European Fighter Decisions: FCAS Next Steps, December 2022

12/20/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The French arms procurement office has signed a contract worth €3.2 billion ($3.4 billion) for work on the technology demonstrator phase 1B of the European future combat air system with Airbus, Dassault Aviation, the Eumet engine joint venture, and Indra, the companies said Dec. 16 in a joint statement.

France, Germany and Spain back the FCAS, with its new generation fighter (NGF) at the heart of the high-tech project, seen as a symbol of European autonomy and sovereignty at a time of rising conflict around the world.

“On behalf of the governments of France, Germany and Spain, the French General Directorate for Armament (DGA) has awarded to Dassault Aviation, Airbus, Indra, Eumet and their industrial partners the contract for the Demonstrator Phase 1B of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS),” the companies said.

“This landmark contract, amounting to €3.2 billion, will cover work on the FCAS demonstrator and its components for about three and a half years,” the joint statement said.

Eumet is a Franco-German joint venture formed by Safran Aircraft Engines and MTU Aero Engines.

The first tranche of the contract was worth “more than €3 billion,” with the total amount of the contract rising to almost €8 billion with the Phase 2 option, the French armed forces ministry said in a Dec. 15 statement.

The new fighter would replace the Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon for the partner nations in 2040.

Phase 2 is due to last a further three years, bringing the FCAS to first flight tests in 2029, Indra, the Spanish industrial partner, said in a statement.

That pushes back the maiden flight of a demonstrator fighter jet by around two years, due to tough industrial negotiations which delayed the contract.

The three partner nations planned to celebrate the launch of the project with a ceremony in Madrid, the French defense ministry said, without giving further details.

Indra will receive more than €600 million in funding from Phase 1B, the company said, helping its technological development of the combat cloud, a large command and communications network underpinning the FCAS.

The combat cloud will link up the new fighter jet with the remote carrier drones, as well as other assets in the air, at sea, on land, and in space, allowing the services to benefit from “collaborative combat,” the French ministry said.

The key partners Airbus Defence and Space and Dassault reached an industrial agreement on the latter’s leading role as prime contractor, allowing the contract finally to be signed.

The industrial agreement had been reached, Dassault executive chairman Eric Trappier said Dec. 1 in Le Figaro, a French daily owned by the Dassault family.

“We have won all the guarantees to open a new phase, which I would like to point out, is an upstream study and not yet a program,” he said.

“We are confirmed in our role as prime contractor and architect for the aircraft and we have obtained protection of our industrial know-how and our technology,” he said.

That meant intellectual property rights would be shared on work conducted in common by the industrial partners, but technology owned by Dassault would remain outside that pool of information.

Airbus DS had long sought to gain access to that privileged technical information, as that gave the insights of “know-why” to the know-how.

News of the European FCAS contract follows the Dec. 9 announcement of Japan joining the U.K. and Italy to build a new fighter jet under the global combat air programme (GCAP), bringing together technology from the U.K.-led Tempest and Japanese F-X projects.

BAE Systems will work with the Japanese prime contractor Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Italian partner Leonardo, opening up an unprecedented European-Japanese cooperation in building an advanced fighter jet.

It remains to be seen whether Sweden and Saab will join the project pursued by London, Rome and Tokyo. Sweden appears to have cooled off from a previous willingness to team up with the Tempest project.

Also on the fighter news front, Germany won Dec. 14 approval from the powerful parliamentary budget committee to spend €10 billion as part of an announced plan to buy 35 F-35 fighters, to replace the German Tornado fleet, which carries U.S.-built B61 nuclear bombs for Nato.

There is a line of German high-level political thought which calls for a strong link with France by cooperating through the FCAS project, to avoid a dependence on U.S.  support. Berlin’s pursuit of European autonomy stems from perceived political instability of the Trump administration, and uncertainty stemming from the U.S. presidential election in a couple of years.

But there appears to be a distinct chill in relations between French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Olaf Scholz, and it remains to be seen how hard the two heads of state will pursue European sovereignty in the military field.

On the domestic front, Macron is under pressure on his planned reform of French pensions, while Scholz has pledged to boost military spending after years of austerity, but a deep bureaucracy appears to have slowed the execution of orders for modern kit.

For Paris, the demonstrator contract was seen as making clear the project would be led by a French company, namely Dassault, which stoutly refused to share a leadership sought with determination by Airbus DS, based in Germany.

“This agreement, which equally confirms the central role of Dassault Aviation in this project, will allow the preparation of the FCAS demonstrator as part of phase 1B, which precedes the development and production phases,” the French defense ministry said in a statement.

On the industrial front, it remains to be seen how Airbus and Dassault will work together, as the company cultures are highly different. The demonstrator is just the beginning, as Trappier pointed out.

FCAS is estimated to be worth €80 billion-€100 billion, if the program gets off the ground.

Photo Credits: Featured Photo in sequence: FCAS: https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.php?aircraft_id=2048

Tempest: https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/will-japan-and-the-uk-collaborate-on-sixth-generation-tempest-future-fighter-aircraft/

Luftwaffe F-35: https://www.flyingmag.com/germany-set-to-buy-35-f-35-fighters/

 

 

 

Visit to USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) by Japanese Prime Minister

12/14/2022

Pacific Ocean – Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited the U.S. Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), while Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 5 units concluded their participation in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force International Fleet Review (IFR) in Yokosuka and Sagami Wan, Nov. 6, 2022.

11.06.2022

Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Keyly Santizo

USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76)

Expeditionary Hospitalization Exercise

U.S. Navy Sailors with Expeditionary Medical Facility Alpha, Navy Medicine Readiness and Training Command, simulate casualty care during exercise Keen Sword 23 on Camp Foster, Okinawa, Japan, Nov. 17, 2022.

During Keen Sword 23, Naval Medical Forces Pacific exercised the inaugural employment of expeditionary hospitalization on the first island chain with bilateral engagement from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.

(U.S. Marine Corps video by Lance Cpl. Stephen Holland II).

CAMP COURTNEY, OKINAWA, JAPAN

11.17.2022

Video by Lance Cpl. Stephen Holland III Marine Expeditionary Force

Beyond Next Steps in the War in Ukraine: Strategic Upheaval and U.S. Interests

By Robbin Laird

When it comes to crisis management and war termination, the United States faces a fundamental challenge: what are our strategic objectives and how do we achieve them in a world where so much is changing?

I recently discussed this challenge with my colleague Dr. Paul Bracken of Yale in terms of the Ukrainian war. The President of Ukraine has clear objectives, namely, the complete recovery of Ukrainian territory including Crimea and expects the United States and the Western allies to bankroll it and presumably accept Ukraine into the EU and NATO.

But is the United States and Europe willing to support whatever the risks are entailed in Ukraine’s strategy? With Russian leadership and Ukrainian leadership driving the strategic change which will shape the next European order, what is the interest of the United States in what the next major change in the European order exactly?

According to Bracken, this kind of question is not likely to be asked with a policy horizon of one  week.  He noted that “when in a crisis, policy makers tend to stretch out the decisions and take small steps. They don’t consider the strategic options of the path being generated by these small incremental moves.”

He noted with regard to Vietnam: “President Johnson crafted a masterful manipulation of force in Vietnam and of politics at home until he was trapped by his own policies and rhetoric into a strategy which would fail.”

He described this “going to work and carrying forward last week’s efforts into the future.” Why did the Vietnam War or Afghan War go too long? “Because nobody in Washington could figure out a way to do it differently. Policy makers came into work every morning and did what they did the day before. Even though the policy was not working, except in a sort of one week by one week basis, until the whole effort collapsed.”  That’s Saigon’s collapse in 1975 and Kabul’s in 2021.

With regard to the war in Ukraine, the Biden Administration is moving incrementally, and the questions considered beyond bankrolling the arms to Ukraine are which weapons to give them.  The question becomes as Bracken puts it: “what kind of artillery to give to the Ukrainians? What is the cutoff line and range of missiles?”

Then there is the question of allies and what exactly the relationship between what specific allies are doing and what might be the long-term objectives for the United States. Bracken noted: “your allies give you almost as many problems as the enemy. This was certainly true in the Korean War and the Vietnam War to mention two cases.”

This is particularly true when European states face a future of rebuilding Ukraine and ensuring that they can defend themselves with declining weapons inventories, face the prospect of WMD being used, facing energy challenges which are made doubly difficult by the escape from geopolitical realities of energy policy, and with an EU in fundamental transition determining whether they really want a state like Ukraine in the European Union.

European states are all over the policy map on these issues, and no amount of assertion by the White House that they are leading Western unity on the war or a future policy towards Russia removes this reality of divergence with allies.

The war is part of a significant strategic shift. As Bracken put it:  ”The world is moving to its more normal form, which is multipolarity. And we, the United States don’t like that. Because we’re used to being in a bipolar or unipolar system – with us in charge. What we’re actually fighting is structural change in world politics which is a far more demanding objectives that we don’t think about or talk about.”

Without the United States, Ukraine cannot fight this war. What happens next is not simply up to the Presidents of Ukraine or Russia. And certainly, a policy process which focuses on a short-term weekly perspective will not provide a strategic perspective for shaping the next European order or the global policy of dealing with the coalition of authoritarian powers.

There is a very large question posed by nuclear weapons in all of this. Russian territory will operate as a sanctuary which the West has little interest in compressively attacking for fear of triggering WMD use in Ukraine, with chemical weapons being the low hanging fruit here. If we go to the Pacific and note that the Chinese use their territory to launch their force out into the first and second island chains, how willing is one to attack their territory in light of their nuclear build up?

The war in Ukraine is about the dynamics of global change and neither the objectives of Zelenskyy nor Putin answer the question of the American interest. This requires a longer view to inform current policy options and choices.

11th MEU and Maritime Autonomous Systems Ops

12/13/2022

While we await the wrap up of Digital Horizons exercise going on currently with Task Force 59, if we look back to last year we can highlight the 11th MEU working with the MANTAS T12 maritime autonomous system.

Marines assigned to the All Domain Reconnaissance Detachment, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), are seen in these photos working with the MANTAS T12 unmanned surface vessel after training with Task Force 59 at Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Oct. 28, 2021.

Shaping Basing Architecture of a Kill Web Con-ops for Nordic and North Atlantic Defense

12/11/2022

By Robbin Laird

As the Nordics work through how to best integrate their forces, a key element to consider is how to shape a basing structure involving the Nordics which will enable an enhanced Northern European and North Atlantic defense.

When I visiting Norway in 2018, I witnessed one of the foundation stones for enhanced Nordic defense, cross-border air operations, something which will now involve the question of the bases involved and their integration with sea basing and land base operations as well in order to shape enhanced capabilities for strike and defense capabilities.

During a visit to Bodø Airbase on April 25, 2018, we discussed the cross-border air training, which Norway is doing with Finland and Sweden with members of the Norwegian Air Force The day we were there, we saw four F-16s take off from Bodø and fly south toward Ørland airbase to participate in an air defense exercise.

The day before this event, the Norwegians contacted the Swedes and invited them to send aircraft to the exercise, and they did so. The day before is really the point. This is a dramatic change from the 1990s, when the Swedes would not allow the Norwegians or Finns to enter their airspace without prior diplomatic approval. Maj. Trond Ertsgaard, Senior Operational Planner and Fighter Pilot from the 132 Air Wing, provided an overview to the standup and the evolution of this significant working relationship.

The core point is that it is being done without a complicated day-to-day diplomatic effort: “In the 1970s, there was limited cooperation. We got to know each other, and our bases, to be able to divert in case of emergency or other contingencies. But there was no operational or tactical cooperation. The focus was on safety; not operational training.”

By the 1990s, there was enhanced cooperation, but it was limited to a small set of flying issues, rather than operational training. As Ertsgaard noted: “But when the Swedes got the Gripen, this opened the aperture, as the plane was designed to be more easily integrated with NATO standards.”

Then in the fall of 2008, there was a meeting of the squadrons and wing commanders from the Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian airbases to discuss ways to develop cooperation among the squadrons operating from national bases. The discussion was rooted in the ability of the national air forces to operate from their own bases and simply cooperating in shared combat airspace.

This would mean that the normal costs of hosting an exercise would not be necessary, as each air force would return to its own operating base at the end of the engagement. The Cross-Border Training (CBT) started between Sweden and Norway in 2009 and then the Finns joined in 2010. By 2011, Ertsgaard highlighted that, “we were operating at a level of an event a week. And by 2012, we engaged in about 90 events at the CBT level.”

That created a template which allowed for cost-effective and regular training and laid the foundation for then hosting a periodic two-week exercise where they could invite nations to participate in air defense exercises in the region. From 2015 on, the three air forces have shaped a regular training approach, which is very flexible and driven at the wing and squadron levels. “We meet each November, and set the schedule for the next year, but in execution it is very, very flexible. It is about a bottom-up approach and initiative to generate the training regime,” Ertsgaard said.

Now with the anticipated inclusion of Finland and Sweden within NATO, the countries can go beyond cross-border training to shaping a basing eco system to provide for distributed integrated operations.

In an article made available to me recently by a Norwegian colleague and published by LUFTEND in December 2022, the focus on a “flexible and resilient Nordic air base concept” was the focus of attention.

The article concludes:

“Finland and Sweden are compatible with USAF’s Agile Combat Employment approach and similar regimes among allied air forces. Norway might reintroduce the principle of protection by dispersal and unpredictability.

“There is a need for regional Cross Border Basing versus national dispersal only. Common Nordic Air C2 is an important enabler for Cross Border Basing of Nordic air forces. In particular it needs to be studied and trained in peacetime with agreed upon frameworks allowing for the usage of spares, munitions and fuel across the different fleets.

“In particular this will provide value to the Finnish and Norwegian F­35 operations, as it allows movement between bases closer to the frontline or using strategic depth to provide flexibility in the air war over the Nordic countries. The implementation of Swedish fighters into the mix is valuable from an operational and tactical point of view, as these offers different capabilities compared to the Finnish and Norwegian fighters, though naturally the deep integration of these in a joint base concept will be more difficult considering that they do not share spares and munitions.

“However, other assets can also benefit from the joint basing, such as the C­130J Super Hercules fleet of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (and where Finland has recently signaled potential interest in acquiring the type).

“It is important to consider that even if Nordic aircraft disperse and rotate to survive in crisis and war, at the same time the main air bases can be congested with allied air force reinforcement units and also APOD related flights. They too will need protection and preferably a GBAD shield. Norway is currently the only Nordic country with GBAD units in the air force structure with a main mission to protect the air bases. A flexible and resilient Nordic air base concept should have a borderless regional approach and include solutions for both Nordic air forces and GBAD units plus all allied reinforcements.”

This is clearly a key way to shape the way ahead for enhanced survivability but enhanced lethality can be provided by integratability of such fixed or mobile land bases with the firepower which sea bases can provide as well.

The entire engagement of allied and Nordic maritime capabilities can provide mobile bases which supplement, compliment, and can be used as part of the protection of such a joint air basing approach.

With an integrated force operating across various air land bases, both fixed and mobile, as well as ground-based missile defense and strike nodes, along with sea bases, common missiles like NSM or JSM can be used as a coalition kill web strike and defense force.

Having distributed strike but focused effects for a distributed force is a key element of shaping a way ahead for Nordic, Northern European and North Atlantic defense.

Author’s Note: The quote with regard to cross-border training was taken from the following book:

The Return of Direct Defense in Europe

For example, see the following:

 

Fleet Readiness Center East Prepares to Maintain the Powerful Engine of the Marine’s CH-53K

12/10/2022

In an article published by NAVAIR on December 6, 2022, the arrival of the powerful engine for the CH-53K and its first disassembly at Cherry Point, North Carolina was highlighted.

Fleet Readiness Center East (FRCE) recently opened a new chapter in the depot’s engine program with its first disassembly of the T408 engine, which powers the CH-53K King Stallion helicopter.

The three-day disassembly was a dress rehearsal of sorts, as it gave stakeholders in the T408 engine program an opportunity to ensure everything from technical data to tooling to support equipment meets the needs of the artisans who will work with the full-scale engine program. Two experienced engine mechanics methodically disassembled the massive engine while FRCE engineers and logisticians, along with representatives of Naval Air Systems Command’s H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopter Program Office (PMA-261) and engine manufacturer GE Aviation, observed and collected data to fine-tune the process.

“We were able to bring together all the stakeholders to work through the maintenance manuals and validate that the instructions are good for the depot artisans to be able to tear down, repair and rebuild the engine,” said Christine Haigler, Propulsion Integrated Product Team Lead for PMA-261. “I was really excited to be at FRCE and witness all the collaboration and partnership that’s going on here.”

FRCE Commanding Officer Capt. James Belmont called the disassembly an important milestone in the depot’s establishment of the CH-53K workload. Maintenance, repair and overhaul of the Marine Corps’ new heavy lift capability and its components will soon represent a significant portion of FRCE’s operations.

“This is a huge win for us. Anytime we establish new capability here at FRCE, it gives the artisans, the engineers and the support staff the excitement of meeting the challenges of new workload,” Belmont said. “I’m excited on behalf of all the employees at FRCE to welcome in the CH-53K engine workload, because it represents the future of FRCE here in eastern North Carolina.”

The CH-53K program office requested that capability establishment for the T408 engine be carried out in a three-year “crawl, walk, run” approach. This multi-phase plan will allow FRCE to smooth out any potential trouble spots before moving on to the next phase, according to Heather Carlson, Engine Capability Program Manager for the FRCE Business Office.

“In crawl phase, we should be able to induct an engine, disassemble it and put it back together with brand new parts,” Carlson said. “We won’t be able to repair those parts yet – we won’t have that capability – but we’ll swap it out with new parts and test it. So we’ll be able to get an engine out the door and ready for issue by utilizing new parts, a plug and play method.”

Carlson said during the “walk” phase, the depot will repair the component parts of the engine and reassemble and test it using the repaired parts, while the “run” phase represents full capability to repair and test the engine. 

The new T408 production line will be the first FRCE engine shop to use digital maintenance manuals instead of paper books. Carlson said the disassembly provides an opportunity for the artisans who will be working on the engines to recommend changes to the interactive electronic technical manuals (IETM) for the engine program.

“If the process says to remove this part, but it doesn’t say how to do it or it’s missing the required support equipment, we have an opportunity to ask for that information to be included because our artisans need to see that,” Carlson said. “The engine manufacturer owns the updates, so the company can incorporate those changes into the final IETMs that we use when we declare capability.”

The T408 engine mechanics who disassembled the engine said they’re excited at the prospect of working on the Marine Corps’ newest engine.

“I love learning new things. It’s something new and I’m enjoying myself,” said Mark Schexnayder. “There’s quite a big difference with this engine versus the T64 engine. So far the engine design seems simpler and easier to follow.”

Travis Barclay, an FRCE engine disassembler, said he’s looking forward to having an impact on how the T408 engines will be repaired in the future.

“Working on the new engine for the CH-53K is going to be an interesting challenge, especially being on the ground floor of this,” Barclay said. “It’s exciting to be directly involved with a program that’s the future of engine maintenance at FRCE.”

FRCE is North Carolina’s largest maintenance, repair, overhaul and technical services provider, with more than 4,000 civilian, military and contract workers. Its annual revenue exceeds $1 billion. The depot generates combat air power for America’s Marines and naval forces while serving as an integral part of the greater U.S. Navy; Naval Air Systems Command; and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers.