U.S., China and Trade Dynamics

09/30/2010

By Dr. Harald Malmgren

(Credit image: http://trendsupdates.com/china’s-exceeds-expectation-as-economy-expands-by-8-8/)Credit: China’s exceeds expectation as economy expands by 8-8,
http://trendsupdates.com
, January 2010

09/30/2010 – Resurgence in economic nationalism and protectionism is unfolding in the US.  President Obama’s bold promise to “double US exports in the next five years” has raised many eyebrows, as questions multiply about how this might be achieved.

In the meantime, recent Obama Administration statements have emphasized commitment to more aggressive enforcement of existing trade agreements.  The USTR (United States Trade Representative) has for several decades been the primary Executive Branch proponent of more liberal trade policies and continued multilateral trade liberalization.

Under President Obama, the USTR and other cabinet officers have instead argued for priority attention to implementation of import restrictions, through revised interpretation and regulation of antidumping and countervailing duty actions and other restrictions on cross-border flows.  While it is argued that this is simply a matter of “enforcement” of existing law, the reality is that interpretations of existing law and appropriate remedial actions are being altered to ensure greater restriction on imports.

In this area of law governing “unfair trade practices,” there has long been broad room for discretion in applying remedial action.  Exercise of such discretion to bring about limitations on imports has varied significantly over recent decades, but under the current Administration has become far more protectionist in intent.

There has recently been a resumption of Presidential interest in the long-pending South Korea-US FTA, under pressure from US exporters.  However, the Administration still seems to be unable to function without acquiescence of industrial unions that argue that they are affected.  Until 1967, American unions, including the industrial unions, supported more open international trade.  Since then, industrial unions opposed trade liberalization agreements.

Since the 1960’s, all Presidents have nonetheless politically overridden union opposition and continued to seek international agreements to liberalize trade.  In the last five decades, in spite of domestic political opposition driven by industrial unions, the Congress continued to give approval of multilateral trade agreements that were endorsed by Presidents.

Now, in a period of extended economic slump and high unemployment, the current President has been unusually responsive to pressures from industrial unions to avoid new international commitments and instead focus Administration attention on import restriction.

In this context, President Obama has gone along with G-20 commitments to seek success in another round of negotiations to liberalize trade in the WTO, but in practice his Administration has given virtually no attention to the WTO.  Rather, trade policy has been relegated to the bottom of a very long list of priorities, most of which are determined by domestic priorities.

The most important political driver behind enhanced import restrictions has been US domestic political attention on China.  There has always been some Congressional emphasis on assigning blame for domestic problems on foreign governments and businesses.

Assisting US businesses or economic segments usually requires government funding.  If restricting imports can provide assistance, politicians know that the domestic cost will be spread thinly among all voters without meaningful opposition, whereas the primary cost will be imposed on foreigners, and “foreigners don’t vote.”

In the 1980’s the principal cause of trouble was believed to be Japan, giving rise to a period known in Congress as “Japan bashing.”  At present, China is politically perceived as the principal challenge to American competitiveness, and “China bashing” is in fashion.

A core issue underlying the anti-China political sentiment is a perception that the exchange rate between the Chinese Yuan and the US dollar is set by Chinese authorities to provide “unfair” competitive advantage.  Alongside this politically potent argument are other issues:  The Chinese laws regarding protection of intellectual property are weak and fail to deter or penalize Chinese “theft” of American product and production technologies and replication of American branded products.  Chinese treatments of US enterprises operating in the Chinese market are discriminatory.

However valid these and other complaints might be, the strategies of world-diversified corporations in dealing with China are changing.

First, many multinational enterprises have found that wages in the Chinese export sector have risen sufficiently to reduce the apparent competitive advantage of China for sourcing parts, components and final products for consumption in the US and Europe.

Second, recent problems in labor relations between foreign corporations and Chinese unions have reduced Chinese attractiveness as a hub for supply chain production.

Third, it is extremely difficult to maintain international quality control standards in Chinese production facilities.  Multinational companies are increasingly mindful of the need to maintain quality standards in order to avoid product recalls and damaging consumer responses to faulty or toxic imports from China.

Fourth, there is little advantage to deploying advanced technology in China as it is likely to be copied and replicated by Chinese competitors, and there is no advantage in undertaking research in China as intellectual property will be pirated.

A common conclusion is that producing inside China for Chinese consumers makes sense, but that using Chinese labor and facilities to produce for sales to more advanced economies is increasingly less attractive.

(Credit graph: http://www.mbablogs.businessweek.com/Daveforce/archive/2009/02/16/1g6u6she5cx9a.htm)

Credit: Business Week, February 2009

Thus, the Congressional focus of attention on imports from China as a cause of job outsourcing from the US is becoming obsolete.  As for the exchange rate, the Chinese manipulation of its exchange rate was closely interlinked with Chinese reliance on exports as the primary engine of growth.  Since the collapse of world trade in the second half of 2008, this export engine faltered.

The Chinese leadership recognizes the need to boost domestic consumption and reduce reliance on exports to drive GDP growth, but making the transition from almost complete dependence on exports to greater economic diversification will take several years.  In the interim, the industrial export sector has suffered and labor displacement inside China has been substantial.

As quoted in : Vineet Kohli, The Fiscal Stimulus Package,
Project on Monitoring and Analysis of Budgets in Maharashtra State, March 2010

Government fiscal stimulus and an extraordinary level of Chinese bank lending mandated by the government have kept Chinese growth going since the collapse of exports in late 2008.  One consequence has been overflow of extraordinary lending into many other economic sectors, including investments in Chinese real estate, commodity stockpiling, expansion of industrial capacity, investments in credit derivatives, and other “bubbles.”

Now, as world growth slows, the dependence of the Chinese economy on external drivers is resulting in economic slowdown.  Given the huge artificial stimulus measures of last year, the Chinese government finds its policy responses to global slowdown limited by domestic bubbles.

As growth slowed, Chinese exports to the US have become less vital as Europe has replaced the US as number one buyer for Chinese exports.  Weakening of the Euro hurt competitiveness, especially when the Yuan was pegged to the dollar.  With export demand still weak, there is minimal incentive for China to encourage rise in the dollar exchange rate and strong incentive to discourage Euro weakening.  “China bashing” in Congress now may have diminishing impact on US jobs, and instead generate other, undesirable tensions with China.

Source: http://4.bp.blogspot.com

—————

Annex

CHINA ECONOMY
EU-China Trade In Facts and Figures

source: http://ceconomy.blogspot.com, July 20th, 2010

(Credit image: http://ceconomy.blogspot.com/2010/07/eu-china-trade-in-facts-and-figures.html)

Enhanced Maintainability: The New Grizzly’s Trail

09/13/2010

Designing New Platforms for Enhanced Maintainability: The A400M Case

An Interview with Richard Thompson

At the Farnborough Air Show last July (2010), Second Line of Defense sat down with Richard Thompson, Senior Vice President for Customer Services from Military Airbus to discuss how the design and development process enables greater maintainability and reliability for the A400M. A key impact of building and buying new systems for the US and allied militaries is rooted in the increased prominence which maintenance considerations receive in the design and build process for the new products.  In addition, Thompson highlights the impact of the Airbus commercial heritage for the design and development process as well.

A400 M Flying at Farnbourgh Air Show with Full Load of Test Equipment Onbaord (Credit photo: SLD)A400M Flying at the Farnbourough Air Show with Full Load of Test Equipment Onboard
(Credit photo: SLD, July 2010)

SLD: one of the things that a lot of folks don’t recognize is that when we design things today, we’re trying to design products with an eye to sustainably more than we historically did.  Could you describe how this has worked with regard to the A400M?

Richard Thompson: With every new generation of aircraft, one of the key drivers is to reduce the maintenance burden.  The cost associated with maintenance and the downtime that the platform will suffer throughout its life in terms of periods dedicated to scheduled or for that matter unscheduled maintenance are important considerations when developing a new aircraft.

The concept of integrating logistic support essentially means that when you start to design the aircraft to meet an operational requirement, you have sitting alongside the designer’s maintainability engineers who are also contributing to that design.  They are contributing with a view to ensure that you can have easy access to that particular part of the plane that you can remove the component or check the component easily, replace it with another one easily, and that you can have access to certain parts of the plane that need to have access to.

A product like A400M not only benefits from that approach, but also benefits from the fact that it’s based on an architecture of an advanced commercial aircraft.  The A400M is largely derived from the A380 in terms of avionics and systems architecture which supports the objective to  enter service with higher levels of maturity, and therefore, reliability compared to past military airlift programs.

That is the objective and that what’s we’re contractually obliged to demonstrate.  As part of the flight test program, we have a maintainability demonstration milestone required as part of the contract. We’re required to demonstrate maintainability metrics of a certain standard as part of the contract.

SLD: Could you elaborate on the impact of the A380 architecture on the A400M?

Richard Thompson: If you go into an A380 and you go then into an A400 you will notice that the two cockpits are very similar, to take one very visible example. And that is because when we started to design the A400M cockpit, and the man/machine interface, we started with an A380 cockpit.  And that represented at the time, the state-of-the-art of Airbus cockpit man/machine interface development, and that was a point of departure for the A400M.

For a period of about two years, we formed several working groups to address the development of the aircraft. We had four working groups that we constituted jointly with our customers.  We sat down with representatives of our European customer air forces in those four working groups; one of the working groups was what we call the cockpit working group.  The other one was the cargo-handling working group.  The third was the defensive aides system working group.  And the fourth one was the ILS working group, the supportability working group.

And we sat down with our experts and experts from the nation’s flying the aircraft, over a period of about two years, we designed or defined, rather, jointly what the customer really wanted in terms of those systems.  With regard to the cockpit working group, for example, we started with the A380 civil cockpit and jointly define exactly how the customer wanted us to migrate that baseline and take it to the military configuration that we have today onboard the aircraft.

An obvious example of changes associated with a military migration would be the need for night vision goggle compatibility.  Other examples would be the management of radios, data links, navigation, particularly accommodating low-level and tactical flight requirements.  Yet even with all the deltas that you’ll find in the A400M cockpit compared to an A380, the basic architecture is an A380 architecture.

And therefore, you’re also migrating the reliability criteria that maintainability criteria associated with a commercial civil program. We’re required to obtain very high levels of dispatch reliability, and mission success.  And we are contracted to provide, not the same, but very similar degrees of reliability.  And those are the metrics that we have to demonstrate as part of this milestone.

A400M Cockpit (Credit Photo: Airbus Military)
A400M Cockpit (Credit Photo: Airbus Military)

SLD:  The key point is that because Airbus has designed the aircraft in close consultation with the customer, you are able to migrate the Airbus commercial experience in a number of areas to the A400M. Presumably, leveraging the commercial design team is also useful in shaping a more realistic agenda on the military side with what is possible from a design point of view?

Richard Thompson: That’s an interesting point, because in fact, there is a self correcting process at work here, almost like a safety valve, because of the natural constraint imposed upon the design teams of having to work with an Airbus process, which as you know, is rooted in over 30 years of design philosophy for the commercial market.  The A400M has been developed by leveraging the technology from a strong product family concept.

SLD:    Like the cockpit.

Richard Thompson: It is a design pedigree developed over years.  It’s very difficult for somebody to come along and to say to these guys, these engineers, I want you to design something completely off-the-wall for me, something that’s never been tried before, because they won’t know where to begin.

And some people might turn around and say well, that’s a disadvantage, surely.  But I think you picked up on the point that it is in fact an advantage, because you have guys with a lot of experience in the civil/commercial world being put together with people in the military world saying, “This is what I would like this to do.” And the civil guy coming back and saying, “That’s great, but you realize that if you go down that road, it’s going to cost a lot more and be too risky.  We recommend that you stick with this instead, that we develop this further, but that we stick to the basic concept and architecture, which is proven, tested, reliable, works, and which will achieve certification a lot easier and will anyway deliver 95% or more of what you want.”

SLD:    That’s a good point.

Richard Thompson: And remember that we are going, first of all, through a civil certification path, which we will get to, which is reliable, it is known; it is trustworthy and is backed by an internationally recognized legal framework. We will deliver that path, which is known to our engineers, it’s known to our flight-test people, and which will guarantee us that we will reach a “safe for flight point” a lot quicker than if we went down some different purely military certification road, where there’s no legally binding consensus, there’s no single authority, there’s no single body.  It’s much more difficult to get everybody to agree on a common set of criteria.

What constitutes safe for flight?  If you go down the civil certification route, you can establish what is “safe for flight” a lot quicker, with a far greater degree of certainty and confidence.  Having done that, then you can work on the military delta, with what we call the CQC, which is the certification and qualification committee, which is constituted by an international agreement and includes members from each of the different countries’ military certification authorities.

They will then take what the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) does in terms of civil certification, and they will add the military delta. We will demonstrate specific military functions in the technical spec of the contract, which are not covered by EASA.

SLD: What is the challenge of juggling civil certification and shaping military specific requirements as well?

Richard Thompson: In practice, the two processes will be done in parallel. Civil certification, of course, has its disadvantages as well. There are some systems onboard the aircraft which are purely military specific.  One of them, for example, is something called the military mission management computer.

This is a computer that integrates all other systems on board the airplane; it’s the gateway between what we call the ‘civil’ systems and the purely military ones.  It’s the thing that talks to both and on which you plan and manage your mission.

That is something which is specific for the A400M, and it’s something which has been designed by people who have always designed mission computers for military aircraft.  It’s a military piece of kit.  Now, they’re having to design a military piece of kit that will have to be civil certified.

These people initially found it quite hard coming from a military background to design a computer that could be civil certified – it’s basically what you are and are not used to.  So, it’s got its advantages, but I think it’s got more advantages than disadvantages, and it provides a very well trodden path to achieving certification of the product quicker overall than would otherwise be possible.

Now that in itself adds or will add to the in-service reliability of the product, and will also mean that costs will be kept down.
———-

***Posted on September 13th, 2010

Combat Air Power: “The Need For A New Path”

09/12/2010

A Conversation with General Corley About the Future of Air Power

General John D.W. Corley
General John D.W. Corley

In late August 2010, Second Line of Defense’s Robbin Laird visited with General Corley for a wide-ranging discussion of the future of air power. General Corley retired November 2009 as the 4 star Commander of the Air Combat Command, with headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, Va. and Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command. ACC operates more than 1,200 aircraft, 27 wings, 17 bases and more than 200 operating locations worldwide. General Corley is a widely respected air power thinker and joint force commander. In this interview, General Corley provides us with a tour de horizon on air power and national security strategy with a special emphasis on how to leverage the new capabilities and to build upon those capabilities for the future joint and coalition force.

***

Persistent Pressure Or The Need To “Dissuade, Deter, Reassure”
General Corley argued that air power is the key lynch pin for the joint force and enables the U.S. to have global presence. He built his discussion around identifying the core or endurable goals for the operation of a Combat Air Force (CAF).

“What are the enduring contributions such a force must provide? What are the enduring ends, which have applicability across a range of military operations? I think sometimes, people are wanting to carve out the limited utility of service A, B, or C, what that service contributes in terms of niche capabilities for the broader the range of military operations, rather than focusing upon joint capabilities across the global operational spectrum. In my mind, I think enduring capabilities for a CAF is, first, the ability to dissuade and deter, and I probably think I would add the word reassure. I think we are missing the point if we don’t have an ability to dissuade an adversary, to deter an adversary, or to reassure an ally.”

These capabilities then facilitate “decision superiority” as well the capability to execute “persistent pressure”:There’s an element of needing to be persistent across the global engagement.”

These enduring ends have to be underwritten by a credible concept of operations.

“The enduring goals, ends, or objectives of the combat Air Force (CAF) are underpinned by a set of concepts of operations. For the air domain, air superiority is a service core competency of the Air Force, bolstered by collaborative competencies from other services that also contribute to air superiority. This is a constant of operations that underpins operational freedom of action. If you don’t underpin operational freedom of action, then again, your freedom from attack, freedom to attack, freedom to maneuver vanishes. If that vanishes for the joint force, then I don’t think you have an effective fighting joint force. I also think your ability to dissuade/deter comes called into question.”


Offsetting Budgetary Constraints: The Advantage of a “Stealth Sensor Integrated Force”
General Corley then discussed how to best proceed in an era of constrained financial resources to empower such a concept of operations supporting the global ends of the U.S. military and the CAF. Throughout the interview, General Corley highlighted that to achieve core strategic objectives in a constrained environment, it was crucial to build upon the new air combat capabilities provided by the F-22/F-35 force. The capabilities of a deployed “stealth sensor integrated force” to operate as the tip of the spear and to enable the rest of the air and joint force to operate globally was highlighted.

Leveraging the legacy fleet with selective modernization to work more effectively with the “re-normed” air arm based on the F-22/F-35 was significant, but he warned against buying new “legacy” aircraft because of their inherent limitations. The approach is to leverage extant legacy assets through building the foundation provided by F-22s and F-35s.

“For example, if I’ve got a fleet of F-15s, how can I leverage those F15s in a potential future environment at the challenging end of the scale with the range of military operations? F-15s today, or F-18s, or F-16s, do not possess the needed survivability inside an anti-access environment. One can say what you will, argue what you won’t, they will not be survivable. And from con-ops point of view, they’re being pushed further and further out due to terminal defenses or country wide or regional defenses that exist. And this diminishes their utility, but they can still be effectively utilized. For example you may take an existing platform, like an F-15 from the Air Force and begin to apply a pod to provide for infrared search tracking, so that it could basically begin to detect assets and then feed that information back to other assets. Or, by providing for connectivity with some advanced tactical data link, that platform, in turn, could be directed to launch weapons from it.”

Towards A New ConOps: Harnessing The Shift From Sequential To Simultaneous Operations
General Corley discussed the key shift from “sequential” to “simultaneous operations” enabled by the new aircraft, which provided a core baseline from which to shape global presence. The General also underscored the importance of the new aircraft in providing significant gains in sustainability and readiness, which made the new force more affordable from an operational point of view.

“How could you ever argue against this digital world which yields more identification of fault if a fault does exist, helps you isolate where that fault is, helps you identify what in fact is going to be necessary to be done for maintenance. It is pooling that information in a careful protected manner, so that appropriate actors can interpret it, manipulate it back to those individuals responsible for the main incidents of support, but also could yield to the individual operator of that vehicle, whatever the impact of the fault happens to be. What are the ramifications? Operators would begin to understand they still have viability in the conduct of a mission that they’re currently performing.”

The General underscored a variety of ways one can leverage the new fleet to provide for continual modernization of the air-enabled joint force.

Among such leverage functions are:

  • Development of new weapons able to capitalize on the F-22/F-35 fleet
  • Incorporation of unmanned elements in the combat force directed by the air element
  • An ability to capitalize on dispersed or decentralized air operations
  • An ability to leverage the digital nature of the new aircraft for an upgrade process.

“I love to have digital interfaces, because if I can bring on board a new capability, which I would like to be able to bring on board a new weapon. I would like to be able to do that and not go through many months’ worth of examination of it, designing the next Rapid Prototype (RP), getting the control panel to talk to the central computer, the central computer to display a different weapons engagement zone in terms of a head-up display, and then ultimately try to discern what is sensor suite A telling me, or sensor A telling me via sensor B and trying to resolve the anomalies between them, and then trying to bring those together.”

But he cautioned: “If you don’t underpin operational freedom of action, then again, your freedom from attack, freedom to attack, freedom to maneuver vanishes. If that vanishes for the joint force, then I don’t think you have an effective fighting joint force. I also think your ability to dissuade/deter can be called into question. We can take note of an example of that when I talked about the global precision attack. If we can no longer hold targets at risk because we no longer have credible assets to be able to strike targets, whether that’s lethal or non-lethal ways to strike those targets, then we are no longer credible. For example, when the 509th bomb wing’s 20-year old B-2 platform no longer possesses the ability to penetrate anti-access environments, even with the finest aviators, maintainers, logisticians, then the global precision attack concept of operations is called into question. If it’s called into question, can you credibly dissuade and deter? And so the ends begin to come apart.”

A key shift in the new concept of operations is enabled by the ability of the new multi-mission systems, F-22, F-35 and Aegis to allow for simultaneous, rather than sequential operations. We have historically talked about sequential escalation, and that’s been rooted in the nature of the structure of the tools we have. What’s interesting about the nature of the new tools, whether it is F-22, F-35, or Aegis is that decision makers can deploy this kit and it is not an escalation: it is a deployment. It could be used for defense, it could be doing security operations, it could be working with allies, in a certain sense, and you have not committed yourself.

General Corley emphasized in conclusion that :

“In earlier decades, when we bought more of one new type of capability in a given month than does the United States Air Force buy in total during this entire year, that buying power also allowed the purchase of specialized assets. Those environments of additional dollars allowed you to buy very specialized platforms in sizable quantities,  platforms that were focused solely on a specific capability. Specialized capability like air superiority, or specialized air surface capability like an F-117. Those fiscal and industrial environments don’t exist today: because of the birth of technology and the age of the digital world, enhanced sensors,  kill chains associated with weapons, and enhancements in terms of survivability with the new aircraft, we now need to pursue another path. This path is to build upon the F-22/F-35 foundation.”

———-

Business Model # 3:Taranis Emerges

09/07/2010
The Taranis Demonstrator Vehicle (Credit Illustration: Team Taranis)

Shaping a Partnership for a “Transformational” Capability

At the BAE Systems Media Center during the Farnbourgh Air show, an update was provided with regard to the UK’s Taranis UCAV.  The program is the UK’s leverage point into any US or European collaborative programs, and underwrites the development of autonomous UK capabilities in the UCAV area.  The UK has collaborated with the US in this area as well as in various ways with European nations.  Indeed, with the budget cuts envisaged a key question facing the UK is how to maintain its program and to attach it to partners in shaping an operational capability in the UCAV area.

The Taranis Demonstrator Vehicle (Credit Illustration: Team Taranis)The Taranis Demonstrator Vehicle (Credit Illustration: Team Taranis)

The big question on UCAS will be whether the U.K. aligns itself with the U.S., having previously worked on that front, or “will we see convergence between Taranis and Neuron?” [Selex Galileo Chief Executive Steve] Mogford asks. And if there is rapprochement within Europe, will it come “in time for there still to be an indigenous fixed-wing capability for the program?”

The briefing did provide some insight into the British approach to shaping a business model for the development effort.

Representing the pinnacle of UK engineering and aeronautical design, Taranis is an informal partnership of the MOD and industry talents including BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, QinetiQ and GE Aviation.

  1. The first key element of the business model is the partnership between MOD’s Defence Equipment and Support Agency and the core team members to share information and shape a demonstrator capability.  The charter provides the basis for fielding a joint MOD-Industry funded demonstrator.
    According to background information provided by BAE Systems on Team Taranis: “A Project Charter was signed between DE and S, BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, QinetiQ and GE Aviation to work together to design, manufacture and test and fly an experimental mission representative UAV system.  With BAE Systems as prime contractor to DE & S, the Team Taranis partners have worked closely with the customer and Industry to develop and demonstrate new technologies on a flying demonstrator.”
    As one presenter at the media briefing underscored:
    What the charter does within the concept of the program is it brings not only the industrial players together, but also the technology specialists and of course, the primary points of contact for the customers themselves.
    And the fact that we have the charter creates a set of behaviors and a common set of objectives and goals for a successful program.  And by doing that, we’re able to actually take very, very real decisions about the direction of the program to maintain the overall objective in a communicative environment… It is a very good way of actually evolving the capability and getting people to make joint decisions together.
  2. A second key element of the business model is shaping across the team “common enabling technologies.” As one of the speakers at the media brief underscored,
    In the concept of the last eight or nine years, we progressed through a series of demonstrations. All the way through the common enabling technologies have been autonomy, and the integration around ground station and the architecture of the system and exploitation of the information systems in common across the whole family of vehicles.  So we have a common architecture and construct around the entire demonstration process.”

    And the idea of the program is to do that very well, do it once and then apply it across the different air vehicles and the different concepts, which has been achieved in the concept of Mantas 30, which is heading towards production, and of course, the Taranis demonstrator.
  3. A third key element of the business model is to focus on close integration between the design and sustainment aspects of the demonstrator.  At the heart of the approach is to ensure that the firms helping build the vehicle will be the firms supplying support for the vehicle.
    We recognize that going forward to be cost effective, something like Taranis has to buy its way into the force, because it has to be cost effective.  And so we start to think about how that would work in the context of such a system and part of that is how many frontline aircraft do you need to each support aircraft?

    How can the ground-based mission planning system have embedded training within it to actually support synthetic relationships to the way the whole system comes together?  And by bringing those things together, you perhaps don’t have to fly the vehicle as often as you might do in today’s world thereby making the cost of ownership a lot cheaper by actually integrating the manufacturing organization with the support organization….

    And of course, by perhaps thinking of how we deal with surging and resources for the MOD as well as industry, and perhaps bringing that closer together may also give us some advantages as well in the overall cost.

In short, as was summarized by one presenter at the media briefing:

“Our mission is to create a UK partnership, which is truly transformational capability, that’s exactly where we’re having success today.”

———-

***Posted on September 7th, 2010

Greece: A Harsh Balancing Act

Government Net Lending as a Percentage of GDP

The Greek Economic Crisis And Defense Budget Cuts: A Question of Balance

By Harry Syringas
[email protected]

Greece’s economic crisis and recent bailout have called for budget cuts across the board, including in its defense budget. Hence, given the fact that major arm suppliers of Greece, like Germany, demand reduction in the public sector – that includes also defence – one couldn’t resume best the situation as a: “…a conundrum. We call them offset agreements, but they are offside agreements.  They really undermine the whole process, if you give with one hand and take with the other in this kind of crisis“.[1]


Government Net Lending as a Percentage of GDP, Greece on the Right (Credit Graph: The OECD, https://community.oecd.org/community/factblog/blog/2010/03/23/deepening-debt)Credit: Government Net Lending as a Percentage of GDP (Greece in blue),  OECD , March 23rd, 2010

The Greek Paradox: The Reason for Spending More Than It Can Pay for Defense
Greece has always spent more on defense than it could afford. Despite the debt the country is bearing, it is currently meeting NATO’s set spending target of 2% of GDP. Relative to its surface, population, and normative role in the international scene, Greece has been one of the biggest spenders in the alliance for decades. The country was already on the way to recession in 2009 when it raised its defense budget by 6.9% – from €5.81 billion to €6.24 billion. Indeed, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Greece was the world’s fifth-biggest weapons importer from 2005 to 2009.

Greece’s geopolitics, despite its size and population, has always played a crucial role in its behavior as an actor in international relations. A peninsula stuck between the West and the East, the country has suffered a series of wars throughout history. Even now, geopolitics contribute to its defense spending, as a long-lasting rivalry with its eastern neighbor and NATO ally Turkey is still the main reason Greece never really cut or scrutinized its defense budget.  After centuries of hostilities, a four hundred year Turkish occupation of the Greek mainland and islands, two Balkan wars, numerous crises in the 20th century, the creation of the “grey zones” (set of interrelated controversial issues between Greece and Turkey over sovereignty and related rights in the area of the Aegean Sea), and the dispute over Cyprus, the two countries have lately tried to bridge the differences through economic diplomacy and investments instead of dealing with their armies. Even when the Greek government officially cut its defense spending, Turkey never did the same despite the will of progressive and pro-European Prime Minister Erdogan, who opts for less army power and more political stability.

The Financial Crisis and Its Consequences: A 25% Cut In Operating Costs As A Starter
What happens though when a country faces its worst financial crisis in the past few years and asks other Euro Zone states and the International Monetary Fund for loans? Severe cuts took place this year in public sector wages and pensions as well as changes in the pension, health, and civil service systems. These changes were mandatory according to the terms of the loan to tackle fiscal problems. The defense budget, which up to now has been hardly scrutinized, cannot be an exception. Defense Minister Evangelos Venizelos announced that the government planned to cut back on operating costs by up to 25% in 2010 from 2009, instead of the planned reduction of 12.6% listed in the 2010 budget. Greece was asked to tame its 13.6% budget deficit to the allowed 3% ceiling by 2014, according  to the 2014 EU’s Stability And Growth Pact directive. [2]

That date was set by the EU and IMF as part of its bailout agreement. With the Greek economy expected to contract by up to 4 percent this year and again in 2011, the reality is that meeting that investment level is a near impossibility, according to Forecast International’s European Defense Analyst Dan Darling.

Even so, this figure represents the highest annual share in real terms among all of Europe’s NATO member states. It is interesting, not to mention impressive, that the two highest nominal defense spenders in Europe – the UK and France – give out 2.3% and 2%, respectively, to their militaries annually and like Greece, they have their share in budget deficit and national debt problems and consider their defense a possible source for budget cuts.

However, cutting back on military expenses does not mean capitulating on the country’s army modernization program. As a member of NATO, Greece is expected to spend in order to preserve global security, according to the Alliance’s goals. To achieve that, the Greek government negotiates with some of the countries which ask for it to tide up its finance so that the rest does not get in trouble as well. As a result Greece bought four type-214 submarines from Germany and six Fremm frigates from France, worth €2.5 billion ($3.38 billion).

As the economic crisis settles in in Europe, one may wonder about this growing gap between EU’s and NATO’s requirements towards its overlapping members….

———-

Footnotes

[1] Spyros Economides, senior lecturer on international relations at the London School of Economics: presentation on the Greek financial crisis.

[2] That date was set by the EU and IMF as part of its bailout agreement. With the Greek economy is expected to contract by up to 4 percent this year and again in 2011, the reality is that meeting that investment level is a near impossibility, according to Forecast International’s European Defence Analyst Dan Darling.
See: Wyrzykowska, Monika, Greek Military Spending in Light of the Euro Zone Crisis, 8 June 2010, http://atlantic-council.ca/?p=1662)

[3] See the draft of  “Strategic Concept”, a 10-year vision for the Alliance designed to help define the challenges it will meet in the 21st century.

Additional Reference

———-

***Posted on September 7th, 2010

Business Model # 1: Team CW

At the Farnborough Air Show, MBDA held a media briefing providing an update on the Team Complex Weapons initiative (“Team CW”) and the way ahead.

The business model is of interest, not only for shaping a key ally’s approach to shaping future capability but in terms of being a potential harbinger for how MODs will handle efforts to maintain capabilities in the face of fiscal stringencies.

Lord Drayson in his formulation of the defense industrial strategy forged a number of initiatives, one of which was Team CW.  The idea was to bring MOD into closer partnership with its weapons providers and supply chain to shape evolving capabilities in the industry with an eye to enhanced efficiencies but at the same time ensuring UK operational sovereignty in this key area of future military capability.

The baseline agreement was signed in June 2006 between MBDA, QinetiQ, Roxel and Thales UK as well as other members of the weapons supply chain to work with MOD in shaping development of future weapons.  The idea has been to share risk, guide investment and clarify early for MOD what procurement choices are optimal for its point of view.

At the heart of the concept is to try to bridge the gap between industry and MOD in reducing risk and enhancing effective procurement.  Obviously there are a number of challenges ranging for Intellectual Property ownership, investment sharing between government and diversity of private sector competitors to the question of the relationship between Team CW, MOD and the companies, such as Raytheon who are outside of the arrangement.

FireShadow, a product of the Team CW Process (Credit Photo: MBDA)
FireShadow, a product of the Team CW Process (Credit Photo: MBDA)

A next phase in the evolution of the Team CW arrangement was reached in March 2010 whereby MOD “commenced implementation of the CW sector strategy by signing a partnering agreement with the first of the Team CW prime contractors, MBDA UK.  This agreement is know as the Interim Portfolio Management Agreement (PMA-1).  Under the agreement, the Ministry of Defence and MBDA UK signed a Through Life Enabling Contract (TLEC) with its first package of work worth £330M for the development and manufacture of two of the six Team CW launch projects and to conduct further assessment work on two projects.” [1]

One of the work packages is for SPEAR Block 2 Capability, which builds on the Brimstone Urgent Operational Requirement to provide “fast jets with a very precise and discrete ground attack capability whilst the Fireshadow program will provide a new Loitering Munition capability.” [2]

The MOD release goes on to add “the Portfolio Management Agreement establishes a joint governance and management structure in order to deliver the future needs of the CW sector.  This joint governance will manage the delivery the portfolio of projects to challenging Performance, Cost and Time parameters including effective risk, opportunity and incentivization management approaches.” [3]

And a further aspect underscored was “one of the key elements of the Agreement is an ability to flex the output of the contract to reflect the changing needs of UK forces.  This approach has been developed through assessment phase and places the agreement in good position to respond to future shifts in requirements.” [4]

In a separate release (Team Complex Weapons [Team CW] Key Facts, July 2010), the approach was characterized as being based on the “delivery of three high level requirements: improved, affordable and swiftly adaptable military capability, operational sovereignty of UK weapons, greater efficiency and improved value for money.”  The document went on to emphasize that “the development of a number of families of weapons” will be highlight “which will benefit from the use of modular technologies across the range, underpinned by a stable pipeline of funding managed at sector and portfolio level.  On this basis the approach will provide stability to the sector in return for greater flexibility to the MOD and sustain indigenous UK industrial skills and capabilities required for operational sovereignty.” [5]

SPEAR, an additional Team CW Effort (Credit Illustration: MBDA)
SPEAR, an additional Team CW Effort (Credit Illustration: MBDA)

At the media briefing by MBDA, an update on the business model was provided.  When asked the benefits to MOD of such a model, one of the MBDA briefers underscored that “MOD and industry were provide a much better insight into the weapons we are buying, why we are buying them, whether we need them and generally brings into sharper focus the platforms on which we will deploy them.”

The briefers were asked whether they thought the Team CW approach might be the harbinger of other such arrangements in the face of growing financial pressure.  The response was to suggest that this might be the case or as it was put by the briefer, “Team CW is a significant enabler to deal with these (stringent financial) circumstances.’”

Quite obviously one of the tensions is between the creation of a teaming arrangement which shapes an MOD-Industrial front end which reduces competition and the need to remain open to benefiting from global sourcing in providing best value to provide the materials and subsystems for Team CW.  As the briefers discussed the problem, they suggested that the challenge is precisely where the crossover point lies between Teaming collaboration and competitive supply chains.  As one briefer commented, “It is clear that access to the global supply chain is crucial, but it is difficult to work that out at the top levels if operational sovereignty is the core goal.”

In a recent RUSI overview on Team CW, MBDA’s Steve Wadley emphasized that

Since the formation of TEAM CW, MoD and MBDA, together with the other Team CW members, have worked hard to improve the ways they work together.  These changed behaviors include joint working at project and portfolio level, and openness and transparency on all issues… Aligned objectives, joint incentivization and joint technical and progress reviews between the DE&S and Industry teams have create a much more constructive, trusting and supportive problem-solving environment.

And at a Raytheon press briefing at the Farnbough Air Show, Dr. Taylor Lawrence, President of Raytheon Missile Systems raised “concerns about the industrial policy of the UK, [which is] preferentially treating one of our competitors, MBDA, for [the] CW [program].”

As the West faces the challenge of shaping common missile defense capabilities a key question to resolve will be the relationship between approaches such as Team Complex and the American firms which will shape future US missile defense capability. In a constrained financial environment, how to shape effective teaming arrangements which are open to tapping effectively and efficiently global capabilities?

———

[1] to [5] All quotes have been taken from “UK MOD-MBDA Bilateral Agreement: Key Facts” (July 2010).

———-

***Posted on September 7th, 2010