“Fly Before Buy”

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11/15/2010

The Air Force Tanker Decision: A ‘Fairer’ Way Forward

By Michael W. Wynne,  21st Secretary of the Air Force



Credit: KC-135, http://www.aviationexplorer.com

11/17/2010 – The Air Force is confronting a conundrum that in 1998, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) called a mandatory replacement program for the aging tanker fleet.  There have been two winners since that time. First, Boeing was awarded a Tanker Lease with a largely acceptable derivative of a commercial design the 767 Aircraft, but which the Congress called a tainted award because of some shenanigans by a senior official resulting in a recompetition. In that recompetition, the Northrop Grumman bid won built around a largely acceptable derivative of a commercial design the 330 Aircraft, which again was disparaged by the GAO for a lack of thoroughness in the available airfield support systems, but which came across as a direct volley into international competition.

Now, like the Charlie Brown character, the football is teed up again, and both teams and their lawyers await the outcome.  Meanwhile, the tankers are now almost 13 years older, the maintenance personnel are doing an amazing job keeping them aloft, and the senior leadership of the Air Force is hoping for a successful conclusion. Is this hope a strategy? That is doubtful.

When the Army was in seemingly desperate straights to address the improvised explosive devices in the roadside areas and was scrambling to gain some military advantage, the Office of the Secretary of Defense authorized a sweeping purchase of all of the offerings, which set aside any aspirations of life cycle costs or the notion of service and support in favor of rapid acquisition and downstream competition between providers.

Yes, there were qualification tests, which narrowed the competitive field, but the clear vision was first to make the mission and second to allow further competition and user feedback to ultimately bring clarity to the ultimate one or two suppliers in the then distant future.  Though the improvised explosive devices have become more deadly, the message to the men and women in the fight was, “The system is listening to you and getting you the right equipment for the fight.” The message to the supplier base was that the department will continue to winnow the providers down by fixed price supply contracts until competition offers a clear winner.

More recently, the Navy has made a decision to continue with two suppliers in the Littoral Combat Ship competition, as this would clearly hone the two design teams and allow the Navy to reap the benefits from a price shootout following rigorous qualification testing. This keeps the best maritime designers on the contract trying to make their offering better than the competitor, as well as an economical offering.

The debate seems to be over as to the Navy’s aspirations in this faster, though smaller class of ships. Some debate the merits of moving away from the ‘Blue Water,’ more traditional Navy into the littoral, and the battle for frigate and cruiser class to assist the carrier may continue to be an issue. No doubt the outlook for the budget and the present dwindling fleet size of our once 600 ship Navy has made the case for this class of ship.

That said, the Navy has lain the marker down that continuous competition has a real place in the defense procurement process, putting the force of continued competition into the prior rhetoric of sole source price increases that have been the mantra to date.

So, here we are. The key infrastructure element for air power and for support for the various missions in support of the ground team in Afghanistan is aging and costly to operate.  The strategic linchpin of the air power, medical evacuation, and even presidential travel–that is what the Air Force tankers do, but now they put at risk the airmen who fly them; if the planes are not available, the missions they support will be undercut.

The Air Force has been patiently engaged in this competition for more than half a generation, while the fleet literally teeters on the edge.  A lesson from the unimaginable breakup of the F-15 in flight yields nightmares to this fleet.

The key infrastructure element for air power and for support for the various missions in support of the ground team in Afghanistan is aging and costly to operate.  The strategic linchpin of the air power, medical evacuation, and even presidential travel–that is what the Air Force tankers do, but now they put at risk the airmen who fly them; if the planes are not available, the missions they support will be undercut. The Air Force has been patiently engaged in this competition for more than half a generation, while the fleet literally teeters on the edge.  A lesson from the unimaginable breakup of the F-15 in flight yields nightmares to this fleet.

Cheerfully all predict no problem–like the taxicabs in Cuba–but wait, this fleet is older than the taxis in Cuba. The Air Force tried to use a law from the Depression to award helicopters, but they now can seek the support of their fellow services to get this award right. Now is the time to move forward and recognize the value of what the USN has determined, namely that continuous competition has a real place in the defense procurement process.

Among Others, the Australians Will Have New Tankers Prior to the USAF (Credit: http://www.cae.com/en/military/australia.a330.asp)Among Others, the Australians Will Have New Tankers Prior to the USAF 
Credit: http://www.cae.com/en

How to move forward?
First, let’s buy the field of the two offerers and rigorously test the offerings, allowing the users to wring out what they like. This would keep the design teams active well into the test phase. The Air Force should extend this competition by asking for ‘Fly Before Buy’. This competitive option would put the pressure directly on the two contractors to bring their very best product to test.

The Air Force should extend this competition by asking for ‘Fly Before Buy’. This competitive option would put the pressure directly on the two contractors to bring their very best product to test.

Second, look to the Navy to get to fixed-price procurement by pushing not for any cost contract but for extending the competition. This will bring price pressure between these commercial providers into a fixed price production bid in the future. This example from the Navy will position the Air Force well on this two-decade production procurement.

There is, as well, a secondary benefit, which is why give up the option to replace the aging KC-10 fleet in parallel with the aging KC-135 fleet. It should be obvious by now that with the total fleet shrinking, the Air Force should be re-evaluating its mix, and why not use this competition to accomplish this true life cycle calculation?

This extension of competition will also position the Air Force to buy one or both of these competitive aircraft to replace either the aging KC-135 fleet, the aging KC-10 fleet, or both, before the terrific maintainers lose the ongoing battle of age and overuse for this foundation of America’s expeditionary forces.

Frankly, ‘Fly before Buy’ is just ideal going forward and takes full advantage of lessons from other service procurements,  and may yield outcomes that are satisfying to all stakeholders and especially the brave men and women that take to the night skies in this teetering fleet.  Award to both, and let’s get the competitive benefit.

F-35: “Fighting And Sustaining As A Team”

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11/06/2010

Shaping a Fleet Sustainment Strategy For The Next Generation Fighter Pilots

An Interview With General Art Cameron (Ret.), Director, F-35 Global Sustainment Customer Alignment, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company

(Retired) General Cameron (Credit: SLD, September 2010)SLD, September 2010

11/06/2010 – During a visit to the Lockheed Martin F-35 facility in September 2010, SLD sat down with (Retired) General Art Cameron to discuss the approach to F-35 sustainment.  With his long experience in USAF maintenance, the focus of the discussion was upon comparing that experience with the evolving approach to building a sustainment approach to the F-35.  At the heart of the shift is the potential to build a fleet-wide maintenance approach to the services and coalition partner’s sustainment capabilities. 



Eglin F-35 Academic Training Center (Credit: SLD, October 2010)


Eglin F-35 Academic Training Center
Credit: SLD, October 2010

SLD: What is your background in fighter maintenance and how does that impact on your thinking about the F-35?

General Cameron: I spent 33 years in the USAF doing fighter sustainment, from turning wrenches on F-106’s in Northern Michigan in the late 70’s to working the latest fifth generation fighter, the F-22.  While I’ve worked all Air Force fighters, most of my career was with the F-16.  I worked F-16’s at the first operational base, Hill AFB, in 1980.  I worked F-16 flight test at Edwards AFB.  I deployed with the F-16.  And, I led the MRO&U effort on the F-16 at Ogden Air Logistics Center.  The F-16 was (still is) a great airplane.  However, it was built like most previous weapons systems, with sustainment not being an integral part of the design.

Aircraft operational capabilities have become evolutionary and revolutionary over the decades but, reliability and maintainability has not kept pace with the increased operational capabilities.  The F-35, in many respects, is the first aircraft that has sustainment as an integral part of the aircraft design.

Aircraft operational capabilities have become evolutionary and revolutionary over the decades but, reliability and maintainability has not kept pace with the increased operational capabilities.  The F-35, in many respects, is the first aircraft that has sustainment as an integral part of the aircraft design.

Ogden Air Logistics Center (Credit: http://www.hill.af.mil/)
Ogden Air Logistics Center (Credit: http://www.hill.af.mil/)

The original fifth generation aircraft, the F-22, was light years ahead in terms of sustainment with some of the integrated sustainment systems, the data management systems and the health management systems that are onboard the airplane.  The next Fifth generation iteration, the F-35, is evolutionary and revolutionary ahead of even the F-22.

What we have learned in aircraft development is that the key to operational capability is to ensure aircraft availability.  Therefore, the big difference in the F-35 is that it’s built as an “Air System” which comprises both the aircraft and the sustainment system.   Sustainment has been built in from day one in this airplane.  We like to say “sustainment is as integral to the aircraft as the wing”.

SLD:  With regard to the F-16 versus the F-35, you’re talking 40 years difference. And as you mentioned the F-35 like other modern programs has been designed with sustainability in mind, something we simply did not do 40 years ago.  What impacts will that have on the ability to sustain the F-35?

General Cameron: The F-35 was designed with a focus on affordability, availability and interoperability.  The services directed us through the operational requirement documents to build sustainment into the aircraft.  The nine F-35 participating countries said that the program would be worked under a “common solution” with a shared supply chain, shared training, and shared development with all the countries baring the cost of the common sustainment solution.

Current global economic realities are driving changes to legacy sustainment systems.  My gut tells me that a common solution has to be more affordable and the facts bear this out.  Think about it, one common supply chain vice 13 separate supply chains. One common fleet management systems system that has fleet-wide visibility of assets and systemic fleet issues vice 13 separate systems that have no linkage to each other.

There are also significant sustainment interoperability issues that we never had before.  Now our allies can share assets when needed during contingencies without the added complexity of crossing multi-service/multi-country sustainment systems.  The advantages of a common sustainment system are staggering.  However, the F-35’s sustainment system is not only revolutionary, it’s a significant change to the way the services presently do business and it’s a culture shift and changing culture is hard!

SLD: One of the problems is that much of the public debate looks at the initial costs of an aircraft. It doesn’t take into account the actual question of the cost of operations. One of the problems in the public debate seems to be an inability to factor in choices  where affordability in operations is considered as important as whatever you think the IOC cost is.

General Cameron: You have to remember the genesis of why the F-35 was designed.  It was designed because the operational costs on legacy airplanes are increasing exponentially to the point where the services are mortgaging off hardware and manpower to keep old iron flying.  At the same time, aircraft availability has been steadily decreasing. Dwindling service sustainment budgets forces them to take risk in sustainment funding that has the long term impact of slowly eroding the fleet health. The F-35 was designed to counter this with a highly reliable and maintainable aircraft, scalable availability based on service/country needs, shared support with the sustainment costs based on the percentage of the total aircraft purchased (vice each service/country building a standalone sustainment infrastructure).

Ease of Access Panels Facilitate Maintenance of the F-35.  Pictured is the final test aircraft for the USMC (Credit: Lockheed Martin, September 2010)Ease of access panels facilitates maintenance of the F-35.
Pictured is the final test aircraft for the USMC.
Credit: Lockheed Martin, September 2010

SLD: Another issue that is not widely understood is that the F-35 is really a beneficiary of the entire F-22 development process.  And you were talking a bit earlier about the prognostic capability on the F-22.  What has been the experience with the F-22 maintenance?

General Cameron: While the F-22 and the F-35 are both Fifth Generation Fighters, you have to remember that the F-22 is 186 aircraft being flown by one service.  The F-35 will be well over 3,000 aircraft, with nine participating countries (comprised of 13 unique services), and an un-told number of future FMS purchasers.

The real beauty of the F-35 program is the fact that you can look out across the entire fleet, all the international partners, all the domestic partners, and tell immediately if there are systemic fleet wide issues.  The program can share assets to ensure a surge capability to wherever it’s needed and can share the robust supply chain that’s already established on the F-35 production line.

Our experiences with the F-16 highlight another major advantage of the F-35 approach.   The F-16 has been a highly successful program.  However, configuration management has been a challenge because it has been handled at the individual service level. Therefore, there are roughly 130 configurations of the F-16.  The operators, when prosecuting the air battle, have to know the precise configuration of each F-16 in order to know what capabilities it brings to the fight.  The sustainment of the F-16 is even more challenging with spares not being interchangeable among F-16 variants. The F-35 is a common configuration so interoperability is the key in both operations and sustainment.  In addition, training (both pilot and maintenance) becomes that more relevant and affordable.  The pilots will fly the same software in the simulators that they’ll fly in the aircraft and the maintainers will train on the same systems they’ll actually see in the field.  Any operational level military member can quickly see the advantages.

The real beauty of the F-35 program is the fact that you can look out across the entire fleet, all the international partners, all the domestic partners, and tell immediately if there are systemic fleet wide issues.  The program can share assets to ensure a surge capability to wherever it’s needed and can share the robust supply chain that’s already established on the F-35 production line. Our experiences with the F-16 highlight another major advantage of the F-35 approach.   The F-16 has been a highly successful program.  However, configuration management has been a challenge because it has been handled at the individual service level. Therefore, there are roughly 130 configurations of the F-16.  The operators, when prosecuting the air battle, have to know the precise configuration of each F-16 in order to know what capabilities it brings to the fight.  The sustainment of the F-16 is even more challenging with spares not being interchangeable among F-16 variants. The F-35 is a common configuration so interoperability is the key in both operations and sustainment.

The F-35 program has learned from the F-22 and listened to the maintainers on the line.  The F-22 is a great stealth platform.  The designers on the F-22 learned from previous stealth platforms (F-117, B-2) and designed an “easier” (than previous stealth platforms) to maintain stealth aircraft. And, the F-35 has learned from the F-22.  Lower MTBF parts are placed behind easy to access panels, parts are not double layered, stealth degradation can be easily measured on the line without sophisticated and cumbersome diagnostic equipment, panels can be reconfigured to accommodate accessing parts, and the coatings are durable and can be easily repaired.  The F-35 has benefited from the experiences of previous LO platforms.

SLD: There will be a common training facility at Eglin AFB for the joint pilots and trainers for the F-35 shaping a common approach as well. It seemed that the instructors would come from very different kinds of operational experience.  You should be able to build an incredible library of knowledge of diverse operational experiences on maintenance of the aircraft—which could then shape real domain knowledge in a way we’ve never had before: this could prove quite exciting?

General Cameron: This is not only exciting; it’s true goodness for the warfighters. This joint training takes place at the Integrated Training Center.  It’s truly a genesis of design.  And, it starts with the Command construct at the 33rd Wing.  The Wing Commander is an Air Force Colonel, his deputy a Marine Colonel.  The Maintenance Group Commander is a Marine Colonel and her deputy is an Air Force Colonel.  The Training Center Commander is a Navy Captain.  A masterpiece of joint design.

When I retired from the US Air Force after 33 years I wanted to go to work on a program that I thought was going to shape the future.  The F-35 was designed to fix the aircraft affordability and availability problems.  I knew working this program was going to be hard because in order to get the maximum benefit out of this program some existing ways of doing sustainment within the services had to change.  However, the truly exciting part of the F-35, from a warfighter perspective, is the interoperability piece of the weapons systems with our allies and own US services.  We often talk of the affordability and availability mandate but, it’s the interoperability piece that’s truly revolutionary.

Let me give you just one example of why that’s needed.

When I was supporting the Bosnia war in the 1990’s in Northern Italy, we had all the US services and many international partners flying out of our air base.  On occasion our supply system couldn’t respond fast enough to get us the parts we needed to meet the next day’s flying schedule.  I knew that the other services and our allies potentially had that part; probably right on the same base, but I didn’t have visibility of their supply systems.  So, my folks would physically visit each unit to check their part availability.  Then, when we occasionally found the needed part, there was no formal process to transfer it from our own US services and certainly no process to transfer from our allies to us. So, think about this.  We’re at war. And we couldn’t get a part from the Navy/Marine side of the base to the Air Force side of the base.  That’s all within our own US services! We also had Italian, Spaniards and other countries flying off the same field.  There was no way I could’ve shared any parts with them. Okay.  Now fast forward just 15 years and now we’re flying the F-35; all flying the same airplane; all using a common configuration, a common supply chain, same training, same everything.  We don’t need to have a process to move parts from the services or our allies; it’s one supply chain..

When I was supporting the Bosnia war in the 1990’s in Northern Italy, we had all the US services and many international partners flying out of our air base.  On occasion our supply system couldn’t respond fast enough to get us the parts we needed to meet the next day’s flying schedule.  I knew that the other services and our allies potentially had that part; probably right on the same base, but I didn’t have visibility of their supply systems.  So, my folks would physically visit each unit to check their part availability.  Then, when we occasionally found the needed part, there was no formal process to transfer it from our own US services and certainly no process to transfer from our allies to us. So, think about this.  We’re at war. And we couldn’t get a part from the Navy/Marine side of the base to the Air Force side of the base.  That’s all within our own US services! We also had Italian, Spaniards and other countries flying off the same field.  There was no way I could’ve shared any parts with them. Okay.  Now fast forward just 15 years and now we’re flying the F-35; all flying the same airplane; all using a common configuration, a common supply chain, same training, same everything.  We don’t need to have a process to move parts from the services or our allies; it’s one supply chain.

Interoperability is the beauty of the F-35 program. We can go to war as a team and operate as a team.  Affordability and Availability are obviously imperatives but interoperability is the key component the F-35 program that will enhance the warfighter’s effectiveness and lethality.

SLD: When people use the term interoperability, it is rare when one refers to it as sustainment or logistics interoperability.

General Cameron: It’s a key tenant to the program. We fight as a team.  And if we’re going to fight as a team, then we need to figure out how to work together as a team from a sustainment perspective.

Integrating Missile Defense (Part Two)

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11/05/2010

Regional Missile Defense: The Challenge of Crafting Integrated Missile Defense in NATO and Other Allied Regions (Part Two)

By Ambassador (Ret.) Jon D. Glassman, Director for Government Policy, Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems

11/05 /2010 – The first part of this report discussed the special characteristics of regional missile defense, emphasizing that the requirements for such defense go far beyond the deployment and support of sensors and shooters and their connection into networks. In Part Two, the author offers potential solutions to the challenges faced by the NATO allies and other international partners in creating truly integral regional missile defenses.

NATO, at its impending Lisbon summit, will decide whether to embrace ballistic missile defense of its member nations as an alliance mission. It will also consider whether to extend its capability against medium and intermediate range upper tier threats, to enhance strategic awareness via the Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information System (Bi-SC AIS), and to install theater missile defense (TMD) enhancements to NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS).

Should a NATO decision be made either to assume the homeland defense mission or study it further, the path will be opened to elevate NATO’s incipient ALTBMD (Active Layer Ballistic Missile Defense) command, control, communications network linking allied missile defense assets to a new task broader than simple defense of deployed forces.

The currently funded initial capability against short/medium range threats against NATO deployed forces could be expanded to a capability including upper tier defense against medium/intermediate threats both to deployed forces (and implicitly their overseas surroundings) as well as to the NATO homelands.

The unfunded budget for the combined upper tier and NATO territorial defense would total in the range of 485-540 million euros (circa 400 million euros for upper tier integration and 83-139 million euros for extension to NATO territorial defense).

The NATO November decisions may also provide a path forward under the enlarged NATO mission for:

  • Installation of strategic-level missile defense situation awareness and planning components into NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information Systems (Bi-SC AIS) — a comprehensive networked services capability that, among other things, will provide NATO ALTBMD C2 connectivity, and
  • Theater missile defense (TMD) enhancement of NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS—the alliance’s air C2 capability that combines air defense with offensive air mission planning.)
  • The ACCS TMD enhancement would provide strategic, operational, and tactical-level missile defense situation awareness and planning plus tactical tasking, based on US-provided SEWS (Shared Early Warning System) space and US and European radar data.

Creating NATO Budgetary Efficiencies

Given the likely budgetary pressure, there could be good reason for NATO to search for funding efficiencies — avoiding duplication with, and building upon, US programs.

There is no reason that a NATO-focused coalition version of the US Missile Defense Agency’s Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system–now at the US EUCOM Gateway at Ramstein Air Operations Center (AOC)–could not provide user-appropriate situation awareness services at all NATO missile defense levels (on the model of NATO’s Afghan Mission Network).

(Credit: (Credit: SLD)

Additionally, the US Army Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) design to knit together “any sensor and any shooter” (including the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) that may replace Patriot and Hawk in the European theater) could serve as an integration template–expanding from an initial tie-up of US Army, Dutch, and German Patriots plus US THAAD to encompass other European naval and ground sensors and shooters. This could also provide a foundation for a reinforcement concept based on movement and seamless insertion of THAADs from the United States to Europe, as needed.

Such a NATO build-out starting from the US baseline could benefit from the IBCS work with the US Navy to develop a Joint Track Manager function that would link Navy Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) tracks with those being worked by US Army and Marine radars.

The combination of the C2BMC battle management component focused on forward-deployed high capability Missile Defense Agency X band radars (TPY 2) and broadly-encompassing IBCS sensor (US S and X and allied S and L band radars) and weapon integration to include battle management could provide to the US and NATO initially (and later other regional groupings) the ability to manage quickly and efficiently their total collective sensor and shooter resources during an engagement.

In the NATO context, this would provide the detailed battle management functionality now sketched out in the NATO ACCS tactical tasking component. The goal of speed and optimal utilization could drive other decisions that would incentivize cooperation and continuing investment.

Integrating the Space and Air Layers

While discussion to date within NATO, Israel, the Gulf, and the Far East has centered on deployment and acquisition of ground and maritime sensors and shooters, the integration of   space and air layers will move up the agenda as operations become the focus.

Space

Engagement by senior civilian and military leaders has to begin prior to hostilities.

Diplomatic actions, defensive and offensive force deployment/readiness postures, and combat authorities/rules need to be decided—informed by space ISR indications and warning and space surveillance.

  • Possession by some allies/partners of electro-optical and radar ground surveillance satellites and space tracking and imaging radars and telescopes permits decisions based on shared facts.
  • Allied/partner investment in space ISR and space surveillance could be seen as a collective good. Appropriate US tech transfer and other incentives might accelerate restoration and expansion of the Japanese reconnaissance constellation and encourage European programs such as MUSIS designed to share information from French, German, and Italian imaging satellites (Helios, SAR-Lupe, and Cosmo-Sky Med).
  • Short ballistic trajectories require early detection and tracking. This can be facilitated by overhead early warning and precision cueing. New architectures providing direct downlink to US assets from US DSP/SBIRS early warning satellites, coupled with lower latency Shared Early Warning System service to allies/partners, would enlarge the battle space permitting more effective, layered response to high-volume challenges.
  • Allied/partner nations—moving beyond imaging—are now seeking their own early warning satellites—France has the Spirale demonstration program and Japan wants to proceed in the same direction. Dispersed early warning capability could become problematical, however, if confusion is generated over the fact of a launch or track coordinates. At a minimum, US-ally/partner certification of initial and continuing non-US early warning performance appears essential. Additionally, US tech transfer policies need to be reviewed to ensure maximum influence in maintaining common, mutually supportive systems and encouraging allied investment to remediate early warning gaps.
  • Additionally, allied industrial participation and investment could be encouraged in the envisaged US PTSS satellite constellation—given its importance in providing ascent phase, mid-course tracking to permit early and successful intercepts for the stressed regional defenses.

Air

  • The forthcoming global deployment of large unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as Global Hawk, BAMS, and Euro Hawk, joined with existing manned air-to-ground surveillance (AGS) platforms such as Joint STARS and ASTOR, and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft such as AWACS, 737 MESA, and E2C/D, could be used to enhance regional ballistic and cruise missile tracking—given an appropriate sensor and networking strategy.
  • This could come from building out from the US Missile Defense Agency’s ABIRS (Airborne Infra-Red System) concept of UAV-mounted infra-red sensors and the future overseas deployment of US and allied/partner F-35 stealth fighters equipped with advanced AESA (Active Electronically-Scanned Array) radar and the Distributed Aperture System (DAS).
  • With a demonstrated range exceeding 800 miles with full spherical coverage, multiple DAS on F-35s and US and allied Global Hawk, Euro Hawk, BAMS, and other UAVs, fighters, and AEW/AGS aircraft, could be meshed together in ad hoc networks through secure data links using software being developed in the Missile Defense Agency’s EC2BMC (Enhanced C2BMC) program. This would allow allies/partners to leverage already committed investments to increase missile defense performance and validate its utility against threats in the ascent and terminal phases.

Spurring Investment

A decision to create US-allied/partner cooperative space and air ISR, early warning and tracking, space situation awareness, and air missile tracking capabilities, plus supporting data links and ground processing infrastructure, could provide the foundational elements for successful defense of regions with tight timelines. These programs, in turn, could constitute   economically- and technologically-stimulating activities for defense industries in fiscally-challenged states.

Should a coalition of the willing emerge in regions with appropriate industrial capabilities such as Europe, the Far East or Israel, an incentive for national investment could be created through establishment of regional missile defense investment funds permitting 100% return to national industry in exchange for invested national funds.

(Previous national return rates proffered in related fields have been 70% for NATO Air-to-Ground Surveillance and 60% for the subsequently-cancelled Kinetic Energy Interceptor.)

Additionally, just as Japan and the US are cooperating in the development of the SM 3, Block IIA interceptor to defend against IRBMs, foreign content could be contemplated for the planned SM3, Block IIB planned to provide early intercept of ICBM launches. Such foreign content would synergize with the effort to encourage allies/partners to join in/expand their space and air activities enabling early intercept to occur.

European, Japanese, Korean and other efforts to develop indigenous interceptors could also be encouraged. While the US directly supports Israeli interceptors such as Arrow 2 and 3 and David’s Sling, non-budgetary support can be provided by developing alliance/regional requirements for maritime and ground deployment of future systems if/when they acquire BMD capability, eg, the Aster/SAMP-T/PAAMS upgrade program and Exoguard in Europe/Persian Gulf and CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT in Asia/Middle East (Australia has still not embraced territorial BMD).

(Credit:(Credit: SLD)

Coordinating Operations

The cueing of sensors and shooters to allow timely interception is a requirement for success in regional missile defense. But it creates only a possibility for success–not a certainty –since misallocation of sensor and shooter resources or the sheer weight of incoming numbers in a constricted time period could spell defeat.

The issue of numbers was raised implicitly in a June 3, 2010 US Air Force memo signed by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the US Air Force. It reaffirmed the joint doctrine that offensive action to destroy and disrupt enemy missile sites, airfields, and command-and-control infrastructure had to be fully integrated with air and ground efforts to defeat incoming enemy aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles. Defense was inseparable from offense.

This defense-offense fusion generates the requirement for political and military operational coordination with allied and partner air forces and with US and allied navies possessing air and offensive ballistic and cruise missile capability. The precedent of coalition air and tactical missile operations in Afghanistan and Iraq supported by multinational ISR assets is helpful in this regard.

Now with the incorporation of the Missile Defense Agency’s C2BMC situation awareness, planning and limited battle management tool into Air and Space Operations Centers (the Air Force integrates offensive and defensive counter-air/missile activities in each Combatant Command), the stage is set for US Air Force, Navy, and Army and allied/partner determination of functions and procedures for executing an integrated offense/defense Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

The defensive part of this CONOPS will be complicated by the fact that the US Army and Navy and allies/partners control the shooters—not the Air Force. Above and beyond this force structure issue, each of the shooter owners is mobile and has intense self-interest in preservation of valuable assets critical to the fight beyond missile defense.

The shifting preoccupations on the defensive side as attacks vary in mode and intensity at particular locations calls forth the need for sensor and shooter resource allocation to ensure that limited assets are not frittered away for less than optimal campaign purposes. The execution of this allocation through centralized control is complicated or made impossible by the self-preservation issue, national sovereignty considerations, and communications survival and latency problems.

The solution to this acute dilemma resides in joint and allied/partner acceptance of a modus operandi that can be executed on a decentralized basis. The nature of this resource allocation solution will be both technically complex and difficult to negotiate. Work toward it can begin through scenario-based simulation and wargaming conducted by regional authorities. The coming inauguration of a regional IAMD Center of Excellence in the UAE offers a potential venue for such activity.

Additionally, STRATCOM’S NIMBLE TITAN international BMD wargaming series and the Netherlands’ technically–focused Joint Project Optical Windmill offer opportunities for the development of political-military and warfighting techniques relevant to resource allocation management—the ultimate key to successful regional missile defense.

———-

[1] The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of neither the Northrop Grumman Corporation, nor the U.S. Government.

Expanding the Battlespace and Replacing the CH-46

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An Update on the Osprey from New River (IV)

An Interview With Major Lee York

10/05 /2010 – In a wide-ranging interviews with Osprey pilots and maintainers at New River Air Station discussing their operational experience with the Osprey, one pilot highlighted with a single story the impact of the Osprey’s speed on operating in the battlespace.

Major Lee York (Credit: SLD)

SLD: Could you tell us about your background?

Major Lee York: My name is Major Lee York. I started out as a CH-46 pilot and did two deployments. The first one was in 2002; we deployed on a 24th MEU and participated in OIF and then after that came home and then we went back out with 24th MEU again. This time in Iraq 2004-2005, set up deployment there, and came home with 263 and stood the squadron down and then transitioned to the V-22 and then I deployed with VMM-263 as a first operational V-22 squadron to Iraq for seven months. After that, we came home and then went to the VMMT-204 to train new students on how to fly V-22 and then I’m back at 263 again.

SLD: What was your operational experience in Iraq with regard to the ability to land the Osprey in spots similar to your helo? Because of your experience of flying rotorcraft in the first deployment and then Osprey’s in the second, your perspective would be definitive on this point.

Major Lee York: I have read all stories, all the naysayers, that the V-22 can’t replace the FROG. But my experience says the opposite. The landing zones if used in ’04-’05 with the FROG, we went back in ’07 with V-22 and we landed in I would say 95 percent of the same zones. The same number of aircraft, two FROGs, two V-22s we put at the same zones and we were able to do it. And I’m talking the same exact place, you know, Ramadi and other cities, on landing zones that we’ve landed earlier with FROGs and now with V-22s. For the guys who said that they couldn’t do it, well, they’re wrong.

3 Ospreys Coming Into Land in Close Quarters During USMC Exercise (Credit: USMC)Three Ospreys Coming Into Land in Close Quarters During USMC Exercise
(Credit: USMC)

SLD: You had an anecdote, which underscores the impact of speed in the battlespace?

Major Lee York: We took some soldiers out to the West of Iraq.

The crew chief comes up to us and tells us that the guys won’t get out of the plane.

We’re like, what are you talking about? They said we’re not there yet.

And we said, “What are you talking about?” He then said, “The last time we did this flight it took an hour and a half.

We’ve only been in the plane for 40 minutes so we can’t be there yet.”

“The last time we did this flight it took an hour and a half. We’ve only been in the plane for 40 minutes so we can’t be there yet.”

We told him to tell the Marines that “we were cruising at 230 rather than at 120 so we were there. I swear we’re here, you know, we’re not going to send him somewhere where he is not supposed to be.”

“Robots In Arms”

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Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, U.S. Navy (Ret.) on the Future of Military Robotics and Awaiting New Concepts of Operations

11/05/2010 – Second Line of Defense recently sat down with Vice Admiral Joe Dyer (U.S. Navy, Ret.), Chief Operating Officer at iRobot Corporation, to discuss the evolution of robotics and its relationship to evolving military capabilities and concepts of operations. Before becoming COO,  Vice Admiral Dyer served as president of iRobot’s government and industrial robots division for seven years. His naval career includes positions as commander of the Naval Air Systems Command, naval aviation’s chief engineer, commander of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division and F/A-18 program manager. Earlier in his career, he was the navy’s chief test pilot.  Vice Admiral Dyer is therefore well positioned to discuss the impact of robotics on future USN and USMC joint operations, which was one theme of the discussion.

SLD: How should we think about robotics in the bigger global competition?

Vice Admiral Dyer: Let me offer you the research question that asks: What’s America’s next big thing? We did well with agriculture, we did well with automobiles, we did well with aviation, and we did well with information technology. So, what’s our next big thing?

There are two strong candidates –biogenetics and robotics. I’m hard pressed to come up with another one that pops during my lifetime.

Let me offer you the research question that asks: What’s America’s next big thing? We did well with agriculture, we did well with automobiles, we did well with aviation, and we did well with information technology. So, what’s our next big thing? There are two strong candidates –biogenetics and robotics.

The economic engine that carries us forward, that provides a foundation for all things defense or all things employment must be part of our economic calculus.

SLD: Is DOD investment in robotics technology part of the equation driving an American advantage?

Vice Admiral Dyer: The concept that DOD technology leads the way to the marketplace is a model of much of the XXth century, and certainly up through the early 1980’s. Beginning in the 1990’s, not so much… In the 1990’s, especially in the information technology, DOD found itself following rather than leading. Robotics may well be a return to the model where DOD investment is delivering breakthrough capability for the Department, and at the same time engendering a new commercial technology.

SLD: How would you characterize the current state of development and the next stages of evolution of the robotics enterprise?

Vice Admiral Dyer: There is huge excitement in the robotics community right now about the development and deployment of autonomous systems. Simultaneous localization and mapping are concurrent developments. We call it, in shorthand, the ability to arbitrate and navigate. What’s at stake is the ability to go from today’s teleoperation, where there is a one-to-one relationship between operator and robot, to more autonomous operation with smarter robots.  This transition is from “driving the robot” to “supervising multiple robots.”

SLD: Rather, an extension of the person?

Vice Admiral Dyer: Yes, the “distance from danger” that robots provide has done an important job of contributing to survivability in today’s conflict. And it is as transformational a story as I think you can find anywhere. When the iRobot PackBot went into in Afghanistan in late 2002, the challenge was to provide a simple extension of the soldier while undertaking cave exploration. Prior, the tactics and doctrine called for 19-year-old soldier with a 12-foot stick and a rope around his waist. The rope was there to get him out if he got hurt, without having to send somebody else in.

So you went from that to a virtual presence via a robot, literally at a point in time you can put your finger on. In a town that loves to talk about transformation, it’s hard to find great examples of it; but, this is clearly a transformation story.

The “distance from danger” that robots provide has done an important job of contributing to survivability in today’s conflict. And it is as transformational a story as I think you can find anywhere. When the iRobot PackBot went into in Afghanistan in late 2002, the challenge was to provide a simple extension of the soldier while undertaking cave exploration. Prior, the tactics and doctrine called for 19-year-old soldier with a 12-foot stick and a rope around his waist. The rope was there to get him out if he got hurt, without having to send somebody else in. So you went from that to a virtual presence via a robot, literally at a point in time you can put your finger on. (…)  this is clearly a transformation story.

To tie that back to autonomy, robots today are where fighter aircraft were when I started flying 35 years ago.  Back then, it took 80 percent of your time to attend to the airframe, the engine, and a navigation problem. And you had only 20 percent of your time left to apply to the mission. Today, that’s almost exactly reversed. Now, the airframe, engine, and navigation problems pretty well take care of themselves. By the way, if the aircraft needs any help, the machine will ask you for it. And you’ve got 80 percent of your time available to dedicate to the mission: robots today are akin to fighters of 35 years ago.

SLD: Could you describe the next phase of evolution?

Vice Admiral Dyer: There are very, very exciting things that are happening right now, literally right now. iRobot is inserting the initial autonomous capabilities – out of the lab, into the field and in theatre. The initial capabilities are much simpler than people think. Right now, you’ve got to drive the robot every step of the way. One of the first things we’re doing is to look at what we might call “cruise control”, which basically tells a robot to maintain its vector until the operator tells it to do something else. That alone brings a tremendous reduction in operator overhead, operator loading and duty cycle.

SLD: So you can get situational awareness without having to have human oversight, so to speak?

Vice Admiral Dyer: Well, it’s even simpler than that. It’s that if I’ve got to drive the robot half a mile before I can go to work on the IED. I don’t want to have to attend to it every step of the way. Another of today’s big problems is — if a robot loses comms today, you have to hike out and get the robot. Not a popular thing; you wouldn’t have sent the robot, if you wanted to be out there. So another of the capabilities we are delivering is a retro-traverse. If the robot loses communications, it retraces its path until communications are restored. These initial autonomous functions are the start of a “hockey stick” growth curve in autonomous technology.

Another of today’s big problems is — if a robot loses comms today, you have to hike out and get the robot. Not a popular thing; you wouldn’t have sent the robot, if you wanted to be out there. So another of the capabilities we are delivering is a retro-traverse. If the robot loses communications, it retraces its path until communications are restored. These initial autonomous functions are the start of a “hockey stick” growth curve in autonomous technology.

Let me talk a little bit in general and then a little bit more specifically on this marriage of technology and how profoundly it’s going to affect tactics and doctrine. Today, we have robots that are an extension of self. With a robot, I can virtually go downrange, I can see, I can manipulate, I can hear, I can talk, I can sense on a broad range of sensors. But still, the robot is an extension of the operator.

SLD: We’re reducing risk to yourself, and able to engage in a wider range of dangerous environments.

Vice Admiral Dyer: Exactly. Robots are putting distance between my fragile body and things that can hurt me. One of the beautiful things about robots, by the way, is that THEY ARE FEARLESS! The next stage beyond robot as an extension of self and a virtual presence is a robot as wingman, or, battle buddy, or teammate. And this big leap is going on at places like iRobot today, and in labs like the TARDEC, Army Research Lab, and SPAWAR out in San Diego.  In this future case, you give the robot a task to autonomously perform as part of the combat team.  And, oh by the way, you can communicate with the robot via voice and gesture; you don’t have to joystick it.

SLD: What is enabling this transformation?

Vice Admiral Dyer: The ideas of how to do that go back literally to iRobot’s founder Professor Rodney Brooks’ work at Stanford 30 years ago, but the processing speed just wasn’t available to make it practicable. Affordable processing, computers light enough and inexpensive enough to put into a piece of mobile equipment, just were not available. Fast forward to today and you can see that Moore’s Law has been really good to many things, but it has never been better than it is to robotics. So, after today’s robot teleoperation, the next phase is this ability to give a robot a task and have it execute the task. We’ll see initial capability deployed within the next three to five years.

SLD: How do you see the next phase of robotics as part of re-shaping concepts of operations?

At iRobot, we have a vision of integrated Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV’s), Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UAV’s) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV’s). A way I like to think about that is to envision a littoral combat ship that shows up off the coast of some bad guy’s country.  Let’s take a look at how different that will be compared to the way we do it today:

Let’s consider UUVs, which I think are one of the most exciting developmental areas that are underway.  UUV’s are, by the way, the area where autonomy is needed more than anywhere else. Why? Well, while you’ve good radio frequency bandwidth when you’re airborne, you have very little bandwidth when communicating with UUVs.  Underwater, you’re limited to acoustic modems for un-tethered operations. An acoustic modem is slower than your first dial-up PC connection to the web. But as you start to introduce more autonomy, you start to tremendously increase the utility of unmanned underwater systems. Autonomy is important for the future of all robots, but critically important for UUVs.  That is what iRobot is building at our unmanned underwater systems group in Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina. But let’s continue with this Navy ship showing up with a Navy/Marine Corps team on an adversary’s littoral during the next decade.  The preparation for entering that battle space will be tremendously improved in many ways by unmanned systems.

SLD: Could you describe the impact?

Vice Admiral Dyer: First, let’s talk about airborne mine countermeasures.  Mine countermeasures are challenging to execute. Because mines are at-sea-IEDs, they are challenging asymmetric weapons capable of “area denial.”

SLD: Wouldn’t it be great if we took an Army lesson learned, and applied it to the maritime mission ahead of being massively challenged at sea by mine warfare?

Vice Admiral Dyer: You’re absolutely right. I worry that the Navy has not taken full notice of the IED threat. Our Navy’s interest in and focus on maritime IEDs (mines) is episodic and our attention has always been short. Unmanned systems will offer new capabilities at sea, just as unmanned ground robots have for ground forces.

SLD: How will you deliver it into the battlespace?

Vice Admiral Dyer: I believe UUV’s offer great potential but there are challenges.  The prime challenges for UUVs are range and power,area coverage. UUVs have the disadvantages of being relatively slow and of limited search duration. So you can’t efficiently transit them; you have to deliver them to the area of interest. At iRobot, we’re coming at this problem with our Ranger program, which we’re funding atop some basic work sponsored by the Office of Naval Research. We are designing a Ranger UUV that’s “A-size.” “A-size” means it fits into a sonobouy launcher. And there are literally thousands of tubes out there on multiple patrol and tacair platforms. Marry the capability to air-launch with swarm capability and you cut out the transit time, greatly reduce the power requirement and introduce UUVs directly into the area of interest.

Using swarm techniques, which DARPA has funded iRobot and others to develop; you start to see the operations research numbers get much, much better. This isn’t something that’s awaiting better batteries and more power; it’s awaiting further development of a new concept.

SLD: One of the things we have been looking at is the impact on the amphib of the new technologies, Osprey, F-35B and CH-53K, on making this ship and its capability a key battle manager center with the LCS and the kind of robotics you are describing. Would carrying UUV’s be a weapons bay issue for an F-35, because it’s stealth?

Vice Admiral Dyer: You’d need to tuck the sonobuoy launcher into the bomb bay to protect the F-35’s radar cross section just as you do with air-to-air weapons. Let me tell you why I think it’s a tacair mission, a tactical aircraft mission, and not an attack sub, helicopter or patrol aircraft mission. Attack subs, are expensive assets to stick into dangerous (mined) areas. They want and need standoff distance.  When standing-off, you suffer UUV transit time, and now you are expending a lot of energy before you’re in the search area. Additionally, upcoming underwater, counter-air launched weapons are going to make mine fields dangerous places for slow movers – helos and low altitude patrol aircraft. A set of mines that can operate against air as well as naval assets will dramatically change the counter-mine calculus.  To deliver a small swarm of UUV’s directly to the area of interest, you need to get in and get out quickly.

SLD: You are creating a whole new approach linked with other new assets, which will become available to the USMC-USN team?

Vice Admiral Dyer: Yes. We see important linkage between the evolution of the robotics capabilities and concepts of operations. With the new UUVs, we will do airborne mine countermeasures before the amphibs go in; in the more distant future, we will be able to do ASW with UUV’s. We will have UUVs taking UGVs into the surf zone, and transporting them ashore. And you’re going to be launching UAVs all at the same time.

We see important linkage between the evolution of the robotics capabilities and concepts of operations. With the new UUVs, we will do airborne mine countermeasures before the amphibs go in; in the more distant future, we will be able to do ASW with UUV’s. We will have UUVs taking UGVs into the surf zone, and transporting them ashore. And you’re going to be launching UAVs all at the same time.

So this Navy/Marine Corps team, as they go into the area of interest, has cleared mines and acquired both God’s view from above and the up-close, personal view from UGVs. This will yield an unprecedented level of situational awareness before anyone ever goes ashore.

SLD: Another way to look at it is the difference between classic combat aircraft and what we’re doing with the F-35.  In the classic aircraft, you’ve got a forward looking infrared sequential look. With the 35, you’re taking a 360-degree swathe, so you’re looking at the entire battle space. So what you’re describing is a 360-degree application from an unmanned point of view. There is tremendous synergy.   Basically, you’re extending the ability to bring the Marine Corps and Navy assets to bear on this or the Air Force assets for that matter. You’re talking about moving the bubble ashore.

Vice Admiral Dyer: Right.  You’ve got it. Let’s talk about western Iraq for a minute. If you go back to the build-up for the war in Iraq, early 2000’s — God bless the special ops guys, because we had them between a rock and a hard spot. We inserted them with serious geopolitical/POW risk. Today, you can supplement and ease their mission with unmanned ground systems in addition to UAV’s. Not unrelated, we’ve done some good work looking at standoff parafoil insertions of robots. This may be one of the best ways to get a robot into a dangerous area. We’re talking about robots that have multispectral sensors; that have acoustic capabilities, both listening and talking. We’re talking about being able to do unmanned, remote laser designation….

SLD: Could you talk about the iRobot Seaglider?

Vice Admiral Dyer: Seaglider is a “sailplane”, but one that operates under water. It’s slow, only does about one to two knots.  But it literally can cross the Pacific. There were four Seaglider UUVs working down in the Gulf of Mexico with the oil spill. Now, you’re talking about affordable persistence surveillance with a Seaglider. It’s a better and more affordable way to regain some of the important capabilities we let-go after the Cold War ended. At iRobot, we’re investing a lot of time figuring out how to combine UUVs, UGVs and UAVs to give warfighters better technical advantages and far better survivability.

Preparing for the Maintenance of the F-35 at Langley AFB

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An Interview with Senior Master Sgt. Steven Wehrle and Master Sgt. David Freeman

11/05/2010 – In September 2010, Second Line of Defense sat down with maintainers at Langley AFB to talk about F-22 experiences and preparation for the F-35.  As the maintainers described it, a significant cultural change was underway which would leave to significant manpower savings and enhanced supply chain efficiencies.  Senior Master Sgt. Steven Wehrle and Master Sgt. David Freeman of the USAF provide their judgments on evolving experience with 5th generation aircraft maintenance approaches.

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“I started out on U-2’s many years ago, which is one of our most primitive planes still in inventory.” (Credit: 380th Air Expeditionary Wing, 3/9/10) 


“I started out on U-2’s many years ago, which is one of our most primitive
  planes still in inventory.” (Master Sergeant Freeman)
 (Credit photo: 380th Air Expeditionary Wing, 0 3/09/2010)

SLD: What are some of the challenges in preparing for the introduction of the F-35 at Langley AFB, from a maintenance point of view?

Senior Master Sgt. Steven Wehrle: My worries are not focused on the brand new one-striper coming out onto the ramp to crew an F-35; he’s going to get trained.  The Air Force rightfully so puts a lot of time into its young troops upfront to ensure they are ready to execute the mission. What we are very concerned about is the Senior Airmen that crewed F-16s, or F-15s, and is transitioning to the F-35. What I’m referring to is a mindset change in our sustainment practices.

We have to ensure we are effectively preparing our mid-level Airmen and our logistics supervision that are transitioning to the F-35.  The acquisition and sustainment of this platform is wholly different than anything that has been done before. This is not just an exclusive Air Force platform and Air Force buy, there will be many processes and procedures executed differently.  It is a joint platform where commonality and affordability have driven concessions amongst all.

SLD: One of the challenges clearly is to leverage the commonality provided by the maintenance systems and interact with service cultures in shaping effective maintenance approaches.  Also, I have seen with regard to the Osprey that there is a challenge as the most experienced maintainers are used more to mechanical than digital systems, and there will be a transition.  Is that part of what you are talking about here?

Senior Master Sgt. StevenWehrle: Yes you are right.  The Autonomic Logistics Information System or ALIS is at the heart of this new air system. It is a challenge at first getting folks to accept this paradigm shift in technology.  ALIS is much different in that there are a number of things—like I had mentioned earlier—that are designed to meet the joint or common solution. Because of the common solution challenges are bound to arise that make us reevaluate our legacy processes.

(Credit: http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/fd/forum/pdf/Gill.pdf)(Credit: http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu)

SLD: You are describing the need for a culture change and to anticipate the time necessary to make that crossover to the new approach?

Master Sgt. David Freeman: It’s a completely different mindset; it’s almost like what our operators are saying.  You have to shift.  I started out on U-2’s many years ago, which is one of our most primitive planes still in inventory.  There are no hydraulic actuators to assist the flight controls.  Cables, bell-cranks and pulleys that must be hand rigged are used.  So that’s the technology level I started on. Mechanical ability was crucial to performing maintenance.

As a Senior Airman I moved to a little more high tech platform, I moved up to the A-10.  I went from 50’s technology to 70’s technology.  So, I went little bit up in the evolution chain to the A-10, great plane, easy to maintain, I liked it.

Later in my career I transitioned over to the F-22, which was a big jump, going from analog to digital—you’re still turning bolts, you’re still turning wrenches, but the way everything is put together and fused on the ops side drives a whole new requirement for all the electronics, pieces and bits that are put together. It’s maintained in a completely different way.  You don’t rig flight controls on an F-22 or an F-35; well, you do but you do it with a laptop and a keyboard versus a tensiometer.

Many legacy organizations within maintenance are going to fade away on the flight-line. There are reasons these organizations and tools are going away. They’re just not needed anymore, because there are not those previous maintenance activities occurring. Many tasks are done so easily now on a computer, or via a bit check. Computers are taking over the workload just like they’re taking that workload off the pilot.

SLD: This cultural shift that you are describing has started with the F-22 maintenance experience?

Master Sgt. David Freeman: It has. With the new guys when they come out to learn F-22 maintenance, this is normal for them.  The challenge arises when you try and take the old guys or even the middle level personnel, who are used to using paper manuals to do repairs, or go look at a fault isolation blueprint.  Those don’t even exist in modern fifth gen.  You have to rely on the prognostics and diagnostic systems on the plane to tell you what’s wrong.  When we previously did troubleshooting, we built fault trees and trouble trees.  With 5th gen we rely on the computer diagnostics and the air system’s prognostics.

The migration will be difficult moving from the analog to digital for the older guys.  And it’s going to be, but as we move into the future, into the iPad/iPod generation, the young guys that are coming out and learning this stuff, it’s going to be second nature to them.

These tools are going to be very valuable to the older maintainers as well, it’s just such a leap, and I imagine maybe even in the pilot community you’ve had some of these challenges with older pilots who are used to older aircraft as well.  I’m sure they went through the same thing.

(Credit: http://www.asipcon.com/2006/06_proceed/Thursday/0330_Garcia.PDF)(Credit: http://www.asipcon.com)

SLD: But I’d like to go back to the F-22 maintenance regime  versus the F-15.  How is that different?

Master Sgt. David Freeman: The F-22 will tell you what the fault is through the ICAWs, integrated caution and warning system.  ICAW.  And the jet will tell you hey, I’ve got an advisory going on with this system, or hey, I’ve really got an emergency, you’ve got engine fire, and it puts out the fire before you even have time to hit the buttons and turn it off.

And the Eagle, it was the mindset of it was just a big system, and I have to manage an emergency and I have to know to go over here and I know the indication is going to be this and this gauge, and back over here.  And I’m going to have to do some troubleshooting.

Whereas on an F-22, the majority of the emergencies or faults that we have are reported by the aircraft.  Or sometimes they’re not even shown to the pilot until we get to maintenance debrief.

Whereas in the F-15, you just indicate that I flew today, I got this light and that means it’s broken or you guys need to take it from here and fix it.  The F-22, I might have that fault, it does its own analysis.

But then when I’m done with the aircraft, I bring in my digital transfer cartridge, it’s basically about the size of one of your recorders there.  I plug it into the computer and then the maintenance system downloads all the faults that the jet is reporting everything.

On the F-22, everything is integrated.  So I might lose this electrical system or this vehicle control node, and it has fingers in everything.

SLD: Could you describe the difference between maintenance on the F-22 and the F-15?

Master Sgt. David Freeman: You’re shifting from a reactionary maintenance regime in a legacy plane to a proactive and targeted maintenance regime in 5th generation.  If you look at an F-15 or F-18, you don’t fix anything until it breaks; until the component is broken, there was very little prognostic type indications to tell you this may break in the future.  So we built in a redundancy and we built in schedule maintenance regimes where you inspect things every so many hours.

With the technology that’s coming along you leverage the sensors, this is nothing new and fancy; look at cars.  I mean, you look at a car from the 80s, how do you change your oil?  You change your oil every 3,000 miles or every three months.  Any new vehicle that’s out anymore has a sensor.  The computer tells you, change your oil.

It’s the exact same technology that’s being applied now that has been to the F-22 and the F-35 and even the F-16 to shift from reactionary maintenance regimes to more prognostic maintenance regimes where you can begin to predict reliably to lean your logistics chain down to support realistically your operations.

SLD: So leaning down your logistic chain is a big gain for your maintenance regime?

Master Sgt. David Freeman: You’re not over-inspecting is one advantage.  You’re not overstocking parts that you may not need.  You can begin to really focus your logistics effort by analyzing data 5th gen fighters are designed to utilize.

On the F-35, the data file that comes off the jet is gigantic.  It records everything that’s happening on the jet and it goes into a file. Over time, we are going to shape how we use the data generated by the plane to get really effective maintenance metrics.

SLD: You are underscoring that the data advantages of the F-35 will be leveraged over time, will take time to leverage, but will build long-term advantages for a maintenance regime?

Master Sgt. David Freeman: The ALIS system that they have built and the whole autonomic logistics construct for the F-35 is going to be awesome.  Previously, we had many barriers in legacy sustainment of the planes, where there are many federated things in your supply chain.  But with a single supply chain driven by an integrated aircraft, a lean approach is possible. The guy on the flight line doesn’t care where his parts come from as long as he can get them.

SLD: Your point about the federated system is you have several un-integrated elements, each with its own maintenance and supply chain?

Master Sgt. David Freeman: Absolutely. I don’t care where that part’s coming from, as long as when my plane breaks, if I can get a part tomorrow and I don’t have to pull it off the plane sitting beside it to get that replenished, I don’t care.  If it comes from the US or any partner nation, I don’t care.  As long as it’s a reliable part that lasts, meets my specifications and standards and I can get it tomorrow, I’ll take it.

SLD: How will the ALIS system work for you?

Master Sgt. David Freeman: It’s very simple.  While you’re doing your job and you’re doing your maintenance, you tick a box.  That’s all you do to order a part. It’s all shot out instantly electronically

That’s all within ALIS.  When I first saw it I was shocked.  I thought, “Do the supply guys know about this? That all I have to do is tick a box and a part is coming my way”?  Normally, I have to fill out a form that is a page and a half long just to get a screw or something very simple.

In ALIS, all you do is tick a box, and it’s intuitive enough to pull in your part numbers, all that data that it needs to, it already knows, it’s already in the system.  So you tick the box, the requisition goes over to the supply module of ALIS. The system responds letting me know if I have this part in my local warehouse.  If it’s in the local warehouse, it sends me back a message saying it’s ready for pick-up, come and get it.

Lockheed Martin Center for Innovation, Suffolk, VA (Credit: Lockheed Martin)
Lockheed Martin Center for Innovation, Suffolk, VA (Credit: Lockheed Martin)

If it is not locally sourced, it goes out to regional supply and you’ll get a message back within a certain time period of where that availability is and when you’re going to get it.  Then all these mechanized processes, which are automatically done in the background, are checked and of course there’s supply oversight into the process. It’s much more mechanized and automated in the background in ALIS versus legacy systems.

SLD: What has been the reaction to other maintainers when they see the new approach?

Master Sgt. David Freeman: Lockheed Martin hosted a conference over at the Center for Innovation near here in Suffolk; it was about a month ago, a little over a month ago.  They invited our HQ ACC/A4 counterparts to come over with their weapon system teams to see the flight-line of the future.  The F-22, F-15, F-16 and A-10 weapon systems teams came along. They were able to see ALIS, to see how it was going to work, including the future of maintenance on the F-35.

Every single one of those maintainers that I talked to you, their jaws just dropped.  They all said, this is awesome, and I want this for my platform.  I want this for my plane.  If you can make it work, I want it.  A great example was the A-10 weapons team superintendent, I was talking to him, he said he could call DLA right now and asks them how many of these widgets do I have in supply?  Then if he were to call back the next day he gets several answers, usually different answers.

All of the legacy teams expressed frustration with an ailing defense supply chain that continues to have challenges keeping their planes in the air. Many echoed “Legacy has grown too large and complex relying on vendors that are no longer even in business to source parts on our aging fleet.”

Loosing Aerospace?

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United States Is On The Verge Of Losing Its Aerospace Industry, Analyst Warns

By Richard McCormack

manufacturing-technology-30

This article was originally published in Manufacturing & Technology News on September 30th, 2010. All graphs come from: “A Case for Repayable Launch Aid,” a study by David Pritchard

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11/05/2010 – The U.S. aerospace supply industry is on the cusp of extinction if the United States government does not put into place a set of industrial policies aimed at making sure it survives an onslaught of foreign government- backed competition. As foreign nations promote the rapid development their own large-body aircraft production industries, U.S. companies risk not being part of any of those international supply chains.

Adding to the woes of U.S. suppliers is the business model adopted by Boeing of shifting the production of parts, components of subsystems to foreign companies. “This is a here-and-now moment” for the United States aerospace supply sector, says David Pritchard, a long-time aerospace analyst with the Canada-United States Trade Center at the State University of New York in Buffalo.

Sources of Boeing's Production

If the United States government does not get engaged in a manner similar to what is occurring over-seas, then it will have to accept the fact that the country’s most important export industry will no longer be a driver in the U.S. economy. Employment in the U.S. aero- space sector has taken a nose-dive, from 1,331,000 in 1989 to 657,000 in 2008. Canada, China, Russia, Brazil and Europe are all developing a new generation of large commercial aircraft. These countries “are putting billions of dollars into their aircraft industries because they say it’s in their national that we have to play by our own rules and that we’re going to be different,” Pritchard explains.

The perception that U.S. historical dominance will persist is causing great damage to the industry, according to Pritchard. “We need to help our suppliers be competitive globally otherwise they are not going to be around.” Foreign countries have explicit industrial policies aimed at promoting the development of their aerospace manufacturing processes and technologies. To sell into those markets, U.S. aerospace companies have been required to participate in those industrial policies, by transferring technology and production under “offset” agreements. “While these strategies may be commercially successful in the short term, they undermine the long-term interest of the U.S. manufacturing infrastructure, American workers and ultimately the U.S. position in this strategic industry,” according to Pritchard. Foreign ownership, production and technology transfer requirements have shifted manufacturing technology, engineering data, product processes and managerial talent offshore.

Moreover, Boeing has been placing the burden of re-search and development onto its suppliers. Instead of investing in research into new production and manpower systems, the company instead has spent $20 billion over the past 20 years buying back its stock. The re-search and development function has been shifted mostly to its foreign suppliers who receive financial assistance from their host governments. The foreign content on airframe structures for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner was 90 percent, Pritchard notes. Almost 70 percent of the 787 is being manufactured offshore, with assembly in the United States accounting for 4 percent of the total value of the aircraft. Pritchard estimates that imports of parts and components account for 60 cents of every dollar of aerospace exports, up from 40 cents in 2000 and 11 cents in 1970. “It’s great that you have an export going out, but how much foreign content is involved in the export?” he asks. “Nobody talks about it.”

Boeing has been placing the burden of re-search and development onto its suppliers. Instead of investing in research into new production and manpower systems, the company instead has spent $20 billion over the past 20 years buying back its stock. The re-search and development function has been shifted mostly to its foreign suppliers who receive financial assistance from their host governments. The foreign content on airframe structures for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner was 90 percent, Pritchard notes. Almost 70 percent of the 787 is being manufactured offshore, with assembly in the United States accounting for 4 percent of the total value of the aircraft. Pritchard estimates that imports of parts and components account for 60 cents of every dollar of aerospace exports, up from 40 cents in 2000 and 11 cents in 1970. “It’s great that you have an export going out, but how much foreign content is involved in the export?” he asks. “Nobody talks about it.”

According to Pritchard’s analysis, Boeing had originally outsourced over 90 percent of the parts for the 787, “even after the U.S. government provided Boeing with $1.8 billion in NASA money for the High Speed Civil Transport program which was earmarked to develop the U.S. industrial base,” he writes in a new study. “The U.S. taxpayers reward Boeing shareholders with billions of dollars by elimination of taxes, yet there is no accounting for domestic content in return. For the first time in U.S. commercial aviation history, foreign risk-sharing partners will have control over the selection of second-and- third-tier suppliers.”

Since 2001, Boeing’s workforce has been downsized from 90,000 to 64,000. If American companies do not start supplying new foreign aircraft programs, their global market share “will continue to deteriorate,” writes Pritchard. “The smaller second- and third-tier suppliers are not typically flush with capital to invest into new aircraft programs which could force them to merge with other U.S. suppliers, be sold off to foreign competitors or exit the market.

US Suppliers' Joint Ventures

The next five years will be a critical time for the U.S. commercial supply chain on what decisions will be made for its future competitiveness.” A new global competitive structure is quickly unfolding, displacing the dominance held by Boeing and Air- bus. In 2008, China created the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) to develop a single aisle commercial airliner – the C919 – that will compete directly against Boeing’s 737 and Airbus’s A-320. COMAC is also developing a regional aircraft, the ARJ 21. In order to provide COMAC with hardware systems, foreign suppliers have been required to form joint ventures with majority ownership held by Chinese partners.

Over the past 30 years, through similar technology transfer and production requirements, China has acquired “the full capability for producing aircraft that would meet U.S. Federal Aviation Administration certification standards,” says Pritchard. In what Pritchard describes as a dumb economic policy, President Obama said he would help the Chinese get the ARJ-21 certified by the FAA. Obama made the pledge on a visit to China last November. “You don’t just give the golden keys of technology to them,” says Pritchard. “Once you get FAA certification, it’s a validation to sell worldwide and [the aircraft] is accepted. I just don’t understand why you would want to do that. You know China is subsidizing its aircraft industry and yet you don’t do anything about it and, by the way, the President is going to help you. There is a disconnect here.”

Over the past 30 years, through similar technology transfer and production requirements, China has acquired “the full capability for producing aircraft that would meet U.S. Federal Aviation Administration certification standards,” says Pritchard. In what Pritchard describes as a dumb economic policy, President Obama said he would help the Chinese get the ARJ-21 certified by the FAA. Obama made the pledge on a visit to China last November. “You don’t just give the golden keys of technology to them,” says Pritchard. “Once you get FAA certification, it’s a validation to sell worldwide and [the aircraft] is accepted. I just don’t understand why you would want to do that. You know China is subsidizing its aircraft industry and yet you don’t do anything about it and, by the way, the President is going to help you. There is a disconnect here.”

Aircraft Programs

The United States is stuck in the mentality that it is the world’s dominant economy with the best technology. “The playing field has shifted and we want to act like we’re in the 1950’s with all the ability to wield our economic power.” That is no longer the case and such thinking is proving to be economically damaging. China especially has been successfully implementing a vigorous 20-year strategy to develop its commercial aircraft industry with government funding. “If you sit there and say that isn’t fair, it means you have your U.S. hat on again,” says Pritchard. “Look at it from the Chinese viewpoint. Why should they keep buying western airplanes from Boeing and Airbus? Why don’t they develop their own industry? Even if they supply their only own market for the first 20 years, there is demand for 3,800 single aisle airplanes that will keep them busy for the next 10 or 15 years just by themselves.”

Even a country like Mexico has been growing its aerospace sector. There are now 27,000 aerospace workers in Mexico. “Where did they come from?” Pritchard asks. “What are the reasons to set up aerospace suppliers in Mexico? Skilled labor? No, they don’t have any skilled labor. Supplier cluster infrastructure? No, they don’t have a supply infrastructure? Any natural resources you need to have? No. There is nothing there to have an aerospace cluster other than a company’s desire to take lower end work there and now they are moving up the chain.

Even a country like Mexico has been growing its aerospace sector. There are now 27,000 aerospace workers in Mexico. “Where did they come from?” Pritchard asks. “What are the reasons to set up aerospace suppliers in Mexico? Skilled labor? No, they don’t have any skilled labor. Supplier cluster infrastructure? No, they don’t have a supply infrastructure? Any natural resources you need to have? No. There is nothing there to have an aerospace cluster other than a company’s desire to take lower end work there and now they are moving up the chain.

And once it is outsourced, it never comes back.” To reverse the outsourcing and importing trends, and encourage American commercial aircraft suppliers to be- come active in the global supply chain, Pritchard says the U.S. government needs to adopt an industrial policy that focuses on “repayable launch aid.” This aid “could be similar to the terms of the 1992 EU-U.S. Large Aircraft Agreement that includes limited direct government sup- port to 33 percent of development costs; support given to programs likely to repay the loan in 17 years; and re- payments that are based on a per-plane basis rather than at the end of the loan,” Pritchard writes. “The main advantage for the U.S. government support to its commercial aircraft suppliers with repayable launch aid is that the U.S. could receive back royalties which could exceed the loans given to the suppliers.

This is in contrast to current governments’ support of tax incentives being given to the industry which are never paid back.” This is especially important now that the WTO is expected to rule that many of the incentives provided to Boeing by the federal, state and local governments have been illegal subsidies. The ruling will likely have ramifications for other industries in the United States that are being subsidized by taxpayers. Even the government bailout of GM could be considered an illegal WTO subsidy.

Funding Concerns over 787

“Great, Boeing won the battle over Airbus and U.S. industry lost the war,” says Pritchard. “Does that case open the door to more filings against U.S. companies? It’s too early to say, but we need to look at the big picture here before we start attacking the rest of the world.” There is little chance that the U.S. government will confront China over its aerospace industrial policies “because it would be suicide for other industries that work with China,” he says. “It could be argued that the market should pick the winners and losers, [but] with the presence of foreign governments pumping billions of dollars into their commercial aircraft industries, the success for the U.S. commercial aircraft supply chain hinges in large part of the U.S. government moving to an industrial policy.”