we need to remember that the grand strategy – if there is such a thing – of pretty much every Asian power for centuries has been to prevent the rise of another Asian hegemon.

In the modern day, this is extended to preventing any Asian hegemon controlling the regional commons. Not geographically based in Asia provides a structural and strategic reason why most Asian countries prefer to outsource security to America rather than to an Asian hegemon.

Moreover, because of China’s pure size, and potential power, there will be no balance in Asia without America if China continues to rise as rapidly over another two decades (a questionable assumption in my view).

In other words, hedging against China and closer to America was always going to be the likely response of every major trading power in Asia.

This leaves China as a strategically isolated rising power despite its economic importance to the region. It is the second largest economy in the world without any genuine strategic allies to speak of (unless you count North Korea). That is unprecedented in recorded history since large economic powers generally exert a strategic pull.

So before I get on to the military dimension of all of this, let me summarize the Chinese view of the region as I see it.

All things being equal, and assuming no disruptive developments to regional trends, America is here to stay strategically and militarily for the reasons that I gave.

China’s enduring vulnerability is not its sovereignty territory but its inability to secure unfettered access to the commons by itself, and inability to defend its unfettered access to the commons.

These vulnerabilities will persist whilst America and its system of alliances and security relationships remain in Asia. And these relationships seem to be robust and enduring.

So even though they have achieved many of the economic goals they set for themselves, the Chinese misread the post-Cold War strategic environment and have a weaker hand than they would have expected. And like all of us, if we get something important wrong, it tends to have a profound and lasting impact on how we look at things. And the Chinese are no different.

But the Chinese are not without strategic options. And this is where the lessons – for Beijing anyhow – of Subic Bay comes in.

I know it’s a complicated story, but essentially, the Americans left Subic Bay – then the largest American overseas base – without a shot being fired. The American vulnerability from the Chinese point of view is that the US will not, and probably cannot afford to go to war in order to maintain its military footholds on sovereign territory if they lose the support of the host government.

So if I were the Chinese, this is how I would be thinking… And in fact, the following is how I believe they do think about strategy in the region. The fundamental principle is to:

Lower American political will to intervene in a military conflict; or lower the political will for regional states to resort to reliance on American military assistance and protection.

The PRC and its newly declared Air Defense Identification Zone is not just about asserting air defense outward. It is about taking a bite out of 21st century approaches of the US and its allies for Pacific defense. Credit Graphic: SLD — The PRC and its declared Air Defense Identification Zone is not just about asserting air defense outward. It is about taking a bite out of 21st century approaches of the US and its allies for Pacific defense. Credit Graphic: SLD

How do you achieve this?

There are a number of ways.

You create the credible expectation that you can impose prohibitive military costs on American military assets; or that you can impose prohibitive costs on the military assets of the American ally with or without American attempts at intervention.

You create the reasonable expectation that any significant military conflict with China will cause severe disruption to economic prosperity in the region – thereby lowering the political will in Washington or other regional capitals to contemplate military intervention in the first place.

You improve your military capacity to seize disputed islands before an organised and effective military counter-response is possible. In doing so, you raise the chances that any counter-response once territory has already been seize will be prohibitive.

You gradually exercise de facto sovereignty and control over disputed areas in the East and South China Sea in a manner in which each individual move is never extreme enough to provoke a military response.

If you can achieve all that, you will dilute the relevance and reliability of the American alliance system, consolidate your control over the immediate maritime commons of Asia, and eliminate your perceived vulnerability in these immediate SLOCs.

And if you achieve that, it is a first and important step to kicking American out of Asia without a shot actually being fired. So American strategic and military pre-eminence in Asia will end with a whimper – like Subic Bay in 1992 – and not a bang.

So bear in mind the inferences you should have from the Chinese view:

They don’t have to be able to win the battle, let alone the war, to achieve their political and strategic objectives – just be able to impose prohibitive military and/or economic costs.

They don’t need military capabilities to defend all their economic interests such as commercial shipping into China through SLOCs which is impossible. They just need enough military capability to cause prohibitive damage to commercial shipping for other countries – a far more feasible tactic.

Let’s now get on to some Chinese military doctrine and concepts – and I’ll link it back to what I just said. The first one you might have heard about is the contradictory sounding ‘Active Defence’.

Active Defense is an operational guideline for military strategy that applies to all branches of the PLA including the PLA Air Force. It states that China’s military engages in a policy of strategic defence and will only strike militarily once it has been attacked. But there are two conditions attached to Active Defence.

First, it states explicitly that such a defense posture is only viable if connected to an offensive operational posture.

In other words, as far as the PLA is concerned, an effective counter-attack is only possible when the PLA is able to negate the enemy’s offensive military assets in predetermined areas.

To put it in another way, if a man is running at you with a knife, you don’t go for his hand. You ensure that you are pre-emptively positioned to stab at his legs.

Second, Active Defence explicitly states that a first strike that triggers a Chinese military response need not be military in nature. It can be political, such as a Taiwanese declaration of independence. In other words, and under Active Defence, a Chinese military reaction is a legitimate response to political provocation.

The next term you might have heard about is ‘Local Wars under Conditions of Informatization’ (or ‘Local Wars’ for short). While Active Defence provides the basic strategic posture for the PLA, Local Wars is more an operational concept and has been the official operational doctrine of the PLA since 1993.

Local Wars assumes that foreseeable wars for China will be located geographically, primarily along China’s periphery. It will most likely be limited in scope rather than a total war, limited in duration and means, and conducted under ‘conditions of informatization’.

To quote the American DoD, this simply means “conditions in which modern military forces use advanced computer systems, information technology, and communication networks to gain operational advantage over an opponent” – in other words, the operational doctrine refers to “high-intensity, information-centric regional military operations of short duration.”

This outlook basically arose when the Chinese observed American operations during the first Gulf War in 1991 and saw this as the beginning of a new era of warfare in which technology revolutionised the way militaries were organised, led and fought.

Moreover, because of the economic and nuclear constraints on the conduct of total war, the Chinese are convinced that future wars will be fought under these localised conditions to achieved limited political goals such as the settlement of territorial disputes.

J-20 prototype which flew shortly before Gates visit. Recently, Gates explained that "Gates, 70, said in an interview yesterday that former president President Hu Jintao “did not have strong control” of the People’s Liberation Army. The “best example,” Gates said, was China’s rollout of its stealthy J-20 fighter jet during a visit he made in January 2010." Credit Photo: Kyodo News, 2011 — J-20 prototype which flew shortly before Gates visit. Recently, Gates explained that “Gates said in an interview yesterday that former president President Hu Jintao “did not have strong control” of the People’s Liberation Army. The “best example,” Gates said, was China’s rollout of its stealthy J-20 fighter jet during a visit he made in January 2010.”
Credit Photo: Kyodo News, 2011

Many of you will know more about China’s military modernisation than I do, but it seems to me that the PLA’s ongoing modernisation has essentially occurred along the lines of the Local Wars Doctrine.

But it’s still essential to place these doctrines and concepts within the notion of the overarching strategy: the advances in military capabilities are ultimately in furtherance of the broader political strategy of retaining the capacity at any stage of a conflict – particularly the opening stage – to inflict prohibitive military and economic costs on a more powerful enemy.

So in any military capability comparison or war-gaming, this has to be taken into account.

Finally, just a comment about Chinese thinking on air power:

As you would expect, the PLAAF has moved from thinking about air power being used to repel air and ground invaders over its continental territory (i.e., land based defence) towards deterrence, strategic strike at sea, and providing cover for landing operations.

So if you take the PLAAF’s concept of “integrated attack and defense” which is part of the PLA’s Active Defence posture, joint counter-air strike campaigns will take place alongside the Second Artillery’s anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities in order to defend China’s territorial and sovereignty claims, and limit the options available to the U.S. in terms of strike, access and maneuvering capabilities.

Likewise, it seems that much of Chinese thinking on air-craft carriers is to use them to provide air cover for landing operations within the South China Sea. Based on limited capabilities of the air-craft carriers and the planes they can service, experts in the US and India tell me that Chinese air-craft carriers will have further battle relevance beyond the South China Sea.

So in summary, the PLAAF is seen as an integrated part of China’s A2AD capabilities along with the PLAN and the Second Artillery. Remember that in the Active Defence doctrine, China needs to execute these capabilities beyond the First Island Chain (which stretches from Japan to Philippines to the north of Indonesia) in order to deter advances against it within the First Island Chain.

Of course, there is a lot we don’t know about the actual capabilities and battle-readiness of Chinese forces. They are pretty much untested beyond a couple of small operations some time ago: when Chinese forces captured the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974; when they occupied Mischief Reef in 1995.

Moreover, Chinese doctrine and concepts is deeply susceptible to miscalculation, not just in terms of their capacity to inflict prohibitive costs on the enemy, but also what the level of damage needed to constitute prohibitive costs might be. In other words, it will be very easy for the Chinese to incorrectly assess the political will of America during any crisis.

For our look at some of the same issues raised by John Lee see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/understanding-the-chinese-military-puzzle/

https://sldinfo.com/evolving-chinese-military-capabilities-the-pla-as-part-of-the-chinese-approach-to-globalization/

https://sldinfo.com/the-pla-goes-feet-wet-testing-the-pla-in-real-world-conditions/

https://sldinfo.com/flipbooks/StrategicInflectionPoints%20May%202012/

https://sldinfo.com/the-chinese-challenge/

https://sldinfo.com/the-evolution-of-prc-air-power-an-overview-from-retired-ltg-deptula/

This presentation is published with the permission of The Williams Foundation.

Crimea, Russia and the Ukraine: The “Findlandizaton” Phase of 21st Century Security?

Posted on March 18, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

2014-03-18 By Harald Malmgren

In March, world attention turned to fast moving events in Ukraine which set in motion a direct clash between Russia, on one side, and the EU and US, on the other. Viewed as an unexpected, but isolated event in the Ukraine, press and media focused primarily on whether or not Russia would use military force, and whether or not the breakoff of Crimea from Ukraine and application of Crimean Parliament for annexation to the Russian Federation could be reversed.

President Obama declared that the US would “never” recognize the referendum for independence of Crimea as legitimate. (US Presidents rarely ever state that something would “never” happen, as it would imply all future Presidents would be bound by the current President’s decision.)

EU leaders made strong condemnations of President Putin’s bullying tactics, including his evident threat of military force, and declared that the Crimea attempt to exit Ukraine was illegitimate and contrary to the integrity of a sovereign state.

When President Obama and some European leaders decided that costs should be imposed on Russia to alter Putin’s calculations, press attention shifted to what kind of penalties or sanctions the US and Europe might impose, and whether such penalties could be effective.

US and European leaders soon found themselves caught in domestic political resistance to harsh confrontation with Russia.

American and European business and banks had become deeply entangled not only in the Ukraine economy but, more important, in the Russian economy. If a confrontation with Russia were to impose serious damage on the Russian economy, concern was expressed that Russia in turn would impose damage on Western businesses and banks.

Weighing the pros and cons, European leaders recognized that Europe was far more vulnerable to Russian reprisals than the US might be.

Russia had become the key energy supplier for Germany and the West European grid, and was capable of imposing significant pain through manipulation of supply and pricing. Export dependent Germany also faced the reality that its primary growth focus in recent years had shifted from North America and recessionary EU towards expansion eastwards to Russia, China, and the rest of Asia. Exposure of European banks to Ukraine and Russia was huge, at a time when European financial institutions were still under stress and in transition to some new form of Europe-wide oversight. Europe essentially found that it was unwilling to put its banks in the path of Russian tanks.

The US and European conclusion was to impose limited sanctions which were focused on specific individuals and interest groups in Russia and the Ukraine, in an effort to alter Russian calculations.

However, it became evident that pains imposed on Putin’s aides and supporters did not alter Putin’s own decisions.

WE and European leaders found themselves at an impasse, unable to alter the loss of Crimea to Russia, or reduce the threat of further fragmentation of the predominantly Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine population.

The March 2014 political and media obsession with the Ukraine and Crimea distracted attention from the historic consequences of such a clash between Russia and the West.

From Putin’s perspective, the collapse of the USSR was an historic catastrophe for Russia. The gradual encroachment of Western Europe, NATO, and even the US into Eastern Europe through such means as membership in NATO, in the EU, or cooperation in military training and defense continued to aggravate Russia’s sense of catastrophe.

Moscow’s efforts to limit fragmentation of Yugoslavia and protect the integrity of Serbia had previously been swept aside by American diplomacy. It was only in 2008 that the Russian incursion into Georgia marked a point of reversal. Russia’s modest success in Georgia may have helped the writing of Putin’s new playbook for what was formerly the Soviet space, or Russia’s “near abroad”.

The great global financial crisis, which unfolded after the Lehman collapse no doubt pushed Putin’s historic ambitions aside while Russia, dealt with the global recession and prolonged debt market storm. Nonetheless, there was continuing discussion in Moscow of the need to “protect” fellow Russians and their Russian-speaking progeny in the neighboring areas. The idea of providing Russian passports to people of Russian origin was given periodic consideration in the Kremlin.

Areas of concentration of Russian diaspora were scrutinized for potential political exploitation among the Baltics and the other nations in proximity, among them especially the Ukraine. The deal to keep a strategic military presence in Crimea, especially the port of Sebastopol, was always perceived in Moscow as an essential segment of Russia’s long-term military strength.

The same thinking lay behind Russia’s determination to keep its naval base in Syria, although other motivations were also in play in support of continuation of Assad’s control.

For example, the Gulf kingdoms desired to build a gas pipeline from the Gulf to Western Europe through Syria, but Russia did not want to yield its vital gas grip on Ukraine, Germany and other nations in Europe. Keeping Assad in power and Gulf interests absorbed in conflict was important for Russia’s energy power, as well as for Russia’s exploitation of relations with Iran.

Most likely the recent Syria “red line” drawn by President Obama revealed a new opening for Putin’s complex, strategic focus on a need to reshape the power structure between Russia and the West.

When President Obama hesitated to carry out his threatened “calibrated” punishment of Syria for breach of the red line, Putin leaped to the opportunity to take a leadership position in a role of easing the risk of conflict and clearing away Assad’s holdings of chemical weapons.

For Obama, the Putin initiative was felt to be a tactical victory for both him and Putin, with hope for a new, pragmatic relationship. For Putin, the reluctance, hesitation, and political division of views in Washington revealed a strategic opportunity for reversing the deterioration of Russian influence in its neighborhood.

Putin’s efforts to manipulate Ukraine’s relations with Europe and Russia through Yanukovych as puppet seemed to be moving in Russia’s favor until the uprisings of indigenous Ukrainians not only overturned the Ukraine government but overturned Putin’s strategy for reclamation of hegemony over Ukraine.

Determined to rescue his ambition for restoration of Russian power in the near abroad, and avoid loss of domination of Crimea, Putin initiated a clever “quasi-military” intervention combined with large scale movements of military forces in nearby Russia to intimidate Ukraine’s new leadership as well as the US and Europe.

Protecting fellow Russians evolved into Russian diaspora self-determination through an overwhelming referendum, followed by a declaration of the new Crimean Parliament of desire to become part of the Russian Federation. Putin declared Russian recognition of the new “independent” republic of Crimea, and waited a little to see if the US and Europe would take definitive new steps to prevent absorption of Crimea into Russia.

The Western response of sanctions did worry some of the key players in Russia and Russian quadrant of Ukraine, but Putin evidently concluded he was finally on a new path, with a new template;

Exploit fragmentation of the nations in the former Soviet space, encouraging devolution of central power to local governments in each country, leaving national capitals ill-positioned to engage with the West economically or strategically, and gaining political influence through the Russian diaspora in each East European nation.

A small-scale experiment with this stratagem has been exploitation of continuing tensions between Russian-speaking Eastern Estonia, close to St. Petersburg, and the central government of Estonia in Tallinn. Putin’s original home was in St. Petersburg, so he was personally familiar with that terrain and clear separation of the Russian-dominated Narva environment from the rest of Estonia. Where to place the national border had been a continuing issue, but more recently it was refined into shift from the Russian side to the Estonian side of the river which was the primary water source of the region, leaving Estonia in a scramble for alternative water supply.

Western press, media, and diplomatic discussion of Putin’s latest, seemingly erratic moves, failed to recognize the larger design of incremental steps to fragment and weaken neighboring central governments in favor of decentralization, and closer engagement of Russians with Russians.

Estonians in particular have long been wary of this potential incremental strengthening of Russia’s grip westwards. Latvia, with a much larger Russian presence in and around Riga, is especially sensitive. Lithuania, more dependent on Russian gas and being a corridor for Russian access to Kaliningrad, also sees itself vulnerable to Putin’s incremental ambitions.

A fragmentation-decentralization process has not been openly exploited until now, but Putin’s tactics with regard to Crimea make sense in a context of a longer-range stratagem for gradual regaining of political influence in the near abroad.

In the long-run, this may take the form of a patient, incremental, but relentless effort to “Finlandize” the vast area between Russia and the West.

China surprised some Western officials when it supported Russia’s arguments about legitimacy of Crimean self-determination, and opposed the use of Western sanctions against Russia.

However, it was most likely recognized in Beijing that Putin’s successful initiative to reconfigure the boundaries of his neighborhood could potentially be exploited in the same way in the South and East China Sea, gradually moving China’s military reach into close proximity with Taiwan while denying US the same degree of proximity. The ADIZ initiative was clearly designed to narrow the scope of maneuver of US and other forces in that geographic area.

Having watched US hesitation and indecisive, tentative responses to Putin, there should be little doubt that China’s PLA apparent itchiness to have armed conflict with one or more of its neighbors may soon be scratched.

Limited, but violent engagement with Philippines, Vietnam, or even Japan is increasingly likely.

Moreover, as the Chinese economy slides into a period of financial market turbulence and slowdown, it may become necessary to offset domestic economic discomfort with a surge of nationalist sentiment against perceived foreign “threats”. In such a context, it would not be surprising to have a limited conflict take place between PLA and Japanese SDF ships or aircraft. It should also not be surprising if China simply forcefully were to establish control over the Spratlys, Senkakus, and other disputed islands in the China Sea.

In this bigger perspective, the Crimean independence event likely signals an inflection point in Russia’s relations with the West, and may signal an opening for an inflection point in China’s relations not only with its neighbors but with Taiwan and ultimately with the US.

Washington thinking has primarily been focused on the immediate tactics of responding to Putin. The idea that terminating Russia’s role in the G8 and reestablishing the G7 would hurt Putin’s feelings seems farfetched in this context. Washington’s declared intention to “isolate” Russia and hurt its standing in global power circles also seems flawed, especially since Putin probably thinks he has finally found means for altering Russia’s position from a center of centrifugal forces to a core of centripetal forces.

From the perspective of Russia’s place in the world economy, Putin’s ambitions will likely be blunted by forces of globalization of markets, including resumed turbulence as the US, Europe and China all pass through an historic period of financial restructuring and economic stabilization.

Russia’s economy is highly vulnerable to external demand for its resources and the fundamental, inherited weakness of its economy. The concept of the new BRIC powers was always a flawed idea. Russia is no more a great economic power than Brazil or India.

As for China, it may be entering a period of being humbled by domestic economic failures as its export engine inevitably falters. An internal power struggle may be the consequence of unanticipated financial or economic management failures.

Command economies are inevitably vulnerable to highly concentrated negative economic and political surprises.

The RAAF Adds New Tanking Capability: A Key Step in Building Out Its Reach, Range and Sustainability

Posted on March 14, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

03/14/2014

2014-03-14 By Robbin Laird

During my visit to Australia, I have had a chance to visit No. 33 Squadron, at Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base Amberley in the state of Queensland. The Squadron operates the KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT).

My mentor and guide for my day at the base was Squadron Leader Chetan Takalkar, Executive Officer of No. 33 Squadron. I also had a chance to talk with the head of the MRTT program in the Australian Department of Defence (DoD), based in Canberra. These talks were then supplemented by discussions with other very senior Australian DoD officials in Canberra about the way ahead, within which the tanker is viewed as a foundational element.

During my time at the squadron, RAAF officers took me through the simulators and let me try my hand at lowering the virtual boom to tank an F-16.

Two of the five planes were at RAAF Base Amberley during the visit.

Three of the five Aussie tanker aircraft are currently involved in maintenance, upgrade, testing, and residual acquisition activities in Madrid and Australia. The squadron fleet should be at full strength in 2015.

Last year, in combination with Australian C-17s, the KC-30A squadron supported several F/A-18 deployments to Guam as well as Darwin and Tindal in Australia’s Northern Territory. This activity demonstrated the ability of the RAAF to move an air wing and support it at extended range with a tanker, while also providing airlift support.

Members of the Royal Australian Air Force and U.S. Air Force Airmen work together to unload pallets from a KC-30 July 12, 2013, after the aircraft landed at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, in support of Talisman Saber 2013. Talisman Saber forms part of the Australian Defense Force's extensive training program to ensure the ADF is prepared to protect and support Australia and its national interests. Talisman Saber is a bilateral exercise designed to train Australian and U.S. forces in planning and conducting combined task force operations in order to improve combat readiness and interoperability. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Nathan Allen) — Members of the Royal Australian Air Force and U.S. Air Force Airmen work together to unload pallets from a KC-30 July 12, 2013, after the aircraft landed at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, in support of Talisman Saber 2013. Talisman Saber forms part of the Australian Defense Force’s extensive training program to ensure the ADF is prepared to protect and support Australia and its national interests. Talisman Saber is a bilateral exercise designed to train Australian and U.S. forces in planning and conducting combined task force operations in order to improve combat readiness and interoperability. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Nathan Allen)

This year the squadron has supported movement of Aussie F/A-18s from the United States across the Pacific and back to Australia.

Both operations underscore capabilities, which are part of shaping a 21st century Air Force.

From discussions at RAAF Base Amberley and in Canberra, it is clear that the squadron is a work in progress that represents a significant boost in capability for the RAAF. The tanker’s potential is a clear advantage as seen by senior RAAF officers.

Standing up the squadron, finishing the procurement and getting initial use of the tanker underway is a prelude for what comes next – working through the best ways to use the tanker with the RAAF, and to work out its interoperable role in the region and beyond.

While the squadron provides support to Defense, it is still very much involved in finishing the acquisition process for the tanker. The RAAF has really the world’s first operational squadron of the MRTT, and as the launch customer is working through the launch point for the foundational capabilities of the tanker. The Royal Air Force, United Arab Emirates Air Force, and Royal Saudi Air Force operate similar tankers, but Australia is in the lead in initial use of the tanker. India, Singapore and France are currently in the process of procuring MRTTs from Airbus Defence and Space as well.

And as they do so, the RAAF is flying the tanker and taking it through its paces and preparing for the next phase of expanding its interoperability as the boom system comes on line later this year.

Shaping interoperability with a clear role as both a national and regional asset is a strategic goal of the RAAF. This will require sorting out common procedures with the United States Air Force and regional and global partners, but this is clearly a core effort in the works for the period ahead.

Squadron Leader Chetan Takalkar, Executive Officer of the No. 33 Squadron, has been working with the tanker since 2005. He has spent 5 years living in Madrid and working with Airbus Military (which changed its name to Airbus Defence and Space in early 2014) to get the launch product ready for entry into the RAAF.

During my interview with Takalkar, he outlined the challenges associated with moving the squadron towards operating a fully mature, sophisticated and highly capable air-to-air refueling asset.

The focuses for the RAAF MRTT capability are on finalizing the delivery of the boom system, leading to final acceptance and maturing the in-service support and training system.

An Operational Test and Evaluation program will be used to explore the full potential of the MRTT capability, including additional receiver clearances beyond the Hornet and Super Hornets (including the E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft; C-17A; F-35A Joint Strike Fighter; P-8A Poseidon; and other KC-30As), as well as allied aircraft.

Takalkar emphasized that in the past few months, the squadron was supporting F/A-18 operations within Australia, and will soon support the attendance of the fighters at allied overseas exercises.

I am departing tomorrow to support a trans-Pacific deployment of our Hornets.

We’ll meet our fighters just off the West Coast of America and then transit to Hawaii and thence Guam.

Then they’ll move from Guam back to Australia, all done in a matter of days For us, the KC-30 is a significant increase in capability and this deployment is an excellent demonstration of RAAF airpower.

It also needs to be remembered that the last Aussie tanker, a fleet of Boeing 707s, retired in mid-2008, and that in the interim the RAAF has leased tankers from other provider or utilized available capacity from United States Air Force.

The RAAF’s Boeing 707s were equipped only for hose-and-drogue refueling, meaning the RAAF is about to embark on boom tanking for the first time.

The gap in air-to-air refueling capability has meant that No. 33 Squadron has had to train Air Refueling Officers or “tankers” to learn their profession. The Air Force has also had to shape a Concept of Operations to operate with air assets within and external to the RAAF, such as the USAF, who are world leaders in air-to-air refueling.

With the boom coming online, the RAAF will be in a position to support both Universal Aerial Refueling Receptacle Slipway Installation (UARRSI) fitted aircraft and probe and drogue capable aircraft.

Delivery of this capability will provide a significant force multiplier for key Defense weapon platforms including the E-7, C-17A and the recently announced P8-A and the likely replacement for the FA-18A/B, the F-35.

The boom will dramatically expand the RAAF’s ability to work with allied air forces. Additionally, working with regional partners like the Republic of Singapore Air Force, which is acquiring the same aircraft, will be an important part for the future of the MRTT/KC-30A capability.

Takalkar was enthusiastic about the coming roles with allies, and the ability to shape a fleet concept of operations with allies as well.

Steps are already underway. Takalkar and squadron executives discussed the work in progress with the US Navy to certify the Aussie tanker to tank US Navy F/A-18s. There is no reason not to do the same with other United States military receivers, especially in light of growing Australian-US defense cooperation that could see increased numbers of American units training in Australia.

CAE is the provider of the simulator and training for RAAF KC-30A pilots and air refueling operators. Discussions with the CAE team prior to entering the two simulators highlighted the fact that the MRTT’s evolution had been reflected within the simulator through numerous software upgrades.

The RAAF pilots and tankers underscored that the simulator worked very well as a training tool, and indeed Takalkar commented during the discussions with CAE that the 90-day training period prepared the team well, and they could confidently be deployed rapidly into operational experience.

Later, I had the chance to discuss the tanker with the head of the MRTT program, Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Chris Deeble. The tanker is viewed as a key element of shaping a 21^st century RAAF, and indeed Deeble is heading soon to the RAAF’s F-35 program as its Program Manager.

There have been problems with the boom on the tanker, but according to the head of the MRTT program in the Australian Department of Defence, the boom problem is well on the way to being resolved.

According to AVM Deeble, “We expect the boom to complete testing and undergo acceptance around third quarter of 2014.”

He indicated that the MRTT boom is a very advanced system, which provides significantly more capability than existing boom systems. He has been working on the program for some time and commented that challenges with the boom have been both software and hardware.

“There are elements of the hardware which have posed problems aerodynamically; and the integration of the software and hardware to ensure the required operating envelope have taken some time to develop.”

We are conducting the final Developmental and Qualification Test and Evaluation, which should be complete by mid 2014.

We are focused on providing the RAAF with a firm basis for growing the boom capability by the end of 2014.

Working collaboratively with Airbus Defence and Space through these final phases of the program will be key to delivering a world class tanker capability to the RAAF.

Clearly, the recent decision by Singapore to select the MRTT to replace its own fleet of KC-135Rs validates the position taken by the Australian Department of Defence. Indeed, AVM Deeble indicated that supporting Singapore during their acquisition program will remain a priority for RAAF and will ensure an interoperable regional MRTT capability.

Editor’s Note: Clearly one needs to learn to walk before one can run. What will a fleet of Aussie and Singaporean MRTTs bring to the fight? The total will be at a minimum 11 tankers for the region and the future capability will be about the mult-national fleet, not just about the RAAF.

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-a-defense-quadrangle-for-pacific-defense-allies-shape-a-flying-air-tanker-infrastructure/

It is clear as well that a key “other United States military receiver” would be the Osprey which has become central to USMC-USN operations and is coming to other allies in the region.

For a look at the Osprey tanking requirements see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/the-kc-130j-and-usmc-operations-the-maturing-of-the-osprey-as-a-partner-for-change/

Credit Photos: Second Line of Defense

The first photo shows one of the two tankers at the base inside its hangar.
The second and third photos show the other tanker outside on theTarmac after transporting some American pilots for an exercise in the area.
The fourth photo shows a crew rest area on the plane. One of the benefits of a refuelable tanker is that with crew rest areas it can operate for a significant period of time in support of operations.
The fifth and sixth photos show the inside of the cockpit.
The eighth photo shows the front of the tanker and two C-17s just in front of the tanker. The Squadron Commander made the point that the C-17s had brought a significant change in the RAAF with the speed, range and capacity of the new lifter. The tanker was bringing a similar change to the RAAF as well, and the two working together was going to have a significant impact as part of RAAF modernization.
The final photo shows the squadron symbol as seen on the hanger. The Dragons are working to extend the reach and range of the Aussie forces in the region and worldwide.

Background: The Tanker Squadron is an integral part of the RAAF’s Air Lift Group.

According to the RAAF website:

Air Lift Group is one of the largest Force Element Groups within Air Force. Air Lift Group operates six aircraft types from three separate RAAF Bases and from Defence Establishment Fairbairn in Canberra.

It was formed in February 1987 and is responsible for providing the Australian Defence Force’s combat air mobility capability, which comprises the following roles:

air logistics support
airborne operations
special operations
VIP transport
air-to-air refuelling
search and survivor assistance
aeromedical evacuation
training

It directly controls Nos 84 and 86 Wings and the Air Mobility Control Centre from its headquarters at RAAF Base Richmond. It is also responsible for Air Movements Training and Development Unit.

Air Lift Group has been at the forefront of Defence operations, given its role of delivering personnel, cargo and equipment where it needs to go. This includes extensive service in the Middle East Area of Operations since 2001, East Timor, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, West Africa and throughout the Pacific.

Air Lift Group has also been extensively involved with humanitarian missions, including the following:

Delivering urban search and rescue workers to Japan following the 2011 Tsunami / Earthquake, as well as conducting internal airlift flights in Japan and delivering remote water cannon equipment from Australia.

Delivering urban search and rescue workers to New Zealand following the Christchurch Earthquake, and returning Australian citizens.

Conducting relief flights to northern Queensland following the Cyclone Yasi, including assisting in the evacuation of almost 200 hospital patients from Cairns area to Brisbane on 1-2 February.

Relieving flood-affected communities in Queensland and Victoria in 2011.

Previous humanitarian tasks have included supporting Operation Pakistan Assist I and II (2005 and 2010); recovery of Australians killed in the Kokoda aircrash in Papua New Guinea in 2009; the Australian Government’s response to Cyclone Nargis in Burma in 2008; the response to Cyclone Larry in North Queensland in 2006; and the Indian Ocean Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004.

Conducting aero-medical evacuation flights for the following:

Evacuations from Vietnam and Darwin after Cyclone Tracy
Rabaul volcanic eruption 1994
Bali bombings 2002 and 2005
Passengers of Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel 36 in April 2009

https://www.airforce.gov.au/About-us/Structure-of-the-RAAF/Air-Command/Air-Lift-Group/?RAAF-sNFA62I5DlLtVOqidVYBjGwjkHSoZlFd

After the Brazilian Fighter Deal: An Update on the Evolution of Brazilian Aviation

Posted on March 14, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

2014-03-14 By Kenneth Maxwell

Brazil quietly deepening air combat capabilities and promoting overseas civilian aircraft exports

After years of delays over the choice of a new generation of jet fighter aircraft Brazil has been quietly developing its defense capabilities.

The decision to go ahead with the deal with Swedish company Saab to purchase a new generation of 36 Gripen NG jet fighter aircraft was announced by President Dilma Rousseff on December 18th. The US$ 4.5 billion contact foresees the provision of the aircraft between 2018 and 2023. Currently the Brazilian Air Force has a fleet of 57 F-5 jet fighters most of which have been modernized.

But the new deal has already brought several beneficial consequences for the Brazilian aerospace industry, expanded its overseas marketing, and enhanced Brazil’s international collaboration.

The commander of the Brazilian Air Force, Tentente-Brigadeiro Junito Saito, told the Brazilian Senate Committee on External Relations on February 27 at a public hearing that he anticipated that between 2,000 to 3,00 jobs would be created in Brazil as well as 22,000 indirect jobs as a result of the deal. These jobs would be distributed between Embraer at the future assembly line at Sao Bernardo de Campos in Sao Paulo State and components produced at Porto Alegre in the state of Rio Grande do Sul.

Junito Saito said that the main reason for the deal with Saab was that the aircraft would be assembled in Brazil and that Brazil would have access to source codes, which would enable Brazil to equip the Grippen NG with armaments produced, by several countries and be able to integrate those weapons themselves.

This would also enable Brazil to acquire knowledge to later enter the 5th generation fighter age.

Shaping a new weapons revolution where weapons are enabled throughout the attack and defense enterprise and not simply resident for organic platform operations is a key element of the way ahead. For example, the new software enabled Meteor missile can be fired by one aircraft and delivered to target by that aircraft or the inflight data link can be used via another asset – air or ground based – to guide it to target. METEOR firing from Gripen. Credit: SAAB

Junito Saito told the Senate Committee on External Relations that 80% of the fighter jets would be produced in Brazil. The Grippen NG was not a 5th general aircraft he said. Only the US has these with the F-22s. But Russia and China were developing 5th generation jets.

Saito also said that the Swedish Air Force was providing a temporary solution to the short fall in Brazil’s defense capabilities over the 4 years before the new planes began to come on line by providing 10 to 12 Grippen fighter jets to Brazil beginning in 2016 until 2020.

These would be Grippen C/D already in service with several air forces. He said that Brazilian pilots were to begin training in Sweden in August.

General Saito said the new squadron of Brazil’s Grippen NG’s would be in service in 2020.

Brazil has also been developing its civilian aircraft production.

Mariana Barbosa on March 7th reported in the Brazilian newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo on Brazil’s continuing successful competition in the civil aviation field where Embraer has maintained its position as a leader in the international market for business jets

Brazil has sold passenger jet aircraft to companies including Azul (Brazil), Air France, Air Canada, American Airlines, Austral (Argentina), British Airways, Copa Airlines (Panama) JAL (Japan), and KLM Cityhopper.

On 8th March 2004 Embraer delivered its first E-jets (E-170) to the Polish company Lot and to US Airways. Since then Embraer has delivered E-jets to 65 companies in 45 countries.

Bombardier C5 100 has been Brazil’s principle competitor in this area. Embraer currently has 51% of the market and Bombardier 25%.

But China, Japan, and Russia are seeking part of this market with COMAC (China) ARJ 21, Mitsubshi (Japan) 165 MRjs, and Russia’s Sukhoi Super Jet 100 and Antonov 110.

The Sukhoi entered into service in 2011and the Russians have delivered 32 so far. The Antonov began service last year with Cubana Aviacion with three An-158, and negotionations are underway with Bolivia. China and Japan each have orders for 300 each, but the COMAC is not expected to enter service until late this year, and Mitsubishi is expected in 2017.

The E-jet market is estimated to be worth some US$ 300 billion over the next twenty years with a demand for 6,400 new jets.

Embraer E2, the new generation of E-Jets, was launched in 2013, and the company has invested US$ 1.7 billion in the project. The E195-E2 will have 132 seats, a range of 2000 nautical miles, and the list price in 2014 is US$ 62.4 million.

“The new generation will be 16% more efficient in fuel consumption” Paulo Cesar de Souza e Silva, the president of Embraer told Folha’s Mariana Barbosa. The first E2 will be ready in 2018 and Embraer already has 200 firm orders including from SkyWest and ILFC in the US and Air Costa in India, and 200 reserved.

In 2013 commercial aviation accounted for 53% of Embraer’s business, of which 27% was executive jets, and 19% defense.

Saab has also signed a contract worth US$59 million with Embraer to update between 2014 and 2017 the Brazilian Air Force’s air born early warning and control systems (AEW&C) on its E-99 aircraft, a fundamental part of Brazil’s capacity for surveillance of its vast frontiers.

The Wedgetail Enters into Service: The Aussies Build Out their 21st Century Airpower Capabilities

Posted on March 12, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

03/12/2014

[slidepress gallery=’visiting-the-wedgetail-squadron-at-williamtown-raaf-base-australia’]

2014-03-07 The Aussies entered the 21^st century with an aging Air Force.

The silver lining in that difficult position is that as the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) began to modernize, they could do so within the context of new 21^st century capabilities.

The process really began by adding the C-17, which was at the end of its production run, but introduced a new lift capability for the force. The reach, range and lift performance of the aircraft was important for the Afghan engagement, but will become a key asset as the Aussies focus primarily on Pacific defense.

The new A330MRTT tanker is the next piece. The impact of the tanker, which is refuelable, will be significant in allowing the Aussies (individually and in terms of coalition contributions) to engage with extended reach, range and endurance in the Pacific.

And operating in extended reach and range to protect the borders of Australia, to operate within the strategic quadrangle from Japan, to Guam, to Singapore and to Australia, will be new aircraft able to manage the battlespace with 360 degree extended reach.

The coming of the F-35 is a key piece of the re-set of airpower in Australia, but the air battle manger for the RAAF will be the new Wedgetail aircraft.

Second Line of Defense had a chance to visit the Wedgetail squadron at the Williamtown, RAAF base on March 6, 2014. In a broad discussion with the squadron, the key elements of the contribution of Wedgetail and its projected evolution over time were discussed.

According to the Australian MOD website:

The first E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft was delivered to Australia in 2009 and began operations in 2010. A total of six aircraft have been delivered to Australia.

The E-7A Wedgetail represents an entirely new capability for the ADF, providing a platform that will gather information from a wide variety of sources, analyze it and distribute it to all friendly air and surface assets. AEW&C aircraft can control the tactical battle space, providing direction for fighter aircraft, surface combatants and land based elements, as well as supporting aircraft such as tankers and intelligence platforms.

Based on the 737-700 commercial airliner airframe, the E-7A features advanced multirole electronically scanned radar and 10 state-of-the-art mission crew consoles that are able to track airborne and maritime targets simultaneously.

AEW&C aircraft elevate the radar 10,000 meters above the earth’s surface so that the radar can ‘see’ everything out to a range of hundreds of kilometers. Low flying aircraft can no longer ‘sneak up’ by approaching below the radar horizon.

An E-7A Wedgetail cruising at an altitude of 10,000 meters can maintain surveillance over a surface area of 400,000 square kilometers at any given time. Over a 10-hour mission, the Wedgetail could cover over four million square kilometers.

The E-7A Wedgetail is therefore a major new capability for the Australian Defense Force, which will significantly multiply the effectiveness of our existing Navy, Army, Air Force and Coastwatch, and help Australia maintain a capability edge well into the future. The E-7A Wedgetail is truly the “Eyes of the Nation”.

The E-7A Wedgetail aircraft are operated by No 2 Squadron from RAAF Base Williamtown, near Newcastle.

Initial Operational Capability for the E-7A Wedgetail platform was announced in November 2012, and Final Operational Capability for the Wedgetail fleet is planned for late 2013.

It is clear that this is a new capability for Australia. And the squadron, which has a distinguished combat record, is approaching the aircraft with a sense of enthusiasm, adventure and willingness to explore new ways it might be used. The backgrounds of the squadron are diverse with navy and air force operators mixed in, and with a wide range of experience in airborne surveillance and battle management, including several years of operational experience with the RAF on the AWACS.

For an American who grew up from the 1950s and is used to the US introducing new systems first and then allies following, the Wedgetail is a whole new experience. When you visit Australia you get to see the E-10 we did not buy (Wedgetail) nor the A330MRTT tanker which we did not buy either.

This puts the Aussies in a rather odd situation whereby they are at the leading edge of 21^st century changes, coupled with working with the USAF main contribution to this effort, the F-22.

What is the current state of play with regard to the Wedgetail?

According to the Squadron Commander, the system is “on the books” and ready to go to serve Australian needs and to contribute to coalition defense.

The Squadron Commander highlighted that the message going forward with the squadron was three fold: grow, integrate and prepare. Growth meant simply to fill out the squadron and enhance its operational capabilities. Integrate meant to build the squadron’s ability to work within the battlespace, to work effectively with the other Aussie forces and with coalition partners. Prepare for the system will always be evolving.

The always evolving part of it is not widely appreciated.

This is a software upgradeable aircraft with a defined launch point (IOC) but no fixed end point (FOC). The system will always be evolving and growing as the software code gets rewritten to reflect events and demands from the squadron.

The squadron works through its experience and shapes change orders which get sent to the procurement authorities to sort out priorities for the next round of upgrading the aircraft.

The difference between older and such a new system was outlined by one participant in the roundtable as follows:

“We have in the same time frame bought a CRC system full up which will look pretty much like it is in 20 years; with Wedgetail it will look nothing like it does now in 20 years.”

The Aussies have named their tanker squadron the Dragons, so here we see at No. 2 squadron the technology Maoists focusing on “continuous revolution” provided for a software upgradeable aircraft. With the coming of the F-35, which is also a software upgradeable aircraft, the Aussies are getting real operational experience with software upgradeability with the Wedgetail squadron.

And make no mistake: this is not simply a new form of AWACS. The AWACS is pushing the upper limit of what it can do. The MESA radar on the Wedgetail is a whole other animal, able to reshape what a battle management radar can do over time in working with new aviation assets.

The Wedgetail versus the AWACS also allows the system to become operational in flight significantly faster. And the Aussies operate the aircraft with no technicians aboard which means that with smaller staff they can get significant results within the operational envelope.

There are other nations operating Wedgetail, namely South Korea and Turkey. And the squadron will operate later this year with both countries. But US ITAR restrictions limit the under the hood cross-learning available from nations working the same aircraft, a restriction which may make no sense when South Korea and Australia will operate more and more together within the strategic quadrangle.

Coalition exercises are seen as a key venue for evolving the capabilities of the Wedgetail over time.

And indeed, this has already proven to be the case.

According to participants in the squadron roundtable, when Wedgetail came to its first Red Flag exercise it was the new boy on the block and partners treated them understandably with kid gloves. But this was in the midst of sequestration so the US was reducing flying time for the AWACS and the Wedgetail immediately filled in and began to do coalition C2 for the exercise.

The Aussie Wedgetail is a player in a 21st century aerospace combat cloud for the Pacific. Royal Australian Air Force personnel prepare the E-7A Wedgetail for a Red Flag exercise, June 11, 2012. Credit: Joint Base Elemendorft-Richardson. 6/11/12

But fast forward to this year’s Red Flag Nellis exercise and the Wedgetail was an accepted partner and operated both day and night in working on coalition operations.

As one participant said: “In a very short period of time, the system has evolved to take on greater responsibilities. And mastering an evolutionary process is what we are positioning ourselves in the squadron both with regard to our own and coalition forces.”

Another participant noted that “because of the growth potential of the system in response to operational realities, we do not need to waste resources on redesigning the system prior to new capabilities showing up. We are a network management system so a key driver of the evolution will clearly be other assets emerging and then our working out with the new system our next code rewrite.”

A case in point is the coming of Aegis to the destroyer fleet and the new amphibious ships as well with their C2 systems.

And a coalition opportunity could well be the coming of the USS America, a new type of large deck amphib, to the Pacific later this year, which could provide an opportunity for cross learning as well.

And the coming of the F-35 to the Australian force will generate its own challenges. The Wedgetail will then have to work with F-35s and legacy aircraft to shape the operational battlespace, but in situation where the F-35s will not operate at all like 4^th generation aircraft.

Not surprisingly, the squadron is already working on the way ahead.

“With fourth generation aircraft, your role is to shape the strike mission and to help coordinate an effective operation. The F-35 is individually its own little battle manager and the challenge then is to provide a broader area management role. And the transition between the two or put another way the management of the two capabilities within a single air campaign will be a significant part of the transitional challenge we will face in the decade ahead.”

The challenge transition will not need to wait for the coming of the F-35 to Australia for the Wedgetail is already working with the F-22s, certainly within the Red Flag and other coalition exercises.

This Wedgetail experience also highlights the coming impact of the F-35 in another way.

Coalition partners will use the F-35 in different ways, and exercises will allow the US to learn from partners about how to evolve 21^st century air operations.

For a kid that grew up in the 1950s, this is clearly a new century.

Background: The MESA Radar

As the designer of the system, Northrop Grumman, has put it about the MESA radar:

Legacy AEW systems have higher drag antenna configurations and are limited by mechanical scan rates of 10 to 12 seconds. In contrast, the MESA radar has variable scan rates and instantaneous target revisit rates to satisfy diverse mission priorities. Battle managers can assign multiple emphasis sectors with extended range and update rates while maintaining a 360-degree background surveillance picture.

MESA’s radar/IFF system is powered by 288 high-power T/R (transmit/receive) modules driving two side arrays and a “top hat” array. Each array has a large aperture for high gain and directivity of the radar and IFF beams. The “top hat” provides fore/aft coverage for full 360-degree surveillance coverage. This configuration provides radar target tracks through aircraft turns and maneuvers.

MESA is designed to operate with graceful degradation, extending available operating hours for both radar and IFF. MESA’s reliability is higher than AEW systems with separate IFF and radar systems due to fewer parts and shared system hardware between functions.

Operating at L-band enables long-range air and maritime search/track and IFF — all in one multifunction aperture system. IFF responses can exceed radar detections, providing cooperative target detections and situational assessments before targets penetrate radar surveillance coverage. Additionally, L-band provides better detection in rain than higher frequency AEW radars as well as longer range detection of smaller targets.

MESA provides wide area surveillance of greater than 340,000 square miles at rates exceeding 30,000 square miles per second for a typical 10-second scan rate. Since scan rates are variable and sectors selectable, other coverage rates, ranges and priorities are programmable by mission commanders. Four-dimensional processing, with monopulse angle processing, provides accurate range, azimuth and elevation locations. Doppler processing resolves closely spaced targets in formations.

MESA Radar

In a video produced by Northrop Grumman prior to the delivery of the Wedgetail to the RAAF, the basic approach of a MESA radar is explained:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuV1sapOqs4

And the following video shows the Wedgetail being assembled in fast forward:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tpMk9R2vSSM

The photos at the beginning of the article were shot during the visit on February 6, 2014 and show a Wedgetail being worked on in a maintenance hanger and are credited to Second Line of Defense.

The engines have proven so reliable that there is an old F-111 engine in the hanger to give the new engine maintainers enough work for their qualifications.

The Re-Set of Pacific Defense: Australia and Japan Weigh In

Posted on March 12, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

2014-03-12 It may be the Pacific Century; but not the PRC Century.

At the Williams Foundation seminar on Air Combat Operations:2025 and Beyond, the director of the Kokoda Foundation, Dr. John Lee examined PRC perceptions militarily of the region. He noted that the Chinese are the number two economic power in the world, but have no strategic partners, except the North Koreans, which they would rather forget.

This means that as they shape their military strategy it can only be based on trying to fracture US relationships with its allies and but that, in reality, those allies are modernizing their capabilities to better defend their interests and to build out a new system of Pacific defense.

The F-35 Pac Fleet is a key deterrent of the PRC and will be built out over time into a more comprehensive defense structure.

When we published our book last Fall on shaping a 21^st century strategy we emphasized the central role of allies and re-setting US approaches to embrace allies in the throes of defense modernization.

It is not about simply building out legacy assets to do classic power projection from the US or US bases to deal with threats in the region.

It is about inserting new capabilities within a distributed force development approach which cross cuts with allied modernizations.

My time in Australia has made it clear that the Aussies are sorting through a 21^st century approach to their own modernization which will intersect not only with the US but other allies in the region.

And further north, the Japanese are reshaping their capabilities to provide for much more credible perimeter defense against the threats from North Korea and China.

Now the Japanese have published their 2014 budget documents which indicate their thinking about the way ahead; and those slides can be seen below:

Japanese SDF 2014

They have also released a video which lays out their strategic rethink and can be seen below.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tT63npchUM

All of this fits into the strategic comments which I published earlier this year and am including below:

2014-01-09 By Robbin Laird

Japanese national security strategy is in evolution.

In the most recent national security strategy, the Japanese government highlighted its latest iteration of what they called earlier “dynamic defense.”

In an earlier piece, I wrote about the Japanese defense white paper of 2012 and highlighted the following:

This is the first white paper released since they announced their decision to acquire the F-35, and provides a further elucidation upon the new defense policy announced in 2010.

The Japanese announced in that year, that they were shifting from a static island defense, which rested upon mobilization, to a “dynamic defense” which required more agile forces able to operate in the air and maritime regions bordering Japan.

Notably, the Japanese recognized the need for these “dynamic defense” forces to be interoperable with allies to provide for the kind of defense Japan and the allies needed in light of changing dynamics in the region.

As the White Paper puts it:

It is necessary that Japan’s future defense force acquire dynamism to proactively perform various types of operations in order to effectively fulfill the given roles of the defense force without basing on the “Basic Defense Force Concept” that place priority on “the existence of the defense force.”

To this end, the 2010 NDPG calls for the development of “Dynamic Defense Force” that has readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology based on the latest trends in the levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities. The concept of this “Dynamic Defense Force” focuses on fulfilling the roles of the defense force through SDF operations.

Rather than simply focusing upon a narrow understanding of the defense of Japan proper, the shift was being made to extended defense of Japan understood as an extended perimeter of defense.

Now the Japanese government has released a new National Security Strategy, which highlights an even more comprehensive look ahead built around what they call building a “comprehensive defense architecture.”

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter destroyer JS Kurama leads ships during a rehearsal for the 2009 fleet review. More than 8,000 civilians toured selected ships and viewed the rehearsal. Credit: USN, 10/21/09

Such an architecture is built on effective joint forces, a close working relationship with key allies, such as the United States, Australia and Japan and a proactive approach in which “Japan will maintain an improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.”

Clearly this approach is not just a briefing board document.

Recent events have demonstrated the Japanese engagement in the Philippine relief mission, including closely working with US forces in coming quickly to the aid of the Philippines and then moving out when no longer needed, and scrambling their Air Force in response to the Chinese unilateral declaration of an air defense identification zone.

The new strategy highlights the importance of Japan being a “proactive contributor to peace,” rather than just sitting back and hoping someone else takes care of their defense interests. The strategy focuses on the importance of protecting Japanese access to global supply chains and to natural resources, including energy.

And in so doing, protection of sea lines of communication is a key challenge facing Japan and its allies.

The document clearly underscores a Japanese approach to be more proactive but in a broader alliance context, within which the relationship with the United States. But message to the US: you need to be proactive as well.

And part of the SLOC issue involves the Arctic, which is part of an expanded Pacific in any case.

“The Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for developing new shipping routes and exploration of natural resources. While it is expected that states concerned work together under relevant international rules, such potential could provide new causes of friction among them.”

: Japanese Air Self-Defense Force F-15J Eagles fly in formation during RED FLAG-Alaska 12-2 June 11, 2012, Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. Credit: 354th Fighter Wing

The document makes it clear that Japan is not simply going to sit back and be intimated by North Korea and China. And Japan is not simply arguing in black in white terms, war or peace, but the necessity to be engaged in shaping a security environment which meets the interests of Japan and its allies.

“In addition to the issues and tensions arising from the shift in the balance of power, the Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to so-called “gray-zone” situations, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests.

There is a risk that these “gray-zone” situations could further develop into grave situations.”

And later in the document, the importance of being able to operate across the spectrum of security and defense is highlighted as well, including an ability to operate in such “gray zone” situations.

“Even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.”

What is underscored in the new strategy is the importance of blending military, security and political initiatives together in expanding effective Japanese alliance relationships.

This approach is highlighted in the discussion of how to deal with SLOC defense.

In particular, sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the surrounding waters of Japan, passing through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea, are critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East.

In this regard, Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.

(Quotations from the Japanese strategy have been taken from a translation of the strategy document which can be downloaded here:

NSS

In our new book on Pacific strategy written with Ed Timperlake and Richard Weitz, a major part of the book focuses on the emergence of Japan and the centrality of the US-Japanese relationship in reshaping the US approach in Pacific defense.

Japan will play a central role in the reshaping of Pacific defense in response to the challenges of the second nuclear age, China and the Arctic opening. This is not the early post-war Japan.

This is a Japan which correctly recognizes the 21^st century is not the 20^th.

In effect, since the end of the Cold War, Japan is evolving through two clear phases with regard to defense and security policy and is about to enter a third. The first phase was extended homeland defense, where the focus was primarily on defending the homeland from direct threats to the homeland. A more classic understanding of defense was in play, whereby force had to be projected forward to threaten Japan and as this threat materialized, defenses need to be fortified.

It was defense versus emergent direct threats to Japan.

Life changed. Technology made warfare more dynamic, and the nature of power projection has changed.

The reach from tactical assets can have strategic consequences, the speed of operations has accelerated and operations highlighting the impact of “shock and awe” high speed operations made it clear that relatively static defenses were really not defenses at all.

At the same time, globalization accelerated, and with it the global significance of maritime and air routes and their security for the viability of the Japanese way of life. When terrorists crashed directly into the World Trade Center, Japanese got the point.

No man was an island, and neither was an island economy simply protected by having a global policy of shopkeepers.

More was required to defend the Japanese way of life.

: The Evolution of Japanese Defense and Security; Credit: Second Line of Defense

The emergence of the Chinese colossus and the greater reach of the Korean crisis into a direct threat to Japan, and the resurgence of Russia, its nuclear weapons and its military forces, all posed the question of threats able to reach Japan rapidly and with significant effect.

A static defense made no sense; a “dynamic defense” became crucial. This meant greater reach of Japanese systems, better integration of those systems within the Japanese forces themselves, more investments in C2 and ISR, and a long-term strategy of re-working the U.S.-Japanese military relationship to have much greater reach and presence.

The “dynamic defense” phase carries with it the seeds for the next phase – the shaping of a twin anchor policy of having reach in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean.

Obviously, such reach is beyond the capabilities of the Japanese themselves, and requires close integration with the United States and other allies. And such reach requires much greater C2, ISR and weapons integration across the Japanese and allied force structure.

The great strength of U.S.-Japan alliance rests not only on a linage of mutual respect for sea operations, and now shared technology, but also Japan also creates a North/South Combat Axis for operations.

Instead of leaving the United States with a Hawaiian-centric strategy with the need to focus on going to West Pac East-West, the Japanese contribution is a very strong (or at least growing again) as a maritime ally which can, in partnership with the United States, help the US go North-South from Japanese Bases to cover an operational area ranging from Pacific Arctic to the Indian Ocean.

And U.S. systems are a key part of the Japanese approach. Clearly, at the top of the list is building out from the Aegis global partnership to include Ospreys and F-35s as centerpiece items. Japanese F-35s would be part of the Pacific fleet of US and allied F-35s and Japan is where the first F-35s are coming in 2015 and by 2020 there could be as many as 5 squadrons of F-35s, USMC, USAF, and Japanese.

This will clearly be the center of excellence for the fledgling F-35 enterprise.

And added to this, the Japanese will build their F-35s in rebuilt Mitsubishi facilities, thus becoming the third final assembly line for F-35s, with Fort Worth, and Cameri, Italy, the other two.

The cross domain synergy among these new systems combined with Japanese integration with their legacy systems are the building blocks for the new “comprehensive defense architecture.”

And to conclude: there is a fundamental difference from PRC and Japanese goals and context. The PRC is an authoritarian regime seeking to reshape international rules to their benefit; Japan is a democracy embedded in alliances seeking to see that international rules are crafted and created which support globalization, not domination.

There is no moral equivalence here.

Rather than asserting that there is a “global commons,” the US and its allies are working to ensure that there will be a functioning global commons in the decades ahead.

This is not about conceptual dominance, but about realpolitik.

An earlier version of this piece was published on Breaking Defense.

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/japan-re-shapes-its-national-security-strategy/

The Way Ahead for NATO: The Ukrainian Crisis Intrudes

Posted on March 12, 2014 | by Robbin Laird

2014-03-13 By Andrew Haggard

British Prime Minister David Cameron will host the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s next ministerial summit in September 2014 at Cardiff, United Kingdom.

Previously, the alliance was expected to focus on “capabilities, partnerships and Afghanistan,” which U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel described as, “three priority areas for the summit.” [ref] Merle David Kellerhals Jr., “NATO Defense Ministers Lay Groundwork for 2014 Summit,” IIP Digital, October 24, 2013, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2013/10/20131024285107.html?CP.rss=true#axzz2veiyX400. [/ref]

While still actively participating in the discussion on NATO’s role in Afghanistan, to which Poland and the Baltics have contributed troops and other resources, NATO’s newer members are likely going to push for a greater emphasis on the former two priority areas n the wake of the Ukraine crisis and the apparent Russian invasion of Crimea.

Poland and the Baltics have long brought up the threat that Russia poses to regional and NATO security.

NATO’s Central European members are obviously worried about the threat Russia poses to their territorial sovereignty as evidenced by the emergency summit called by Lithuania and Poland under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which mandates emergency meetings when a member state feels its territorial integrity is threatened.

The main security threat to Ukraine since independence has been that Russia will seek to incorporate all or some parts of its territory. Credit Image: Bigstock — The main security threat to Ukraine since independence has been that Russia will seek to incorporate all or some parts of its territory. Now that this is happening, what next?Credit Image: Bigstock

In 2008, Dimitry Medvedev, the then-Russian president, laid out part of the doctrinal basis for the Kremlin’s war in Georgia and, now, its invasion of Crimea when he declared, “protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.” [ref] “The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy,” Stratfor, accessed March 11, 2014, [/ref]

The Baltics have legitimate concerns about Russian designs to limit their sovereignty.

Each of the three Baltics—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—all have significant minority populations of ethnic Russians, who migrated to the Baltic states after their Soviet annexation and in line with a policy of “Russification,” wherein the Soviet authorities tried to dilute nationalist sentiments by making the Baltics more Russian.

While Lithuania has done a better job of integrating its Russian population, Estonia and Latvia face criticism from Moscow for their treatment of their Russian populace. In Estonia, for example, Russian is not an official language and Russian speakers, for the most part, cannot obtain Estonian passport until they pass an Estonian-language test and can prove that their ancestors resided in Estonia prior to the Soviet invasion. Language discrimination has also been reported in jobs where Russians with poor command of Estonian are occasionally dismissed from their jobs. [ref] David Greene, “Russian Minority Struggles In Post-Soviet Estonia,” NPR.org, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129333023.[/ref]

General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, clearly understands the concerns Washington’s NATO allies have. He recently told PBS’ Newshour, “If Russia is allowed to do this, which is to say move into a sovereign country under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians in Ukraine, it exposes Eastern Europe to some significant risk, because there are ethnic enclaves all over Eastern Europe and the Balkans.” [ref] “Dempsey Reassures NATO Allies on Ukraine,” accessed March 12, 2014, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/03/dempsey-reassures-nato-allies-ukraine/80125/.[/ref]

While Poland doesn’t have the risk of concentrated pockets of Russian speakers that the Baltics do, Poland is one of the European Union and NATO’s staunchest supporters, much to the chagrin of the Kremlin.

In recent years, the Kremlin has issued not-too-veiled threats against Poland if it would host the proposed missile defense system initially proposed by the George W. Bush administration. One such threat came in 2008 when the commander of Russia’s nuclear forces declared, “Poland is making itself a target. This is 100 percent.” [ref] By Damien McElroy in Tbilisi, “Russian General Says Poland a Nuclear ‘Target’,” Telegraph.co.uk, 15:36, sec. worldnews, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2564639/Russian-general-says-Poland-a-nuclear-target-as-Condoleezza-Rice-arrives-in-Georgia.html [/ref]

Knowing Judo and Karate Maybe Better Training for Diplomacy Than Playing Gulf. — The Russian leader is not going to be influenced by the mere words of Club NATO.

Moscow followed up this threat a year later with joint war games with Belarus in which the allies simulated a nuclear strike against Poland and the suppression of an uprising of ethnic Poles in Belarus. [ref] By Matthew Day in Warsaw, “Russia ‘Simulates’ Nuclear Attack on Poland,” Telegraph.co.uk, 16:37, sec. worldnews, [/ref]

Furthermore, both Lithuania and Poland are concerned about Russia’s military build-up in the Kaliningrad enclave, a geographical anomaly that is Russian territory, but not contiguous to the Russian mainland, a region akin to Alaska for the United States, that borders Poland to the north and Lithuania to the southwest. [ref] Scott Neuman, “Poland, Lithuania Nervous Over Reports Of Russian Missiles,” NPR.org, accessed March 12, 2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/12/16/251666172/poland-lithuania-nervous-over-reports-of-russian-missiles. [/ref]

In the upcoming NATO summit to be held in Cardiff, United Kingdom, the former-Soviet bloc countries are going to want to focus on developing a mature response policy in the event of Russian aggression.

To this end, the former-Warsaw Pact members are going to be seeking more concrete security assurances from NATO’s heavy-hitters, notably the United States, given its capabilities and force-projection abilities are par none.

Thus far, the United States has made a good initial impression in the last few weeks. Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski said he recently received “full security guarantees” during a call with U.S. President Barack Obama. [ref] Joe Parkinson And Marcin Sobczyk, “Ukraine Neighbor Nations Seek NATO, U.S. Security Assurances,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2014, sec. World, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304585004579417313413460136.[/ref]

Meanwhile, the United States has enlarged its contribution and presence in NATO exercises currently being hosted by the Baltics and Poland.

As well, these countries are likely going to push for NATO’s defense capabilities to be developed rather than relying too heavily on rhetoric about developing European military capabilities, which a former Polish defense minister calculated was “still very premature.” [ref] “How Safe Is Poland?,” Warsaw Business Journal, May 20, 2013, http://www.wbj.pl/article-62763-how-safe-is-poland.html.[/ref]

To develop their capabilities, the countries that fear Russian aggression the most are going to request a larger NATO footprint and more frequent NATO military exercises in their neighborhood. [ref] Milda Seputyte and Aaron Eglitis, “U.S. Fighters Circle Baltics as Putin Fans Fear of Russia,” BusinessWeek: Undefined, March 7, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-03-06/u-dot-s-dot-fighters-circle-baltics-as-putin-reignites-fear-of-russia.[/ref]

Estonia would definitely welcome a greater emphasis on the NATO’s cyber defense capabilities given its experience of cyber attacks emanating from Russia and its well-developed I.T. industry. Latvia, which is investing in its own cyber defense capabilities, would certainly also welcome increased interest in the issue given that cyber defense has become a key priority for Latvia’s defense plans. [ref] Latvia Launches Cyber Defence Unit to Beef up Online Security | Sci-Tech | DW.DE | 04.03.2014,” DW.DE, accessed March 12, 2014, http://www.dw.de/latvia-launches-cyber-defence-unit-to-beef-up-online-security/a-17471936. [/ref]

In order to finance this, there could be renewed calls for increasing national defense budgets.

Poland, which budgets just shy of the recommend two-percent of GDP, is currently undergoing a $45 billion modernization of its armed forces. Donald Tusk, Poland prime minister, said that Russian aggression in Ukraine meant his country would need to speed up the pace of military modernization. [ref] Andrius Sytas and Pawel Bernat, “As Ukraine Crisis Deepens, Russia’s Neighbors Boost Defenses,” Reuters, March 7, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/us-ukraine-crisis-defence-idUSBREA260NW20140307.[/ref]

Meanwhile, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite has suggested her attitude towards defense spending has shifted and her country would pursue raising its defense budget. “Life always gives many corrections, including to political decisions,” Grybauskaite was quoted as saying in reference to her previous stance on defense spending while in Brussels after the Crimea crisis began. [ref]Ibid.[/ref]

Adding additional members to NATO could be another policy option that NATO’s frontier members could pursue.

Aside from the obvious choices of Ukraine and Georgia, whose potential memberships have been supported by Polish politicians in the past, they could encourage Sweden to join NATO as a full member given that the Jan Bjorklund, the Swedish deputy prime minister, has recently indicated his government’s was undergoing a doctrinal shift related to its defense policies. [ref]Ibid.[/ref]

Finally, the newest members would also like to see one of their own at the political helm of NATO. Currently, some commentators are speculating Radolsaw Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, would be an ideal choice to replace Anders Fogh Rasmussen NATO Secretary General, whose term expires in September. Sikorski is often described as a true Atlanticist and that he is, but he is also an adept reader of the environment. In an interview with Foreign Affairs earlier this year, Sikorski said that he viewed conflict between Europe and Russia as “imaginable” while holding out hope that differences could be mediated and promises kept. [ref] “The Polish Model,” Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/the-polish-model.[/ref]

Editor’s Note: It would behoove the Administration and the key European countries to shape CREDIBLE military options. Certainly among them would be air and defense integrated capabilities. At the top of the list would be deploying THAAD and F-22s to the region, and not pretending that the Russians are not modernizing their forces along with expanding their ambitions.

With Euro Zone in Crisis and Washington in the throes of drawdowns in defense, the question of what is the most credible defense modernization approach, rather than simply rhetorical flourishes so evident in the past years are on offer.

And the Afghan drawdown itself could be affected with denial of Russian air space and related measures, which Russia surely could undertake.

By the time September rolls around, the world could look quite differently with Ukraine, Syria, and Iran in play.

For earlier pieces on the Ukraine see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-impact-of-crimean-history-the-danger-of-playing-one-upski-with-putin/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/ships-cities-and-modern-weapons-the-sevastopol-flashpoint-2/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-next-phase-of-the-eurocrisis-the-germans-react-and-the-challenges-grow/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/germany-russia-and-ukraine-supporting-the-re-set-of-russian-influence/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/russias-high-stakes-game-in-iraq-expanding-their-role-in-the-middle-east/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/nato-exercises-in-poland-and-the-baltics-the-russian-play/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/nato-enlargement-and-moscow/