Pacific Ocean – Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited the U.S. Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), while Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 5 units concluded their participation in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force International Fleet Review (IFR) in Yokosuka and Sagami Wan, Nov. 6, 2022.
11.06.2022
Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Keyly Santizo
USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76)
U.S. Navy Sailors with Expeditionary Medical Facility Alpha, Navy Medicine Readiness and Training Command, simulate casualty care during exercise Keen Sword 23 on Camp Foster, Okinawa, Japan, Nov. 17, 2022.
During Keen Sword 23, Naval Medical Forces Pacific exercised the inaugural employment of expeditionary hospitalization on the first island chain with bilateral engagement from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.
(U.S. Marine Corps video by Lance Cpl. Stephen Holland II).
CAMP COURTNEY, OKINAWA, JAPAN
11.17.2022
Video by Lance Cpl. Stephen Holland III Marine Expeditionary Force
By Robbin Laird
When it comes to crisis management and war termination, the United States faces a fundamental challenge: what are our strategic objectives and how do we achieve them in a world where so much is changing?
I recently discussed this challenge with my colleague Dr. Paul Bracken of Yale in terms of the Ukrainian war. The President of Ukraine has clear objectives, namely, the complete recovery of Ukrainian territory including Crimea and expects the United States and the Western allies to bankroll it and presumably accept Ukraine into the EU and NATO.
But is the United States and Europe willing to support whatever the risks are entailed in Ukraine’s strategy? With Russian leadership and Ukrainian leadership driving the strategic change which will shape the next European order, what is the interest of the United States in what the next major change in the European order exactly?
According to Bracken, this kind of question is not likely to be asked with a policy horizon of one week. He noted that “when in a crisis, policy makers tend to stretch out the decisions and take small steps. They don’t consider the strategic options of the path being generated by these small incremental moves.”
He noted with regard to Vietnam: “President Johnson crafted a masterful manipulation of force in Vietnam and of politics at home until he was trapped by his own policies and rhetoric into a strategy which would fail.”
He described this “going to work and carrying forward last week’s efforts into the future.” Why did the Vietnam War or Afghan War go too long? “Because nobody in Washington could figure out a way to do it differently. Policy makers came into work every morning and did what they did the day before. Even though the policy was not working, except in a sort of one week by one week basis, until the whole effort collapsed.” That’s Saigon’s collapse in 1975 and Kabul’s in 2021.
With regard to the war in Ukraine, the Biden Administration is moving incrementally, and the questions considered beyond bankrolling the arms to Ukraine are which weapons to give them. The question becomes as Bracken puts it: “what kind of artillery to give to the Ukrainians? What is the cutoff line and range of missiles?”
Then there is the question of allies and what exactly the relationship between what specific allies are doing and what might be the long-term objectives for the United States. Bracken noted: “your allies give you almost as many problems as the enemy. This was certainly true in the Korean War and the Vietnam War to mention two cases.”
This is particularly true when European states face a future of rebuilding Ukraine and ensuring that they can defend themselves with declining weapons inventories, face the prospect of WMD being used, facing energy challenges which are made doubly difficult by the escape from geopolitical realities of energy policy, and with an EU in fundamental transition determining whether they really want a state like Ukraine in the European Union.
European states are all over the policy map on these issues, and no amount of assertion by the White House that they are leading Western unity on the war or a future policy towards Russia removes this reality of divergence with allies.
The war is part of a significant strategic shift. As Bracken put it: ”The world is moving to its more normal form, which is multipolarity. And we, the United States don’t like that. Because we’re used to being in a bipolar or unipolar system – with us in charge. What we’re actually fighting is structural change in world politics which is a far more demanding objectives that we don’t think about or talk about.”
Without the United States, Ukraine cannot fight this war. What happens next is not simply up to the Presidents of Ukraine or Russia. And certainly, a policy process which focuses on a short-term weekly perspective will not provide a strategic perspective for shaping the next European order or the global policy of dealing with the coalition of authoritarian powers.
There is a very large question posed by nuclear weapons in all of this. Russian territory will operate as a sanctuary which the West has little interest in compressively attacking for fear of triggering WMD use in Ukraine, with chemical weapons being the low hanging fruit here. If we go to the Pacific and note that the Chinese use their territory to launch their force out into the first and second island chains, how willing is one to attack their territory in light of their nuclear build up?
The war in Ukraine is about the dynamics of global change and neither the objectives of Zelenskyy nor Putin answer the question of the American interest. This requires a longer view to inform current policy options and choices.
While we await the wrap up of Digital Horizons exercise going on currently with Task Force 59, if we look back to last year we can highlight the 11th MEU working with the MANTAS T12 maritime autonomous system.
Marines assigned to the All Domain Reconnaissance Detachment, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), are seen in these photos working with the MANTAS T12 unmanned surface vessel after training with Task Force 59 at Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Oct. 28, 2021.
By Robbin Laird
As the Nordics work through how to best integrate their forces, a key element to consider is how to shape a basing structure involving the Nordics which will enable an enhanced Northern European and North Atlantic defense.
When I visiting Norway in 2018, I witnessed one of the foundation stones for enhanced Nordic defense, cross-border air operations, something which will now involve the question of the bases involved and their integration with sea basing and land base operations as well in order to shape enhanced capabilities for strike and defense capabilities.
During a visit to Bodø Airbase on April 25, 2018, we discussed the cross-border air training, which Norway is doing with Finland and Sweden with members of the Norwegian Air Force The day we were there, we saw four F-16s take off from Bodø and fly south toward Ørland airbase to participate in an air defense exercise.
The day before this event, the Norwegians contacted the Swedes and invited them to send aircraft to the exercise, and they did so. The day before is really the point. This is a dramatic change from the 1990s, when the Swedes would not allow the Norwegians or Finns to enter their airspace without prior diplomatic approval. Maj. Trond Ertsgaard, Senior Operational Planner and Fighter Pilot from the 132 Air Wing, provided an overview to the standup and the evolution of this significant working relationship.
The core point is that it is being done without a complicated day-to-day diplomatic effort: “In the 1970s, there was limited cooperation. We got to know each other, and our bases, to be able to divert in case of emergency or other contingencies. But there was no operational or tactical cooperation. The focus was on safety; not operational training.”
By the 1990s, there was enhanced cooperation, but it was limited to a small set of flying issues, rather than operational training. As Ertsgaard noted: “But when the Swedes got the Gripen, this opened the aperture, as the plane was designed to be more easily integrated with NATO standards.”
Then in the fall of 2008, there was a meeting of the squadrons and wing commanders from the Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian airbases to discuss ways to develop cooperation among the squadrons operating from national bases. The discussion was rooted in the ability of the national air forces to operate from their own bases and simply cooperating in shared combat airspace.
This would mean that the normal costs of hosting an exercise would not be necessary, as each air force would return to its own operating base at the end of the engagement. The Cross-Border Training (CBT) started between Sweden and Norway in 2009 and then the Finns joined in 2010. By 2011, Ertsgaard highlighted that, “we were operating at a level of an event a week. And by 2012, we engaged in about 90 events at the CBT level.”
That created a template which allowed for cost-effective and regular training and laid the foundation for then hosting a periodic two-week exercise where they could invite nations to participate in air defense exercises in the region. From 2015 on, the three air forces have shaped a regular training approach, which is very flexible and driven at the wing and squadron levels. “We meet each November, and set the schedule for the next year, but in execution it is very, very flexible. It is about a bottom-up approach and initiative to generate the training regime,” Ertsgaard said.
Now with the anticipated inclusion of Finland and Sweden within NATO, the countries can go beyond cross-border training to shaping a basing eco system to provide for distributed integrated operations.
In an article made available to me recently by a Norwegian colleague and published by LUFTEND in December 2022, the focus on a “flexible and resilient Nordic air base concept” was the focus of attention.
The article concludes:
“Finland and Sweden are compatible with USAF’s Agile Combat Employment approach and similar regimes among allied air forces. Norway might reintroduce the principle of protection by dispersal and unpredictability.
“There is a need for regional Cross Border Basing versus national dispersal only. Common Nordic Air C2 is an important enabler for Cross Border Basing of Nordic air forces. In particular it needs to be studied and trained in peacetime with agreed upon frameworks allowing for the usage of spares, munitions and fuel across the different fleets.
“In particular this will provide value to the Finnish and Norwegian F35 operations, as it allows movement between bases closer to the frontline or using strategic depth to provide flexibility in the air war over the Nordic countries. The implementation of Swedish fighters into the mix is valuable from an operational and tactical point of view, as these offers different capabilities compared to the Finnish and Norwegian fighters, though naturally the deep integration of these in a joint base concept will be more difficult considering that they do not share spares and munitions.
“However, other assets can also benefit from the joint basing, such as the C130J Super Hercules fleet of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (and where Finland has recently signaled potential interest in acquiring the type).
“It is important to consider that even if Nordic aircraft disperse and rotate to survive in crisis and war, at the same time the main air bases can be congested with allied air force reinforcement units and also APOD related flights. They too will need protection and preferably a GBAD shield. Norway is currently the only Nordic country with GBAD units in the air force structure with a main mission to protect the air bases. A flexible and resilient Nordic air base concept should have a borderless regional approach and include solutions for both Nordic air forces and GBAD units plus all allied reinforcements.”
This is clearly a key way to shape the way ahead for enhanced survivability but enhanced lethality can be provided by integratability of such fixed or mobile land bases with the firepower which sea bases can provide as well.
The entire engagement of allied and Nordic maritime capabilities can provide mobile bases which supplement, compliment, and can be used as part of the protection of such a joint air basing approach.
With an integrated force operating across various air land bases, both fixed and mobile, as well as ground-based missile defense and strike nodes, along with sea bases, common missiles like NSM or JSM can be used as a coalition kill web strike and defense force.
Having distributed strike but focused effects for a distributed force is a key element of shaping a way ahead for Nordic, Northern European and North Atlantic defense.
Author’s Note: The quote with regard to cross-border training was taken from the following book:
For example, see the following:
In an article published by NAVAIR on December 6, 2022, the arrival of the powerful engine for the CH-53K and its first disassembly at Cherry Point, North Carolina was highlighted.
Fleet Readiness Center East (FRCE) recently opened a new chapter in the depot’s engine program with its first disassembly of the T408 engine, which powers the CH-53K King Stallion helicopter.
The three-day disassembly was a dress rehearsal of sorts, as it gave stakeholders in the T408 engine program an opportunity to ensure everything from technical data to tooling to support equipment meets the needs of the artisans who will work with the full-scale engine program. Two experienced engine mechanics methodically disassembled the massive engine while FRCE engineers and logisticians, along with representatives of Naval Air Systems Command’s H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopter Program Office (PMA-261) and engine manufacturer GE Aviation, observed and collected data to fine-tune the process.
“We were able to bring together all the stakeholders to work through the maintenance manuals and validate that the instructions are good for the depot artisans to be able to tear down, repair and rebuild the engine,” said Christine Haigler, Propulsion Integrated Product Team Lead for PMA-261. “I was really excited to be at FRCE and witness all the collaboration and partnership that’s going on here.”
FRCE Commanding Officer Capt. James Belmont called the disassembly an important milestone in the depot’s establishment of the CH-53K workload. Maintenance, repair and overhaul of the Marine Corps’ new heavy lift capability and its components will soon represent a significant portion of FRCE’s operations.
“This is a huge win for us. Anytime we establish new capability here at FRCE, it gives the artisans, the engineers and the support staff the excitement of meeting the challenges of new workload,” Belmont said. “I’m excited on behalf of all the employees at FRCE to welcome in the CH-53K engine workload, because it represents the future of FRCE here in eastern North Carolina.”
The CH-53K program office requested that capability establishment for the T408 engine be carried out in a three-year “crawl, walk, run” approach. This multi-phase plan will allow FRCE to smooth out any potential trouble spots before moving on to the next phase, according to Heather Carlson, Engine Capability Program Manager for the FRCE Business Office.
“In crawl phase, we should be able to induct an engine, disassemble it and put it back together with brand new parts,” Carlson said. “We won’t be able to repair those parts yet – we won’t have that capability – but we’ll swap it out with new parts and test it. So we’ll be able to get an engine out the door and ready for issue by utilizing new parts, a plug and play method.”
Carlson said during the “walk” phase, the depot will repair the component parts of the engine and reassemble and test it using the repaired parts, while the “run” phase represents full capability to repair and test the engine.
The new T408 production line will be the first FRCE engine shop to use digital maintenance manuals instead of paper books. Carlson said the disassembly provides an opportunity for the artisans who will be working on the engines to recommend changes to the interactive electronic technical manuals (IETM) for the engine program.
“If the process says to remove this part, but it doesn’t say how to do it or it’s missing the required support equipment, we have an opportunity to ask for that information to be included because our artisans need to see that,” Carlson said. “The engine manufacturer owns the updates, so the company can incorporate those changes into the final IETMs that we use when we declare capability.”
The T408 engine mechanics who disassembled the engine said they’re excited at the prospect of working on the Marine Corps’ newest engine.
“I love learning new things. It’s something new and I’m enjoying myself,” said Mark Schexnayder. “There’s quite a big difference with this engine versus the T64 engine. So far the engine design seems simpler and easier to follow.”
Travis Barclay, an FRCE engine disassembler, said he’s looking forward to having an impact on how the T408 engines will be repaired in the future.
“Working on the new engine for the CH-53K is going to be an interesting challenge, especially being on the ground floor of this,” Barclay said. “It’s exciting to be directly involved with a program that’s the future of engine maintenance at FRCE.”
FRCE is North Carolina’s largest maintenance, repair, overhaul and technical services provider, with more than 4,000 civilian, military and contract workers. Its annual revenue exceeds $1 billion. The depot generates combat air power for America’s Marines and naval forces while serving as an integral part of the greater U.S. Navy; Naval Air Systems Command; and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers.
F-22A Raptors assigned to the 3rd Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf, Alaska, arrived for deployment at Kadena Air Base, Nov. 5-8, 2022.
11.09.2022
Video by Senior Airman Gary Hilton
18th Wing Public Affairs
The Danish Foreign Ministry set up a Security Policy Analysis Group, chaired by Ambassador Michael-Johns, Danish NATO Ambassador (the featured photo), which issued its report on the nature of the evolving strategic environment.
This is how the 16 November 2022 announcement of the public meeting to launch the report read:
“The geopolitical and geoeconomic lines on the world map are being redrawn once again. As the pandemic recedes, the world is faced with an energy crisis, economic shocks, floods and droughts, nation-first populism, and the looming danger of the escalation of the war in Ukraine. This emerging “polycrisis” facing humankind, as the current condition is being described, is creating extreme uncertainties about the shape of the future worlds. Taking Denmark as the locus, we initiate a series of conversations on how to navigate these uncertain worlds and the manifold futures that might lie ahead.
“We will begin with an introduction to the newly released report “Danish Security and Defence towards 2035” by Ambassador Michael Zilmer-Johns, Chairman, The Security Policy Analysis Group, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It will be followed by two expert roundtables that will discuss regional perspectives as well as ways forward. The speakers’ panel brings together distinguished scholars and policy experts.”
The first roundtable was entitled “Denmark and the World.”
The second was entitled “The Way Forward.”
The summary of the report provides the overview of the report.
An entire generation of Danes grew up without fear of war in Europe and in a world that opened up. They could travel freely around the globe and experience how democracy and human rights progressed. They experienced a historic boom in prosperity in Denmark and the rest of the world. The children and young people of today are faced with a bleaker future.
A new iron curtain is descending over Europe since the brutal Russian attack on Ukraine. This is a landmark event in European security. The Russian willingness to use military force to change the European borders and seek to enforce a European order based on spheres of interest and the right of the strong means that the entire Kingdom of Denmark will face significantly intensified threats in the coming years. The network of arms control agreements and confidence-building mechanisms that created stability and predictability on our continent is lying in ruins.
Not only Europe, but the entire international community, is in disarray. The USA has lost its position as the only superpower, and the balance of power between the great powers is shifting rapidly, not least due to the rise of China. Cooperation is being replaced by sharp competition between the great powers while the UN and other global institutions are weakened. The ever-closer integration of the world economy – with complex supply chains across national borders and time zones – has slowed down. Nuclear arsenals are growing and will play a greater role in the global security policy game in the future. We find ourselves on the threshold of a new era in which the rules-based international system based on the unique strength of the United States will be replaced by a new system. At this point, it remains too early to tell how far this development will go towards a more fragmented world order, where power means more than rules and principles. The direction is unfortunately clear, however, and it is certain that the future international system will be very different from what we have known since the end of the Cold War.
The intensified great power competition of the future will take on a different character than was the case during the Cold War. Firstly, the economic integration between China and the West is far deeper than it ever was between the former Eastern Bloc and the West. This means that there will continue to be cooperation in trade, climate, and pandemics in parallel to fierce competition for control of transport routes, supply chains and infrastructure and – not least – for the technologies that can fundamentally change the future military battlefield. Secondly, China and the United States are not as globally dominant as were the USSR and USA. The EU, India, Japan, and a number of medium-sized powers have considerable economic and military capacity and greater freedom of action than was then the case. This will very likely lead to a more fluid international system with changing patterns of cooperation and more proxy wars between the great powers. A sharp division of the world into democracies and autocratic countries could be an alternative but is considered less likely.
China’s ascendance as an ever stronger and more assertive global power will affect European security. The great geographical distance means that China cannot be expected to become a conventional military threat to Europe before 2035. But because the USA is turning its strategic focus towards China, Europe will have to provide a much larger part of the NATO deterrence and defence against Russia as well as the efforts against terrorism and irregular migration from the Middle East and Africa. China will also be more prominent in other aspects of the threat landscape. China’s rapid development and militarisation of new technologies, and its continued efforts to gain and access to European technology through legal and illegal means, will pressure Europe.
In light of the multiple and significantly intensified threats against Denmark, it is more important than at any other time since the end of the Cold War that we are firmly rooted in NATO and the EU and maintain close ties to strong allies in Europe and North America together with partners in Asia. NATO will remain the foundation for Danish security and the world’s strongest military alliance. The intensified Russian threat has strengthened the unity of NATO and triggered a significant strengthening of the collective NATO defence along the eastern flank against Russia. While NATO ensures the military deterrence of Russia, the EU contributes significantly to European and global security in many other ways. With the prompt and harsh sanctions in response to the Ukraine invasion, the EU emerged as a real geopolitical actor. The active involvement of the EU Commission in the European defence dimension is game changer with important ramifications for building an efficient European defence industry.
As a result of the Danish referendum on the lifting of the defence opt-out and the Finnish and Swedish decisions to seek admission to NATO, the Nordic countries will for the first time in history stand together as military allies in NATO and as partners in the EU defence dimension. This opens up entirely new perspectives for Nordic defence cooperation.
The Faroe Islands and Greenland forms part of the Arctic/North Atlantic security policy complex, which has a key role in the mutual nuclear deterrence between the USA and Russia. Greenland lies in the middle of the path of intercontinental missiles between Russia and the USA. As the relations between the two great powers have deteriorated, the relevance of Pituffik (Thule Air Base) has increased. The Faroe Islands and Greenland are important for the strategically important maritime passage in the waters between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Scotland, which Russian submarines and warships must pass to enter the North Atlantic.
The new security policy situation of the Kingdom of Denmark entails a significant increase in the tasks facing the Danish Armed Forces until 2035. It will be necessary to increase the Danish contribution to the ongoing strengthening of the Western deterrence and defence against the increased military threat from Russia and to the relief of the USA in Europe. The main tasks of Danish Defence are expected to be forward defence in the Baltic Sea region, including more forces on short alert, as well as increased surveillance in the Arctic and the North Atlantic. The Armed Forces has to deliver our NATO capability targets. Future NATO targets for Denmark are likely to become even more demanding and to require much higher preparedness levels. Continued support for Ukraine, including training and weapons, can also require more resources.
Climate change and demographics will intensify the threats and challenges emanating from weak and fragile states. Maritime security will also remain a key priority for Denmark. Furthermore, our allies will likely request Danish military contributions to activities in Asia in line with the increased strategic focus there. The Danish defence should therefore retain capacity to send relevant military contributions to distant international operations. Even with the decision to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP, however, there will be less capacity to participate in such operations in the coming years.
The rapid technological development will require a significant technological boost to the Danish Armed Forces if it is to remain a relevant partner for our strongest allies. This increase will also be required to enable the Armed Forces to handle increasing tasks despite limited prospects for expanding the manpower. The new, bleaker threat assessment also requires a strengthening of the broader societal security. The Kingdom of Denmark must be able to deal with a wide range of growing manmade and natural threats, including cyber-attacks, malign foreign interference in political processes or control of critical infrastructure, shortages of critical supplies, pandemics, and extreme weather.
See, also the following:
Shaping a Way Ahead for Denmark and Nordic Defense: The Impact of the War in Ukraine
-regeringens_security-policy-report_uk_web-The Kingdom of Denmark: Trigger for Change in Nordic Integration?