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U.S. Marines with 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, conduct a live-fire day and night deliberate ground attack on Range 410A as part of Service Level Training Exercise 2-24 at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California, Jan. 25, 2024.
Range 410A challenges platoons to perform a complex fire and maneuver attack requiring communication and coordination between multiple support-by-fire positions and a maneuver element.
Improving sustainment has been an ongoing major effort throughout the evolution of the tiltrotor enterprise.
The Nacelle Improvement program (NI) is a major milestone in this effort.
When discussing sustainment, an important metric is the mission-capable rate (MC). That rate – expressed as a percentage of total time an aircraft can fly and perform at least one mission – is used to measure of the health and readiness of an aircraft fleet.
The key objectives of the NI program were to improve maintainability and reliability, so as to improve the V-22’s mission-capable rate. A reduction in maintenance man-hours to troubleshoot and repair, coupled with reduced failure rate of components results in less downtime and increased mission-capable status.
I wanted to learn more about industry’s role in the Nacelle Improvement program, so I turned to David Albin, the Nacelle Readiness Program Manager at Bell.
For 20 years, David Albin served on active duty in the Air Force and in the New Mexico Air National Guard as a helicopter and tiltrotor instructor pilot, completing more than 200 combat sorties in the V-22 and rotorcraft.
From my experience with the U.S. Marine Corps in terms of the evolution of maintenance and sustainability, the first years were focused on getting the aircraft deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and learning how to support it. The focus was on providing parts to ensure mission availability.
As a digital aircraft, the Osprey generated data on parts performance that allowed the Marines to understand better the maintenance profile of the aircraft. By the time it was anchoring the new Special Purpose-MAGTF or SP-MAGTF, Marines could make a reasoned judgment about what parts needed to be onboard the KC-130Js, which were flying with the Osprey on crisis management missions.
By 2015, enough data had been accumulated to focus on how to shape a sustainment enterprise. This enabled the Marines to achieve better mission-capable rates and lower cost per flight hour for the Osprey.
This is where nacelle improvement entered the narrative, as described by Albin:
“When we started the nacelle improvement effort in 2014, we had access to data that allows industry to generate solutions using the fleet’s data. We worked with government on the input from maintainers about the aircraft and looked for solutions to enhance the MC rate and lower cost for flight hour.”
Albin continued, “There are fixed costs and variable costs in working sustainment for an aircraft. We focused on the variable costs and how to reduce them. How do we reduce the demand for components? How many times are parts being ordered based on false positives from the diagnostic system? How do we reduce false positives or get more accurate reporting from the diagnostic system? How do we improve the choke points in maintenance which reduce MC rate, and drive-up cost?”
The focus of the redesign effort was on engineering efforts to improve the operational characteristics of the nacelle.
Albin underscored: “The redesign focused both on service components to reduce the need for in-service repairs, like cracked frame stations, cracked baffles, the hinges and latches were all improved, so that maintainers would have to spend less time dealing with these components and their follow-on effects on the aircraft such as vibration in flight which caused the doors to open and potentially depart the aircraft, for example.”
He continued: “The Reliability & Maintainability Team used the data which had been accumulated from the operational fleet to determine what components or areas on the aircraft needed redesign. Based on this work, the engineers went and did the redesign and the NI program – then delivered reduced maintenance man hour rates and enhanced reliability.”
These combined effects of reduced maintenance man hours & improved reliability are what have holistically resulted in modified aircraft demonstrating higher MC rates compared to aircraft with the prior variant of nacelle.
This approach which yielded the NI program was rooted in two things: (1) a demand side shaped by the maintainers, and (2) the data generated by the aircraft from the operational fleet.
This information then flowed into industry, which then could parse the data and convert the maintainer input into engineering requirements. The engineers then focused on specific, realistic solutions in a re-design precisely focused on a more sustainable aircraft.
The resulting program had four key lines of effort:
New build of the nacelles;
Enhanced reuse of repairable components;
A new wiring design which improved maintainability, reliability and reduced part count;
New structure, consisting of targeted improvements to address fleet needs.
What has been the result?
According to data through the end of 2023 from the first users of the NI effort, namely the Air Force CV-22 community, the results have been significant. Twenty-one NI modified aircraft have flown 4,065 hours to date. During those flight hours, the maintainability improvements of NI have saved over 10,000 maintenance man hours or over 400 days of maintainer time on the modified aircraft compared to the time that would have spent on the legacy nacelle design.
Based on the NI program objective to improve reliability by four times, the prediction for NI after over 4K flight hours was 140 component failures. The actual failure rate of NI components to date has been zero, which is a truly significant result.
With regard to the NI maintainability rate, the results have also been notable. The objective was to reduce maintenance man hours by 75%, which after 4K flight hours should have accrued 2,195 hours. The actual accrued maintenance man hours on NI components are at 12-man hours to date, which is a remarkable outcome.
As for the MC rate benefit from NI, in October 2023 AFSOC observed a 10.8% MC rate improvement in their NI modified aircraft compared to the legacy nacelle aircraft in their fleet.
Industry predictions are for an overall MC rate improvement of 7% or higher for the CV-22 fleet once all 50 aircraft in the Air Force fleet are modified.
To data leads to one conclusion: The NI program is a significant step forward in shaping a more sustainable tiltrotor enterprise. The benefits to the fleet from improved maintainability, reliability and overall MC rate are certain to provide great benefit in the austere and distributed operations employment of the aircraft in the future.
The featured photo shows Albin in his military role as a CV-22 pilot.
Airmen from the 40th Airlift Squadron from Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, executed a supply run during exercise Bamboo Eagle 24-1 from Nellis Air Force Base Jan. 31, 2024.
Recently, the Hudson Institute hosted a session looking at how the Australian Navy is approaching the opportunity to incorporate maritime autonomous systems in the fleet.
In an article by John Grady published by USNI News on February 1, 2024, the session was highlighted.
Numerous forward deployed, unmanned, underwater systems “might be the poor man’s version of the nuclear deterrent,” the director general of warfare innovation for the Royal Australian Navy said Thursday.
Capt. Adam Allicia, speaking at a Hudson Institute online event, said these systems “help us get over those long distances” that figure into any Indo-Pacific operation. The idea, he added, “is to rotate them in and out” to maintain at least a persistent presence for deterrence.
The underwater systems “look like a submarine,” but, because they’re not manned, “you can probably take more risks” in how they are employed. “We can take losses without the loss of human life.”
In assessing their immediate use, Allicia said, “they’re probably small, [so] how do we fight with these systems” as well as manned air and surface platforms and submarines? The immediate answer likely harkens “back to the ’50s, ’60s and ’70s – talking to one another.”
Allicia said the RAN has established a central integrating office for surface, subsurface and air experimentation and exercises to understand the risks and limits. “How we’re going to use these robots together is a challenge.”
“We’re obviously an island nation,” he said. Forward-deployed unmanned systems capable of delivering mass effects in addition to providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data can close “the ocean gap between us and a potential adversary.”
“Reach and persistence [over such] a maritime empire is becoming harder and harder,” Air Commodore Ross Bender, who heads Australia’s air combat capabilities efforts, added. Unmanned systems can make a difference in Canberra’s ability to defend itself and project power in the Indo-Pacific.
Army Brig. Gen. James Davis, who heads Canberra’s joint autonomy efforts, said “autonomy is the only way to bridge the gap in vast geography and population” for Australia to defend itself, particularly on its northern borders. Australia is roughly the size of the lower 48 states and has a population of about 28 million compared to the United States’ 330 million.
U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet aircraft with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 232 arrive at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Jan. 19, 2024. Nicknamed the “Red Devils,” VMFA-232 traveled from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan to Guam as a part of their Aviation Training Relocation Program deployment to train multilaterally with allies and partners, and enhance the squadron’s combat readiness.
Paris – Airbus is taking more time to decide on the early stage of design for a European medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, with the industrial partners looking for a good fit with specifications, Guillaume Faury, chief executive of the aircraft builder, said Feb.15.
“The preliminary design review (PDR) is a very important milestone of each and every program, when we freeze the general design, meaning all specifications can be reached based on this general design,” he told a press conference on Airbus’s 2023 financial results.
“This has been postponed,” he said. “We took more time – we have more challenges to come to this convergence between specification and design.”
Challenges, a French business magazine, reported Feb. 14 the extra time spent on preliminary design on the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), dubbed Eurodrone, had pushed back the critical design review, which had been due to be completed later this year.
The French media report said it drew on a German defense ministry report published at the end of January, with the Berlin authorities pointing up a perceived lack of coordination between Airbus and Dassault Aviation, which led to the project running late.
Airbus Defence and Space is the prime contractor, with the subcontractors Airbus DS in Spain, Dassault in France, and Leonardo in Italy.
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain back the project with a €7.1 billion ($7.6 billion) budget. The launch order, signed Feb. 24 2022, was for 20 systems, comprising 60 aircraft and 40 ground stations, shared between the partner nations.
There was no problem in working with the industrial partners, Faury said.
“There are four partners in the program,” he said. “Airbus is the integrator.
“There are challenges in this program, like on all programs in…selection of the design to come to a convergence,” he said. “There is no communication issue with any of the different partners. But there are challenges in coming to convergence.
“The communication is between industrial partners and we move forward on the Eurodrone.”
Dassault, which will supply the flight control system, was waiting for Airbus to supply specifications needed, the media report said, drawing on the German report.
Dassault was not available for comment.
Certification of Engine
Occar officials met Feb. 7 their counterparts of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to launch the certification for the Eurodrone engine, to be supplied by Avio Aero, the Italian unit of General Electric Aerospace, a U.S. company.
“The Eurodrone will integrate the Catalyst engine produced by AVIO AERO, fully ITAR free and produced in Europe, that is planned to receive a full civilian certification released by EASA,” Occar, the European arms procurement agency, said.
ITAR refers to international traffic in arms regulations, the U.S. rules which give Washington power to withhold authorization when American-built components are used in European systems sold to foreign clients.
Airbus DS picked the Avio engine over a rival offer from Safran, a French aero-engine builder, sparking lively debate in France.
Safran, meanwhile, will supply the undercarriage and its Euroflir 610 electro-optical system for the drone.
Meanwhile, Japan has joined as observer on the Eurodrone project, Occar said Nov. 30 in a statement.
Japan had made its request for observer status on Sept. 7, the agency said, pointing up “Japan’s willingness to explore opportunities to collaborate on subjects of common interest and its recognition of the importance of cooperation between Japan and Europe.”
Japan has also signed up as partner nation on the global combat air program (GCAP), joining Britain and Italy in designing and building a stealth fighter jet, due to fly in 2035. That global project grew out of an Anglo-Italian plan to build the Tempest new generation fighter.
“European MALE RPAS (remotely piloted aircraft system) will be a key enabler for future operations ensuring to European nations state of the art capabilities. It will be a key pillar in any FCAS to improve the collaborative combat capabilities,” Occar said on its website.
France, Germany, and Spain are backing a future combat air system, which includes a new fighter jet, competing with the Tempest.
The twin-engined, turbo-prop Eurodrone is due to fly in 2030.
Aarok Attack Drone
Meanwhile, Turgis & Gaillard, a privately owned company, plans to launch flight tests of its prototype unmanned combat aerial vehicle, dubbed Aarok, in the first half of the year, Piloter, a specialist magazine reported.
The Aarok, which drew media attention last year at the Paris air show, has been modified with a temporary manned cockpit for the flight tests, the report said.
“We will also test the sensors, communications, and then the air-to-ground capability,” said chief executive Patrick Gaillard, the report said. Two test pilots, former service personnel, will fly the aircraft in the test program, due to last this year.
The test flights will be fairly basic, with the company looking for a launch order to finance the flights needed for full certification.
The French company signed an agreement with Antonov last year, with the Ukrainian aircraft builder acting as its local partner if the Ukrainian authorities ordered the combat drone.
There was interest in the drone’s delivery of communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and the capability to fit the AASM powered smart bomb, the report said.
The medium-sized company was among firms which accompanied the French armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, on his visit to Kyiv last September.
Faury, formerly head of Airbus Helicopter, previously worked in the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office, where he was flight-test engineer on the Tiger attack helicopter.
The war in Ukraine has pointed up the importance of low cost and readily available drones, with the Ukrainian forces looking to improvised aerial vehicles and sea-going vessels to hit Russian targets on the land and the water.
Airbus reported 2023 adjusted operating profit of €5.8 billion, up four percent from the previous year, and sales of €65.4 billion, up 11 percent.
In my recent interview with LtGen Heckl, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, we went back to his time as the second squadron commander to have taken the Osprey into combat. He was an experienced CH-46 pilot but brought with him members of the squadrons who were “newbies” who did not come from the legacy aircraft but started fresh with the Osprey.
He noted that they were adapting to the aircraft faster than the legacy folks.
This raised the question of how different from the CH-46 the Osprey was, and the challenge of the learning curve to take full advantage of the generational leap.
Recently, I talked with Carl Forsling, a long time USMC CH-46 and Osprey pilot, now with Bell.
We focused in our discussion on his operational experience while in the USMC with the CH-46 to Osprey transition and the nature of the learning curve.
Forsling joined the USMC in 1995 and he had two CH-46 deployments, one to the Balkans and one to Afghanistan. After this, he was part of the first MV-22B-equipped MEU, which brought the Ospreys to Afghanistan in 2009 for LtCol Bianca’s squadron.
He then had several years of experience operating the Osprey until his retirement from the USMC in 2015, and continued his engagement with the aircraft after he joined Bell in 2017.
We started by discussing how different was flying the CH-46 into Afghanistan compared to doing so with the Osprey.
Forsling underscored that “the stark difference between those two events still sticks out in my mind.”
As he described the difference: “It was a challenge to get the CH-46s from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Going over the mountains was death defying. You had stops along the way– including a secret helo base in Pakistan. The CGI which measures the rotor strain on the aircraft regularly indicated that we were maxing out performance and we barely could get over the mountains. It was a huge challenge just to get to Kandahar.”
The Osprey experience was very different. “It was as interesting as flying from Chicago to Minneapolis. You put on your oxygen mask, flew up to The Boulevard from the Arabian Sea to Afghanistan at 18,000 feet, and flew directly to Camp Bastion in a couple of hours.”
This difference also underscored a key point I have made over the years when discussing the Osprey.
Rather than focusing on cost for flight hour in comparison to a rotorcraft why are we not focusing on the cost of delivered capability?
The Osprey does not need the bases, FARPs and other landing points to get to the target area. It doesn’t need security at those facilities, it does not need fuel delivered to those bases, it just goes directly to the point of interest and can receive air refueling if it needs it.
This was evident from the beginning as indicated by Forsling in his experience of flying a CH-46 versus an Osprey into Kandahar from outside Afghanistan.
But with the arrival of the Osprey, the learning curve began.
Forsling underscored that in his perspective a core challenge was getting Marines to shift from thinking of the Osprey as a fast helicopter to thinking of it as a plane which could land vertically. This meant learning new force insertion tactics, new ways to work brownouts, new ways to address landing in combat zones, or simply understanding how the speed and range of the Osprey changed the tactics the Marines could develop compared to how they were operating with the CH-46.
It was a change maker; not a replacement for the CH-46.
In addition, the Osprey was a digital aircraft and as in many ways the pioneer digital aircraft, it was introducing significant change in terms of how to maintain the aircraft.
The Marine Corps needed to shift its maintenance approach to have maintainers more familiar with software and avionics than with the legacy approach to wrench bending. This did not happen overnight and was part of the learning curve.
Forsling indicated that a key part of the learning process was to correlate where the aircraft was operating with the kind of parts most needed in the very different geographical and climatic conditions in which the aircraft operated.
As Forsling noted: “We needed specialized maintenance and adjustment in tactics for the different operating environments.”
Obviously, that could only develop as the Osprey gained operational experience globally and at sea.
Another key aspect of the development of the aircraft was experienced by Forsling while in the USMC which continued after he joined Bell.
The Osprey is part of the new generation of software upgradeable aircraft, where changes in software rather than hardware allows for ongoing modernization of the aircraft. This is one of the most neglected aspects in analysis of the impact of the software generation aircraft in enhancing ongoing modernization of such aircraft.
Forsling provided this example: “Enhancing capability to operate in brownout conditions is a good example of how having a digital aircraft provides a key advantage in the approach to product improvement. When I started flying the Osprey, the brownout landing procedures were almost entirely manual. After I left, both the display was improved, and the aircraft is much more automated in terms of brownout landings. For a non-digital aircraft, such an improvement would require a hardware fix. With a digital aircraft, it is a software drop.”
Forsling also underscored that when undergoing CH-46 to Osprey transition, his training was involved with not just CH-46 operators, but fixed wing operators as well. But his mix of skills was necessary for a plane which landed vertically rather than being a CH-46 rotorcraft replacement.
The tactical impact of the Osprey was clearly evident from the outset.
As Forsling highlighted: “Having the options of going anywhere from a helicopter speed and altitude up through the 10,000-foot-plus range and airplane mode speeds or being able to do a low altitude insertion at high speed that combination of options allows you to adjust your tactics for the threats. And the threats we faced in in Afghanistan and Iraq, were mostly small arms or MANPADs, and the combination of the Osprey’s speed and altitude allowed you to manage these threats. That flexibility also enhances survivability in higher threat environments by altering the flight profile. That might mean going lower and using the aircraft’s speed and range to circumnavigate certain threats.”
In short, the MV-22B was not a good CH-46 replacement.
It was the entrant into a new force insertion capability.
Featured Image: An MV-22B Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, taking off from the flight deck of the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) Nov. 6, 2009. The aircraft were flown to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, where they will be transferred to Marine Medium Tiltrotor squadron 261 and used in support of 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This was the first time the aircraft will be used in Afghanistan. The 22nd MEU was serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command.
An MV-22B Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepares to take off from the flight deck of the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) Nov. 6, 2009. The aircraft were flown to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, where they will be transferred to Marine Medium Tiltrotor squadron 261 and used in support of 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This is the first time the aircraft will be used in Afghanistan. The 22nd MEU is serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command.
An MV-22B Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, takes off from the flight deck of the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) Nov. 6, 2009. The aircraft were flown to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, where they will be transferred to Marine Medium Tiltrotor squadron 261 and used in support of 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This is the first time the aircraft will be used in Afghanistan. The 22nd MEU is serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command.
An MV-22B Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepares to take off from the flight deck of the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) Nov. 6, 2009. The aircraft were flown to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, where they will be transferred to Marine Medium Tiltrotor squadron 261 and used in support of 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This is the first time the aircraft will be used in Afghanistan. The 22nd MEU is serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command.
An MV-22B Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, takes off from the flight deck of the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) Nov. 6, 2009. The aircraft were flown to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, where they will be transferred to Marine Medium Tiltrotor squadron 261 and used in support of 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This is the first time the aircraft will be used in Afghanistan. The 22nd MEU is serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command.
An MV-22B Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, takes off from the flight deck of the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) Nov. 6, 2009 The aircraft were flown to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, where they will be transferred to Marine Medium Tiltrotor squadron 261 and used in support of 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This is the first time the aircraft will be used in Afghanistan. The 22nd MEU is serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command. (Photo by: MC2 (SW) Julio N. Rivera)
An MV-22B Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepare to take off from the flight deck of the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) Nov. 6, 2009 The aircraft were flown to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, where they will be transferred to Marine Medium Tiltrotor squadron 261 and used in support of 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This is the first time the aircraft will be used in Afghanistan. The 22nd MEU is serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command. (Photo by: MC2 (SW) Julio N. Rivera)
An MV-22B Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepare to take off from the flight deck of the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) Nov. 6, 2009 The aircraft were flown to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, where they will be transferred to Marine Medium Tiltrotor squadron 261 and used in support of 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This is the first time the aircraft will be used in Afghanistan. The 22nd MEU is serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command. (Photo by: MC2 (SW) Julio N. Rivera)
An MV-22B Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), prepare to take off from the flight deck of the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) Nov. 6, 2009 The aircraft were flown to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, where they will be transferred to Marine Medium Tiltrotor squadron 261 and used in support of 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This is the first time the aircraft will be used in Afghanistan. The 22nd MEU is serving as the theater reserve force for U.S. Central Command. (Photo by: MC2 (SW) Julio N. Rivera)
U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet aircraft with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 232 conduct flight operations at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Jan. 24-25, 2024.
Nicknamed the “Red Devils,” VMFA-232 traveled from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan to Guam as a part of their Aviation Training Relocation Program deployment to train multilaterally with allies and partners, and enhance the squadron’s combat readiness.
