10/08/2010 –These photos were taken at the end of August 2010 during a visit to New River Air Station. Repair activities are here being conducted by VMM-264 technicians; some of the squadron’s Ospreys are also being shown on the tarmac.
[slidepress gallery=’osprey-at-new-river’]
Credit: SLD, New River Air Station, North Carolina, August 2010
By Dr. Heinrich Matthee, Academic Head, Black Hall College London
Dr. Heinrich Matthee is a political and security risk analyst specializing on the Middle East and Muslim politics worldwide. Dr. Matthee has more than 14 years’ experience of advising governments, multinational companies and NGOs.
10/08/2010 – This article was originally posted in Strategic Insights, Number 24 (June 2010), published by Risk Intelligence.
Credit: Iranian Navy Operations, US Navy
Iran’s leadership has been under severe pressure during the past twelve months. Infighting among the political elite and persistent popular protests since the presidential elections of 12 June 2009 are still fuelling tensions. Outside Iran, the US has increased pressure, with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even raising the prospect of ‘crippling sanctions’.
What will the likely responses of Iran’s rulers be? Under what conditions would maritime actions become likely? Would they include a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40% of the world’s tradable oil flows?
Political turmoil
The protests against perceived manipulation of the election results in June 2009 at times involved an estimated hundred thousand demonstrators in the streets of central Tehran. Some Western media speculated that it was a Green Revolution that would sweep the current regime from power.
However, within ten days the government effectively stopped the protests from completely spiraling out of its control. While CNN was still broadcasting the same images of massive street demonstrations by late June, demonstrations were by then much smaller and limited to a few places in the big city of more than 8 million people.
The protests have recurred on Quds day on 18 September and the 13th of Aban on 4 November 2009. During Student Day and the Ashura festival in December protests occurred in several cities, including Esfahan, Tabriz and Mashhad. Protests also occurred on the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in February 2010.
The protests have by now changed into protests against parts of the Islamic system itself, reflecting a weaker legitimacy of the regime among parts of the Iranian electorate. However, the size of demonstrations has declined. While the government is less popular or accepted than before, the protesters have demonstrated that they simply do not have the ability to overthrow the government.
Credit table: Strategic InsightsAmong the factors that have resulted in this outcome are the impact of targeted suppressive measures, the exertion of the Supreme Leader’s authority and no split in the security forces. The lack of an armed underground movement, and the absence of a strong unified leadership and communication system among the protesters in disparate regions have also played a role.
Thus, even if the protest campaign cannot be crushed, it can at present be contained. Still, the outpouring of dissent has weakened the sense of control of the government. The political turmoil has amplified the divisions between and among different powerful elite factions. This state of affairs and a sense of being under siege are likely to influence policy responses to foreign pressure.
A Tough Government
The government itself may have a weaker hold on power than a year ago, but it can by no means be described as a pushover. In fact, it is dominated by tough pragmatists like the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the highest political authority, and policy hardliners around him, including president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Khamenei has increasingly relied on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps or Pasdaran, the elite para-military group of about 125,000 members established to protect the revolutionary project in 1979 and the most loyal part of the government apparatus.
Even before Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, the Supreme Leader had started reorganizing. Khamenei’s aim in this regard had been and has been to increase the resilience of the regime against foreign pressure and to expand the domestic reach of loyalists. His approach was influenced and supported by the appearance of a new generation among the political and military leadership, those who had been the foot soldiers of the Islamic revolution and the front soldiers of the Iran-Iraq war.
The power of the Pasdaran has expanded in the security domain, but also in politics and the economy. Khamenei will continue to rely on it as a mainstay of power during the current period of political turmoil.
Iran’s decision-makers will also remain under pressure from peers and intra-elite competitors not to appear ‘soft’ on issues threatening the Islamic system. Both structural and situational factors will therefore result in a preference for robust responses to both domestic and foreign pressure.
The Pasdaran, which also oversees Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, are likely to play an important role in such responses.
Geopolitical Competition
Since 1979, strategic competition has dominated relations between Iran on the one hand and the US, other Western powers and Israel on the other. For the time being, this strategic competition will continue. The Iranian leadership will continue trying to improve its existing political options or to create new ones. One means has been to build its military capability. This capability allows it to expand its influence and project its power against targets in Western Asia, the Gulf and the GCC states. It also serves to create or reinforce deterrence and intimidation. In addition, it limits or denies the military options of competing states.
In this regard, there are close links between several Iranian projects. The first is the upgrading of the military forces, seen for example in the launch of the first locally-developed destroyer, the Jamaran, at a ceremony attended by the Supreme Leader on February 2010. Other projects include its missile programs, its probable chemical and biological weapons capability and its nuclear program, which probably aims at the development of a civilian nuclear capability that could be weaponized at short notice. Iran’s emphasis on asymmetric warfare and its approach to maritime security should also be viewed in this context.
Iran’s Maritime Security in the Arabian Peninsular/Gulf
Maritime security forms an important part of Iran’s strategic position. The 600-mile-long Persian/Arabian Gulf is one of the most important waterways in the world. Almost 40% of the world’s traded oil is normally being shipped through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
The key passages through the Strait consist of 2- mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic. Tanker and shipping routes pass close to Iran’s land mass, its naval bases and the islands it controls in the Gulf. This situation creates vulnerabilities for Iran.
In addition, Iran has been involved in territorial disputes with its United Arab Emirates neighbors over ownership of three islands near key tanker routes, namely Abu Musa, Greater Tunb Island and Lesser Tunb Island. Both Iran and Qatar have also claimed ownership of the North field, the site of most of Qatar’s gas reserves.
However, Iran is also conscious of its ability to put pressure on strategic competitors like the US in the Gulf. In a speech in June 2006, Supreme Leader Khamenei stated that if any country attacked Iran, “shipment of energy from this region will be severely jeopardized.”
Naval Abilities
Iran has two naval forces to pursue its interests in the Gulf, namely the regular navy and the Pasdaran navy. The main bases of the regular navy include Bandar e-Abbas, Bushehr and Kharg Island. The regular navy operates traditional warships and auxiliary ships.
However, the regular navy is smaller than the Pasdaran navy. During the past few years it has often lost to the Pasdaran navy in the competition for bureaucratic resources. The Pasdaran has a 20,000 man naval branch with facilities at Bandar-e-Abbas, Khorramshar and the Halul oil platform. It also has facilities on the islands of Larak, Abu Musa, Al Farsiyah and Sirrir and uses the main naval bases. In addition, the Pasdaran controls access to smaller jetties, which are also used to evade sanctions and smuggle commodities without paying the required customs.
In 2007, the Pasdaran navy was given full operational control of the Gulf, while the regular navy was assigned to the Gulf of Oman and the Caspian Sea. The Pasdaran navy has focused on obtaining small, fast boats. Some of these boats are armed with recoilless rifles and rocket launchers, others with man portable surface-to-air missiles and anti-armor guided weapons.
Iran can target any point within the Strait of Hormuz and much of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman with C-802 anti-ship missiles bought from China.
In past years, both the navy and the regular navy have increased their mine-laying capability. The Strait of Hormuz could be mined in a relatively short amount of time. Lacking modern mine-laying vessels, the naval forces could deploy mines using commercial vessels and small boats.
Asymmetric Warfare
Iran’s security force doctrines compensates for the limits to their capabilities. In general, Iran’s deployments and maritime strategy reflect a defensive approach that focuses on deterrence and attrition. Since the Iran-Iraq tanker war during 1984-1988, maritime strategy has also incorporated asymmetric warfare.
Asymmetric warfare emphasizes the use of small assets’ strengths, for example the stealth, maneuverability and speed of small boats, against the weaknesses of big opponents, such as sluggish ships. An emphasis on a “revolutionary” resilience and a commitment to Islamic martyrdom also complement this doctrine.
Other elements of Iran’s maritime strategy have been a passive defense to survive a first strike through camouflage, deception and tunnels and bunkers. A decentralized command system to increase its resilience has also been developed.
Another element has been to capitalize on favorable geography, for example the shallow waters, coves and marshes on the coastline, and narrow lanes of the Gulf.
At present, it seems unlikely that the US would launch an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, if the current tensions between Iran and the US or Israel would escalate into a war or a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran would seriously consider forms of asymmetric warfare in the Gulf. These could also assume the form of low-level and deniable measures, like the selective and periodic use of mines.
Strategic Messaging and Naval Diplomacy
The maritime dimension has historically been used by Iran to advance its geopolitical aims. Iranian naval forces have in the past used several forms of peacetime gunboat diplomacy. In 1971, during the rule of the Shah, they also created a fait accompli by occupying Abu Musa Island.
Iran’s navy has in the past year stepped up activities aimed at countering piracy. In April and May, Iranian naval ships warded off attacks in the Gulf of Aden by pirates against Iranian ships transporting goods and oil. As reflected in the statements of Iranian delegates to the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in Abu Dhabi in mid-May 2010, Iran also uses the situation of limited international success against piracy in the region to support its case for a regional security arrangement that would exclude Western powers.
Fiften British Royal Marines taken by the Pasdaran navy in March 2007 occurred at a time when Iran was under increased pressure about its nuclear program and shortly after US forces had raided an Iranian diplomatic office in Arbil, Iraq, in the hope of capturing two senior Iranian officials. Whether intended or not, the naval incident bought some breathing space for Iran at the time as far as the US and UK campaign against its nuclear program was concerned.
The Pasdaran and regular navy also regularly conduct naval/air exercises in the Gulf. During the exercises, they usually train and demonstrate their ability to attack ships, offshore oil fields and coastal desalination and power facilities, also through naval commando operations.
These exercises are often timed to precede UN sessions, important international meetings on Iran’s nuclear program or further sanctions, or key US decisions on Iran. As during the latest exercise in the Strait of Hormuz and northern Indian Ocean, which lasted eight days and ended on 12 May 2010, deterrence has been a major objective of the event.
Different naval actions have been employed to deter or influence Western powers. The seizure of Iranian psychological warfare in the Gulf: Iran’s rulers have several options if they want to exert pressure on the US or send a strategic message: funding, training and arming of Hizbollah, Hamas and some insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the support of some pressure groups in Gulf Arab states.
However, the withdrawal of most US troops from Iraq by mid-2010 will reduce the possibility to exert pressure by threatening measures against US soldiers there.
This situation, in conjunction with increased foreign pressure, domestic political turmoil, and hardline government elements considering themselves under siege, could result in Iran’s security forces considering the Gulf more often as a theatre to exert pressure. Periodic incidents like the capture of the British Royal Marines in 2007 or the capture of British servicemen in 2004 in the Shatt al-Arab waterway where they were training the Iraqi river patrol service will therefore remain a likely occurrence.
Non-military vessels will mostly be at lower risk, but their owners should prepare for higher incidental risk and design contingency plans in case such an incident has an impact on business operations.
However, closure of the Strait of Hormuz during a period of tensions or even armed hostilities is much less likely. Due to foreign sanctions and domestic mismanagement Iran’s economy has become extremely dependent on a few refineries, product imports and food imports. It could not choke off the Strait of Hormuz for more than a few days, even if it was willing to sacrifice all its assets.
Still, this state of affairs does not preclude the use of threats in peacetime about blocking the Strait or interfering with free shipping in the Strait. The threat of action in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and resulting high insurance premiums and oil prices will continue to constitute one of the more cost-effective ways for Iran to respond to extreme US pressure.
Gulf oil production and the importance of Gulf exports as a percentage of total world exports are also expected to increase in the next decade. The Gulf is likely to remain a prime potential theatre for Iranian measures to limit or deter foreign intervention.
Credit: U.S. Air Forces Central Public Affairs, September 20th, 2010
10/04/2010 – US Air Force transport aircraft dropped 3,800 container delivery system supply bundles in August to troops at remote forward operating bases in Southwest Asia, establishing yet another airdrop record. The August airdrops topped July’s mark of 3,600 bundles delivered, the previous record. Mobility airmen averaged more than 99 tons delivered per day in August, which equates to about six million pounds of food, water, equipment, and supplies for the month. “These airdrops are critical to sustaining ground forces at austere locations where other means of re-supply aren’t feasible,” said Col. David Almand, director of the Combined Air and Space Operations Center’s air mobility division, which coordinates, tasks, and executes in-theater air mobility missions.
Source: Air Force Association Daily Report
09/30/2010 – This posting begins a three part series of the Honorable Bill Anderson’s examination of how to deliver energy to the deployed warfighter. By enhancing the ability of the deployed force to self-sustain, a revolution in combat logistics can be generated.
As Bill Anderson underscores:
A more heavily armored target incentivizes the enemy to develop more lethal weapons. Major General Rick Lynch, who commanded a division in Iraq, noted in an interview with USA Today that the MRAP has forced insurgents to build bigger and more sophisticated bombs. Of course, bigger bombs are harder to make and deploy…giving coalition forces a better opportunity to catch the insurgents. However, if the enemy is successful, coalition fighting forces pay the price.
The answer is simple…the risk only goes away when vehicles come off the road. The vehicles only come off the road if they are no longer required to carry cargo to the front lines.
And as Anderson emphasizes, this capability is within reach.
Once Part Three is posted, the complete article will be published as a SLD special report in our power projection series in PDF format for downloading by readers.
***
Energy, the lynchpin of the battlefield
It has been said since the time of Napoleon that an Army moves on its stomach. It is probably safe to say those words are as accurate today as they were centuries ago, and will likely remain accurate for centuries to come.
Increasingly, however, in today’s modern and ever-evolving battle space Soldiers, Sailors, Airman and Marines cannot move at all, not by land, by sea, by air, in space or in cyberspace, without significant amounts of energy (in the form of both liquid fuel and electricity). In fact, the modern war fighter is unable to project power without adequate….and that means significant…amounts of energy.
This fact is not new-found information, nor is the fact that delivery of energy to the battle space is an incredibly expensive endeavor, both in financial terms and, more importantly, from the perspective of loss of life and limb.
Now, if delivering energy to the troops was as simple as flipping a light switch or a quick trip to the local service station for a fill-up, the military’s energy supply chain would be quite mundane. Unfortunately, our war fighters don’t live in that kind of a world. Their activities are often conducted in remote and hostile environments, far from the delivery points for traditional energy sources, and certainly complicated by the enemy, intent to disrupt, destroy and take life.
Challenges related to delivering fuel to the battle space have sparked debate among various experts for years now as to the financial cost of fuel delivered to the war fighter. The debate has raged within the Pentagon over the exact formula to calculate the fully burdened cost of fuel, with DoD specialists and a cadre of outside experts providing various methodologies to arrive at the exact number.
The calculation of the fully burdened cost of fuel certainly varies depending on delivery method and location, and can range from tens to hundreds of dollars per gallon delivered to point of use. Yet after years of debate and analysis, we have yet to arrive at consensus as to the true fully burdened cost of fuel delivered down range. And while the analysis drags on, the cost to the taxpayer continues and the toll on lives and families weighs heavier by the day.
This situation brings to mind the sage advice provided by General Colin Powell in his well-distributed “A Leadership Primer”. The General warns that excessive delays in the name of information gathering breeds “analysis paralysis”. And procrastination in the name of reducing risk actually increases risk.
Factoring in the real cost of fuel delivery
Now, with that in mind, look beyond the simple financial cost of fuel delivered to the front lines…factor in the human costs…the lives and limbs of American warriors who man the convoys that deliver fuel, and by the way…water (hold that thought, as it becomes important later)…to forward operating bases. The “financial” fully burdened cost of fuel quickly becomes almost irrelevant in comparison to the costs to our war fighters, their families and our country in terms of loss of promise from lives cut short manning the supply lines. Although coming to grips with the true cost of energy delivered to the battlefield is indeed important, we know enough now to draw the most important conclusions:
These two factors alone…following General Powell’s approach to decision making…lead to only one conclusion. That is, we have enough information now…and probably did several years ago…to suggest it is imperative to identify, develop, test and deploy self-contained alternative energy systems to the battle space with all urgency.
Credit: CRS Report on Fuel Costs in Iraq
So, using a bit of General Powell’s logic, let’s do some math and see what it tells us. Ignoring the up-front capital cost to acquire a diesel generator for a moment, focus simply on the variable fuel cost to operate the unit. A 10 kilowatt generator set will typically burn about 1 gallon of fuel per hour. At a cost of $2.60 per gallon, that machine will provide power at a fuel cost of about $0.26 per kilowatt hour…probably not all that bad for emergency backup power.
Now, let’s take a look at what it would cost to provide a kilowatt hour of electricity (primary power) from such a unit on the battlefield. I’ve often heard that it is a general rule of thumb that it takes 7 gallons of fuel to deliver one gallon of fuel to a forward operating base…so let’s use that rule of thumb for the moment. At the same $2.60 per gallon, the fully burdened cost to deliver one gallon of fuel to a forward unit would equate to $20.60 per gallon. Now, run that gallon of fuel through our generator. We are now producing electricity at over $2.00 a kilowatt hour. Imagine receiving that electric bill at your home in next month’s mail!
So, what’s the point of the math? Well… let’s compare the opportunity presented here to the billions of dollars that were required to be spent in the rapid development and deployment of the fleet of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. On May 8, 2007 Defense Secretary Robert Gates said acquisition of MRAPs was DoD’s highest priority, with $1.1 billion earmarked for MRAP in FY 2007. Now, no one is going to deny the best equipment to our warrior heroes who put themselves in harm’s way…especially since at the time of that decision. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were causing more than 60% of US deaths in Iraq.
However, a more heavily armored target incentivizes the enemy to develop more lethal weapons. Major General Rick Lynch, who commanded a division in Iraq, noted in an interview with USA Today that the MRAP has forced insurgents to build bigger and more sophisticated bombs. Of course, bigger bombs are harder to make and deploy…giving coalition forces a better opportunity to catch the insurgents. However, if the enemy is successful, coalition fighting forces pay the price.
The answer is simple…the risk only goes away when vehicles come off the road. The vehicles only come off the road if they are no longer required to carry cargo to the front lines.
Credit: CRS Report on Fuel Costs in Iraq
Generating power at the point of use
So, if the majority of over-the-road cargo is fuel and water…the only logical answer is to generate power and process clean water at the point of use so that these resources no longer have to be hauled along dangerous roads. It would, of course, be an added bonus if the acquisition of these alternative power generation/water purification units could be offered with minimal impact to taxpayer pocketbooks. More on that concept later.
Frontline commander recognition of the hazards associated with the battlefield supply chain has been well documented. Former US Air Force Chief of Staff T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley, while in a previous role as Commander, US Central Command Air Forces, planned and executed some of the most successful air campaigns in both Afghanistan and in Iraq. In executing these “joint” combat operations, he recognized the risks of ground-based transport of supplies. General Moseley therefore shifted a significant portion of supply delivery to the air…reducing risks to ground forces and reducing the potential for loss of the materials, albeit at a higher cost of delivery.
His decision reduced the overall volume of inventory across the roads while at the same time increased the percentage of delivery volume comprised of fuel and water. Overall, this decision resulted in not only a reduced threat to our troops, but also an exponential reduction in delivery times of the critical supplies.
Possibly the most reported acknowledgement of the fuel/water delivery problem is the July 25, 2006 request by then Al-Anbar Commander, USMC Major General Richard Zilmer. He saw first-hand the significant amounts of fuel and water moved in the battle space by road…with some estimates suggesting 70% or more of material moved being fuel and water…presented an unnecessary and unacceptable risk to our military forces.
MG Zilmer’s solution? A request for 183 renewable energy systems of various power capacities for deployment in Al-Anbar. The logic was as brilliant as it was simple…and it is exactly what is stated above. That is, the best way to reduce over-the-road casualties is to reduce the number of vehicles…and the personnel required to operate and protect those vehicles… on the road.
Regrettably, as has been reported, in June of 2007, almost a year after MG Zilmer’s original request, it was rejected by the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the grounds of cost and uncertain technologies. It was said that the technology was not mature enough to deploy on the battlefield. Now, how ironic is it that shortly before the Pentagon denied the Marines’ request for deployable renewable energy systems it embarked on that massive program to develop and field the MRAP, a technology that wasn’t just immature… it did not even exist.
MG Zilmer even provided a set of performance standards that would allow the private sector to tailor solutions for the identified need. Those standards are:
Fortunately, even though MG Zilmer’s request was denied, some work has been done to identify distributed alternative power generation options. A number of technical and business teams within the US military have been working this issue for some time. As one example, recently, the US Air Force announced award of a $3.5 million contract to a partnership of Lockheed Martin and Sky Built Power to develop a containerized Integrated Smart-Bear Power System. Obviously, moving the ball forward in this important area is critical.
But, you really have to ask yourself whether there isn’t something available today…ready for immediate deployment…that can begin addressing this problem now. The answer is yes there is. A portable renewable power unit with energy storage capability has been developed, tested and has proven itself in initial deployments in harsh battlefield conditions.
Type 022 (Houbei-class) fast-attack missile craft
Credit Photo: http://www.sinodefence.com
09/30/2010 – On August 17th, 2010 the U.S. Department of Defense released its latest edition of its annual assessment of China’s military capabilities, intentions, and behavior to the U.S. Congress.
Although the title of this year’s report has been changed from the previous “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” to the more anodyne “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010,” the report’s themes echo those found in previous editions. When one considers the recent reports collectively, one prominent theme is the growing strength of the Chinese Navy.
China’s maritime strategy has traditionally centered on countering threats posed by foreign powers to its coastal region. A more recent function of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is to defend the PRC’s claims in off-shore territorial disputes with maritime neighbors. PRC policymakers want to protect their access to off-shore fisheries and gain access to the energy resources under nearby Pacific waters, whose estimated value has soared in recent decades. As China has become a global trading nation increasingly dependent on overseas energy sources and other key imports, PRC leaders have likely become interested in protecting China’s maritime supply lines from pirates and other threats to their freedom of the seas.
Over time, the PRC’s sustained military buildup has allowed the PLAN to modernize many of its platforms and weapons systems. Since the late 1990s, China has begun revolutionizing its naval capabilities by undertaking an ambitious modernization program, producing approximately one hundred new warships since 2001. At its projected rate of expansion, the PLAN could possess more ships than the U.S. Navy at some point in the next decade or two. The qualitative improvement has been equally stunning. Successful introduction of anti-ship missile technology, near silent submarines, and Soviet-era radar and tracking technology has effectively turned what had been a primarily shore-defense Navy into a viable regional maritime power. These developments, along with parallel and anticipated future advancements, set the stage for the PLAN’s possible acquisition of blue-water power projection capacity.
A PLAN priority has been to enhance the capabilities of its submarine fleet. The dozen Russian-made Kilo-class diesel electric submarines, along with the indigenously built Song submarine class, acquired by the PLAN during the last two decades have represented a marked advance in the PRC’s undersea warfare capabilities. Most recently, the PLAN has acquired about a dozen indigenously made submarines whose capabilities are quite impressive compared with previous boats. The Jin-class SSBN (Type 094) is armed with 12 JL-2 ballistic missiles, with the theoretical range to hit targets in the western half of the United States from strike positions west of Hawaii. The Shang-class SSN (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack submarines and the Yuan-class SSN (Type 041 or Type 039A) diesel-powered attack submarines complement one another due to their diverging power systems. In addition, the PLAN has by now acquired over a dozen slightly less advanced Song-class SSN (Type 039 or Type 039/039G) attack submarines. Furthermore, the PLAN order of battle includes around 60 older diesel-electric submarines of varying caliber that serve in anti-submarine and anti-surface roles using the newest Sino-Russian torpedo and missile design technologies. Although many PLAN submarines are outdated, the newest classes are approaching the capabilities of those of the other major world navies in sound-dampening technology, naval propulsion, and weapons systems.
Credit Graph: 2010 Annual Report to Congress on Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
In addition to modernizing its fleet of submarines, the PLAN has developed increasingly sophisticated surface combatants. Since the early 1990s, the PLAN has put five new types of destroyers and frigates into service, with each successive model featuring new variations and improvements. Taken together, these modern warships are substantial improvements over China’s aging Luda (Type 051) destroyers that entered service in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of these new warships feature stealthy hull designs; efficient propulsion systems; and enhanced sensors, electronics, and weapons systems. blue sky ship.
During the 1990s, China purchased two Sovremenny class missile destroyers (DDG) from Russia. These outclassed any surface combatant fielded by the PLAN at the time, providing improved anti-submarine warfare capabilities; more advanced anti-ship missiles, and longer expected sea-duty time. Since the original purchase of these four Russian destroyers, the PRC has introduced its own improvements regarding both design and functionality to its indigenously made surface warships. At present, concurrent generations of indigenously manufactures destroyers, and to a lesser extent
frigates, have been increasingly more capable due to the longer reach of their platforms, improved active electronic countermeasures, advanced ASW helicopters, and newer generations of air defense and anti-ship cruise missiles. The Luzhou, the most current version of the Chinese destroyer, serves the role of a fleet air defense ship with the SA-N-20 missile system capable of engaging targets upwards of 150 km away utilizing an onboard radar guidance system. The slightly older Luyang-II missile destroyer features an indigenously developed radar system similar to the Aegis AN/SPY-1 used by the U.S. Navy, along with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles capable of engaging targets at a distance of 280 kilometers. Although it does not employ the SA-N-20 missile, the air defense capabilities on the Luyang II offer substantial improvements to earlier Chinese models and, coupled with some ASW capabilities through the use of an onboard all-weather ASW helicopter, provide the Chinese Navy with a solid foundation on which to build additional fleet support surface combatants.
The latest PLA-N destroyers, the Taizhou and Ningbo, were constructed in 2004. They offer more advanced on-board weapons systems than their predecessors. Again, though, only two ships were constructed, since the PLAN seems to be looking to combine the best ASW capabilities, fleet air defense, and anti-ship missiles all on one ship class. The latest versions of frigates, the Jiangkai I and II offer similar improvements as the Luyang or Luzhou class destroyers by employing the latest in conjoined radar and air defense technology. In addition, the Jiangkai II offers advanced sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles capable of engaging targets at 180 kilometers and an ASW helicopter.
Furthermore, the Chinese Navy has been developing a large number of smaller vessels, including littoral and coastal vessels, gunboats, missile boats, torpedo boats, amphibious craft, and mine warfare ships. These vessels can be used for a variety of missions, both offensively and defensively or in support of larger ships, though many of these vessels are for coastal combat only because of their limited range and size. The dozens of small Houbei-class (Type 022) fast-attack craft, armed with anti-ship cruise missiles and using stealthy catamaran hulls, might prove the most useful. They perform coastal patrol and defense missions, allowing larger ships to extend their operations elsewhere.
These new warships in both the frigate and destroyer classes offer significant improvements over the Navy’s designs of the 1970s and 1980s. The roles of these ships, that of air defense and power projection, provide the beginnings of what could become a fleet battle group. Most notably, though, is the absence in the PLAN order of battle of any cruisers or aircraft carriers. It is speculated that, when the PLA-N is comfortable with the improvements made to these smaller classes of ships, work will start on these vital but more complex elements of a blue-water fleet. The PLAN has already purchased from Ukraine the aircraft carrier Varyag, an uncompleted Soviet-era sloped-deck carrier. The expectation is that the Varyag will serve either as a training vessel or as a model for future carrier development.
The potential reach of Chinese weapons
Credit Map: 2010 Annual Report to Congress
on Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China
The PLAN still lacks the sealift capacity to transfer and sustain a large expeditionary force for an extended period, though it is increasing its capabilities. China has effectively doubled its force of roughly 20 landing ship tanks (LSTs) by additionally building 10 Yuting-II and 10 Yubei-class LSTs from 2003 to 2005, each with a capacity to carry roughly 250 troops. The PLAN also maintains numerous smaller transports that augment the LSTs. In 2006, the Chinese Navy built a larger landing platform dock that can hold up to 800 troops and can provide greater mission flexibility. In total, the PLA-N can amphibiously transport a maximum of 15,000 troops in a single wave. China’s airlift capability is comparably modest, with a capacity to transport a maximum of 5,000 parachutists in a single operation.
In addition to its sea-based assets, the PLAN currently encompasses a ground-based air contingent, the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF), along with a small Marine Corps. Although Chinese warships have been making impressive gains, the PLAN’s air and ground elements have not kept pace. The PLANAF includes hundreds of older J-7E (a Mig-21 variant) and J-8II air superiority fighters along with the H-6D (based on the Soviet Tu-16 Badger), which carries two anti-ship missiles. The effectiveness of these planes against modern air defenses such as those found on U.S. Navy ships is questionable. The planes, weapons, and other technology found in the PLANAF lags considerably behind those of the more generously funded regular PLA Air Force.
Still, the PLA-NAF has received some newer generation Russian fighters purchased by the Chinese government, including Su-30s and Su-27s. The Su-30MK2 variant provided China has some advanced C4ISR capabilities along with a long-range search radar to detect surface ships to engage them with anti-ship missiles. The Su-30MK2 variant is generally compared to the U.S. F-15E fighter, though it still lags behind newer 5th generation aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35. In comparison, the SU-27 originally purchased from Russia was later copied to build a Chinese variant, the Shenyang J-11, which has undergone several modifications and technological improvements from the original Russian version. The J-11 offers improvements in radar and early warning systems, but most of these warplanes have gone to the regular Air Force. Perhaps the newer J-11s could be modified to serve as carrier-launched fighter planes when the PLAN proceeds with its expected aircraft carrier development. Until then, existing doctrine calls for the PLANAF to conduct primarily territorial water defense and fleet air support in those within reach of land-based warplanes.
The PLAN Marine Corps is a small contingent of highly trained troops that serve on China’s few amphibious transport dock ships, which are based at the Zhanjiang port attached to the South Sea Fleet. Numbering approximately 12,000 troops, the Marine Corps exists to provide the “first boots on the ground” during any sea based invasion, while also serving as garrison forces for islands under dispute yet controlled by the PRC. The Marine Corps equipment includes amphibious Type 63 and 63A tanks along with a variety of armored personnel carriers. These are all seriously outdated. Barring a significant investment in new equipment and larger numbers, the PLAN Marine Corps will continue to serve primarily as an instrument to garrison remote islands and board and fight pirate ships.
(Credit Map: 2010 Annual Report to Congress on Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China)
As partial compensation for its weak marine air and ground components—two areas that could be important should Beijing ever try to invade Taiwan—the PLA has developed a powerful strike capability in its large number of long-range missiles. They give the PRC the capacity to deter U.S. support for Taiwan as well as to improve its ability to project military power in Asia. The PLA has positioned more than one thousand short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan to menace the island—periodically reinforcing this stockpile with a smattering of medium-range ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles. The PLAN has also acquired a variety of indigenous and foreign-made anti-ship cruise missiles. Among the most powerful are Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles carried aboard China’s Sovremenny-class destroyers and SS-N-27 Sizzler missiles found aboard some of China’s twelve Kilo-class attack submarines. Of special concern to the U.S. Navy is China’s ongoing effort to develop an anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21. With a sought-after range of more than 1,500 km (900 miles), the PLAN’s wants to have a missile that would allow the PLA to strike deep into the western Pacific. The missile is also to be equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle that would allow its warhead to target moving ships and a warhead sufficiently powerful to disable or sink an aircraft carrier. One important reason that missile technology is they would help compensate for the inferiority of China’s conventional air power in a clash with the United States.
Notwithstanding the rapid modernization of the Chinese military, a significant technological gap continues to exist between the PRC and the United States in almost all important areas of military power. In addition to the continued existence of a disparity between the two nations in terms of air, naval and missile technology, China lags even farther behind the United States in other important areas, such as the capacity to organize joint operations; command and control communications systems; military computers; surveillance and reconnaissance; and precision strikes. The PLA’s ability to sustain force at a distance remains limited, which means that China is still a regional rather than a global military power. How long this favorable balance will persist in the face of the PRC’s sustained buildup of its military power is anyone’s guess.
By Dr. Robbin Laird
China in Africa,
Plamen Petkov
Changing Epochs
Richard Weitz has provided a good look at the most recent Pentagon report on the evolution of Chinese military power. Clearly the new number two economic power, which has significant and growing manufacturing capability, is a force to be reckoned with. But a difficulty facing American and Western analysts is how to interpret the challenge and ways to cope with or manage it.
A global shift in manufacturing capability towards China, a significant investment by China in global commodities and the enhanced presence of China on the world stage are all significant developments. When married to a growing investment in the development and fielding of military capabilities, something globally significant is afoot; of the sort which suggests changing epochs.
This all raises the question of what template or templates to use when dealing with interpreting the ascendant Chinese military challenge?
Many analysts simply compare or contrast the state of Chinese military power to that of the United States. This is seriously flawed because the U.S. built a power projection capability to deal with the Soviet Union and Asian operations, and the sunk cost in this investment still provides for unparalleled global capabilities.
But sunk cost is not the same as making significant investments to build new capabilities. And many analysts confuse past historical capabilities persistent into the present with future realities shaped by absent investments necessary to shape relevant capabilities for the future.
China does not need to mimic or match U.S. power projection capabilities to become ascendant. They need simply to project power into the Asian region to reshift the power relationships within Asia.
Graph 1
Graph 2
Graph 3
The U.S. has been the key lynchpin holding together the Asian powers, which de facto contain China. An ability to threaten the lynchpin function is almost enough by itself to create the effect which the Chinese leadership would wish to create – Asian powers competing with one another without the binding power of the American lynchpin. This leaves them open to Chinese hard power being married to the ascendant soft power of China in the region.
The capabilities which the Chinese are emphasizing – notably air and missile systems – are eminently exportable. By having a first class missile business a decade out, the Chinese can change regional power balances by export policy only incidentally supported by the power projection capability necessary to dominate in far away regions.
Graph 4
Also, the Chinese are enhancing their Coast Guard capabilities to shape their role in securing the conveyer belt of goods and services. They have entered the world in the fight against piracy and are participating with Coast Guard or Navy ships and assets far away from Chinese waters.
Additionally, the tool sets of no interest for Western or U.S. forces to acquire, such as mini submarines, are of interest to the Chinese. They have a distinct interest to invest in “asymmetric” technologies to shape disruptive capabilities to U.S. and allied forces.
For example, the Chinese recently used a mini sub to project power. According to Reuters: China said on Thursday it had used a small, manned submarine to plant the national flag deep beneath the South China Sea, where Beijing has tussled with Washington and Southeast Asian nations over territorial disputes. The submarine achieved the feat during 17 dives from May to July, when it went as deep as 3,759 meters (12,330 ft) below the South China Sea, the official China News Service said, citing the Ministry of Science and Technology and State Oceanic Administration.
The largest Coast Guard fleet in Asia belongs to Japan, but the Chinese are expanding their fleet. Americans often forget the significance of global USCG activities and with the USN entering into some traditional domains operated by the USCG with its littoral assets, the role of Coast Guard activities as part of the global presence activity will grow in significance. This is especially due to the role of global maritime trade, the need to protect the “conveyer belt of goods” and the expanded significance of offshore minerals and commodities. Presence is a key good for power projection in the 21st century, even if this presence is playing “civil” functions.
In other words, the Chinese can invest in technologies for global export, for enhanced “asymmetric” capabilities, and anti-access denial and it is enough to degrade declining numbers of U.S. forces.
Indeed, unless the U.S. shapes innovative joint con-ops and invests in new technologies leveraging some of the core new capabilities, such as the fifth generation fighters, the ability to deter will go up for the Chinese simply by enhancing degradation of U.S. capabilities. Again, the lynchpin function for the United States is central to its Asian role.
Chinese Deployment to Conduct International Counter-Piracy Operations
Credit photo: http://news.bbc.co.uk
*** Graphs 1, 2,3 and 4 come from the 2010 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.
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*** This week we have a special report on the Chinese challenge. The report provides a one-stop download of the articles posted this week on various aspects of understanding the Chinese challenge. It can be downloaded as a pdf file [906K].
09/30/2010 – Another theme in this year’s DoD report on the Chinese military is its appeal to China to make its military programs and objectives considerably more transparent by disclosing more data and engaging in more comprehensive military exchanges with the U.S. armed forces. Although acknowledging “modest improvements” in this area in recent year, the authors caution that, “The limited transparency in China’s military and security affairs enhances uncertainty and increases the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation.”
Conversely, they argue that, “Sustained and reliable U.S.-China military-to-military relations support this goal [of avoiding an adversarial relationship”] by reducing mistrust, enhancing mutual understanding and broadening cooperation.” Unfortunately, the report confirms that, “China’s recurring decision to suspend military exchanges has impeded this effort.”
Despite the vigorous efforts of several different U.S. administrations since 1990, little progress has been achieved in the military dialogue between the United States and the PRC during the past two decades. Since the early 1990s, the two defense communities have negotiated a series of bilateral security and confidence-building measures seeking to reduce mutual tensions and advance common interests. These agreements have promoted a better understanding of the other side’s security concerns, but they remain highly constrained and vulnerable to disruption from external shocks.
The two governments still fundamentally disagree regarding how to manage military relations in ways that eschew these acute confrontations. Incidents between PRC and U.S. military units operating in the international waters and airspace near China have repeatedly disrupted their bilateral relations. In addition, the PRC frequently suspends Sino-American defense ties due to disputes over Taiwan and other issues, making clear how little Beijing values the relationship between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Pentagon.
South China Sea as Area of Competition
Credit map: http://www.abanet.org
Several factors have impeded the development of Sino-American defense ties:
The absence of a robust relationship between the Chinese and American militaries is indeed disturbing since the PLA has expanded its level of external engagement considerably in recent years. The December 2008 decision to send a naval task force to assist with the multinational counter-piracy mission off Somalia’s coast has established a precedent for further Chinese military operations at great distances from the PRC.
More occasions are likely to arise when Chinese and American ships and other military units operate in close proximity. The PLA’s growing global presence increases the risks of further Chinese-American military incidents, whether due to accidents, miscalculation, or other causes.
Credit map: 2010 Annual Report to Congress on Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
As long as Beijing insists on reestablishing control over Taiwan, the Taiwanese people insist on their right to exercise their hard-won democratic liberties independent of the mainland’s Communist government, and Washington insists on its obligation to provide Taiwan with weapons to resist a PLA military invasion, the Taiwan situation will remain an insuperable obstacle to better PLA-Pentagon ties.
This Taiwan triangle almost obliges the People’s Liberation Army and the U.S. Department of Defense to perceive one another as potential military adversaries. In the Pentagon’s assessment, the PLA’s modernization drive is shifting the military balance between the mainland and Taiwan further in the PRC’s favor.
Although tensions between Beijing and Taipei have decreased following the March 2008 election of a new Taiwanese government led by President Ma Ying-jeou more committed to improving cross-Strait relations, the PLA is still seeking through its military build-up to deter Taiwan from declaring independence as well as to acquire the means to coerce Taipei into accepting Beijing’s terms for the resolution of any cross-Strait dispute. To this end, the PLA is pursuing capabilities to defeat Taiwan in any military confrontation as well as to “deter, delay, or deny” potential American military intervention on Taipei’s behalf.
PRC leaders have become increasingly interested in ensuring China’s access to the offshore undersea resources situated near the PRC but beyond the country’s traditionally defined territorial waters. For example, they want to secure access to offshore fisheries and the oil and gas deposits located on China’s continental shelf.
The PRC government has exerted various types of sovereignty claims over the seabed, seas, and airspace of within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The extent of China’s sovereignty claims over its EEZ differs from internationally accepted standards. According to one calculation, one-third of all the world’s commercial shipping traverses waters that Chinese policy makers claim belong to them.
China’s assertive claims have led to conflicts with the U.S. military directly as well as the PRC’s neighbors. Chinese officials have sought to exclude the U.S. Navy from conducting surveillance operations within its EEZ, contrary to common interpretations of the international law. In contrast, the United States and other states hold that defense surveillance missions are permissible within EEZs as long as they remain outside a country’s territorial waters and do not aim to exploit the undersea natural resources located there. These conflicting interpretations contributed to the EP-3 collision in 2001 and the Impeccable incident in March 2009.
Beyond these concrete territorial issues, the underlying climate of ties between China and the United States has exerted the most significant impact on progress in developing bilateral military confidence-building measures. Repeatedly, adverse political-military developments have derailed PLA-Pentagon military-to-military ties and impeded both the consolidation of existing confidence-building measures and the development of new ones.
For the Chinese, curtailing defense exchanges has been a favored way of signaling displeasure with some development in the overall PRC-U.S. relationship. Whenever Beijing has been angered by some U.S. action, the PRC suspends defense ties with Washington.
U.S. objections to PLA behavior have also disrupted military exchanges. The Tiananmen crackdown of June 4, 1989, when Chinese troops forcibly repressed peaceful democracy activists in Beijing, resulted in the George H. W. Bush administration’s suspending military contracts and defense technology transfers. A decade later, members of Congress demonstrated their alarm about alleged PRC espionage in the United States by imposing restrictions on Chinese-U.S. defense contacts that could lead to inappropriate PLA access to an itemized list of advanced U.S. military capabilities.
Accidents—which ironically might have been prevented had the bilateral defense relationship been stronger—also have disrupted PLA-Pentagon exchanges. The mistaken U.S. bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, which killed three people and wounded more than twenty, led the Chinese government to drastically curtail military contacts. Similarly, the April 2001 crisis resulting from the collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese warplane near China’s Hainan Island discouraged the new Bush administration from attempting to reinvigorate military ties.
Another reason for the poor state of Sino-American relations has been the underlying mistrust and competition over power and values between China and the United States. The fragility of relations between the PLA and the DoD are endemic of the deeper suspicions that shape the perspectives of each government toward the other.
Since at least Tiananmen, influential PRC leaders have feared that, whatever their declarations of practical intent, U.S. officials would like to change the PRC’s communist regime. Chinese leaders argue that, as long as Americans view the PRC as an adversary or strategic competitor, defense ties cannot develop significantly between the two countries.
Suspicions about the other side’s intentions also affected the U.S. approach toward PLA-Pentagon ties. Some Americans express concerns that the Chinese were using military exchanges to acquire U.S. defense secrets or, at a minimum, would exploit any knowledge they gained to enhance their military strength vis-à-vis the United States and its allies (especially Taiwan).
Chinese strategists also adhere to a strategic tradition that lauds deception as a means to confuse potential opponents and promote deterrence through uncertainty rather than by robust displays of military capacity. In addition, PLA leaders fear that improved defense transparency could provide U.S. military intelligence with revealing insights into the PLA’s defense vulnerabilities. Concealing China’s military assets and plans complicates foreign military efforts to identify potential PRC military targets or respond effectively to the PLA’s programs and strategies.
Unfortunately, not only does the PLA’s penchant for secrecy increase the risks misunderstanding and miscalculation, these uncertainties could also mislead China’s political leaders regarding their country’s real military capabilities and problems. For example, they might mistakenly consider new systems as fully operational and integrated into China’s military arsenal. In addition, defense managers could use the lack of transparency to conceal inadequacies within their units.
More generally, the PLA’s lack of openness alarms China’s neighbors, which encourages them to respond to their worst possible interpretations regarding the PLA’s capabilities and intentions by strengthening their own military capabilities. If this occurs and provokes a reciprocal response from the PRC, East Asia could experience avoidable negative security spirals and regional arms races.
PLA leaders perceive that they have little incentive to reciprocate U.S. openness:
Solving the reciprocity problem will require overcoming many of these underlying factors that prompt the PLA to limit what it conscientiously shows and tells the Pentagon.
This article was originally published in Manufacturing & Technology News on August 30th, 2010.
The military uses of nanotechnology are just
part of China’s massive program of research and development.
(Credit Photo: AFP/Getty Images as published in the Guardian, March 2009 )
09/30/2010 – The U.S. military is starting to consider how China’s economic growth and the corresponding loss of important American high-tech industries might impact future national security. The Project on National Security Reform run by U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, an independent academic group, has put together a “Vision Working Group” that is assessing various future possible military scenarios including how to deal with a more aggressive China if the United States does not have much left of an industrial base.
“Weaknesses in our defense industrial base supply chain, dependency on third-party vendors, continual disregard for the Berry Amendment, and lack of foresight regarding the interplay between the global economy and national security are the root causes” of a potential U.S. “failure,” according to the assessment, which notes that its views do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Army or the Department of Defense.
The U.S. government does not do an adequate job of assessing the national security implications of China’s rise, notes the Strategic Studies Institute in its “Vision Working Group Report and Scenarios.” “Nowhere in the U.S. government will one find personnel dedicated exclusively to developing overarching strategy with a long-term view. It is imperative to remedy this deficiency in order to avoid disastrous consequences, and reduce risks — both potential and real.”
It is not hard to imagine China exerting its increasingly high-tech and capable military muscle against the United States. Such a scenario “is not a product of fantasy or prediction, but rather of practical reasoning and logical deduction,” says the Vision Working Group’s report. “To be sure, the framework required for disaster [if] this scenario [is] to unfold is largely already set.”
The Chinese have already “infiltrated” much of the U.S. industrial base by targeting automotive, aerospace, metals and electronics, according to the assessment. The U.S. military has further enabled China by insisting on purchasing “off the shelf ” commercial technologies that are now made in China, and through the near elimination of MILSPEC requirements. “These changes have caused some concerned individuals within industry, government and the Pentagon to derisively call the changing state of affairs in terms of weapons systems development and procurement, along with acquisition support materiel, ‘the Wal-Mart Military,’ ” according to the vision report. “Economy and competitiveness, not security and performance, are the overarching parameters of DOD supplier participation.”
National security vulnerabilities “are literally being built into our offensive, defensive, and detection systems,” says the study. “A veritable Pandora’s box of systems security compromises was thrust open due to a gradual reduction in standards and shortsightedness by too many within industry and government. . . It is only a matter of when — not if — disaster will occur.”
The Chinese are actively engaged in acquiring the most advanced military technologies through commercial operations in the United States, and the lack of U.S. federal government oversight of Chinese business acquisitions. “We know from interactions with Chinese representatives, industry spokesmen, and government and military personnel that specific strategies are in place to gain control of various elements of the U.S. industrial and defense industrial bases,” says the study. The Chinese are purchasing high-tech U.S. suppliers that are under financial stress. They are also providing financial assistance to U.S. companies that are in need of cash “until they work their problems out,” according to the Vision Working Group. Such partnerships provide the Chinese with cover from charges of industrial espionage and copyright laws.
The Chinese are able to gain access to important technologies…..U.S. defense contractors have no transparency within their supply chains, the study notes. The Pentagon does not know which components in military systems are made overseas.
Furthermore, the Chinese control of global shipping puts the United States in a dependent and precarious position, with the potential for “economic chaos in the United States and its surge capability,” which could “disappear.” The United States, says the vision document, “needs a plan to ‘win’ the war, economically, diplomatically, politically and militarily with China and other emerging powers.”
The Vision Working Group recommends the creation of a new Center for Strategic Analysis and Assessment that would reside within the Executive Office of the President. “Fragments of such a system exist in various parts of the federal government,” writes Leon Fuerth, from the Project on Forward Engagement.
“But no single system exists for the application of foresight to governance as a whole.” The center would provide policymakers with “foresight and awareness of the path we are on, of the consequences of our decisions and of the major challenges that await us. Doing this involves, in part, the continuous development and exploration of future scenarios to enhance our preparedness and improve our chances of success…. If this goal is to be achieved, the United States will move from merely reacting to emergencies to pre-empting them, from responding to threats to seizing opportunities. . . Failure to act could mean that the nation is caught off guard by emerging threats, unable to see them until they have become imminent and, perhaps, intractable problems. In the worst case, the country could suffer what has been described as a synchronous failure, wherein the adaptive capacity of government and society is overwhelmed by the convergence of diverse and interacting stresses, resulting in a breakdown of institutional and social order.”