By Robbin Laird

During my visit to Honolulu during the last week of April 2023, I had a chance to meet with Rear Admiral Jeffrey Jablon, the Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (SUBPAC) commander. We disscused the evolving role of the submarine fleet in the challenging environment of the Pacific.

In Europe,  Russia faces three Western nuclear powers. In the Pacific, the U.S. and its allies and partners face three nuclear powers: China, Russia and North Korea. Any consideration of the nature of warfighting in the Pacific has to be considered in the context of the threat of nuclear weapons use, with three adversaries who do not have the same doctrine.

SSBNs are a key part of any nuclear deterrent equation in addition to the key role which SSNs play in the broader conventional deterrence equation. We did not focus specifically on the nuclear dimension, but it can never be forgotten in the Pacific context.

As I wrote comncering the impact of the war in Ukraine to date on nuclear deterrence: “But the core question is simply put: does the possession of nuclear weapons effectively create sanctuaries in your territory in case of conflict?

“Does this work with regard to extended deterrence as well by the United States with its allies? Would this apply to the defense of Australia as it expands its basing support for the United States? Does this work as well in the Pacific with China, Russia, North Korea and the mainland of the United States effectively sanctuaries? How does the question affect warfighting strategies, muti-domain or otherwise?”

Let me start by clarifying what the role of Rear Admiral Jablon and his command is within the overall submarine contribution to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. As the submarine type commander in the Pacific, he is charged with the task of manning, training and equipping the submarines in the theater. He is also the operational commander of Task Force 34, where he reports to the U.S. 3^rd Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Boyle (whom I meet with in January in San Diego) who has responsibility for naval operations east of the international dateline.  The U.S. 7^th Fleet Commander owns all operations west of the international dateline.

In his role with regard to training and equipping the submarine force, Jablon is responsible for ensuring that the subs are combat ready: able to conduct any mission, and ready to deploy. Warfighting is his top priority.

The SSNs operate on a Fleet Response Training Plan cycle. The subs go on a 6-month deployment. They then come back for 12 months of training, modernization, and maintenance and then go back on deployment.

The stealth quality of the nuclear submarine and its speed are key elements of its ability to be first to the fight. But as described by Rear Admiral Jablon, the submarine being able to be first to the fight is in the context of moving the joint force into a better position to prosecute the fight. As he put it: “I would no longer characterize ourselves as a silent service. Deterrence is a major mission for the submarine force. You can’t have a credible deterrent without communicating your capabilities; if the adversary doesn’t know anything about that specific deterrent, it’s not a deterrent.”

Part of this deterrent emphasis is upon a more public display of the submarines we have and the capability they can demonstrate. Frankly, what the SSGNs have demonstrated over the years is the versatility of the submarine to contribute range, speed and stealth and then deliver firepower including the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and special operations forces.

Now submarines are becoming part of deterrent signaling and operating in new ways to enhance their overall deterrent impact.

For example, earlier in April 2023,  the ballistic missile submarine USS Maine (SSBN 741) publicly visited Guam for a logistics visit. During that visit, submarine commanders from Japan and the Republic of Korea embarked the Maine. The Navy stated that “The embark was an example of how U.S. forces are advancing the U.S-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship that is forward-leaning, reflective of shared values, and resolute against threats that challenge regional stability.”

And recently, the White House announced that an SSBN would make a port visit to South Korea. As a Reuters story published on 27 April 2023 noted: “For the first time since the 1980s a U.S. Navy nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) will visit South Korea to help demonstrate Washington’s resolve to protect the country from a North Korean attack. The visit was announced in a joint declaration during a summit between South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington on Wednesday….

“The United States has pledged to deploy more so-called “strategic assets” such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and long-range bombers to South Korea to deter North Korea, which has developed increasingly powerful missiles that can hit targets from South Korea to the mainland United States.”

Also, the Navy is stepping up its cooperation with allied submarine forces, as illustrated in Rear Admiral Jablon recently hosting the Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference: a core meeting with other submarine commanders from Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. As he underscored: “During the conference, the submarine force commanders discussed the coalition approach to interoperability, which is a key part of deterrence.”

In an 18 April 2023 story published by the U.S. Navy, this conference was highlighted as follows: “Commander, Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet hosted the 2023 Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference (SWCC) at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, April 12-14, 2023.

“The purpose of SWCC, which was first held in 2018, is to strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific region through expanded cooperation between submarine force commanders of allies and partners.

“When we hold the SWCC each year and come together with our allied and partner submarine force commanders, we demonstrate the strength of our relationships,” said Rear Adm. Jeff Jablon, commander, Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet. “Now more than ever, these strong relationships give us an asymmetric advantage as we work together in this incredibly dynamic region to maintain the international rules-based order.”

“Submarine commanders from the Royal Australian Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, French Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Republic of Korea Navy, Royal Navy, and Republic of Singapore Navy met with U.S. Pacific Fleet commanders on the historic submarine base at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam, Hawaii.

“The U.S. Submarine Force is an indispensable combat capability in our Joint and Combined Force to ensure freedom of the seas in support of defending the security, freedom and wellbeing of our nation and allies and partners through deterrence and upholding the international rules based order,” said Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. “Our undersea warfare is made up of advanced technology, quality of training and exceptional personnel, but the solidarity of our alliances and partnerships is our asymmetric advantage.”

“The multi-day event included briefings from each submarine force commander and discussions which focused on the theme of this year’s conference, “Improve Multinational Maritime Domain Awareness and Theater ASW Capability in the Indo-Pacific Theater”. SWCC provided an opportunity for commanders to exchange perspectives through an open dialogue and encouraged allied and partner countries to continue to find ways to work together through collaboration and innovation.

“The conversations we had during this conference will collectively strengthen our team, and will maintain our overmatch in the undersea domain,” said Jablon. “I look forward to more opportunities for us to work together as a combined force in exercises and real-world operations.”

The role of the submarine in the joint and coalition force is being expanded. The submarine force is part of the joint fires solution. The submarine force can operate independently or work with the joint or coalition force in providing joint or coalition force combined effects.

As the joint force works enhanced kill web capabilities, combat clusters can operate together to deliver joint fires solutions. As Ed Timperlake and I have argued in our book on the evolution of the maritime kill web: “Force packages or combat clusters are deployed under mission command with enough organic C2 and ISR to monitor their situations and integrate the platforms that are part of that combat cluster and to operate effectively at a point of interest. Within that combat cluster, the C2 and ISR systems allow for reachback to non-organic combat assets which are then conjoined operational for a period of time to that combat cluster and becomes part of an expanded modular task force.

“With the right kind of security arrangement, and C2 and ISR capabilities, the presence force, now an expanded modular task force, need not be American to expand the reach and effectiveness of the operational force in the extended battlespace. Such an approach and capabilities are the essence of what a kill-web enabled force is and how such integratability can close the geographical and combat seams which 21st century authoritarian powers are focused on generating.

“This allows for the kind of escalation management and control crucial for the competition with the 21st Century authoritarian powers. It is not about getting to World War III as rapidly as possible or generating nuclear exchanges early in a widening conflict. It is about escalation control and management, and an ability to close seams which adversaries seek to open to gain significant escalation dominance as they expand the reach and range of those 21st century authoritarian powers.”[1]

Rear Admiral Jablon underscored the nature of the shift as follows: “The submarine force is now becoming part of the ‘combat clusters’ that you’re talking about instead of an independent operator.  In the Cold War, we operated independently, alone, and unafraid. During the land wars, we started becoming part of the joint force as we provided land fires via the TLAM. Now, we are fully integrated with the joint force in terms of targeting and communications. But, of course, we can also conduct independent operations as the ‘silent service’ when directed.”

The broadening of the submarine’s role within joint warfighting is being expanded by the arrival and then growth in capability of autonomous systems. In my own view, rather than seeing autonomous systems in the short- or medium-term creating ghost fleets, their role will be to expand the range, capability, and lethality of capital assets. Rather than looking simply at the organic capability on a specific platform, we will consider surface ships using such capabilities as becoming mother ships and submarines will share in this development as well.

Rear Admiral Jablon specifically mentioned two types of autonomous developments of note for the submarine fleet. One is the ability to operate a UUV out of a torpedo tube, with the UUV coming back after its mission to offload data specifically onboard the submarine.

In article published by USNI News on 2 November 2022, this development was described as follows: “In the near future, the U.S. nuclear attack submarine fleet will be able to launch and recover an underwater robot from a torpedo tube, Navy officials said this week. The torpedo-sized Razorback — designed to extend the awareness of a submarine— has been in testing on the Navy’s attack boats for more than a year but requires a dry deck shelter and divers to recover the 600-pound UUV. The current procedure has blunted the utility of the system, Submarine Force commander Vice Adm. Bill Houston said on Tuesday at the Naval Submarine League’s annual symposium.

“The Medium UUV can go on any one of our submarines. That is a priority for us. We have no problem launching UUVs. That’s easy. The recovery part has been the critical aspect,” Houston said at the Naval Submarine League’s annual symposium. The Navy tested a system earlier this year to recover the Medium UUV via torpedo tube and is close to deploying the system in the “very near future,” said Rear. Adm. Doug Perry, the director of submarine warfare for the Office of Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N97).”

Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Squadron One is under Rear Admiral Jablon’s command and is where UUV solution sets are being worked for deployment. And in February of this year, he visited Keyport, Washington where the squadron is based.

The second autonomous development is the ability to launch a UAV while submerged to enable joint fires.[2] Rear Admiral Jablon said that they had specifically worked this with the USMC as the force develops its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) solution set.

Finally, the joint force, including the submarine force, are working new ways to do expeditionary logistics to enable resupply of the force when operating in a contested environment.

A 23 August 2022 Navy story discussed such VERTREP.

“NAVAL BASE KITSAP – BANGOR, Wash. — Two Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines demonstrated their ability to replenish while operating at sea during a series of vertical replenishment (VERTREP) exercises off the coast of California July through August, 2022.

“During the exercise, the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines USS Nevada (SSBN 733) and USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) operated jointly with U.S. Navy MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, U.S. Marine Corps CMV-22 Ospreys, and U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster IIIs.

“Recently the Pacific SSBN submarine force exercised a vertical replenishment capability for at-sea SSBNs to prove our resiliency for worldwide operations and to replenish our ships with materials, food and operational gear,” said Capt. Kelly L. Laing, director of maritime operations for Commander, Task Group 114.3. “This allows us to maintain an unpredictable forward presence and continued demonstration of the unmatched strength of our strategic forces.”

“The event showcased the submarines’ ability to remain on mission and at sea while performing essential replenishment operations.

“Our fundamental mission is to deter a strategic attack, which is an existential threat to the United States and our allies.” said Rear Adm. Mark Behning, commander of both Submarine Group 9 and Task Group 114.3. “Testing our readiness ensures we maintain a safe, secure and reliable strategic deterrent force.”

“The event was part of a U.S. Strategic Command exercise which highlights the interoperability of multiple U.S. military platforms in order to implement the strategic deterrence mission.

“Exercising these VERTREPs was a joint operation involving Marine and Air Force assets,” Laing said. “This shows our commitment to joint operations worldwide and between combatant commanders. This is important so that we don’t stovepipe ourselves under one community or brand. We are committed to operating together as a global force.”

“This event is the latest in a series of efforts by the United States submarine force to look at alternative operations that previously required a submarine to be pierside to accomplish. For example, in May, the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Alabama (SSBN 731) conducted an at-sea crew exchange, swapping out the blue and gold crews. This demonstrated the submarine’s ability to continuously operate and stay on mission for longer periods of time while sustaining quality of life for the crews and their families.

“What this shows to our allies and adversaries is that we have the ability to keep our boats at sea,” Laing said. “This shows them that we are ready.”

“Nevada and Henry M. Jackson are two of eight Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines homeported at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor. The Ohio-class ballistic missile platform provides the United States with its most survivable leg of its strategic deterrent forces.”

While a variety of systems could be used to replenish food onboard the submarine, if a critical part is required, the speed, range and variable path of operations of the Osprey would make this the preferred partner. As the Navy is adding CMV-22bs to its fleet, this is yet another role it could play for fleet distributed operations.

For rearmament, the submarine tenders have been developing various locations from which to re-arm submarines. Obviously, the command element would work submarine operations in such a way that a cascading approach to weapons resupply would be worked in times of conflict.

But the navy has only two submarine tenders, and both are to be replaced by new versions in the mid-term. But the Navy is working various ways to get best value out of their sub tenders, but as the Navy adds UAVs to the fleet, the demand signal goes up on the Military Sealift Command and upon its sub tenders as well.

We concluded by my asking Rear Admiral Jablon what investments in the mid-term would make a significant contribution to his operational force.

“Having a robust maintenance infrastructure is crucial for us, and the Navy is allocating more resources to this through the SIOP program. When we can get submarines through maintenance periods on time or ahead of time, that translates into more time I can operate these submarines at sea, which increases our presence, and increases deterrence.”

[1] Laird, Robbin F. and Timperlake, Edward. A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century (pp. 41-42). Kindle Edition.

[2] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39700/the-u-s-navys-submarine-launched-aerial-drone-capacity-is-set-to-greatly-expand

By Robbin Laird

During my March-April 2023 visit to Australia. I had a chance to meet with Air Vice-Marshal Michael Kitcher, Deputy Chief Joint Operations (DCJOPS) and to talk with him about the Joint Operations Focus on regional defence after a long period in the Middle East. AVM Kitcher is responsible for assisting Chief Joint Operations (CJOPS) with the command of ADF joint operations, directing command units and assigned forces in the planning and conduct of campaigns, operations, joint exercises, and other activities.

I last met with him during a 2018 visit to Williamtown Airbase with Murielle Delaporte. He was then the Air Combat Group Commander as Air Commodore Kitcher. During that visit we focused on the transition from legacy aircraft to a fifth-generation force.

We started the April 2023 discussion by focusing on the shift of the Joint Operations Command from the shaping of a joint force for operations in the Middle East to a refocusing on joint operations in the region with core allies to shape more effective coordinated allied operations. Kitcher pointed out that the command had been established in 2007 to plan, execute and optimise the conduct of ADF joint operations.

I noted that during the ADF’s participation in the Middle East Wars, the RAAF for the first time deployed an integrated air task force which included air battle management aircraft, lifters, tankers, and fighters and that this experience laid a foundation for bringing back into the Indo-Pacific region an ADF force that had exercised really for the first time this level of air tasking integration.

But as Kitcher underscored: “The focus in this period, up to say 2017, for CJOPS was on operations in the Middle East whilst managing operations in our  region. We clearly have leveraged the earlier experiences in our renewed focus on the conduct of Operations, Actions and Activites, OAA, in the Indo Pacific. We are focused on developing a theatre campaign plan to translate strategic guidance into the OAA we execute in our region to achieve our desired objectives.

“We are focused on ways we can operate as a joint force to optimise our regional OAA  to have the maximum positive effect  in supporting our theater campaign plan. You don’t get the maximum benefits from a joint force unless firstly the services provide you with trained personnel capable of executing joint missions and then HQJOC, through focused joint planning, maximises the potential of the individual components. We have  made good progress along this path but still have a way to go.”

Air Vice-Marshal Kitcher highlighted that we are “now squarely focused on managing operations in a coordinated fashion in our region.” And this means both how to get the best joint force effect but also how to coordinate the ADF effort with core allies in also getting the best  proper coalition effect.

Obviously in working with coalition partners, national sovereignty has to be respected but at the same time for effectiveness in operations coalition forces need to operate in an integrated manner. This is a key tension which needs to be managed, notably in crises where the government of the day will make decisions about the allowable operations of their national forces, these individual decisions may challenge the effectiveness of a coalition force.

This is challenge which CJOPS has to be prepared to deal with in both exercises and real world operations. Kitcher underscored: “Planning and exercises prepare the way for joint and coalition capabilities but executing them in an actual operational situation requires agility and flexibility of command by CJOPS and his staff, and our parallel staff in the various coalition headquarters.”

Air Vice-Marshal Kitcher emphasized that working with partners to deal with challenges in the region has clearly grown in importance for both deterrent and operational impacts. The relationship with U.S. forces has certainly become closer. He mentioned an upcoming CPX exercise with the U.S. Indo-PACOM command in which the ADF and the U.S. will run a detailed CPX on a regional scenario together. The cooperation with both Japan and India is also growing.

And with Australia’s regional defence emphasis, joint operations will need to focus on regional partners in the Australian neighborhood. This will see more emphasis on building regional expertise and continued engagement with regional countries through relationship building, languages, cultural awareness and local knowledge. This can provide an important aspect of Australian leadership in a regional military coalition but dependent on the crisis, a differentiator for Australian involvement as well.

As Air Vice-Marshal Kitcher summarized their job: “We’ve got a responsibility to make sure that we optimize how well the joint force works together for the greatest positive effect and present the best possible options to government on how that force might be employed. We’ve also got a remit to ensure that we can work as closely and as efficiently and effectively as possible with our regional partners in both peacetime HADR situations and potential crisis  situations.

“We’ve got a responsibility to be as efficient and as effective together among like-minded nations militaries. If we are not careful, uncoordinated actions in our region will overwhelm smaller countries and not have a positive effect. Planning and conducting OAA together ensures we present a much more credible regional security capability than we do as individual nations. The militaries have a large part of the responsibility to generate how we can do so. And then it’s up to individual governments to determine how those forces will be employed at any one time or in any one set of security circumstances.”

We closed the discussion by focusing on a question I asked him with regard to how does Australia best leverage its geography in shaping its defence and deterrent structure?

He answered that is a core challenge and question. He noted: “The really good thing about Australia is the size of Australia and the amount of nothing that is in Australia. The really bad thing about Australia is the size of Australia and the amount of nothing that is in Australia.”

Australia’s population and economic base is in the South and East of the country; the core defence locations for projecting force into the region are in the North, North East and North West  of Australia. Northern Australia (especially the North and North West)  is lightly populated without significant infrastructure and major industrial base. How does Australia have capabilities which can be used to project force into the region from Northern Australia but the majority of the population and industrial base remains well in the south?

For example, the RAAF has a number of bare  bases in northern Australia in addition to their main operating bases. But how can those bases really be used for operations in a crisis, and flexibly use all of the basing options available? How to support all these locations? How to move fuel and weapons? How to ensure the necessary level of resilience and that combat support, logistics and health elements are available? There are no easy or cheap solutions to achieve a viable outcome.

Air Vice-Marshal Kitcher concluded: “The challenge of how we optimize the Australian geography for defence is real and is quite significant. As is how we use Australian geography for the best effect of allies and partners that we might invite to deploy here. This is an ongoing process and a real challenge.”

Featured Photo: (R-L) Air Vice-Marshal Michael Kitcher, Deputy Chief Joint Operations talks with HMAS Hobart’s Weapons Electrical Engineering Officer Lieutenant Commander Monica Tabulo during a visit to the ship in Manila, Philippines as a part of a Regional Presence Deployment.

Credit: Australian Department of Defence, October 22, 2022.

See also the following:

The Air Combat Group in Transition: The Perspective of Air Commodore Kitcher

By Robbin Laird

If you are looking at the potential role of maritime autonomous systems from the standpoint of traditional acquisition approaches, the legacy concept of platforms, and are not focused on the priority for software transient advantage in modern warfighting, then you will totally miss what the coming of maritime autonomous systems is all about.

During my March-April 2023 visit to Australia, I had a chance to meet again with Commodore Darron Kavanagh, Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy Headquarters, to discuss maritime autonomous systems and their role going forward. As a nation facing major maritime challenges, there is probably no nation on earth that needs to get this right more than Australia. Threats tend to focus the mind and the efforts.

Maritime autonomous systems don’t fit into the classic platform development mode or the sharp distinction between how particular platforms operate or perform and the various payloads they can carry. They are defined by the controlling software and the payloads they can deliver individually or as a wolfpack with the role of platforms subordinated to the effects they can deliver through their payloads. The software enables the payloads to be leveraged either individually, though more likely in combination as a wolfpack or a contributor to a combat cluster.

We started our discussion by focusing on mission threads as a way to understand the role and contribution of maritime autonomous systems. What missions does a combat commander need to accomplish? And how can maritime autonomous systems contribute to a mission thread for that combat commander, within the context of combat clusters?

As CDRE Kavanagh underscored: “One of the issues about how we’ve been looking at these systems is that we think in terms of  using traditional approaches of capability realization with them. We are not creating a defense capability from scratch. These things exist, already, to a degree out in the commercial world, regardless of what defense does. AI built into robotic and autonomous systems are in the real world regardless of what the defence entities think or do.

“And we have shown through various autonomous warrior exercises, that we can already make important contributions to mission threads which combat commanders need to build out now and even more so going forward.”

And that is really the next point. The use of maritime autonomous systems is driven by evolving concepts of operations and the mission threads within those evolving CONOPS rather than by a platform-centric traditional model of acquisition. CDRE Kavanagh pointed out that traditional acquisition is primarily focused on platform replacement, and has difficulty in supporting evolving concepts of operations.

This is how he put it: “We’re good at replacing platforms. That doesn’t actually require a detailed CONOPS when we are just replacing something. But we now need to examine on a regular basis what other options do we have? How could we do a mission in a different way which would require a different profile completely?”

Put another way, combatant commanders can conduct mission rehearsals with their forces and can identify gaps to be closed. But the traditional acquisition approach is not optimized for closing such gaps at speed through the use of disruptive technologies. The deployment and development of autonomous systems are part of the response to the question of how gaps can be closed or narrowed rapidly and without expensive solution sets.

In an interview I did earlier this year with a senior Naval commander, he identified the “gaps” problem. “Rehearsal of operations sheds light on our gaps. if you are rehearsing, you are writing mission orders down to the trigger puller, and the trigger puller will get these orders and go, I don’t know what you want me to do. Where do you want me to be? Who am I supposed to check in with? What do you want me to kill when I get there? What are my left and right limits? Do I have target engagement authority?

“This then allows a better process of writing effective mission orders. so that we’re actually telling the joint force what we want them to do and who’s got the lead at a specific operational point. By such an approach, we are learning. We’re driving requirements from the people who are actually out there trying to execute the mission, as opposed to the war gamers who were sitting on the staff trying to figure out what the trigger pullers should do.”

But how to close the gaps?

As CDRE Kavanagh argued: “We need to deliver lethality at the speed of relevance. But if I go after the conventional solution, and I’m just replacing something, that’s actually not a good use of my very finite resources. We need to be answering the operational commanders request to fill a gap in capability, even if it is a 30% solution compared to no solution on offer from the traditional acquisition process.”

These are not technologies looked at in terms of a traditional acquisition process which requires them to go through a long period of development to form a platform which can procured with a long-life use expectancy. CDRE Kavanagh simply pointed out that maritime autonomous systems are NOT technologies to be understood in this manner.

“We build our platforms in a classical waterfall approach where you design, develop and build a platform over twenty years to make them excellent. But their ability to adapt quickly is very limited. This is where software intensive systems such as maritime autonomous systems are a useful complement to the conventional platforms. Maritime autonomous systems are built around software first approaches and we are able to do rapid readjustments of the code in a combat situation.”

And the legacy acquisition approach is not well aligned with the evolution of warfare. Not only is the focus changing to what distributed combat clusters can combine to do in terms of combat effects but the payload impacts at a point of relevance is also becoming of increased salience to warfighting approaches.

What is emerging clearly is a need to adapt more rapidly than what traditional platforms and their upgrade processes can do. Gaps will emerge and need to be closed not just in mission rehearsals but in the combat operations to be anticipated in the current and future combat situations.

And to endure in conflict, it will be crucial as well to protect one’s core combat capital capabilities and platforms which calls for increased reliance on capabilities like maritime autonomous systems to take the brunt of attrition in combat situations as capital ships become mother ships rather than simply being the core assets doing the brunt of combat with whatever organic capabilities they have onboard.

As CDRE Kavanagh noted: “The nuclear powered submarine is absolutely necessary for what we need to do for our defense in depth, but what we’re focused on with maritime autonomous systems completely complements it, because what I want to do is ensure that the dangerous stuff gets done by the autonomous forces as much as possible, because we can rebuild that capability much more rapidly.  We can actually restore it whereas we can’t restore a nuclear powered submarine quickly if lost.”

I wrote in a previous piece about the shift from the distributed force being shaped in the Pacific to an enduring force. The distributed force and its correlated capabilities are a near to mid-term answer to providing for enhanced Pacific defense and deterrence, but longer-term answers are needed for an enduring force.

CDRE Kavanagh closed our discussion by emphasizing the crucial need for Australia to have an ability to stay in the fight in case of conflict in the Pacific. He argued that having their own abilities to innovate in autonomous systems areas was part of such a desired capability.

“Resilience in a combat situation is an ability to be able to experiment and adjust on the fly. To have an enduring force that can operate until statecraft can shape an end state, the warriors and their support community must adjust the combat force rapidly to the real-world combat conditions. By shaping a deployment and ongoing development process in the maritime autonomous systems area, we are contributing to such a combat capability.“

Featured Photo: Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy, Commodore Darron Kavanagh inspects the ‘Dive-LD’ autonomous underwater vehicle. Credit: Australian Department of Defence

Also, see the following:

Shaping a Way Ahead for Maritime Autonomous Systems in the ADF: A Discussion with Commodore Darron Kavanagh