Exercise Coastwatchers 22

10/31/2022

Exercise COASTWATCHERS is Defence’s premier bilateral exercise series with the Solomon Islands. It is developed jointly with the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) to build Solomon Islands’ Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) and policing capabilities.

There are three iterations planned for 2022 – July, September and November.

Exercise COSTWATCHERS II, held in September, will involve the conduct of small boats training package with the RSIPF, the delivery of the VHF component of the Solomon Islands Police Emergency Radio Network (RSIPERN) communications project to the RSIPF and key leadership engagements.

Exercise COASTWATCHERS forms part of Australia’s broader engagement with Solomon Islands under the Defence Cooperation Program.

Australian Department of Defence

October 7, 2022.

The Perspective of VADM Mark Hammond on the Way Ahead for the Australian Navy

10/28/2022

At the recent Williams Foundation on the challenge of building out a more lethal and survivable ADR, the newly appointed Chief of Navy, VADM Mark Hammond provided his perspective on the way ahead of the RAN and the nation in meeting these challenges.

His text delivered at the seminar follows:

I thank the Sir Richard Williams foundation for their invitation to provide my perspectives on our current and future operating environment in support of today’s theme of “Enhancing the Lethality and Survivability of the Integrated Force”.

This afternoon I will focus on Diplomacy, Deterrence and Defence, in the context of today’s theme of lethality and survivability. I note I will be quoting former Chief of Navy VADM Barrett who is here today – thank you.

But before I do so I believe it is important to raise our eyes above the tactical level for a moment to reflect upon why we build and employ the Integrated Force.

I say this because what we build, and what we do with it, matters only in so much as it enhances our National wellbeing.

Our national wellbeing – like all nations – is derived from sustained economic prosperity and peaceful coexistence with nations.

As a trading, island, nation – connected to the global trading system by sea bed cables and maritime commerce – our economic wellbeing is almost exclusively enabled by the sea, and by the sea bed. Enablement though is not enough.

Sustained economic prosperity has only been possible because these systems – freedom of navigation for commerce, and sea bed infrastructure which enables our financial and strategic connectivity with the global trading system – have flourished in an environment of acceptance of, and adherence to, the complex array of treaties, laws and conventions that for almost 80 years have been iterated, improved and almost universally supported.

We call it the ‘rules based order’ and we credit it with providing good order at sea in the collective interest of peace for all nations.

Those of us who understand that Australia derives its wellbeing from this system are alarmed that such norms are being challenged. We are concerned that the right to peaceful co-existence with other nations can no longer be assumed.

As former Minister for Defence the Honourable Kim Beazley stated in Perth last month, and I paraphrase,

‘…what right do we have to exist as a sovereign nation of only 25 million people occupying an island continent with room and natural resources the envy of the world?’

His answer was ‘the rights conferred by adherence to the rules based order’. The very rights we have assumed to be enduring and beyond contest for decades.

But that is no longer the case.

This system is now being challenged, and our Government has commissioned the Defence Strategic Review in response to these challenges.

It is reasonable to conclude that ‘that which cannot be assumed, must be guaranteed’ – and that is why the lethality and survivability of our Defence Forces is being re-examined.

In this context, there is a direct and distinct nexus between the lethality and survivability of the integrated force and the survivability of our nation.

And this relationship is recognised by our Prime Minister.

In the last month the Honourable Anthony Albanese, has stated that he sees the three key principles of our current security policy are

“to defend our territorial integrity, protect our political sovereignty from external pressure, and to promote Australia’s economic prosperity through a strong economy and resilient supply chains”.

In seeking to understand Defence’s role in supporting our Prime Minister, I am reminded of the words by TB Millar which underscore the relationship between territorial geography, economy and supply chains: and please excuse me as I again paraphrase:

Australia is a Paradox: the geography which make it difficult to invade and conquer Australia, also make Australia dependent upon seaborne trade. In other words, Australia might not be vulnerable to invasion, but the hostile power does not need to invade Australia, to defeat Australia.”

We have all been affected in some way by the War in the Ukraine, and the grounding of Ever Given that forced closure of the Suez Canal in March 2021, has sharpened community focus, and increased understanding of how connected Australia is, and how vulnerable Australia could be.

Thus, Millar’s Australian paradox endures.

The Ukraine conflict has provided us numerous lessons and reiterated the importance of logistics, the value of partnerships, and criticality of rapid learning and adaptation, and necessity to swiftly integrate new technology. It is also a stark reminder that an adversary will not fight by our design, contest our strengths and may even be willing to do what we would never consider.

In the Indo pacific – we live in similarly uncertain times in an equally complex region. Except we don’t share a land border with Poland – arguably the key to enabling Ukraine’s ongoing viability in the past 6 months.

The oceans are our nation’s lifeblood – both the trade that traverses the vast oceanic highways or the data that flows freely across the seabed – and our Defence Force require the capability to influence, deter, and if necessary defend against any potential aggressor, in order to remain a credible safeguard to Australia’s prosperity, wellbeing and survival.

For more than two hundred years, we have lived, and thrived under the protection of a great maritime power. It was first the RN, and then the USN who served as the guarantor of global trade, enabling a 10 fold increase of global GDP per person between 1920 and 2010. Australia has been significant beneficiary of this period of global economic growth over this period, and over this period we have seen billions lifted from poverty across the world.

This is not to downplay the work and the role of our Navy and our Defence Force in our region, over many years, but to highlight that our allies have allowed our Island nation, and almost all nations of our region, to develop without developing a maritime mindset. Indeed, in the 1980s as the Defence of Australia doctrine took hold in strategic narrative – the then Defence Minister Kim Beazley even stated that, and I quote: “Australia is not a maritime nation and its people do not sustain much of an interest in Australian maritime strategy”.

40 years later when considering Australia’s region, the Indo-pacific, is undergoing the most significant period of strategic realignment since the Second World War. I think there are few that would challenge a forecast of rough seas ahead.

This sharpens my focus, as I seek to contribute Naval Power to the Joint Force that is capable for what might lie ahead and not the war of yester-year.

The complex geographic, economic and security connections that bind the diverse countries and cultures across the Indo-Pacific are vital for Australia – just as Ukraine’s partnerships with like-minded nations and vital for their viability as a nation over the last six months.

It is through this lens that I look at our region and am reminded of the importance of Diplomacy, Deterrence, and the development, deployment and use of force in Defence of our nation’s citizens.

And so it is through this lens that I work with my counterparts in the region and across the world, to assist our Nation’s diplomatic efforts to partner with nations that value us, and our existence, as much as we do. Hence

Navy’s role as Diplomats on, and from, the Sea.

I have spent much of the past 83 days as Chief of Navy working to build strong relationships in Canberra and importantly with my counterparts from Fiji, Indonesia, the UK, France, Japan, India, Singapore, Canada, the United States, South Korea, and Thailand – just to name a few. I have been six countries in the last eight days and am pleased to hold a strong relationship with the French Navy and ADM Vandier, who has generously closed the book to our previous commercial relationship and is focused on our enduring strategic partnership.

And it is through this lens that I consider my role to generate Naval Power for employment as part of the joint force. That is, Naval power employed to meet our unique Australian challenges, in our own Australian context, integrated with all elements of national power, in pursuit of our national objectives dynamic region.

Hence Navy’s role to deliver Deterrence on, and from, the sea. And when Diplomacy and Deterrence fail, Navy must be ready to Defend our nation on, and from, the sea. Let me expand.

The deployment and employment of Military forces is a deliberate choice to be made by our government.  In Navy’s case, at home we patrol our maritime approaches, support law enforcement at sea, and we prepare our advanced capabilities for contingencies that range from disaster relief, to destruction of our force’s adversaries.

At home and throughout the Indo-Pacific we exercise and operate with likeminded partners and allies; we conduct presence, engagement and deterrence operations where our nation’s interests are acutely engaged.

In peacetime these activities are a key component of conversations between governments – they must be planned and conducted as such. This includes being actively engaged across our region – because trust and interoperability cannot be surged – presence has a power that absence, even with promise and friendship, cannot match.

To paraphrase CN Barrett: “Naval Power is the ultimate purpose of the Navy. Fear of the consequences of that Naval power is what deters armed adventurism. Our ability to deploy decisive lethality to sanction anyone who might wish to use armed force against our nation and its interests deters conflict and contributes to maintenance of peace and security around the world.”

This has always been the case.

In order to deter action against our National interests, we must have the capability and capacity to defend them.  Far too quickly discussions about military strategy devolve into a discussion about numbers of units and technology as the solution to all problems. For example, too often the conversation about Naval forces pivots to the great sea battle between opposing forces.

Like many, our Navy has been guilty of such preoccupation, but I posit that direct contest between opposing naval forces matters only in so much as it impacts either nation’s ability to sustain their economic well-being or to destroy the opponent’s centre of gravity.

In considering Lethality and Survivability, I believe we need to frame the conversation in terms of lethality for the nation’s survivability.

Firstly, Survival through Diplomacy and Deterrence One option is to maintain the status quo and avoid fighting in the first place. This requires doubling down on Diplomacy while investing heavily in Deterrence. Diplomacy to build and nurture relationships with likeminded nations while seeking a stable and predictable relationship with others based on respect and law.

Deterrence to put the costs of using force foremost in the mind of those who would consider initiating conflict with Australia.

Investing in capabilities that enhance our diplomatic efforts and create deterrent effects provide the best return on investment in this context. Let me emphasise, investing in capabilities that enhance our diplomatic efforts and create deterrent effects provide the best return on investment in this context.

Australia has deep ties across the Pacific, and the prosperity of the region has deep personal meaning to almost all Australians – we know that in times of need we will always support each other.

Over many decades I believe that Australia has earned respect across Asia for our openness, our transparency and our desire to build mutually beneficial relationships. Our ADF has been at the forefront of engagement with our neighbours and I believe Australia is trusted across the region. Our trade in the region continues to benefit us all and this also means we are never truly alone.

It is through this lens that our successive Governments have engaged and built relationships across the region, while concurrently investing in our Defence industry, infrastructure, trade skills and supply chains. We have also developed a lethal network of allies and partners as evidenced by the work underway under the AUKUS framework.

If Diplomacy and Deterrence fail though, and the ‘conversation between governments’ becomes violent, then our nation must be ready to simultaneously ‘not lose’ while fighting back. This is the Survival through resilience, and this is what we have witnessed in the last six months in Ukraine.

The ability to sustain economic well-being while fighting is absolutely key, and as an island nation we will rely on both stockpiles onshore and imports across the seas. The right balance of capabilities to ensure national resilience through this phase is crucial.

This system connects us globally – for better and for worse – is the key factor that enables Australia’s prosperity and provides us with the ability to build infrastructure like hospitals, schools and sporting facilities. But it is also liable to the impacts of distant events such as war between nations, natural disasters and pandemics.

Against this backdrop this government will decide the role of the ADF, what we will defend and where; what force we must project and where…and for how long; and who we must integrate with due to common purpose and shared interests to allow us to generate military force in the national interest. This will allow us to generate military advice to inform their decisions.

This begs a number of questions.

So what is the vital terrain requiring defence? Is it the rules based system? Is it physical infrastructure or people? Is it information? Is it all of the above?

If it is sea bed infrastructure, is it in deep water or shallow water? Is it above water terminations? Is it in international or sovereign domains, or is it privately owned? It underpins our economic wellbeing – how important is it?

What about Merchant shipping? Whose flag, what cargo, where, when, for how long?

And what about the Ports and their maritime approaches? Which ports – ours, overseas, how many, for how long, from what? All or just some?

If we protect and assure these things do we assure our economic well-being?

Only then we can ask, what is it that we need to do or have, to allow us to hold at risk or to undermine in order to defeat an adversary? Do we focus on our approaches or theirs, or both? Is it a manned systems problem or a job for robots? Do we need to project and protect a land force or a swarm of things? Or both? If so, in what phase of the conflict and with what risk appetite? How will we do this? Will it tip the balance in our Nation’s favour?

These are all questions in play in the Defence Strategic

Finally, we must be able to Defeat an adversary.

A military force poorly employed might have tactical successes, but unless they negatively impact the resource base or national will of the adversary, or enhance the well-being of their parent nation, tactical successes are essentially meaningless.

Lethality is the ability to deliver a decisive force against an adversary where it generates the greatest leverage. In the Australian context, with limited assets it is about maximum return on investment and maximising value for money as we deliver our desired effect. We cannot do everything, and we cannot sustain an attritional conflict.

We cannot afford to take note of what of what “everyone else” is doing and simply follow the path of the past.  Neither can we simply look to a new capability to solve all problems. We are a small country with a small Defence Force. We need to generate maximum military power for every dollar of our taxpayer’s money that we possibly can.

The key challenge in ensuring our capability and capacity to deter action against our interests, is to make sure we make decisions based on our needs, and in our context. As Deputy Prime Minister Marles has said recently: “We need to make sure that our Defence Force is potent, that it is capable. We need to make Australia a difficult proposition for any adversary.”

As one example, our Government has made a clear choice to support the acquisition of nuclear powered submarines for our Australian Defence Force. This is but one portion of the greater Undersea Warfare efforts which seek to ensure we are able to deter nefarious action against our national interests. It is also a clear statement that seeks to ensure we maintain the ability to hold a potential adversary at risk well into the future, and not just in our home waters.

Of course USW is only one aspect of the proposition referred to by the Deputy Prime Minister but provides us an excellent example as we think to the future of what lethality and survivability mean for our Joint Force, and to sharpen our thoughts around ensuring we have both the capacity and capability to deter action against our national interests.

As a final closing thought. Our lethality will not be delivered only through buying new platforms. To use a historical example: in 1945 Japan lost the ability to exploit the natural resources that she needed to continue the war against the United States, predominantly because her merchant shipping transiting her sea lines of communication had been decimated by American submarines. US submariners had achieved decisive results against Japan, whereas their German U-boat ‘peers’ ultimately failed in the same mission against Britain in both World Wars.

While technology advances certainly assisted the US, no specific technology proved decisive in its own right. What is seldom effectively highlighted, is the fact that US submariners seized and maintained their advantage against Japan by applying new technologies and tactics at a rate that continually mitigated their own weaknesses, targeted the enemy’s and capitalised on their own strengths. This was done as part of global campaign of allied nations, working together as an integrated and joint force to destroy the capacity and will of another nation to continue a conflict.

Thank you once again for the invitation to join you today. I hope that what I have shared today has challenged your ideas, and stimulated your thought processes. The Williams foundation plays an important role in promoting intellectual discussion and challenging us as a Defence Force to hold ourselves to account on the big issues. To Air Marshall Brown, Geoff, thank you for your continued leadership in this space.

As a take away idea I propose that no matter what the character of future conflict may be, no matter the type of conflict we find ourselves in; it is the nation that can sustain its economic wellbeing for the longest that will ultimately emerge the strongest.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force at UNITAS Exercise, 2022

U.S. Marine Corps Lt Col. William Woodward, commanding officer of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 773, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Forces Reserve in support of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force UNITAS LXIII, gives an interview at São Pedro da Aldeia, Brazil, Sept. 13, 2022.

UNITAS is the world’s longest-running annual multinational maritime exercise.

09.13.2022

Video by Cpl. Colton Garrett U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South

The Way Ahead for the Danish Navy in the Nordic and North Atlantic Context: The Perspective of Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen

10/26/2022

By Robbin Laird

I had a chance to discuss maritime issues with Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen both in Copenhagen during my visit in June 2022 and at the Euronaval exposition in Paris during the week of October 16, 2022. He has been Admiral Danish Fleet Commander since 2017 and recently left that position to become head of the Danish naval modernization effort. His new title since June of this year is Executive Director, Navy Programs, Defence Command, Denmark.

I spoke to him in June shortly after he entered the new job and at Euronaval and will combine comments made in the two interviews which bring together his perspective. And with Finland and Sweden coming into NATO, it is important to think of maritime operations in support of defense and security for the entire region from Iceland through to the Kola Peninsula.

There is clearly a need for a creative rethink, or in the words of the late Brendan Sargeant, “the exercise of strategic imagination.” This means that Mikkelsen is not coming to the position as the head of naval modernization with a narrow focus on replacing legacy platforms. His task is to think of maritime operations in a broad sweep of capability across the region and how best for Denmark to contribute.

Both interviews provided perspective on his new job. Rear Admiral Mikkelsen is to focus upon the maritime operations ecosystem and way ahead for maritime power in the Nordic region and to examine the desired effects to be created by Danish forces in conjunction with Nordic forces and with other core allies operating in support of the region.

Looking at the operational ecosystem more broadly means looking at basing, training, and manpower which will be available for the maritime force. It means examining and conceptualizing how ships will operate and be supported on regional basis. It means examining ways to enhance cooperation and integration among Nordic navies and with allied navies.

A key focus is upon the desired effects to be created, and the missions to be supported by the desired maritime payloads, rather than upon the platforms as the primary focus.  The effects focus means that air and land capabilities which are integratable with maritime platforms is a key focus of attention is as well in thinking about the operational ecosystem.

Rear Admiral Mikkelsen underscored the importance of the following: What effects do we need to achieve?

And how will sensors and the weapons as payloads on the fleet and in the force create those effects?

How will autonomous systems play a role?

How and where in our battlespace?”

Rear Admiral Mikkelsen is focused on the operational effects point of view rather than a platform centric focus.

For example, he noted that autonomous systems could contribute to the domain knowledge to protect the seabed infrastructure, for example. They could also play a key role within the Baltic Sea in ISR sharing as well among the Nordic nations.

What effects do we need to create and how would different platforms seen as an integrated operational whole deliver those effects, from a coalition point of view?

With regard to the seabed infrastructure challenge, what Rear Admiral Mikkelsen has highlighting was that the maritime domain involved a growing security challenge as a core aspect of the effects he was focused upon achieving.

For example, the offshore oil and gas fields as well as existing and not least the many coming wind farms, for example, needed to be protected. Almost certainly, maritime robotic systems would play a key role here and modular task forces of robotic systems with relevant manned vessels would be a key element of the way ahead?

But how to do so?

And as he looks at ship design going forward, they will be focused on what effects any new platform can deliver in an integrated context. Their understanding will be shaped by their experience with modularity and will build on the next generation of modularity represented by the cube system built by SH Defence.

Here the focus is upon systems, platforms, and weapons, which can be swapped out  rapidly to prepare a ship and its crew to a specific mission. The flexibility which comes with the possibility of adding such functional preparedness is key to a rapid changing future. And they will work closely with Nordic and other navies to purse an approach so that they can reconfigure allied fleets rapidly for fit for purpose operational requirements.

Another aspect for their shipbuilding approach is lowered manning requirements as well as more rapid approaches to ship maintenance. Not to mention a focus on a much more adaptable and flexible educational and training perspective for that force. How can they tap new technologies for such purposes?

Rear Admiral Mikkelsen and his team will look at areas where “green propulsion” will give you an operational advantage and makes sense. Where can such new technologies fit into NAVY vessels and is there a possibility to see the “green propulsion” change in the merchant NAVY in conjunction with Royal Danish Navy.?

In short, Rear Admiral Mikkelsen and his team will look at concrete ways to shape a mission focused navy which is working closely with other Nordic navies to do so with a key focus as well on integration with other larger allied navies.

They will start by focusing a Multi Combat Patrol vessel ship class with Baltic Sea and North Sea missions.

The ship class will be designed with integrated combat and security effects in mind and capabilities to work with all domain uncrewed systems as well.

Featured Photo: BALTIC SEA (June 07, 2020) Royal Danish Navy HDMS Esbern Snare (L17) sails in the Baltic Sea during the start of BALTOPS 2020. BALTOPS is the premier annual maritime-focused exercise in the Baltic region, enhancing flexibility and interoperability among allied and partner nations. (Photo courtesy of the Lithuanian Navy)

See the following articles as well:

The Payload-Utility Function and the Kill Web Concept of Operations: The Case of the Cube System

Visiting Euronaval 2022: Shaping a Way Ahead for the Maritime Kill Web Force

 

 

 

 

 

CH-53K First Exercise

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 perform external lifts and fire GAU-21 .50-caliber machine guns from CH-53K King Stallions at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, Aug. 4 – 24, 2022.

This was the first time the Marine Corps deployed the King Stallion in an exercise. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force.

08.30.2022

Video by Cpl. Adam Henke 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

KC-130J Harvest HAWK

10/24/2022

U.S. Marines with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 252, fire AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and AGM-176 Griffin missiles near Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, Aug. 31, 2022.

VMGR-252 trained in close-air support by using the Harvest Hercules Airborne Weapons Kit.

VMGR-252 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force.

08.30.2022

Video by Lance Cpl. Christian Cortez 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

For our interview with KC-130J Harvest Hawk operator, see the following:

Operating the Harvest Hawk: Shifting the Operational Context and Next Steps

Sustainment at the Point of Operational Relevance: Aligning the U.S. Navy’s Osprey Sustainment Approach with Operations in the Contested Battlespace

By Robbin Laird

In my recent article on the CMV-22B coming to the carrier, I highlighted the importance of ramping up the CMV-22B buy to enable the kinds of support needed for a distributed fleet in a contested environment.

I also noted that “the synergies between the Navy and the USMC in this area are obvious, in terms of operating and maintenance knowledge.”

I want to focus on the sustainment side of the equation and the importance of having a fleet of aircraft ready for operations around the world, safely and quickly, when they are needed.

How do you sustain a fleet conducting forward operations but distributed across a vast battlespace?

Clearly, the need to deliver the necessary capabilities for sustained operations at the speed required is crucial; and this is where the transition from the C-2A to the CMV-22B will truly be a force multiplier.

I first dealt with Marine Corps Osprey maintainers during a visit to Marine Corps Air Station New River in 2010. That was 12 years ago, and the U.S. Navy has nearly two decades of Marine Corps experience to draw upon since the Marines began to operate the aircraft in 2007 in Iraq.

In an interview I did with Master Sgt. Jeremy Kirk during that 2010 visit, he underscored what he saw as a challenge for the Marines in maintaining the aircraft. I asked him the differences between maintaining the H-46, (the legacy aircraft known as the “Phrog”) and the Osprey: “There are differences. One of the biggest differences is the lack of experienced maintainers for the V-22. With the “Phrog” being around for so long, we have decades of experience in the minds of the maintainers. We are still learning the V-22. You have younger Marines and a new aircraft.”

The Osprey is a digital aircraft and the Marines working with their first digital aircraft was a key part of the transition. With the Navy now operating the aircraft, there is a “ground-hog-day” experience where the Navy needs to learn that a tiltrotor aircraft is neither a rotorcraft nor airplane; it is a hybrid with unique contributions to make to the warfighting enterprise.

One Marine Corps officer I interviewed during the Osprey transition’s early days was Colonel Chris “Mongo” Seymour.

In a meeting I had with him during his last week of service at New River before retirement in 2013, he noted: “There are several streams of activity which need to align to get the new system up and running and integrated into operations. He spoke in detail about one which was getting the Marines committed to owning the system and learning how to fix “new” problems, which come up with a new system. The challenges are different and must be worked differently. You need to get the maintainers to change their culture.

“Sorting out problems with the gearbox is a good example of what needed to be done. The gearbox on this airplane is very complex and central to its unique operational capabilities. The gearbox inside the nacelle turns a rotor, and they were chipping. This is high-end engineering. But when it was chipping, maintainers put it aside and waited for a new part. This meant the fleet was going to be degraded.

“The flight line needed to take ownership of the problem because a lot of it was self-inflicted.  Maintainers would look to blame someone else when they had a proprotor gearbox go bad. As it turns out, the technology required was to use isotropic oil that absorbs moisture out of the air, so if you have a gearbox that’s not turning and boiling the oil out on a regular basis, it goes long term down. It’s sucking in the moisture of the North Carolina Coast into the oil.

“And the maintainers would leave it out on the flight line all opened just breathing the air, and then when they finally got a part or piece, they try to fire it up and another gearbox would chip, or another problem would manifest itself someplace else. It was an endless loop. We took some ownership here on flight line, shaped better maintenance practices, and helped industry.

“Once we got that proprotor gearbox moving back out of the red into the black, the internal culture of the community changed to become significantly more optimistic. The maintenance man-hours required to change a proprotor gearbox initially was estimated at 1800 maintenance man-hours. We’re doing it now in about 380. That’s how good we got at it.”

Recently, I turned to “Mongo” again to discuss the challenges and opportunities posed by the U.S. Navy now buying into the Osprey capabilities to support the carrier and the fleet. He is now in charge of sustainment at Bell, and we picked back up from our earlier interview.

He highlighted that while the Marines have significant experience in sustaining the aircraft, the Navy has its own learning curve, just as did the Marines earlier.

“It is sort of a ‘ground-hog-day.’ The Navy maintainers are generationally detached from the innovations of the past two decades of Marine Corps operations and development. But they are inheriting more than 20 years of operational experience and are building from that forward with specific U.S. Navy operational demands associated with the large deck carrier and then with the fleet.”

He pointed out that the Navy’s acquisition of the Osprey meant the Navy was taking ownership of the aircraft and making it a naval aircraft instead of a unique Marine Corps platform. This meant the Navy was activating its naval sustainment enterprise and would focus on the demand side of the fleet regarding the sustainment effort.

Seymour pointed out that both services benefit from Navy ownership of the platform; the Marines will benefit from Naval ownership and the focus on support from the naval enterprise, while the Navy will benefit from the established global sustainment capabilities and parts distribution points supporting USMC operations.

The Marines have an established infrastructure for supply and intermediate and depot-level repairs throughout the United States, as well as forward bases in Okinawa, Hawaii, in addition to facilities at RAF Mildenhall in the UK and Yokota Japan for the USAF variant of the aircraft (which is highlighted in the photos in the slideshow at the end of this article).

There is a significant opportunity for change concerning the sustainment approach driven by the Navy’s aircraft acquisition.

The Osprey’s complete integration into the Navy’s sustainment enterprise provides an opportunity to build an Osprey focused aggressive performance-based logistics approach. The Navy does this with the Seahawk helicopter and is in the throes of establishing a major F-35 Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract for both the Marines and Navy.

Currently, the Navy manages most of the 1,600 to 1,700 repairable parts that make up an Osprey. The co-prime contractors on the program – Bell Boeing – manage nearly 20% of these parts. The shift to a PBL would allow the co-primes to better manage the supply chain, the parts distribution and the readiness and reliability of the parts and bring down the cost per flight hour.

The speed of delivery to the fleet – not merely as a narrowly defined COD replacement – makes the V-22 an asset that can deliver supplies with the relevant speed in a contested battlespace. The Navy’s challenge of managing many parts by contracting with many suppliers slows the ability to keep that fleet operational at the readiness levels desired.

A shift to a comprehensive PBL would empower Bell Boeing to drive change where rapid operations might expose a need to re-design parts. Under the PBL construct, the cumbersome process required to redesign parts is streamlined. Instead, this would be done in a timely fashion in partnership between government and the Osprey OEM.

The co-primes with the current PBL contract are in the high 90 percentile regarding material availability for the 228 parts for which they are responsible. These are the key parts that I discussed with “Mongo” 10 years ago. “What has been exposed then is how a wide number of low technologies, low cost and low complexity parts for the aircraft which the Navy is directly managing are not as readily available for the fleet when they need them.”

And because the predictable trajectory for the CMV-22B is to provide fleet support in its point-to-point sustainment roles, significant enhancement in fleet readiness is a key element of getting the kind of enhanced performance for the fleet as an integrated combat force.

The Navy has demonstrated in other programs its confidence and competence in working PBLs with industry. This benefit can also be extended for Osprey fleet readiness.

The defense industrial base is strained even in the face of the conflict with Ukraine.

For a Naval force with high demand in contested operations, this should indicate what is needed: a shift from a peacetime mindset to one in which significant global operations and conflict is becoming a distinct possibility.

We need a wartime approach to sustainment, not a “just-in-time” one. The speed of delivery to the fleet – not merely as a narrowly defined COD replacement – makes the CMV-22 an asset that can deliver supplies with the relevant speed, range and operational flexibility in a contested battlespace.

During its first two global deployments with 7th fleet, the CMV-22 demonstrated a remarkable positive impact on carrier battle group operations and readiness. To prepare for future maritime operations in a contested environment and take full advantage of Naval Aviation’s Osprey force: (1) lessons learned must be shared between Navy and Marine Corps users; (2) a robust PBL must be developed; and (3) serious consideration must be given to increasing the CMV-22 program of record so that the entire Joint Force Maritime Component benefits from this game changing capability.

Exercise Trident Completed

10/23/2022

By Captain Carla Armenti

A combined maritime task group comprised of Australian and Singaporean warships and troops has completed Exercise Trident.

Three warships and over 1600 people were involved in the exercise, a continued commitment to bilateral joint military exercises under the 2015 Singapore-Australia Comprehensive Partnership.

The exercise came to an end with a formal closing ceremony held at Tiger Hill at Shoalwater Bay, Queensland.

During the exercise, troops from the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, and 3rd Battalion, Singapore Guards, completed land integration training before embarking on Royal Australian Navy landing helicopter dock HMAS Adelaide and Republic of Singapore Navy landing ship tanks RSS Endurance and RSS Persistence.

Trident’s Deputy Director Captain Tim Byles, from the Royal Australian Navy, said the co-led exercise was an opportunity to build on an over 30-year defence partnership between the Australian Defence Force and the Singapore Armed Forces.

“This year we have integrated our staff, tested our operational planning skills and executed the tactical phase of the training, which includes ship to shore operations, and an offensive land manoeuvre as the culminating activity,” Captain Byles said.

This was the eighth iteration of Exercise Trident and the amphibious training component was a first during the bilateral activity.

“We demonstrated the ability to project a ground combat element from the vessels to the beach, with support from rotary wing assets and small boat teams, before the seizure of an inland objective,” Captain Byles said.

Close air support and troop lift was provided by Republic of Singapore Air Force CH-47D helicopters permanently based at Oakey in Queensland.

The troops will continue their training in the area into October, before the Singapore Armed Forces wrap up additional training in Australia later in the year.

Published by the Australian Department of Defence

17 October 2022