SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

The Key To Survival

Posted on December 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin

12/09/2010

Part of the High-High Mix but operational over the spectrum of operations, the combat systems enterprise of the F-35 is a game changer. (Credit: Lockheed Martin Photo)

A Perspective on the Role of Air Power in the Defense of Israel

An Interview with (Retired) General Herzl Bodinger

General Bodinger, SLD, November 2010

12/09/2010 – During a visit to Israel in November 2010, Second Line of Defense had the chance to sit down with the former chief of the Israeli Air Force from January 1992 to July 1996. General Bodinger is a noted air power thinker and during our discussion provided some insights into the evolution of air power and its role in the defense of Israel. He is the incoming President of the Israeli Air Force Association and is President of RADA Electronic Industries. During his 35-year career, General Bodinger accumulated about 6,000 flight hours and conducted 451 aerial sorties.

Israeli F-15I (Credit: USAF)

SLD: What role has airpower played in the defense of Israel?

General Bodinger: From the beginning, airpower has been essential to the survival of Israel. We have developed our Air Force at the maximum size that we can have with our resources. The Air Force needs to cover the whole Middle East, and be able to strike any target that the government of Israel will decide is necessary for the defense of Israel. The goal is to be able to convince adversaries that you cannot stop us, and you cannot retaliate in the same manner. We have had total air superiority for a considerable period of time. But air superiority is not a given. We live in a dangerous neighborhood with new weapons, missiles and capabilities. This provides today’s challenge of air dominance against significant numbers of missiles and defensive systems, primarily not delivered from aircraft. Ensuring air dominance against a polyvalent threat is crucial to the defense of Israel.

From the beginning, airpower has been essential to the survival of Israel. (…) We have had total air superiority for a considerable period of time. But air superiority is not a given. We live in a dangerous neighborhood with new weapons, missiles and capabilities. This provides today’s challenge of air dominance against significant numbers of missiles and defensive systems, primarily not delivered from aircraft. Ensuring air dominance against a polyvalent threat is crucial to the defense of Israel.

SLD: The new approach to take away air dominance is to augment defenses and to proliferate missiles?

General Bodinger: Yes. The effort is to provide new capabilities against our aircraft and to do so by using various means including, ground-to-air missiles of different kinds. And against the ability of Israel to retaliate, and to attack this very small country, a country with no strategic depth. Our adversaries are relying on the proliferation of missiles, both surface-to-air and the ground-to-ground to prevail.

SLD: So how do you respond to this new threat environment?

General Bodinger: You can simply upgrade existing systems to deal with the new threats. There are some gaps that you can’t overcome just by making a small minor change done either by changing the tactics or simply upgrading the aircraft. There comes a time that you have to make a leap forward in combat capability which we plan to do with the F-35.

SLD: Your point is that you need to introduce a different type of combat system to deal with the new threat environment.

General Bodinger: A different kind. Now, you know that we went to robotic systems or UAVs of various kinds. We were the first to use them in numbers in 1982. So this was one solution. And this is also a solution for staying over the battlefield for a long time. I call it a satellite in the atmosphere.

Now, you know that we went to robotic systems or UAVs of various kinds. We were the first to use them in numbers in 1982. So this was one solution. And this is also a solution for staying over the battlefield for a long time. I call it a satellite in the atmosphere.

SLD: It gives you persistence.

General Bodinger: Yes, it stays there for hours, and provides information, and sometimes can attack. But it’s a robot with the limitations of a robot. You need to shape the correct mix between manned and unmanned aircraft, which is an evolutionary process. But you clearly need to deal with the threat from the defensive systems for both the manned and unmanned systems. You need the ability to overcome all these threats, which are being developed against it, like the S-300 and S-400.

SLD: So you need to craft effective capability to deal with the new defensive systems and missile proliferation, which threaten both manned and unmanned systems?

General Bodinger: Correct. So, the correct way to go, which we watched very carefully, was what the F-117 introduced at first. The idea of low observable and low radar cross section, and it really looks a newer way to go. Of course, with all the avionics that come with it, at first all these machines are very expensive. But to keep buying the old aircraft simply creates targets for the new defensive systems and is a much more expensive approach. For us airpower is a spearhead force, which can be used as an icebreaker. It will open the way for the rest of the aircraft to come. For us, this will be the F-35. Because it can lead the way, and it can reach the targets. It can fly over any point over the Middle East, and strike any target. I just want to finish this and say that the surface-to-surface missiles also are a big problem here. Maybe other places less. Because of the range and because of the size of the country. We don’t have strategic depth. So, we have to bear in mind that all our assets are at risks from missiles. Whether it’s the military assets or it’s the civilian assets. From electric power stations, airports, and refineries and factories, and airbases, the entire infrastructure can be held at risk.

SLD: And your point is that offensive and defensive systems need to be available to Israel to deal with the new threat environment?

General Bodinger: Clearly you can take some points of interest, and maybe defend them better. And if worse comes to worse, and there is such a bombardment, so the civilians, you can put to shelters and you can even evacuate for a period of time. We don’t know what our adversaries will do. What we’ve seen from 1991, they bombed two towns, two big cities in Israel. Forty missiles, twenty on each. And about one to two a day. So, it shows the ability to inflict a lot of damage. You are not simply going sit back and take strikes. You have to defend your offensive assets so that you can strike back. We can put aside the defense against surface-to-surface, there are different means and layers, there’s a whole theory here in development of weapons. But we need time to get better results and better integration. And our defense forces always have to think like that. And we have to prepare for the worst; defense spending is like insurance. How much you invest in insurance, is the value of the assets that you want to insure. And the probability they will be damaged. So this time, the asset is a country. So, it’s invaluable. And the probability that it will be damaged is not low enough. So we have to invest wherever we have to invest. Even if at the end at the day, maybe we have seen the dark side of the cloud, and we’re pessimistic, one could say, and nothing happened. No alarm and disagreements, and everything is flourishing; it’s like Europe here. So, we hope for that, but hopes are not a plan of work.

You are not simply going sit back and take strikes. You have to defend your offensive assets so that you can strike back. We can put aside the defense against surface-to-surface, there are different means and layers, there’s a whole theory here in development of weapons. But we need time to get better results and better integration. And our defense forces always have to think like that. And we have to prepare for the worst; defense spending is like insurance. How much you invest in insurance, is the value of the assets that you want to insure. And the probability they will be damaged.

F35 — Israel has agreed in principle to purchase twenty F-35 Lightning II JSF (Credit: http://www.ecnmag.com/Blogs/2010/08/Precision-Guidance/Isr)

SLD: But what we do know on the defense technology side is the defense is getting better; the missile technology is getting better. So all of that could be bundled into different threat environments that could be very, very difficult if you cannot manage the battle space.

General Bodinger: That’s why we need the new aircraft. One would say we need better tanks; we need better everything. But when we talk about the ranges, and the value of air power not as a partner of the ground forces, but as a lead. So, here now we are coming to the F-35. As I look back in the development of the Israeli air force certain aircraft gave us an opportunity to make a leap forward, and the F-35 fits into that tradition. Looking back one quality leap was provided by the Mirage, the other by the F-15.

I remind people that in the late 50’s and the beginning of the 60’s, there were arguments here in the government level and the military, and also in the Air Force whether or not we needed the Mirage. Maybe we can take the aircraft that we have, we had all fresh stuff. We can upgrade them. That was the idea. Really, many officers and pilots in the Air Force supported this. We can do with upgrades, you carry the advanced weapons, and you’re better off. Why do we need to spend a lot of money with something, which could be a little better? But the problem with those who cannot envision the future is that they can not understand the leap which a new platform can provide. It’s another kind of aircraft; another kind of capability.

The Mirage was the first revolution in the early Air Force. The second time such a thing happened, we had Phantoms, we had Sky Hawks, we converted to American machines, it was very good, but the F-15 brought a breath of fresh air. The whole way we started to fight, we got the first aircraft that we received were in 1977, four prototypes of F-15s. We bought them from the test aircraft; they were fit to make some changes to become operational. And we got those. This was a revolution in the Air Force.

The whole way of flying changed after the first four aircrafts came here. Of course, when they were multiplied and then came the F-16, it became the Air Force as it is today. But the first aircraft that arrived already made the change. And we didn’t expect that this would be the change. And so, when you ask me about the F-35, I know the qualities of the aircraft. I know the value of low radar constriction, the fact that you have the communication network, the missiles and weapons that you can hold inside, and whatever you can reach. And I know the qualities of the aircraft, but I am sure that the minute the aircraft will actually be used; again, I know that there will be a big dramatic change.

SLD: No one has ever flown a 360-degree aircraft with combat systems, which allow it to manage that space. We have written on the website about the cultural change associated with the new aircraft. We’ve talked to many test pilots of this aircraft. And the notion of a 360-degree aircraft, with the kind of combat system integration, which the aircraft has, will create pressure for a culture change.

General Bodinger: You can understand it only if you experience it. And it is very difficult to transmit it to somebody who’s never flown the aircraft. And I’m sure that this will not be a small leap, again, it will be a dramatic change.

SLD: Similar to your F-15 kind of experience.

General Bodinger: Yes. I was lucky to put in place the first pilots in the country who flew F-15s. And I’m sure that this will be what will happen. And I know that there will be a big development, but you cannot even imagine what it will be. When it will come, we will know. And it will lift the whole Air Force to another level.

SLD: I think at the heart of the issue from my point of view is sortie generation rate. Your ability to turn an aircraft around quickly to go back into combat.

General Bodinger: Now, you’re coming back to the defense against surface-to-surface missiles. We have to retain our ability to take off. But let me go back to discuss the robots which I consider to be satellites in the atmosphere. I think that wherever you can send a robot, instead of a person, you should prefer a robot. Where can you do it? When the targets are static targets, the headquarters of something, any installation that you wish or asset to bring down is ideal for a robot. That is an important for the war, strategically or tactically. And you know where it is, and it is located there, and this is what you have to do. And all those cases, I think it’s a waste to send a person, because you can do the punch, whatever you wish, it will go and will kill the target and come back. And if it doesn’t come back, you send another one. So this is a robot. All the other cases that you have need to have a human mind on the battlefield to decide, because you don’t want to kill people who are not involved, how the targets have moved to another location, you need to decide on the spot. Or suddenly, you want to make another priority, and you have the authority to do it, because that shift in targets is necessary to success.

SLD: That’s a really crucial issue, reprioritization in a fluid environment.

General Bodinger: So then, you have to have a person on board. Now, it could be, I’m looking at one step forward, we didn’t do it yet. You could do it in an F-35, two or three or four. Lead a herd of those machines — the robots — and give them missions on the spot. Especially when adversaries start to become very accurate because of GPS or any other means via there missiles, we will need dominance in the decision making cycle to prevail. We look to the F-35 to be key to that process. And as we develop the combat capability, we may eliminate many robots; you don’t even need a UAV, why do you need a platform to carry your weapon? Launch the weapon. Like the tomahawk, but this will be different tomahawks.

The Arctic Sea Competition (Part Three)

Posted on December 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin

Europe’s Key Challenges

By Caroline Mükusch

German Correspondent, Second Line of Defense
**@****fo.com

ESA’s CryoSat-2 is designed to collect new insights into the role of ice  in the Earth system.
The April 20th mission plan was to underfly the  satellite over the Arctic Sea Ice.
Credit photo:  http://earthsky.org

2010-12-09 – The ownership of natural resources – the right to discover, exploit and trade oil and gas – combined with the control of the Arctic region – missile defense, strategic deterrence and maritime security operations – set the agenda for the 21st century Arctic power game. In respect to these fundamental security and energy issues, the Arctic region is of strategically importance for Europe:

Boundaries: The territories of three EU member states extend to the Arctic region: (1) Denmark with Greenland; (2) Finland and (3) Sweden. Norway and Iceland – two other Arctic neighbors – are members of the European Economic Area.
Energy: Two of Europe’s top energy suppliers – Norway and Russia – were struggling for some 40 years about the contested borders beneath the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean.
Allies: Three strategic partners to the European Union, the United States, Canada and Russia, are claiming – if needed armed – territorial rights on the continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean: Two of them are NATO members; Russia is Europe’s major energy supplier.

This environment affects Europe’s strategic regional interests such as economic development and energy security; protection of sea lines of communication, especially for trade and energy flows; environmental impacts; military activism of allies (Russia and the United States); and Arctic policies of member states and allies. Although the EU has developed guidelines regarding the future of EU Arctic policy, it is far away from an Arctic policy strategy reflecting Europe’s geopolitically and strategically reality in a comprehensive way.

A comprehensive Arctic policy encompasses:

Maritime knowledge regarding mobility, safety, and security.
National defense and international security.
Environmental knowledge regarding resources conservation.

The 2009 adopted conclusions of the Council of the EU are just a basis for the EU’s position on Arctic issues. The European Union should more clearly define its role in Arctic cooperation.

Additionally, the EU needs tools to deal simultaneously with environmental change, protection the law of the sea, environmentally hazardous chemicals, research, shipping, cooperation with indigenous peoples, and cooperation with existing forums and structures.

Even without the threat of a potential armed conflict over the Arctic between the “old” and “new” superpowers the economic and environmental trends alone justify that Europe should develop a concerted Arctic policy for the years ahead. European nations need to agree among themselves on policy, border issues of member states and allies, European security architecture, and the protection of transit routes as well as Europe’s energy security future.

The German ships MV Beluga Fraternity and MV Beluga Foresight
 traveled through the Northeast Passage without incident.
The ships began their journey from South Korea in late July.
Credit photo: Beluga Shipping via Associated Press,
http://www.boston.com

Europe also needs to build up appropriate defense and security capabilities, especially capabilities to inter-operate. A comprehensive approach would first enhance Europe’s ability to realize political interests and goals and secondly Europe’s role as global player as well as its reliability to member states and allies.

In order to enforce and ensure European Arctic policy the EU has to take the following steps:

Formulating European Arctic interests and goals.
Generate an overview (strategically picture) of capabilities, resources and capacity in member states.
Formulate a comprehensive European Arctic policy.
Develope a flexible long-term program of action.
Improve the decision-making process on Arctic issues.
Enhance scientific and enforcement capabilities, to support both member states and allies.
Engage in Arctic cooperation structures, processes, and training.
Support an international framework for rules of engagement, especially regarding shipping and military exercising.

The window of opportunity is short. Europe has to build up at least three domains:

Framework for cooperation: Establishing the infrastructure within and without the European Union for (1) common concept development, (2) information sharing, (3) permanent command and training staff, and (4) a comprehensive politically decision making process.
Network architecture: Enforcing (1) operational infrastructure – C4ISR (command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) – (2) situational maritime awareness, (3) an operating picture including regularly updated real-time situational images as well as available equipment and personnel, (4) an operational decision making process, (5) crisis management, and (6) management and coordination tools.
Effects based capabilities: Providing (1) bases for air surveillance capabilities, (2) monitoring and early warning systems, (3) appropriate time response plans and forces, especially coast guards, and (4) emergency preparedness capacity for large-scale natural disasters, maritime rescue services, search and rescue, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response in the Arctic sea.

Single European countries are unable to deal with large-scale, complex and special operations. Because of large and steadily increasing costs associated with the procurement of modern security and defense technology. Inter-operability and pooling are the key enablers for appropriate capabilities to meet Arctic challenges of the 21st century.

The Mukawama Effect

Posted on December 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin

Israel: « No Second Chance »

An Interview With Amos Harel

Amos Herel (Credit: www.haaretz.com)

12/09/2010 – During the Second Line of Defense Visit to Israel in November 2010, an article was published by Amos Harel of Haaretz, which caught our eye [1]. The article began with a focus on the testimony of outgoing director Military Intelligence Maj. General Amos Yadlin given to the Knessett’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. In his testimony, General Yadlin warned that Israel would probably fight in its next major war on two or three fronts simultaneously.

As Amos Harel wrote, the change in the Israeli security situation is due in part to “the shift in the approach of Israel’s adversaries known in Arabic as mukawama (resistance, attrition) rather than an attempt to defeat the Israel Defense forces on the battlefield. Mukawama is grounded in technological developments. For instant, precision munitions are now readily available and relatively inexpensive and there is a better ability to locate and control large-scale missile launches. The threat to Israel’s entire territory has increased significantly in recent years and it’s safe to assume that the accuracy, range and destructive capability of the enemy’s weapons will continue to improve.”

“Mukawama is grounded in technological developments. For instant, precision munitions are now readily available and relatively inexpensive and there is a better ability to locate and control large-scale missile launches. The threat to Israel’s entire territory has increased significantly in recent years and it’s safe to assume that the accuracy, range and destructive capability of the enemy’s weapons will continue to improve.”

One of the suggestions of how to deal with this situation in the piece was a better use of the “maritime domain” to provide greater strategic depth for Israel. Here Amos Harel cited a recent article in the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University’s journal Military and Strategic Affairs. In the article by Commodore First Class Gideon Raz, the author suggests:

“Air power is no longer sufficient in itself. The Israel Navy must transform the sea into part of the country’s strategic depth….Israel’s western flank (the sea) is the only open border, the Achilles’ heel of Israel’s enemies and the IDF’s great opportunity.”

During the visit we sat down to discuss with Amos Harel the article and, more generally, the evolving Israeli defense debate.

Credit: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/semedite.pdf

SLD: Could you talk a little bit about the changing threats that really require a different approach?

Amos Harel: I think it took us some time to understand where we’re heading. We actually realized that after the Lebanon war in 2006. But it’s now very clear to everybody who follows what’s going on that it’s not going to be the same kind of battles anymore. The last real war we were involved in was 1973. You had Syrian tank divisions charging against Israeli tank divisions and the same happened in Sinai between the Egyptians and the Israelis. A conventional warfare is not going to take place in the near future. And I think that in the end, probably, most of our Arab enemies have realized that they’re not going to wipe Israel off the map of the Middle East. What they’re looking for is the idea which is called in Arabic “mukawama”or resistance. But it’s not resistance actually: it’s attrition. The goal is to make the Israelis pay and in the end, after some period of time, pressuring Israelis into any kind of concessions.

SLD: So, it’s a combination of the military technique of attrition, leveraging the fact that Israel is a democracy and will have to deal with the termination of the attrition somehow.

Amos Harel: Exactly. And it has a political goal also, i.e. to lead Israel to unilateral withdrawals, which already happened twice. It happened in southern Lebanon in 2000 and it happened with disengagement in 2005 in the Gaza Strip. Now one could claim, and personally, I feel that these were the right decisions at the time for both cases. But what the other side sees is Israel withdrawing under pressure.

SLD: So the perception of an outcome.

Amos Harel: Yes. Not army against army, but guerilla warfare, terrorist warfare and so on, where the target is Israeli civilian population. And the best way to handle this from their point of view, the easiest way, is rockets and missiles. It’s even better than suicide bombers. It’s true the suicide bombers cause you more pain. One suicide bomber can kill 20-25-30 people on the bus or in a restaurant. The way it happened seven or eight years ago. But it’s more complicated to send him on his way, to have him reach his target without Israeli intelligence, interfering and capturing him on the way or so on.

Now they’re getting better missile rockets. They’re getting missiles from many sources – Iranian made, Chinese made, Syrian made -, some of them pretty accurate. And if you look at the next five or six years, they will have more accurate weapons, more lethal weapons with longer-range missiles. Already now, Hezbollah has (according to the Israeli assessments) 45,000 rockets, and they can hit almost any point in Israel. In a few years time, they’ll probably manage to have GPS capability on their warheads, on rocketsthat will be able to strike at any point in Israel quite accurately.

[The military technique or attrition is] not army against army, but guerilla warfare, terrorist warfare and so on, where the target is Israeli civilian population. And the best way to handle this from their point of view, the easiest way, is rockets and missiles. It’s even better than suicide bombers. It’s true the suicide bombers cause you more pain. One suicide bomber can kill 20-25-30 people on the bus or in a restaurant. (…) Now they’re getting better missile rockets. They’re getting missiles from many sources – Iranian made, Chinese made, Syrian made -, some of them pretty accurate. And if you look at the next five or six years, they will have more accurate weapons, more lethal weapons with longer-range missiles. Already now, Hezbollah has (according to the Israeli assessments) 45,000 rockets, and they can hit almost any point in Israel.

SLD: Let’s just hover for a moment. One of the points that we’ve made on the Chinese challenge is precisely this one. The Chinese are building advanced capabilities in missiles. They will launch a GPS system, they’re putting it together. And this is enough to give them moves on the chessboard in the Middle East, because that is a compelling threat.One has to understand that this missile threat is changing in character, because it’s correlated with this political pressure strategy. Putting those two together, it makes a difference in just exporting missiles. Does that make sense to you?

Amos Harel: Yes it does. So what is our response? Traditionally, it was the Air Force. We strived to have the best Air Force in the Middle East, better-trained pilots, American equipment, American fighter planes and so on. And if you read carefully what Hezbollah thinkers are writing, Iranians and so on, you understand their game plan; it’s not very complicated to grasp it. Apart from hitting Israeli civilians, which is their main target, they will go for Israeli Air Force bases. And it will be very, very difficult for the Air Force to function with such a bombardment. Hezbollah is talking of shooting 1,000 rockets a day. Now, if it was only against the state, it may not be such a big deal, but against airfields that is another question.

"Israeli Air Force Bases will become the main target of the Hezbollah"
Credit photo: Siegi, Israel Air Force, Sikorsky S-70A-50 Yanshuf 830,
Tel Aviv - Sde Dov (SDV / LLSD), Israel
12 May, 2010

SLD: So in part this is the stimulus to thinking about using the sea as a strategic reserve?

Amos Harel: Exactly. It’s more difficult to hit ships, and we could use the ships to target and to attack targets in Lebanon or in Gaza. Now naturally, the Air Force doesn’t like it. And the Air Force traditionally has much more influence over decision makers than anybody else. They think better, they’re more organized, they are more persuasive when they present their argument, and so on. Behind the scenes, there’s now a sort of emerging battle, a bureaucracy battle between the Air Force and others, especially the Navy saying: listen, we have to think of it a bit differently, it’s not only a question of budget, it’s a question of theory- of capability and where you’re going to be able to operate against the threats. And personally, you might think that the F-35 is a good idea. But talking with the ground forces, at least some of the generals felt that this is not where the money should be spent, but they’ve lost this battle completely.

SLD: As we talk about it, I think there’s a potential here for the F-35 to provide synergy. This whole concept of extending this space in maritime terms is probably an excellent idea, and the F-35 could acdtually be a facilitator for this.

Amos Harel: We do not yet have a plan to deal with the new threats. There are ideas, there are changes that have been made; most of them after the war and after the chief of staff resigned, and a new one came in as his successor. What Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi did more than anything else was to go back to the basics. Get back to training, get back to making sure that the soldiers get the right equipment and so on. But thinking ahead is a different issue. And then, at least some of it will have to be left to the next chief of staff, who is going to come into office by February of next year.

[Thinking ahead] will have to be left to the next chief of staff, who is going to come into office by February of next year.

SLD: I’m not sure you can have a single plan, because it depends on whether we’re talking about Lebanon, or whether we’re talking Syria.

Amos Harel: Or Iran or Gaza …

SLD: Or Iran or Iranian held territory in Iraq, which is conceivable. Having maritime capability may be at least part of how you can get that answer, so you can actually go to where the threat is coming from. So that your answer really is: “no matter where you’re going to launch your missiles from, I can reach it”.

Amos Harel: The paradox with Israel is I think that we’re facing a wide spectrum of threats, while in the end, our capabilities are very limited, because of the questions of budget, because there are only 7 million people here, and it’s a tiny country. And you need to make the decisions fast, and there’s no second chance here.

———-

Footnote:

[1] Herel, Amos, By Land, Air and Also by Sea, Haaretz, November 5, 2010

The Maintenance Learning Curve

Posted on December 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin

An Update on the Osprey from New River (VII)

[download PDF of full report]

From Supply Of Parts To Battle Damage Repair: The Challenge Of Components’ Reliability

An Interview With Lieutenant Colonel Garcia

12/09/2010 – This is the second part of the interview with Lieutenant Colonel Garcia with both Iraq and Afghan experience. In the first part of the interview, Garcia laid out some findings from his operational experience, and ways to look at the Osprey from combat deployments. Here Lieutenant Colonel Garcia deals with the challenge of maintaining the aircraft in Afghanistan. He highlights that the maintenance approach is a work in progress. It takes time to get it right, but notably the maintenance regime and supply chain is being reworked to reflect actual operational and combat experience. This is normal in the deployment of new systems. But ensuring that the deployed warfighter has the right parts at the right time is the challenge facing the supply system, and this system is clearly a work in progress.

SLD: How many aircraft did you have in operation?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: We generally operated about 10 of those aircraft on a regular basis. Usually, one of them was in phase maintenance, scheduled maintenance at 210 hours of flight hours. The other aircraft is generally in the down status for extended period of time due to cannibalization, because of some issues with the supply system.

SLD: Could you identify some of those issues?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: Let me be clear: it’s not the aircraft itself, which poses the challenge. Aircraft does what it’s been designed to do. In fact it’s done it very well. As I mentioned, we had a lot of converts, a lot of fans of it.

SLD: What then in your view is the challenge, which needs to be met to get to the next phase of reliability with the aircraft?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: Improving the performance of the components is central. We have components that are supposed to last in excess of 5,000 hours, which we’re routinely replacing less than a thousand hours and it’s not just the fact that we have to pull something off and replace it with something else. It’s all the other things that you have to pull off to do that, all the maintenance — it added maintenance on top of that.

Improving the performance of the components is central. We have components that are supposed to last in excess of 5,000 hours, which we’re routinely replacing less than a thousand hours and it’s not just the fact that we have to pull something off and replace it with something else. It’s all the other things that you have to pull off to do that, all the maintenance.

SLD: The challenge is enhanced by the need to access the parts to be replaced?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: For example, with repair to the gearbox, you have to remove almost everything out of the nacelle. To get at the gearbox, the blades have to come off the hubs. The engine has to come out; a lot of accessories have to come out of that. And you have inherent low risk once everything gets put back together to make sure it works properly.

Waiting for Parts, February 2010 in Afghanistan (Credit: USMC)

SLD: And you are doing this in difficult conditions in Afghanistan?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: Absolutely.

SLD: Do you think there’s any way that they can redesign some of the access panels in the aircraft to be more effective?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: That is happening. The access panels have improved a lot. The block A to the block B is night and day as far as some of the access panels and some of the rewiring. Changes have been funded to rework some of these issues. So basically what it looks like if you take a wire diagram of the aircraft, the hydraulics folks, the engineers built the hydraulic system, the electro-guys built their system, the fuel guys built their system, none of it was integrated. Among some of the issues we missed out back in 2000, a lot of these were fixed. We are working more effective approaches to integration.

Among some of the issues we missed out back in 2000, a lot of these were fixed. We are working more effective approaches to integration.

SLD: From your point of view, you look at the system overall. You don’t really care about the subsystem replacement. You want to see the system and your ability to get the aircraft operational as rapidly, as safe as possible.

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: Absolutely. Once again, the design inside has gotten better. So it’s a little easier, it’s not as cluttered. The panels have gotten bigger, a lot better.

SLD: What is the impact of the digital maintenance systems on the aircraft?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: The aircraft was designed before you went flying in a regular basis, you weren’t supposed to go and open these panels unless you had to work on it. The aircraft is instrumented that it tells on itself. If there’s an issue, it’ll tell you based on vibrations, based on electrical components not working properly, not sending back the appropriate signal to tell you that everything is okay. So the panels weren’t supposed to be used as often. So with that mindset, the panels that they had on there probably made sense, that’s no longer the case. We are changing the panels to reflect actual operational experience. The aircraft always tells on itself entirely. Although it identifies an issue, you don’t know completely what it is from the digital indicators, especially when we talk about wiring.

Maintenance is a 24/7 demand.Maintaining at Night in Afghanistan
(Credit: USMC)

SLD: So you need to visually look?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: Absolutely. We also need to do periodic checks just to make sure that there’s no undue wear. A lot of things that we have to do now—a lot of the checks that we do on a daily and turnaround inspection that the crew chiefs go out and do, that the mechanics go out and do—is to look for undue wear, parts that came loose, wiring that is broken. This reflects our learning process over the past five or six years.

SLD: So you have worked a learning curve to shape the next phase of reliability enhancements in effect, based on operational experiences?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: Our maintainers have learned a lot and their knowledge has grown by leaps and bounds. Battle damage repair was one of the things and when we went out with the VMM-263 in Iraq, there were no publications that said this is how you fix it. This is what’s going to happen. Because nobody knew, we hadn’t faced that before. In fact right now, it’s still in its infancy. So we went out there, that was one of the unknowns. We weren’t sure what to expect. We had the misfortune of receiving some damage. However, we quickly found out the aircraft is very survivable. We weren’t hit with anything very large, mostly small arms, and from RPGs, stuff like that but the holes that actually left were very small. The composites performed exceedingly well. So we were able to fix those things. The maintainers have learned a lot and they get very good at fixing composites, some of the repairs, you cannot tell that anything had happened. Unfortunately, the forklifts also created some damage.

SLD: One of the things you were monitoring was the real state of the performance of the parts and essentially either the parts have to be modified to give you the actual performance hours or one must have more realistic performance parameters?

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia: We always poke supply, hey, you guys are getting the supplies that we need, the parts that we need. You know, if you have all the parts, if you have an endless supply of parts right there handy, we can keep this aircraft flying constantly. The maintainers will bend over backwards to make sure it happens. But the reason the supply is not working optimally is once again a 5800 to 5900 hour component is lasting less than the stated norm. There are multiple components like that. Some of them are on 75 to 80 percent of the projected lifetime. Some are 40 percent or less. Those that are 40 percent or less or something at some point, if you just re-normalize what that lifetime component is, it’s not really 268 hours, it’s 130 hours. So we can then buy twice as many parts to ensure continuity of operation.

The reason the supply is not working optimally is once again a 5800 to 5900 hour component is lasting less than the stated norm. There are multiple components like that. Some of them are on 75 to 80 percent of the projected lifetime. Some are 40 percent or less. Those that are 40 percent or less or something at some point, if you just re-normalize what that lifetime component is, it’s not really 268 hours, it’s 130 hours. So we can then buy twice as many parts to ensure continuity of operation.

Operation Atalanta

Posted on December 8, 2010 | by SysAdmin

12/08/2010

Backgrounder

EUNAVFOR, A Promising “First”

By Harry Syringas

**@*****fo.com



Atalanta operation in the Gulf of Aden

 The aim of the "Eunavfor Somalia - Atalanta  operation" is to protect ships of the World Food Programme (WFP)
transporting food to the displaced populations of Somalia, to protect  the vulnerable ships sailing off the Somali coast,
 and to dissuade,  prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of  Somalia.
The operation is placed under British command. The French  frigate le Floréal are also put in position.
Germany also announced its  participation and could be joined by other EU countries.
Credit:The navy watching, controlling and arresting suspicious fishermen, European Union, January 2009

12/08/2010 – One of the European common defense policy’s main goals is to consolidate the EU’s impact and role in the international scene. Apart from controlling what goes on within its borders, it also conducts operations in order to monitor and intervene, within its capacities, in a situation taking place beyond them. One of those operations is EU Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta, one branch of an even vaster EU action in the Horn of Africa to deal with the crisis in the region. Below is a mid-course glance at the four-year mission undertaken in 2008.

Twenty Years of Escalating Chaos In Somalia
Piracy around the Horn of Africa is the result of two factors: the motive of profit and political instability, the latter being the origin of escalating chaos. Somalia is a country that has not had a functioning government since 1991 : today it remains in a state of total anarchy, facilitating riots between opposite illicit groups and banditry. [1] Somalia has had indeed no functioning government since the United Somali Congress (USC) ousted the regime of Maj. Gen. Mohamed Said “Barre” on January 27, 1991. The present political situation is one of anarchy, marked by inter-clan fighting and random banditry, with some areas of peace and stability. In the wake of the collapse of the Somali Government, factions organized around military leaders took control of Somalia.

Banditry however is not only action between local clans. Pirate attacks coming from Somali ships increased so much over the past few years that Somalia became the number one security challenge in the area. The International Maritime Bureau recorded 111 attacks in the waters off the Horn of Africa in 2008, almost double the number in 2007. As of April 20, 2009, the International Maritime Bureau had counted 84 attacks since January: approximately 300 non-U.S. crew members on 18 hijacked vessels remain in Somali captivity. [2]

The absence of coastal security authorities led to unlawful fishing, waste dumping, and attacks against foreign commercial vessels and humanitarian aid missions.

ESDPs First Maritime Operation
In response to this scourge, the UN Security Council issued four resolutions (1816, 1838, and 1846 adopted in 2008, and 1897 adopted in 2009). Resolution 1851 allowed international naval forces to arbitrate in the open sea around the Somali coasts. The EU launched the operation in December 2008 – the first maritime operation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – and reached full capability in February 2009. According to the decision of the Council of the EU last June, the mandate will continue until December 2012. [3]

Its main objectives are to escort vulnerable shipping crossing the area, including vessels from the World Food Program and the African Union Military Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), repress piracy, and monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.

At present, the strength of EU NAVFOR – Atalanta is formed by:

One fast frigate and one maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft – MP and RA – (CISNE CN235) from Spain
One frigate from Greece
One frigate and one MP and RA (JESTER P3C) from Germany
One ocean patrol vessel and a MP and RA (Blue Bird Dash 8 ) from Sweden
One MP and RA (Seagull Merlin III) from Luxembourg
One landing platform Dock/Amphibious Ship from Holland
One MP and RA (Lobo P3P) from Portugal
One Frigate and helicopters from France.

Belgium and a number of third countries, such as Norway and Croatia, are also participating, and the Ukraine and Montenegro are expected to participate. Moreover, there is a military staff from Cyprus, Ireland, Finland, Malta, and Sweden providing aid to the team at the Northwood Operation Headquarters.The European naval force operates in a zone comprising the south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and part of the Indian Ocean, which now includes the Seychelles. This represents an area comparable to that of the Mediterranean.

Credit: Disruption operations, www.eunavfor.eu

EUNAVFOR As Key Coordinator
Since November 2009, EUNAVFOR-Atalanta took the lead in the coordination between the multinational, national, and regional naval forces operating in the area, a very important step to the strengthening of the EU’s role as an international key factor, considering that it got to become the liaison and to bring together the CTF-151, the NATO Maritime Group as well as the Russian, Indian, Japanese, and Chinese vessels taking part in the monitoring of the zone concerned.

Results have shown that since the operation was initiated in late 2008, vessels of the World Food Program have stopped being attacked, making it possible for near 400.000 metric tons of food to be delivered into Somalia through Mogadishu, Merka, Bossaso, and Berbera ports.

Results have shown that since the operation was initiated in late 2008, vessels of the World Food Program have stopped being attacked, making it possible for near 400.000 metric tons of food to be delivered into Somalia through Mogadishu, Merka, Bossaso, and Berbera ports.

The operation and, more importantly, the coordination of international forces brought fruit and showed that when there is will there is a way. However, the fact that the presence of European and international naval forces in the Somali coasts and the Gulf of Aden is prolonged means that the primary goal is yet to be achieved. The EU NAVFOR isn’t an unconnected police/monitoring mission; it’s part of the global EU initiative and action in the Horn of Africa to arrange the situation in Somalia, to resolve an ongoing crisis of political origin. In overall terms, we can talk about a successful operation, a positive example of European coordinated, defence policy action. However, the root of the problem, which is the absence of an actual state in Somalia, is still there; extirpating it will probably mean that the EU is really in a position to resolve a crisis.

——–

[1] www.globalsecurity.org

[2] Congressional Research Centre, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, http://africacenter.org

[3] www.eunavfor.eu

The US Vs USSR in TacAir Lessons Learned from a Hot Cold War

Posted on November 29, 2010 | by SysAdmin

11/29/2010

By Ed Timperlake

11/29/2010 – In this posting and the associated special report, Ed Timperlake examines the key question of the interactive development of combat capability built around the tactical aircraft. As Ed Timperlake underscores:

The lesson for the air power rivalry between the US and USSR is rather straightforward: the technology had to be available but it also had to be successful understood and employed.

Ed Timperlake highlights the historical take away from an assessment of the US and USSR rivalry in this core combat area:

A historical take away from the cold/hot war air battles is that in the air-to-air mission a country that equips its fighters with airborne radar and sensors allows more autonomous action and actually favors tactical simplicity and operational autonomy—even though the equipment becomes more complex. In air-to-ground, airborne simplicity indicators are usually smaller formations and allowance to maneuver independently into weapon launch envelopes primarily in a weapons-free environment. Embedding technology into the weapon itself –bombs and rocket fired weapons– has also made a revolutionary difference.

A key conclusion is shaped by the Timperlake analysis: always assume a reactive enemy can develop the necessary technology to try and mitigate any advantages. With the world wide proliferation of weapons even a second or third world nation might have state-of-the art systems. The air war over the skies of Vietnam was between two peer competitors because of USSR support and constraints by the US national command authority on how the US would fight an air campaign.

The peer fight in the air abruptly ended when President Nixon unleashed the full power of US air in the famous Christmas bombing of 1972. The war ended quickly after that. When the North invaded the South in 1975 US air power was not used like the first invasion in1972, which was a dismal failure.

The lesson on the US-USSR rivalry is that air combat leaders must be able to adjust during the course of an air battle or war by changing strategy and tactics, to achieve exploitation of the enemy’s mistakes or weakness. Aircrews must be adaptable enough to follow changing commands from leadership and also, on their own initiative, to change tactics to achieve local surprise and exploitation. Like the quote in Animal House: “knowledge is good.” In the cockpit it can be a life saver and aid in mission accomplished.

An air-to-air engagement totally slaved to a ground controlled radar attack, the USSR model was a colossal failure and deadly to a lot of pilots locked into such a system. A bottom-up approach with evolving aircraft system capabilities in a competitive airframe makes for adaptive, creative aircrews that will have a large repertoire of tactical moves and a better chance of getting inside an opponent’s OODA loop. This is true for both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat missions.

As the history of war in the air shows it was a constantly evolving process of human factors integrated into technology. The Cold War ended well for humanity and a lot of courageous pilots, bold leaders, and smart technologists deserve a lot of credit for this great victory.

The US would be wise to remember the lessons learned and along the way the loss of very good men in the air who paid in their blood for America today to have the best technology available flown by best Air Force, Navy, and Marine aviators this country can produce.And to shape its concepts of operations to take advantage of the 5^th generation aircraft and the associated new tools of combat.

The Arctic Sea Competition: Strategic Competition (Part Two)

Posted on November 28, 2010 | by SysAdmin

11/28/2010

By Caroline Mükusch
German Correspondent, Second Line of Defense

Credit image: www.crystalinks.com

11/28/2010 – When it comes to the North Pole and the question of who wins the race for the Arctic, two major interests are rising: energy and security. Therefore Arctic neighbor states regularly assert their national interests in this region. Predictably, they are increasing their civil and military engagement in the Arctic area. Although Norway and Canada are very engaged in the Arctic area, the policy stage is still set by the Cold War superpowers Russia and the United States. Russia has a proactive policy; the U.S. has a reluctant policy.

In 2008 after Canada, the United States, and Denmark criticized Russia’s territorial claims to the continental plateau of the Arctic, Russia set out training plans for military units that could be engaged in Arctic combat mission; extended the “operational radius” of its northern naval forces; and reinforced its army’s combat readiness along the Arctic coast – just in case of a potential conflict. [1]

In its new national security strategy (2009), Russia raised the prospect of war in the Arctic Ocean if Russia’s interests and border security were threatened by neighboring nations, likely considering the current circumstances of pending border agreements and disagreements between Russia and those nations. To secure and guarantee its overall energy and security interests, Russia stated “in a competition for resources it cannot be ruled out that military force could be used to resolve emerging problems that would destroy the balance of forces near the borders of Russia and her allies.” [2]

Russia is willing – and able – to use the entire spectrum of instruments to settle legal status problems in disputed regions such as the Arctic, Caspian, and South China Seas. [3]

Russia’s 2007-2015 rearmament program plans to rebuild the submarine force, recommending building several dozen surface ships and submarines, including five Project 955 Borey nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines equipped with new Bulava ballistic missiles, two Project 885 Yasen nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines, six Project 677 Lada diesel-electric submarines, three Project 22350 frigates, and five Project 20380 corvettes. [4]

The United States – although it had been an important Arctic nation since it purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867 – is now a “reluctant Arctic power.” After the Cold War the United States became too passive in the Arctic, preferring mainly re-active policy measures than a comprehensive Arctic strategy. [5]

With the end of the Cold War the United States steadily closed some northern military bases, including the naval base on Adak and Fort Greely. These developments reflect the United States’ perception that a significant military presence is – since Soviet Union submarine force collapsed – no longer needed in the Arctic. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to make the challenges easier to resolve, the challenges in the Arctic facing now U.S. policy-makers are much more complicated than expected in 1991. Threats are much more nebulous, long term, and complex.

Credit image: www.uscg.mil

Additionally resources are bringing new actors to the north as well.

Although China is lacking an Arctic coast, China stated recently: “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it”. [6]

Japan for instance does not possess any Arctic claims, Japan is interested in gaining greater access to discussions and negotiations on the Arctic because it could benefit from the opening of the Northwest Passage, which would establish a route circumventing the Suez Canal and shorten transit times between Asia and Europe by 40 percent. [7]

Furthermore, Russia invited China – the world’s fastest-growing economy that requires 10 percent of global energy demand while meeting 95 percent of those needs with domestic energy supplies – to exploit oil and gas reserves locked in the “Russian section of the Arctic.” In 2010 China, with an interest in sustainable energy supplies, was offered a “mutually advantageous and constructive cooperation” exploring and exploiting the regional natural resources base with Russia.

In 2009 finally the United States changed its Arctic perception by releasing both an Arctic policy declaring security as top priority of American Arctic policy and an Arctic roadmap outlining the direction of U.S. maritime Arctic security protection [8]. But what is missing is a clear shaping of capabilities to implement the policy.

Hence, the strategic environment within the Arctic region is set by very simple rules:

Sufficient scientific data about topography and environmental conditions
Money for resource expedition, exploration and infrastructure projects
Vague rules of international law
A latent conflict level.

———-

References

[1] http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080624/111915879.html

[2] The London Times

[3] See Principles of the state energy policy and its implementation phases, Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030, Moscow 2010

[4] Compare: Rianovosti (2008): Russian Navy to receive Severod Severodvinsk nuclear submarine in 2010

[5] Huebert, Rob (2009): United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power, The School of Public Policy: SPP Briefing Papers Focus on the United States. Vol 2, Issue 2, May 2009, p. 1-26

[6] Chang, Gordon G. (2010): China’s Arctic Play, The Diplomat from 3/10/10, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/03/09/china’s-arctic-play/

[7] The Japan Times from 11/7/08, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20081107a9.html

[8] National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive No 66 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive No 25 and Department of the Navy (2009): Memorandum for Distribution – The U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, 3140 / Ser. N09/9U103038

European Defense: Save, Cut And Sustain

Posted on November 28, 2010 | by SysAdmin

European Defense: Save Money, Cut Forces, Sustain Afghan Commitments (for now)

By Dr. Richard Weitz

11/28/2010 – The 1998 St. Malo Declaration between Britain and France, which inaugurated the European Security and Defense Policy, declared that: “The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” The declaration further called for “strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and technology.”

Despite the passage of more than a decade since this declaration was issued by the two EU members with the largest defense budgets, the EU has made little progress in developing a collective military capacity. The EU Lisbon Treaty, which came into force last year, has concrete provisions allowing EU members to collaborate more in the military field, but much additional European defense industrial cooperation has yet to occur.

A study of European defense spending recently released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found two divergent trends that both result from declines in the size of European armed forces occurring more rapidly than cuts in European defense spending .

From 2001 to 2009, aggregate European defense spending fell from €251 billion to €218 billion (a negative compound decline of 1.8 percent annually, measured in constant euros). Over the same period, aggregate spending per soldier increased in constant terms, from €73,000 to €91,000 (a compound yearly growth rate of 2.8 percent).

These same broad trends can be found in the narrower defense spending categories. For example, European military research and development (R&D) spending in Europe fell from 12.3 billion euros in 2001 to 10.3 billion euros in 2008, but R&D per active duty member rose somewhat from 6,700 euros in 2001 to 7,2000 euros in 2008. Operations and maintenance fell the least during the 2001-2009 period, largely because of the need to sustain the missions in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and elsewhere during this decade.

Credit: http://csis.org

Together, these trends mean that Europe has fewer troops—total active duty military personnel in the 37 countries studied fell from 3.5 million in 2001 to about 2.3 million in 2009—and other aggregate military capabilities. But the remaining military personnel are on average probably becoming potentially more effective. Although risks arise from having smaller numbers of troops and equipment, these trends do create opportunities—further facilitated by favorable changes in EU defense procurement regulation—for greater defense specialization on select military acquisitions by country, as well as enhanced collective capability if countries focus their remaining resources on developing smaller, more expeditionary-capable forces.

Total active duty military personnel in the 37 [European] countries studied fell from 3.5 million in 2001 to about 2.3 million in 2009. But the remaining military personnel are on average probably becoming potentially more effective.

Credit: http://csis.org

In response to these declining defense budgets, on February 23, 2010, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned that European governments’ failure to meet their minimum defense spending obligations was creating “funding and capability shortfalls [that] make it difficult to operate and fight together to confront shared threats.” The May 2010 Group of Experts report further cautioned that the transatlantic capabilities gap “could undermine Alliance cohesion” because only the United States and perhaps a few major European powers will have many transformed forces capable of conducting sustained foreign combat missions.

Optimists hope that the downward pressure on military spending will force European governments to take long-needed measures to reduce procurement duplication and pursue greater military specialization and interoperability. EU and NATO leaders have cited the cost pressure as giving them an opportunity as well as an imperative to secure more military value for defense spending through such measures as reducing unwanted defense duplication, reallocating resources based on collective rather than national priorities, encouraging more national military specialization on niche capabilities, as well as pursuing more collaborative research, development and procurement based on common funding mechanisms.

Pessimists point to enduring obstacles to enhanced European defense industrial coherence, and wonder if progress will come soon, or prove sufficiently widespread, to have much of an impact on their military capabilities. Industrial policy concerns typically exert much more influence on NATO or EU spending than national security considerations.

For this reason, proposals to extend NATO- or EU-wide defense procurement have never made much progress. NATO defense investment continues to be diluted across an excessive number of projects, with the most important military powers seeking to sustain national aviation and shipbuilding sectors despite the resulting duplication, inefficiencies, and insufficient economies of scale. Even in European countries with large aggregate defence budgets such as Germany and Turkey, spending is not optimized to NATO’s expanding international security obligations since money flows predominately to manpower and maintenance rather than researching, developing or procuring new weapons systems.

European nationalists and strategists recognize that continuing present policies risks leading the EU into strategic irrelevance. At the September 2010 informal meeting of EU defense ministers in Ghent, French Defense Minister Hervé Morin warned his colleagues that Europeans needed to pool their defense capabilities more effectively or Europe risked “gradually becoming a protectorate – 50 years from now we’ll become a pawn in the balance between the new powers and we’ll be under a joint dominion of China and America.”

Former French defense minister Hervé Morin has long been pressing EU governments to make defense a more important priority, telling one interviewer a few years ago that having a common defense policy was at least as important to the EU as having a common currency. At Ghent, Hervé Morin argued that, without sufficient military capability, Europe could not exert significant influence in the world. Yet, notwithstanding their defense cuts, he maintained that European governments could enhance their overall military capabilities by deepening their defense cooperation. He proposed that all 27 EU states compile a list of their military capabilities and indicate which should be shared and which should remain under the control of the individual nation states.

Former French defense minister Hervé Morin has long been pressing EU governments to make defense a more important priority, telling one interviewer a few years ago that having a common defense policy was at least as important to the EU as having a common currency.

European Defence Agency EDA Facts and Figures 2008
Credit: http://www.eda.europa.eu

Asked about Hervé Morin’s remarks, the head of the liberal grouping in the European Parliament, Guy Verhofstadt, even thought the imperative to cut military budgets had now perhaps created the necessary incentives to take the ultimate step of creating a common European army: there are two million soldiers in Europe, but only 300,000 in the US, and I think that the American army is more efficient that the European forces. So that’s a good reason to start this.”

Seeking to make this position more credible, Verhofstadt noted that the EU would simply be replicating the progress it had made in the diplomatic realm in the related area of defense: “We have now a diplomatic service, which is very important, but we also need the other instrument – a common European defense, a common European army.”

Few expect the EU to seek a common European army, but whether the Union can achieve even the more limited proposals to pool defense assets and significantly expand their collective defense procurement efforts is questionable. At present, European defense spending is misallocated for meeting governments’ self-described global security requirements. Funds go overwhelmingly toward paying for personnel and operations and not on developing or buying weapons.

According to the CSIS study, in 2009, more than half of European defense spending went to military personnel, while only one-fifth of defense budgets paid for equipment. These distributions will not soon change due to the rigidity of many military pay structures. Furthermore, most European militaries still devote most spending for capabilities related to territorial defense rather than for meeting global challenges through expeditionary forces. Of the two million European active duty forces, only 3-5% of them are readily deployable and sustainable at strategic distances from Europe in complex contingencies such as on stabilization or counter-piracy or peacekeeping missions. These deployments address emerging threats that directly affect Europeans’ interests if not necessarily their national frontiers.

NATO needs dynamic and flexible forces to address these threats rather than legacy forces that suck up funds but provide relatively little defense capability. At present, only British and French forces are able to join their U.S. counterparts as equals in the initial phase of a war such as the two invasions of Iraq in 1990 and 2003.

The other European powers now generally lack sufficient advanced weapons systems required to support out-of-area missions against a regional power like Iran—and these are precisely the procurement projects likely to be degraded by the recent wave of budget cuts. At the aggregate level, only 5 (Albania, Britain, France, Greece and the United States) out of 28 NATO members in 2009 met alliance requirements to spend two percent or more of national GDP on defense. Bulgaria and Turkey fell below that threshold after meeting it in 2008.

Without major changes in these conditions, Americans could become even more annoyed at perceived European free-riding. The defense cuts could also increase tensions among European countries since some, such as Britain and France, spend much more on defense than others with roughly equivalent economies and populations, such as Germany and Italy. In fact, there is a five-to-one ratio between the highest and lowest European country in terms of spending on military R&D.

There is a five-to-one ratio between the highest and lowest European country in terms of spending on military R&D.

NATO says it will manage further defense spending cuts “through continuing transformation, comprehensive reforms, setting clear priorities, identifying savings where possible, strengthening and modernizing financial governance, and providing the necessary resources.” Yet, the anticipated priorities of the new Strategic Concept—dealing with global threats through improved power projection, cyber warfare, and counter terrorist abilities—are those most likely degraded by the planned cuts.

Hopes to improve these figures through a further rationalization of defense spending will depend on overcoming some long-standing barriers in this area. NATO and EU members’ defense practices sometimes appear more responsive to industrial policy considerations than collective or even national military needs.

The low level of investment is spread over too many projects as each major country wants to support its own shipbuilding and aviation industries, resulting in excess duplication and inefficiency in the European defense industries.

European leaders have proposed reducing duplication of military investment across NATO and EU member states by promoting further cooperation between the two organizations. But collaborating on defense procurement has proven surprisingly difficult in the past and nothing new has occurred to suggest things will prove any easier now.

Turkey constrains NATO collaboration with Cyprus while Cyprus limits Turkey’s engagement with the EU; the mutual vetoes restrict broader institutional collaboration. European governments pledge the same forces to both organizations while hoping they do not receive simultaneous requests for the same assets.

The NATO governments will probably avoid another transatlantic blowup soon over the issue because, even while cutting defense spending overall, most European governments have sought to sustain their combat presence in Afghanistan to address the evident priority concern of the Obama administration. For example, French former minister of defense Morin said that, while his ministry would cut spending by some €3 billion through 2013, France would maintain its Afghan operation at current levels. Similarly, the Italian government has issued plans to cut back on military hardware, such as by buying fewer Eurofighters, but conduct its own surge in Afghanistan, to 4,000 soldiers by the end of this year.