SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

From the Sea to the Sea: Power Projection and “Withdrawal”

Posted on October 15, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

10/15/2010

The Hon. Ed Timperlake on the role of power projection forces in supporting U.S. obligations and interests when effecting a strategic withdrawal.

Amphibious Assault Vehicles with AAV platoon, Battalion Landing Team 1/7, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit,
maneuver toward the USS Denver off the coast of Okinawa, Japan, Sept. 7, 2010
(Credit: http://www.marines.mil/unit/31stmeu/pages/photos.aspx?Page=11)

10/15/2010 – It was said that when the last Marine F-4 on August 15th, 1973 pulled off target and after dropping the last bombs to stop the Khmer Rouge from taking over Cambodia, the call went out: “That’s it: see you next war.”

Tragically, the “next war” was executing on of the most difficult of military operations in the tactical handbook: evacuating forces out of combat. It was specifically tragic because the U.S. Congress cut off all funds in 1975 to support the South Vietnamese in their attempt to roll back a 17 Division invasion from the North. Once Congress said not to any more funds, the fall of South Vietnam became inevitable.

It was not a military defeat as much as a political defeat and that is how a democracy can and does work.

Previously, the North Vietnamese had tried to invade the south in the famous Easter Offensive of 1972. It became a huge mistake and military setback for the NVA Army, because USAF, USN and USMC air power decimated their attack. But by 1975, Congress had stopped the use of any U.S. air in providing offensive support missions for the South Vietnamese regime.

North Vietnamese T59 tank captured by South Vietnamese 20th Tank Regiment,
south of Dong Ha, Quang Tri province, Vietnam, during the 1972 Easter Offensive
(Credit: http://www.olive-drab.com/od_history_vietnam_easter1972.php)

Consequently, during the last days of Saigon, Marine unites arriving from the sea could only arrange to help as many Vietnamese as possible evacuate to the sea. Boat people and the Cambodian holocaust were yet to come as the U.S. was making an attempt in April 1975 to rescue those Vietnamese we had a debt of honor to pay. Sadly that debt was not fully repaid.

When most military authors write about amphibious operations they do not focus at all on the “withdrawal” dynamic, and certainly with no consideration of coalition engagement and “leave-behind” obligations to support allies shaped within engagement operations.

Normally, analysts of amphibious operations tend to focus on the offensive or the insertion of force. Some describe historical failures such as Gallipoli, Zeebrugge and Dieppe. While the majority go into great detail appropriately describing unbelievable courage and, at times, costly success, Guadalcanal, and all USMC island hoping campaigns in the Pacific and USMC landing at Inchon in the Korean war are excellent historical examples.

In the World War II European Theater, the U.S. Army, British, Canadians, Free French and other allies liberated a continent from Nazi tyranny starting with one of the most successful amphibious operations in history at Normandy.

Offensive operations from the Sea are complex and dangerous, because you literally begin with one Marine or Trooper and build from that person. “Defensive” operations are even more complex and dangerous because your forces are declining as you withdraw, not building up for insertion.

Historically, “the Miracle at Dunkirk” is often looked at as the epic operation to evacuate a force to the sea while under fire. The saving of the British Army be Royal Navy and civilian ships was a key building block for the eventual return to Europe and to the defeat of the Nazis. Dunkirk would not have been possible without two elements coming together: sealift and air superiority provided by the RAF over the withdrawal area.

As mentioned before, Inchon is considered an historic event in successful USMC amphibious operations. But what needs also to be considered is what occurred after the famous breakout to the sea from the “Frozen Chosen” Reservoir in what is now still North Korea.

Marines move toward evacuation ships at Hungnam harbor in December, 1950, as the United Nations abandons northeast Korea. (Credit: U.S. Army photo, http://www.bevinalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm)

The 1^st Marine Division was surrounded and outnumbered by six battle hardened Chinese Divisions and they successfully fought their way to Hungnam Harbor. Protected by Naval gunfire and thanks to the USAF engaging in MIG Alley, the Marines were successfully pulled out. As a nice touch, they left blowing up the harbor.

Then the next generation of Marines was called into as Saigon was falling to provide a withdrawal to the sea. Navy/Marine amphibious forces, once again under an air umbrella, saved thousands of Vietnamese.

Bottom line: what can go in from the Sea with a Navy/Marine AF team can also be withdrawn. Allies to whom we owe a debt can be evacuated or protected from the sea.

These possibilities remain important for our current global commitments and operations. And with the 21^st century con-ops provided by the MV-22, the Harrier and then the F-35B, the Marines can engage in providing capabilities for such situations.

The U.S. Naval Institute in an excellent and timely narrative on recent USN and USMC anti-piracy operations describes three concurrent activities by a Marine expeditionary Unit.

The Navy and USMC team recaptured a ship, while also conducting combat operations in a war and concurrently providing humanitarian relief. It would be hard to find a better value investment for global operations than such combined and flexible capabilities.

A number of key lessons learned should therefore guide our judgments about some key desired elements for the evolution of future power projection capabilities.

The current U.S. Congress and Administration, notably Secretary Gates, are publically discussing the future of the USMC. Aided and abetted by ignorance of some writing in the media (a recent Newsweek piece comes to mind), the entire concept of USN/USMC amphibious forces is being challenged. And, in the UK deliberations on the future of their forces, a key target are amphibious forces.

The challenge comes in two forms. One is an assertion of strategic vulnerability and, hence, irrelevance, and the second, a result of congruent drawdowns and cuts.

First, there are those who argue that enemy capabilities are becoming so deadly that U.S. forces afloat might be considered “wasting assets.” This claim which is rarely contested needs to be addressed and will be addressed in a future column.

The second challenge is a result of the confluence of several Administration initiatives: the drawdown in Iraq, the proposed post-surge withdrawal from Afghanistan and a significant cut in the US air and naval force structures.

The second challenge ignores the residual engagement of withdrawing force and the continuing obligations to allies forged for many years of operations. There is a never forgotten moral obligation the U.S. owes to those Iraqi and Afghan forces and citizens that trusted and supported the U.S. and its coalition partners during a decade of combat engagements.

Once the US and its allies draw down ground combat elements, air power can help keep the fanatical killers at bay to some extent. But ultimately, air power only goes so far. We owe it to our Iraqi and Afghan allied forces and their Nation’s civilians to have available in close proximity a rapid reaction force. Such a force needs to combine combat and humanitarian relief in a 21^st century hybrid insertion of boots on the ground in all rugged terrain, which is a hallmark of the evolving capabilities of the amphib force.

Since we are getting ready to drawdown in Iraq and to leave Afghanistan, what about those villagers and people in enclaves that trust us? A MEU is a 9/11 force in readiness that can make sure that we can demonstrate that we have not forgotten the Vietnam result or the Cambodian Holocaust.

Insertion of an offshore MEU to defend a village or evacuate threatened allies to safe havens is a lasting debt. And this obligation becomes part of our staying power in a region, which will remain central to the U.S. even after significant removal of ground forces. The MEU allows us to have available a combat blocking force on the ground as an enemy begins to mass and concentrate forces and have a lift as necessary to relocate them to safe havens.

A MEU backed by a Carrier Battle Group (CBG) can easily bring enough firepower and Marines on the ground and lift so innocents are not massacred. This debt of honor backed by an ever ready Navy/Marines afloat and AF Air Power on station can and should last as a key element of the regional calculation.

The next Congress should view a strong and agile military power projection force of a MEU, CBG and expeditionary USAF assets as a legacy force for good. U.S. power projection in the Gulf can and will save lives and demonstrate the presence of tools to support friendly forces and elements in the region.

If not, we would see once gain an old cliché coming into play: even worse than being America’s enemy is being our ally in an unpopular war.

The Future of C2

Posted on October 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin

10/09/2010

A French View

By General Jean-Patrick Gaviard

10/09/2010 – This article, released here with the permission of its author, has been published previously by DSI magazine.

Credit photo: C2ISR/CAOC, Air Force Network Integration Center,
USAF(www.afnic.af.mil)

After initially describing the “classic” operation of air command and control centers (C2) of yesterday and today, a more prospective vision of the C2 of the future will be developed in a second part. The vision will be within a more transverse framework and therefore more joint and interministerial highlighting the specific capabilities of airpower. A final part will focus on the men who will obviously be at the heart of the C2 operations of tomorrow.

The Operation of the “Traditional” C2
During the famous “Battle of Britain”, the Air Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding was commanding and controlling the air operations from his center of Stanmore, located north of London by unknowingly “spinning” the famous wheel: “Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action” (“OODA”) to be modeled much later by Colonel Boyd of the USAF, and which still prevails in the functioning of existing centers.

During the Second World War, "the officers and NCOs, in place in the Stanmore C2 'observed' at first the elements coming from different air watches posted on the English coast and from radars.... This phase made it possible to alert the pilots of the famous Spitfire and the anti-aircraft guns affected by the attack to come." (Credit photo: The Philip Alexander Air, Sea, Land & Fantasy Art Exhibit, www.rb-29.net) — During the Second World War, “the officers and NCOs, in place in the Stanmore C2 ‘observed’ at first the elements coming from different air watches posted on the English coast and from radars…. This phase made it possible to alert the pilots of the famous Spitfire and the anti-aircraft guns affected by the attack to come.” (Credit photo: The Philip Alexander Air, Sea, Land & Fantasy Art Exhibit, www.rb-29.net)

Therefore, the officers and the NCOs, in particular women (the WAAF), in place in the Stanmore C2 “observed ” at first the elements coming from different air watches posted on the English coast and from radars whose essential role in the success of this air battle will not be told enough. From those observations, officials could “steer” the action to come and then “decide” about the engagement plan. Specifically, this phase made it possible to alert the pilots of the famous Spitfire and the anti-aircraft guns affected by the attack to come, and to warn the units in charge of deploying balloons whose role was to interfere with German bombers shots on London. Finally, the control orders corresponding to the “action” phase were launched to stop the air raids detected previously. Everyone remembers the “scramble” or take off on alert of the very brave young British fighter pilots to whom Winston Churchill made a strong and moving tribute at the end of this historic air battle. In summary, the loop “OODA” turned overall as we are turning it today in modern C2. We also understand the fundamental role played by central command in this battle even if, traditionally, the Spitfire pilots are the ones credited with the success rather than its valiant orchestrator Air Marshal H. Dowding. Air Marshall happened to be sacked a few months later, for reasons of internal rivalries in the British High Command. Today, as a just reward, the Stanmore Center was opened to the public to pay tribute to Sir Dowding and to the C2 of the Battle of Britain.

The basic principles of C2 operation persist. But today in the face of asymmetric warfare, three new factors must be taken into account: the comprehensive approach, the tempo of operations, and the collateral damages.

Since September 11, 2001 the C2 in charge of “air defense” over the country have focused primarily on the terrorist threat type described as “renegade” by NATO. Thus, intelligence, which has become paramount in this new war against terrorism, requires a more transverse work, that is to say, more interdepartmental. Within the National Air Operations Center (“Centre National des Opérations Aériennes: CNOA”) of Lyon, for example, representatives of the Ministry of Interior and of the General Delegation to Civil Aviation (“Délégation Générale à l’Aviation Civile: DGAC”) have to play the interface with their department to increase interministerial synergy.

This transverse work allows the insertion of all state actors involved in the fight against terrorism in the same informative loop and to act more effectively. The “air policing”, more specifically, needs to anticipate the actions given the speed of the aircrafts and the fleeting nature of the threat, to engage resources on time and to inform the national policy maker, who in this case remains the sole judge of opening fire if necessary. In this context, bilateral agreements with France’s neighboring countries were signed to enhance this essential anticipation of action.

Meanwhile, in the C2 in charge of air operations over foreign theaters, particularly in Afghanistan, asymmetric warfare has now resulted in an acceleration of the tempo of operations. The principles of observation reinforced with evolved ISR systems remain here very relevant. Furthermore, more relevant targeting capabilities coupled with information exchange based on a Rover system, for example, between land and air components enable us to act with greater precision, while integrating the rays of lethality of the weapons on board. We must, indeed, know how to take into account the collateral damage that is routinely used by opponents via the media to influence public opinion. Thus, in some cases, the tactical air controller in contact with the ground troops (JTAC) can re-specify the target coordinates or, given the environment, cancel the shooting initially envisioned, and choose more appropriate courses of action, non lethal, such as “show of force”, for example.

But this work marked by the conduct in real time is not enough anymore. We must now “observe” even faster and in a smarter way to be able to make time to “orient” and “decide” that is to say, plan ahead and to “act” more accurately and therefore more efficiently in time and space.

During the Second World War, General Marshall admitted that if “40% of the art of command was based on the ability to improvise,” he also stressed that “60% resided in the ability to anticipate.”

The C2 of the Future
Current operations combine the joint modes of action through effects to be produced decided by the theater commander (“Joint Task Force”, JTF). In this increasingly joint context we can attempt to categorize different types of missions assigned to air power. This categorization provides insight into the role of “supporting” and “supported” played by the Air Component Commander (ACC) with other commanders, according to the effects desired by the JTF. These different categories can be described, for example, in descending order of their level of joint integration. If this hypothesis is accepted, then we can distinguish three categories of missions assigned to air power, ranging from the most joint mission to the most specifically air one:

Joint support operations

Control of the air

Deep operations.

Joint support operations are today at the center of missions assigned to air power in Afghanistan. In this area, we must significantly improve the very centralized work procedures between the land and air components to anticipate future actions.

Air operations have been, since the end of World War I, primarily designed and controlled centrally and executed in a decentralized manner.

For reasons related mainly to their own characteristics and to the targets allocated to them by the theater commander, air operations are planned today in a very centralized way. The versatility of modern airborne delivery reinforces this centralization. Thus, in 2003, U.S. forces often used the same F15E and F16 aircrafts based in the Gulf emirates to act in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s for this historical reason that air operations related to operations Iraqi Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan are still lead from a single C2 located on the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

“The air operations related to operations Iraqi Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan
are still lead from a single C2 located on the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.”

Credit photo: Al Udeid base, http://gc.nautilus.org

However, this hyper-centralization may be woefully inadequate when it comes to missions in direct support of ground forces. These missions are currently planned in “series” by the land first then air officials, and not in an integrated manner. Thus, the air-ground coordination in Afghanistan weights primarily on the “shoulders” of a tactical air controller (JTAC) who must, in case of an emergency request, finely describe, under fire, the complex situation on the ground to pilots who came to assist and with all the difficulties that we can imagine including fratricide kills. However, we can imagine solving this difficult problem more effectively by a collaborative work of integrated planning done well in advance between the concerned tactical air and land units. This decentralized and more appropriate planning can only be achieved if the concerned tactical leaders have at their disposition better collaborative working tools and a relevant land and air “situation assessment” that can be found today at the central C2 level in order to act knowingly.

One can easily imagine that thanks to modern means of communication, we will soon be able to “move” the situation assessment to the tactical level and therefore “decentralize” the planning of some joint support air missions.

However, the air commander will obviously be able to “regain control” if the situation required it in order to redistribute the tasks according to new desired effects. The air commander’s responsibilities would therefore be, in this case, more toward monitoring than strict control under the “command and control sense, allowing it to stand back from events in real time, at a tactical level.

Mastery of the third dimension is total in Afghanistan. We must not, however, deduce consequences too hastily regarding future operations. Everyone remembers the tragic bombing carried out in 2004 against French forces in Bouake (Ivory Coast). The mastery of this third dimension or aerospace is often wrongly forgotten. But without air superiority, there is no “freedom of action” for the other forces, primarily terrestrial. One can easily imagine what operations in Afghanistan could be like without the full control of the sky available to the coalition forces today. Regarding the control of the airspace itself, it is clear that the air commander has recognized expertise in that field. Indeed, in most operations, the joint theater commander gives from the outset this responsibility to the air commander. Beyond the full responsibility, we must also understand the need to coordinate in the same airspace, the means used by other components, especially helicopters and drones. It is not about interfering with the tasks assigned by another command but rather to coordinate actions in the third dimension with a main goal of security and more particularly of anti-crash.

Without air superiority, there is no ‘freedom of action’ for the other forces, primarily terrestrial. One can easily imagine what operations in Afghanistan could be like without the full control of the sky available to the coalition forces today.

Finally, tomorrow the C2 vested in the anti-missile ballistic defense (AMBD) will have to act seamlessly with the C2s responsible for air defense to coordinate the production of the different aerospace effects. There clearly is, in fact, a common “DNA” between these two C2.

In-depth operations characterize in a unique way the aerospace power. Indeed, only aerospace power can provide policy makers with strategic information, weigh on the opponent, and deliver effects within hours anywhere in the world with a minimal or even absent footprint. The long-distance exercises called “Iroquois”, conducted by the Command of Air Defense and Air Operations (CDAOA) using Rafales equipped with cruise missiles accompanied by an Awacs, tankers and equipped with means of long distance communication illustrate this unique strategic capability. Indeed, this COMAO (“Composite Air Operation”) can not only move towards its initially programmed destination but can also be recalled or diverted in flight at any time based on the strategic effects desired by the policymaker.

In a more prospective way, work undertaken by the command of NATO Transformation (SACT) in Norfolk regarding future air C2 highlight the need to develop collaborative work with other components or with interdepartmental agencies or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

This collaboration can be achieved by relying on robust and meshed communication networks to create “a C2 constellation” with the needed situation assessment to plan at the required level and in a transverse way missions with other components, other government departments or NGOs if needed, as it was previously presented.

On another level, “rare” capacities management among several theaters of operations has also emerged. Strategic transport, cyber defense, use of MALE type UAS, anti-missile ballistic defense, and satellites are part of those capabilities that go beyond the specific regional context in essence.

These capabilities are highly strategic and will likely remain under the command and control of countries that provide these resources to benefit the Alliance. As a corollary, they probably will not be put under the command or the direct control of a NATO C2. It is therefore appropriate to consider a new fundamental principle of unity of effects. In this context, the “air C2 inter theaters” will have the responsibility of managing and coordinating those strategic assets but without having direct control over them.

CASPOA seal (Credit image: Minstre de Défense, la France)

In summary, we know that if the command keeps all its relevance through production of effects, the control is changing in favor of a more collaborative vision. It should be noted that General Mattis, the predecessor of General Abrial as head of the General Staff of NATO Transformation in Norfolk, preferred to use the term “feedback” rather than “control”. The C2 acronym may therefore gradually evolve from the term “command and control” to “command and coordination” and to “command and collaboration.” Note, finally, that the current work focused on new concepts of C2 air will, undoubtedly, have a direct impact on land and sea and of course joint C2 organizations.

The Men: Toward a New Generation CASPOA
Beyond all these conceptual issues and the exponential advances in information technology, it should be borne in mind that men are and will remain at the center of the device. General Montgomery emphasized this point by defining the command as: “the ability and willingness to rally men and women around a common goal.” Cultural change and training will therefore remain central to driving these transformations.

The C2 are real weapon systems and must thus receive appropriate training methods, what had been fully understood by the Air Force officials who had already created more than fifteen years ago the Centre of Analysis and Simulation for Preparation of Air Operations (“CASPOA”)dedicated to the training of all personnel serving in the Air C2.

To anticipate the advances in terms of C2, the CDAOA already works at a New Generation (NG) CASPOA. The path is now marked.

“The air operations related to operations Iraqi Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan are still lead from a single C2 located on the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.”
(Credit photo: Al Udeid base, http://gc.nautilus.org)

“Re-norming” Air Operations (Part One)

Posted on October 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin

“Re-norming” the Asymmetric Advantage in Air Dominance: “Going to War with the Air Force You Have” (Part One)

By Michael W. Wynne

21st Secretary of the U.S. Air Force

10/08/2010 – In this piece, Secretary Wynne identifies ways to leverage new technologies to “re-norm” air operations to assure U.S. and allied air dominance in the challenging period ahead. The piece will appear in three postings, this being the first. Upon the publication of the third, a special report containing the full presentation will be available for download to Second Line of Defense readers.

***

The F-117, which has been retired, was a key strike asset.
Credit photo: http://www.usafnukes.com

Secretary Rumsfeld, in one of his philosophic comments said, “You go to war with the Army you have; not the Army you want.” I would suggest a similar approach to understanding our capabilities for future concepts of air operations and making modifications to accommodate them.

A realistic look at the future of Air Operations must take into account the size of the force, the capabilities of the force and the evolving construct of the future weapons available; and then we can place against this template of available forces against what technologies would or could maximize their utility to a combatant commander. There has been steady erosion in the quantity of aircraft being made available to allied Air Forces around the world. For the past several generations of development, we have substituted combat qualities for enhanced quantities within each platform.

To deal with declining numbers (“quantity has a quality all of its own”) calls for imagination and innovation in thinking about future investments and concepts of joint operations. We need to leverage technology trends; and picking strategies that our ground combat commanders have used historically, to restore the unfair fight, and ensure that we have superiority at the point of the spear.

At the same time, we must focus on ways to minimize the probability for failure; while we maximize our probability of success. We may be longing for the days of large numbers of combat platforms, but now must consider where we are and what is the real, not desired trends affecting deployable capability.

We cannot rely on the ability to quickly accelerate our industrial capacity as we have done in the past. We must consider the fact that the speed of war has increased, and that the time necessary to field new technology marvels has increased. We must take to heart Secretary Rumsfeld’s comment and begin to design a future plan that allows for erosion in our “asymmetric” advantage.

To deal with declining numbers (“quantity has a quality all of its own”) calls for imagination and innovation in thinking about future investments and concepts of joint operations. We need to leverage technology trends; and picking strategies that our ground combat commanders have used historically, to restore the unfair fight, and ensure that we have superiority at the point of the spear. At the same time, we must focus on ways to minimize the probability for failure; while we maximize our probability of success. We may be longing for the days of large numbers of combat platforms, but now must consider where we are and what is the real, not desired trends affecting deployable capability. We cannot rely on the ability to quickly accelerate our industrial capacity as we have done in the past. We must consider the speed of war has increased, and the time necessary to field new technology marvels has increased.

Building such CONOPs is rooted in more data sharing and more integrated tactics. We need to reach into the ground commander’s kit; and consider shaping air versions of forward observers, weapons teams and spotters to assist with targeting; and to provide for layered offenses to match layered defenses.

In other words, as we shift from older notions of our capabilities for air superiority, how do we shape dominance on the battlefield? But what must be understood, as General Corley has forcefully underlined in his interview, is that, without air superiority, it is impossible for the joint warfighter to operate at all or effectively in projecting global power.

Realists point out that if you want to know the armed forces capability ten years hence, you must look around today. Even Germany’s Blitzkrieg capability was minimal in 1940; in many ways it was an aspiring template relative to the bulk of their deployed forces; some of which was still horse drawn and supplied. Indeed, if one looks carefully at Leni Riefenstahl’s masterpiece “The Triumph of the Will,” one sees as many horses as tanks in the propaganda film.

Unless actions are quickly taken, the structure of America’s capability to provide the kind of air dominance in a future fight will decline, even dramatically. And with this decline will come reduced freedom of action for our allies as well.

The size of the air arms of the U.S. forces is clearly going down. Current Air Force plans call for standing down 250 fourth generation tactical fighters as the transition to the complement of 185 F-22. This represents a total inventory and not an operational inventory that is closer to 150. Added to this are an emerging, but undetermined and as yet un-deployed, total of F-35 fighters.

Fifth generation air will slowly grow with deliveries and the Marines will push the AV8 out of their inventory as the STOVL F-35 sparks their imagination regarding CONOPS. Navy has asked to invest further into fourth generation fighters, as their F-35 CV version goes through the testing phase and they worry for the viability of their aging carrier Air Fleet and see the need to populate the carrier decks.

Lt General Deptula’s depiction of the challenge to the offense posed by growing defensive capabilities.
Credit: Airpower Evolution briefing, April 14, 2010

Clearly, the resultant structure of U.S. airpower will be a mixed fleet of fifth generation and fourth generation fighter aircraft for an indefinite period. And several specialized capabilities central to past successes are eliminated or rapidly aging. Of the aircraft that the American military used to penetrate the air defenses in Iraq in 2003, the F-117 has been grounded and the B-2 continues to age with reduced capability to penetrate air defenses that are increasingly sophisticated. Adversary defenses have not remained static; integrated air defenses are now becoming much more effective and much more mobile. The strategic trajectory is to update defenses with regard both to range and maneuverability. Competitors have complemented these defenses with upgrades of their own air fleet using a mixture of calibrated 4.5 generation technologies.

Front view of the aircraft (Credit photo: http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/showthread.php/8276-PAK-FA-Post-First-Flight-Developments!-Putin-visits-PAK-FA?p=121035&viewfull=1) — Front view of the Sukho T-50 PAK FA (Credit photo: http://www.defenceforum.in)

Competitors are introducing near fifth generation capabilities, such as the new Russian fighters, and others are shaping new generation missiles for their own use and export. The Chinese will be able to project power simply by exporting missiles to various developing states and can certainly up the ante in any Middle East confrontation.

The mission concerning air dominance is unyielding and will continue to call on our brave pilots to hold hostage targets anywhere in the world: to do so requires an ability to penetrate integrated air defenses, and along the way to deter or defeat enemy air.

This puts CONOPS pressure on the other elements of the combat air force. The refuelers or tankers become essential to power projection. But they are not being replaced in a timely fashion. Other approaches may be necessary such as developing the concept of drop tanks for fifth generation aircraft as the sortie to the battle zone; thus allowing tankers added discretion. But compensating for missing tanker platforms by such means is not optimal.

We need to take a hardheaded look at what we have to execute the air dominance mission; and therefore complement the ability of the combatant commander to succeed by extending well into the 21st century America’s control of the skies. We cannot continue to assume a dominance which has been built by past investments, absent a robust engagement to shape capabilities for the future.

We need to look into the benefits of the current investment and the technologies, which are or can be brought to bear seriously to level the fight. I have a philosophy that if America is ever in a fair fight; we have suffered from bad planning. Though this stemmed from the clear asymmetric advantage that has been whittled away, coupled with the Clausewitzian advantage always granted to defenders. What then are the available platforms and technologies that we have invested in to date? And how can we shape effective Concepts of Operations for a Joint and Combined Air Strike Force, which leverage these capabilities?

We need to look into the benefits of the current investment and the technologies, which are or can be brought to bear seriously to level the fight. I have a philosophy that if America is ever in a fair fight; we have suffered from bad planning. Though this stemmed from the clear asymmetric advantage that has been whittled away, coupled with the Clausewitzian advantage always granted to defenders. What then are the available platforms and technologies that we have invested in to date? And how can we shape effective Concepts of Operations for a Joint and Combined Air Strike Force, which leverage these capabilities?

Building the F35C

Posted on October 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

Following Up With Armando Martinez, Lockheed Martin

Armando Martinez was recently the completion supervisor for the BF-4 or the 4th F35-B; he is now the completion supervisor for the first build of the F35-C, or the naval version of the F-35.

[slidepress gallery=’building-the-f35c’]

Credit: Lockheed Martin, Fort Worth, Texas, September 15th, 2010

10/09/2010 –SLD: When we last talked, you were working on the F-35B. You are now working on the F35-C, the first of the carrier-based F-35s. Could you talk to me about the experience level of your flight line team?

Armando Martinez: My crew ranges anywhere from 24 years experience all the way to 30 years experience on combat aircraft. So I have a lot of experience, especially when it comes to working on the F-16s. Of course, with the new JSF, the average experience on the aircraft is three to four years. Maintenance wise, unless they come from the plant, which is an assembly line, but we’re flight lining, they’re more specialized, and their experience is working just about everything. They’re not just structured, they’re just not engine hydraulics, or electrical. They work fuel, they work every system, and they have to when it comes to the flight line. So, being in the flight line, we’re in a unique area where we have to finish the build, and then get the final product to the customer, and make sure we bring back a pilot safe and happy.

SLD: As you were explaining, a couple of major differences working on the C versus the B or the A are the nature of the wings and obviously, the strength of the undercarriage for landing a carrier.

Armando Martinez: One difference is the size of the aircraft; the size of the aircraft is immense compared to the other models. And of course, you’ve got the wings, they fold in or like I said, they fold up. That’s to make sure they can get up into the aircraft area for maintenance when it’s inside the aircraft carrier itself. Another difference are the main landing gear. The landing gear are immense. Size, you know, conditions the strength to hold that weight because they got to get on the aircraft carrier. They have to be strong to handle the continuous pounding and flying to perform the Navy’s mission. Basically everything else is the same, the seats are the same. The actuators are the same, besides the wing fold. So these are some of the similarities.

One difference is the size of the aircraft; the size of the aircraft is immense compared to the other models. And of course, you’ve got the wings, they fold in or like I said, they fold up. That’s to make sure they can get up into the aircraft area for maintenance when it’s inside the aircraft carrier itself. Another difference are the main landing gear. The landing gear are immense.

SLD: An additional difference is that unlike the AF or USMC version, this initial Navy aircraft is being build fully missionized, isen’t correct?

Armando Martinez: Yes, the first aircraft that’s scheduled to hit the aircraft carrier is fully instrumented and missionized. One of the objectives is to be in a position to record just about all kinds of information, from the weather at sea to performance of the aircraft. They want to record all that information, plus the performance of the mission systems for the software they’re loading on the aircraft.

General Deptula on the Challenges to US Air Superiority

Posted on October 8, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

10/08/2010

10/08/2010 – The recently retired USAF chief intelligence officer recently warned of the impending loss of US air superiority.

In a presentation to the recently completed Air Force Association annual conference, the General outlined how he viewed the various challenges to US air superiority and how these challenges interacted to create a significant reduction in air power capability. These slides are presented here in the slide show below.

[slidepress gallery=’general-deptula-on-the-challenges-to-us-air-superiority’]

A video was also presented at the conference, which underscored some of General Deptula’s points. An excerpted version is presented below.

Credit: Air Force Association, September 2010

The challenges are real and we have discussed these in various ways on the website: Ambassador Glassman provided an overview on the challenges posed by new air defenses , while Richard Weitz has discussed the new Russian aircraft as well.

The USAF is becoming more like the US Coast Guard: the USCG surges its assets against a problem and the surge leaves significant gaps. The USAF is increasingly unable to provide for global air superiority capabilities: it is moving towards the surge paradigm, with gaps left in the wake of the surge. The addition of new aircraft will require a significant investment in changing the culture to facilitate distribute operations, and in the systems that make the continuous engagement capabilities of the new aircraft a paradigm changer. Buying F-22s and F-35s is a beginning, but just that.

The Osprey: Bedrock For Con-Ops Change (I)

Posted on October 8, 2010 | by SysAdmin

New River Update on the Osprey: Osprey Speed and Range Enables Change

10/08/2010 – In an SLD interview with Captain Dwyer, the Osprey pilot discussed his time with the MEU after leaving Haiti. The USS Nassau on which Captain Dwyer was deployed first went to Haiti (which will be discussed next week) and then left for the Gulf of Aden after the Haiti engagement. During his time on board the USS Nassau, the Marine Expeditionary Group executed some new tactical opportunities associated with the use of the Osprey. The speed of the Osprey allows it to work more effectively with fast jets, which allowed the commander to split the MEU into a rotorcraft supported fleet and a fast jet and Osprey supported fleet. By splitting the MEU, the commander gains significant operational flexibility, but without loss of the integrity for the operation. This provides a solid bedrock in preparation for the inclusion of the F-35B with the fleet, anticipating a time when the Osprey and F-35B operate together, enabling the three dimensional warrior.

Captain Dwyer: After Haiti, we started heading east and we went to the Gulf of Aden and from there, we were operating out of Djibouti. We actually split the MEU, the entire MEU, which I don’t believe, had been done before in specific type model series, so all of the skids, the Hueys and Cobras were on one ship and they were almost autonomous. They pretty much got to do different things than the ones they were scheduled to do with different countries under the umbrella of the 24th MEU, but didn’t impact our actual operations. The 53s, that are grounded in Djibouti, hopped off the Nassau as soon as we got in there, so it was really an AV-8 and V-22 show for four and a half to five months.

SLD: Because you have operated solely flying the Osprey, you come at the question of the potentials with a fresh eye. Is this an opportunity to shape a new relationship with fast jets and to re-shape con-ops?

Captain Dwyer: I saw so much potential for the short take-off vertical landing attack aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft and the V-22 working together. In the future, I would have those two, the V-22 and F-35 working very closely together and even for extended operations when you add the refueling piece. The paring of these two aircraft are far better than paring the V-22 with any of the helicopters.

I saw so much potential for the short take-off vertical landing attack aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft and the V-22 working together. In the future, I would have those two, the V-22 and F-35 working very closely together and even for extended operations when you add the refueling piece. The paring of these two aircraft are far better than paring the V-22 with any of the helicopters.

SLD: Is it because of speed?

Captain Dwyer: Because of speed, range. And not only that. It’s the endurance of the aircraft itself. Basically you might say once it’s flying, it’s flying. And we had a lot of missions that required flight time above six hours, which is very taxing for the jet guys and for us, it is as well, but maybe not so bad because we can trade off in the cockpit. The fact is that you can have airborne assets, both as a package as well as a trap for sensitive site exploitations, being airborne all at the same time for hours at a time to respond to something that happens in the AOR. It will give you the maximum flexibility for response time down to something like thirty minutes, depending on where it is. And then sanitize the scene from there and then everybody returns home. It’s a capability that I’m not going to say it’s been overlooked but it just hasn’t been utilized like that.

SLD: This provides the capability to insert and withdraw force both airborne and ground insertion.

Captain Dwyer: We just didn’t really have that capability before, especially on much longer ranges and in sort of response time. So by marrying those two, the fixed-wing aviation asset we can do operations differently. We could neutralize a target and then you can immediately have a strike team insert to confirm that whatever happen, happened, give whatever materials they need, get back on an aircraft and leave in under thirty minutes in any location that we’re operating on a 600-mile ring. This is just so amazing for me.

SLD: What changes to the ships would you make to facilitate Osprey ops?

Captain Dwyer: A bigger hangar. We would be big enough so that the V-22 could do a full range of maintenance inside the hangar.

SLD: What is the impact of replacing the F-35B with the Harrier?

Captain Dwyer: When you separate the V-22 and the fixed-wing striker you untether the range from the helicopters. So since we could put the V-22/F35B tandem on a different vessel, that vessel can go somewhere else and still be able to provide protection for the entire MEU because of speed, range and capabilities.

When you separate the V-22 and the fixed-wing striker you untether the range from the helicopters. So since we could put the V-22/F35B tandem on a different vessel, that vessel can go somewhere else and still be able to provide protection for the entire MEU because of speed, range and capabilities.

SLD: On another ship?

Captain Dwyer: On a different ship. We don’t have to accompany them at close range to provide support.

Ospreys from Marine Medium Tilt Rotor Squadron 162 (Reinforced),
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, quietly remain full stowed on the flight deck of USS Nassau
on January 19th, 2010 for their upcoming deployment
Credit photo: USN Visual Service, 1/21/10

SLD: So you would be supporting them, but at much greater range.

Captain Dwyer: Absolutely, or not only could we be supporting them but we could be supporting someone else at the same time that’s much farther away. The AV-8 or the F-35 and the V-22 give you great range. We have the opportunity, especially throughout the Mediterranean and also in the Middle East where you can take detachments from each of the squadrons or from each of those aircrafts to take some F-35s, take a couple of V-22s, put them on an airfield somewhere and support those separately. You’re not restricted to space yet you have the range to do other things and support those other smaller ships.

The Future of Power Projection: Déjà Vu—All Over Again

Posted on October 8, 2010 | by SysAdmin

By Hon. Ed Timperlake

10/08/2010 – As the United States Marines go through one of the cyclic challenges to their mission, it is interesting to look at the Navy/Marine team’s recent performance of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Navy/Marines forces in the Indian Ocean (IO) projected power from the sea using inherent “ready now” capabilities, in taking back a pirate-held ship. This audacious effort made global headlines. However, there was much more to that one exploit and the entire story really captures some USMC unique capabilities.

The opening narrative of this exploit by Captain Alexander Martin – “The Magellan Star: Pirate Takedown Force Recon Style” – was recently published by the US Naval Institute and says it all:

Over a 48 hour period, the 15^th MEU/PELARG team conducted offensive air operations in Afghanistan resulting in the deaths of 5 confirmed enemy fighters, provided disaster relief in Pakistan to 120 victims who had been without aid since July, and seized a pirated vessel, rescuing a crew of 11 hostages and detaining 9 suspected pirates off the coast of Somalia. A busy couple of days and an impressive battle-rhythm by any standard for this dynamic Navy-Marine Corps team.

This IO series of operations is just another successful operation in a long tradition of projecting power from the Sea. Battle hardened and ready to fight on a moment’s notice—as the Marine Hymn says– it is proven again and again as not just words but deeds:

We fight our country’s battles
In the air, on land, and sea

And let there be no mistake about geography…

We have fought in every clime
And place where we could take a gun
Credit photo: The Magellan Star, http://blog.usni.org

Compare the success being reported in Captain Martin’s write up with other authors who recently said in Newsweek that the Marines have to justify themselves to Secretary Gates, and then state:

The Marines launched their last amphibious invasion in Korea in 1950.

First, before any discussion of the future of the Navy/Marine team can be addressed, it has to be said that the ignorance of that statement is astonishing.

After the Korean War Inchon landing in 1950, the Marines landed a brigade-sized amphibious force into Lebanon in 1958, which brought almost a decade of stability to a very hot part of the world.

Then the Marines went ashore in force at Da Nang, South Vietnam, in March 1965 to begin fighting in some of the Corps most historic battles.

Finally, in endgame Vietnam, a Marine amphibious force had to evacuate South Vietnam citizens to off shore Naval forces in April 1975. In the tragic fall of Vietnam the Navy/Marine team using Marine helicopters saved countless lives. In fact, the last two American killed in the Vietnam War were two members of that force in April 1975, trying to save lives. One note from a historical perspective, “The Mayaguez Incident” did not turn out to be the last battle of the Vietnam War, but rather the first battle and a harbinger of today’s irregular conflicts that can break out at a moments notice.

Finally, still focusing on large scale Marine amphibious capabilities, a very sizeable Marine amphibious force was afloat and used as a diversion in Desert Storm to allow General Schwarzkopf to make his brilliant and legendary left hook and win the “100-hour war.” Even though Newsweek doesn’t get it, Sun Tsu, the genius writer on “The Art of War,” would understand completely when a faint is as good as an attack.

In endgame Vietnam, a Marine amphibious force had to evacuate South Vietnam citizens to off shore Naval forces in April 1975. In the tragic fall of Vietnam the Navy/Marine team using Marine helicopters saved countless lives. In fact, the last two American killed in the Vietnam War were two members of that force in April 1975, trying to save lives. One note from a historical perspective, “The Mayaguez Incident” did not turn out to be the last battle of the Vietnam War, but rather the first battle and a harbinger of today’s irregular conflicts that can break out at a moments notice.

Make no mistake: Marines, if not degraded, can continue to concentrate significant forces to strike anywhere anytime. However now it will get even better at the smaller MEU level because of innovative 21^st century capabilities. The Second Line of Defense interview with USMC Captain Dwyer, a V-22 pilot, captures the innovative thinking in the Marines about coming “bottoms up” from an operator. Captain Dwyer makes some very interesting and thoughtful points, which indeed foreshadow a significant strategic transition.The ability of a fighting force to emphasize and encourage both top down strategic innovations and also allow the operators to express their tactical views is a hallmark of the Marine way of war.

Flight deck crew members prepare an MV-22 Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 266,
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, for take off during flight operations aboard USS Kearsarge,
April 23, 2010 (Credit photo: USMC)

There is revolutionary aviation technology coming to the decks of Navy amphib ships which includes the emerging F-35, a V/STOL 5^th Generation Fighter, and the remarkable MV-22 Osprey. A Marine force afloat will have the most modern concentrated air/ground units in the world to meet all requirements for 21^st Century missions. Innovative thinking and long term planning by Marine leadership will now allow contingencies to be met across a spectrum of simultaneous challenges. From direct amphibious assaults, to flying hundreds of miles inland to project power, to providing relief in times of natural disasters the Marine Expeditionary Unit is ready.

There is revolutionary aviation technology coming to the decks of Navy amphib ships which includes the emerging F-35, a V/STOL 5^th Generation Fighter, and the remarkable MV-22 Osprey. A Marine force afloat will have the most modern concentrated air/ground units in the world to meet all requirements for 21^st Century missions. Innovative thinking and long term planning by Marine leadership will now allow contingencies to be met across a spectrum of simultaneous challenges. From direct amphibious assaults, to flying hundreds of miles inland to project power, to providing relief in times of natural disasters the Marine Expeditionary Unit is ready.

In fact, the disaster relief in Pakistan mentioned by Captain Martin is following remarkable relief efforts in the recent Haitian earthquake and also earlier efforts in the tsunami relief with the Navy/Marine team providing aid from off-shore ships to Indonesians.

Harriers aboard HMS Illustrious, 2007 (Credit photo: SLD)

Over time Marines afloat have been pioneering the correct mix of air/ground assets, training and tactics to handle many contingencies. A look at the history of the 22^nd Marine Amphibious—now renamed Expeditionary – Unit will show “from the Sea” capabilities to America. The 22^nd is but one of several Marine MEUs either afloat or training to relieve a rotating unit

A composite narrative taken from historical reporting:

On Oct. 18, 1983, the 22^nd MAU (name changed to MEU later) left for a deployment to the Med. Several days after embarkation, it was diverted for the Caribbean of Grenada. Following several days of fighting, the victorious Marines re-embarked and set sail for Lebanon. During Operation Urgent Fury the MAU participated with a number of helicopter and surface landings on the island of Grenada and eventually occupied over 75% of the island.

After 9/11 the 22nd MEU took part in several anti-terrorist missions in Central Command Theater. Combat mission included Afghanistan and Pakistan border and yet again Marines also launched life-saving humanitarian efforts in the African nation of Djibouti.

Finally. as mentioned earlier, significant Marine amphibious forces (elements of both 22^nd and 24^th MEU) with Navy ships in support became part of Operation Unified Response to the earthquake in Haiti.

A melding of the “three dimensional capabilities” of the F-35 with the range and speed of the MV-22 will revolutionize an MEU’s ability to attack from the sea. The vector of an insertion from a Navy/Marine combat force afloat can now cover huge distances. The ability to strike from a distance on many vectors combined with pre-insertion support from AF and Navy strategic strike capability along with UAS and emerging robots may for a very significant time, tilt the battle to the Marines favor.

Ensuring The Osprey’s Readiness: The VMM-264 At Work

Posted on October 8, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

An Update on the Osprey at New River Air Station, North Carolina

10/08/2010 –These photos were taken at the end of August 2010 during a visit to New River Air Station. Repair activities are here being conducted by VMM-264 technicians; some of the squadron’s Ospreys are also being shown on the tarmac.

[slidepress gallery=’osprey-at-new-river’]

Credit: SLD, New River Air Station, North Carolina, August 2010