SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

Preventing the Next Private Sector Cyber Security Breach

Posted on July 18, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

07/18/2011

07/18/2011 – In rolling out its new cyber defense strategy, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn revealed that a foreign intelligence agency stole 24,000 files from a major U.S. defense contractor this March. Lynn added that this incident was just the latest example of how, during the past decade, “terabytes of data have been extracted by foreign intruders from corporate networks of defense companies.”

The announcement again underscores the importance of enhancing private sector cyber security in the United States, where the private sector owns or operates almost all U.S. computer networks, including an estimated 80%-90% of the most critical infrastructure networks. Given that private companies handle sensitive information and manage the overwhelming majority of the U.S. critical infrastructure, public-private cooperation has been a focus of cyber security initiatives for over a decade.

Globalization of data as a core challenge (Credit: Bigstock)

In 1998, President Clinton issued a directive for the federal government to seek to eliminate vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. In 2003, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and a Homeland Security Presidential Directive gave the new Secretary of Homeland Security responsibility for coordinating enhanced infrastructure protection efforts. in 2007, the Bush administration launched a Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) to bolster infrastructure protection programs. Sector Coordinating Councils have been established to institutionalize public-private cooperation for various critical infrastructure sectors. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center provides a more general forum for homeland security engagement between industries and the government.

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) outlines guidelines for public-private partnerships in securing critical infrastructure, including provisions for owners and operators to have access to information, ensuring that industries are involved in initiatives and policies at their outset, and supporting research to enhance security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) allows sectors to identify cyber assets that may have nationally significant consequences through cross-sector cyber methodologies based on the NIPP risk management framework. Responsibility of monitoring private networks remains with the private sector.

In 2009, as part of the Obama Administration’s Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, the National Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted an examination of U.S. cybersecurity policy. The resulting Cyberspace Policy Review found that the United States was facing mounting cyber threats and had to improve both public and private sector cyber defenses.

DHS appears to have overcome some early problems in this area and has recently successfully partnered with the private sector on several initiatives. For example, the Departmemt has worked with companies including Visa, Cisco, and Google on major public education and outreach efforts such as the National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA), which sponsors that staysafeonline.org website and an annual National Cybersecurity Awareness Month in October.

DHS also cooperates with the private sector in the biennial Cyber Storm exercise series. These DGS-led exercises aim to increase public and private sector preparedness for a cyber attack by rehearsing the strategic decision making capabilities of agencies as well as their ability to cooperate together and with non-federal entities in a cyber incident. Cyber Storm III in September 2010 involved 60 private companies from the finance, chemical, communications, dams, defense, IT, nuclear, transportation and water sectors as well as some sector coordinating councils.

Cyber Storm III was also the first test of the National Cybersecurity and Communication Integration Center (NCCIC), which was inaugurated in October 2009. According to DHS, NCCIC is an always open entity that generates a common cyber and communications operating picture across federal, military, and private sector The NCCIC coordinates information from within DHS, among other federal agencies such as the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and National Security Agency, and between the public and private sectors. The NCCIC is responsible for coordinating the preparation and response to a cyber attack among the public and private sectors.

The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the operational arm of the DHS National Cyber Security Division, disseminates “reasoned and actionable cyber security information to the public.” US-CERT offers free cyber security training to operators of control systems for critical infrastructure. DHS also works with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide free online cyber security training for IT professionals and businesses.

In December 2010, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the Department of Commerce joined with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (DHS/S&T) and the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (FSSCC) to conduct accelerated “collaborative research, development, and testing activities for cybersecurity technologies and processes based upon the financial services sector’s needs.”

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also supports private sector cyber security. Its Cyber Action Teams (CATS) of FBI agents can quickly deploy to investigate cyber intrusions. For example, the FBI assisted Google this May to investigate the hacking of U.S. government officials’ Gmail accounts. The InfraGard program partners FBI with state and local governments as well as the operators of critical infrastructure designed to increase communication and information sharing between those entities that protect and operate critical U.S. infrastructure.

During their 111^th session, members of Congress introduced approximately 50 cyber security bills. At the request of the Senate leadership, the Obama Administration formulated a comprehensive legislative proposal designed to address an array of cyber security concerns addressed in these bills.

Security in the global network is a variable, not a constant. (Credit: Bigstock)

On May 12, 2011, the Obama Administration released its Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal. Its stated aim is to strike a balance between the concerns of industry and the patent need for greater cyber security through enhanced public-private cooperation to better protect Internet-based networks. Both administration and congressional leaders have stressed that the proposal represented a contribution to congressional deliberations and would likely be amended by the half dozen committees having jurisdiction over public-private cyber security issues.

Although many industry leaders applaud government efforts to bolster national cyber defenses, some private sector stakeholders have expressed concern that increased federal intervention in private cyber networks would impose excessive burdens and thereby stifle innovation and commerce.

Critics have suggested that regulation could actually have adverse effects on the private sector’s ability to parry cyber-attacks. They assert that creating cyber security frameworks designed to meet compliance standards would not be cost effective given the wide variation among systems and networks as well as the rapid change of information technology. In this regard, private sector leaders have warned that an overly broad definition of what constitutes “critical” national infrastructure could result in the government’s imposing excessively wide cyber security mandates across the private sector.

The Obama administration has sought to reassure the private sector that its proposal would not overly burden corporations and other non-governmental entities. Administration representatives have affirmed their general opposition to a top-down approach that employs heavy government regulations to cyber security partnerships and instead have backed a bottom-up approach driven by market forces and self-regulation. In most industry sectors, firms would be responsible for establishing their own cyber security standards and for developing and validating plans to achieve them. The federal government could assist this process only if the firms involved requested help.

Only in the case of “core” critical infrastructure, which would be identified through standard agency rulemaking processes that are open to industry participation, could DHS compel companies to adopt specific remedial measures if federal regulators deemed the existing standards and plans inadequate. These would be subjected to a third-party commercial audit and, if the operator already reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC certification of their plans. DHS would then work with businesses to improve plans deemed insufficient.

The administration’s proposal would bolster DHS capabilities in this area in any case by enhancing the Department’s abilities to defend civilian government networks. DHS will now replace OMB as the manager of the Federal Information Security Management Act and develop and implement intrusion detection systems along with oversight through annual certification to verify their effectiveness. DHS would also receive the same authorities as the Department of Defense to hire more cyber security professionals on an accelerated basis. DHS would also receive authorization to exchange cyber security experts with the private sector to enhance mutual understanding.

Beyond DHS assistance to other federal agencies, the administration’s proposal aims to clarify DHS’s role in helping state and local governments as well as private companies respond to cyber attacks. The Obama administration recommends that legislation should provide DHS with a clear statutory framework for action in the cyber security realm that would enable the Departmemt to respond more rapidly to requests for assistance without fear of overstepping its authority. This initiative aims to address a recurring private sector complaint that the government was not providing them with sufficient actionable threat information and cyber alerts.

Hackers are constantly working to break data locks. (Credit: Bigstock)

Conversely, public bodies complain that private companies are excessively reluctant to relate information about cyber attacks, degrading mutual situational awareness and complicating efforts to assess and strengthen national cyber security programs. State and local governments as well as private companies may be unsure of what cyber security information they can safely share with federal government entities.

Business leaders hesitate to provide sensitive, proprietary data for fear government action could harm their competitiveness if proprietary information reaches their competitors. Furthermore, company executives often fear that sharing information about private individuals could expose them to potential legal action on civil liberty grounds.

The Obama administration wants legislation to grant limited legal immunity to organizations including private companies that share cyber security information with DHS. To facilitate matters, the administration would replace the existing hodgepodge of 47 separate state “breach” notification laws with a single requirement that a firm that experiences a cyber intrusion that could have gained access to information about private individuals must report that breach to DHS. The new rule would also specify when and how the company must notify the affected customers.

As a form of deterrence, the proposal would modernize other laws and regulations to address cyber crimes. For example, it would extend the scope of some laws to Internet crime and increase penalties for cyber crime so that they match those imposed for non-Internet illegalities.

The administration’s proposal also stresses the need for measures to ensure that shared information and other public-private cyber security collaboration does not impinge on civil liberties. The proposed privacy protection framework includes new oversight, reporting, and annual certification requirements to ensure that cybersecurity technologies are used only for their lawfully intended purposes.

A final area of private sector concern is that U.S. government action to establish industry standards could prompt foreign governments to institute their own, different standards. This process could result in a “Balkanization” of the Internet that would impede global commerce. The private sector would also like the U.S. government to try to make U.S. industry best practices the global standard for cyber security.

Along with the Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal, which focuses on domestic cyber security, the Obama administration released an International Strategy for Cyberspace with the goal of maintaining an “open, interoperable, secure, and reliable cyberspace.” To realize this goal, the Strategy states that the United States will partner with other national governments to promote benign international norms for cyber security that favor the growth of global commerce. The administration also wants to enhance international cooperation in cyber law enforcement since cyber criminal organizations are often transnational actors that exploit the almost borderless world of the Internet.

Several Congressional Committees have held hearings on the administration’s proposal. Many of the suggested changes have been welcome, but there have been several recurring objections. For example, whereas the administration would rely on market disincentives to drive behavior (e.g., companies’ desire to avoid losing customers, including federal procurement contracts, or paying higher insurance premiums through exposure of weak cyber security practices), members of Congress have called for more positive incentives such as tax subsidies for adopting superior cyber defenses.

Another congressional concern is to limit the president’s ability to “kill” the Internet in a national emergency by specifying what an administration can do under crisis conditions. Members have also sought to constrain the immunities given firms that experience a data breach through negligence or other problematic behavior.

Finally, many members of Congress want to replace the current White House-appointed Cyber Coordinator with a more powerful official who would also be more responsible to Congress through a requirement for Senate confirmation of any nominee for that position.

The Honorable Bill Anderson

Posted on July 18, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

Biography

William C. “Bill” Anderson is President and Chief Executive Officer of Anderson Global Innovation Group, Inc.; a Berlin, Maryland based firm specializing in energy technology commercialization, environmental sustainability, defense, real estate asset optimization and business development. Bill is also Chief Executive Officer of Generations Property Group, a family-owned real estate management firm serving Maryland’s Lower Eastern Shore. He currently serves as an Operating Partner at Pegasus Capital Advisors L.P., a New York City based private equity firm, Bill also holds several senior advisory positions in organizations serving the defense, aerospace, sustainability and energy markets.

Most recently, Bill was appointed by President George W. Bush and confirmed by the United States Senate to serve as Assistant Secretary of the United States Air Force for Installations, Environment and Logistics, and the Air Force’s Senior Energy Executive, based at the Pentagon in Washington, DC. As Assistant Secretary, he led an organization with responsibilities that included installations, military construction, base closure and realignment; environment, energy, safety and occupational health issues, and all logistical matters. For his efforts, Bill was presented the Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service and the Presidential Award for Leadership in Federal Energy Management.

Born in Syracuse, N.Y., Bill is an honors graduate of Washington College in Chestertown, Md., and earned his law degree with honors from Syracuse University. He has also studied in the master’s program for international business at the University of Miami. Bill is a member of the Maryland and Florida Bars.

Bill previously served in a variety of financial and tax consulting positions at Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Arthur Anderson & Co., and Ryder Systems, Inc. He then joined the General Electric Company holding a variety of positions, including Tax Counsel, General Counsel and Director of Environmental and Quality Affairs for General Electric’s electrical products business in Europe. He returned to the U.S. as their General Manager and Senior Counsel, Environmental Health and Safety.

An avid bicyclist, he organized the U.S. Air Force Cycling Classic, an internationally sanctioned annual pro cycling event in Arlington, VA, and currently serves in an advisory capacity to the race promoters. Bill continues his commitment to our veterans and their families by serving as a member of the Board of Directors of the Raisin Hope Foundation, an organization focused on raising awareness of traumatic brain injuries and supporting survivors of TBI, including our wounded warriors.

Hans Tino Hansen

Posted on July 18, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

Biography

Hans Tino Hansen is founder and CEO of Risk Intelligence. He specialises in intelligence, terrorism, insurgency, organised crime and piracy as well as contingency planning. He led the development of the “Four Circles Model” for understanding the impact of and inter-relation between terrorism, insurgency, organised crime and piracy. He has advised a number of companies and governmental organisations at management level since the founding of Protocol in 2001 and as Risk Intelligence since 2007.

From 1997 to 2001 he was CEO of East and Central European Advisors (ECEA). Partly in parallel, 1996-1998, he was President of the European non-governmental organisation for young future leaders, Young Europeans for Security (YES); from 1994-1996 he served as Secretary General.

He holds a master’s degree in economics from the University of Copenhagen. Prior to his studies he served in the Danish Army for two years and later in the army reserve as a mortar platoon commander.

He has contributed to books on maritime security and is regularly consulted as an expert commentator by the international and Danish media.

Emerging Alliance, Part IV

Posted on July 13, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

07/13/2011

(Credit: http://www.opinion-maker.org/2010/11/us-bouts-victor-bout/)

Criminalized States and Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines

By Douglas Farah

Senior Fellow, Financial Investigations and Transparency

International Assessment and Strategy Center

Adjunct Fellow, Americas Program, CSIS

http://www.ndu.edu/press/emerging-alliances.html

07/13/2011 Viktor Bout: A Case Study in the New World Order

07/05/2011 – Viktor Bout, a former Soviet military intelligence official, became one of the world’s premier gray market weapons merchants, able to arm multiple sides of several conflicts in Africa, as well as both the Taliban and Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. But of particular interest here is his relationship with Taylor and how he made that connection, and the different, interlocking networks that made that relationship possible.

Bout made his mark by building an unrivaled air fleet and arms procurement operation that could deliver not only huge amounts of weapons but also sophisticated weapons systems and combat helicopters, to armed groups. From the mid-1990s until his arrest in Thailand in 2008, Bout armed groups in Africa, Afghanistan, Colombia, and elsewhere.[1]

Bout’s relationship to Taylor and the West African conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone sheds light on how these networks operate and connect with criminal states, and the symbiotic relationships that develop.

Sanjivan Ruprah, a Kenyan citizen of Indian descent who emerged as a key influence broker in several of Africa’s conflicts, introduced Bout into Taylor’s inner circle, a move that fundamentally altered the supply of weapons both to Liberia and to the RUF in Sierra Leone, Taylor’s vicious proxy army controlling important diamond fields. One of the favors Ruprah and Taylor offered Bout was the chance to register several dozen of his rogue aircraft in Liberia.

Ruprah had taken advantage of operating in a criminal state and used his access to Taylor to be named the Liberian government’s Global Civil Aviation Agent Worldwide in order to further Bout’s goals. This position gave Ruprah access to the aircraft and possible control of it.[2] “I was asked by an associate of Viktor’s to get involved in the Aviation registry of Liberia as both Viktor and him wanted to restructure the same and they felt there could be financial gain from the same,” he has stated.[3]

Bout was seeking to use the Liberian registry to hide his aircraft because the registry, in reality run from Kent, England, allowed aircraft owners to obtain online an internationally valid Air Worthiness Certificate without having the aircraft inspected and without disclosing the names of the owners.[4]

Through his access to aircraft whose ownership he could hide through a shell game of shifting registries, as well as to the arsenals of the former Soviet bloc, Bout was able to acquire and transport a much-desired commodity – weapons — to service clients across Africa, Afghanistan, Colombia and elsewhere. The weapons — including tens of thousands of AK-47 assault rifles, Rocket Propelled Grenades, tens of millions of rounds of ammunition, anti-aircraft guns, land mines and possibly surface-to-air missiles – were often exchanged directly for another commodity, primarily diamonds, but also coltan and other minerals.

Bout mastered the art of leveraging the advantages offered by criminal states, registering his aircraft in Liberia and Equatorial Guinea, purchasing End User Certificates from Togo and other nations, and buying protection across the continent. For entrée into the circles of warlords, presidents and insurgent leaders, Bout relied on a group of political fixers like Ruprah.

The exchange of commodities such as diamonds for weapons moved illicitly in support of non-state actors was largely not punishable because, while the activities violated United Nations sanctions, they were not specifically illegal in any particular jurisdiction. This vast legal loophole still remains intact.[5]

[1] Details of Bout’s global operations can be found at: Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes and the Man Who Makes War Possible,” John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2007. In November 2010 Bout was extradited to the United States to stand trial for allegedly planning to sell weapons to a designated terrorist organization. See: Chris McGreal, “Viktor Bout, Suspected Russian Arms Dealer, Extradited to New York,” The Guardian, November 16, 2010, accessed on December 28, 2010 at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/16/russian-arms-dealer-extradited

[2] UNSC S/2000/1195, op. cit.

[3] Ruprah email to author for the book Merchant of Death, op cit., p. 159.

[4] Farah and Braun, op cit. p. 159; and UNSC S/2000/1225 paras. 142-143.

[5] Farah and Braun, op cit.

The Littoral Combat Ship and the Newly Enabled ARG

Posted on July 12, 2011 | by SysAdmin

07/12/2011

A New Capability for the USN-USMC Team

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

07/12/2011 – The USN is buying the LCS but its Con-Ops remain to be developed. No platform fights alone, and this asset is best understood in terms of the synergy which can be brought to it by how it is connected to other combat systems. The clear partner is the newly configured Amphibious Ready Group or the ARG, built around the F-35B.

These two forces – the LCS and the newly configured ARG – can be conjoined and forged into an enlarged littoral combat capability. But without the newly configured ARG, and the core asset, the F-35B, such potential is undercut.

This is a good example of how buying the right platform – the F-35B – is part of a leveraging strategy whereby greater value is provided for the fleet through the acquisition of that platform.

In a time of fiscal stringency, good value acquisitions need to be prioritized. Such acquisitions are able to leverage already acquired or in the process of being acquired capabilities and provide significant enhancement of capabilities.

They are high value assets, both in terms of warfighting and best value from an overall fleet perspective.

A newly configured USMC ARG is emerging from several new assets:

The new ARG built around the LPD 17 has a larger deck to operate from, with modern C2 capabilities.
The F-35B can be launched as a 360 degree presence asset to do electronic warfare, C4ISR and preparation for kinetic or non-kinetic strike.
The CH-53K can take off from the amphibious ships and carry three times the cargo of a CH-53E, to include 463L pallets (normally used in KC-130s).
The USMC Ospreys can support insertion operations with speed and range.

What the newly equipped ARG does is provide a significant shaping function for the President. And this shaping function allows significant flexibility, any hard 3000 foot surface is available for the Navy/Marine amphibious forces to seize and hold. This world class uniquely American battle capability is a redefinition of the dichotomy between hard and soft power.

And such capability in turn draws upon the decade of innovation which the USAF has engaged in in shaping the Air Dropping Revolution. As the commander of the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) underscored:

Question: When you put that data out there about air dropping trends, it’s impressive in and of itself, but when you think of the CONOPS implications they are significant as well. I don’t even need to use roads to actually start inserting a force. Interestingly for the Marines when they’re looking at the amphibious ready group (ARG) and what they could do with the future ARG, with their MC-130Js that can land in 3,000 feet or less, the Ospreys and the B’s that they could put basically on almost any paved highway worldwide. They could be anywhere in the world, and then people say, “Well how would you supply them,” and I would say, “Well what do you think we’ve been doing in the last ten years?” So if we marry up this revolutionary air dropping capability with projection of force from the sea, we could have a much more flexible and powerful insertion force if we wanted to.

General Allardice: I agree. Our new air dropping capabilities can be used to support our global operations in new and innovative ways. And honestly, innovation is really the essential takeaway. Through collaboration we are able to optimize the performance of the global mobility enterprise and orient it toward the effect we need. There will always be a tension between capacity and requirements, but we have found a way to manage it that allows us to respond rapidly and address those tensions in ways that would be much more difficult without the processes we have in place.

The USN-USMC amphibious team can provide for a wide-range of options for the President simply by being offshore, with 5th generation aircraft capability on board which provides 360 situational awareness, deep visibility over the air and ground space, and carrying significant capability on board to empower a full spectrum force as needed.

F-35B in Supersonic Flight Test (Credit: Lockheed Martin)

Now add the LCS. The LCS provides a tip of the spear, presence mission capability. The speed of the ship allows it to provide forward presence more rapidly than any other ship in the USN-USMC inventory.

It was said in fighter aviation “speed is life” and in certain situations the LCS can be paid the same complement. The key is not only the ships agility and speed but it can carry helicopters and arrive on station with state-of-the art C4ISR capabilities to meld into the F-35B combat umbrella. Visualize a 40+ knot Iron Dome asset linking to Aegis ships and the ARG air assets.

Inserting an LCS into the Maersk Alabama incident can see an example of the impact of speed. As one naval analyst put it, the impact would have been as follows:

LCS at 45kts would have been on scene in less than 7 hours (6.7), or 37% sooner than a ship transiting at 28 kts.
LCS fuel consumption for such a sprint 40% less than the 28 kt sprint.
LCS would consume less than 23% of her fuel capacity in such a sprint.
A helo launch within 150 nautical miles from Maersk Alabama puts helo overhead within four hours (4.3) from the time of the initial tasking.
Two H-60’s permits LCS to maintained a helo overhead Maersk Alabama for a sustained period of time.
With a response time of four hours the probability of thwarting a piracy attack is increased—especially if the naval ship is called upon the first realization of the targeted ship’s entry into piracy infested waters.
If an LCS was tasked to respond when Maersk Alabama encountered the first group of pirates craft on 7 April 2009, it would have arrived on scene well in advance of the attack on 8 April and may well have prevented it.

And if you add the LCS to the USN-USMC amphibious team you have even more capability and more options. As a senior USMC MEU commander has put it:

You’re sitting off the coast, pick your country, doesn’t matter, you’re told okay, we’ve got to do some shaping operations, we want to take and put some assets into shore, their going to do some shaping work over here. LCS comes in, very low profile platform. Operating off the shore, inserts these guys in small boats that night. They infill, they go in, their doing their mission.

The LCS now sets up — it’s a gun platform. It’s a resupply, refuel point for my Hueys and Cobras. Now, these guys get in here, okay. High value targets been picked out, there is an F-35 that’s doing some other operations. These guys only came with him and said hey, we have got a high value target, but if we take him out, we will compromise our position. The F-35 goes roger, got it painted, got it seen. This is what you’re seeing, this is what I’m seeing. Okay. Kill the target. The guys on the ground never even know what hit them.

USS Freedom (Credit: USN)

In World War II the Imperial Japanese Navy Admirals were said to call the US PT, or Patrol Torpedo Boats—“Devil Boats”—The LCS is not a PT boat but the LCS ocean presence with 21^st Century capabilities may make it a modern “Devil Boat” to vex any enemy combat action.

Similar to the PT boats of WWII the LCS by itself has limited staying power; connected to the ARG, the LCS announces presence and is connected to significant full spectrum combat capability.

Several LCS’s could be deployed with Osprey and F-35B cover. The F-35B provides the 360 degree multiple of hundreds of miles coverage. The LCS becomes a node in the combat system of the F-35 and any weapons on the LCS can be cued up by the F-35B.

With the new aviation assets, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) can be split at sea allowing it to cover hundreds of miles more than historical operations with unexpended speed and maneuverability.. And adding an LCS to each of the disaggregated elements can further enhance the presence and combat functions of the MEU.

An Osprey pilot has already indicated that Ospreys have already allowed the splitting of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) at sea.

I saw so much potential for the short take-off vertical landing attack aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft and the V-22 working together. In the future, I would have those two, the V-22 and F-35 working very closely together and even for extended operations when you add the refueling piece. The paring of these two aircraft are far better than paring the V-22 with any of the helicopters.

Because of speed, range. And not only that. It’s the endurance of the aircraft itself. Basically you might say once it’s flying, it’s flying. And we had a lot of missions that required flight time above six hours, which is very taxing for the jet guys and for us, it is as well, but maybe not so bad because we can trade off in the cockpit. The fact is that you can have airborne assets, both as a package as well as a trap for sensitive site exploitations, being airborne all at the same time for hours at a time to respond to something that happens in the AOR. It will give you the maximum flexibility for response time down to something like thirty minutes, depending on where it is. And then sanitize the scene from there and then everybody returns home. It’s a capability that I’m not going to say it’s been overlooked but it just hasn’t been utilized like that.

The LCS-ARG team cannot only leverage each other’s capabilities, but can lay the groundwork for a significant robotics revolution. The new maritime capabilities built around robotic vehicles, on the sea, under the sea, and over the sea, can be launched and managed by either LCS’s or LPDs.

As the Prospective Commander of the LPD-24 noted, “We have a lot more space of carrying robotic assets. And can work effectively with the LCS. We can easily work with the LCS, especially with her different mission capabilities. And if she needs to change out mission capabilities, we have the cargo space to fulfill her mission.”

And in an interview with the retired head of NAVAIR, Admiral Dyer now COO of iRobot provided a sense of how this team could work with the robotics revolution:

At iRobot, we have a vision of integrated Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV’s), Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UAV’s) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV’s). A way I like to think about that is to envision a littoral combat ship that shows up off the coast of some bad guy’s country. Let’s take a look at how different that will be compared to the way we do it today:

Let’s consider UUVs, which I think are one of the most exciting developmental areas that are underway. UUV’s are, by the way, the area where autonomy is needed more than anywhere else. Why? Well, while you’ve good radio frequency bandwidth when you’re airborne, you have very little bandwidth when communicating with UUVs. Underwater, you’re limited to acoustic modems for un-tethered operations. An acoustic modem is slower than your first dial-up PC connection to the web. But as you start to introduce more autonomy, you start to tremendously increase the utility of unmanned underwater systems. Autonomy is important for the future of all robots, but critically important for UUVs. That is what iRobot is building at our unmanned underwater systems group in Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina. But let’s continue with this Navy ship showing up with a Navy/Marine Corps team on an adversary’s littoral during the next decade. The preparation for entering that battle space will be tremendously improved in many ways by unmanned systems.

I worry that the Navy has not taken full notice of the IED threat. Our Navy’s interest in and focus on maritime IEDs (mines) is episodic and our attention has always been short. Unmanned systems will offer new capabilities at sea, just as unmanned ground robots have for ground forces.

USS Freedom in Transit (Credit: USN)

When asked how one would deliver such capabilities into the battlespace, the airborne assets of the LCS and the ARG were highlighted:

I believe UUV’s offer great potential but there are challenges. The prime challenges for UUVs are range and power,area coverage. UUVs have the disadvantages of being relatively slow and of limited search duration. So you can’t efficiently transit them; you have to deliver them to the area of interest. At iRobot, we’re coming at this problem with our Ranger program, which we’re funding atop some basic work sponsored by the Office of Naval Research. We are designing a Ranger UUV that’s “A-size.” “A-size” means it fits into a sonobouy launcher. And there are literally thousands of tubes out there on multiple patrol and tacair platforms. Marry the capability to air-launch with swarm capability and you cut out the transit time, greatly reduce the power requirement and introduce UUVs directly into the area of interest.

Using swarm techniques, which DARPA has funded iRobot and others to develop; you start to see the operations research numbers get much, much better. This isn’t something that’s awaiting better batteries and more power; it’s awaiting further development of a new concept.

No platform fights alone, but often when the LCS gets discussed it is discussed only alone, but it has very little staying power in and of itself, as has been clearly noted by a senior USN Admiral in discussing the approach to LCS sustainment.

Question: The LCS is really a collaborative ship, so you’re doing collaborative con-ops and the sustainment approach is part of those collaborative con-ops. It seems that what is crucial for a new built platform, whether it be air or whatever, is that you’re doing in terms of maintenance from the initial shaping of the con-ops. So presumably the relationship of the LCS to other ships is a key part of the distance support and not just to the shore.

Admiral McManamon: Part of what the exploration is doing is shaping the build as we get new information from the maintenance efforts. For the initial deployment for USS Freedom, much of what we are doing is ringing out the basic mechanics, the engineers, being able to put the ship in the water, being able to communicate with other ships, being able to talk to an operator or air assets, etx : all this has been extremely successful from February to the end of April this first year. And from this deployment we start to shape standards of performance. She was able to do the connectivity essential to distance support; she was able to operate in ways that took advantage of a 2,800 ton ship going 40 plus knots. As one of our commanders indicated just last week, there’s this whole psychological power to itself for a 2,800 ton ship to go after a go-fast and actually be able to sustain in, keep up and take it down, which we simply can’t do in the current environment with regular navy ships.

But did I design and build LCS simply to run after a cigarette runner? No. But does it give me that capability when I need it? Yes, and as we now understand that capability and that connectivity necessary to do the con-ops, I think that’s exactly what we’re moving forward with to shape future ships and operations.

And the glue which generates LCS-ARG synergy are the aviation assets on the two entities, notably the Osprey and F-35B which have the speed and range to create a moving 360 degree combat and presence bubble over an operation. Without that glue, these platforms become disaggregated and vulnerable. Linked together, the resulting synergy creates a force multiplier effect.

And such a multiplier effect can have a significant deterrent effect. General “Dog” Davis, the Commander of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing at Cherry Point, North Carolina, underscored such an impact when discussing the newly enabled ARG.

I’m Muammar Gaddafi. I’m whoever, and I’ve got an ARG with this new gear embarked – and I can’t help but think its going to change the way I view that force. That ARG can reach out and touch me from long range, landing high-end infantry forces deep inside my territory, and do so with a speed that twice as fast as anyone else can. Our MEUs have never been used as effectively as they are today. These new capabilities are going to make them exponentially more potent and useful to our nation’s leadership.

The F-35Bs give the new ARG a very high-end air superiority fighter, that’s low observable if I want it to be. I can roll from Air to Air to Air to Ground quickly and be superior to all comers in both missions. That’s bad news for our adversaries. I can use the F-35s to escort the V-22s deep into enemy territory. With those V-22s we can range out to a 400-500-mile radius from the ship without air refueling. I can go deliver Marines deep in the enemy territory or wherever and do it at 250 miles an hour, so my speed of action, my agility is exponentially increased, and I think if you’re a bad guy, that would probably give you a reason to pause. It’s a very different animal that’s out there. We are good now, but will be even more so (by more than a factor of two in the future).

I also have significant mix and match capability. And this capability can change the impact of the ARG on the evolving situation. It is a forcing function enabled by variant mixes of capability. If I wanted to strip some V-22s off the deck, to accommodate more F-35s – I could do so easily. Their long legs allow them to lily pad for a limited period of time — off a much large array of shore FOBs – while still supporting the MEU. It’s much easier to do that in a V-22 than it is a traditional helicopter.

I open up that flight deck, or I can TRANSLANT or PAC additional F-35s. If I had six on the deck and I want to fly over another six or another four, we could do it rather quickly. Now the MEU has ten strike platforms. So if I need to have a TACAIR surge for a period of time, that deck provides a great platform for us. We’ve got the maintenance onboard that ship, so we can actually turn that Amphib very quickly from being a heliocentric Amphib to a fast jet Amphib. Conversely, I could also take the F-35s off, send them to a FOB and load it up with V-22s, 53Ks, or AH-1Zs and UH-1Ys.

Flexible machines and flexible ships. The combination is exceptional.

We will have a very configurable, agile ship to reconfigure almost on a dime based on the situation at hand. I think the enemy would look at the ARG as something completely different from what we have now. I think we have to change the way we do things a bit in order to allow for that, but I think we will once we get the new air assets. The newly enabled ARG, or newly whichever the term you’re using, will force our opponents to look at things very differently. We will use it differently, and our opponents are going to look at it differently.

Finally, being connected to the newly enabled ARG can intelligently facilitate LCS modernization. The LCS can carry a range of assets, from missiles, to helos, to unmanned assets, to a complement of distributed “cyber warriors” all of which can much more potency by being part of the ARG team. The F-35B can perform the function of the battle manager, without the presence of large USAF aircraft, or a carrier presence. This is truly a combat revolution in the making.

Russian Bulava SLBM Will Enter Service Next Year

Posted on July 11, 2011 | by SysAdmin

07/11/2011

By Dr. Richard Weitz

07/11/2011 – The recent successful launch of Russia’s RSM-56 Bulava (NATO code name SS-NX-30) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) may finally mark a turning point for this troubled weapons system.

On June 28, a Bulava left a submerged next-generation Borey-class submarine, the Yuri Dolgoruky, and flew 6,000 kilometers from the White Sea to the Kura test range in Russia’s Far East Kamchatka region. Three days later, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced that the Bulava will enter into serial production next year. Russian military sources indicated that they would conduct four additional tests of the missile before placing the Bulava into service by the end of 2011.

The Bulava (Russian: Булава; “mace” in English) is designed to carry 10 maneuverable and independently targeted (MIRVed) nuclear warheads, with a destructive power of some 100-150 kilotons each, a maximum range of some 8,000 kilometers. On paper, the Bulava’s advanced missile defense countermeasures, solid-fuel propellant, small size, light weight, rapid speed, maneuverability, and other capabilities make it a superior deterrent to anything in Russia’s existing SLBM arsenal.

(Credit: http://defenddeterrence.com/news/?p=695)

Unfortunately, the Bulava’s terrible test record has resulted in its remaining a paper system for years beyond 2006, its originally scheduled date for entering into service. More than half of the missile’s 15 test launches failed, sometimes spectacularly.

The repeated failures of the Bulava test flights proved an embarrassment for the Russian defense industry at a time when the Russian government was trying to reestablish Moscow’s claims to great power status.

The Bulava represents one of the few major Russian weapons systems developed after the Soviet Union’s collapse. It is probably also the most expensive military research and development program in Russian history. One experienced Russian analyst estimates that the Bulava, combined with the new Borey-class submarine to launch it, recently consumed 40% of Russia’s defense budget.

The Baluva’s problems result from two primary factors. The first is the mistaken if understandable Russian government decision to award the original contract to the wrong design firm and then follows its bad advice. The second was more serious mistake of continuing weaknesses in Russia’s military-industrial complex, especially production, quality control, and systems integration problems.

In 1998, the Russian Security Council awarded a development contract for a new SLBM to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), led by the well-respected missile-designer, Yuri Solomonov, after the government had abandoned its program to develop an earlier SLBM, the SS-NX-28 (D-19M) Bark. The Bark, designed by the rival Makeyev Design Bureau, had experienced three successive failures during test launches and its development costs were soaring.

(Credit: http://defenddeterrence.com/news/?p=695)

Yet, while the MITT had earlier developed the successful ground-based RT-2PM Topol (SS-25 Sickle) and the RT-2PMU Topol-M (SS-27) land-based ICBMs, it had never built a SLBM. Solomonov argued that his team could save considerable time and money (both in short supply because of the Bark debacle) by incorporating many of the innovative features already developed for the Topol-M into the Bulava program.

The most important innovations were the missile’s ability to accelerate rapidly soon after launch, a capacity designed to overcome any U.S. post-boost phase missile defenses.

The Russian government heeded Solomonov’s advice regarding the Bulava. Russia’s budgetary woes in the 1990s caused policymakers to try to save money by standardizing the research and development of the production of ballistic missiles, regardless of whether they were land-based or launched at sea.

The design of this three-staged SLBM is similar though not identical to the Topol-M. Russian officials also followed Solomonov’s recommendation to proceed rapidly to sea-based trials rather than conduct extensive initial land-based testing. Such “ground testing”—especially sophisticated computer-aided modeling of a missile or other aerospace vehicle that could locate potential flaws before conducting an expensive and, if failed, embarrassing test flight—is standard procedure for American and European missile design firms, but is rarer in Russia due to the lack of modern infrastructure and funding.

The intent was to accelerate the Bulava’s deployment and minimize its development costs, which had begun to exceed the initial budget. These government decisions and development shortcuts may have contributed to the missile’s recent problems.

Besides the overly ambitious design schedule, problems of production, quality control, and systems integration—coordinating the input of the dozens of independent subcontractors involved—was as a major reason for the Bulava’s difficulties. The large number of failures was due to a variety of problems rather than a single cause, making it difficult for the designers to correct the problem. Some failures affected the first stage, others occurred later in flight, while some difficulties arose even before launch. It looks as if different subcontractors provided defective equipment or material or inadequate service for many of the tests, meaning that correcting the defect from the previous launch did not prevent different problems from arising the next trial launch.

Furthermore, the Votkinsk Plant State Production Association where the missile was assembled and manufactured was also experiencing poor industrial production standards, quality control, and obsolete equipment. A factory manager at the Votkinsk plant stated on average 83% of the equipment was worn out and that 50 billion rubles were needed through 2020 for modernizing the factory’s equipment. Votkinsk also suffered from a lack of young specialists to replace the experienced staff who was retiring without mentoring a team of successors.

More generally, the design of the Bulava has to be compromised because the decline in Russia’s military-industrial base meant that many desired parts were no longer available. Vladimir Vysostsky, a senior Russian Navy official, officially explained Bulava’s issues as the consequence of a “deep, elementary dysfunction in the technical industry for… strategic missiles.” C.H. Kovalyova, the creator of the Akula submarine, has said that a lack of certain necessary support structures is contributed to Bulava’s mishaps.

Successive failures due to a variety of problems led an increasing number of Russian defense analysts and officials to consider abandoning the project despite the 100 billion rubles already spent on the system.

Nonetheless, the Russian government felt it had to persist with the Bulava because the weapon has been designed to work with Russia’s next-generation Borey-class (Project 955) ballistic missile launching submarine (SSBN). Since 1996, the nuclear-powered Borey has been the only strategic submarine under production in Russia. The Russian Navy has been waiting impatiently for these boats since the existing fleet of Delta and Typhoon SSBNs are exhausting their service lives as they undertake their so-called “deterrence cruises” through the Arctic and Pacific Oceans.

One Project 941 Akula-class Typhoon, the Dmitriy Donskoy, has been serving as a specially modified test platform for most of the Bulava launches pending completion of the first Borey-class ship. The first Borey-class SSBN, the Yury Dolgoruky, has begun sea trials and conducted the successful June 28 launch. The second, the Alexander Nevsky, is at the final stages of construction at the Sevmash Machine Building Enterprise shipyard in northern Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense plans to build at least six additional Borey ships, with the third and fourth also already under construction at Sevmash. Although the Yuri Dolgoruky is designed to carry as many as 12 Bulava SLBMs, the next three Borey ships will have 16 launch tubes able to accommodate the Bulava missile.

The Russian military is considering designing the remaining four Borey SSBNs to launch as many as 20 Bulavas. The Russian government plans to manufacture at least 150 Bulava SLBMs. The Russian military intends the Borey-Bulava combination to serve as the foundation of Russia’s nuclear triad until 2040. If the Bulava does not work, these billion-dollar Boreys will have nothing to fire.

The most popular alternative proposal was to retrofit the Borey to carry the R-29RM Sineva-class ballistic missile, another recently developed Russian SLBM. Although not as advanced as Bulava (the Sineva uses liquid rather than solid fuel and lacks some of Bulava’s defensive capabilities), Sineva is a capable modern missile that has an impressive launch record.

(Credit: http://warfare.ru/?linkid=1715&catid=265)

Yet, fitting the Borei to carry Sineva missiles would be expensive and time-consuming. Although Russian government and academic experts supporting the government’s general military reform program argue that their country faces no immediate military threat and therefore has time to undertake a comprehensive if challenging defense restructuring, the Russian military has steadfastly rejected the Sineva option or other alternatives.

Russian defense managers may have recalled Soviet experience when, in some cases, Russian weapons that had a long and tortuous development process ended up working well despite their early struggles. The R39 (SS-N-20 “Sturgeon”) was a Soviet SLBM project which began development in 1971, failed more than half its initial test flights, and was stuck in development for 12 years. Nevertheless, its problems were eventually worked out and the R39 served well in the Soviet and Russian Navy until 2004. The fact that the Bulava introduces path-breaking technologies into Russia’s SLBM force made that country’s defense managers expect that there would be many initial test failures. As Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev wrote in July 2009: “Bulava is a new rocket; in the course of its development we will encounter various setbacks… nothing new happens quickly.”

Another theoretical option would be for Russia to get out of the nuclear weapons business entirely. Yet, eliminating nuclear weapons enjoys little support among the Russian national security elite, who see Russia’s nuclear weapons as their ultimate instrument of defense, deterrence, and global influence.

Shortly after NATO commenced bombing Libya, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin made a special trip to the Votkinsk factory where the Bulava is produced. Putin used the occasion to remind its workers that Russia’s nuclear weapons shielded their country against a similar attack by Western powers. In his words, “they bombed Belgrade, Bush started a war in Afghanistan, then under a pretext, an entirely lying pretext, started a war in Iraq, liquidated the whole Iraqi leadership, now they’ve started to bomb Libya… today’s situation once again confirms the correctness of what we are doing to strengthen the defense capabilities of our country, and the new program of governmental arms-building is intended to achieve this.”

Although Russian designers may finally have gotten the Borey-Bulava combination to work, this success may prove exceptional. The Russian government devoted enormous sums to this one very important project, and cannot undertake a comparable effort with all its desired military systems. This limitation partly explains why Serdykov had to deny recent media reports that the Russian government planned to build an aircraft carrier in the next decade.

It also explains why Russian leaders are willing to buy expensive foreign weapons systems like the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship. Russian defense companies, having not yet recovered from the traumatic breakup of the Soviet-era military-industrial complex, are still incapable of building such a complex weapons system in a timely manner.

VMAQ-4’s High Tempo Mission

Posted on July 11, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

07/11/2011: Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 arrived in Afghanistan in early May. Their mission is complicated and secret, but Sgt Andrew Milner visited them and several Marines provided insights, and those Marines include Lance Cpl. Antonio Felix – Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 (VMAQ-4), Plane Capt., Collateral Duty Inspector and Lt. Col. Marlin Benton – Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 (VMAQ-4), Squadron Commanding Officer.

Credit: Defense Media Activity USMC: 06/04/2011

French Naval Ship Docks at Naval Station Norfolk

Posted on July 8, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

07/08/2011

07/08/2011: French Naval Ship Docks at Naval Station Norfolk

[slidepress gallery=’french-naval-ship-docks-at-naval-station-norfolk’]

Credit: Commander, U.S. Second Fleet: 07/11/2011

In the first photo, FS Ventose (F 733) from France arrives at Naval Station Norfolk after completing the at-sea phase of FRUKUS 2011. FRUKUS 2011 is an invitational exercise designed to enhance communication and interoperability between the navies of France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
In the second photo, Sailors assigned to the FS Ventose (F 733) from France set sea and anchor detail in preparation for their arrival at Naval Station Norfolk after completing the at-sea phase of FRUKUS 2011.
In the third photo, FS Ventose (F 733) from France navigate to Naval Station Norfolk from the Atlantic Ocean after completing the at-sea phase of FRUKUS 2011.