Poland After the Elections: What Happens Next?

10/21/2023

By Robert Czulda

Last Sunday, millions of Poles voted for a new parliament for a four-year term.

These elections had record-breaking turnout (74.38%) and attracted the attention of global media like no other recent election.

Although Western liberal media immediately declared a great victory for the opposition in Poland, the new political landscape is more complicated than such judgements would suggest.

A new distribution of seats in the Polish bicameral parliament creates an almost deadlock situation, which will practically make governance more difficult. It’s not even known who will become the prime minister.

PiS (Law and Justice), which has been the ruling party since 2015, and is ideologically right-wing but economically left-leaning, won the election. In total, PiS received 35.38% of the votes (in 2019, they got 43.59%), which gives them 42.17% of all Sejm mandates (194). The second is KO (Citizens’ Coalition) with 157 mandates, while the third, Trzecia Droga (Third Road), obtained 65 mandates.

PiS has the most votes, but it no longer has a parliamentary majority, and its ability to form a coalition with other parties is very limited.

However, PiS does not want to lose power and is offering the PSL (Polish People’s Party), which is an agrarian party, a coalition.

However, the PSL, at least for now, remains on the opposition side. If the PSL changes its stance and accepts the offer, the current government will retain power.

It is also legally possible to form a minority government, but its effectiveness would be minimal.

Currently, this is the most likely scenario.

An alternative option is the formation of a coalition government of opposition parties that have already begun negotiating a potential division of power.

However, such a government would be constrained by a power of the President.

Until August 2025, the right-wing President Andrzej Duda will remain in office, but he cannot run for re-election.

Duda has closely collaborated with the PiS government. Thus it is expected that he would be willing to veto any laws that deviate from the previous government’s program.

This also applies to military matters, as Duda has emphasized a crucial role of military modernization since the beginning of his term. Overriding a presidential veto in Poland requires a 3/5 majority vote.

This means that Poland is expected to face months of political chaos and severe struggle for power.

More elections  – in early 2024 – cannot be ruled out.

The final distribution of mandates has created an impasse in that no one party has a stable majority that would enable effective governance.

However, what if re-elections do not ultimately take place, and the opposition assumes power?

Fundamental problems remain in obtaining a clear majority which means there will be an ongoing need to consider opinions and interests of coalition partners and face the risk of the President’s veto.

The President will no longer be required to be loyal to PiS and can act more independently to pursue his individual goals.

For now, the opposition pledged not to abandon arms procurements made by the PiS government.

Currently, Poland is undertaking significant investments in its armed forces.

From 2021 to 2035, the state budget is expected to include USD 154 billion on defense, with additional off-budget expenditures expected to reach up to USD 75 billion between 2021 and 2027.

This entails increasing expenditures (3% of GDP) and a planned rise in debt up to USD 19 billion annually between 2025 and 2027.

However, many of these planned purchases have not yet been financed, and there are no executive agreements, which raises questions about their future.

The opposition, particularly left-wing coalition partners, may be tempted to reduce defense spending.

It is speculated that the new (opposition) government could try to cancel some agreements with South Korea, including civil ones (a future of the Polish nuclear energy program, which also involves the U.S. companies, is in serious doubt).

The most controversial modernization projects include an agreed purchase of 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft and up to 672 K9 155 mm self-propelled howitzers.

Poland is almost certain to abandon a plan to establish armed forces with a size of 300,000 personnel. This was one of the flagship programs of the PiS government.

The new government (if formed by the current opposition) will seek to improve relations with the European Union, primarily with Germany.

Therefore, one can expect a return to arms deals with European suppliers and certain reductions in orders from the United States, although Polish commentators generally agree that the new government in Warsaw will not want to spoil its relationship with the Americans.

One should anticipate reduced procurements of the AH-64E assault helicopters and a cancellation of a plan to buy the S-70i helicopters.

Even without such radical moves, the United States will no longer have such a loyal and a steadfast ally.

“New” Poland under the opposition’s rule will speak more often with a European (German) voice than an American one.

There is a widespread awareness in Poland that the armed forces have to be further strengthened.

This impression is a result of two fundamental factors.

Firstly, Russia has not been defeated in Ukraine and continues to present aggressive intentions. Particularly concerning are recent announcements of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian parliament, who stated that in 2024, military expenditures are supposed to increase by 68% to roughly USD 110 billion (6% of Russian GDP).

Secondly, the situation in the Middle East is becoming increasingly unstable. At some point, this may necessitate direct involvement by the United States. In the event of a deteriorating situation in the Indo-Pacific region (where China might attempt to exploit the issue), Poland may be compelled to defend itself independently.

Although there are many open questions in post-election Poland, two things are certain.

Firstly, even with a change of government, Poland will not undergo any abrupt changes in its foreign and security policy. The friendly stance towards NATO and the West will be maintained.

Secondly, Poland continues to be a strong and healthy democracy.

Despite the opposition’s hysterical claims in recent years that PiS is an authoritarian regime that will not relinquish power and might attempt a military coup in case of an electoral defeat (sic!), none of such scenarios have materialized.

Photo Credit: Poland’s President Andrzej Duda during a press statement after meetings with European Council and Commissions presidents in Brussels, Belgium, 07 February 2022.

Shutterstock: Stock Photo ID: 2120178674

Pacific Defender Exercise

10/20/2023

Multinational Humanitarian Disaster Relief Exercise in San Jose Ca, Aug 2023. 20 plus countries in the Indo-Pacific Region come together to train on communications efforts during and after a Humanitarian event.

Hosted by USINDOPACOM from Hawaii, this annual event serves as a catalyst for joint training and networking amongst the participants.

09.01.2023

Video by Justin Fairley

2D Audiovisual Squadron

REPMUS 23

10/19/2023

Exercises REPMUS 23 and Dynamic Messenger 23 took place in Tróia and Sesimbra, Portugal in September 2023. They focused on integrating new maritime unmanned systems into NATO operations, and featured the ability of autonomous underwater vehicles to operate effectively together.

REPMUS (Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping augmented by Maritime Unmanned Systems) is an annual sea trial that focuses on technology development and interoperability. REPMUS is led by host country Portugal.

Fifteen NATO Allies, along with partner Ireland and NATO invitee Sweden, were involved in the exercise.

Exercise Dynamic Messenger 23 focused on integrating maritime unmanned systems into NATO’s military operations.

This exercise gathered more than 2,000 civilian and military personnel, giving all involved a chance to familiarise themselves with the cutting edge of unmanned systems in the maritime domain. Fourteen NATO Allies took part, as well as NATO invitee Sweden.

September 18, 2023

NATOCHANNEL

We are publishing a new book next year entitled The Coming of Maritime Autonomous Systems.

 

The DSR Introduces Change: But How to Shape a Realistic Force Re-Design?

10/17/2023

By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Australia is support of the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation seminar, I was able to meet with Dr. Stephan Frühling, Professor at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University.

Professor Stephan Frühling teaches and researches at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of The Australian National University and has widely published on Australian defence policy, defence planning and strategy, nuclear weapons and NATO.

We discussed four key aspects of the impact of the Defence Strategic Review and the process associated with it.

First, Frühling underscored that the DSR has recognized the need for a new approach to planning and shaping force structure development or at least new to the practices of the Department of Defence. The document speaks of net assessment planning, a term which he introduced in one of his books.

What the Department means in using this term is threat-based planning in which force structure development decisions are made in direct response to adversary capabilities and likely operations against Australia. That the review calls for government-endorsed planning scenarios is important in this context, and implementation of this change is underway within the Department but it is early days with regard to judging the outcome of this process shift within DoD.

Second, even with the issuance of the DSR, what strategy Australia will pursue to achieve deterrence and defence is not actually spelled out in the document. What is clear from AUSMIN communiques since 2020 and the increased cooperation with the U.S.—and now also Japan—on the Force Posture Initiative is that the government has committed itself to working with the American-led effort in Indo-Pacific deterrence and defence. But the DSR only acknowledges this in passing, in relation to the development of the bare bases.  It also means that government struggles to articulate to the public how AUKUS fits within the broader Australian defence policy settings.

Third, this raises a fundamental question according to Frühling.

How do you craft Australian force structure design without understanding explicitly what the U.S. will do in the same conflict?

There will be operations Australia will want to be able to undertake self-reliantly; but what these would entail and what the demands will be on Australian forces will ultimately arise from within the context of overall, US-led theatre strategy.  This is something that Australia’s defence planning process, or U.S.-Australia alliance discussions, are yet to come to terms with.

Frühling argued that shaping a practical way ahead could well be driven by the Australians and Americans working practical details of how their forces will work together in the years ahead.

In other words, rather than white papers or Australian DoD planning documents, perhaps we should look at how the ADF and Indo-PACOM work a way ahead. Of course, the U.S. is itself in the throes of fundamental change with regard to its force structure.

What Frühling was suggesting that this could be a two-way street between shaping the way ahead with regard to the ADF and with regard to the U.S. and other allied forces, perhaps most notably the Japanese.

Frühling underscored: “One can’t do the DSR planning without knowing the broader context of what the U.S. is doing.”

The fourth key element we discussed was the focus of Australian defence policy. Frühling argued: “The DSR prioritizes deterrence by denial. With such a focus, the success of our strategy hinges on actually being able to credibly deny whatever the Chinese want to do.

“And I just don’t think that we are in such a position to do so.”

In a major conflict, Australia will need to carefully manage risks of attrition; setting the expectation that every Chinese operation would need to be denied by the ADF would not be helpful.

We discussed an approach we both felt was more credible: crafting, shaping and enhancing a defence in depth strategy. Frühling emphasized: “This is a much more realistic concept. It focuses on preparedness, resilience and national build out of sovereign capabilities to sustain our ability to stay in the fight.”

Ironically, I would add, that from an American point of view that might be the key contribution of Australia, not projecting power away from Australian territory. It will be interesting to see what happens as the ADF is restructured and the U.S. forces work through the fundamental changes associated with force distribution.

I would argue that Australia will certainly have its impact on the American military leadership located in Hawaii thinks about the way ahead. It is a two-way street.

Virtual Reality Training at Osan Air Base

10/16/2023

U.S. Air Force defenders from the 51st Security Forces Squadron standardization and evaluations flight, ensure base security through virtual reality training at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Sept. 28, 2023.

This team ensures defenders in the squadron have the knowledge and capability to defend the base from any and all threats, enabling others to execute Osan’s mission as the Air Force’s most forward-deployed permanently-based wing.

OSAN AIR BASE, 41, SOUTH KOREA

09.22.2023

Video by Senior Airman Aaron Edwards and Tech. Sgt. Zachariah Lopez 51st Fighter Wing

European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)

10/13/2023

Signing ceremony – Allies join Airspace Management (AER) and public opening remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 12 October 2023.

Natochannel

See also, the following:

Germany and the European Sky Shield Initiative: A July 2023 Update

European Sky Shield Initiative Update

Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard

Maintenance Facility and the crew of the USS Hawaii (SSN 776).

Happy 248th Birthday Navy and Ha`oli La Hanau!

09.20.2023

Video by Dave Amodo Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility

This spring, we visited the shipyard and interviewed its commander.

May 26, 2023

As the U.S. Navy works its ability for distributed operations with integrated effects, how will the fleet be supported and sustained?

One answer to that question is the major challenge of rebuilding the fleet’s maintenance infrastructure.

Years of just-in-time maintenance, supporting wars of choice not wars of necessity, have highlighted the need to invest in the ability to turn U.S, Navy  ships out from maintenance in a timely manner and to have the requisite trained workforce to support enduring operations in a high tempo conflict.

Although increasingly recognized as a key priority, rebuilding the U.S. Navy’s maintenance infrastructure takes not only time and money, but the human capital to maintain a fleet built for enduring operations.

Unlike China, U.S. maintenance yards need to be redesigned and upgraded to support comprehensive and efficient operations of a modern combat fleet.

What is the U.S. Navy doing to right the ship, with regard to maintainability?

During my late April 2023 visit to Honolulu, I sat down with Captain Richard Jones, Commander of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PHNSY & IMF), to discuss how they are shaping a way ahead that both enhances near-term capabilities and looks ahead to meet the Pacific’s challenging strategic environment .

Simply put, the key metric of a shipyard is the speed at which ships under maintenance are returned to combat commanders. Shipyards must continually look for opportunities and methods to ramp up the maintenance period rate, particularly when considering the possibility of sustained conflict against a peer competitor.

With the recognition that shipyards must become more efficient, the Navy established the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) program office in May 2018. As the Navy has described this effort:

The Navy’s four public shipyards — Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY), Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY), Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PSNS&IMF), and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PHNSY&IMF) —  perform a vital role in national defense by executing maintenance on submarines and aircraft carriers in order to provide combat-ready ships to the fleet.

Originally designed and built in the 19th and 20th centuries to build sail- and conventionally-powered ships, the Navy’s public shipyards are not efficiently configured to maintain and modernize nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines.

With the Navy’s needed focus on operations, the aging shipyards have been unable to adequately sustain and optimize their facilities, utilities, dry docks, equipment and information technology infrastructure. These inefficiencies and obsolete facilities result in higher maintenance costs, schedule risks and reliability issues.

To create the shipyards that our nation needs requires making significant investments to modernize dry docks, optimize industrial processes and modernize standard equipment to bring these critical industrial sites to modern standards.

To meet that mission, the Navy established the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) program office in May 2018. The SIOP Program Office (PMO 555) is under the Program Executive Office (PEO) Industrial Infrastructure (II), which was established in Fiscal Year 2022 as a Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) affiliated PEO and is responsible for the cost, schedule, and performance of SIOP. PEO II reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RD&A).

The Navy will ensure that the optimization process fully integrates environmental considerations including natural and cultural resources, water and air quality, and more. During the development of individual shipyard plans, the Navy will develop alternatives for assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). The Navy will work with stakeholders as part of the decision-making process and will conduct all appropriate NEPA, natural resource and NHPA analyses; agency and government-to-government consultations and public engagement and obtain all required permits to ensure a proactive approach to environmental protection.

With the breadth and depth of needs, the SIOP program has a significant workload to deliver the critical warfighting infrastructure enabling a distributed fleet to operate effectively in crisis and combat situations.

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on SIOP indicated the steps SIOP has taken to recapitalize its shipyards:

The Navy has taken several actions to improve its public shipyards in recent years. In 2018, the Navy began an effort to modernize and optimize its shipyards, known as the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP). The Navy has also implemented some GAO recommendations in its efforts to improve shipyards, such as creating a program office to manage the SIOP. In addition, the Navy invested in shipyard infrastructure above the minimum level set by Congress. Finally, the average condition of facilities at Navy shipyards has improved at three of the four shipyards from 2016 to 2020.

In addition to the progress enumerated by GAO, SIOP has commenced the second phase of industrial modeling for all four shipyards to provide data for optimized workflows and has begun the project planning studies for Waterfront Production Facility (WPF) at Pearl Harbor. A task order has been awarded for construction of the new Dry Dock 5 at Pearl Harbor, and multiple Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) projects to maintain the shipyards’ mission readiness have been executed.

SIOP will continue to “recapitalize the four public shipyards to optimize maintenance production by correcting infrastructure and equipment condition, configuration, capacity, and resiliency shortfalls,” according to Mr. Mark Edelson, the head of the program executive office, Industrial Infrastructure (PEO II). . “The happiest Fleet Commanders have the ships required to fulfill forward presence commitments.” PEO II has oversight of the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, which is a holistic plan that integrates all infrastructure and industrial plant equipment investments at the Navy’s four public shipyards to meet nuclear fleet maintenance requirements.

In my discussion with Captain Jones, he identified a number of attributes needed for mission success and how PHNSY & IMF is working to build these areas.

A key attribute – and one he emphasized – was having a skilled, capable and motivated workforce. He noted that for nearly a decade, the shipyard did not hire new staff, prior to the refocus on the great power competition. This led to a major hiring gap which meant they had an experienced but aging workforce. With the returned focus and renewed appreciation of the yards not to mention an increased workload, the shipyard began bringing many new hires onboard.

With this new workforce, the question became, “how to close the gap and ensure proper transfer of skills to the new hires while simultaneously taking in new types of learning and skills?” The new personnel brought new perspectives, approaches and techniques. Captain Jones indicated that they have been able to blend the old with the new to create a highly effective workforce.

He noted: “If you look at the people coming in, they see the work differently. We don’t accept every idea they propose, but we do we listen and take those ideas into account because they may have a great idea that nobody’s ever thought of before.”

New teaching approaches have helped as well. Captain Jones highlighted the use of virtual reality training. He gave two examples, welding and crane operations. With regard to welding skills, students wear a virtual welding hood that is a simulator.

“It actually feels like you’re holding welding rod. The computer system can tell how hard you’re pressing on it and if you’re pressing on it at the right angle,” Jones said. “When you’re looking through the hood, you see what you would see during an actual welding operation.”

He also described the crane operation training: “We have a rigging trainer for crane operators. When they have their virtual reality hood on, they are in the cab of the crane and have the same controls. When you’re wearing the virtual reality hood, sitting in the chair, it’s very life-like, similar to being in the crane. It really speeds up the training because it doesn’t take a physical crane off operations and it’s much safer because the trainees can make mistakes virtually and not damage anything.”

While the training the workforce receives is a cornerstone of the shipyard, it is also the workforce themselves both as individuals and as a team which is crucial to the success of the shipyard. Captain Jones underscored the workforce is motivated to join PHNSY & IMF. Not only do they have many more Apprentice Program applicants than available openings each year, but they are part of the local community through sports teams, teaching in colleges and universities, mentoring young scientists in STEM programs, and volunteerism.

The workforce also knows PHNSY & IMF has been and continues to be a vital asset to the Nation’s defense both in the past and today. One example is the significant role the shipyard played in World War II and in the following years, ensuring the Navy had the ships they needed to respond to any situation.

It is indeed gratifying to see a local community committed to the nation and its defense.

A second key attribute is to have the proper tooling and material for the repair process. Here the yard could use more investment in new tools and machinery, but the workers use a mix of the old and the new to good effect. As part of the SIOP program, assessments are underway to evaluate the various equipment throughout the shipyard so that upgrades can be made where needed.

Captain Jones noted, “Our machine shop actually uses some pre-World War II equipment. Some of these machines are extremely reliable and they almost never break down and are very good at doing certain things. For example, if we are only going to do single-type milling, it’s much faster to do it on the older machine. We have balance between the new and the old that seems to be working very well.”

A third key attribute also linked to the SIOP program is the process for redesign of the shipyard to support modern workflows to optimize the work process to speed up the ability to more rapidly do ship repairs. The need for these upgrades is linked to how the yard was established in 1908 and developed over time to meet the needs of that time.

SIOP has completed one phase of industrial modeling that shipyards can leverage to improve efficiency. Another phase of industrial modeling for Pearl Harbor and each of the other three shipyards has begun that will provide data for optimized workflows at the yards. This work will provide modeling data for workflows inside the facilities and will inform more detailed project level planning and design (P&D) for future SIOP construction projects.

Another element of this challenge is to enhance the digital backbone at the yard. When asked what Captain Jones would like to see in future investments, the digital backbone is clearly one capability which he felt needed to be enhanced.

Retired Adm. James Foggo emphasized the need for such investment in a 6 January 2023 article on the way ahead with regard to the SIOP. Foggo argued: “While improving the physical infrastructure of these facilities will be critical to success, it’s equally essential that we take this opportunity to build the digital infrastructure required to accelerate our readiness advantage.”

Captain Jones noted that they have established an innovation division within the shipyard which will facilitate the digital transition, such as using 3D printing and other technologies. “I think it’s a step in the right direction but we are still in the infancy stage.”

A fourth key attribute is simply adding more infrastructure capacity. The main effort of the yard is repair of submarines, but the yard does not have the dry docks it needs. The first SIOP related project is the construction of a new graving dry dock to accommodate for a now obsolete Dry Dock #3, which will be replaced by the new Dry Dock #5.

“Our first major project is a new Dry Dock #3 replacement, also known as Dry Dock #5, which will be deep enough, wide enough, long enough for our current SSNs and any future one that’s in the books for planning. There is also a Waterfront Production Facility we are going to put next to it and a pier that we need. We have very little pier space here that meets the requirements,” said Jones.

“Then there is this optimization piece. If you look at the shipyard, our first dry dock built in 1919 has all the work shops were right along next to it. Then we built dry docks 2, 3 and 4. But most of the workshops are still located around the first dry dock. This is not optimal for our workflow, and we need to bring workers closer to where the work instead of spreading the work all over the yard. A lot of time is consumed in transit throughout the yard. We have 1,000 engineers out of 6,000 civilians roughly, the majority of whom are on the fourth floor of this building which is quite far from the waterfront. Moving them down right above the production shops is key element for optimization.”

We also discussed battle-damage repair as illustrated by the yard’s participation in the last RIMPAC exercise.  PHNSY Navy divers participated in simulated battle-damage repair on USS Denver.

As Edward Lundquist noted in an article on this event:

“Before going down on July 22, Denver made one more valuable contribution to the Fleet. Navy salvage and repair experts set explosive charges aboard the ship that enabled battle damage assessment (BDA) teams to respond to actual damage.

“According to Jamie Koehler a Naval Sea Systems Command spokesperson, the event exercised the capabilities and limitations of an expeditionary group of Reservist and Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) Sailors for emergent repair when paired with an emergent repair container capability.

“The event provided the opportunity to survey realistic blast damage and conduct planning to utilize the Emergent Repair Capability afforded by the Emergent Maintenance and Repair Container (EMARC) along with Surge Maintenance (SURGEMAIN) Navy Reservist Sailors to plan and execute emergent repair,” Koehler said.  “Divers were offered a realistic training environment to learn how to assess battle damage and how to effectively repair the ship.”

“The training simulated exactly how a ship would look after an attack or casualty and offered Mobile Diving Salvage Unit One and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard divers a chance to work as a team to assess, repair and return the vessel back to sea,” Koehler said.  “Opportunities like this also identify future manning requirements, equipment shortfalls, and medical response preparations that can be measured appropriately.”

“Battle Damage Assessment Training aboard ex-USS Denver

  • Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC) coordinated the availability of the EMARC containers.
  • Hawaii Regional Maintenance Center provided Sailors an Engineering Assessment team support to the repair planning effort.
  • SURGEMAIN provide Sailors and three Officers to support the assessment, planning and execution of repairs.
  • MDSU-1 conducted Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) and notified PHNSY of their findings. Their knowledge of salvage equipment and techniques were used to complete the BDA evolution.
  • PHNSY conducted Battle Damage Repair (BDR) and patch work to fix the damaged vessel based on MDSU-1’s recommendation. Our knowledge of patches and repair techniques were used to complete the BDR evolution.”

Let me conclude with a few final thoughts.

The challenge of ramping up the speed to deliver ships back to the operational fleet is a key part effective deterrence. It is also a challenge which requires strategic attention.

PHSNY & IMF is keenly aware of their strategic importance and the importance of meeting the key metric of  the speed at which ships under maintenance are returned to combat commanders.. They are actively working to address the key areas of people, process and environment to successfully meet the nation’s needs today and into the future.

NATO Flight Training Europe (NFTE) High Visibility Project

According to a 12 October 2023 NATO Press Release:

Two initiatives were signed in the margins of the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting this week (11-12 October 2023), demonstrating Allies’ commitment to work together to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence in the air domain.

On Wednesday (11 October 2023), Germany and the United Kingdom joined the NATO Flight Training Europe (NFTE) High Visibility Project, bringing the total number of participants to 12 (Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Spain, Türkiye, United Kingdom).

NFTE aims to ensure that sufficient state-of-the-art pilot training is available around Europe in a cost-efficient and interoperable manner. NFTE will leverage existing national and multinational facilities in Europe and, where necessary, expand or create new training capacity to address training requirements for different types of pilots.

These can include basic, intermediate, and advanced categories of training for fighter jet, helicopter, and transport pilots, as well as personnel who remotely pilot unmanned aircraft. This is a high priority, especially for many smaller European NATO Allies whose training requirements do not justify the creation of national training centres.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană said: “NATO’s strength comes from our unity, our posture, the related forces and capabilities, and from systematically training together and forging trusting relationships in the process.

This carries particular importance at a time when we need to ensure the executability of our defence plans. NATO Flight Training Europe is an excellent example of this. This important multinational effort will help us develop a shared approach to training the next generations of aircrews.”

On Thursday (12 October 2023), 13 Allies (Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Türkiye) and invitee Sweden signed an agreement to cooperate on cross-border airspace.

This reflects the participating nations’ commitment to ensure that Allied civil and military authorities can collaborate on the use of air space for NATO training and exercises, and other air activities in several regions of Europe.

The use of larger volumes of national airspace by NATO requires close coordination between civil and military authorities to deliver airspace solutions in a safe and flexible manner.

As the recent Air Defender 23 exercise showed, NATO’s ability to train at scale in the air domain is a critical element of the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defence.

Mr Geoană said: “The solutions will be considered across several European regions and will deliver a flexible approach to airspace management. They will help the Alliance to strengthen NATO’s air and missile defense capabilities. Close collaboration will be required between civil and military users of our airspace […] T

of close collaboration between our military forces and our civilian aviation colleagues.” his has also set an excellent example of close collaboration between our military forces and our civilian aviation colleagues.”

Featured Photo: Left to right: NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană with Ludivine Dedonder (Minister of Defence, Belgium), Boris Pistorius (Minister of Defence, Germany) and Grant Shapps (UK Secretary of State for Defence)