F-22A Raptors assigned to the 3rd Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf, Alaska, arrived for deployment at Kadena Air Base, Nov. 5-8, 2022.
11.09.2022
Video by Senior Airman Gary Hilton
18th Wing Public Affairs
The Evolving Strategic Environment: The Danish View
12/08/2022
The Danish Foreign Ministry set up a Security Policy Analysis Group, chaired by Ambassador Michael-Johns, Danish NATO Ambassador (the featured photo), which issued its report on the nature of the evolving strategic environment.
This is how the 16 November 2022 announcement of the public meeting to launch the report read:
“The geopolitical and geoeconomic lines on the world map are being redrawn once again. As the pandemic recedes, the world is faced with an energy crisis, economic shocks, floods and droughts, nation-first populism, and the looming danger of the escalation of the war in Ukraine. This emerging “polycrisis” facing humankind, as the current condition is being described, is creating extreme uncertainties about the shape of the future worlds. Taking Denmark as the locus, we initiate a series of conversations on how to navigate these uncertain worlds and the manifold futures that might lie ahead.
“We will begin with an introduction to the newly released report “Danish Security and Defence towards 2035” by Ambassador Michael Zilmer-Johns, Chairman, The Security Policy Analysis Group, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It will be followed by two expert roundtables that will discuss regional perspectives as well as ways forward. The speakers’ panel brings together distinguished scholars and policy experts.”
The first roundtable was entitled “Denmark and the World.”
- Ambassador, Michael Zilmer-Johns, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Chairman of the Security Policy Analysis Group
- Henrik Østergaard Breitenbauch, Dean, Royal Danish Defence College,
- Elena Meyer-Clement, Associate Professor, China Studies, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.
- Morten Rievers Heiberg, Professor, Department of English, Germanic and Romance Studies, UCPH.
- Katrine Stevnhøj, PhD Fellow, Russia Studies, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.
- Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Professor, Middle Eastern Studies, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.
- Ravinder Kaur, ADI Chair, Associate Professor, Modern India and South Asia Studies, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.
The second was entitled “The Way Forward.”
- Camilla Mordhorst, Director, The Danish Cultural Institute.
- Charlotte Flindt Pedersen, Director, The Danish Foreign Policy Society.
- Annika Hvithamar, Head of Department, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.
- Peter Bøgh Hansen, China Political Director, Confederation of Danish Industry (DI).
- Morten Elkjær, Vice President, Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU).
- John Rand, Professor, Department of Economics, UCPH.
The summary of the report provides the overview of the report.
An entire generation of Danes grew up without fear of war in Europe and in a world that opened up. They could travel freely around the globe and experience how democracy and human rights progressed. They experienced a historic boom in prosperity in Denmark and the rest of the world. The children and young people of today are faced with a bleaker future.
A new iron curtain is descending over Europe since the brutal Russian attack on Ukraine. This is a landmark event in European security. The Russian willingness to use military force to change the European borders and seek to enforce a European order based on spheres of interest and the right of the strong means that the entire Kingdom of Denmark will face significantly intensified threats in the coming years. The network of arms control agreements and confidence-building mechanisms that created stability and predictability on our continent is lying in ruins.
Not only Europe, but the entire international community, is in disarray. The USA has lost its position as the only superpower, and the balance of power between the great powers is shifting rapidly, not least due to the rise of China. Cooperation is being replaced by sharp competition between the great powers while the UN and other global institutions are weakened. The ever-closer integration of the world economy – with complex supply chains across national borders and time zones – has slowed down. Nuclear arsenals are growing and will play a greater role in the global security policy game in the future. We find ourselves on the threshold of a new era in which the rules-based international system based on the unique strength of the United States will be replaced by a new system. At this point, it remains too early to tell how far this development will go towards a more fragmented world order, where power means more than rules and principles. The direction is unfortunately clear, however, and it is certain that the future international system will be very different from what we have known since the end of the Cold War.
The intensified great power competition of the future will take on a different character than was the case during the Cold War. Firstly, the economic integration between China and the West is far deeper than it ever was between the former Eastern Bloc and the West. This means that there will continue to be cooperation in trade, climate, and pandemics in parallel to fierce competition for control of transport routes, supply chains and infrastructure and – not least – for the technologies that can fundamentally change the future military battlefield. Secondly, China and the United States are not as globally dominant as were the USSR and USA. The EU, India, Japan, and a number of medium-sized powers have considerable economic and military capacity and greater freedom of action than was then the case. This will very likely lead to a more fluid international system with changing patterns of cooperation and more proxy wars between the great powers. A sharp division of the world into democracies and autocratic countries could be an alternative but is considered less likely.
China’s ascendance as an ever stronger and more assertive global power will affect European security. The great geographical distance means that China cannot be expected to become a conventional military threat to Europe before 2035. But because the USA is turning its strategic focus towards China, Europe will have to provide a much larger part of the NATO deterrence and defence against Russia as well as the efforts against terrorism and irregular migration from the Middle East and Africa. China will also be more prominent in other aspects of the threat landscape. China’s rapid development and militarisation of new technologies, and its continued efforts to gain and access to European technology through legal and illegal means, will pressure Europe.
In light of the multiple and significantly intensified threats against Denmark, it is more important than at any other time since the end of the Cold War that we are firmly rooted in NATO and the EU and maintain close ties to strong allies in Europe and North America together with partners in Asia. NATO will remain the foundation for Danish security and the world’s strongest military alliance. The intensified Russian threat has strengthened the unity of NATO and triggered a significant strengthening of the collective NATO defence along the eastern flank against Russia. While NATO ensures the military deterrence of Russia, the EU contributes significantly to European and global security in many other ways. With the prompt and harsh sanctions in response to the Ukraine invasion, the EU emerged as a real geopolitical actor. The active involvement of the EU Commission in the European defence dimension is game changer with important ramifications for building an efficient European defence industry.
As a result of the Danish referendum on the lifting of the defence opt-out and the Finnish and Swedish decisions to seek admission to NATO, the Nordic countries will for the first time in history stand together as military allies in NATO and as partners in the EU defence dimension. This opens up entirely new perspectives for Nordic defence cooperation.
The Faroe Islands and Greenland forms part of the Arctic/North Atlantic security policy complex, which has a key role in the mutual nuclear deterrence between the USA and Russia. Greenland lies in the middle of the path of intercontinental missiles between Russia and the USA. As the relations between the two great powers have deteriorated, the relevance of Pituffik (Thule Air Base) has increased. The Faroe Islands and Greenland are important for the strategically important maritime passage in the waters between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Scotland, which Russian submarines and warships must pass to enter the North Atlantic.
The new security policy situation of the Kingdom of Denmark entails a significant increase in the tasks facing the Danish Armed Forces until 2035. It will be necessary to increase the Danish contribution to the ongoing strengthening of the Western deterrence and defence against the increased military threat from Russia and to the relief of the USA in Europe. The main tasks of Danish Defence are expected to be forward defence in the Baltic Sea region, including more forces on short alert, as well as increased surveillance in the Arctic and the North Atlantic. The Armed Forces has to deliver our NATO capability targets. Future NATO targets for Denmark are likely to become even more demanding and to require much higher preparedness levels. Continued support for Ukraine, including training and weapons, can also require more resources.
Climate change and demographics will intensify the threats and challenges emanating from weak and fragile states. Maritime security will also remain a key priority for Denmark. Furthermore, our allies will likely request Danish military contributions to activities in Asia in line with the increased strategic focus there. The Danish defence should therefore retain capacity to send relevant military contributions to distant international operations. Even with the decision to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP, however, there will be less capacity to participate in such operations in the coming years.
The rapid technological development will require a significant technological boost to the Danish Armed Forces if it is to remain a relevant partner for our strongest allies. This increase will also be required to enable the Armed Forces to handle increasing tasks despite limited prospects for expanding the manpower. The new, bleaker threat assessment also requires a strengthening of the broader societal security. The Kingdom of Denmark must be able to deal with a wide range of growing manmade and natural threats, including cyber-attacks, malign foreign interference in political processes or control of critical infrastructure, shortages of critical supplies, pandemics, and extreme weather.
See, also the following:
Shaping a Way Ahead for Denmark and Nordic Defense: The Impact of the War in Ukraine
-regeringens_security-policy-report_uk_web-The Kingdom of Denmark: Trigger for Change in Nordic Integration?
The USS Gerald R Ford Returns to Norfolk: Putting it into Strategic Context
12/07/2022
During a Bold Alligator story which I wrote for what is now Breaking Defense, I highlighted the importance of understanding what a photo meant when in context. I wrote in that 2012 article that because the Osprey was used to conduct an assault raid from the seabase deep inland, the usual vision of looking for the assault vehicle coming ashore missed the point.
I wrote: “Let us hover over this image. Instead of assaulting the beach, the forces aboard the sea base are maneuvering within and over the battlespace inserting, moving and withdrawing forces. This is a far cry from just looking at photos of the landing ships and assault vehicles.”
We are seeing something similar if one looks at pictures of the Ford coming back to Norfolk. Not only is this a very unique warship – which will be considerably more capable with the air wing it will have in the near future, including F-35s and CMV-22Bs and in the medium future operating with directed energy weapons – but is operating the new template generated by the new approach of 2nd Fleet and JFC Norfolk – and with strategic change in the NATO alliance itself associated with the re-imaging of Nordic defense with the inclusion of Sweden and Finland in the alliance.
I have written with my co-author at length in our book A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making about the large deck carrier and kill web task forces. The new systems onboard the Ford allow it to operate differently from the Nimitz class carriers on the maiden deployment just completed. The crew of the Ford operated with these new systems and began the process of re-inventing how a carrier can operate.
As Capt. Paul Lanzilotta, Ford’s commanding officer commented: “On our ship, you don’t hear Sailors saying, ‘that’s the way we’ve always done it’ because we’re using new gear, new technologies. Our Sailors are the ones who make all of these new technologies real.”
If you don’t connect the new ship with new approach to how to re-craft maritime operations, a central point of transformation will be missed. We provided a full chapter in our book on the maritime kill web on this new approach to operations, including force distribution, mission command, re-working of the U.S. Navy works with allies at sea and ashore, and rethinking how to approach to deterrence in Europe facilitated by maritime operations.
According to an article published by VOA News on October 4, 2022:”Lanzilotta said the North Atlantic deployment will serve as a “steppingstone kind of approach” to prepare for longer global deployments that will begin next year. It will also project power in the North Atlantic through air defense exercises, maritime domain awareness, long-range maritime strikes, distributed maritime operations, anti-submarine warfare exercises, as well as naval integration, according to Vice Admiral Dan Dwyer, commander of U.S. Second Fleet, which overseas operations in the Arctic and North Atlantic.
“In this area of strategic competition, we can no longer assume that geography provides us with the protection and standoff that we’ve had in the past,” said Dwyer.”
Added to this is the expansion of NATO in response the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. This is leading to a re-imaging of Nordic defense which expands the capabilities for Northern European defense that decisively will affect defense operations in the North Atlantic and re-enforce on the U.S. side the importance of maritime capabilities and concepts of operations. I have written a complete series of articles on Breaking Defense over the past few months on this subject and refer readers to those articles.
And the expanded work on interoperability and interchangeability among NATO navies was demonstrated early by the Ford and complemented by congruent activity by CVN-77 in its Mediterranean operations. Even though the Ford was on its first deployment it engaged in integrated operations with ships from Spain, Denmark, Canada, France, the Netherlands and Germany.
Meanwhile, the USS George HW Bush operated in the Western Med with European naval ships, including European carriers.
According to NATO: “In the North Atlantic, the USS Gerald R. Ford, the world’s newest and biggest warship, has arrived in the UK following weeks of drills alongside warships from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain. The Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth left Portsmouth on 10 November for F-35 fighter jet drills in the North Atlantic.
“In the Mediterranean, the French Navy’s Charles De Gaulle – escorted by Greek, U.S. and Italian ships – left Toulon on 15 November for deterrence patrols on NATO’s eastern flank and counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East. Also in the region are Italian carrier Cavour and the USS George H. W. Bush. In recent weeks, jets from the George H. W. Bush have flown deterrence patrols over Lithuania and Poland. Following exercises, Italy’s Garibaldi returned to Taranto on 15 November.
“NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu said the deployments “demonstrate our ability to project power across the Alliance and to rapidly reinforce Allies”. Set against the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, she said: “These carriers deliver deterrence, and they help keep our sea lines of communication open. Our strength sends a clear message that NATO will protect and defend every inch of Allied territory.” At the NATO Summit in March, Allies decided to deploy carrier strike groups, submarines, and significant numbers of combat ships on patrol on a persistent basis.”
I had a chance to discuss these various developments during a visit in Norfolk on November 30, 2022, with Admiral John Meier, Commander Naval Air Force Atlantic. We started by focusing on the strategic changes in Europe.
According to Admiral Meier: “the Russian invasion of Ukraine has backfired certainly in terms of Putin’s effort to undercut NATO. Rather it has solidified and expanded NATO. Both the Ford and Bush strike groups had significant participation from NATO partners and allies. What we saw was the impact of Russian actions as a forcing function to strengthen and solidify NATO like I haven’t seen in my lifetime.”
We then talked about the initial Ford deployment. As the first Captain of the Ford, it was with no little pride that he discussed developments. What he emphasized what was the somewhat unusual nature of a first deployment. On the one hand, we had what he called “a phase one deployment” where Ford operated its new systems and trained to operate and to be certified.
But there was he referred to as “a phase two deployment” which exercised the template established under Woody Lewis and further developed by Admiral Dwyer and “carried to completion by him.”
What Meier was referring to the “tremendous coordination with partners and allies” which the Ford spearheaded with its significant C2 and combat coordination capabilities. And this intersected with the strike group operation of USS George H. W. Bush. “With the participation of Italian, French, British and two U.S. carriers all coordinating a significant operational space covering significant swaths of land along with large deck amphibs, we demonstrated a significant NATO strike capability from the sea.”
The fleet as described operated as mobile sea bases and with mission command giving it enhanced operational flexibility and leveraging distributed concepts of operations, it becomes an important capability to affect the air-land battle as well.
Meier commented that “carriers are more survivable than land basing or can be seen as complementing other forms of basing. When you have five or six sea platforms operating anywhere from the high north into the Mediterranean, you are creating a maritime kill web which intersects with and provides strategic depth to forces ashore. This is a direction we’re headed and will enhance in the next few years with new strike and defense capabilities.”
We talked about three of those aspects.
The first was the complimentary aspect of the LHAs or the small deck carriers like the Italians or the Spanish have with F-35Bs on board. Admiral Meier commented: “They partner very well with the large deck carrier in shaping a broader strike capability.”
And one of the capabilities we have seen with large deck amphibs, swapping out capabilities from the deck, is something Admiral Meier would like to see the U.S. Navy doing with the large deck carrier as well. “We can shape different configurations of the airwings onboard the carrier to emphasize what is needed from enhanced electronic attack to rotor craft support to various types of operations, to enhanced command and control for the combat force. We have an inherent flexibility which as we reshape ways to deliver a kill web integrated but distributed force across the fleet.”
The second was one change to the carrier airwing which is already significantly enhancing the large deck carrier’s capability for distributed operations. This is what Admiral Meier had to say about the impact of replacing the C-2A with the CMV-22B for carrier support: “the CMV 22 can land in many, many more places than the current C-2A does. The C-2A being transitioned out, but it can only land on an aircraft carrier or a long runway. That’s pretty confining.
“Our CMV22s can be really a connector and if we’re going to talk about doing distributed maritime operations, its ability to resupply and rearm, not just the carrier, but the other nodes in that distributed network, is a significant advancement. In other words, the CMV-22B represents a huge improvement in both the airwing but also in distributed operations capabilities.”
A finally we talked about weapons. The Ford was built to have a significant increase in power generation and will be clearly a key part of the directed energy revolution on the way. As Admiral Meier noted: “We have 300-to-600-megawatt capability that could be put on an aircraft carrier today. The clear advantage for directed energy weapons for defense is they represent an infinite magazine. We would be constrained by our recharge rate, which on those weapons is actually really fast, and can keep up with salvos that would be launched as we could potentially run ourselves out of kinetic kill vehicles.”
The other aspect of directed energy weapons is they have a future beyond simply providing for ship self-defense to providing a defense capability to a distributed force. A destroyer could provide in the future defense of a mobile air base on which the USAF or allied air force could land, re-arm, re-fuel and go under the defensive umbrella of that destroyers directed energy weapons.
There is a dynamic development in the kinetic weapons world of range and speed. Admiral Meier added insight into this dynamic along these lines: “I think we’ve historically have relied on long range subsonic weapons that have excelled at fixed targets. Most recently, the synchronized attack into Syrian chemical plants was launched from U.S. subsurface and surface naval platforms and coalition and joint partners using various platforms. It was amazing, it was incredibly precise, extremely long range, and very effective at decimating fixed targets. But doing so with moving targets remains a challenge for us.
“And it’s very clear that technology is advancing in a direction where range and speed are both preeminent in this regard. We’re in an arms race, if you will, of longer and longer ranges. I think now it’s just advancing at a pace that is happening much more rapidly in our lifecycle, if you will, the ranges are rapidly increasing.
“The speed is really the next piece though when we start talking about hypersonics. It’s really about the difficulty of defending against a weapon like that or to target that weapon. Such weapons obviously present some significant technological challenges in terms of heat, in terms of avionics and in terms of targeting capability.
“And when we talk long range weapons, the biggest challenge with long range weapons will continue to remain the ability to hold targeting quality data and get that data to the weapons such as the weapon can concentrate effectively on the target. One can create a Mach Five missile that will go 1000 miles, but can one target a moving target at 1000 miles with a Mach Five missile? That’s the challenge.”
In short, this Fall the U.S. Navy along with allies and partners are working on providing strategic depth at sea against various Russian threats to both North America and the European continent.
Just snapping a picture of the Ford in Norfolk harbor with its readily identifiable island will not capture the strategic context into which it is entering and will provide a spearhead for shaping a way ahead for North Atlantic defense.
Featured Photo: The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) returns to Naval Station Norfolk after completing their inaugural deployment to the Atlantic Ocean with the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group (GRFCSG), Nov. 26
11.26.2022
Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Nathan Beard
Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet
Neptune Strike
An activity aimed at testing the combined capacity of NATO air and naval power has just wrapped up following two weeks of training. Neptune Strike, a multi-domain exercise, ran from 14 to 28 October 2022.
Seventy aircraft of various types, 20 ships and around 5,000 personnel from 26 NATO Allies and partners took part in the exercise.
Neptune Strike tested NATO’s maritime warfare capabilities and the Alliance’s cohesion in a dynamic environment for both Air and Sea elements.
Neptune Strike also tested NATO’s ability to combat potential threats caused by the malicious use of drones.
On a training site on the northwest coast of Denmark, the Danish Armed Forces practised launching a Banshee 600 drone.
The Banshee 600 is a custom-built drone designed specifically for air defence simulated training.
DENMARK 1
0.28.2022
Natochannel
The Way Ahead for Northern European Defense: Shaping the Future with Sweden and Finland as NATO Members
12/05/2022
By Robbin Laird
The coming of Finland and Sweden into NATO changes how the defense of Northern Europe is worked. As Admiral (Retired) Nils Wang has put it: “Now one needs to think in terms of defence of the North of Europe from Iceland to the Finnish and Norwegian borders.
“How do we build capacities which can operate throughout this entire region and deliver the kind of defence and crisis management effects that can deter Russia or for that matter Chinese intrusions into Nordic economic, security and defence concerns?”
I continued my discussion on the challenges and opportunities for reworking Northern European defense with my colleague Hans Tino Hansen, the CEO of the Danish firm Risk Intelligence. In a phone interview I did with him in early November 2022.
He started the conversation by underscoring that he sees the Northern European defense area as one broad continuous area ranging from North America across the North Atlantic and the Arctic with the Nordic countries and into the Baltic with three clusters of dense problems, each of which change somewhat the key states in that cluster.
The first is a North Atlantic challenge associated with the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. Here the Kingdom of Denmark and Norway along with Iceland are the lead states from the Nordic region, but as Sweden reworks it air-maritime approaches it could be an indirect contributor as well.
The second is the security and defense areas associated with the High North. In NATO until now, Norway has been the leader on these issues, but the entrance of Finland and Sweden into NATO provide strong opportunity for significant challenge in collaborate approaches. The first steps have already been taken between the three countries and going forward a mutual combined corps-level command could enable development of doctrines and defense planning.
Credit: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uks-defence-contribution-in-the-high-north/the-uks-defence-contribution-in-the-high-north
The third area is that of the Baltic Sea and region. This area could see the possibility of significant innovation. On the one hand, the Baltic Sea becomes a “NATO” area as all the states on that Sea are NATO members with Russia’s entrance to the Baltic coming through the Gulf of Finland and with Kaliningrad as an even more isolated “island”.
Much innovation could be generated in the security and defense of the Baltic Sea through innovations in maritime sensors, robotics and shared ISR systems.
Hans Tino Hansen underscored: “Even in this area there are distinctive differences in the tasks with Norway, Finland, Poland and the three Baltic republics being frontline states. This leaves the other Nordic states with the important task to take part in the defense of these states along with Germany and Poland as well as UK and USA as well as delivering Host Nation Support to reinforcements travelling through their territory.”
An ability to project power in their defense through collaboration in ground capabilities and the ability to project air-ground power through lift systems and innovations in ground maneuver forces will be significant in shaping an effective way ahead.
Credit: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/17/securing-the-nordic-baltic-region/index.html
The point is really rather straightforward – there is no single defense problem with same defense solution or the same lead state in shaping solution. Each state can contribute assets to common defense problems, but each state might well lead with an “unbalanced” force structure – air versus maritime versus land systems — which that state’s lead role within a particular “defense cluster” within the overall defense challenges faced by the region.
Hans Tino Hansen argued that the “current NATO command structure has been built for another time, which was a time of “peace dividend” with reductions of NATO structures, and engagement in out of area operations. The chiefs of defense of the four Nordic nations have argued for a command structure in NATO, where the region is subordinated to one command and not to two, JFC Norfolk and JFC Brunsum.”
He takes the argument one step further and argues that “the creation of a new JFC command for the northern region like AFNORTH during the Cold War will be a strong driver in the process of integrating Finnish and Swedish defense with existing member NATO countries in the region. Taking into consideration, the size of the combined planned forces in all domains in the region as well as potential reinforcements to the region, it may be more than challenging to handle and develop this with the existing NATO command structure.”
How to shape the most effective integrated force for the region in light of the different dense clusters and the ability of the nations to emphasize their specific capabilities and contributions rather than having unnecessary duplications of capabilities?
The region features a number of the key security problems for the new era as well. How to defend offshore facilities from drone attacks? How to monitor undersea threats to infrastructure? How to defend undersea infrastructure?
The Nordic innovations in Northern defense can intersect well with the innovations started with the stand up of Second Fleet and Allied Joint Forces Command Norfolk. This will intersect most notably with regard to common infrastructure, basing and sustainment decision. A new era of significant innovation in Northern European and North Atlantic defense could be opening up.
I talked with the Admiral who led the initial efforts in Norfolk to re-establish Second Fleet and to standup Allied Joint Forces Command Norfolk about the impact of the Nordic innovations. For Vice Admiral (Retired) Lewis: “With the changes in the Nordic region, there will be an opportunity, for JFC Norfolk to become a four-star command on an equivalent level with JFC Brunssum and Naples from a rank standpoint. We could also have a subordinate command physically stationed in the Nordic nations, that would have the effect of pulling the continents together whereas JFC Norfolk is stationed obviously in the continental United States.
“This would allow for significant innovation in thinking through how, in a practical sense, operations from east to west and west to east in the North Atlantic battlespace.”
Featured Graphic: Credit: Dreamstime
NATO Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Poland
NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Poland M109A7 Paladins and M992A3 Carrier Ammunition Track (CAT) assigned to 2nd Platoon, Bull Battery 2nd Battalion, 82 Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division (3-1 ABCT) operationally controlled by the 1st Infantry Division (1 ID), conduct a live fire training exercise in Toruń, Poland, Nov. 3, 2022.
TORUN, POLAND
11.03.2022
Video by Staff Sgt. Matthew Foster
117th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (Hawaii)
Exercise Elangaroo 22
12/04/2022
By Flight Lieutenant Bronwyn Marchant
This year, RAAF’s 19 Squadron played a vital role in the success of Exercise Elangaroo 22, hosting nearly 200 personnel along with the F-35A Lightning II and C-27J Spartan for the first time.
Embedded with the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) at their Butterworth Air Base, 19 Squadron is responsible for the projection of air power for ADF international operations within the Indo-Pacific region.
Commanding Officer of 19 Squadron, Wing Commander Darren Prior said the squadron –consisting of 30 aviators, 1 APS and 55 locally engaged civilians – works collaboratively with their RMAF counterparts to ensure the success of international engagement activities such as Elangaroo.
“We achieve this through the sustained delivery of airbase operations squadron capabilities such as aviation refuelling, strategic communications networks, air movements, logistics, accommodation and messing, and upkeep of all ADF facilities at Butterworth, including welfare facilities,” Wing Commander Prior said.
“Our RMAF host provides major airbase capabilities including runway/taxiway operations, air traffic control, firefighting and rescue, meteorological services and base security.
“We work closely alongside the RMAF to ensure that operation and exercise needs are met – enabling the capability and strategic reach to conduct and enhance regional responses and international operations.”
Wing Commander Prior said both RAAF and RMAF look for opportunities to share ideas and work practices to strengthen mutual understanding and respect. The addition of a Tindal-based wildlife management officer for Elangaroo is a fine example.
“Exercise Elangaroo has been a fantastic opportunity to further enhance the relationship we have with our Malaysian partners, especially being the first deployment of a RAAF 5th generation aircraft to South-East Asia,” Wing Commander Prior said.
“Our 19 Squadron refuellers have been able to get up close to the F-35A Lighting II and C-27J Spartan for the first time, which is not only essential to the exercise, but also supports force generation activities to further upskill and develop our workforce.”
Published by Australian Department of Defence
In an earlier piece published by the Australian Department of Defence on 7 November 2022:
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel and aircraft have deployed to Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Butterworth Air Base to participate in Exercise Elangaroo, an air-to-air fighter interaction exercise.
This year’s exercise involves Australian F-35A Lightning II and C-27J Spartan aircraft for the first time.
RAAF Co-Exercise Director, Group Captain Ravinder Singh, said the aim of the exercise would be to test and improve force integration and combined readiness between the nations.
“Australia and Malaysia have a long-standing relationship and a history of conducting military exercises together,” Group Captain Singh said.
“Exercise Elangaroo features the return of RAAF’s 75 Squadron to its old home in Butterworth, where it spent 16 years living and working alongside RMAF counterparts from 1967 to 1983.
“This particular exercise will feature a range of modern air combat platforms integrating across the diverse and challenging geography and weather patterns of the Malay peninsular.
“Crews will use RMAF and RAAF tactical assets, including the application of strike and air control missions, to continue the great mutual understanding that exists between our nations.”
Exercises such as Elangaroo are pivotal to ensure Air Force is ready to respond, and support the ongoing commitment to regional stability within the Indo-Pacific region.
Group Captain Singh said the training and integration during the exercise would directly support Air Force’s ability to conduct operations.
“Elangaroo will further advance our capability to project air power at short notice,” Group Captain Singh said.
“The employment of a potent, integrated force requires careful planning and training to ensure that if called upon, our efforts are safe, efficient and effective.”
Exercise Elangaroo is being held from 7 to 18 November 2022.
Featured Photo: A C-27J Spartan from 35 Squadron alongside 19 Squadron’s refuelling tanker.
Credit: Australian Department of Defence
No. 75 Squadron is making history during Exercise Elangaroo 22, flying the F-35A Lightning II for the very first time in Malaysia! Exercise Elangaroo 22 is an air-to-air fighter interaction exercise between the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).
The exercise strengthens our bilateral partnership by improving combined readiness and interoperability between the RMAF and RAAF.
Exercise Elangaroo 22 was held at RMAF Butterworth Air Base, Malaysia from 07 to 18 November 2022 involving No. 75 Squadron F-35A Lightning II and No. 35 Squadron C-27J Spartan.
Exercise Steadfast Noon
12/02/2022Air forces from across NATO exercised nuclear deterrence capabilities over north-western Europe from 17 to 30 October 2022.
Exercise Steadfast Noon is an established and recurring training activity.
BELGIUM
10.27.2022
Natochannel