Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Landing Dock HMAS Canberra (L02) received two CH-53E aircraft to transport members of the Australian Army, Malaysian Army and Sri Lanka for the assault phase of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022.
The embarkation of foreign militaries, ability to land U.S. aircraft and deploy together for one common goal has provided proof of the interchangeability between the partner and ally forces.
08.01.2022
Video by Christopher Szumlanksi Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet
By Robbin Laird
Ever since 2018, MAWTS-1 has focused on the high-end fight component of the full spectrum of warfare. Force distribution is a key part of the survivability against a competitor who has significant firepower and can concentrate fires on relatively fixed positions.
The Marines have worked mobile basing for a long time, such as working forward refueling points and buying the Osprey and the F-35B which can operate off a wide variety of launch and landing points.
But in the past few years, the emphasis has been with regard to how to move more quickly from mobile operating bases and to do so in support of the joint force. This is a capability not only of interest to the Marines and the U.S. forces but core allies as well.
While during my latest visit to Australia where there is enhanced interest, for example, in the RAAF with agile air operations, I spoke with the CO of MAWTS-1, Colonel Eric Purcell about how MAWTS-1 was progressing with regard to training with regard to mobile basing.
He started by noting that given the close working relationship which the Marines had with the Australians, they were focused on training for such operations. Col Purcell mentioned that last November his team met in London with U.S, and partner commands similar to MAWTS-1 in the UK. The USAF and the U.S. Navy along with Canada, and Australia discussed joint learning and training perspectives.
According to Purcell: “At the meeting last November, we looked at a number of different ways in which we can work jointly on problems such as agile combat employment, distributed maritime operations, EABOs (Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations) and F-35 integration. Canada has just recently formally joined the F-35 program, so they were not part of that discussion.”
As the Marines operate Ospreys. F-35s and now CH-53Ks, the Marines are bringing significantly capability to the evolving mobile basing function. In my book published last year on USMC transformation, I underscored the central role which mobile basing is playing in the current phase of USMC transformation. Col Purcell put it succinctly: “We are taking capability which we have had for some time, but focused on how we can move more rapidly from mobile base to mobile base. We have to find ways to make mobile bases, smaller, more distributed and persist for shorter periods of time.”
Another key aspect is that what has been a core competence of the USMC now is becoming a key capability for the wider joint and coalition force. Col Purcell put it this way: “I think the challenge for all of the forces, whether it’s the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the coalition forces is that the sustainment of distributed forces is challenging. How do we adapt our maintenance, logistical and sustainment systems that have been used to operating from austere bases, but now enhance the mobility of those austere bases?”
During my last two visits to MAWTS-1, I discussed with the ground artillery Marines the challenge of integrating their fires into a joint fires solution when emphasizing force distribution and mobility. I asked Col Purcell about progress in this area. He argued that the joint fires piece is a central challenge being worked. He noted that at the recent WTI 2-23 they were working this hard. One example was incorporating the simulated integration of the future USMC Nemesis ground launch system into joint naval fires.
Part of the enhanced capability for the Marines to support force mobility was the involvement of four CH-53Ks into WTI 2-23. Col Purcell indicated that “during the course we lifted 36K loads with the CH-53K which points to future capabilities. With regard to future capabilities, we can leverage the aircraft’s ability to hold 9 to 10,000 pounds of fuel off on each of the three hooks of the CH-53K. The ability of each of the hooks to carry a fuel bladder is a key advantage for force mobility. One could add that the changes in the cockpit allow for the management of such a load as well. This is a real game changer for us at a time when we and the joint force are emphasizing distributed force logistical support and sustainability.”
In short, MAWTS-1 continues its core mission of supporting the change which the Marines and the joint and coalition force need to pursue. In our 2013 book entitled, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific, we underscored what we saw as the integration being generated at MAWTS-1 a key driver of the kind of military change required to deal with Pacific threats. We still do.
Twenty-six nations, 38 ships, three submarines, more than 30 unmanned systems, approximately 170 aircraft and 25,000 personnel are participating in Exercise Rim of the Pacific from June 29 to Aug. 4 in and around the Hawaiian Islands and Southern California.
The world’s largest international maritime exercise, RIMPAC provides a unique training opportunity while fostering and sustaining cooperative relationships among participants critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world’s oceans.
RIMPAC 2022 is the 28th exercise in the series that began in 1971.
08.07.2022
Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Joel Mundo
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)
By Murielle Delaporte
The return of high intensity conflict in Europe is having a major impact on the way NATO countries are reconsidering their military stockpiles policies.
In its first 2023 iDeaS conference entitled ‘’Military stockpiles within NATO: What challenges ahead for the defence industry?’’ held on March 21s and organized by Hawa-Léa SOUGOUNA, Conference Manager, COGES focused on this specific question by gathering three experts: Brigadier General Ivan CARUSO, Bruno CANTIN and Léo PÉRIA-PEIGNÉ.
The return of high intensity conflict in Europe is having a major impact on the way NATO countries are reconsidering their military stockpiles policies, an issue now at the heart of debates within the defense and security community. Between buying on-shelves and systematizing a just-in-time peacetime approach, what have been the different logics underlying stockpiling, supply chain management and procurement decisions among NATO countries?
In its first 2023 iDeaS conference entitled ‘’Military stockpiles within NATO: what challenges ahead for the defence industry?’’, held on March 21s and organized by Hawa-Léa SOUGOUNA, Conference Manager, COGES focused on this specific question by gathering three experts :
The moderator for this panel was Ashley ROQUE, Land Warfare Reporter for the U.S. media, Breaking Defense.
Former head of Italian Army Special Forces Command among other things [1], Brigadier General Caruso highlighted the shift back to collective defense within NATO ever since the invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops in February 2022.
“Threats are fast-moving in the grey zone”, he said, and with collective defense “back in the center stage (…), new solutions are needed”.
The new strategic concept adopted in Madrid re-affirmed the three complementary pillars guaranteeing the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, i.e. “deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security” [2].
In this “war of necessity” as opposed to the post-Cold war’s “wars of choice”, NATO does not “drive the timeline anymore” and has to increase its level of readiness in order to properly defend its members’ territories if necessary.
New types of capabilities are necessary to face the challenges of multi-domains operations, which require synchronization, speed and force. NATO must rely in particular on technical advantages wherever it can, whether in “digital transformation (…), autonomous technologies, quantum physics or big data”. But beyond new capabilities, what is also crucial is the development of “a new mindset, new doctrine and new training.”
The General insisted that “we need to be ready for the next war, not the last one,” confirming that the question of military stockpiles is a prominent challenge NATO faces: “ no one could sustain a war with the level of consumption of military hardware and ammunition” that one does observe today on the Ukrainian battlefields.
“If NATO goes back to a Cold war-like challenge, the infrastructure to support high intensity does not resemble the one prevailing after World War II, when armies were able to rely on “large logistical organizations”.
Today “the extensive use of “just in time” to avoid inventories and stockpiles while constantly outsourcing” have led to very little logistics and maintenance capabilities within the armed forces.
It is necessary to take a few steps back to re-build warehouse and depots that do not exist anymore, to restore ammunitions production, but also “ the human resources to store and maintain it ,” as well as “ strategic and tactical transport capabilities and resupply lines. ”
An on-going process, such a reform must balance quantity and quality, as the key focus must be to enhance interoperability and standardization: “ the fact that NATO has been delivering sixteen different types of artillery shells to Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict is not a great example for standardization ,” General Caruso said.
One of the challenge in that regard for NATO commanders is the fact that logistics are a national responsibility, while NATO decisions are taken by consensus: NATO standards are de facto ” a minimum benchmark agreement, ” while NATO can only be a “ facilitator for standardization, ” but has no power of enforcement.
Such a process also needs the support of the whole nation, as “after one year, it is clear the war cannot be fought by the armed forces alone”. The latter need to be regenerated and call on the resilience of each nation: this “ will require a change of philosophy and mindset, because we cannot be late. This will make the difference between defeat and victory ,” he said.
During the Q&A session, he later stressed out that keeping the supply chains going, enhancing mobility, as well as the lines of re-supply and communication, in addition to prepositioning ammunition and equipment were key to gain time. In case of aggression, there will be indeed “no time to react in time.”
Ukraine is a “war of attrition and has become a battle for logistics”, he concluded.
Through both his presentation and Q&A session, Bruno Cantin gave a historical overview of the evolution of NATO multinational logistics, which can be dated back to 1994 when the Implementation Force (IFOR) was sent in ex-Yougoslavia: “ this was NATO’s first major operation for land forces ”, recalls the expert, who was then Commander of a logistics Battalion. “We had no ammunition bunkers and we were very concerned about the safety of our soldiers”.
For him, this was “the first wake up call” prompting NATO to use contractors to support the forces. And so it was done by picking up fuel and food contracts initiated by their United Nation peacekeeping predecessors.
Multinational cooperation in logistics was born out of the need to “ make sure small countries could contribute to operations with combat forces without worrying about logistics (…). The Joint Logistics Support Group was implemented ”. It worked very well since then, in particular in theaters like Afghanistan, where there were “more contractors than foot soldiers (with a ratio of 1.4 to 1)”.
Keeping in mind that the NATO four largest members are better able to sustain their own forces than most other members, Bruno Cantin highlighted the fact that what multinational logistics succeeded to do over the past decades have been to allow smaller countries’ combat forces to be on the frontline, as well as to prompt their ability to develop their own expertise in that area.
The NSPA – NATO Support and Procurement Organization [3] – became more and more involved, in particular with the creation of the SALIS ( Strategic Airlift International Solution [4]) program to lease strategic airlift , while nations took on growing responsibilities and initiatives, such as:
At about the same time as the war in ex-Yougoslavia in the early 1990’s was created the Partnership For Peace (PFP) which proposed to any nation wishing it to develop a bilateral cooperation with NATO. Most nations participating then are today NATO members.
Ukraine joined that program in 1994 and has been participating in multiple committees and forums since then enhancing interoperability through standardization agreements.
Bruno Cantin, who has been dealing with his Ukrainian counterparts in NATO logistics forums since 1999, pointed out that this is the reason why NATO’s current assistance in the area of ammunition was able to take place, as agreements have been in place not only in terms of technical specificities, but also transport safety.
However, the challenge remains for NATO countries to sustain Ukrainian daily fire of seven thousand rounds of ammunition in the mid to long term: “ NATO works with members to provide ammunition, but nations are using their own stockpiles including the ones required for NATO. (…) Each nation needs to reconsider the post-Cold war peace dividends’ attitude, ” he said.
Several NATO initiatives are being bolstered such as the NSPA’s ammunition support partnership or NATO Multinational Ammunition Warehouse Initiative (MAWI [9]) and need to be expanded beyond ammunition.
For Bruno Cantin, these are some of the guidelines, NATO members need to follow to be able to adapt their response to the challenges ahead:
1. Increase military budgets.
2. Speed up the procurement processes.
3. Reform regulations to enhance cooperation.
4. Improve ammunition storage and capabilities.
5. Enhance the sharing of industrial information on future military requirements.
6. Reduce industrial capability gaps.
7. Reestablish stockpiles productions and put an end to the “just in time.”
8. Procure raw materials.
9. Improve high tech developments.
10. Increase the volume of specialized personnel.
Such an effort needs to be collective, as “more allies have met the [10] requirement in defense investment ”, because “we are stronger together”. And that is the good news…. [3]
Léo Péria-Peigné started his presentation by explaining the evolution of French military stockpiling policy, which has been matching the ones of its neighbours. The end of the Cold war and the era of peacekeeping missions led to the shrinking of military budgets, and in the case of France, to a succession of structural reforms within the armed forces, starting with their professionalization and the end of conscription.
Looking for savings meant adopting the “Just in time” mode as far as stockpiling went. And it is only in 2015 with the terrorist attacks that French political authorities became aware of the necessity to “repair” procurement: “a slow reparation program started” …
With Ukraine, the question of military stockpiles entered the “mainstream news”, but real change has not yet occurred everywhere, just because inflation and access to raw materials are impacting how much “real money” is to be allocated to that area.
The expert quoted Poland as a nation having started to re-initiate mass production for real, and Rheinmetall as a company doing the same. He also highlighted the cooperative mechanisms now existing between NATO and the European Union to replenish stocks and allocate supplies to Ukraine.
The IFRI researcher stressed out the fact that while most decision-makers focused on building more high-value and complex assets, the thinking was that “ they could always buy on shelves on the market ” the supply they would be needed in case of crisis.
That worked as long as crises were regionally limited, but with a global crisis, the market became also a source of competition and tension and access is not as easy as imagined then. “Today crises are as globalized as the markets”, he said quoting the explosion of the powder demand on the market as an example.
The whole logic of the past ten to fifteen years must be reversed with a focus on reshoring production. Positive change has occurred, but Léo Péria-Peigné sees no “systemic change” yet and expressed the worry that once the war in Ukraine will be over, it will be a return to business as usual in this area.
As we rebuild our production capabilities, we have to keep in mind the South Korean and Turkish models, which are very present on the Ukrainian battlefield.
As we rebuild our production capabilities, we have to keep in mind the South Korean and Turkish models, which are very present on the Ukrainian battlefield. Unlike traditional arms producers, both countries can mass produce and do not need to export to produce military equipment in the segment of medium tech hardware (including 4.5 generation aircrafts).
These “national arsenal model” newcomers on the globalized weapon market are definitely a signal of change with a clear impact on the way we might re-think our industrial strategies, the researcher concluded as he wrapped up the Q & A session.
[1] See general Caruso’s biography >>> https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_211536.htm?
[2] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm
[3] https://www.nspa.nato.int/
[4] https://ac.nato.int/archive/2020/SALIS_Update
[5] https://www.army.cz/en/armed-forces/organisational-structure/general-staff/multinational-logistics-coordination-centre-87194/ ;
[6] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50104.htm
[7] Author’s note : The Strategic Airlift Coordination Cell is co-located with the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) based in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. (See: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_ 50107.htm ; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50107.htm)
[8] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_146571.htm?selectedLocale=en
[9] MAWI est issue d’une initiative de la Belgique (voir : https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-mawi.pdf)
[10]https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm
This article was published on 25 April 2023 on the Eurosatory website section “Wide Angle Defense and Security.”
Featured Photo: Training of an Ukrainian soldier by a Norwegian instructor in the United Kingdom © NATO, March 24th, 2023
In preparation for the coming of the CH-53K King Stallion entering into USMC operations, HMH-461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing has been putting it through its paces.
In this slideshow, the Marines of HMH-461 are seen in transit to the West Coast for a training exercise.
In addition, in the first two photos U.S. Marine Corps Capt. Timothy Brown, CH-53K King Stallion pilot, right, and Lance Cpl. Brent Sorenson, crew chief, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, are seen conducting pre-flight inspections during a training exercise at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, April 13, 2023.
The purpose of this training was to give junior pilots opportunities to fly in a new environment and build cohesion with their crew.
April 13, 2023
Photos by Lance Cpl. Gideon Schippers
Marine Corps Air Station Yuma
U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 164 and Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169, Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), conduct an air assault during exercise Steel Knight 23, at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, Dec. 05, 2022.
Exercise Steel Knight 23 provides 3rd MAW an opportunity to refine Wing-level warfighting in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force and fleet maneuver.
MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, CA,
12.05.2022
Video by Lance Cpl. Daniel Childs
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
The featured photo shows a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II aircraft assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), participating in a night tactics exercise, during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-23, at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, March 31, 2023.
The other photos show other elements or participants in the exercise.
WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.
YUMA, AZ,
03.31.2023
Photos by Lance Cpl. Ruben Padilla.
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1
In a 6 April 2023 piece, Murielle Delaporte focused on the French Military Program Law for 2024-2030. The piece was published on the website of Eurosatory which highlights key developments shaping the 2024 Eurosatory exposition in Paris.
In this excerpt from the article, the French Defence Minister’s focus on nuclear and priority conventional force modernization is highlighted:
For the minister of the Armed Forces, the government has a “generational responsibility” to modernize the nuclear component and deterrence, insofar as most of the decisions that affect the French population today date back fifteen years. “Decisions taken today will affect generations to come in the same way, whether it concerns launchers, warheads or specific investments made within the Military Applications Division du Commissariat à l’énergie atomique], the French Navy or the Strategic Air Forces.”
Echoing certain criticisms, he argued that the French nuclear singularity is in no way a “Maginot line”, as it does work. French nuclear deterrence contributes to that of NATO and strengthened its credibility, the minister also stressed out in response to questions from Parliamentarians.
Nuclear deterrence does not however constitute a magic wand against all threats, as “new areas of conflict are emerging under the nuclear vault”, e.g. space, seabed, or cyber.
The nuclear question also raises the fundamental reflection about strategic autonomy, sovereignty and alliances. It is necessary to sort out “what we must do alone, what we want to do alone, and what we can share“, in terms of industrial capacities or planning instruments at the multilateral or bilateral levels. The French model for its armed forces does depend on this question.
For Sébastien Lecornu, questioning France’s membership to NATO as some political parties do, is irrelevant, as France is one of its founding members. It is on the contrary important to reaffirm it, as well as the fact that “France is not isolated strategically-speaking ”. This does not however preclude the ability to distinguish between what NATO can and what it cannot do in other parts of the world.
Underlining the importance of conventional means required to support this nuclear vault, Sébastien Lecornu has then identified ten priorities in terms of modernization:
Intelligence – essential for Deterrence, the war against terrorism and anticipation in a tense strategic context – will benefit from a 60% budget increase in favor of its three major directorates: the DRSD (“Direction du Renseignement et de la Sécurité de la Défense”, i.e. the Defence Intelligence and Security Directorate, the DRM (“Direction du renseignement militaire”, i.e. the Military Intelligence Directorate) – to which the Minister paid tribute by emphasizing the “fabulous leap forward” in terms of the gains in situational awareness achieved since the first Gulf War – and the DGSE (“Direction générale du renseignement extérieur”, i.e. the General Directorate for External Security). Such an effort to continue to imporve our intelligence capabilities are all the more important that the services have been mainly focusing over the past years on the fight against terrorism.
Drones (which include loitering munitions) must be the focus of attention in terms of funding and research. Indeed it is not enough to close an unacceptable gap, but it is necessary to make a technological leap in order to meet the challenges we shall be facing in 2030-2035. This is true for all the services and “a sum of five billion Euros will be dedicated” to the task.
Ground/Surface-to-air defense: if there is a major lesson learned from the conflict in Ukraine, it is that ground-to-air defense should no longer be neglected, as it is inseparable from deterrence itself. “[Système sol-air moyenne portée Nouvelle Génération]”, said the Minister.
Overseas capabilities must be enhanced whether on land, air or sea-based, without forgetting innovation and space issues: indeed, “space assets are especially crucial in these parts of the world where distances are especially challenging”.
Cyber needs to be clearly defined, since it touches upon both technology and doctrine, while raising the question of subsidiarity given its impact on sovereignty. First of all, it is necessary to be able to identify the origin of the attacks (develop “a kind of judiciary police”), as cyber criminality must be differentiated according to the type of targets affected. You also have to be able to hinder and to put an end to attacks, and, thirdly, you have to be able to counter-attack for the sake of “cyber self-defense”. The current challenge in France is the creation of human resources due to the lack of sufficient courses in the field of cyber and electronic warfare (including in high-ranking universities such as Polytechnique).
The protection of the Seabed: “the sixth “patch” [for modernization] “concerns the seabed, in the Overseas Territories, but not only“. The protection of the seabed is now called into question, as we can see in the conflict in Ukraine (protection of pipelines for example). We need to put an end to access denial. This involves mine warfare, as well as deep water robotic capabilities “up to six thousand meter deep”.
The space sector is also significantly behind in all areas, whether in terms of launchers or whatever means we sent into space – “what we do on earth in connection to space and what we do from and in space” -. In order to catch up, “an ambitious copy is also in progress” in that new battlefield.
The Special Forces were praised by the Minister for their courage: “joint and the first to march” , they “command the respect of all”, he said, while condemning the lack of capabilities as far as individual equipment are concerned, but also in terms of means of transport (particularly helicopters).
The field of ammunition, one of the central elements of the surge in industrial defense capacities towards a “war economy”, is being supported by new acquisitions and reshoring, such as the reshoring of the production of powder in Bergerac, a “first concrete decision” in sight.
Support as a whole must continue to be strengthened beyond the current “repair LPM” with particular emphasis on the Armed Forces Health Service (SSA in French for “Service de santé des Armées”) and its military field hospitals, for which a specific roadmap must be dedicated. “What I say for the SSA is also valid for the SCA’s administrative services (“Service du commissariat des Armées”), for the SEO’s energy support (“Service de l’énergie opérationnelle”) or even for the SID’s infrastructure missions (“Service d’infratrsucture de la défense”) …”, specified the minister. The budget allocated to the maintenance of equipment should increase by 40% from 35 to 49 billion Euros.
For the full article, see the following: