By Peter Jennings

The immediate significance of the recent AUKMIN gathering in Sydney (January 21, 2022) was that it took place while a Russian military assault on Ukraine is imminent. Given the threat from Moscow, no one would have been surprised had the UK foreign and defence secretaries delayed their visit.

Foreign Minister Marise Payne told the post-dialogue media conference she had observed an exponential and continued upward commitment of UK engagement in the Indo-Pacific. UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said ‘we are facing global challenges from multiple aggressors’.

That’s the reality of our strategic times. The democracies are working more closely together because they must. Either we find ways to add strength through closer co-operation or else we lose ground to aggressive international behaviour from Russia and China.

The strategic outlook could hardly be more different today compared to the relatively more benign world of 2006, when AUKMIN was established. At that time UK and Australian officials were seized of a common view: they thought the bilateral agreement was a pointless waste of effort. Britain’s future, you see, was in Europe, and Australia was ‘Asian century’-bound.

Former foreign minister Gareth Evans summed up the mood. Writing in 2016 about former prime minister Tony Abbott’s affection for the Anglosphere, Evans claimed ‘the truth of the matter is that the UK has brought nothing of significance to the region’s defence since the fall of Singapore in 1942’. Closer Australia–UK co-operation was simply a ‘nostalgic’ hankering for the past, a ‘fantasy’ of ‘Anglosphere dreamers’, that no one would be interested in, least of all the US, which would focus on the ‘biggest game of all for the foreseeable future’, its competition for ‘global supremacy’ with China.

Evans was far from alone. In January 2011, I attended the third AUKMIN held at HMAS Watson naval base in Sydney. Kevin Rudd as foreign minister and Stephen Smith as defence minister, hardly Anglo-tragics, met their Conservative counterparts, William Hague and Liam Fox.

After a morning of productive talks, officials were told to write up a list of quite ambitious agreed outcomes for ministers to approve after lunch. A strange wrestle ensued with unhappy and jet-lagged Whitehall officials. Their mission was to ensure that nothing too substantial by way of future action was recorded.

We had all heard what the ministers wanted. But the British agenda was ‘curb your enthusiasm, let’s not get carried away here’. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was largely on board the Whitehall bus too. Evans’s Kool-Aid had been drunk deeply, we should stick to our Indo-Pacific knitting.

More than a decade later and it seems little has changed. Ticky Fullerton reported in The Australian on Thursday that Truss had to drive ‘the free-trade agreement with Australia, pushing back against entrenched Euro-centric views of Whitehall public servants’, when she was trade secretary last year.

Significant credit should go to British and Australian politicians of all political stripes for sticking with AUKMIN in the face of indifference from many officials.

Four important lessons come from the AUKMIN story.

First, the historic, linguistic and cultural connections that tie the UK and Australia do matter. Contrary to Payne’s article in The Australian on Thursday, this is not about basking in being ‘two of the most diverse nations on Earth’, it’s our commonalities that bring us together.

For all that is condescendingly decried (in Evans’s words) as a ‘passion for English country walks and pubs’, the truth is that historical closeness translates into effective defence and intelligence co-operation.

Second, Britain and Australia have interests that go beyond our immediate neighbourhoods. We are not small regional players but rather large states with global interests. We cannot be as small as the conventional thinking of some of our officials.

Third, rising aggressive totalitarianism in the form of China and Russia—and let’s add in North Korea and Iran—is the biggest strategic challenge of our age. It is pushing the consequential democracies together.

It is massively to Australia’s benefit that the UK, France, Germany, The Netherlands and others now define Indo-Pacific security as relevant to them. Hugh White dismisses these connections, saying they offer no guarantees of support in conflict: ‘We need to plan to fight alone,’ he maintains.

But we are not on the start line of the conflict today. The issue is what like-minded countries can do to avoid war. Thinking and acting alone is what China wants us to do because it encourages capitulation. Working together in ANZUS, AUKUS, AUKMIN, the Quad and other groupings is what Beijing dislikes because together the democracies are stronger.

A fourth AUKMIN lesson, nicely expressed by British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace on Friday, is that deep alliances can’t just be transactional, trading reciprocal favours. They are based on long-term trusted relationships working towards shared goals. These links take a long time to build.

To really work, alliances need practical outcomes, military engagement, things that really happen.

On this test the AUKMIN communique delivers a set of interesting outcomes, although perhaps none as startling as the AUKUS nuclear propulsion announcement of last September. (To be fair, those sorts of ‘deliverables’ are rare.)

Off the table is the idea of basing a Royal Navy Astute-class submarine at an Australian base, but the promise is for ‘greater rotations’ of British vessels into the region. The RN will deploy two offshore patrol vessels, HMS Spey and HMS Tamar, ‘re-establishing a persistent Indo-Pacific presence’ this year.

That’s a significant commitment. Australia should encourage the RN to make one of our naval bases its long-term centre for operations, treating this as a joint endeavour.

Defence Minister Peter Dutton stressed the ‘seamless’ progress in negotiations on nuclear propulsion and the wider technological agenda for joint work on artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonic vehicles and underwater systems.

One can only hope AUKUS delivers. On submarines, going into Friday’s meeting, Truss pointed to the possibility of ‘collaborative development by the three AUKUS parties rather than a choice of Britain’s Astute class or America’s Virginia class’.

There is promise in that approach, which could produce a design common to all three navies. Ministers will be keenly aware of the risks and challenges posed by the nuclear propulsion plan for Australia. This is one heck of a project to land.

The AUKMIN partners signed agreements for a ‘cyber and critical technology partnership’ and for ‘clean, reliable and transparent infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific’. This points to a broadening of co-operation beyond traditional defence and intelligence roots.

In many ways, the competition for influence between the democracies and the dictatorships in the Indo-Pacific comes down to those countries looking for ‘clean, reliable and transparent’ co-operation and those who will settle for Beijing’s money, which is anything but clean.

How curious that, for decades, Canberra’s response to globalisation was to obsessively narrow our interests to a thin slice of Asia. Australia and Britain are stronger because of AUKMIN. Britain is again, and Australia is at last, thinking about our interests on a global scale. We have much to live up to.

Peter Jennings is the executive director of ASPI and a former deputy secretary for strategy in the Defence Department.

A version of this article was published in the Weekend Australian.

The featured mage: Bianca De Marchi/Pool/AFP/Getty Images.

This article was published by ASPI on January 24, 2022.

By James Durso

Afghanistan’s Taliban recently proposed it take a role in aid distribution via the creation of a joint mechanism with international aid organizations to coordinate the distribution of food aid to the country. According to the Taliban, “The goal of this committee is coordination on a higher level for facilitating humanitarian aid of the international community and to distribute aid for needy people.”

Taliban representatives recently met with Western government officials and Afghan women’s rights and human rights activists in Norway. The U.S. delegation addressed “the formation of a representative political system; responses to the urgent humanitarian and economic crises; security and counterterrorism concerns; and human rights, especially education for girls and women.”

Afghanistan’s neighbors Central Asia and India aren’t dallying. They recently met and agreed to create working groups to address Afghanistan’s food emergency, recognition of the Taliban, and the development of the Iranian port of Chabahar. The U.S. and Europe can help by holding their fire as the neighbors of heavily-sanctioned Iran and Afghanistan attempt to stabilize the region and create economic opportunity that will allow them to distance themselves from China’s thrust into the region.

The West needs to get a move on as the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)  have declared that 19 million people in Afghanistan are experiencing “high levels of acute food insecurity” and that that number will climb to 22.8 million this winter unless action is taken.

Washington’s priorities of a satisfactory (to the U.S.)  representative government, and its desires for Afghan women girls should take a back seat to averting a humanitarian catastrophe this winter. Afghans are being forced to sell their children for food, so more public engagement along will U.S. food aid will rebound to Washington’s benefit.

U.S. policymakers no doubt feel anger and humiliation at the public failure of their two-decade project to reform Pashtun culture.

But refusing practical steps to engage now with the new government in Kabul as disaster looms will show the U.S. and its confederates to be both incompetent and spiteful, a massive in-kind donation to the Taliban’s PR campaign internally and aimed at the wider Muslim world.

Recent visitors to Kabul report the Taliban want Americans to return to the country (“Even Erik Prince can come here!”), one reason being to counter Chinese expansion in the region.

A good start would be visits by U.S. officials to Kabul, as limiting their contacts to the Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar may also be interpreted as a lack of physical courage, which won’t inspire confidence in Kabul’s new chiefs. It will also give U.S. officials an opportunity to meet the Taliban out of earshot of Qatari officials who, while they have been helpful to the U.S., have their own agenda.

According to the visitors, the roads are open, free of roadblocks, and repair crews are at work. As the country was historically a trading crossroads, now is the time to again make it the connector between Central and South Asia, and a trade partner with Iran’s 80 million people.

Fortunately, leaders from Central Asia and South Asia — Uzbekistan and Pakistan — previously acted to connect the regions to increase trade and opportunity. In July, Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Pakistan prime minister Imran Khan met in Tashkent where they signed agreements to upgrade their countries’ economic relations. The leaders may have been racing the clock, but their project requires an Afghan crossroads where their businesses can trade with without fear of the U.S.

The U.S. attempt to export identity politics to Afghanistan (via demands for a “representative government”) may be obliged by the Taliban if they introduce the world to the Afghan Margot Honecker, which will cause wails of “We didn’t mean a woman like that!” The Taliban aren’t neglecting girls’ education as private schools – for boys and girls – are open, and the government  promised public schools will all be open after the Afghan New Year in late March.

After the Taliban’s August victory, there were few revenge killings and no one has been sent to a reeducation camp. If the Taliban deliver on their promise to open girls’ schools in March, the way should be open to consider releasing some Afghan funds seized by the U.S. or waiving sanctions against Taliban leaders so foreign businessmen can start to explore just how ready the Taliban are to engage with them and meet their demands for security and transparency.

The U.S. will have concerns about what the Taliban is doing to repress the Pakistan Taliban (the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)), Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K). If the Taliban follow through on the girls’ schools, the U.S. should grant concessions that will facilitate regional trade, then ask Kabul to take action against the three extremist groups. The Taliban may then be likely to move against Al-Qaeda and IS-K, but not against the TTP, and the U.S. will know this if it is clear-eyed, though it should call for action against the TTP, at least to keep Pakistan on-side when Islamabad goes into a funk over the latest American “abandonment.”.

Pakistan’s army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, described the Afghan Taliban and the TTP as “two sides of the same coin.” The Afghan Taliban see the TTP as their Pashtun allies in a conflict with Pakistan over the nominal border, the contested Durand Line. It is a scrap the U.S. will be wise to otherwise avoid, and instead focus on strengthening local economies as a counter to Beijing’s designs for Central and South Asia.

The Taliban aren’t the baddest actors America ever dealt with.

After World War II, the U.S. quickly hired German scientists and former Nazi officials. The U.S. also gave a pass to leaders of Unit 731, Japan’s germ warfare unit that experimented on Allied POWs.

The difference between then and now is that then the U.S. was the victor, so it was easy to be generous, especially as the West was rapidly retooling to confront Communism.

The question for America now is, as it faces a Communist regime in Beijing instead of Moscow, can it be magnanimous in defeat?

James Durso (@james_durso) is a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters. Mr. Durso served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

Flag of Taliban is highlighted in the featured graphic. Credit: Bigstock.

We have just published a collection of the essays which Durso has provided over the last couple of years, which provides his unique perspective on Washington and the world:

See also the following:

The Afghan Winter 2022 and Afghan Sanctions

Norway, the Taliban, and the Afghan Situation