Espionage and the PRC Challenge

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Espionage and the PRC Challenge
04/27/2011

By Edward Timperlake

04/27/2011 – Testimony on cyber-attacks, espionage, and technology transfers to the People’s Republic of China, before the Foreign Affairs Committee, United States House of Representatives.

Friday April 15, 2011

***

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, it is an honor to be asked to testify on such an important subject.  I have prepared this written documentation of past and current activities of agents of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) who conduct espionage operations against the United States of America.  Tragically, agents of the PRC have had some notable success.

Mr. Chairman I will summarize my prepared statement.

The history of Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) espionage attempts against US military and dual-use technology in the nineties were identified and reported on by a Select Committee of the House of Representatives. The Congressional report is a tribute to the tremendous bipartisan effort of those Members who served because the final report was voted out unanimously:

“U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China,” Declassified Report issued, May 25, 1999, 106th Congress, 1st Session. (Credit: www.house.gov/coxreport)“U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China,” Declassified Report issued, May 25, 1999, 106th Congress, 1st Session. (Credit: www.house.gov/coxreport)

The late Chairman Solomon of the House Committee on Rules established this select Committee under the direction of the Speaker because of the clear and present danger of illegal foreign money entering the American Political process. It can be seen in its entirety at www.house.gov/coxreport/ or at Amazon.com, “The Cox Report.”

All types of individuals were giving money to the American political process, from drug dealers, Russian Mafia to PLA espionage agents.  It was a dangerous and nasty time and America is still living with the consequences of those days.

The PRC had an agenda to not only curry favor with agents of influence but also collect information and conduct espionage operations; a select Congressional committee was created. The extensive report issued by that committee covered significant aspects of US military and commercial dual-use technology that was targeted by PRC collectors. The PRC agent’s success in the 90s and continuing to this day is being seen in the continued rapid modernization of all military forces of the Peoples Liberation Army.

For brevity I have pulled out a few representative samples in this overview of the PLA’s current clear and present threat to America’s National Security. I am using “PLA” as a catch all for PRC Army, Navy, Air Force, 2nd Artillery, Cyber and Space forces.

A significant number of technologies which are now in the current PLA inventory were identified as potential problem areas by Congress over a decade ago. We are living today with the rapid modernization of all PLA forces originating from mistakes made in the 90s.

The representative technology I picked is associated with Ballistic Missiles, Super-Computers and Stealth. (Report language I chose is in italics)

First, the key point to understanding espionage by the PRC is to recognize their National Security “16 Character Policy.”

The PRC 16-Character Policy is to “Give Priority to Military Products”

• Jun-min jiehe (Combine the military and civil)

• Ping-zhan jiehe (Combine peace and war)

• Jun-pin youxian (Give priority to military products)

• Yi min yan jun (Let the civil support the military)

Ballistic missile technology:

  • The PRC has stolen U.S. missile technology and exploited it for the PRC’s own ballistic missile applications.

  • In the late 1990s, the PRC stole or illegally obtained U.S. developmental and research technology that, if taken to successful conclusion, could be used to attack U.S. satellites and submarines.

  • The PRC has proliferated such military technology to a number of other countries, including regimes hostile to the United States.

Iran —The PRC has provided Iran with ballistic missile technology, including guidance components and the recent transfer of telemetry equipment. The PRC reportedly is providing Iran with solid-propellant missile technology. Additionally, the PRC provided Iran with the 95-mile range CSS-8 ballistic missile. The PRC has also provided assistance to Iran’s nuclear programs.

North Korea— The Select Committee judges that the PRC has assisted weapons and military-related programs in North Korea.

  • My comment: On January 11 2007 the PLA successfully attacked and kinetically killed one of their satellites in orbit.

High Performance (HPCs) or “Super Computers”

HPCs from the United States have been obtained by PRC organizations involved in the research and development of:

• Missiles

• Satellites

• Spacecraft

• Submarines

• Aircraft

• Military systems components

• Command and control Communications

• Microwave and laser sensors

  • My comment: On 28 October 2010 the BBC announced that China has claimed top spot on world’s Super Computer List—Their Tianhe-1A (Milky Way) can carry out more then 2.5 thousand trillion calculations a second.

Stealth and Composite Technologies

What is stealth? Simply put, stealth is the ability to conceal an attacker from a defender’s detection and defensive systems, and successfully accomplish the mission. To avoid detection, it is necessary to reduce or eliminate the attacker’s “signature.” The “signature” is composed of five primary elements:

• Visual signature

• Infrared (heat) signature

• Acoustic (noise) signature

• Radio transmission signature

• Radar signature

The J-20 (Credit: http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/05/j-20-stealth-fighter-jet-5-facts-about-chinas-new-stealth-plan/)The J-20 (Credit: http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/05/j-20-stealth-fighter-jet-5-facts-about-chinas-new-stealth-plan/)

In my research I have found often that PLA weapon development efforts can go “dark” for five to seven years.  PLA forces, after perfecting their purloined technology and adding homegrown technology can then surprise the world on their technological advancements. The recent rollout and test flight of the J-20 follows this pattern.

  • My comments: Recently the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force surprised our Secretary of Defense and the American intelligence community when their PLAAF fighter, the J-20 “Annihilator,” had its initial test flight.

  • Congress anticipated this emerging capability over a decade ago and yet in 2011 the PLAAF still surprised the world.

  • To be fair, General Corley, USAF,  Lt Gen. Dave Deptula, USAF, and Lt Gen. Thomas McInerney, USAF anticipated this event.

  • Unfortunately, this rapidly emerging J-20 threat, along with the slightly earlier 5th Gen Russian Sukhoi T-50’s test flight, were not seen early enough by the US intelligence community.  Consequently, in October 2009, funding for continuing the F-22 production line was stopped at 187 Raptors because at that moment the F-22 was declared both “outdated” and no threat was seen on the horizon.

The Revolution in Military Affairs and Cyber War

While Congress was researching the issues mentioned above in the late 90s, Mr. Andrew Marshall Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, published his short and very direct paper heralding the advent of a  “Revolution in Military Affairs.” The PLA and especially their spymasters were paying close attention.

Mr. Marshall’s vision was profoundly simple. He postulated that technology and war fighting would evolve toward two constantly improving military capabilities.

  • Precision-guided munitions with remote sensors

  • Information war (the word “cyber” had not yet come into vogue)

In developing their “Information War” military doctrine, the PLA was awarding Doctorates in Information War to military officers as early as 1998. Since that time PRC cyber espionage attempts have been growing and are unrelenting.

Traditionally the commonly accepted thoughts about PRC espionage is that they have different “spy craft” then the “Cold War Russian” model of linear cells and cut outs.

The evidence in the 90s is that the PLA approached collecting information and technology much differentially than the Russian “cold war” model.

It has been my experience in investigating illegal money contributions that the PLA as needed will use their military along with their Intel community professionals, criminal elements (Triads), businessmen “hustlers,” academics both professors and students and even relatives of all those groups—what ever works.

So when the world became more digitized through the computer revolution, the PLA adapted, and became world class offensive cyber war fighters.  However, this time there was a role reversal from Russian cyber activity.  Russian cyber activity has been reported to be very wide open ranging from military and state sponsored activity, to numerous criminal enterprises for profit, to any of many other reasons.

As mentioned above PLA collection efforts in the field are very freewheeling and unstructured. But in cyber activities the PRC has adopted a Russian paranoid “cold war mentality.” They appear to be trying to keep their cyber war fighters in a rigid military chain of command. In fact there are significant criminal penalties in China for violating cyber restrictions put in place to keep their citizens from freely playing on the web and also acquiring information. The leadership of China is trying to constrain and contain the growing World Wide Web sharing of information.  It will be interesting to see if overtime the PRC is capable of stopping their citizen’s nascent “Jasmine Revolution” which is currently originating in Africa and the Middle East and spreading.

The PRC essentially has two cyber targets, those external to China and also their own citizens. Only totalitarian dictatorships and closed societies have this challenge. It is an Intel/cyber seam for a free and open society to exploit.

But currently today, regardless of internal PRC cyber issues their external attacks continue to be relentless. It is an ongoing struggle by the DOD CI community (NCIS, OSI, Army G-2), NSA, DNI, Law Enforcement (FBI and others) and Homeland Security to try and stay ahead of this dynamic and significant threat.  Several important recent examples of PLA “cyber attacks” were posted in Foreign Policy, January 22, 2010:

US Naval War College–In December 2006, the Naval War College in Rhode Island had to take all of its computer systems off line for weeks following a major cyber attack. One professor at the school told his students that the Chinese had brought down the system. The Naval War College is where much military strategy against China is developed.

Lockheed Martin’s F-35 program–In April, 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that China was suspected of being behind a major theft of data from Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter program, the most advanced airplane ever designed. Multiple infiltrations of the F-35 program apparently went on for years.

Two Case Studies

The Varyag Aircraft Carrier, a study in successful PRC Denial and Deception (D&D)

The Varyag Aircraft Carrier, April 2011 (Credit: http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/131998/20110408/varyag-china-s-first-aircraft-carrier-xinhua.htm)The Varyag Aircraft Carrier, April 2011 (Credit: http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/131998/20110408/varyag-china-s-first-aircraft-carrier-xinhua.htm)

The Soviet Union was building an aircraft carrier when the wall fell and they went into the dust bin of history. Consequently they put the unfinished carrier up for sale. It was bought by Chong Lot Travel Agency for $ 20 Million US to be used as a floating hotel and gambling parlor. Or so the cover story went. But this turned out to be a huge lie.

The ship was towed from the Black Sea to a Chinese ship yard, and on April 7, 2011, the New York Times announced, “Chinese War Ship May Be Nearly Ready:”

  • Xinhua’s headline with the photos said: “Huge warship on the verge of setting out, fulfilling China’s 70-year aircraft carrier dreams”

It now appears that the PRC denial and deception move was hugely successful.

However, in my professional judgement denial and deception only goes so far against the US Navy/Marine/Air Force Team.  Attack submarines, B-2s and USN Carrier Battle Groups like the USS Nimitz Battle Group, named after our Fleet Admiral that presided over the “Miracle At Midway” and victory at sea in WW II, are battle tested.

So if one day the Peoples Liberation Army Navy wants to challenge the American Navy in combat the US will sink their dream carrier the “Shi Lang,” named after their Ming Dynasty admiral, any time any place.

Second case: The “Iraq Technology Transfer List” project (shipping bad things to bad people)

The Chinese have a history of exporting weapons. It is important to note that when dealing with PRC espionage there is a double bounce, first into the PRC and then to other countries. This was seen, as mentioned, with Iran and North Korea but also with Iraq.

Not only is the PLA focused on collecting high tech military and duel use items, they have a vibrant weapons industry and do not hesitate to proliferate anything they have. Especially if the money is right.

The PLA armed Saddam’s Military through weapon shipments to Iraq in violation of UN Sanctions.  The PRC was second only to Russia on arming Iraq.

In December 2003 I was sent through out Iraq to inventory the conventional contraband weapons shipped to Saddam Hussein in violation of arms embargoes. The weapon smuggling effort was initiated under the provisions of the “oil-for-food” program managed by the French Bank PNB Paribas. The objective of my task was to assess “ground truth” from items found in Iraq in order to identify and bring to justice those individuals and criminal syndicates that had violated UN sanctions.

Support was provided to my mission by those in charge of captured enemy ammunition and unexploded ordnance (CEA/UXO) cleanup. The Army Corps of Engineers and 101st Airborne Division personnel who provided the data that were available.

Countries ranked in violation of arms embargo to Iraq:

U.S.S.R.: 122 different types of munitions, total number: 12,878,291

China: 19 different types of munitions, total number: 377,885

Chinese origin of contraband munitions found throughout Iraq by December 2003:

NOMENCLATURE                MODEL

75/40MM                         RP TYPE 40

82MM                              MORTAR,ILLUM

120MM                            MORTAR, HE TYPE 55

122MM                            HE TYPE 54

100MM                            HEAT TYPE 73

130MM                            ILLUM, PROJECTILE TYPE 59,

152MM                            HE TYPE 66

152MM                            INCENDIARY TYPE 66

GRENADE                      RIFLE TYPE 84

GRENADE                      HAND, FRAG TYPE 82-1

GRENADE                      HAND, FRAG TYPE 86P

HEAT-T                           RPG TYPE II

GRENADE                      75-MM, HE-T,

ROCKET                        107-MM, HE-FRAG, SPINSTABLIZED

ROCKET                        SP, 122-MM, HE TYPE 81

107MM                           RKT HE Model Ukn

130MM                            WARHEAD Type 63

ZH0L LANDMINE        APERS TYPE 72,72B AND72C

LANDMINE                  AT TYPE

LANDMINE                  APERS, CLAYMORE TYPE 66

FUZE                              PROJECTILE, PDSD ML-1

Now to focus on the more high tech UN sanction busting to Iraq—the Asian Wall Street Journal nailed it on the actions of the PRC/PLA firm Huawei:

Technology Two-Timing  (March 19, 2001):

U.S. intelligence sources confirm (despite a denial from the Chinese government) that Huawei Technologies, one of China’s leading makers of communication networks, has helped Iraq outfit its air defenses with fiber optic equipment. The assistance was not approved by the United Nations, and thus violates the international embargo against Iraq. Unless Huawei leaves Iraq and takes its equipment with it, the United States should force American companies to cut Huawei’s technology lifeline.


(Credit: http://asian-defence.blogspot.com/2010/08/chinas-cyber-command.html)
(Credit: http://asian-defence.blogspot.com/2010/08/chinas-cyber-command.html)



As mentioned above, I investigated criminal syndicates that violated UN sanctions.  After the US Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established in 2004 it was apparent that Huawei was bribing their way back into Iraq. It was a simple case they were not allowed in, yet their website in 2004 was bragging about their then current Iraq activities.

Huawei in my professional judgement is an ongoing criminal enterprise using denial and deception techniques and a lot of money and influence to infiltrate their high-tech products into American communication networks.

The Way Ahead – The US has not been ignoring the threat!

In 2007 Justice Department and Partner Agencies launched a national counter-proliferation initiative. (www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/October/07_nsd_806.html)

  • WASHINGTON—The Justice Department and several partner agencies today launched a national initiative that will harness the counter-proliferation assets of U.S. law enforcement, licensing, and intelligence agencies to combat the growing national security threat posed by illegal exports of restricted U.S. military and dual-use technology to foreign nations and terrorist organizations.

  • China and Iran pose particular U.S. export control concerns. The majority of U.S. criminal export prosecutions in recent years have involved restricted U.S. technology bound for these nations as opposed to others.

Several examples of success from DOJ press releases can be found at justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-nsd-959.html

Carbon-Fiber Material with Rocket & Spacecraft Applications to China – On Oct. 28, 2008, a grand jury in the District of Minnesota returned an indictment charging Jian Wei Deng, Kok Tong Lim, and Ping Cheng with conspiring to illegally export to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) controlled carbon-fiber material with applications in aircraft, rockets, spacecraft, and uranium enrichment process.

Space Launch Technical Data and Services to China – On Sept. 24, 2008, Shu Quan-Sheng, a native of China, naturalized U.S. citizen and PhD physicist, was arrested in the Eastern District of Virginia on charges of illegally exporting space launch technical data and services to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and offering bribes to Chinese government officials. Shu was the President, Secretary and Treasurer of AMAC International, a high-tech company located in Newport News, Va., and with an office in Beijing, China.

Electronics & IED Components to Iran – On Sept. 18, 2008, a 13-count indictment was unsealed in the Southern District of Florida charging eight individuals and eight companies with conspiracy, violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the U.S. Iran embargo, and false statements in connection with their participation in conspiracies to illegally export electronics, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) systems, and other dual-use commodities to Iran. All the items had potential military applications, including in the construction of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

Avoiding a Black Swan (the impact of the highly improbable event), Especially in Cyber

(see book by Dr Nassim Nicholas Taleb)

Secretary of the Air Force Mike Wynne’s vision, professional experiences and lifelong dedication to American National Security gave him the insight to create the USAF Cyber Command.

That effort was stopped by internal Department of Defense politics. But Secretary Wynne was right about the need and soon a DOD Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was created. The USCYBERCOM was enacted into law with a very important mission.

In May 2010, General Keith Alexander first Commanding General outlined his views in his testimony to an Armed Services subcommittee

My own view is that the only way to counteract both criminal and espionage activity online is to be proactive. If the U.S. is taking a formal approach to this, then that has to be a good thing. The Chinese are viewed as the source of great many attacks on western infrastructure and just recently, the U.S. If that is determined to be an organized attack, I would want to go and take down the source of those attacks. The only problem is that the Internet, by its very nature, has no borders and if the U.S. takes on the mantle of the world’s police; that might not go down so well.

Conclusion

For several years CI representatives working together in NCIX/FBI executive committee sessions have tried to address the extremely hard problem of adjudicating the correct allocation of US Counterintelligence Assets. This is an extremely complex challenge.

Collectors and agents of influence from the PRC can go after objectives many ways as I have discussed. But beyond the scope of my paper they can also buy their way into America through acquisitions and joint ventures-the money offered in those deals is huge.

With respect to PLA cyber espionage efforts to make the situation even more difficult, I believe PRC cyber efforts also have two components: cyber intrusions as collectors and cyber components and software as physical properties.  One of the hardest challenges we have faced is defending against cyber collectors and those with malicious intent originating half a world away.  Concurrently, the PRC is also trying to place physically compromised components in computers and transmission modalities.

Finally, one must never forget that the human element is always critical—think Private Manning and Wikileaks.

If one tries to protect everything because of resource constraints it might wind up that nothing is protected.  The most important resource we all need to protect is “time.” The hardest resource to allocate in protecting against espionage is the “time” of the CI FBI Special Agents and their fellow Agents in the DOD CI community.  The time of those units of Special Agents in the field working cases and also behind computer consuls as cyber defenders, is our most precious and invaluable asset.  I am always optimistic that eventually America will get it right.

Maritime and Port Security in Pakistan

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Maritime and Port Security in Pakistan
04/21/2011

Risk Intelligence

By Mathias Hagstrøm,

Stud. Scient. Soc., Roskilde University

Strategic Insights No 27 October 2010

4/21/2011 – With a population of more than 180 million people and being a potential gateway for Central Asian and western Chinese trade, Pakistan is a very interesting developing market. But with problems of insurgency groups and state stability, it has not yet realized its geopolitical and economic potential.

The sheer scale of insurgency activity in Pakistan as a whole underlines the need for caution when operating either inland or at sea. While the number of concrete attacks on port facilities and ships is relatively low the number of security incidents in 2009 has surpassed 2,100 nationwide.

This article looks at the overall security situation in Pakistan’s maritime area, the specifically at the main port areas, and suggests that the overall security of the maritime sector will be strengthened if development of trade and business is able to bring about visible economic improvements for the coastal communities

Security Overview

(Credit: Risk Intelligence)(Credit: Risk Intelligence)

While piracy in Pakistani waters and along the coast is non-existent, there are still pressing security considerations in relation to the risk of maritime terrorism and attacks on ships and port facilities by insurgency groups.

These considerations are complicated by bureaucratic inefficiency and wider corruption and fraud. As well, the dispute with India over maritime boundary 258 and the resulting struggle over fishing rights have both the Indian and the Pakistani coast guards engaged in capturing foreign fishing vessels.

Piracy

While the official Pakistani position is that there are no incidents of “robbery at sea” in Pakistani waters, the media has covered several incidents. The reason why these incidents are not registered by Pakistani authorities is that they are interpreted as part of a local conflict, and the authorities therefore abstain from classifying the incidents as robbery at sea. This practice of not registering security incidents on smaller vessels makes it impossible to estimate the extent of the problem and makes it harder to pinpoint developing security issues.

The Pakistani navy and coast guard are, however, engaged in reducing both piracy and armed robbery at sea. In 2009 Pakistan hosted a conference on sea piracy and engaged in a major naval exercise with China with a focus on combating piracy. The Pakistani coast guard is also engaged in combating drugs and other types of trafficking with increasing military presence in Pakistani as well as international waters.

These engagements are part of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) that was established in 2002, born out of Operation Enduring Freedom and consists of three dozen ships from Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, Canada, Denmark, Turkey, the U.S. and U.K., as well as other naval forces and personnel from several other nations.

CMF is divided into three task forces: the CTF 150 commanded by the Pakistani Navy Rear Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi is engaged in counterterrorism, the CTF 151 task force is responsible with combating piracy including activity at the horn of Africa, and the CTF 152 is engaged with combating trafficking.

Pakistan has experienced eight notable maritime security incidents in the past 10 years; two of these have been accidents. These are, however, not the only security risks in relation to maritime security. Inland port connectivity and supply lines such as roads, rail tracks, power lines and oil and gas pipelines have all been repeatedly targeted in order to disrupt the working of the ports, with limited success.

The most severe disruption on trade relating to the Pakistani ports has been several incidents of ambushes, direct attacks and torching of NATO/ISAF supply convoys in route from Karachi to Afghanistan.

Terrorist and Insurgency Groups

The problems with terrorist and insurgency groups should not only be seen as limited to northern Pakistan. Al Qaeda, Pakistani Taleban (the Tehrik-i-Taliban), separatist movements and other militant groups do have the capability to execute terrorist attacks within the maritime and the shipping sectors. Al Qaeda has already demonstrated its maritime capabilities by executing the attacks on the USS COLE in 1999 and the 2002 attack on the French registered vessel LIMBURG. Business Monitor International classifies Pakistan with danger rating “red” and with a terrorism score of 35 where 100 signifies most unlikely place for terrorism to hit, surpassing the Philippines and other Asian countries with high risks of terrorism.

(Credit: Risk Intelligence)(Credit: Risk Intelligence)

Gwadar deep-sea port has experienced direct attacks on port facilities in 2004 and Gwadar Harbor in 2009. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has also in recent years targeted critical infrastructure in relation to inland port connectivity. From 2004 to 2009, Balouch insurgency groups launched approximately 471 attacks on infrastructure such as oil pipelines, roads, power grid and telecommunications. While terrorists and insurgents mainly target critical infrastructure the safety of road travel to and from the ports is also influenced by sectarian violence, unrest and criminal activity.

Pakistani Authorities

Corruption is widespread in Pakistan and entails both the private as well as the public sector with Pakistan scoring 2.4 in Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index (CPI). There have been recent reports on corruption in Gwadar, Qasim and Karachi ports and Pakistani media has reported deep-seated corruption within the Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) that deals with imports and exports on behalf of the government of Pakistan and deals directly with shipping companies. The Port Qasim Authority (PQA) has also been highlighted as a “golden egg of corruption” in the Pakistani media and prime example of corrupt government organizations in Pakistan.

Corruption poses a significant threat to goods and costs and it also poses a threat to human security in terms of imprisonment or violence. The ports of Pakistan are investing in technical equipment in order to tighten security, but corruption can seriously undermine these efforts.

Pakistani observers speculate that corruption has played a significant role in bypassing security. The 2003 environmental disaster of the TASMAN SPIRIT illustrates other security concerns when operating in Pakistani waters and dealing with authorities. The detention of the ship’s crew shows that there is a significant risk of criminalizing the crew in relation to security incidents by the Pakistani authorities and a willingness to use detention of crewmembers to pursue political agendas.

Trafficking

The risk of trafficking of weapons, drugs or people is present in all ports of Pakistan. According to the World Bank, both Gwadar and Karachi ports are major hubs in international drug trade. The risk of stowaways is also significant; Afghans are the largest nationality of stowaways that embark from the ports of Pakistan. Pakistan joined the Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance in 2002 and has registered 1,826 cases of trafficking between 2003 to 2006.

Pakistan is also a significant producer of small arms. It is estimated that there are more than 18 million illicit small arms in the country and a substantial amount of these are exported each year. Pakistan is also struggling with the vast problem of drug trafficking, mainly from Afghanistan. Pakistan tries to deal with this issue at a number of difference levels with their contribution to Coalition Task Force, CTF 152.

(Credit: Risk Intelligence)(Credit: Risk Intelligence)

Sindh Province and Karachi Area Ports

Sindh has experienced clashes between ethnic groups since the partition of British India in 1947. Night travel is not always possible due to risk of robbery, but rail and pipeline security is good in general, making the overall inland port connectivity relatively stable and safe.

The transportation networks of Sindh are today the main route for reaching the markets of Afghanistan, Western China and Central Asia and is relatively safe to use compared to other transportation networks in Pakistan. While the number of attacks has been increasing from 2006, Sindh remains one of the most peaceful provinces of Pakistan.

Sindh and Karachi are of vital importance for the Pakistani economy. Karachi is therefore a high-level target for insurgency groups where a relatively small successful operation could jeopardies Pakistan’s economy and trade relations with the rest of the world.

Karachi is the financial capital of Pakistan with a population of 15.5 million people and is served by the two ports Port Qasim and Karachi port. Karachi lies in the Indus delta in the Sindh province. Travel warnings have been issued by many Western governments emphasizing the need for caution by business travellers, but taking into account the size of the population and the types of attacks, Karachi remain a relatively safe city for the international traveller.

Overall, the Karachi ports are vulnerable to terrorists picking soft targets such as ships or port facilities. The Pakistani authorities are aware of these risks, however, and have a major interest in properly securing the ports.

Port Qasim Authority has been working with Transparency International in order to solve its problems with corruption. Soft targets like oil tankers and container ships are at the time of writing extremely lucrative for terrorist and insurgency groups. Such a target would be devastating for the Pakistani economy and commerce and would further destabilize the already volatile State of Pakistan.

In the province of Sindh where Karachi is located, separatist and sectarian groups have a key interest in such operations that could further the destabilization of Pakistan and thereby strengthening their agendas. There are no immediate security risks of campaigns of terrorism or other violent actions against the ports of Karachi. There are, however, heightened risks of isolated security incidents related to political, sectarian and other types of violence.

The ports of Karachi are high value targets, and with the latent risk of violence and terrorism in Pakistan isolated security incidents are a significant security concern.

Port Qasim

Port Qasim is one of the country’s busiest ports consisting of a four-berth multipurpose terminal, a two-berth container terminal, a one-berth liquid chemical terminal, and a one-berth oil terminal. The port is managed by the Port Qasim Authority (PQA) and consists of terminals and industrial zones covering an area of roughly 12,000 acres.

Large investments have recently been made to strengthen security mainly in terms of improving vessel tracking systems and establishing an Integrated Cargo Container Control (IC3), the first of its kind in Pakistan.

In order to tighten security in relation to terrorism a number of road blocks and barriers have been established throughout the port. Video surveillance and patrols by security teams are some of the initiatives the PQA has implemented in order to heighten security. However, a recent incident with theft of 5,000 truckloads of sand has sparked speculation about the general level of security.

Karachi Port

Karachi is the former capital of Pakistan and Karachi port is the historical seaport. The industrial harbor consists of two wharfs each with its own container terminal of two berths. The East wharf has 17 berths while the west wharf has 13.

Additionally, there are three liquid cargo berths and a combined naval and civil shipyard. A fishing harbor and smaller boatyards also adds to the traffic in the harbor. The Karachi Port Authority administers Karachi port, with a port security force in charge of security.

Karachi port utilizes many of the security measures that are also present at Port Qasim with video surveillance and vessel tracking systems. Karachi port has established a central port operation center where both security and administrative tasks are administrated and coordinated.

An intelligence report published just after the insurgency attack on the Pakistan National Army headquarters in Islamabad on 10 October 2009, expressed a high risk of terrorist attack on the port of Karachi. The report states that insurgents have been scouting for maritime targets and security weaknesses in the port and warns about a possible attack on various port installations. While the Karachi police and the Pakistani navy have confirmed a heightened security level it should be mentioned that the whole port area is only covered by a single police station.

Pakistan media has reported that the port security force is ill equipped to counter any terrorist attack. Another issue that raises security concerns is an ongoing conflict between the port security force and Karachi Port Authority on labor rights, and this is an issue that is currently being dealt with by the Sindh High Court. Port officials have reported that the security protocol is significantly heightened when ships from the EU navigate the port where these are escorted by gunboats. In September 2010 the World Bank endorsed a US$115.8 million port improvement project aimed at expanding capacity and institutional strengthening.

Balochistan Province and Gwadar Deep-sea Port

The province of Balochistan is the Pakistani side of a much wider territory covering parts of Afghanistan and Iran. Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan and is covered by vast deserts, mountains and rough terrain and is the least populated province of Pakistan. Today, Balouch separatist movements are active again, adopting guerrilla tactics of targeting critical infrastructure, local government, police, and military. While the number of civilian casualties is still high, the tactics applied by insurgency groups in Balochistan is significantly different than in other parts of Pakistan.

Since 2004 Balochistan has experienced 30% of the security incidents of Pakistan, which makes it one of the most unstable provinces only surpassed by the North frontier province. A network of oil and gas pipelines connects Gwadar port with these resources and these are frequently targets of the BLA.

In relation to the wider Gwadar development project, there are heavy investments in road and rail links. These infrastructures connecting the port of Gwadar have become lucrative targets due to a relative low risk and the possibility to disrupt movement, trade and supply lines. While Balouch insurgency groups seem to favor pipelines as a target, road and rail connectivity to Gwadar is also at risk.

There persists a strong mistrust towards foreign and non- Balouch involvement in the province. Within Balouch nationalist communities, Pakistani and foreign involvement is seen as Punjabi colonization. Since 2004 there has been a steady increase in security incidents. While Gwadar remains quite safe for the most part, the port is a significant symbolic target. Like is the case with the ports of Karachi there is a risk of an isolated terrorist incident, but with the activity of BLA and other separatist groups there is also a risk of a longer sustained campaign against Gwadar deep sea port.

Gwadar Deep-sea Port

Ten years ago Gwadar was a small and dusty fishing town in Balochistan. Today it is a thriving and developing port city with a population of 53.000 people. The development of Gwadar has been far from easy and has also added fuel to the ongoing conflict between Balouch nationalists and Pakistani authorities. The security incidents tend to concentrate around urban and industrial development and non-Balouch persons.

While security incidents in Gwadar are much fewer than in Karachi there is a significant difference in the nature of these incidents. While Karachi has a large amount of political and sectarian violence the incidents in Gwadar seem more focused on the presence of non-Balouch activities and investments. This should be taken into consideration when operating in Gwadar and wider Balochistan where hiring non-Balouch labor or being foreign can increase the risk of becoming a target to Balouch insurgent groups.

Gwadar deep-sea port is located on the tip of a narrow peninsular. It has three multipurpose berths and one service berth. The deep-sea port is close to two fishing harbors and a military installation belonging to the Navy of Pakistan. The first ship anchored at Gwadar deep-sea port in March 2008. The port is run by the Port Singapore Authority (PSA), which won the bid for a 40-year contract.

This year the PSA started the initial survey for phase two, a US$932 million Gwadar development project adding an additional nine berths to the port on its completion.

In its development phase and short existence, Gwadar deep-sea port has already had a number of security incidents.

On 3 May 2004, 3 Chinese engineers were killed and 11 others wounded in an IED attack and the following month the port itself was the target of a coordinated attack. One of the port facilities was damaged along with a police checkpoint, a government building and the construction site of an international hotel. Again, on 10 July 2010,

Chinese engineers were the suspected targets of a BLA rocket attack launched from a small boat in the port; no one was hurt in this incident. The port has also suffered from numerous blackouts due to the BLA’s successful operations targeting pylons and power lines connecting the port.

In August 2009 the first accident happened at the port when a vessel collided with the ro-ro, berth creating structural damage to the port. The PSA was accused of trying to cover-up the incident and downplay the damage caused.

Pakistani authorities are very security conscious when it comes to Gwadar and a naval base is situated on the same peninsular as the deep-sea port. It has also been reported that the Chinese are supporting the Pakistani military with intelligence in relation to Balouch separatist groups.

Due to security risks and insufficiently developed infrastructure connecting the port, Gwadar has not yet attracted a lot of international shipping traffic.

Future Developments: Stability and Trade

Many scholars on Pakistan warn about the likeliness of a state collapse but such predictions have been articulated many times before without anything happening.

There exists an invisible glue that keeps Pakistan together, not as a real nation state but as the place where very different ethnic, religious and political groups struggle to coexist.

But being a country without a common national identity brings about serious security challenges. The maritime sector has so far been relatively unaffected by these problems.

The increasing activity of Balouch separatist groups and their focus on targeting critical infrastructure, airports and ports and harbor facilities should not be taken lightly. Other groups like Al Qaeda also pose a continued threat to the maritime sector although single security incidents seem more likely than an actual campaign against the maritime sector.

It is still the local civilian and business sectors that are most affected by security incidents. Police and military are to some extent directly targeted but also experience a high number of attacks when protecting potential main targets.

Comparing Balochistan and Sindh, it is clearly two different types of security issues.

Balochistan experiences some of the classic security problems associated with guerrilla warfare whereas Sindh sufferers from political, ethnic and religious unrest.

The ports of Karachi are not as much at risk of local security incidents as is the case with Gwadar deep-sea port. The abilities of insurgency groups operating nationwide and their ability to operate in Karachi should not be underestimated.

In July 2010 Pakistan was hit by severe floods following the monsoon rain. The UN estimates that over 2,000 people were killed and 17-21 million people injured or rendered homeless due to the floods. While the ports only suffered minor damage the connecting infrastructure was badly hit. It is estimated that 2,433 miles of highway and 3,508 miles of railway was affected with damage exceeding US$280 million and setting back Pakistani development for years to come.

The areas worst affected have been Sind and Punjab provinces while the infrastructure in Balochistan was hit less severely. The major supply lines are open again, however, including the two important NATO routes to Afghanistan through Chaman and Torkham. Pakistani authorities state that there are again 2,000-3,000 NATO supply trucks on route to Afghanistan on any given day.

Despite the floods and the general unrest in Pakistan, investment is being made in order to fulfill its potential as a gateway for trade. Pipelines connecting Iran to the port of Gwadar are in development and road links through Afghanistan to the central Asian republics are also in the making. If just some of these projects succeed they will generate increased traffic to Gwadar and Karachi ports.

Such developments will help to strengthen overall port security but also makes the shipping industry a more high value target. The overall security of the maritime sector will be strengthened if development of trade and business is able to bring about visible economic improvements for the coastal communities. This would undermine support of insurgency and terrorist groups in the local communities and improve security not only for foreign investors

French Ops in Libya

Posted on | by SysAdmin
04/20/2011
Libya: Operation Harmattan (Credit: EMA/Armee de l'Air - Marine Nationale)

Preliminary Lessons Learned

By General Jean-Patrick Gaviard


Libya: Operation Harmattan (Credit: EMA/Armee de l'Air - Marine Nationale)Photo Credit: Libya: Operation Harmattan, EMA / Armée de l’Air – Marine Nationale, March 2011


04/20/2011 – In the aftermath of several weeks of bombings above Libya, it might be of interest to attempt to decrypt two key events which happened as this operation was being conducted:

  • The “pole position start” of the French Air Force as a direct support to political action.
  • the shift of command of the operation to NATO, even though a Franco-British alternative solution could have been considered.


An Unusual Operational Tempo
When reviewing the March 19th strikes, one needs to apprehend, first and foremost, the notion of operational tempo, i.e. the rhythmus of a political-military pulse which air power’s inherent characteristics, such as reversibility, reactivity, and effective range, manage to initiate in a sequenced order.

On March 19th, the action played out in less than 7 hours:

  • At 11 a.m.: while the Carrier Battle Group warms up in Toulon, four Rafale fighters in air defense configuration take off from Saint Dizier airbase. They are supported by air tankers from Istres and one AWACS from Avord airbase.
  • At 12:30 p.m.: at the Elysée palace, the French President opens an international meeting about Libya, two days after Resolution 1973 was signed  in New York.
  • At 1:00 p.m. : the four Rafale fighters are on site and patrol above Benghazi to enforce the no-fly-zone. They are filmed and broadcasted on TV channels all over the world.
  • At 2:00 p.m.: two Rafale and two Mirage 2000D fighters in close air support configuration take off respectively from Mont de Marsan and Nancy airbases.
  • At 5:00 p.m.: French aircrafts destroy several of Gaddafi’s troops’ armored vehicles on the outskirts of Benghazi, disrupting the encirclement of the Cyrenaica’s capital. Half an hour later, after leaving the international meeting, the French President can communicate on his decision and the first results which stem from it.


A Good Synchronization of Assets
What do such a string of events and tempo demonstrate?

– First of all, there has been a highly accurate synchronization between political actions and aerial operations, displaying in a minimum amount of time a strong and loud signal of determination and credibility, in less than 48 hours after the UN resolution.

– What is also palpable here is an effective planning capability and the ability to conduct an operation, which involved the President’s personal chief of staff with his accurate operational expertise, the Joint Chief of Staff  and the Air Force. Indeed, the latter was able to perfectly adapt to the mission, while, along with the navy and Army, it is going through a major restructuring and manpower reduction.

– The importance of the Air Defense Command and Air Operations should also be highlighted: it is currently headed by General Desclaux, who, under the guidance of the Army’s Chief of Staff, planned and controlled these first air operations on his own.

There is none of NATO’s “big machinery” here. But without this command center located at the Balard base in Paris and supported by Lyon Mont Verdun-based air operations center, these French operations could never have been carried out. Finally and mostly, this string of events on a short loop basis stressed the coherence between all involved assets: ranging from the investments made to equip Lyon Mont-Verdun’s – where all European air forces are trained for air operations – to the determined choice of multirole capabilities illustrated by the « Rafale equation » and its armaments which aim at replacing all existing French air platforms. The operational result is a product of thirty years of investments driven towards a major and crucial imperative: France’s strategic autonomy and operational sovereignty.

This string of events on a short loop basis stressed the coherence between all involved assets: ranging from the investments made to equip Lyon Mont-Verdun’s – where all European air forces are trained for air operations – to the determined choice of multirole capabilities illustrated by the « Rafale equation » and its armaments which aim at replacing all existing French air platforms. The operational result is a product of thirty years of investments driven towards a major and crucial imperative: France’s strategic autonomy and operational sovereignty.


A Strategic Autonomy To Preserve

Such observations open the floor for a more poliotical dimension, i.e. the question of operational etiquette. Without NATO, it has been heard and said, no complex air operations would have been possible and therefore no alternative to its role exists.

The French and the British do however own first rate and NATO-certified command-and-control centers at the strategic, theater and service (in this case air) levels. As a matter of fact, the “all-in-one NATO solution” might not be the one, as soon as the alliance steps out of its original mission, which remains the collective defense on the European continent.

The systematic use of NATO as a universal crisis manager raises some questions, and not only in the Muslim world. That’s why the Common Security and Defence Policy will be, in actual fact and increasingly so, a proper answer to these kind of operations, in areas where balances matter to us and imbalances concern us.

Among the European Union’s agora, the political consensus mays not always be easy to achieve, but no less after all than within NATO (Ankara’s veto comes to mind). Let us not forget that EU’s operations can be executed via a “capable and volunteer” core (like the French-British alliance in the case of Libya), so long as European countries give themselves the meanss to conduct long term operations independently from the USA, in case the latter so not want to be involved. It’s probably not enough the case yet, and one can only stress out the importance for nations to master Command-and-Control (C2) assets.

Once again, the issue is not to assess March 19th’s political choice: it is about reminding the obvious truth which is that, whatever the future operational and political scenarios, autonomy stands from funding. French forces currently lack air tankers and armed UASs. In addition, French land-based, sea-based and air-based capabilities closely depend on the quality of training (in this case, the pilots’ training is at stake, but the same reasoning applies to infantrymen or sailors). Finally, these events highlight the necessary subordination of support to operations.

Whatever the future operational and political scenarios, autonomy stands from funding. French forces currently lack air tankers and armed UASs. In addition, French land-based, sea-based and air-based capabilities closely depend on the quality of training (in this case, the pilots’ training is at stake, but the same reasoning applies to infantrymen or sailors). Finally, these events highlight the necessary subordination of support to operations.

Credibility has a cost and this cost needs to be understood as an investment. As NATO is taking over the control of the Libyan skies, this is the very first lesson learned from the French Air Force strategic autonomy.

The LPD 17 Enhances the USN-USMC Capabilities

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04/19/2011
Commander Nelson at the Christening of the USS Arlington (Credit: SLD)

The Prospective Commander of LPD-24 Discuss the Future

An Interview with Commander Darren W. Nelson

Commander Nelson at the Christening of the USS Arlington (Credit: SLD)Commander Nelson at the Christening of the USS Arlington (Credit: SLD)

04/19 /2011 – At the christening of the LPD-24, the USS Arlington, the SLD team had a chance to talk about the new ship and its impact on the ARG.  prospective commander of LPD-24, Commander Darren W. Nelson.

SLD: Let’s just talk to this whole evolution of the ARG and the ship.  What excites you about it?

Commander Nelson: Well, some of the things that excite me on this ship is just the way she looks.  It’s a very sweet design.  It reduces a radar cross-section. We took the concept off of the DDG, and applied it here.  So that provides more protection for us; it’s harder for us to be seen by the bad guys, which makes it very nice.

We have enhanced cargo space. On previous amphibious ships USMC space was limited.  On this ship they have more space for men and equipment.  The Marines do not want to be told “you can’t bring that howitzer or the HUMVEE. There is not room enough.”

SLD: When we interviewed the 15th MEU Commander, “Ozzie” Osborn, he made the point “I had to leave a lot of stuff home, because I can’t take it on the ship”.

Commander Nelson: With the LPD 17, we have a dramatic increase in our capabilities to carry more cargo, more vehicle space, and our flight deck is huge.  We’re able to launch and recover two MV-22 Ospreys at the same time.  Of course, the Osprey’s a whole different animal, with significant capabilities to expand what we can do.

The size of the footprint for the flight deck is significant. And, of course, we can handle the CH-53Es or Ks.  We can land four CH-46s at one time.

Also, the LPD 17 represents a significant increase in the C2 capability available to the ARG. I have the communications capabilities of an LHD with this ship.

SLD: In many ways, this ship is not in any way a linear replacement for earlier amphibious ships.

Commander Nelson: You are right.  It is truly the next generation.  Even if you look at the amount of Marines we can carry aboard this ship it is a qualitative shift.  I was an Executive Officer on an LSD, we carried 350 Marines; we had 300 sailors.

And we were packed.  This ship is set up for 700 Marines, and it has a surge berthing of up to 800 That’s on top of the 365-person crew.

In effect, you are giving the new commander much more mission flexibility. You are giving him the capability to “say yeah, we need to take a few extra mission guys, or something like that, and we will be able to put them aboard our ship.

SLD: How will you work with the new Littoral Combat Ship?

Commander Nelson: We can easily work with the LCS, especially with her different mission capabilities.  And if she needs to change out mission capabilities, we have the cargo space to fulfill her mission.

The Chemical Weapons Threat Remains: Shaping a Way Forward

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By Richard Weitz

04/ 19/2011 – The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention and abbreviated as the CWC bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of offensive chemical weapons (CW).

States Parties to the CWC are also prohibited from threatening, or engaging in, military preparations to use chemical weapons. These provisions apply universally in terms of time and place. The Convention is of indefinite duration and aims for comprehensive coverage of all global activities potentially related to chemical weapons. Its regulations encompass government and private sector activities as well as chemical weapons storage facilities (CWSFs), chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs), and chemical weapons destruction facilities (CWDFs).

All States Parties to the CWC are obliged to declare any stockpiles of chemical weapons they hold, including their number and type, and any facilities that store, produce, or destroy them. These declarations describe the location of any CWSFs as well as the location and characteristics of any CWPFs. Each State Party commits to eliminate all the chemical weapons in its possession, under their jurisdiction or control, or that it might have abandoned in another country, normally at designated CWDFs, which are subject to regular on-site oversight by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The States Parties are required to destroy any CWPFs or, as permitted by the CWC, convert them to non-military uses. Furthermore, they must declare chemical industry plants that annually produce, process, or consume “scheduled” toxic chemicals and their precursors in quantities above certain CWC-specified amounts. They also must provide information on certain other chemical production facilities (OCPFs) that produce large quantities of discrete organic chemicals (DOCs).

The CWC mainly applies to assembled unitary chemical weapons such as artillery projectiles, mortars, air bombs, rockets, rocket warheads, and spray tanks; chemical weapons agents stored in bulk; binary munitions that only become dangerous when their two components are combined; and recovered chemical weapons munitions. The CWC does permit the use of small quantities of chemical weapons for non-offensive purposes such as research, medicine, and the development of CW defenses.

The Convention allows a State Party possessing chemical weapons some latitude in their choice of elimination methods—which must destroy the chemical warfare agents, the conventional explosives used to detonate the weapons, and some dangerous metal parts—with the exclusion of ecologically unacceptable techniques such as burying them in land, dumping them in bodies of water, or dispersing them in an open pit.

The enormous quantity and sophistication of the chemical weapons in the United States and Russia makes only two types of CW destruction techniques practical: high temperature technologies like incineration, and low-temperature technologies like hydrolysis followed by treatment of the resulting reaction masses.

In the United States, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) served as a prototype plant to develop a “base-line” incineration technology that was then applied to a number of chemical destruction facilities: Tooele (TOCDF), Anniston (ANCDF), Pine-Bluff (PBCDF) and Umatilla (UMCDF).

Public pressure against the environmental consequences of incineration led the U.S. government to also launch an Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment program to develop several low-temperature elimination technologies as an alternative to the base-line incineration technology.

These technologies, constantly under development, typically involve processes that neutralize the agent at the main destruction facility while the generated hydrolisates are irreversibly disposed at off-site commercial Treatment, Storage and Disposal Facilities (TSDF), which are also subject to OPCW verification. The United States has used this low-temperature technique at three large facilities to eliminate agents stored in bulks: Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ABCDF), Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (NECDF) and Pine-Bluff Binary Destruction Facility (PBBDF).

The U.S. government has also decided to apply the alternative low-temperature elimination technique at the two remaining U.S. CWDFs under construction: hydrolysis followed by biodegradation at Pueblo, Colorado and hydrolysis followed by Super Critical Water Oxidation at Blue Grass, Kentucky. These two facilities are at an early stage of construction.

From 2006 to April 2010, the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency also ran a separate Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project at the Pine Bluff Explosive Destruction System (PBEDS), located at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas., to destroy recovered munitions such as 4.2-inch mortars and German Traktor rockets captured during World War II.

The remaining 10% of the U.S. stockpile will be destroyed by the two CWDFs currently under construction in Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky, through a separate U.S. Army Element Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, using either the incineration or agent neutralization destruction methods.

The original CWC timetable specified that, five years after its entry into force, states with declared chemical weapons had to eliminate 20% of their stockpiles. After seven years, they were required to destroy 45% of their CW arsenals. Ten years after entry into force, the States Parties had to eliminate all their chemical weapons in a verifiable and irrevocable manner.

Yet, by the original April 2007 deadline, only about a quarter of all declared CW stocks had been eliminated. The convention provided for a one-time extension of as long as five years beyond the April 2007 destruction deadline.

On December 8, 2006, the CWC Conference of State Parties (CSP) granted the following extensions: South Korea to December 31, 2008; India to April 28, 2009; Libya to December 31, 2010; and both Russia and the United States to April 29, 2012, the maximum permissible extension. The CSP also extended the intermediate destruction deadlines for Albania.

When the CWC entered into force in April 1997, the United States possessed approximately 30,000 tons of chemical nerve and blister agents.  The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency took charge of destroying 90% of this total, consisting of 28,350 tons of blister (mustard) and nerve (VX and sarin) agents.  It eliminated 50% of the original stockpile by December 2007 and 60% by April 2009. On July 1, 2010, the Agency announced that it had incinerated or chemically neutralized 75% of the U.S. chemical agent stockpile, or 22,958 tons of chemical agents and more than 2.1 million chemical munitions.

In his presentation to the CSP on November 29, 2010, Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, the U.S. Permanent Representative, said that the United Sates had “destroyed more than 81% of our Category 1 chemical weapons, which includes the destruction of over 82% of our chemical rockets, the destruction of 96.6% of our nerve agents, and the destruction of all of our binary chemical weapons. The United States has also destroyed all of our former chemical weapons production facilities.” Ambassador Mikulak estimated that the United States will have eliminated 90 percent of its original stockpile by the April 2012 deadline.

According to the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, as of March 16, 2011, the United States had destroyed 85 per cent of its original stockpile of 27,768 tons of declared offensive CW, including all advanced binary weapons. The Agency reports the following chemical agent destruction status for each facility:

  • 100 percent of stockpile at the Aberdeen, MD Facility neutralized
  • 98 percent of stockpile at the Tooele, UT Facility destroyed
  • 100 percent of stockpile at the Johnston Island Facility destroyed
  • 93 percent of stockpile at the Anniston, AL Facility destroyed
  • 70 percent of stockpile at the Umatilla, OR Facility destroyed
  • 100 percent of stockpile at the Pine Bluff, AR Facility destroyed
  • 100 percent of stockpile a the Newport, IN Facility neutralized

The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility and the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama are expected to eliminate their entire stockpiles by October 2011. The Army would complete its CW destruction efforts in December 2011 at the Umatilla Chemical Depot.

The Army now calculates that its chemical elimination effort will cost approximately $24 billion in total.  The U.S. CW disposal program, when first envisioned in 1985, was expected to be finished within a decade and cost roughly $1.8 billion. The United States has already spent more than $22 billion eliminating its stockpiles. Recent estimates place the total cost of destroying all U.S. chemical weapons on accordance with the CWC at approximately $36 billion.

The States Parties have not decided what sanctions to apply, if any, when the United States or another CW-possessing country misses its extended deadline due to environmental, financial or other reasons unrelated to deliberate efforts to renege on their obligations. In April 2008, Director-General Pfirter had suggested that the States Parties might convene a Special Session of the CSP to decide next steps.

But in October 2009, the OPCW Executive Council asked chairman Jorge Lomónaco Tonda to commence informal discussions on how and when to start consultations on states that could not meet their “final extended deadlines” for CW elimination.  At the June 29, 2010 session of the Executive Council, Ambassador Mikulak called for “a political solution, not a technical change or an amendment to the Convention.”

In theory, the other CWC members could apply penalties to countries that fail to meet their CW destruction deadlines or that fail to comply with their Article VII obligations. These might include limiting their voting rights at OPCW meetings or preventing the organization from employing citizens from those countries. The most severe punishment would entail imposing sanctions that would prohibit them from importing or exporting certain chemicals.

Thus far, however, the other States Parties have been content to receive evidence—through such measures as their national budget allocations for CWC-related tasks as well as their hosting routine inspections—that these lagging countries are making progress towards eventual elimination of their CW stockpiles and incorporation of CWC obligations into their domestic legislation, even if at a slower pace than desired.

In separate comments in December 2009, both the current and future director-generals of the OPCW downplayed the damage that these missed deadlines would inflict on the international chemical disarmament regime. Pfirter argued that “we need not…make the ultimate success of the treaty dependent on any particular date.”

Ahmet Üzümcü, who succeeded Pfirter as the OPCW Director-General on July 25, 2010, expressed his belief that the two governments’ commitments to eliminate all their chemical weapons was “unwavering.” Üzümcü termed the reasons for the delays as “more technical…than political.”

After informal consultations with the Russian government, Pfirter confirmed on June 29, 2010 that Russia would join the United States in missing its April 2012 deadline.  However, he said he felt reassured that both countries were seeking to meet their commitment to “the key goal of achieving the total and irreversible destruction of their declared stockpiles.” He added that Moscow and Washington “have consistently shown their resolve to abide by their commitments under the Convention, and I for one have no doubt that they will continue to stay on track.”

Shortly before the transition in office from Pfirter to Üzümcü in July 2010, both OPCW director-generals commented further on the issue. Pfirter called the missed deadline “regrettable” and an “unfortunate circumstance,” but he quickly added that he was “nevertheless confident that both countries will continue to work hard in order to fulfill their CW disarmament obligations at the earliest and that the Organisation’s response to these events will remain balanced and constructive.” Üzümcü offered similar evenhanded comments, reaffirming the importance of meeting the objective of complete elimination, but indicating a lack of alarm at a further delay in reaching that goal:

“Complete destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles by possessor states is a primary objective of the Convention. During my visits to the United States and the Russian Federation, I was impressed by their determination to fulfill their obligations as well as the dedication and professional skills of those who run the demilitarization programs. These are indeed costly, labour-intensive and hazardous activities. Tremendous financial, human, and material resources have been allocated. We must maintain our efforts until every single chemical weapon is destroyed. We don’t know yet the exact level of destruction to be reached by April 2012. It will certainly be significant. If however the process cannot be completed, this will be due, I am convinced, to technical reasons. I am encouraged to see that consultations on this issue have already been underway under the leadership of the Chairman of the Executive Council. Our focus must be to keep the momentum, to highlight the unprecedented success of the CWC regime, and to preserve its credibility.”

An overly stern response by the OPCW for the expected U.S. delay would be unfair given that financial and technical challenges as well as environmental and safety considerations are causing the delay, rather than a desire to retain chemical weapons.

Along with Russia, the United States has no reason to retain chemical weapons since it has more readily usable conventional weapons and more powerful nuclear weapons. It would also be unwise to sanction the United States since any sanctions would not accelerate the elimination timetables. It would also undermine the generally non-confrontational CWC-related deliberations have been characterized by consensus and compromise for over a decade.

Although the Executive Council’s rules of procedure allow for two-thirds majority voting on substantive issues and simple majority voting on procedural questions, the consensus principle is so strong that the Council has taken only one vote in its entire history, on an administrative matter.

A satisfactory compromise might be to exempt both countries from additional sanctions in exchange for continued extraordinary transparency and confidence-building measures, such as their current practice of receiving visits by Executive Council representatives to CW dismantlement sites, perhaps supplemented by additional inspections. This would demonstrate the willingness by all sides to prioritize chemical weapons elimination, while also recognizing the very real difficulties involved in achieving it.

Shaping a 21st Century USCG: The Key Role for Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Posted on | by SysAdmin

­­­By Dr. Robbin F. Laird

04/19/2011 – The Obama Administration has come to power at a global turning point.  The President has underscored the importance of working with allies and shaping a new global engagement for the United States.

At the same time, he has emphasized the need to enhance global collaboration to deal with terrorism with a global reach.  And he has underscored the importance of expanding the US engagement in the global trading and economic system.  He has clearly articulated the objectives of building a new role for the United States in an evolving multi-polar world.

No service is more important to this vision than the USCG.  The USCG is at the vortex of commercial, law enforcement and military activities.  It is tasked with a multi-mission focus in support of the protection of the homeland, securing global trade, protecting against terrorist threats at sea, interdicting the sea-borne drug trade, assuring the safety of shipping, and participating in global collaboration in securing the global commons.  At the same time, with the global financial downturn, the USCG like other US agencies is to do this with constrained resources.

Yet the Administration is significantly cutting back on the USCG and its capabilities.  Two cutters are to be retired from the Pacific; OMB seeks to stop the acquisition of new cutters at 4 rather than the 8 or 9 that the USCG needs; and the Maritime Patrol Aircraft numbers are to be cut significantly.

None of this makes sense unless the desire is to reduce maritime safety, security and custodianship is the strategic objective.  The cost to the US economy will be significant.  The Pacific fleet will not be able to provide adequate coverage for fisheries protection and this alone will guarantee the loss of billions of dollars of fishing commerce.

No area reveals a greater gap between the rhetoric of the Administration and its actions than the fate of the USCG and its missions.  This gap must be closed for security, defense, and economic reasons.  It is difficult to cover territory, enforce laws and provide with security with missing assets. The USCG does a great job but disappearing assets means significantly reduced safety, security and economic support to the nation.

As the Department of Homeland Security budget documents emphasizes:

The Coast Guard provides agile, adaptable, and ready operational capabilities to serve the Nation’s maritime interests.  Throughout the U.S. maritime domain, the Coast Guard provides a recognized maritime presence in carrying out its safety, security, and stewardship roles.  It is also the only DHS organization and Armed Service that can operate assets for both law enforcement and military purposes within and beyond U.S. territorial limits.  This presence, supported by a military command, control, and communications network, gives the Coast Guard both prevention and response capabilities for all threats.

The Coast Guard can augment forces from the local level to a national or international level of involvement, regardless of the contingency.  In responding to domestic disasters and emergencies, the Coast Guard can also accept and integrate assistance from DoD and other federal agencies.  Moreover, the Coast Guard can flow its unique capabilities and authorities to DoD for national security contingencies.  As both a military service and law-enforcement agency, the Coast Guard “straddles the seam” separating the federal government’s homeland-security and homeland-defense missions.[1]

Great statement but where is the beef?

Providing for this sort of flexibility with limited resources within a constrained budgetary environment is challenging.  To do so requires shaping highly connected forces around capable multi-mission assets.  Connectivity is central to effective knowledge shaping action; multi-mission assets are necessary to execute on the basis of that knowledge in a variety of different circumstances. And without the physical assets able to operate in a more effective connected environment, enhanced connectivity will not lead to effective action.  An ability to cover territory with aviation assets to work with surface assets, whether ships or on-shore capabilities is central to success for the maritime security and safety team, of which the USCG is the crucial anchor.

The USCG C-130 as Seen in Elizabeth City Air Station (Credit: SLD)The USCG C-130 as Seen in Elizabeth City Air Station (Credit: SLD)

The maritime patrol aircraft, the C-130s and the helos form together the surveillance, lift and action team, which provide significant capabilities to extend the reach of the USCG and joint surface assets.  With the new platforms, which are being introduced into the USCG, the MPAs, the upgraded C-130s and networked enabled helo assets, the capability to work with the joint team is significantly enhanced.

And in an era of financial stringencies making use of joint assets, USN and US Air Force for the USCG, and vice versa is essential.  The new connectivity-enabled air assets allow this to happen.

But it will not happen if you do not have the platforms; and you do not have the modern integrated systems.  Enhanced connectivity is not an excuse not to buy platforms; it is the multiplier of the networked enabled new platforms being acquired.

The Connectivity Enhancer

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the USCG had crafted a new approach to acquisition called Deepwater, which was forged upon the requirement to dramatically recapitalize ageing physical assets with limited resources. The acquisition of surface, shore and air assets were to be integrated with common C4ISR tools and approaches to provide for interoperability across the range of stakeholders in maritime safety and security.

The goal was to provide C4ISR systems, largely rooted in the use of commercial and government off-the-shelf procurement, as the backbone for an integrated service. A new central nervous system would allow for fewer, but more capable, physical assets. The events of 9/11 accelerated this approach and demanded new capabilities. Deepwater was redirected by new requirements. The USCG was tasked with handling newly defined maritime security threats. Its evolutionary approach was disrupted by the need for surge requirements to deal with new threats.

Deepwater critics have focused on problems with the acquisition of some assets – largely patrol boats and, to some extent, the new National Security Cutter. The USCG responded by shaping a new acquisition directorate to subsume Deepwater.

But lost in the shuffle has been the significant success of several shore and aviation assets as well as the core C4ISR systems and the effort to provide interoperability with its civil, commercial and military partners. The addition of a classified network, the upgrade of Inmarsat communications, the deployment of an automatic identifications system, the upgrade of law enforcement radios and other systems have greatly improved the USCG’s capabilities.

Illustrative of the impact is the role the new capabilities have played in a variety of USCG missions, including interdiction of drug trafficking. The Coast Guard combats drug trafficking in the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico and Eastern Pacific—their work accounts for more than 50% of all cocaine seizures each year. The service also stops thousands of illegal migrants thereby avoiding billions of dollars annually in social services. At the same time, they aid persons and vessels in distress, saving lives and minimizing injuries. In addition to trained personnel, accomplishing these challenging missions requires technology—electronic charts that integrate with radar, computerized planning and tracking systems, infrared-detection gear, all weather day/night cameras and secure channel radios.

Multi-mission stations, cutters, aircraft and boats linked by communications networks permit effective operations. Electronic systems enable coordinated tactics, integrated intelligence, multi-agency interoperability and common situational awareness necessary to fulfilling statutory missions.



(Credit: SLD)
(Credit: SLD)



A good measure of success of technology implementation is the continued increase in cocaine seizures. New communications systems, coupled with the latest in electronic sensor technology, are credited with making drug trafficking intelligence rapidly available and improving target tracking, thereby achieving effective prosecution of criminal activities. These systems, deployed across multiple types of assets allow for interoperability of electronic equipment and commonality of software. Operators are able to transmit and receive classified and unclassified information to and from other assets, including surface vessels, aircraft, local law enforcement, and shore facilities. The electronic network is the glue that permits them to work together to effectively achieve a common purpose—a true force multiplier.

A common architecture deployed across multiple types of assets allows for commonality of equipment and software systems and supportability of the entire Coast Guard enterprise. In general, the Deepwater C4ISR architecture ensures an open systems approach for design and implementation, providing a web enabled infrastructure. Its architecture adapts to technology insertion and enables the progression to future Coast Guard wide C4ISR architectures.

The first National Security Cutter, USCGC BERTHOLF, has passed all TEMPEST and information assurance requirements culminating in the authority to operate. Indeed, Lockheed Martin one of the partners in Deepwater was specifically cited in a Coast Guard letter of appreciation dated Jun. 24. Delivery of the second National Security Cutter, USCGC WAESCHE, also received an excellent C4ISR evaluation and the ship was accepted with no C4ISR trial cards. Systems include electronic charts that integrate with radar, computerized planning and tracking systems, infrared-detection gear, all weather day/night cameras and secure channel radios.

Multi-Mission Platforms and the C4ISR Advantage

The Coast Guard has accepted delivery of missionized HC-130J Long Range Surveillance Maritime Patrol Aircraft. The aircraft’s new mission equipment and sensor packages are designed to deliver enhanced search, detection and tracking capabilities to perform maritime search and rescue, maritime law enforcement and homeland security missions. The aircraft modifications include installation of belly-mounted surface search radar, a nose-mounted electro-optical infrared sensor, a flight deck mission operator station and a mission integrated communication system. The mission system installed on the HC-130J is derived from the same software series developed for the mission system pallet onboard the HC-144A maritime patrol aircraft

The Coast Guard has also accepted mission system pallets for their new HC-144A “Ocean Sentry” Medium Range Surveillance Maritime Patrol Aircraft. This roll-on, roll-off suite of electronic equipment enables the aircrew to compile data from the aircraft’s multiple integrated sensors and transmit and receive both classified and unclassified information to other assets, including surface vessels, other aircraft, local law enforcement, and shore facilities.

At the heart of all these platforms is a common command and control system. It provides system interoperability as well as commonality for savings in maintenance and training. C4ISR system software reuse across Coast Guard platforms is significant. The same 100% common software between air platforms is also 41% common with the software on the National Security Cutter. The suite on the National Security Cutter leverages nearly 75% of the code from the Navy’s latest Aegis baseline while the air suite is 80% common with Navy’s P-3 Aviation Improvement Program. The command and control system is not only compatible with across the Coast Guard’s land, air and sea assets. It is also interoperable with the Navy and 117 federal agencies.

In ports and coastal areas, one of USCG’s most significant capability enhancements clearly is shaping a robust connectivity capability for the USCG and its maritime and security partners. It is a fundamental building block in improving the Coast Guard’s ability to maintain maritime domain awareness focused on meeting the needs of decision makers engaged in operations at sea, ashore, and in the air.

In spite of such developments, the Coast Guard has insufficient new assets—much of the fleet is wearing out at an ever-increasing rate. Modern communications and electronic systems are needed so that new and aging assets can be deployed effectively.  And the aviation assets are not being modernized at a sufficient rate to enable to the USCG to have the reach necessary to act upon the newly acquired information generated by new C4ISR systems.

The Maritime Patrol Aircraft at the Center of the Enterprise

Too often when one thinks of a maritime service, one thinks largely of ships.  Yet in a 21st century maritime enterprise, data, communications, and integrated air and surface systems are really at the heart of effective operations.  The Administration is seeking within the Department of Defense to organize a more effective integration of the USAF with the USN; at the heart of this new air-sea approach is a core recognition of the role of integration of air and surface assets in mission success.

The USN has underscored the central role which it new maritime patrol aircraft and unmanned vehicles (MMA and BAMS successively) will play in maritime operations.  Illustrative of this connectivity contribution by the USN’s aviation fleet was the following comment made by RADM Brooks.

The MMA will be a rapidly deployable force capable of operating independently in the far reaches of the world’s oceans or in coordination with naval, joint, or allied forces. Its superior connectivity ensures MMA a major role in FORCEnet as a key airborne node. MMA’s projected state-of-the-art communications and data links have the potential to act as sensors and provide the airborne node necessary for the Navy’s network-centric C4ISR architecture of the common undersea and common operations pictures. This capability will enable real-time, multi-channel command, control, communications, and intelligence links combined with onboard sensing, quick-look analysis, data fusing, and data dissemination to deliver timely information to naval, joint, or allied decision makers.[2]

And US forces have discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan the central role which aviation assets – manned and unmanned – can play for successful operations of ground forces.  The USMC concept of the MAGTF – the combined air and ground force – is being replicated to a considerable extent as the US Army works with the US Air Force in shaping joint concepts of operations.

The USCG uses its aviation assets in a similar manner.  The aviation assets – helos and MPAs – exist as an extension of the ground and surface fleet capabilities.  Indeed, for the 21st century USCG much like for the 21st century US military overall, air assets extend the reach, range and capability to act of the surface assets.  For the USCG this means a simple truth: a surface ship without the long reach of an MPA or a UAV cannot see very far.  By extending the sight and reach of a ship or a fleet, the ability to act and to protect US equities and interests are significantly expanded.

The New MPA Provides Significant Savings in Operational Costs, a Significant Expansion in the Ability of the Fleet to Execute Missions and Carries New C4ISR Systems to Benefit the USCG, the Joint and Coalition Forces (Credit: EADS)The New MPA Provides Significant Savings in Operational Costs, a Significant Expansion in the Ability of the Fleet to Execute Missions and Carries New C4ISR Systems to Benefit the USCG, the Joint and Coalition Forces (Credit: EADS)

With the addition of the multi-mission pallets to the MPAs, and with the ability to integrate the information gained by those systems within shipboard operations and decision making, notably with the new USCG cutter, the MPAs become especially significant extenders of fleet activity.  Without this extended reach, drugs may well enter the US, illegal immigrants may well not be seen, and illegal shipping with whatever consequence may enter US waterways.  Inadequate resources leads to the inability to acquire assets with clear consequences for reduced ability for the USCG to see and act on that knowledge to protect the US homeland or forces operating abroad.

The new MPA’s concept of operations is essential as well to the functioning of the 21st century USCG.  The new MPAs are significant enablers for the legacy and modernized fleet.  The best way to think about this is simply a simple Venn diagram in which the surface asset occupies one Venn circle, and the MPAs provide a second Venn circle significantly expanding the range of operation, and hence the ability to execute missions.

The con-ops typically depends on the mission and is essentially the same as the HC-130.   Part of this calculation is the determination of proper track spacing (distance between search legs), which is a function of the size of the target (man in the water would require a very small track spacing for example), sea state, visibility, cloud cover, etc.  Night searches are done if the target is thought to be capable of detection by radar, possess radio or signaling equipment.  Typically a ship would be controlling one or more MPA/helicopters and continuously updating which areas have been searched and the results.  Of course this function can be done by a shore station as well.  The primary purpose the ship is involved at all is to be available as a helo platform and/or to launch a boarding party, engage the target if hostile or to recover survivors.

However, the C-144 can do more than just pass target position information or provide vectors.  It has the ability to take photos and download them. So the ship can have information on the number of people aboard the target craft (good to know if they are bad guys) and perhaps even information on arms.

Finally fixed-wings are often required to loiter over targets or follow them until a surface can intercept.  Endurance is critical here and a major shortcoming of the HU-25.  The HU-25 has about 4 hours of endurance regardless of the altitude.  It can fly much further high up than down low, but 4 hours is what you get.  The HC-144 can provide ten hours.

The role of the MPA as a force enhancer can be seen in several examples.

The first example is the July seizure of cocaine mentioned earlier.

Late Wednesday night (July 10, 2009), the crew of the National Security Cutter Bertholf conducted the cutter’s first drug bust and disrupted a major drug smuggling operation in international waters.  Two suspected drug smuggling boats, four suspected smugglers and a bale of cocaine were seized as evidence some 80 miles off the coast of Guatemala.  The incident began when a group of four suspicious ‘pangas’ were spotted by a maritime patrol aircraft and alerted the Bertholf. A Coast Guard helicopter launched from the cutter and a marksman aboard was able to shoot out the engines of two speedboats and fire warning shots at the other two during the pursuit as bales were being thrown overboard from all four boats. Shortly after, Bertholf’s interceptor boats apprehended two of the boats and detained the four people onboard.[3]

The New USCG Cutter and the New MPA Provide a Significant Capability Leap and Replace Disappearing Assets (Credit: SLD)The New USCG Cutter and the New MPA Provide a Significant Capability Leap and Replace Disappearing Assets (Credit: SLD)

The con-ops described in this operation is typical of an integrated air-to-surface operation.  Obviously, all of the assets described are necessary to mission success, but the MPA as spotter and tracker is clearly at the heart of such success.

An additional example underscores the significance of the ability of the USCG through its new connectivity solutions to work with other US aviation assets to achieve mission success.  Here the example is that of a 2008 drug seizure in the Pacific where a USN MPA was central to mission success.

USCG Commandant Allen wrote:

I’m proud to tell you that over the past five days, Pacific Area Coast Guard units, with the help of our U.S. Navy and interagency partners, seized over 14 tons of cocaine from two Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS) vessels in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. On 13 September, a Navy maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) detected an SPSS in international waters and vectored a Navy ship, with a Pacific Area Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET), to intercept it. After conducting an unannounced nighttime boarding, the LEDET discovered 7 tons of cocaine. Then on 17 September, another Navy MPA detected an SPSS and vectored the cutter MIDGETT to investigate. MIDGETT’s boarding team subsequently discovered an additional 7 tons of cocaine….The interoperability between Coast Guard and Navy assets has never been more effective.[4]

Finding a Semi-Submersible at Sea and Then Prosecuting Effectivley is a Challenging Task, Something the Drug Smugglers are Counting on for their Mission success. (Credit: USCG)Finding a Semi-Submersible at Sea and Then Prosecuting Effectivley is a Challenging Task, Something the Drug Smugglers are Counting on for their Mission success. (Credit: USCG)

MPAs are not only central to extend the reach of surface ships but as multi-mission assets can operate alone to provide for independent actions, ranging from C4ISR missions on their own for the benefit of DHS decision-makers or as lift assets able to move goods and personnel as they did in the case of dealing with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

With flood waters from the Mississippi River threatening several Midwestern states in June 2008, the U.S. Coast Guard put one of its newest aircraft in the air to survey the damage and to assess the condition of vital shipping lanes. The HC-144A Ocean Sentry flew over flooded portions of eastern Iowa and northeast Missouri on 19 June 2008.  Though its initial operational capability was still six months off, RAdm. Joel Whitehead, Commander Coast Guard District Eight, selected the HC-144A because he believed this fixed-wing, turboprop aircraft’s longer ranges, slow flying speeds, and passenger capacity best suited the needs of the mission.  Also affecting its selection over other Coast Guard aircraft was the limited availability of HU-25 Falcon  jets, the aircraft the HC-144A will eventually replace.

The mission took senior Coast Guard officials, including RAdm. Whitehead and maritime industry representatives, on a flight to observe the extent of the flooding. The shipping industry representatives flew along to gain a better understanding of how the floods would impact shipping and commerce along the Mississippi River and its tributaries in Iowa and Missouri. The Ocean Sentry’s ability to fly at slower speeds allowed for more effective aerial assessment and increased time on scene.[5]

And in a crisis like the Haiti rescue effort, the lift and logistical capabilities of the USCG becomes central to the national response. Although useful to have UAVs flying over the island, better intelligence is not worth much without the lift and logistical capability of aircraft, like the USCG C-130s and MPAs.

The Challenge of Moving Forward

The legacy fleet is in extremis and the need to provide the new aircraft, which are built around significant improvements in costs of maintenance, is essential to ongoing USCG operations. The CG initially bought 41 HU-25A aircraft, of which 36 were operational.  The operational fleet size was reduced in the early 1990s by Admiral Kime to fund expansion of the Marine Safety Program.  The very high cost of maintaining the HU-25 (especially the engines) has been a significant burden on USCG operations. Currently the HU-25 fleet is being reduced as C-144s are brought on line.  The current fleet is only 18 aircraft, 14 operational and 4 support aircraft.  The CG has made minimal investment in the HU-25 over the past several years to save money.  For example, the aircraft is limited to FL230 (service ceiling is FL420) because the CG elected not to invest in an upgraded IFF several years ago.



(Credit: EADS)
(Credit: EADS)



The new USCG MPA’s are the lead acquisition in the Deepwater program.  The Deepwater program was built around USCG assessments of an integrated approach to executing core USCG missions.  This assessment was shaped in the mid-1990s and then re-casts in the wake of post 9/11 assessments.  The core approach was that an integrated C4ISR capability would allow the USCG to avoid a costly one for one replacement approach for its obsolescent assets.  By integrating the replacement assets, less numbers of each particular asset would be required.

Although the execution of the Deepwater program was flawed, the underling approach remains sound.  Yet the C4ISR funding for the USCG is on a downward trajectory, and the numbers of the replacement assets are going down not up.  This is the worst of all possible worlds.  The C4ISR, which enabled the acquisition of less numbers of platforms, is underfunded, and the result is not more platforms being acquired but less!

The only result of this will be a significant shortfall in the ability of the USCG to perform its missions, with a security shortfall and various negative consequences such as more drugs getting into the United States, more illegal immigrants with possible health hazards unnoticed, more arms trafficking from sea successfully entering the United States and so on.   Failure to recapitalize the USCG is not a funding game; it is a pulling apart of the network, which protects the United States.  Holes in the net are ways through for forces creating negative consequences on US territory.

In the original Deepwater schema, the USCG was projected to acquire 35 new MPAs, as well as 6 high altitude endurance organic UAVs.  The UAVs were cancelled, although the USCG and DHS are looking at ways to supplement or replace the cancellation.[6] With this cancellation, organic airborne ISR was reduced and with it, the number of MPAs should logically go up by some function of the 6 cancelled UAVs, so that the number might now approach 40 MPAs.

The program is on track and on budget. The HC-144A Ocean Sentry is a derivative of the European Aeronautics and Defense Systems (EADS) CASA CN-235-300 twinturbo medium cargo/transport aircraft. It is fitted to carry sensors, search radar, and an advanced communications suite. Forming the Ocean Sentry’s nerve center is the Mission Systems Pallet (MSP) that integrates all the aircraft’s systems with a two-place operators’ station inside the cargo compartment. The MSP is a roll-on/roll-off suite of electronic equipment that allows the aircrew to compile data from the aircraft’s multiple sensors and transmit that data to other participants in the operational area.

As the USCG describes the new MPA:

This fixed-wing turbo prop aircraft provides invaluable on-scene loitering capabilities and perform various missions, including maritime patrol, law enforcement, Search and Rescue (SAR), disaster response, and cargo & personnel transport. The Mission System Pallet is a roll- on, roll-off suite of electronic equipment that enables the aircrew to compile data from the aircraft’s multiple integrated sensors and transmit and receive both classified “Secret”-level and unclassified information to other assets, including surface vessels, other aircraft, local law enforcement and shore facilities. With multiple voice and data communications capabilities, including UHF/VHF, HF, and Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM), the HC-144A will be able to contribute to a Common Tactical Picture (CTP) and Common Operating Picture (COP) through a networked Command and Control (C2) system that provides for data sharing via SATCOM. The aircraft is also equipped with a vessel Automatic Identification System, direction finding equipment, a surface search radar, an Electro-Optical/ Infra-Red system, and Electronic Surveillance Measures equipment to improve situational awareness and responsiveness.[7]

The new MPA is the product of a blend of several mature technologies, produced by the best defense and aerospace companies in the world.  In other words, it is a mature product, in initial production with no problems to be anticipated in either continued production or ramp-up of production.

Starting with delivery in 2003, eight new MPAs have been delivered through the end of 2008 along with three mission pallets.  MPAs nine through 11 are to be delivered in 2010 along with mission system pallets four through twelve.  The MPA baseline fielding plan called for 16 additional MPAs to be delivered by 2014 for a total of 36.

Unfortunately, there is a reported delay in the program by senior DHS acquisition officials.[8] The proposal is to have a break in production after the deliveries in 2010.  Such a delay to save near term acquisition monies will come at the expense of needed capabilities.  An interruption in production will not be matched by an interruption in the threat environment facing the United States, or in the “normal” challenges facing the USCG.  A funding delay is a further opening in the security net around the United States.  An interruption in production is penny wise and pound-foolish.

To quote the DHS budget document:

The Coast Guard embraces a culture of response and action, with all of its personnel trained to react to “All Threats, All Hazards.”  In many cases, Front-line operators are encouraged to take action commensurate with the risk scenario presented, without needing to wait for detailed direction from senior leadership.  This model enables swift and effective response to a wide variety of situations.[9]

But it is difficult to provide “swift and effective response” with missing capabilities. And the absence of capabilities means simply put an enhanced probability of threats not being met today and augmented tomorrow.


[1] Budget in Brief (2010), Department of Homeland Security, pages 82-83.

[2] RADM Richard E. Brooks, USN, “The Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force Transformation,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest (Volume 24, Number 3, 2003), p. 240.

[3] The Coast Guard Compass, (July 10, 2009)

[4] http://www.eaglespeak.us/2008/09/self-propelled-semi-submersibles.html

[5] Greg Davis, “Coast Guard’s newest aircraft surveys Midwest flooding,” Naval Aviation News (January 1, 2009)

[6] Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program Update (Homeland Security, USCG, 2009).

[7] “Coast Guard Takes Delivery of First Mission Systems Pallet for its HC-144A “Ocean Sentry” Maritime Patrol Aircraft,” USCG Press Release, March 11, 2008.

[8] “Coast Guard Seeks to Avoid HC-144 Production Break,” Defense Daily (September 14, 2009).

[9] Budget in Brief, 2010 (DHS, page 83).

China-Russia Relations and the United States: At a Turning Point?

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on China-Russia Relations and the United States: At a Turning Point?
04/13/2011

By Dr. Richard Weitz

04/12/2011 – Since the end of the Cold War, the improved political and economic relationship between Beijing and Moscow has affected a range of international security issues. China and Russia have expanded their bilateral economic and security cooperation. In addition, they have pursued distinct, yet parallel, policies regarding many global and regional issues.

Yet, Chinese and Russian approaches to a range of significant subjects are still largely uncoordinated and at times in conflict. Economic exchanges between China and Russia remain minimal compared to those found between most friendly countries, let alone allies.

Although stronger Chinese-Russian ties could present greater challenges to other countries (e.g., the establishment of a Moscow-Beijing condominium over Central Asia), several factors make it unlikely that the two countries will form such a bloc.

The relationship between the Chinese and Russian governments is perhaps the best it has ever been. The leaders of both countries engage in numerous high-level exchanges, make many mutually supportive statements, and manifest other displays of Russian-Chinese cooperation in what both governments refer to as their developing strategic partnership.

The current benign situation is due less to common values and shared interests than to the fact that Chinese and Russian security concerns are predominately directed elsewhere.

Although both countries have experienced a geopolitical resurgence during the past two decades, Chinese and Russian security concerns are not directed at each other but rather focus on different areas and issues, with the notable exceptions of maintaining stability in Central Asia and constraining North Korea’s nuclear activities.

Most Chinese policy makers worry about the rise of separatist movements and Islamist terrorism in western China and about a potential military clash with the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, especially regarding Taiwan and the contested maritime regions of the South China and East China Seas.

In contrast, most Russian analysts see terrorism in the North Caucasus, maintaining influence in Europe, and managing security relations with Washington as the main security challenges to their country.

Neither Chinese nor Russian military experts perceive a near-term military threat from the other’s country. The Russian government has even provided sophisticated navy, air, and air defense platforms to the Chinese military, confident that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would only employ these systems, if at all, against other countries. In addition, China and Russia have resolved their longstanding border disputes as well as contained their rivalries in Central Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and other regions.

Since the Soviet Union’s disintegration in the early 1990s, China and Russia have resolved important sources of their Cold War-era tensions. Through protracted negotiations, the two governments have largely solved their boundary disputes, which had erupted in armed border clashes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The stoking of anti-Chinese sentiment by politicians in the Russian Far East impeded the ability of Russia’s first President, Boris Yeltsin, to make substantial progress during the 1990s in demarcating the Russia-China border. These politicians sought to rally local support by accusing Moscow of planning to surrender territory to Beijing. By the mid-2000s, Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, managed to centralize sufficient political power in the Kremlin to ignore these local sentiments. Furthermore, Russia and China have demilitarized their lengthy shared frontier through a series of arms control and disarmament measures.

Chinese and Russian leaders share a commitment to a philosophy of state sovereignty (non-interference) and territorial integrity (against separatism). Although Russian and Chinese leaders defend national sovereignty by appealing to international law, their opposition also reflects more pragmatic considerations—a shared desire to shield their human rights and civil liberties practices, and those of their allies, from Western criticism.

Chinese and Russian officials refuse to criticize each other’s foreign and domestic policies in public. They also have issued many joint statements calling for a multi-polar world in which no one country (e.g., the United States) dominates. During the past few years, their leaders have commonly blamed American economic mismanagement for precipitating the global recession.

They regularly advocate traditional interpretations of national sovereignty that exempt a government’s internal policies from foreign criticism. Beijing and Moscow oppose American democracy promotion efforts, U.S. missile defense programs, and Washington’s alleged plans to militarize outer space.

The two countries strive to uphold the authority of the United Nations, where the Chinese and Russian delegations frequently collaborate to dilute resolutions seeking to impose sanctions on Burma, Iran, Zimbabwe, and other governments they consider friendly. In July 2008, they finally demarcated the last pieces of their 4,300-km (2,700 mile) frontier, one of the world’s longest land borders, ending a decades-long dispute.

Chinese and Russian officials have expressed concern about the efforts by the United States and its allies to strengthen their ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities. Their professed fear is that these strategic defense systems, in combination with the strong American offensive nuclear capabilities, might enable the United States to obtain nuclear superiority over China and Russia.

Both governments have also expressed unease regarding U.S. military programs in the realm of outer space. Russian and Chinese experts claim that the United States is seeking to acquire the means to orchestrate attacks in space against Russian and Chinese reconnaissance satellites and long-range ballistic missiles, whose trajectories passes through the upper atmosphere. In response, the Russian and Chinese governments have proposed various arms control initiatives purportedly aimed at preventing the militarization of space.

For example, the Russian and Chinese representatives have unsuccessfully sought for years at the UN Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a treaty on the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” which would seek to prohibit the militarization of outer space. More recently, China and Russia have submitted a joint Space Treaty to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which would impose legal constraints on how the United States could use outer space. They have sought to link progress on other international arms control initiatives to the adoption of these space limitations.

The bilateral defense relationship has evolved in recent years to become more institutionalized and better integrated. As befits two large and powerful neighbors, the senior military leaders of Russia and China now meet frequently in various formats. Their direct encounters include annual meetings of their defense ministers and their armed forces chiefs of staff. Since 1997, they have also organized yearly “strategic consultations” between their deputy chiefs of the general staff.  In March 2008, the Chinese defense minister established a direct telephone line with his Russian counterpart, the first such ministerial hotline ever created by China and another country.  In December 2008, the chiefs of the Chinese and Russian general staffs created their own direct link.

Senior Russian and Chinese defense officials also typically participate in the regular heads of government meetings between Russia and China, which occur about once a year as bilateral summits. They also confer frequently at sessions of multinational gatherings, such as at meetings of the SCO, which host regular sessions for defense ministers. Contacts are even more common among mid-level military officers, especially those in charge of border security units and military units in neighboring Chinese and Russian territories.

Russian and Chinese military experts also engage in regular direct discussions related to their functional expertise such as communications, engineering, and mapping. Substantial academic exchanges also regularly occur. More than 1,000 Chinese students have studied at over 20 Russian military academies since 1996. The two defense communities conduct a number of larger exchanges and engagements. The best known are the major biennial military exercises that they have been holding since 2005, but smaller-scale engagements also frequently occur.

Chinese and Russian leaders also have developed shared perspectives and independent offensive capabilities regarding governmental activities in the cyber domain. The two governments have been developing their information warfare capabilities and now possess an extensive variety of offensive and defensive tools in this domain.

Furthermore, recent revelations regarding Chinese cyber-espionage activities suggest the extent to which Chinese operatives have penetrated Western information networks. In Russia’s case, cyber attacks against Estonia, Georgia, and other countries illustrate the extensive offensive capabilities available to that country’s forces. Russia’s hybrid August 2008 campaign against Georgia was particularly effective in disabling Georgia’s infrastructure as well as demonstrating a potential capacity to inflict widespread physical damage.

Both countries appear to have already conducted extensive surveying of U.S. digital vulnerabilities and to have prepared targeted campaign plans to exploit U.S. network vulnerabilities if necessary. Although these offensive and defensive preparations are being conducted independently, the Chinese and Russian governments are collaborating, along with other Eurasian allies in the SCO, to deny Internet resources to civil liberties groups and other opponents of their regimes.

Central Asia perhaps represents the geographic region where the security interests of China and Russia most overlap. Although China and Russia often compete for Central Asian energy supplies and commercial opportunities, the two governments share a desire to limit potential instability in the region. They especially fear ethnic separatism in their border territories supported by Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia. Russian authorities dread the prospect of continued instability in the northern Caucasus, especially Chechnya and neighboring Dagestan. China’s leaders worry about separatist agitation in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

The shared regional security interests between Beijing and Moscow have meant that the newly independent states of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have become a generally unifying element in Chinese-Russian relations. Their overlapping security interests in Central Asia have manifested themselves most visibly in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Since its founding in 2001, the SCO has essentially functioned as a Chinese-Russian condominium, providing Beijing and Moscow with a convenient multilateral framework to manage their interests in Central Asia. At present, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are also full members, while India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan have observer status in the organization.

Yet, this harmony between Beijing and Moscow arises primarily because the Chinese leadership considers the region of lower strategic priority than does Moscow, which still considers Central Asia an area of special Russian influence. China’s growing interest in securing Central Asian oil and gas could lead Beijing to reconsider its policy of regional deference.

 

Despite their improved relationship, China and Russia have not formed a mutual defensive alliance and still tend to pursue distinct, if largely parallel, policies regarding many issues. Personal and economic exchanges between China and Russia remain minimal compared to those found between most large countries in Europe and North America.

 

The most noteworthy development in their bilateral defense relationship has been the sharp decline of Russian arms sales to China in recent years. The ongoing improvement in the quality and quantity of China’s national defense production confronts Russian officials with a difficult choice. Until now, the Russian government has refused to sell its most sophisticated weapons systems—such as long-range ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, or air and missile defense systems—to the PRC for fear that such weapons could disrupt the balance of power in East Asia.

The Russian government has also declined to sell China weapons—such as advanced land warfare weapons or tactical air support aircraft—that could assist the PLA in a ground war with Russia. Instead, Russia has transferred advanced weapons mostly for naval warfare and air defense. Moscow’s restraint has meant that Russian arms sales to Beijing have been insufficient by themselves to enable China to defeat the more technologically advanced militaries of Taiwan, Japan, or the United States.

Now the growing prowess of China’s indigenous defense industry has decreased Beijing’s interest in purchasing low-quality Soviet-era weapons from Moscow, leaving the PLA interested in only the most advanced Russian weapons. The Russian government has thus far declined to sell such weapons for fear the Chinese might copy their technology and use it to design weapons that Chinese firms could then sell to potential Russian customers at lower prices, in addition to the above concerns regarding Russia’s national defense.

This transformation has meant that bilateral defense-industrial ties between China and Russia have gone from being the foundation of their new post-Cold War partnership to a major irritant.

Russian officials are similarly reluctant to transfer their best nuclear energy technologies and other knowledge products that could allow lower-cost Chinese manufacturers to displace Russian exports from third-party markets. The rest of their bilateral energy relationship remains equally problematic. The two sides repeatedly announce grandiose oil and natural gas deals that, until recently, have failed to materialize. Russian energy firms try to induce European and Asian customers to bid against one another. Although this approach enhances Russian bargaining leverage, it reinforces Chinese doubts about Russia’s reliability as a long-term energy partner.

The two governments remain suspicious about each other’s activities in Central Asia, where their state-controlled firms compete for oil and gas. Chinese officials have steadfastly refused to endorse Moscow’s decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, which Russia pried from Georgia during the August 2008 war. At the societal level, ties between ordinary Chinese and Russians remain minimal despite years of sustained efforts by both governments to promote humanitarian exchanges and the study of the other country’s language. Chinese criticize the failure of the Russian government to ensure the safety and respect the rights of Chinese nationals working in Russia. Russians in turn complain about Chinese pollution spilling into Russian territory and worry that large-scale Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East will result in large swaths of eastern Russia becoming de facto parts of China.

 

After many years of false hopes and frustrated deals, China and Russia have made only modest progress in establishing their long-anticipated energy partnership. Notwithstanding China’s efforts at energy supply diversification over the past decade, it was not until 2009 that Russia became China’s fourth largest oil supplier, providing 7.8% of China’s imports in 2009, up from 6.3% in 2008. This figure is now rising further thanks to the opening of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean oil pipeline on January 1, 2011. Still, this low figure is surprising because the two countries would appear to be natural energy partners. Furthermore, negotiations over a direct natural gas pipeline remain stalled due to disagreements over what price China will pay for the gas. Russia has carved out only a small share of China’s expanding nuclear energy sector.

Given the geographic proximity between the two nations, the fact that Russia is the world’s largest oil producer, and the fact that China is the world’s largest energy importer and fastest growing economy, it would seem that Russia and China would have aligned sooner. Russia’s oil and natural gas deposits, some of the largest in the world, lie much closer than the more distant energy reserves of the Persian Gulf and Africa. Oil and gas from these regions can only reach the PRC through international waters vulnerable to interdiction by foreign navies and sea pirates, whereas Russian energy can enter Chinese territory directly without having to pass through third-party territories. Some energy-exporting Central Asian countries also enjoy these advantages, though Chinese policy makers act warily in this region given Moscow’s traditional dominant regional position, which generally guarantees an important role for Russian companies in the exploitation and especially transportation of Central Asian oil and gas.

Despite these advantages and other mutual incentives to increase bilateral energy cooperation, Chinese-Russian energy cooperation has been surprisingly limited. Technical obstacles, pricing conflicts, inadequate transportation infrastructure, and mutual suspicions have historically kept Chinese purchases of Russian energy at relatively low levels. Frequent delays in shipments on the part of the Russians and attempts to leverage the competing interests of the Chinese, Asian, and European markets off each other have prevented Chinese policy makers from regarding Russia as a reliable long-term supplier. In assessing energy relations between the two countries, it is important to distinguish concrete contracts from mere declarations of intent. Many of the bilateral agreements reached in recent years—often described as memoranda of understanding or framework accords—aim merely to signify interest as well as gain leverage regarding third parties, such as Japan and Europe.

 

Despite their 2008 boundary agreements, tensions regarding the Russian-Chinese border periodically reappear, such as when the Chinese government first learned that two Russian coast guard ships had sunk a Chinese-owned freighter off its coast on February 15, 2009. Revelations about the incident produced sharp protests in the Chinese media, which ran stories recounting how Czarist Russia had seized the land from a weak China during the 19th century and citing examples of how contemporary Russians mistreat Chinese nationals. Nationalist politicians in both countries can mobilize people behind extremist platforms using racism and ethnic hatred.

 

Their trade imbalance is another source of tension. The decline in Russian arms purchased by China in recent years has shifted this balance significantly against Russia. Before 2007, Russia racked up steady surpluses from large deliveries of energy, arms, and other industrial goods. Since then, the terms of trade have shifted markedly in the PRC’s favor due to a decline in Chinese purchase of weapons systems and other high-technology items. At present, Russian exports to the PRC consist overwhelmingly of raw materials, especially natural resources like oil and timber. Oil deliveries alone often account for half the value of all Russian exports to China.  When prices of these commodities collapsed in 2008, Russia ran a $13.5 billion trade deficit with China. The resurgence in energy prices in the past year has now returned Russia’s surplus, but Moscow policy makers are eager to reduce their dependence on volatile raw material exports by reviving the PRC’s purchase of high-value industrial goods and services. China could address this source of tension by purchasing more Russian weapons and high-technology products.

Mutual investment is another lagging area of cooperation that has attracted the attention of both governments. In 2009, the PRC’s direct (non-financial) investment in Russia amounted to only $413 million, which itself represented a 73.5 percent growth over the previous year.  By the end of 2009, China’s accumulative non-financial direct investment in Russia was only $2.02 billion. Most Chinese non-financial capital flows into Russia’s textile, timber, and raw materials sector. The parties have drafted, but not yet implemented, a Sino-Russian Investment Cooperation Plan, designed to increase their mutual cooperation in investment and financing.  The Russian government is particularly eager to secure Chinese investment to help achieve their goal of modernizing the Russian economy.  In addition, Russian officials want Chinese firms to participate in the government’s plans to sell Russian state-owned shares in hundreds of large companies. Through this partial privatization, Russian officials hope to receive an influx of cash at a time when surging government spending and weak revenues are pushing the budget into deep deficit. One factor likely limiting Chinese interest is that the privatization process could take five years to implement and the Russian government will still retain majority ownership and therefore control over most of the companies.

Despite their mutual concern about American strategic ambitions, the governments of China and Russia have not undertaken any widespread collaboration in this area. For example, they have not pooled their military resources or expertise to overcome U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems by, for instance, undertaking joint research and development programs to create shared anti-BMD technologies. Nor have they coordinated pressure against other countries in Europe or Asia to abstain from deploying U.S. BMD assets, even in Central Asia or Northeast Asia, regions that border Chinese and Russian territories.

In East Asia, China and Russia share a concern regarding the evolving political, military, and economic situation on the Korean peninsula, which borders both countries. In these dimensions, the two governments have thus far pursued largely independent but parallel policies toward both North and South Korea. In terms of influence, Beijing enjoys a more dominant role, while Moscow often struggles to maintain even a supporting position. Their policies towards Japan and Taiwan are also not well integrated. Beijing considers its ties with these countries as among its most important bilateral relationships, whereas Moscow manages its relations with both states almost as an afterthought.

In the Middle East, the governments of China and Russia have also followed parallel but typically uncoordinated policies. They both want to sell Iran weapons, nuclear energy technologies, and other products. In addition, Beijing and Moscow have defended Tehran at the Security Council while warning against any Iranian ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, they both opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq but have shared concerns that an early American military withdrawal from that country could lead to an increase of Islamic militarism throughout the Middle East, which could disrupt China’s energy supplies and reinvigorate the Muslim insurgency in southern Russia. Thus far, however, neither country has sought to make issues related to Iran or Iraq major areas for bilateral Sino-Russian cooperation or significant points of confrontation with Washington.

More recently, China and Russia have declined to coordinate their policies regarding Libya or other manifestations of the Arab Awakening despite common fears of contagion, dislike of Western military intervention on humanitarian grounds, and concerns about losing valuable commercial opportunities. Sino-Russian cooperation in the Libyan War has thus far predominately consisted of their government officials’ citing each other’s opposition to Western interference.

The limits of foreign-policy harmonization between China and Russia are also visible in South Asia, where the two governments have adopted divergent positions on critical issues. For instance, despite the recent improvement in Chinese-Indian relations, Russia’s ties with New Delhi still remain much stronger than those between China and India. Persistent border disputes, differences over India’s growing security ties with the United States, competition over energy supplies, and other sources of Sino-Indian tensions have consistently impeded realization of the vision of a Moscow-Beijing-New Delhi axis that has periodically arisen over the past decade, especially when Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov visited New Delhi in 1998.

The Russian military has begun to cite China’s growing military potential as a reason why Russia needs to acquire more warships and retain tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) despite U.S. pressure to negotiate their elimination in the next round of the strategic arms talks. It is difficult to sustain a major conventional military force in the Russian Far East, but TNWs can help compensate for shortages in numbers. The Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, has also cited Beijing’s interest in the Arctic as a reason to field a larger fleet. (Russian strategists often describe control over the Arctic region as a vital national interest and fundamental for sustaining Russia’s great power status in the 21st century). Until recently, Russian analysts were confident about maintaining military superiority over China for at least the next decade, but recent displays of growing Chinese defense capabilities, combined with a more confrontational manifestation of Chinese diplomacy, appear to be causing the same unease in Russia as in other countries.

Defense Department Prepares for CyberWar

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Defense Department Prepares for CyberWar
04/12/2011

The Current State of Play

By Dr. Richard Weitz

(Credit: Bigstock)

04/12/2011 – Ensuring the security of the cyber domain has emerged as one of the most serious challenges to U.S. national and economic security. Of all U.S. government departments, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has evinced the greatest interest in cybersecurity issues.

In a June 2009 speech, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn warned “the cyberthreat to DoD represents an unprecedented challenge to our national security by virtue of its source, its speed, and its scope.” The Department has launched a number of initiatives to enhance its cyber capabilities. These range from developing new operational concepts, deepening its cyberspace expertise, extending its interagency partnerships, establishing a new U.S. Cyber Command, to trying to change its cybersecurity culture.

Starting in 2005, the Director of National Security Agency (NSA) was dual-hatted as commander of the Joint Functional Component Command-Net Warfare. The commander of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) was also dual-hatted, as commander of the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations. In 2008, a foreign intelligence agency placed a malicious computer code onto a flash drive that was inserted into a U.S. military laptop, causing the code to spread rapidly throughout U.S. Central Command’s network and transfer classified information to servers under foreign control. In response to this unprecedented disaster, later that year Secretary of Defense Robert Gates placed the Joint Task Force-Global Network Ops under operational control of the commander of the Joint Functional Component Command-Net Warfare. The move recognized both the imperative for better synchronizing offensive and defensive cyber capabilities as well as the need to leverage NSA’s intelligence capabilities to support an understanding of the threat and respond to it.







(Credit: U.S. CYBERCOM)
(Credit: U.S. CYBERCOM)






On June 23, 2009, Secretary Gates authorized the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to “secure freedom of action in cyberspace.” It is a subunified command of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) tasked “to lead, integrate and better coordinate the day-to-day defense, protection, and operation of DoD networks.”


CYBERCOM’s purpose was to integrate the multiple DoD commands, assets, and activities that exist in this area as well as strengthen the “full-spectrum” of DoD’s cyber activities, including the planning and conduct of defensive and offensive cyber operations. Although CYBERCOM achieved initial operational capability on May 21, 2010, concerns over civil liberties and other issues delayed the command’s establishment for months. Many of CYBERCOM’s key missions, relationships, and authorities still remain unresolved.

CYBERCOM has specific broad responsibilities:

  • Defend US military networks (from criminals, terrorists, foreign intelligence services, as well as foreign militaries)
  • Support current military operations and planning for future contingencies
  • Assist civilian partners as needed and permitted

CYBERCOM’s initial agenda consists in helping to develop and integrate existing DoD cyber initiatives, establishing detailed rules for when and how the U.S. military can conduct retaliatory or first cyber strikes, and defining its relationship with the other U.S. cyber stakeholders. CYBERCOM will oversee DoD efforts to recruit, train, and retrain many more cyber security experts, who are also heavily sought after by other public and private employers. The command aims to use the considerable technical expertise and other cyber assets possessed by U.S. military and intelligence agencies more effectively.







General Alexander (Credit: NSA)
General Alexander (Credit: NSA)






Gen. Keith Alexander, in charge of the NSA, now also concurrently leads the new Cyber Command. As director of the NSA, he also retains the additional duty of Joint Functional Component Command Net Warfare. In addition, NSA still reports directly to the (DNI for operational intelligence matters. The DNI oversees all the threat-related collection that goes on in cyber space. The most recent DoD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) calls on the U.S. armed forces to develop greater cyber expertise, develop a comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace, centralize command of cyber operations, and enhance partnerships with other U.S. government agencies.


The new command is intended to integrate DoD cyber intelligence, offense, and defense within one organization. CYBERCOM is responsible for directing the daily operations and defense of DoD information networks and for the systemic and adaptive planning, integration and synchronization of all DoD cyber activities.

In addition, when directed under the authority of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Commander of STRATCOM, CYBERCOM is responsible for conducting full-spectrum military cyberspace operations to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace. Specifically, when appropriately directed, CYBERCOM will support joint commanders with cyber capabilities to conduct military operations. Joint commanders are demanding that available cyber capabilities be considered in military operational planning.

This support will range from synchronizing planning among the other combatant commanders, to advocating for needed joint capabilities, to defending their networks from attack, to assisting them launch intelligence operations.

CYBERCOM will assist other government and civil authorities and industry partners, though only in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is the lead agency for domestic infrastructure protection from cyber and other threats.

Deputy Secretary Lynn has compared that domestic cyber role to the same way DoD assists the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in natural emergencies in the United States, such as hurricanes: “DOD has enormous assets, helicopters, transportation, logistics that can be provided to help. But it’s FEMA that’s in charge. And FEMA calls on those DOD assets, but FEMA is the organization in charge. And this is I think a similar kind of a situation.” As in other domains, DoD aims to coordinate and cooperate on cyber issues with members of the intelligence community, the State Department, law enforcement agencies, and the private sector.

Other combatant commanders want to know the status of their command-and-control networks, when penetration attempts are detected, and what actions are being taken. Gen. Alexander has therefore established the early goal of understanding the status of U.S. networks in real time and building an effective cyber-situational awareness through a common operating picture. “We must share indications in warning threat data at Net speed among and between the various operating domains. We must synchronize command-and-control of integrated defensive and offensive capabilities, also at Net speed.”

Alexander complained that often the military can only identify attacks after they have occurred and must can therefore only determine their source and nature after the initial attack. “And the consequence of that is, it was almost policing up after the fact versus mitigating it in real time. So the requirement, from my perspective: We need real-time situational awareness in our networks, to see where something bad is happening and to take action there at that time.” Cyber Command is working with other combatant commanders to conduct rigorous assessments of their network security collaborate to correct any flaws.

Before the creation of CYBERCOM, DoD bodies comprised a patchwork network for securing military communications. The Military Services still have independent military commands for their information operations that are also components of Cyber Command:

  • Army Forces Cyber Command
  • 24th Air Force
  • Navy’s Fleet Cyber Command and
  • Marine Forces Cyber Command

The Army’s Cyber Command has unique cyber operations capabilities from the 9th Signal Command, the Intelligence and Security Command and the First Information Operations Command. It uses a single operations center that’s tied to Cyber Command’s practical Joint Operational Center as a focal point for planning, synchronizing and conducting cyber operations.

The 24th Air Force is seeking to integrate the separate networks that were developed in each of the Service’s major commands—Air Combat Command, Space Command, and Air Mobility Command—into a single common operating environment. Fleet Cyber Command in the United States Navy 10th Fleet has unique responsibilities as the central operational authority for networks, cryptology, signals intelligence, information operations, cyber, electronic warfare and space operations in support of forces afloat and ashore.

STRATCOM retains oversight responsibility for operating and defending our U.S military networks, though it has traditionally focused mostly on outer space and especially nuclear defense issues. DISA also retains a role in managing DoD networks. The Defense Industrial Base initiative collaborates with American defense contractors to bolster their defenses against cyberthreats. At least some of these organizations also plan to draw on Reserve Component personnel as well as Active Duty members—and also to use professional contractors as well as full-time civil servants. The relationship of all these legacy institutions to CYBERCOM is unclear. DoD has simply observed that the success of the new command in fulfilling its missions will depend heavily on “the capabilities and growth of the Service components that are stood up to support USCYBERCOM.”

Actually attempting to employ offensive cyber attack capabilities could prove problematic. The George W. Bush administration approved each U.S. cyber attack, such as those against Iraq in 2003, on a case-by-case basis. The key members of the Bush administration could not reach a consensus on a comprehensive authorization to govern U.S. information warfare activities because they would likely involve third-party (both foreign and domestic, including civilian) Web sites given the global and interlocking nature of the Internet.

Some U.S. officials acknowledge that another problem was that the negative publicly resulting from the NSA wiretapping scandal led the Bush White House to believe that they lacked the credibility to articulate an explicit policy on so controversial an issue.

In addition to restructuring how its organizes for information operations, DoD has also launched initiatives to train more cybersecurity experts, encourage better information security practices among the department’s millions of civilian and military personnel, and refine DoD doctrine and practices for the cyber domain.

While some observers claim that the new command represents an expansion of the DoD cyberspace mission, others see it as continuing within the U.S. military’s historic mission of protecting U.S. national security from all potential threats. Yet, certain analysts fear that CYBERCOM will so militarize U.S. cyber defense efforts that the U.S. government will prove unable to realize the deep public-private partnerships that experts see as essential for securing the Internet.

Yet, U.S. officials acknowledge they cannot solve the cybersecurity problem simply by applying more human and technological resources. It will have extensive cooperation with non-DoD partners in government industry, academia, and in foreign countries.

Many key cyber skills and assets will not belong to DoD. CYBERCOM also awaits detailed overarching guidance from the National Security Council regarding what types of offensive operations are permissible and under what conditions. The deputies of other national security departments are meeting regularly to discuss the legal issues relating to cyber security and to decide what CYBERCOM can legitimately do under various conditions.







Bill Lynn (Credit: Department of Defense)
Bill Lynn (Credit: Department of Defense)






Deputy Secretary Lynn has said that one reason for CYBERCOM’s creation was to “help rationalize the interagency process” by giving non-DoD agencies a focal point of contact within the military. Yet, CYBERCOM’s relationship with these key players is very uncertain. In addition to bureaucratic competition over authorities and resources, cybersecurity issues involve almost all U.S. government agencies, create unprecedented multinational challenges, and generate tensions between effective network surveillance and protection of civil liberties.


DoD leaders have argued that it would be foolish not to take advantage of the military’s superior cyber capabilities for defending non-military networks. CYBERCOM is prepared in principle to support civilian agencies as needed and permitted, but its authorities to do so, and the appropriate thresholds for triggering military intervention, remain unclear. A cyber emergency could require a much more urgent response than when the military renders aid to civilian authorities after natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina.

DoD officials stress the need for close military-intelligence collaboration, but privacy advocates worry that CYBERCOM’s close relationship with the NSA will enhance the ability of the intelligence community to monitor Americans. Alexander heads both CYBERCOM and the NSA (which is considered a part of both DoD and the U.S. intelligence community) and the two Both headquarters are co-located at Fort Meade, Maryland.

Other DoD cyber organizations are also moving there. Defenders of close integration between CYBERCOM and NSA believe it will promote synergies and a more rapid response to urgent threats. Intelligence is needed for defensive cyber operations since countering attackers effectively requires identifying them. Intelligence is required for offensive cyber operations since they require extensive knowledge of foreign networks often gained through network penetration.

Some cyber security experts worry about the expanding role of the military-dominated NSA in this area. The NSA helps protect some government computers but is better known for its global information collection operations. During the George W. Bush administration, the NSA provoked intense controversy for engaging in an extensive global wiretapping and message intercept program.

Although designed to monitor terrorists, the program appears to have captured the communications of many innocent Americans. The head of the National Cyber Security Center, Rod Beckstrom, resigned in protest of the NSA’s expanding cyber security functions, which he saw as encroaching on DHS’s responsibility for protecting non-military websites. He argued that the military’s growing role in U.S. cybersecurity initiatives posed “threats to our democratic processes.”

In addition, the high security classification of NSA activities could impede the sharing of cybersecurity information among government agencies and with the private sector, which owns an estimated 90 percent of U.S. critical infrastructure. A March 2009 report by the Task Force on National Security in the Information Age warned about persistent cyber vulnerabilities due to the continuing failure of U.S. government agencies and other organizations to share information effectively.

Extensive classification could also disrupt the already troubled campaign to reorient U.S. government information managers from the traditional “need-to-know” philosophy to one embodying a “need-to-share” attitude. The success of the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the attempted bombing by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab have led many to stress the importance of ensuring that national security managers have access to all available information so that they can best identify and understand current and emerging threats.

In addition to privacy concerns, detractors worry about further undermining the distinction between Titles 10 and 51 of the U.S. Code (the laws governing respectively the military and the non-military intelligence communities).

Policy makers can potentially circumvent legal prohibitions contained in one section of the code by authorizing the suspect action under the other. For example, Congress can extensively oversee the Pentagon drone strikes in the Afghan-Pakistan theater, but not those conducted by the US intelligence community. The White House decision to authorize the CIA to capture or kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen now waging jihad against the United States from exile in Yemen, has intensified these concerns. Alexander argues that comprehensive oversight mechanisms involving all U.S. government branches as well as additional procedures firmly protect Americans’ civil liberties, but he and others refuse to discuss details for fear of exposing potential U.S. security vulnerabilities.