Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Its Initial European Consequences

Posted on February 25, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

02/25/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – “The fate of not only our state is being decided, but also what Europe will be like,” the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, said Feb. 24.

Zelenskiy was addressing the nation on the day of the Russian early morning missile attacks on the East European nation, followed by assault on land, sea and air ordered by Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Ukraine was offering assault rifles and urged people in Kyiv to prepare Molotov cocktails, as Russian troops entered the northern suburbs the following day.

Zelenskiy’s remark raised questions on whether the Russian assault on a democratic sovereign state would bring change in the European architecture for security and defense, and what those reforms might be.

The Russian offensive raised a range of security issues, such as how to deal with energy dependence, Russian food supply, and the need to deal with cyber warfare.

On the military front, there might be questions on deployment of Nato troops and missiles in central Europe and the Baltic nations, members of the alliance.

“This changes everything,” Timothy Garton Ash, professor of European studies at Oxford University, said Feb. 24 on BBC Radio 4. “We have to fundamentally rethink how we approach Russia, how we approach European security, how we approach a larger global architecture.”

“Peace on our continent has been shattered,” Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg said Feb. 24.

While Ukraine was not in the transatlantic alliance, Nato was holding Feb. 25 an emergency virtual meeting of heads of state and government of the 30 member states, to decide how to respond to the Russian assault.

Food, Energy Security

On the broad security front, Putin ordered investment of $52 billion in Russian agriculture, to cut reliance on food imports, website La Tribune reported.

Russia effectively held a “food weapon,” said Henri Biès Peré, head of the FNSEA farmers union, with 18 percent of the world wheat market, the report said. By grabbing Ukraine, which held 12 percent, Moscow controlled a third of the world market.

The Western nations had banned food exports among sanctions, in response to Russia seizing the Crimea region, eastern Ukraine, in 2014. That prompted Russia to become a leading wheat exporter after previously relying on imports.

Russia was also self-sufficient in poultry and almost so in pork production, following investing in industrial farming.

With lower quality standards, Russia grabbed market share from French wheat producers, who had been market leaders in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey. Russia had also won a share in Asian markets.

That strategy had political significance, as those nations would not “bite the hand that feeds them,” and could be considered “natural allies,” the report said.

In energy, Europe relied on Russia for some 40 percent of natural gas, with Germany vulnerable due to a switch away from nuclear power and plans to abandon coal by 2030.

Berlin suspended Feb. 22 a controversial certification of the Russian Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, worth $11 billion, and U.S. sanctions include the main contractor on the pipeline, Nord Stream AG, a Swiss-registered company, a unit of the Russian energy giant Gazprom. The industrial partners on that Russian pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine, comprise the French state-owned company Engie, Shell, Austrian firm AMV, and German companies Unipo and Wintershall DEA, Reuters reported.

That German suspension was just for now, but raised the question how Europe, and in particular Berlin, would tackle long-term dependence on Moscow.

The use of energy as a weapon for power projection could be seen with the International Energy Authority accusing Moscow of cutting 25 percent of gas supply in recent winter months, fuelling price rises to record highs in Europe.

Win the Information War

The French chief of staff, Army Gen. Thierry Burkhard, told Oct. 1 reporters there was need “to win the war before the war begins.”

Burkhard, a paratrooper who was previously spokesman for a previous chief of staff, pointed up the need to tackle the information war, and to train the services for “high intensity warfare.”

The opponents spread false information in a time of competition, contestation, and confrontation, and it was no more peace, crisis, and war of former times, he said.

There was also need to adapt the services from the asymmetrical warfare on the Barkhane mission in the Sahel sub-Saharan region, he said, where French troops did not receive incoming artillery fire, and pilots did not fly against air defense systems.

Russian forces fired cruise missiles, flew fighter jets, and their troops seized or destroyed 80 military sites on the first day of the assault on Ukraine.

France to Send Weapons to Ukraine

“We are in contact with the Ukraine authorities to supply them with the defense equipment they need,” French president Emmanuel Macron said in a formal written address read out Feb. 25 for him to both houses of parliament.

France was making further commitments to Nato “to protect the territory of our Baltic and Romanian allies,” he said, and would bolster the fight against manipulation of information and cyber attacks from foreign powers.

Macron had earlier met former heads of state François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy before the solemn parliamentary address.

“The present crisis stems from the decision planned, decided and organized by Russia to invade Ukraine,” Macron said. France would adopt sanctions, which would have consequences for Russia and France.

The sanctions would show that Europe was not a union of consumers but a political project tied to values and principles held in common, he said.

“It is in this way the European Union must truly become a more sovereign power in energy, technology, and the military,” he said.

Ukraine would welcome delivery of weapons such as patrol boats, armored vehicles, and Caesar artillery, parliamentarian Jean-Charles Larsonneur told Feb. 23 the Association des Journalistes de Défense press club in a phone briefing.

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions were important and France flies ISR missions from Romania, he said. Larsonneur delivered a report on Ukraine to the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly.

France, since Jan. 1, is the lead nation in Nato’s very high readiness joint task force, set up in 2014 following Russia’s attack on Ukraine and Middle East crises.

In Nato’s enhanced forward presence, there are four multinational battalion-sized battle groups rotating through Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. There is also a Nato multinational brigade based in Romania.

Macron told the Nato summit France will send in the next few weeks 500 troops to Romania as the “lead nation,” with other Nato partners free to deploy soldiers, and also 200 troops to Estonia, alongside a British and Danish deployment, the spokesman for the armed forces ministry, Hervé Grandjean, told television channel BFM TV.

France was also as of Feb. 25 flying from France two air patrols a day, comprising two Rafale fighters and an A330 MRTT inflight refueling tanker in each patrol, he said, with the patrols flying on the eastern flank of Poland as part of a Nato air defense mission.

In mid-March the French air force will send four Mirage 2000-5 fighters to Estonia, with some 100 personnel, he said. These French deployments were intended as signs of “reassurance” to Nato members close to Ukraine.

Macron had discussed a fresh look at European security when he met Feb. 7 Putin in Moscow in a bid to “de-escalate” the crisis.

Macron spoke to Putin on the night of Feb. 24, with an exchange direct and brief, Le Monde reported.

Business Sanctions

The European Union, the U.K, and the U.S. were adopting a fresh batch of sanctions against Russia, which included freezing foreign accounts of Russian banks, suspending Aeroflot airline flights over Britain, and assets held by Russian parliamentarians and oligarchs close to Putin.

The Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, criticized the EU for declining to suspend the Swift system of interbank transfers for Russia.

“I will not be diplomatic on this,” he said on a social platform. “Everyone who now doubts whether Russia should be banned from Swift has to understand that the blood of innocent Ukrainian men, women and children will be on their hands too. BAN RUSSIA FROM SWIFT.”

Stock in Thales, an electronics company, was one of the rare shares which rose Feb. 24, when financial markets fell on concerns over the Russian invasion.

Thales had sales in Russia of less than one percent of total turnover, a spokesman said, with some 130 staff in that country. Some 100 personnel worked in the civilian digital, identity and security unit, which handled bank cards and SIM cards.

In aeronautics, Thales supplied cockpits for aircraft including the Sukhoi Superjet 100 regional jet, and components for space projects.

Safran, which builds aero-engines, received half its titanium from the Russian company VSMPO, executive chairman Olivier Andriès said Feb. 24, reporter Vincent Lamigeon said on social media. The French company would speed up diversification of supply but was presently relying on VSMPO. Safran had built up its stock of titanium and had enough until autumn.

Rolls-Royce, a British engine maker, relied on Russia for 20 percent of its titanium and was also looking for other sources of supply, Reuters reported.

Dassault Aviation was understood to have sold the Falcon business jet in Russia but no details were available.

Rearming Europe?

A fresh debate on rearming Europe was likely, Mark Leonard, director of the European Council for Foreign Relations, said in a note Lessons for Europe from Munich Security Conference 2022. Such a discussion was all the more likely if Russia stored nuclear weapons in Belarus.

How Turkey would balance its ties to Russia and the West was one of the issues, he said, and what was the outlook for EU member state Hungary.

“European leaders coming out of the Munich Security Conference 2022 should focus on how to invent a new West in which they are less infantilised and can actively shape the new rules of engagement that will emerge from this crisis,” said Jana Puglierin, head the ECFR Berlin office and senior research fellow.

ODESSA, UKRAINE – 20 FEB 2022: Unity march in Odessa against Russian invasion. Man with placard about russian army

“Only Russian conscripts afraid of Russian army.”

Credit: Bigstock

Airpower When Directly Faced with the Authoritarian Powers: The International Fighter Conference 2019

Posted on February 25, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

WE ARE REPOSTING THIS PIECE WHICH WAS FIRST PUBLISHED IN THE FALL OF 2019

By Robbin Laird

There were a wide range of presentations in Berlin at this year’s International Fighter Conference. Among those presenting were Air Force officers or industry representatives from countries facing a direct “existential threat” from either the PRC or Putin’s Russia.

How are the countries directly threatened by the 21^st century authoritarian powers addressing the role of airpower in their self-defense?

The answer as seen in the presentations by speakers from Taiwan, Ukraine, Lithuania and Malaysia was that air power was crucial for their self-defense but an airpower which could be tailored to the specific threat being posed in their proximate neighborhood.

And done so in a manner designed and developed to link with partners and allies to extend the range of their defense as well.

But self-reliance is a key part of the answer, as being as close as they are to the authoritarian powers, and living in their neighborhoods means you have to be able to do what is possible for self-defense in order to buy time for partners and allies to plug into one’s defensive system.

Interestingly, none of the these states was focused on a posture which frankly the authoritarian states should find threatening to their own territories, but only threatening in terms of challenging the agendas of the authoritarian powers who believe that playing an away game in support of their domestic territorial, defense, economic and political agendas is their right.

The Case of Lithuania

Col. Dainius Guzas, Lithuanian Air Force Commander, provided a briefing entitled “Developing Capability Against a Peer Opponent.”

The challenge as described by Guzas was both the direct threat posed by Russia against the Baltics and the use of political warfare to undercut the core defense of Lithuania – the engagement of NATO allies in Baltic Air Policing and the delivery of air defense to Lithuania via NATO coalition airpower.

Because of the significant number of NATO air policing participants in the Baltic Air Policing effort, Lithuania was a host nation to a wide variety of NATO forces.

This means that they probably have experienced more first-hand knowledge than most of the challenge of operating the range of NATO fighter aircraft at the tactical edge in NATO defense.

This NATO engagement experienced first-hand by the Lithuanian Air Force provides the ground truth for how to defend the Baltics in a crisis

And the Russians have spent considerable time and effort in generating “fake news” to try to undercut the confidence of Lithuanians in their NATO allies.

This form of political warfare is combined with air space incursions to try to test and pressure the Baltic Republics.

Three slides from Col. Guzas’s briefing can be seen in the slide pack below, which illustrate his discussion of Russian airspace violations, the NATO participants to data in Baltic Air Policing, and an example of Russian “fake news” designed to undercut the confidence of Lithuanians in their NATO allies.

The Case of Ukraine

Commander of the Air Command “South” of the Ukrainian Air Force, Lt. General Vasyl Chernenko presented a briefing entitled, Peculiarities of Employment Fighter Aviation and Development of its Future Capabilities According to Ukrainian Air Force Experience of Participation in Joint Forces Operation at the East of Ukraine.”

Ukraine of course has experienced war first hand in the 21^st century with the Russian seizure of Crimea, and with continued engagement in the rest of Ukraine with the goal of shaping Ukraine’s future.

Russia used what analysts referred to as hybrid war as the means both to seize Crimea and to engage in destabilization efforts within the rest of Ukraine.

But what can be forgotten is the nature of the Russian military incursion which was much more similar to the means used by insurgency forces, which, of course, from a military point of view would require Ukraine to have the kind of counter-insurgency capabilities honed by the West over the past two decades in the Middle East.

Put bluntly, Ukraine does not have such capabilities, which poses the question of whether and how the West might provide such capabilities?

Notably, the West would not do counter-insurgency in the Middle East without airpower, and the question is how Ukraine might obtain or develop such capabilities?

According to the presentation, the Ukrainian Air Force is in the process of transition with increased but still very limited pilot training and enhanced readiness for their legacy fighter fleet of MiG-29s and Su-27s.

The speaker highlighted what he labelled “the sabotage-terrorist nature of the enemy’s actions,” which he argued required the use of fighter aircraft as part of the strike and defense force needed by Ukraine.

And these fighters would need to confront the Russian air defense system moved forward into the areas of interest as well.

He argued that Ukraine was focused on the upgrades of its current fighter force either by indigenous developments or by working with partner nations.

Obviously, the partner nation bit is the challenging part, as the West needs to sort out how to provide military aid to Ukraine but in such a way that it reinforces the defense capabilities of Ukraine without justifying the undoubted claims Russia would make that such efforts are designed to threaten Russian territory.

Clearly, the “fake news” piece discussed by Col. Guzas is not only already happening but would be part of ongoing Russian campaigns against Western efforts to help Ukraine counter Russian agression.

This means that whatever aid programs are generated need to be accompanied by well throughout out political campaigns to support such efforts.

The fact that Ukraine is an unfortunate bystander in an impeachment dynamic in the United States is clearly not a good illustration of how this needs to get done.

In the slide pack below are two slides from Lt. General Chernenko’s briefing which highlight the nature of the air defense challenge to Ukrainian fighter forces as well as the technologies prioritized by the evolving Ukrainian Air Force.

The Case of Malaysia

Major General Dato’ Muhamad Norazilan Bin Aris, Royal Malaysian Air Force, Chief of Staff, provided a briefing entitled, “Striking the Balance Between Affordability and Capability.”

Malaysia’s’ strategic outlook was highlighted in this slide from his briefing.

The need for airpower is clearly rooted in terms of the need for two theater operations just to defend their own territory, and the Navy and Air Force need to be capable of addressing the challenge of defending and/or being engaged in the Malaysian EEZ.

The scope of that challenge can be seen in the slide below from his briefing.

The role of Light Attack Aircraft in playing multiple roles for the Air Force, which could deliver a mix of capability and affordability to the Air Force.

The capabilities which the Royal Malaysian Air Force is looking for from its light attack aircraft program can be seen in the slides from the presentation which can be seen in the slide pack below

This is the near-term effort with the fighter replacement program after that.

The Major General was asked about the challenge of working with partner Air Forces, notably with regard to the Australian Air Force and Navy (RAAF and the RAN).

And he underscored that a key requirement was building out its Link 16 capabilities to do so much more effectively.

This answer highlighted a key point made by the various presenters from countries living in the neighborhoods of the authoritarian power, namely, the need to be connectable to allies and partners in times of crisis.

The Defense of Taiwan

With the People Republic of China’s reach into the Pacific, including building bases in the South China Sea, clearly the question of the defense of Taiwan is becoming a more pressing issue.

And the Republic of China has focused on its own self-defense, making it a much harder piece of democratic real estate for the authoritarian Chinese regime to grab.

And clearly, efforts by Taiwan need to be supported and reinforced by core allies, as is being done with the United States sale of new F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan.

The new variant has the Block 70 combat systems onboard, which include an advanced Northrop Grumman Radar.

The APG-83 SABR draws on F-35 technologies and provides greater capability for the F-16 to work in a complex battlespace.

The greater bandwidth, speed, and agility of Northrop Grumman’s APG-83 SABR enables the F-16 to detect, track and identify greater numbers of targets faster and at longer ranges. In addition, the radar can operate in hostile electronic environments and features all-weather, high-resolution synthetic aperture radar mapping, which presents the pilot with a large surface image enabling precision target identification and strike.

At the International Fighter Conference, there were two presentations highlighting ways ahead for the defense of Taiwan.

The first was by Colonel Li-Chiang Yuan, ROC Air Force, Assistant Director, Taipei Representative Office in UK and the second by Dr. Yu-Jiu Wang, Chairman and CEO of Tron Future Tech. Inc.

Col. Yuan highlighted that the PRC reach into the Pacific was now presented Taiwan with an encirclement challenge.

And this is why the new F-16s would be deployed to the eastern side of Taiwan.

He underscored as well the strategic direction of Taiwanese defense which is to create an integrated defense force able to link active defense, with air defense, and an ability to provide a more effective “dig in force” which can withstand initial attacks from the mainland in case of conflict

He also highlighted the need for airpower to adjust to the threat and to be able to operate aircraft from a variety of locations.

He noted that recent exercises operated Taiwanese aircraft from highways and not just regular airfields.

As the Finns have demonstrated, airpower dispersed is a crucial defense capability when living adjacent to an aggressive authoritarian power. It is part of the deterrence equation.

The approach of multiple deterrence was highlighted by Col. Yuan as the way ahead for Taiwan in its self-defense, which was conceptualized in the slide below from his briefing.

Other slides highlighting his argument are included in the slide pack below.

The second presentation was by a Cal. Tech graduate and now head of Tron Future Tech, Inc., based in Taiwan, a company focused on the development of new AESA technologies.

Dr. Wang provided a fascinating overview of the evolution of AESA technologies and their integration into current and future platforms which could contribute to the kind of C2 and ISR integration crucial to the multiple deterrence concept highlighted by Col. Yuan.

How this might occur is highlighted in the following slide from his briefing and other slides from his briefing illustrating the approach can be seen in the slide pack below:

We have argued earlier that as Taiwan enhances its C2 and ISR grid that provides the opportunity for allies and partners of Taiwan to engage in a deterrence in depth strategy which would complement the multiple deterrence approach of Taiwan.

The kinds of technology which Dr. Wang projected going forward is precisely the kind of capability which an allied integrated distributed force could integrate with in times of crisis and to provide for the kind of deterrence in depth the Russians and Chinese would have to take seriously.

Conclusion

An advantage of the wide range of presentations provided at the International Fighter Conference is to provide an opportunity to appreciate the challenges faced by a wide range of allied and partner air forces.

Notably, one can learn or be reminded of the challenges facing air forces operating in the context of every day existential threats from authoritarian powers.

And as the allies of these countries which operate at greater distance are learning is that the kind of dispersal of airpower, the need to have more flexible force packaging, an ability to connect under duress are not just required by the air forces in the authoritarian power neighborhoods but becoming core necessities for the allied and partner air forces as well.

Notably, when coming into the neighborhood, there will be no uncontested airspace.

And that is something at odds with more than 30 years of the post-cold war experience.

The featured photo shows President Tsai Ing-wen and senior Taiwanese military staff during an exercise in southern county Changhua, not far from one of the island’s main airbases at Taichung. Photo: Facebook

UK and France Joint Weapons Development Moves Forward: February 2022

Posted on February 25, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France and the U.K. signed Feb. 18 contracts with MBDA for development of next generation cruise and anti-ship missiles, with the weapons due to enter service by 2030, the European missile builder said in a statement.

The long awaited agreement for work on risk reduction was significant, industry executives said, backing a rare case of industrial cooperation between France and the U.K., which have gone through a time of tension between president Emmanuel Macron and prime minister Boris Johnson.

“The United Kingdom and France have confirmed the launch of the preparation works for the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) program, after the signature today of a government agreement and associated contracts by the French Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) and the British Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), MBDA said.

“These preparation works will focus on the co-ordinated development of a program of next generation deep strike and heavy anti-ship weapons,” the company said.

No details of the budget and development time were available.

The agreement signed by the procurement offices was a sign of “drop in tension” between Britain and France, a defense executive said, the start of a welcome change in political relations between the two nations.

There was a “return of dialog,” reflecting greater European cooperation sparked by the crisis in Ukraine, the executive said.

President Emmanuel Macron called Boris Johnson to brief the British prime minister before he flew to Moscow for a Feb. 7 summit meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin, in a bid to defuze the Ukraine crisis. That call to Johnson was among those the French head of state made to leaders of allied nations, including two to U.S. president Joe Biden.

The Ukraine crisis helped move the project along but was not the “trigger” factor, a second executive said. There was need to resume work on the project, and on the British side, there was a particular perceived threat from China.

The teams of the two partner nations had been ready to work on the risk reduction phase but had to wait six months due to lack of French political will, the second executive said. A return of political backing allowed the procurement chiefs — rather than the ministers — to sign the intergovernmental agreement.

“That was the right level,” the second executive said.

A chill in relations was seen when the French armed forces minister, Florence Parly, pulled out of a meeting with her British counterpart, Ben Wallace, last September.

That ministerial meeting was due to be held one week after the U.K., Australia and the U.S. announced a plan to build nuclear-powered attack submarines for the Australian navy under the AUKUS agreement.

A memorandum of understanding on the MBDA development work had been due to be signed at that ministerial meeting, which the French minister had scuppered.

The AUKUS project sank a project for Naval Group, a French shipbuilder, to design and build a diesel-electric attack submarine for Australia, in a deal estimated to be worth some €30 billion (US $34 billion).

France imposed a hold order on relations with the UK, as British officers played a key role in opening talks between Canberra and Washington, after the Australian navy switched interest to sailing nuclear-powered boats instead of conventional submarines.

Australia changed its procurement plan due to a heightened perception of threat from China, after picking in 2016 Naval Group for studies for the Australian Navy’s Attack class of boats.

The MBDA contract for cooperative development opened up a new phase in an Anglo-French replacement for the Scalp-Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missile, and Exocet and Harpoon anti-ship weapons.

“It will assess two complementary missile concepts, expected to be fielded at the end of the decade: a subsonic low observable concept and a supersonic, highly manoeuvrable concept,” MBDA said.

The development work follows MBDA’s studies in the FC/ASW concept phase, which had a budget estimated at €100 million.

The planned weapons will be a “game changing capability” to hit hardened targets on land and at sea, at very long distance, beating air defense systems in “increasingly contested battlespace environments,” the company said.

There was risk of two classes of next generation European cruise missiles, a third defense executive said, with the MBDA FC/ASW missiles potentially competing with remote carriers from Airbus.

If the Airbus remote carriers were just electronic jamming, loitering systems, there would not be direct competition with MBDA missiles, the executive said, but arming the former system would effectively split the market for long range weapons.

Remote carriers are a key part of the European project for a Future Combat Air System, backed by France, Germany and Spain. Airbus is prime contractor for the RC, with MBDA and Thales as industrial partners.

Airbus displayed a full scale model of an RC at the 2019 Paris air show.

Featured graphic: Photo 26270027 © Pavel Kusmartsev | Dreamstime.com

Australia Works Regional Defense Infrastructure

Posted on February 23, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

02/23/2022

By Australian Defence Business Review

Australia will spend $580 million to upgrade ports in Papua New Guinea, enhancing some of the country’s out-dated infrastructure, providing useful facilities for use by Australian and allied warships, and – perhaps most importantly – warding off investment by China.

Under an agreement signed by Prime Minister Scott Morrison and PNG PM James Marape in mid-January, Australia will provide a series of loans and grants for work on a number of priority ports, all in PNG’s north and on islands.

Through this investment, the Lae Tidal Basin will be PNG’s largest port with an enhanced capability to handle container traffic from Southeast Asia, and possibly becoming a regional hub for exports to the Pacific.

Works will also be undertaken at Kimbe on the north coast of New Britain, Lorengau on Manus Island, Kavieng in New Ireland, Vanimo in West Sepik, and Wewak in East Sepik (see map below).

Australia is already assisting PNG to renovate the Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island for use by PNG’s patrol boats, and also by Australia and the U.S. Though nominally intended for PNG’s Guardian class patrol boats, it could accommodate larger vessels.

China has already demonstrated an interest in boosting ties with PNG, in mid-2020 signing a $200 million deal with the PNG government to export seafood directly to the Chinese mainland and to develop the local fishing industry. At the time, China’s ambassador to PNG talked up a potential free trade agreement.

Under its massive Belt and Road Initiative launched a decade ago, China’s CCP has supported developing nations through investment in their infrastructure projects. But it has been accused of using this investment as ‘debt trap diplomacy’ by saddling small nations with infrastructure debts they can’t readily repay, for which China has sought concessions in return.

Announcing the ports deal, Mr Morrison made no mention of China, instead saying it was about enabling and supporting the sovereignty, independence, and self-sufficiency of PNG. “Infrastructure strengthens economies, creating the conditions for long-term jobs growth,” he said. “Bigger ports mean greater access to global trade opportunities.”

This article was written by Max Blenkin and published by ADBR on January 27, 2022.

The featured photo is of the port of Lae.

A European Update: Germany to Acquire F-35s?

Posted on February 22, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

02/22/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Germany has yet to decide on whether to buy the F-35 fighter jet, but a decision will be made later this year, a senior German parliamentarian said Feb. 21.

“There’s no decision yet, but we will decide this year,” the parliamentarian told reporters, here. “There is a clear urgency.”

A replacement of the “obsolete” Tornado fighter jet flown by the German air force set the timing and need for a potential order for the F-35, which was certified to carry U.S.-built nuclear bombs, part of the Nato deterrence, the parliamentarian said.

An order for the F-35 could be made alongside purchase of Eurofighter jets for conventional operations, particularly electronic intelligence, the parliamentarian said.

Asked why an order for the Rafale was not possible, the parliamentarian said the French fighter lacked certification for U.S. nuclear bombs, ruling out that aircraft. It was interesting to note that when the Tornado was built in the 1970s, there was no problem for a European fighter to be certified to carry U.S. nuclear weapons, the parliamentarian added.

On French concerns on an order for the F-35 cutting the German budget for the Future Combat Air System, the parliamentarian said that would depend on the number of F-35s to be bought.

Airbus builds the German Eurofighter Typhoon, while Lockheed Martin is prime contractor for the F-35. Airbus signed Nov. 11 2020, a German contract for 38 Eurofighters under a project dubbed Quadriga.

Britain, Germany, and Italy ordered the swing-wing Tornado in the 1970s, and those partner nations – plus Spain – are backers for the Eurofighter Typhoon. France dropped out early in the Eurofighter project to pursue its Rafale program.

There was a more general problem with European defense projects, the parliamentarian said, pointing to differences in French and German timetables for maritime patrol aircraft.

There were some in Paris who criticised Berlin’s order for a fleet of P-8 Poseidon aircraft, seen as effectively ditching the project for a maritime airborne warfare system (MAWS), and pulling out of an MK3 upgrade to the Tiger attack helicopter.

The German coalition, led by the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), has said there would be a review of government policy, seen as opening the door to procurement of the F-35. The coalition partners are the environmentalist Green party and pro-business Free Democrats.

That policy review by the government led by the Social Democrat chancellor, Olaf Scholz, marked a change in direction from a previous coalition led by the Christian Democrats, with the then chancellor Angela Merkel at the helm. The Social Democrats had been the junior partner, until the elections last September reversed that balance of political power.

The previous center-right administration had ruled out the Lockheed Martin F-35 and considered the Boeing F/A-18 or Eurofighter as replacement for the Tornado, due to be withdrawn around 2030.

The previous government’s opposition to the F-35 could be seen in the removal in 2018 of the German air chief of staff, who had expressed preference for the F-35.

In France, the prospect of a German order for the F-35 has sparked concern, as that was seen as cutting funds for the FCAS, which has a new generation fighter at the heart of the program. France, Germany and Spain back the FCAS, with Dassault as the prime contractor on the new fighter. The French family-controlled company is in dispute with the German Airbus unit over intellectual property rights and leadership of key program elements.

A Russian-Generated European Crisis

Putin formally said Feb. 21 Donetsk and Luhansk, the two disputed territories in the Donbas region, eastern Ukraine, were republics and independent from Kyiv, sparking sharp denunciations in the West and in the U.N.

Shortly after Putin’s recognizing those two Russian-controlled separatist areas across the border in Ukraine, Moscow sent in troops and armor in as “peacekeepers.”

“There is a Russian crisis, not Ukraine crisis,” the parliamentarian said the day before the effective annexation, with Russian president Vladimir Putin taking a “revisionist” approach.

That approach consists of Putin seeking to reshape the status quo in Eastern Europe, where nation states have aligned with Nato and their Western European allies, after having been held under direct control by the Soviet Union.

A key East European partner for France was Poland, the parliamentarian said, with a relaunch of the Weimar Triangle, which brings France, Germany and Poland into close cooperation.

The Baltic nations – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are also key actors in the Russia crisis, taking a highly negative view of Moscow.

The threat from Putin extended beyond Ukraine, the parliamentarian said, raising a “real challenge for Europe,” such as cyber attacks. European governments were poorly prepared and there was a need for enhancing resilience.

Sanctions Against Russia

The U.K. has drawn up a list of sanctions against Russian companies with shares trading in the London financial center, the City, and Russian oligarchs with large property holdings.

London is reported to be a money-laundering capital, with wealthy Russians facing allegations of corruption or those close to the Kremlin holding £1.5 billion ($2 billion) in U.K. property, The Times, a British daily, reported Feb. 18, drawing on a report by Transparency International, a campaign group.

In the House of Commons, a senior member of parliament and former BBC journalist, Benjamin Bradshaw, asked defense minister Ben Wallace, why under the current prime minister not a single Unexplained Wealth Order had been issued, not a single Russian national holding a golden visa had been named, and “why does he think we have been so slow at tackling Russian dirty money in London.”

The UK passed in 2002 the Proceeds of Crime Act, which included unexplained wealth orders, which allowed the seizing of property without having to prove crimes had been committed, relying on civil standards of proof rather than criminal law.

Britain adopted in 2008 golden visas, which speeded up applications to be a UK resident for those who had £2 million. Some 2,500 such visas have been issued to Russians, out of a total of more than 12,000 golden visas, daily The Guardian reported Feb 20.

The British parliament’s joint intelligence and security committee said in 2020 that the golden visa scheme “was welcoming oligarchs with open arms,” and remained open after the alleged poisoning by two Russian GRU agents in 2018 of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer, and his daughter Yulia, in Salisbury, southern England.

Featured graphic: Photo 237245721 © Kontakt5956 | Dreamstime.com

Exercise Cutlass Express 2022

Posted on February 20, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

02/20/2022

In a press release published on February 6, 2022, the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa announced the launch of Exercise Cutlass Express 2022.

DJIBOUTI – Maritime forces from East Africa, West Indian Ocean nations, Europe, North America, and several international organizations began the multinational maritime exercise Cutlass Express 2022 (CE22) with an opening ceremony held at the Coast Guard Training Center in Djibouti, Feb. 6, 2022.

CE 22, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet (NAVEUR-NAVAF/C6F), assesses and improves combined maritime law enforcement capacity, promote national and regional security in East Africa, and increases interoperability between the U.S., African nations, and international partners. CE22 will be linked with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s International Maritime Exercise (IMX), eliminating regional seams and increasing U.S. global capabilities and interoperability.

“The valuable operational experience gained during Cutlass Express contributes to participating countries’ ability to suppress and counter illegal activities, including piracy, arms trafficking, human smuggling, and drug trafficking,” said Jonathan Pratt, U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti. “Our participation together over the next 12 days is key to help us strengthen our relationships and recommit to the principles that guide this partnership—adherence to rule of law and the capacity to disrupt illicit maritime activity.

This year’s exercise leverages the recently adopted Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which 14 nations are signatories, as a framework for exercising information sharing practices and enforcing marine rule of law. The participating nations will be testing their ability to detect or disrupt illicit trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing, as well as search and rescue situations.

The exercise will improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), information sharing between Maritime Operation Centers (MOCs), maritime interdiction, adherence to the rule of law, and counter-proliferation interdiction capabilities in order to disrupt illicit maritime activity and strengthen safety and security in East Africa.

The exercise begins with an in-port training period followed by at-sea scenarios and concludes with a senior leadership symposium. The underway portion of the exercise tests the ship’s abilities to conduct maritime interdiction operations (MIO) by boarding teams against simulated suspect vessels, detecting illicit activity, and follow-on evidence collection procedures.

The valuable operational experience gained during Cutlass Express contributes to participating countries ability to suppress and counter illegal activities, including piracy, arms trafficking, human smuggling, drug trafficking, and illegal trade in wildlife.

CE 22 is one of three U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet -facilitated regional exercises undertaken to provide African forces and international partners with collaborative opportunities on comprehensive maritime security concerns.

Exercises like Cutlass Express in East Africa/Western Indian Ocean, Obangame Express in the Gulf of Guinea, and Phoenix Express in the Mediterranean fall under the international collaborative maritime capacity-building program Africa Partnership Station (APS) as part of a phased approach to building enduring relationships and combined capacity to ensure the safety and security of the regional maritime environment.

“International Maritime Exercise 2022 and Cutlass Express 2022 will play a critical role in the ongoing development of regional cooperation in support of the Djibouti Code of Conduct and improving information sharing and maritime domain awareness among the 12 participating nations,” said Capt. Cannon Neslen, Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, Maritime Partnership Program, U.S. Navy Reserve Detachment 118.

Participating nations in Cutlass Express 2022 include Comoros, Djibouti, Georgia, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, United Kingdom, and United States. Interpol, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime are also participating in the exercise.

U.S. Africa Command, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, is one of 11 U.S. Department of Defense combatant commands, each with a geographic or functional mission that provides command and control of military forces in peace and war. AFRICOM employs the broad-reaching diplomacy, development, and defense approach to foster interagency efforts and help negate the drivers of conflict and extremism in Africa.

“Coming together to coordinate our capabilities throughout the maritime domain not only breeds regional security and stability,” said Capt. David Family, Commanding Officer, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. “It gives us a chance to deepen our partnerships and cultivate new ones moving forward.”

U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied and interagency partners in order to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.

DJIBOUTI, Djibouti (Feb. 4, 2016) Maritime forces of Djibouti pilot a patrol boat during exercise Cutlass Express 2016. Cutlass Express is a U.S. Africa Command-sponsored multinational maritime exercise designed to increase maritime safety and security in the waters off East Africa, western Indian Ocean island nations, and in the Gulf of Aden. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Barry Loo/Released)

DJIBOUTI, Djibouti (Feb. 4, 2016) Maritime forces of Djibouti prepare to board a patrol boat during a training scenario as part of exercise Cutlass Express 2016. Cutlass Express is a U.S. Africa Command-sponsored multinational maritime exercise designed to increase maritime safety and security in the waters off East Africa, western Indian Ocean island nations, and in the Gulf of Aden. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Barry Loo/Released)

DJIBOUTI, Djibouti (Feb. 4, 2016) Maritime forces of Djibouti board a ship during a training scenario as part of exercise Cutlass Express 2016. Cutlass Express is a U.S. Africa Command-sponsored multinational maritime exercise designed to increase maritime safety and security in the waters off East Africa, western Indian Ocean island nations, and in the Gulf of Aden. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Barry Loo/Released)

DJIBOUTI, Djibouti (Feb. 4, 2016) Maritime forces of Djibouti secure a patrol boat during a training scenario as part of exercise Cutlass Express 2016. Cutlass Express is a U.S. Africa Command-sponsored multinational maritime exercise designed to increase maritime safety and security in the waters off East Africa, western Indian Ocean island nations, and in the Gulf of Aden. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Barry Loo/Released)

DJIBOUTI, Djibouti (Feb. 4, 2016) Maritime forces of Djibouti treat a simulated U.S. casualty during a training scenario as part of exercise Cutlass Express 2016. Cutlass Express is a U.S. Africa Command-sponsored multinational maritime exercise designed to increase maritime safety and security in the waters off East Africa, western Indian Ocean island nations, and in the Gulf of Aden. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Barry Loo/Released)

The North Carolina-Based Marines Participate in Cold Response 2022

Posted on February 18, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

02/18/2022

By Robbin Laird

During a visit to 2nd Marine Air Wing last summer, I met with Marine Air Group 26.

During that visit we discussed the transition from the land wars, which included the need for more focus on the Northern Flank of NATO.

Certainly, the current European crisis has underscored the importance of such an effort.

This is what I wrote after my meeting with the MAG-26 team:

During my recent visit, I had a chance to discuss the way ahead for combat assault support with three members of MAG-26. Maj. Mazzola is MAG-26 Operations Officer. Maj. Kevin O’Malley is assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (VMM-263), an operational MV-22 squadron, and Maj. Tom Gruber is a member of VMM-365. We focused on the challenges of transition from the Middle East land wars as well as the work on shaping a new way ahead for the assault force.

Up front, the shift was described by one participant as “A total paradigm change.”

2nd MAW Marines will perhaps lessen expeditionary operations in Mesopotamia and increase engagements in the North Atlantic area operations.

In fact, the Marine Corps has already made gains towards this goal.

Since 2018, focus on specific challenges such as cold weather training and exercises have increased at a pace not witnessed since the Cold War.

Case in point, one interviewee noted that in March 2022, they would once again train with the Norwegians in the Cold Response—one of the largest Norwegian and Coalition exercise since the Cold War.

This is how that exercise is described by one source:

“About 40,000 soldiers will participate in Norway’s Cold Response 2022 exercise next year, planned to take place in the Ofoten area with the country’s navy and air force as the main players in the war game. “There is a significantly increased interest among our allies for the north and the Arctic,” said General Eirik Kristoffersen, head of the Norwegian Armed Forces in a phone interview with the Barents Observer. In times of growing distrust between Russia and Europe, Norway seeks to build its security in partnership with NATO allies and Nordic neighbors.

“That includes more joint military training up north. Now, the Armed Forces are revealing more details about next year’s planned large-scale winter exercise.

“As it seems today, we will have about 40,000 soldiers in exercise Cold Response,” Kristoffersen said. “It will be the largest military exercise inside the Arctic Circle in Norway since the 1980s,” the general added.

“Cold Response 2022 will train reinforcement of northern Norway, and the main action will be by navy and air force capacities in the Ofoten area. The region is near to the Army’s northern brigade and training areas where U.S., British and Dutch soldiers frequently drill in Arctic warfare.

“Ofoten is also home to Evenes airport where Norway’s new fleet of P8 Poseidon maritime surveillance planes will be based together with NATO’s two northernmost Quick Reaction Alert F-35s fighter jets on standby to meet Russian military planes flying near Norwegian air space. For NATO and the Nordic countries’ defense partnership, Ofoten is of core strategic importance in case of a larger global conflict involving Russia in the North-Atlantic. The area is about 600 kilometers from the Kola Peninsula where the Northern Fleet’s nuclear submarines are based.”

As the Marine Corps conducts force design, they must figure out how to supply that force.

For example, when operating in the Mediterranean, the Ospreys can fly to several support facilities.

This will not be the case when operating in an environment like the North Atlantic.

This means working the logistical support challenge with the Navy to provide for afloat support and to work on pre-positioning of supplies and work the arc from North America to the Baltics.

How will the supply chain to support North Atlantic operations be shaped going forward?

Clearly, the renewed focus on naval integration is part of the answer.

This will be a function of how the Navy reworks its own logistical support; this will be a function of how ashore support is built out in the region (the arc from North Carolina to the Baltics) and how the amphibious fleet is reshaped.

Clearly, the coming of maritime autonomous systems can be part of evolving support solution sets.

As one participant put it: “Perhaps the supply shortfall can be mitigated by logistical movers. Having unmanned aircraft or unmanned surface vessels will undoubtedly be able to contribute going forward.”

There is clearly a shortage of amphibious shipping both in terms of combat ships and connectors for the North Atlantic mission against a peer competitor.

We did not discuss the broader challenge which can be referred as shaping a new family of systems to deliver the amphibious warfare capability to the extended littoral engagement in the North Atlantic, but this is a key challenge which must be met going forward.

Another aspect being worked is how to integrate the ARG-MEU in wider fleet operations.

The Marines and the Navy are working exercises in the North Atlantic to find ways to do so, and the recent BALTOPS-50 did provide some insight with regard to this.

And the evolving relationship between 2^nd Expeditionary Strike Group and II MEB will clearly focus on this challenge.

An aspect of the way ahead for the ARG-MEU is its participation in fleet defense and shaping ways the amphibious force can better defend itself afloat.

The F-35 has already demonstrated in the Pacific that it can contribute significantly in this role and with the F-35 coming to 2^nd MAW’s operational force, it can play a similar role in the Atlantic.

But given the nature of the arc from North Carolina to the Baltics, allied F-35s will play a key role in all of this, as has already been demonstrated in BALTOPS-50 with the role of Norwegian F-35s.

The participants indicate that indeed they are engaged in discussions with the Navy about how to better integrate capabilities for the extended littoral operational fight.

As one participant highlighted: “As the Navy focuses on integration of their fleet operations, they want to be able to use all of the assets available to them.

“And that is why the MEU is now part of the discussion.”

One key question which is a shaping function moving ahead was posed by one participant this way: “How does the Air Combat Element (ACE) participate effectively in defense of the amphibious force?”

Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Lt. Gen. Mark Wise, is noted as saying that “the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force must be agile, mobile, and survivable. That means looking to, and building upon, current warfighting philosophy and our way of doing business.

“This vision is built around distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in a contested environment, and expeditionary advanced based operations: DMO, LOCE, and EABO.

“The Marine Corps will not abandon, but rather will refine and improve upon, these concepts for operational design for a littoral fight.”

Now they are engaged in the exercise, and in the article are some early photos from their engagement.

For my look at the USMC transformation path, see my new book, published last week:

U.S. Marines and Sailors with II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) arrive at Bardufoss Air Station, Norway, Feb. 2, 2022. Norway is the host nation of Exercise Cold Response 22, an annual training event that II MEF and several other partner nations participate in to exercise and advance critical military capabilities. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jacqueline C. Arre)

Norwegian military police check COVID-19 vaccine cards and military identification cards as U.S. Marines and Sailors with II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) arrive at Bardufoss Air Station, Norway, Feb. 2, 2022. Norway is the host nation of Exercise Cold Response 22, an annual training event that II MEF and several other partner nations participate in to exercise and advance critical military capabilities. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jacqueline C. Arre)

U.S. Marines with II Marine Expeditionary Force operate Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement vehicles on icy terrain during Exercise Cold Response 2022 (Ex CR22) in Setermoen, Norway, Feb. 8, 2022. Ex CR22 demonstrates that the critical relationships and commitments among partner and allied nations remain an anchor of stability with each nation poised and ready to protect our collective, our people, and our territories. The U.S. stands firm in our commitment and readiness to support Norway and our other partners and allies. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jacqueline C. Arre)

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Dillon Orren, a native of Hampstead, North Carolina, and a motor vehicle operator with Combat Logistics Battalion 6, 2d Marine Logistics Group, II Marine Expeditionary Force, attaches snow chains to a Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement vehicle for icy terrain training during Exercise Cold Response 2022 (Ex CR22) in Setermoen, Norway, Feb. 8, 2022. Ex CR22 demonstrates that the critical relationships and commitments among partner and allied nations remain an anchor of stability with each nation poised and ready to protect our collective, our people, and our territories. The U.S. stands firm in our commitment and readiness to support Norway and our other partners and allies. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jacqueline C. Arre)

Norwegian Army Sgt. 1st Class Sander Melheim, a native of Oslo, Norway, and a platoon sergeant with Coy 5, Combat Service Support Battalion, Brigade Nord, observes U.S. Marines with II Marine Expeditionary Force operating Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement vehicles on icy terrain during Exercise Cold Response 2022 (Ex CR22) in Setermoen, Norway, Feb. 8, 2022. Ex CR22 demonstrates that the critical relationships and commitments among partner and allied nations remain an anchor of stability with each nation poised and ready to protect our collective, our people, and our territories. The U.S. stands firm in our commitment and readiness to support Norway and our other partners and allies. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jacqueline C. Arre)

Norwegian Army Sgt. 1st Class Sander Melheim, a native of Oslo, Norway, and a platoon sergeant with Coy 5, Combat Service Support Battalion, Brigade Nord, instructs U.S. Marines with II Marine Expeditionary Force on operating Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement vehicles on icy terrain during Exercise Cold Response 2022 (Ex CR22) in Setermoen, Norway, Feb. 8, 2022. Ex CR22 demonstrates that the critical relationships and commitments among partner and allied nations remain an anchor of stability with each nation poised and ready to protect our collective, our people, and our territories. The U.S. stands firm in our commitment and readiness to support Norway and our other partners and allies. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jacqueline C. Arre)

While the Ukrainian Crisis Simmers: The Launch of Brilliant Jump 2022 and Cold Response 2002

Posted on February 18, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

Even though the focus is upon Ukraine, the Northern and Southern flanks of NATO are deeply affected by the crisis.

The Belarus takeover by Moscow and the virtual permanent deployment of Russian force there with the Kaliningrad enclave not far way poses a direct threat to the Nordics, the Balts and Poland which makes up the 21st century version of the NATO’s Northern Flanks or better put as the defense arc from the Nordics through to Poland.

In a recent article posted on the website Eye on the Arctic, Thomas Nilsen underscored what the Russians are about in the Northern waters. The Russians have issued a Notice to Airmen or NOTAM with regard to an area of high risk to civilians.

The Bear Gap is a military term for the strategically important waters from the North Cape, via the Bear Island and north to Svalbard. It is here the Barents Sea meets the deeper Norwegian Sea, and by that access to the North Atlantic.

In a conflict scenario, keeping control of the Bear Gap would be important for the Russian Northern Fleet to protect its strategic missile submarines in the eastern Barents Sea from NATO forces.

The Russian NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) is aimed at alerting civilian aviation to stay away as military missiles shootings will take place. The alert does not specify which missiles might come. However, the Northern Fleet’s largest warship “Pyotr Velikiy” sailed out from Severomorsk this weekend to the Barents Sea. The nuclear-powered battle cruiser is armed with Kalibr cruise missiles, among other weapons.

There are also other multi-purpose submarines and surface navy ships in the area that are armed with cruise missiles. Launching cruise missiles from east of the Varanger fjord against potential targets in the western Barents Sea is a scenario Russia’s Northern Fleet also drilled last February. However, last year’s NOTAM-alert near Bear Island covered a much smaller area.

At the same time, Norway is hosting a large NATO exercise.

This is how the Norwegian Ministry of Defense highlighted the exercise in a January 26, 2022 press release:

Exercise Cold Response 2022 (CR22) is a national Norwegian exercise.

The Cold Response exercise series are held every other year, with invited international participants.

The exercise was notified according to the Vienna Document 2011 § 61 on the 12th of November 2021, as well as in November 2020 – as the exercise could be over 40 000 personnel.

Cold Response 22 is the largest planned exercise conducted within NATO in 2022.

A significant part of exercise Cold Response 22 will take place in international waters adjacent to Norwegian territory with a large maritime and air presence. The Field Training Exercise will take place between 23 March‐ 30 March. A total force of 35 000 personnel from 25 nations are taking part in the exercise. Due to the pandemic, there are ongoing changes, so this number might change until the start of the exercise.

The Officer in charge of the Exercise is the Chief of the Norwegian Joint HQ in Bodø.

The objective of CR 22 is to exercise reinforcement of Norway in order to enhance the readiness of the participating forces and demonstrate Alliance and Partner cohesion under challenging climatic and topographic conditions.

Scenario

The scenario of the exercise is artificial and will mainly provide a framework to portray the road to crisis with peer adversary in all domains (North vs South forces).
Depicted on this map, you can see the planned phases for the exercise. Phase1 – is starting with naval operations in the Atlantic in order to gain access,
Phase 2 – constitutes of Air heavy operations in order to enable landing.
Phase 3 – Is the amphibious landing and land battle in order to restore national integrity.
There will be two exercise areas, one in the north and one in the south, marked in green.
Important to notice is that a significant part of exercise Cold
Response 22 will take place in international waters with large
maritime and air presence, and not on land.
At the moment it is foreseen a participation of approximately 16000 forces on land, these numbers might change before the start of the exercise due to the pandemic and necessary precautions in this regard.

Command and control.
There are two operational commands in the exercise.

Norwegian Joint Headquarter (NJHQ) – is the Exercise HQ and
will command the North forces.
NATO Joint Force Command Brunsum (JFCBS) will lead the
South forces

During the exercise, the participating forces will be deployed to different locations as depicted on the map. The largest participating states in the exercise are Norway, the USA, France, and the United Kingdom.

Norway is committed to the Vienna Document obligations. We are strong supporters of confidence and security building measures. With reference to Chapter V (§47) of the Vienna Document 2011 we will invite all OSCE participating states to an observation of the exercise. The observation will take place from 23. till 30 March 2022. Should the number of forces drop below observation threshold, Norway will conduct the observation on a voluntary basis.
The observation will cover both the northern and southern exercise area, all brigades and most of their subunits will be visited. Invitation will be sent out in early February.
It is important for Norway to inform early and comprehensively about large military exercises to avoid potential for military tensions and misperceptions. Larger changes to this exercise will be notified accordingly the coming weeks. This to keep participating states who would like to plan a Vienna Document inspection and/or participate in the observation of CR 22, up to date on the developments in the planning.
(In November this year (2022) we will notify the next Cold Response exercise, which will be conducted in 2024.)
(We appreciate the Vienna Documents provisions regarding early notifications and observations as one of the Vienna Documents many measures to foster transparency, trust, and confidence.)
(Press and public will also receive information on the exercise. This will be done through the local authorities on site, but also through official webpages, press releases and other media outreaches.)

Thomas Nilsen in a January 13, 2022 article notes:

Preparation for the long-time planned exercise is already well underway and is not directly linked to the current standoff between NATO and Moscow over Russia’s massive military buildup of troops at Ukraine’s border. However, a conflict in eastern Europe could spill over to the Arctic as the Kola Peninsula is home to some of Russia’s most powerful weapon systems, including hypersonic cruise missiles and the naval component of the strategic nuclear triad.

On December 24, President Vladimir Putin said his military forces successfully fired a simultaneous salvo of the Tsirkon hypersonic missile. The weapon is now ready for deployment with the Northern Fleet on both frigates and the 4th generation multi-purpose submarines of the Yasen-class.

Launched from the Russian sector of the Barents Sea, the Tsirkon missiles could reach targets in the Norwegian Sea in about 10 to 15 minutes if Moscow in a war conflict chose to activate its Bastion defense concept aimed at denying NATO forces control of the Norwegian and Greenland seas.

And in a February 11, 2022 NATO press release the exercises Brilliant Jump 2022 and Cold Response 2022 are highlighted:

On Monday, 28 February 2022, in Norway, NATO will launch one of its main exercises of the year, involving naval, air and land forces from across the Alliance. Under the command of NATO’s Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS), the long-planned Exercise BRILLIANT JUMP 2022 (BRJU 22) will demonstrate the readiness and mobility of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the spearhead of the NATO Response Force (NRF). This rapid deployment will also enhance the interoperability of Allies and Partners.

Approximately 2,500 troops, mainly drawn from four NATO nations (France, Italy, Poland and Spain) will participate on the land. These forces will be supported by 10 warships from eight NATO nations (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, The Netherlands, Norway and The United Kingdom) with some 750 sailors operating off the coast of Norway and by air assets drawn from NATO member states.

This year, exercise BRILLIANT JUMP will lead directly into the bi-annual Norwegian-led exercise COLD RESPONSE 2022 (CR 22), which runs from 14 March to 1 April 2022. CR 22 is a defensive exercise under a NATO Article 5 scenario. The aim is to train the reinforcement of allies/partners under challenging climatic conditions, enhancing the readiness and capabilities of the participating forces. Up to 35,000 troops from some 28 nations will participate, including non-NATO partner nations, Finland and Sweden.

Norway and allies are committed to transparency and risk reduction. For that reason, Norway announced this long-planned exercise two years in advance in accordance with requirements of the Vienna Document. The Vienna Document obliges all host nations to notify the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of major military exercises. For that reason, Norway has invited all OSCE member states – including Russia to send observers to Exercise COLD RESPONSE.

Both exercises are strictly defensive in character; all allies are committed to openness and transparency in full compliance with international obligations.