Rethinking Sustainable Defence Forces: A Discussion with Dr. Alan Dupont

05/09/2023

By Robbin Laird

In an earlier discussion with David Beaumont, I focused on the challenge facing the ADF of managing what I called the strategic triangle for force enablement.

That triangle is conceptualized in the featured graphic for this article. At the core of the triangle is the challenge of sustainability, the provision of supplies, magazine depth and what can produced by the allied arsenal  of democracy.

At the 28 March 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar, Dr. Dupont looked at the sustainability challenge as understood in terms of the capabilities of the defence industrial base. He provided an assessment of the significant limitations facing the Western industrial base to support sustainable defense forces which could endure through a significant period of conflict.

As Dupont characterized the very significant challenge facing the liberal democracies: “The country or alliance that can deliver the biggest punch and outlast adversaries will win. Right now, that is not us. The arsenal of democracy has been replaced by the arsenal of autocracy. The Ukraine conflict has exposed Australia’s and the West’s thin, under-resourced defence industrial base. If we don’t fix the problem – and quickly – we won’t prevail in a conflict with a better equipped adversary.”

This is a key challenge as the West simply has hollowed out basic consumable production for just-in time wars supported by just-in time supply chains.

But neither the industrial base nor the supply chains are up to prolonged conflict of any sort. If Australia and the West want to deter the post-Cold war legacy approach to defense industry and supply chains will simply not be adequate. A major re-think and re-structuring is in order.

I had a chance after the seminar to discuss with him on 3 April 2023 on how to do so. One could consider this a discussion of the defense industrial base, but we both think this is too limiting as it really is about shaping the entire eco-system for sustainable defense forces, which includes specific defense companies, new acquisition approaches, companies that support the core capabilities which defense taps into but are not specifically defense companies per se, and tapping into new logistical and support approaches to support distributed force.

As Dupont concluded our conversation:

“I think we should move away from this defense industrial base language which can be very clunky and 20th century. People think in terms of big factories and production and development cycles of 20 years. We need a very different focus.”

Dupont started the discussion by laying out his methodology for building what he considers to be an appropriate Australian defense industrial effort. As it stands know, Australia is almost entirely dependent on overseas supplies and when Australia orders what it needs it joins the queue along with other customers, with no certainty be supplied in a timely manner. Added to this the tyranny of distance facing the transportation of military parts to Australia, and you have a perfect storm facing Australian defence in terms of conflict.

To deal with this challenge, Australia needs to enhance its sovereign defense production capabilities. But to do so, Dupont suggests the need for a realistic methodology to shape the way ahead.

What does Australia need in terms of defense capabilities over the next two decades? How much of what it needs could realistically be produced in Australia? What can it do with co-development or co-production with key allies? And what will it simply have to procure from allied countries and producers?

In those areas where it feasible to build sovereign capabilities, a new development approach is needed. Many of the dynamic new capabilities being used by defense forces come from smaller more innovative firms. Australia has such firms but there is no Australian government policy to support them or to ensure that they have the capital to grow. There is a need for an Australian industrial policy in this area.

In areas where Australia could produce for its own needs, the government should commit to a South Korean, Israeli, or Swedish path of growing for exports. He pointed out that South Korea now exports 17 billons of dollars of exports which provides a key pillar for its own defence.

In addition, to discussing his methodology for the development of Australian sovereign defense industrial capabilities, we discussed the strategic direction of defense and how best to support it. Defence forces in the Pacific for the liberal democracies are focusing on force distribution for survivability.

There are new technologies to support force distribution such as synthetic fuel production and 3D printing in the field. New approaches to sustaining distributed forces through a relevant development and production support are crucial to provide enhanced capabilities for distributed forces.

New platform/payload combinations are being introduced through such sectors as aerial and maritime autonomous systems. How will Australia support this effort? How will it do so in a way that allows for exportability? How will it work with core allies to enhance the rapidity of change in this area?

Cost effective and expendable platforms carrying a variety of payloads are a key element of the new defense equipment ecosystem. How will this ecosystem be supported and thrive? Most likely not with old acquisition approaches and older concepts of a “defense industrial base.”

In short, a reworking of the Australian approach to supplying its forces is required. But it should be done a realistic manner but with a focus on the force structure changes taking place and the need to help sustain a distributed defense force both now and in the future.

Australia in the New Strategic Environment: The Australian-Japanese Relationship Within in an Evolving Deterrent Context

05/08/2023

By Robbin Laird

The most recent seminar of The Sir Richard Williams Foundation focused on shaping a way ahead for Australia in the new strategic situation. At the heart of consideration was Australia facing the core challenges of deterrence.

But as a non-nuclear power and as a junior partner in the post-World War II American coalition, deterrence has not been something Canberra has really had to think about.

But this is changing.

As LTGEN Simon Stuart, COS of the Australian Army, put it at the seminar: “Pax-Americana was an historic anomaly. The norm in human history is a violent transfer of power from one empire to another – and 14 of the 16 transitions between empires in human history have involved wars. We live in an era that might be described as post-peak globalisation. Understanding how the international system works, what the great economic or trading blocks are, is an endeavour we need to understand.”

As global conflict continues apace, and Australia navigates its way ahead, there is a clear desire to defend Australia’s interests and to deter actions by China which significantly undercut those interests.

But what does Australia wish to deter?

How does it do so?

And how does it work its allied and partner relationships in conjunction with defining its new relationship with China?

Working with core allies and deepening military and political-military cooperation in the region and beyond is a core part of how Australia is shaping its way ahead. The AUKUS agreement is certainly an expression of this; but it clearly is not the only element of what Australia needs to do.

During my visit, I had a chance to talk with my colleague Professor Stephan Frühling (whose biography can be seen at the end of this article) about a key aspect of this issue, namely, the significant evolution of the Japanese strategic relationship with Australia. Recently, Frühling taught for several months in Japan and gained some first-hand insights into the situation.

He argued that the U.S.-Japanese defence relationship has been built around close political-military and force integration capabilities. Australia’s relationship with Japan has not been constructed this way. But he argues that Australia and Japan have clearly moved towards such a relationship.

Last Fall, the Japanese Prime Minister visited Australia and the two governments agreed to a new strategic relationship in which their intelligence and military forces would work more closely together, and the scope and ambition for policy dialogue on how both countries’ strategic posture can coalesce significantly expands (the agreement is reproduced at the end of the article). There was an agreement for Japanese forces to be part of allied exercises on an ongoing basis in Australia, which could see a much broader relationship in terms of providing mutual strategic depth for both countries.

Hitherto, Australia has avoided anything looking like an American-Japanese defence agreement. But Frühling suggests that such a path might have started for the two countries with the new agreement and the joint concern with the Chinese strategic threat to the region.

But growth along these lines will require a culture change in Canberra, Frühling argues. Given the absence of a deterrence focus in Australian strategic culture, defence cooperation has been limited to the technical aspects of interoperability and cooperation at the political level, rather than building a robust political-military working culture.

In such a culture, one would shape key agreements on how Australia works with allies in working the strategic chessboard to support deterrence before a conflict breaks out. Canberra’s experience in working with the United States was shaped through joint operations that started after conflict had already broken out, especially in the Middle East, rather than joint presence and signaling for deterrence.

In the past few years, this is changing. And shaping new political-military relationships along with military cooperation agreements can be expected to grow. Frühling made the interesting observation that the AUKUS agreement by bringing the UK military into a more direct role in Australian defence could bring the significant experience the Brits have in political-military allied cooperation efforts to bear on the Australian experience. This would be a sort of cultural contribution of the British military with their long history within NATO institutions as well as their most recent bilateral US-UK capability integration evident in the coming of the UK aircraft carrier and carrier aviation.

Frühling underscored: “What we’re talking about actually is operational integration in the sense of relying allies’ contributions in a crisis rather than a technical focus on interoperability.”

In the Australian-Japanese context this would mean direct discussions on what the two sides would be willing to commit to in case of crises to meet their joint operational requirements in fluid strategic situations. There is a clear need to expand how Japan and Australia might cooperate bilaterally or with other allies in generating new military capabilities, sustainment depth or joint logistical support in a crisis.

In a discussion I had with a U.S. senior military official earlier this year, he made quite a similar point with regard to shaping the way ahead with allies. When operating in a coalition, it is not simply a question of whether the forces can work together but of where and with what authorities to do so in a crisis.  As this official put it: “My definition of interoperability begins with our ability for systems to talk to each other, and our TTPs to be synchronized. Interchangeability is where we understand where our national objectives overlap, and we drive into that space, and then we operate in that space.

“For example, with regards to Australia and the United States, our objectives, have a have a large overlap in a Venn diagram. Maybe Indonesia and the United States don’t overlap as much. I’m not asking them for support. I’m understanding what their objectives are, and I’m finding where our objectives overlap, then I will let the policymakers understand how in the warfighting perspective it’d be great if we can help reshape the Venn diagram of intersecting objectives. But that’s not my job. My job is to understand, what’s an ally’s objective.? What’s your objective in the South China Sea? What’s your objective as far as freedom of navigation? Are we on the same page? Let’s just start there. And then work together.”

There is much to be done by Canberra in dealing with Tokyo along these lines. What Frühling is suggesting is that effort has begun in earnest.

Professor Stephan Frühling

Stephan Frühling is Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University and has widely published on Australian defence policy, defence planning and strategy, nuclear weapons and NATO

Stephan was the Fulbright Professional Fellow in Australia-US Alliance Studies at Georgetown University in Washington DC in 2017. He worked as a ‘Partner across the globe’ research fellow in the Research Division of the NATO Defence College in Rome in 2015 and was a member of the Australian Government’s External Panel of Experts on the development of the 2016 Defence White Paper.

Previously, he was the Associate Dean Partnership and Engagement (2021-2022), Deputy Dean (2020 to 2021), and Associate Dean Education (2016 to 2020) in the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, the inaugural Director of Studies of the ANU Master in Military Studies program at the Australian Defence Force’s Australian Command and Staff College (2011 to 2013), and Managing Editor of the Kokoda Foundation’s journal Security Challenges (2006 to 2014).

Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

22 October 2022

  1. We, the Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan, hereby reaffirm the vital Special Strategic Partnership between our two countries, a pillar of a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient.
  2. We commit to a positive and ambitious agenda to deepen and expand our comprehensive engagement over the decade ahead.
  3. Our significant trade, investment, defence and security ties, the deep affinity between our peoples and our shared values of democracy, human rights, free trade and a rules-based international order, make Australia and Japan natural partners.
  4. We will build on the great strides our two countries have made through the Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation of 2007 and the Special Strategic Partnership established in 2014.
  5. We recognise that our partnership must continue to evolve to meet growing risks to our shared values and mutual strategic interests. We affirm our unwavering commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is underpinned, in particular, by:
  • a rules-based order where states resolve disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law, and where sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected
  • a favourable strategic balance that deters aggression and behaviour that undermines international rules and norms
  • an open, stable, and secure maritime domain underpinned by adherence to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in which States can exercise freedom of navigation and overflight and are not subject to coercive or destabilising actions
  • inclusive and transparent institutions, norms and standards that guide cooperation on shared challenges in domains such as cyber, space, critical and emerging technologies and telecommunications
  • countries that are resilient to aggression, coercion, disinformation, malicious cyber activity and other forms of interference, as well as to global challenges such as pandemics, natural disasters and climate change
  • continuing regional economic integration underpinned by a rules-based and market-oriented trade and investment system, as well as diverse and resilient supply chains.
    1. Over the next ten years, Australia and Japan will work together more closely for our shared objectives. We will strengthen exchanges of strategic assessments at all levels, including through annual reciprocal leaders’ meetings, foreign and defence ministers’ meetings, dialogues between senior officials, and intelligence cooperation. We will consult each other on contingencies that may affect our sovereignty and regional security interests, and consider measures in response.
    2. Our bilateral partnership also reinforces our respective alliances with the United States that serve as critical pillars for our security, as well as for peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific. Deepening trilateral cooperation with the United States is critical to enhancing our strategic alignment, policy coordination, interoperability, and joint capability.
    3. We will expand and deepen practical cooperation and further enhance interoperability between the Australian Defence Force and the Japan Self-Defense Forces through more sophisticated joint exercises and operations, multilateral exercises with partners, mutual use of facilities including maintenance, asset protection, and personnel links and exchanges. We will reinforce security and defence cooperation including in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, capacity building for regional partners, advanced defence science and technology, defence industry and high-end capabilities. We will explore additional ways to improve the effectiveness of our bilateral security and defence cooperation, including through discussions on scope, objectives, and forms of enhanced operational cooperation between our two defence forces.
    4. We will strengthen cooperation with partners to ensure the benefits of economic openness do not engender vulnerabilities that can be exploited. We will promote economic security by building resilient supply chains, including for clean energy technologies, promoting high quality infrastructure and transparent and sustainable lending practices, strengthening protection of critical infrastructure, including telecommunications security and resilience, addressing forced technology transfers, including those with more sophisticated means, strengthening border and law enforcement collaboration and resisting economic coercion and disinformation. We will work together to maintain an open, free, safe, and secure technology environment.
    5. Australia and Japan will strengthen our cyber defences and improve our shared awareness of cyber threats. We will also enhance our cooperation in the space domain and other strategic capabilities vital to our partnership. We will continue to enhance our cooperation and information exchange on law enforcement and border security to combat transnational and serious organised crime, including on risks to critical supply chains.
    6. In our shared pursuit of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, Australia and Japan will work closely with each other to uphold and strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
    7. We will advance the women, peace and security agenda, as enshrined in UNSCR1325.
    8. We will entrench and expand our cooperation with other partners in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, to align our efforts towards realisation of our vision for the Indo-Pacific.
    9. We will cooperate with ASEAN and support ASEAN centrality and the fundamental principles of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and its practical implementation. We will support a resilient and sovereign Pacific region, working with existing institutions, including the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and to support the PIF with the implementation of its 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We will collaborate to build regional resilience in areas such as climate change, health security, energy transition, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and maritime security.
    10. We commit to leading action at all levels to implement this ambitious agenda for enhanced security cooperation, to maximise the potential of our Special Strategic Partnership and contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
See also the following:

The Marine Force Protection Unit Kings Bay

05/05/2023

The Marine Force Protection Unit Kings Bay is tasked with the protection of U.S. Navy ballistic missile submarines while surfaced and transiting U.S. territorial waters to and from their patrol stations in Kings Bay, Georgia, Feb. 22, 2022.

There are approximately 150 U.S. Coast Guard members stationed at the MFPU with various rates and ranks.  KINGS BAY, GA

02.22.2022

Video by Petty Officer 3rd Class Vincent Moreno

U.S. Coast Guard District 7

PADET Jacksonville

NATO’s Marine Forces

05/01/2023

A unique capability that is able to operate on different terrains under all weather conditions, the Marines are a vital NATO asset. As amphibious troops and able to bridge the gap between the land and the sea, they are held at high readiness to deploy rapidly if a crisis strikes.

Many NATO countries have Marine capabilities and they often train and exercise together in different Allied countries to hone their skills and practise working alongside one another.

In this short documentary, we look at the Dutch and German Marines in Scotland, the Portuguese Marines on the rivers of Lithuania, the UK Royal Marines training in Norway, and NATO’s largest Marine contributor, the US Marine Corps, which exercises across the European continent.

DENMARK 11.01.2023

Natochannel

Working the Architecture for the Next Generation European Air Combat System

04/28/2023

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France, Germany, and Spain, the partner nations of a European future combat air system, are due to pare down the short list of architecture options for a new generation fighter jet by the middle of next year, an air force officer said.

“There is an important milestone next year, with the four or five architectures narrowed down to two or three,” said the officer, who works on the French team on the future combat air system (FCAS).

“This is an important moment,” the officer said.

The industrial partners on FCAS submitted in September 2020 five options for the architecture, and expected that to be whittled down to two the following year, Airbus Defence and Space said December 2020.

That short list of five had been selected from a list of 10 architecture options, a source with knowledge of the project also said in December 2020.

The new generation fighter (NGF) is the critical first pillar in the three-nation project for a European air combat system, and a core element in the next generation weapon system (NGWS), along with remote carrier drones, and a combat cloud for command and control.

“It is a question of the modernization of air operations for tomorrow, to go faster, stronger, further, and higher,” the officer said. “Air superiority is the precondition for any operation, to allow freedom of action.”

There will be a high level of automation in the new fighter, but in the fog of war, it will be a pilot who decides whether to fire a nuclear weapon, not an automated system, the officer said.

Threats Evolve

The French armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, is due to go to Madrid April 28 for a meeting with his German and Spanish counterparts on FCAS, the ministry said.

Adversaries are making great effort in fielding modern, high-technology and stealthy threats, the officer said, and failure to keep up would lead to a downgrade of French capability.

Senior air force officers of the partner nations, working as a team, will pick the architecture options, the officer said. There is no tension with German and Spanish officers on designing the fighter to carry a nuclear weapon and fly from an aircraft carrier, two French operational requirements for the sixth generation fighter.

A steering committee of senior officers of the three air forces, and an officer of the Direction Générale de l’Armement, the French procurement office, pilot the FCAS project, which seeks to fly the new fighter by 2040, eventually replacing the Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon.

The steering committee held a physical meeting in January, the first gathering of officers for some time, as the Covid virus had forced meetings to a virtual basis.

The committee oversees a combined project team, based in Arcueil in the suburbs of the capital, with some 20-25 officers working in two teams, managing operational aspects and working with industrial partners which signed a key contract Dec. 16 2022 .

That contract, worth €3.2 billion ($3.5 billion) and running three years from 2023 to 2025, covers the studies in phase 1B, now under way.

There were “kick-off” phase 1B meetings in mid-March, with companies including Airbus DS, Dassault, Indra, MBDA, MTU, Safran, and Thales sharing out work on the seven FCAS  pillars, namely the fighter, engine, drones, cloud combat, sensors, simulation, and stealth.

The goal is to arrive at a single architecture by the end of phase 1B in 2025, allowing entry into phase 2, to build and fly a technology demonstrator for the fighter and two classes of drones in 2028/29. Ground stations for combat cloud are part of that package. The two types of remote carrier will include the advanced loyal wingman type, flying with the manned fighter, and lower cost drones, which do not need to return from mission.

The total budget, comprising phase 1B and the option for phase 2, will be almost €8 billion, the French defense ministry has said.

There is a common operational vision on the European project, as set out in the High Level Common Operational Requirement Document (HL CORD) agreed by the chiefs of staff of the three partner nations, and backed by a letter of intent by the defense ministers, said an article titled The Future Air Combat System (SCAF): A European Defence Policy That is Moving Forward.

The article, by Eva Portier, a procurement officer, and air force general Jean-Pascal Breton, appeared in Revue Defense Nationale, a monthly publication, marking the 2019 Paris air show.

Bottom Up and Top Down – Both Approaches

Work on research and technology – seen as a bottom up approach – seeks to test and de-risk disruptive new technology. There are expectations the demonstrator aircraft will be as close as possible to the fighter to be built in phase 3 in the 2030s decade and enter service in 2040.

There is also a top down approach, drawing on the joint concept study (JCS) prepared by

Airbus and Dassault. The industrial partners said in a 2019 joint statement the two-year study would “conceptualise the different FCAS capabilities…”

The selection of architecture will draw on 11 operational “scenarios,” or “mission vignette” such as flying in the first wave, close air support, and naval operations.

There will not be a new motor on the demonstrator, built to show whether technology meets the requirements of the selected architecture.

These are still early days and there is discussion on the basic design of the fighter, such as aerodynamics, and finding compromise between weight and speed.

That uncertainty on specifications can also be found on the other side of the Channel, as it was too early to say how much the Tempest fighter would weigh.

To See At Paris Air Show

Airbus and Dassault are expected to set out their own sketches of the fighter at the upcoming Paris air show, seen as an important meeting place for the officers working on FCAS.

The French air force sees the schedule as tight, with time seen as needed to mature technology as part of the de-risking process.

The European FCAS timeline lags behind the U.K. Tempest fighter program, which expects to fly a demonstrator before 2025 and the first operational version before 2035, said a report on defense-aerospace.com, a specialist website.

Meanwhile, the officer said the combat cloud is essential to the fighter design, offering a sharing of sensors over an advanced digital network. A pooling of sensors might, for instance, allow a smaller radar fitted on the fighter, which could draw on data from other fighters.

The combat cloud is seen as critical for interoperability with allied air forces, sharing information with the Tempest fighter, the global combat air programme (GCAP) shared between the U.K., Italy, and Japan, and the U.S. F-35.

An extended digital communications network will be vital, the officer said, as the present Link 16 system is already saturated.

BAE Systems, a U.K. arms company, and Thales, a French electronics company, are sharing  communications technology in “connectivity” in, the officer said. That cooperation stems from a cancelled Anglo-French project, namely future combat air system-development programme (FCAS-DP) for an unmanned combat air vehicle. That plan had been launched under the 2010 Lancaster House defense cooperation agreement, before being axed.

Interest Abroad

Belgium is considering the successor to the F-35 fighter, Belgian media reports said, and there is political interest in signing up for the European new generation fighter rather than signing up for the Tempest fighter program.

It is too late for Belgium to join phase 1B, which is under way, but it was perhaps possible to sign up at a later stage and negotiate a work share in the European fighter program.

European air force officers met in the week of April 10 in Bordeaux, southwest France, to discuss lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine, the officer said, and it was in such gatherings  that other air forces might show interest in the European FCAS.

Funds for Tempest

Meanwhile, the U.K. signed a contract worth £650 million for development of the global combat air programme, the ministry of defense said April 14. The Tempest is the fighter at the heart of that trilateral GCAP project, backed by Britain, Italy, and Japan.

That funding is part of the £2 billion budget for the fighter project to May 2025, the ministry said. Some £1.4 billion has been spent on the Tempest project, part of the more than £10 billion planned over the next 10 years.

BAE Systems is working with the British units of Leonardo, an Italian company, and MBDA, a European missile builder, and Rolls-Royce, a U.K. engine maker.

“We will determine the cost-sharing arrangements ahead of the next phase, based on joint assessment of costs and national budgets,” Alex Chalk, a U.K. government minister, said March 30 in reply to a parliamentary question on the funding for the GCAP fighter project.

Assault Support Tactics Training at MAWTS-1

U.S. Marines and U.S. Navy sailors assigned to 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division participate during Assault Support Tactics 2 (AST-2), as part of Weapons and Tactics Instructors (WTI) course 2-23 at Observation Point Feets, Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range, California, April 12, 2023.

WTI, hosted by MAWTS-1, is a seven-week course providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness. AST-2 is a daytime, force-on-force event which affords prospective WTIs the opportunity to plan, brief, and execute a company-reinforced air assault while integrating the six functions of Marine Aviation.

U.S. Marine Corps photos by Cpl. Eric Ramirez.