U.S. Finnish Bi-lateral Exercise, August 2022

11/18/2022

U.S. Army Soldiers with 12th Combat Aviation Brigade conduct flight operations with Finnish aircraft during an island seizure training exercise in Syndalen, Finland, August 10, 2022.

The Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group and 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit are on a scheduled deployment under the command and control of Task Force 61/2 while operating in U.S. Sixth Fleet in support of U.S., allied and partner interests in Europe and Africa.

FINLAND

08.10.2022

Video by Lance Cpl. Cameron Ross

22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit

Building an Arsenal of Democracy in the 21st Century: The Perspective Penten’s CEO Matthew Wilson

11/15/2022

By Robbin Laird

During my September trip to Australia, I had a chance to sit down with the CEO of Penten, Matthew Wilson, along with my colleague John Blackburn, to discuss the role of Australia defence industry in direct defence of Australia.

According to their website:

“Penten is an Australian owned, multi-award winning, cyber technology business.

“We offer unique, sovereign capability to deliver new defence and security technologies for the future fight. Our advanced hardware and software products and services support government and defence clients with Secure Mobility, Applied AI and Tactical Communications Security solutions.

“Our aim is to deliver world-leading security technologies to realise digital advantage for the nation Our work is dedicated to enabling the modern warfighter and policy maker with information to deliver advantage.”

The interview focused largely on his assessment of the digital defence and security domain because logically that is where is business operates.

We started with a discussion of the core book which analyzed the contribution of U.S. industry in win winning World War II.  Freedom’s Forge by Arthur Herman laid the conditions under which the government worked with industry to create an arsenal of democracy.

As Wilson noted: “The book provides a look at what is required to mobilize an industrial base. What financial incentives are required? What approach be government is required? If industry is to make smart investments to build and support an arsenal of democracy how to do so?”

And shaping an arsenal of democracy either starts with or includes securing the digital domain.

Here Perry argued that Australia is making strides in the right direction. “It’s taken us a little while to try and get norms of behavior established concerning what’s acceptable and what’s not acceptable within the cyber realm.

“But one of the things I’m actually quite proud of from Australian perspective is that Australia – both government and industry –has accepted the need to support the policy development in that space.”

Wilson noted that such an effort is crucial to operating in the “gray zone of conflict” which Australia operates within with China and others.

“But now the challenge is changing.

“The truth of matter is, the last 20 years, we’ve been in conflicts that we haven’t needed to consider the interruption of the digital supply lines as a core defence and security challenge: it was not going to happen, and it didn’t happen.

“Now it is a core element for the defence and security of the Commonwealth.”

“And in this domain, we have to think not only about the first strike.

“It’s about what a sustained conflict looks like in the digital domain”

This falls in the domain of robust defence of national infrastructure as part of the direct defence of Australia.

But what about the defence materiel necessary for Australian defence?

Wilson assessed the challenge as follows: “When you think about cyber resilience for us it is slightly different to the way that others who would rely on their own industrial base alone to produce the material to be able to fight effectively.”

Such defence materiel will exist only in alliance team concept for Australia. “

We’re on a team, and you need to make a contribution to the team; you’ve got to pick your places we can make those types of contributions.

“My genuine belief is that this is a space where Australia can create some industrial capability that it can feed back into the allied combined effort to create an arsenal of democracy.”

Wilson felt there was a need a comprehensive approach to thinking about a way ahead for the arsenal of democracy.

“We need to think of how can mobilize industry and not just the defence industry narrowly considered.”

See the following:

Securing Mobile Networks: The Penten Approach

And an article focused on the speech where FDR introduced the concept of arsenal of democracy:

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/12/roosevelt-arsenal-of-democracy-speech-213483/

Allies Test Ground-based Air Defence Systems in Greece

11/14/2022

Dutch, German and Norwegian soldiers took part in exercise Spartan Arrow in Chania, Greece.

The exercise took place from late September to early October 2022. In the span of two weeks, the exercise focused on the integration of the participating nations’ ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems.

These ground-based defensive systems contribute to the integrated shielding of NATO’s territory.

GREECE

03.10.2022

Natochannel

Re-Imaging Nordic Defence

11/13/2022

By Robbin Laird

Brendan Sargeant, my late friend and colleague, and a noted Australian defence strategist, underscored the importance of strategic imagination when reshaping defence and foreign policies when entering a new historical era, such as we are doing right now.

“A country will possess a strategic imagination which will have evolved over time in response to the influence of geography, history, culture, and the many other tangible and intangible forces that go to create a community and its vision of itself. A country’s strategic imagination is a living thing, dynamic and evolving in contact with the world, and full of contradictions. In those rare moments in a country’s history where a genuine choice must be made and action taken, a country’s strategic imagination becomes most visible.”

Clearly, this is such a time for the Nordic countries as Finland and Sweden join NATO and Denmark sheds its restrictions on working defence issues within the European Union. I had a chance during the recently held Euronaval salon held in Paris to meet with Nordic colleagues to discuss the challenge and way ahead for Nordic defence cooperation and integration going forward in the new historical epoch.

Fortunately, my colleague Rear Admiral (retired) Nils Wang was attending and I had a chance to discuss his take on how one should think about the “new” defence geography of a Nordic defence that included both Sweden and Finland in NATO.

He started by underscoring that “for the first time in our lifetimes not only do the Nordic countries share common values but will work within a common defence alliance. Although Sweden and Finland over the years cooperated more fully with NATO countries, they will now be fully integrated into NATO defence planning. That means they will look at their capacities compared with other NATO countries in order to have the right balance in the region.”

“Now one needs to think in terms of defence of the North of Europe from Iceland to the Finnish and Norwegian borders.

“How do we build capacities which can operate throughout this entire region and deliver the kind of defence and crisis management effects that can deter Russia or for that matter Chinese intrusions into Nordic economic, security and defence concerns?

“This means as well that the Baltic Sea becomes a NATO sea, and the Nordics and their NATO allies can focus on how operational reach from the Baltics into the North Atlantic can best be generated and deterrence best served.”

Wang highlighted “that seen from the whole of region perspective, we will have different foci for different countries within the region seen as a whole. Finland which shares a long land corridor with Russia is and will continue to focus on their capabilities to manage any border threats. But now they can look back to the rest of the Nordic region and to other NATO allies to provide strategic depth for them.

“And if one looks at the western end of the Nordic defence region, there is Iceland. They are located in the middle of the GIUK gap. Iceland is focused on this area in terms of hosting NATO forces for North Atlantic defence, and not like Finland on the Eastern flank of NATO.

“Sweden is geographically behind Finland, but consider themselves a front-line state in a security environment where the Baltic states and the Baltic Sea are key regions facing directly the Russian threat. To deal with these challenges, Sweden will need to rework, and to use your words, reimagine how their maritime forces can provide for their defence and fit into a wider Nordic/NATO framework. The Swedish Navy is structured to operate in the Swedish archipelago relying on the land-based air defence umbrella. I think that the Swedish Navy needs to operate further at sea in the new strategic setting with more organic air defence on their ships and maybe even use these weapons to create geographic depth in the national air defence.”

“With regard to Norway, they share a common border with Russia and are the Northern Flank of NATO in that sense. Their ground-air forces are focused on this part of their defence challenge while their Navy and Air Force are focused on the Kola Peninsula and how best to contain the Russian Northern Fleet.

“Denmark is likewise focused on that threat from the Kola Peninsula but as well with regard to the Baltic Sea. We are working with the U.S. Second Fleet and the Allied Joint Forces Command in Norfolk to work the defence in depth challenge as well.

“We need to protect the basing and staging areas within Denmark with the kind of air defence systems crucial to do so. We are a bridging nation as the Kingdom of Denmark embraces Greenland and the Faroe Islands which are part of the reinforcement for Northern Europe from North America requirements in times of crisis.”

He then summed up how to look at the new defence situation facing the Nordics as they work towards enhanced integration.

“When one talks about Nordic military cooperation, it’s not enough to talk about one country cooperating with another country.

“One needs to go deeper and to find out what are they cooperating about. It will be air force cooperation for some countries; it will be land forces cooperation for other countries; and it will be naval cooperation for all of the Nordic countries, whether focused on the Baltics, the Kola Peninsula or into the North Atlantic and the GIUK gap.”

Featured graphic: Photo 74457995 / Flag © Sjankauskas | Dreamstime.com

See also the following:

The Perspective of Rear Admiral (Retired) Nils Wang on the Way Ahead for Shipbuilding in North Atlantic Defense

RED FLAG-Alaska 23-1

11/11/2022

U.S. Air Force Maj. William Hock, the assistant director of operations assigned to the 354th Operations Group DET 1, sits down for an interview detailing the history, purpose, and behind-the-scenes operations of RED FLAG-Alaska 23-1.

Exercise participants featured the Royal New Zealand Air Force, Royal Air Force, NATO AWACS and other units from across the U.S. Air Force.

JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON, AK,

10.18.2022

Video by Airman 1st Class J. Michael Pena

Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson Public Affai

Osprey Maintenance in Hawaii

11/09/2022

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 268, perform maintenance on the internal weapon system of the MV-22B Osprey at Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Hawaii, Feb. 16, 2022.

VMM-268 performs regular maintenance on their aircraft so they can be ready in a moments notice when called upon.

02.16.2022

Video by Cpl. Dalton Payne

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Finland Prepares to Come Into NATO: A Finnish Perspective

11/08/2022

During my visit to Euronaval on October 20, 2002, I had a chance to talk with Tuija Karanko, the Secretary General of the Association of Finnish Aerospace and Defence Companies. I will highlight what the Association does and focuses upon in the appendix to the interview, where I will republish an article by Ms. Karanko focusing on that question.

What I focused with her was her perspective on Finland come into NATO and how that impacted both Finland and the Alliance. Finland is one of the most serious states about defense in Europe; it did not abandon direct defense for the away game in the Middle East, nor did it abandon conscription or comprehensive security.

Indeed, Finland provides leadership by example for much of the rest of the Alliance including the United States.  Indeed, coming from Australia where I spent the month of September and discussed throughout the month the challenge of focusing on the direct defense of Australia, many of the capabilities which Finland has built are relevant for shaping Australia’s way ahead, most notably comprehensive security.

Our discussion indeed started with Ms. Karanko underscoring that Finland was a net contributor to Western defense and security, not a free rider. “We never abandoned the direct defense of Finland in the post-Cold War period. We have a general conscription service and polls regularly indicate that more than 80% of Finns stand ready to defend their country. This is in our DNA as a nation.

“We are a small country of 5.6 million citizens, but we focus on comprehensive security. Our defense approach encompasses the private sector and the ability to mobilize society and our economy in times of crisis. We are very concerned to defend our critical infrastructure as part of our comprehensive security approach.”

We then discussed how Finland and its defense industrial capabilities might intersect with the wider Alliance as Finland became a member. Naturally, now that Finland would be a member of NATO new opportunities to work across European and transatlantic industry were opening up.

She certainly is aware of the challenges to do so but felt that Finland brought several advantages to the table in terms of its defense industrial products and capabilities. Finland builds very robust equipment which can work in harsh conditions. It builds stockpiles of its supplies as well. And designs its equipment to be used by conscripts which means mobilization is facilitated by ease of use of Finnish equipment.

If a society is to mobilize, having only complex high-end equipment will make it difficult to do so. Given the Finnish approach to defense and comprehensive security, Finland has built equipment designed to support a citizen force along with high-end equipment such as the F-35.

She noted: “Our equipment needs to rugged. It needs to be capable of heavy use with a very long lifecycle. We are focused on the training side and the logistical side as a key element for the operation of our forces. A key question guiding or equipment approach: how quickly can you used the equipment and with how few people does using it require?”

She highlighted as well the core competencies of Finland in the communications field and the priority which securing something like a 5G network in a crisis is for the performance of a nation in defending itself. In my own interviews with regard to exercises in Norway as well as operations in Ukraine during the war, the ability to use secure civilian communication networks both for ISR and C2 have been clearly evident.

Appendix: “The Finnish Defence Industry – A Different Approach to Supporting Defence Capabilities,” by Tuija Karanko (European Security and Defence, 14 February 2020).

We Finns are famously modest, but Finland is, according to many international rankings, one of the world’s top countries. We are consistently ranked in the global top 3 in terms of education, innovation, professionalism, security and trustworthiness. For the past two years, Finland has even been named the happiest country in the world!

Finland is a country at the forefront of high-level technologies and digital solutions. This is also the case with Finnish defence industries. Finnish defence and aerospace companies are market leaders in our chosen systems and technologies. These include armoured wheeled vehicles, turreted mortar systems, certain C4ISR/C5, systems, and logistical solutions.

Most Finnish defence companies are privately owned SMEs. They invest significantly in R&D, ca. 15% of their annual turnover. Apart from being acknowledged internationally for producing high-quality, premium products with long life-cycle performance, the companies excel in their methods of utilizing technology and combining so-called civilian technologies into military systems.

The Finnish climate sets demanding requirements for defence technologies. Everything must function reliably in an arctic environment as well as in summer’s heat and autumn rainfalls – and be NATO interoperable. We do excel in snow-how, but most of our products are used in the most demanding environments and crisis management operations around the world. The volume of exports varies annually from 40 to 60 % of companies’ turnover.

Military Security

In Finland, a viable and competitive domestic defence industry is a fundamental element of credible national defence. Finnish technology expertise plays a vital role in the entirety of the defence system providing in-country capabilities (military security of supply).

Finland is also an open market for defence goods. Despite high-level technological expertise and skills, Finland’s own defence industrial capacity is focused on certain specific areas and, therefore, we have chosen to procure many major systems and platforms from abroad.

Military security of supply means that Finland must sustain the necessary industrial and technological competence and autonomy. That includes maintaining and tailoring critical systems so that their independent use can be guaranteed in all conditions.

The Finnish defence industry is integrated into the Finnish defence system in many ways. A major part of army, navy and air force maintenance has been outsourced to domestic companies, which act as close partners to the Defence Forces. The Finnish Defence Partnership model relies on companies carrying out their responsibilities, at all times, to secure military capabilities. We believe that the proper level of military security of supply can only be maintained through competitive defence companies with processes, systems, products, services and partnerships to match.

AFDA

The Association of Defence and Aerospace Industries, AFDA, represents Finnish companies within defence, aerospace and security. AFDA has ca. 130 member companies. It is a member of ASD – AeroSpace and the Defence Industries Association of Europe. AFDA also represents the Finnish companies at EDA, NATO and Nordic fora.

AFDA works in close cooperation with the Finnish Defence Establishment and other security authorities in Finland. AFDA is your point of contact for defence business in Finland. We can support you in networking with Finnish companies and in understanding the business environment in Finland.