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The Administration will make perhaps its most important announcements over the next few months, affecting our very existence.
I am referring specifically to the results of our nuclear posture review and the arms control deal we are seeking to make with Russia. Congress, and the Senate in particular, will have to judge both. The stakes are very high and the complexities are immense. Plenty has been written on both, but the essential reasons why we have nuclear forces has been ignored.
Below are a few myths.
Myth #1: If we reduce our nuclear stockpile, it will encourage others to do the same. There is no historical evidence to support this claim. The USSR/Russia has been the only state to follow our lead in the past, and then only after years of negotiations. Our nuclear stockpile has declined by 80% since 1991; yet in the same timeframe India, Pakistan, and North Korea have built nuclear weapons, China has increased its stockpile, and Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria have started nuclear programs. To the contrary, US disarmament has so far not made us safer. It will not lead our adversaries to disarm.
Myth #2: The best way to reduce our stockpile is to arbitrarily declare a new lower number. Actually, this is the worst way to determine the composition, alert status, number, type of delivery vehicles, and posture of our forces. Instead, we should describe our strategies, our forces’ intentions, our deterrence plan, and our intended response to attacks; then we should derive our forces with the characteristics to meet our strategy.
Myth #3: We don’t need many weapons, just enough to destroy many of our adversaries’ cities. Actually, it is both immoral and against many of the treaties signed by the US to intentionally target non-combatants. As a result, the nuclear guidance given to our military forces emphasizes military targets. Yes, there will be collateral damage, but in many cases the civilians who perish will be far from our adversary’s cities … and in much lower numbers than many pundits suggest.
Myth #4: Lower numbers are always better. Actually stability will be undermined if the number of nuclear weapons is too low. It will create a very low margin for error in assuring compliance. A low number encourages our adversaries to cheat, consider a first debilitating strike to remove our nuclear capabilities, or assist other US adversaries in their efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.
Myth #5: We don’t need nuclear weapons because our main enemies are terrorists. This myth is based on the belief that terrorism is our only adversary and will be so far into the future. Historically, we have always been wrong in our postulation of when, where, and who we will fight next. There is no reason to suggest that sometime in the future an adversary, which has nuclear weapons, will not threaten us. It is far better to deter an adversary by being strong, than to fight him.
Myth #6: Deterrence will work, even if we put no forces on alert and allow our nuclear capabilities to degrade. This myth is sometimes phrased as “taking deterrence for granted.” We actually do not know that deterrence has worked or not worked – we only know that our forces, readiness, planning, etc have been credible in the eyes of potential enemies. We also know that we have not been attacked. The common measure of deterrence is generally considered: Deterrence = Capability + Will. Capability is measured not only in numbers, but also in forces that are ready, responsive, survivable, and flexible. Will is understood as our intent to respond in the event of a nuclear attack. Deterrence is always measured through the eyes of a potential enemy – not our own eyes.
Myth #7: We don’t need many nuclear weapons, because we have strong conventional forces. Actually our power projection forces are the oldest in our history. B-52s are from the 1950s. Our newest bomber, the B-2, is now 20 years old. Our tanker forces are the oldest in our history. Even the strongest pillar of our nuclear deterrent — our Minuteman ICBMs first entered the force in the 1970s. Yes, our conventional forces are good – but our own security is not the only reason why we possess nuclear weapons. We provide extended deterrence for our Allies, NATO, Japan, South Korea, and others – so they won’t feel obliged to develop their own nuclear programs. Our extended nuclear umbrella reduces the world’s total number of nuclear weapons, puts the majority of weapons safely in US hands, and reduces the odds of proliferation to rogue states or other non-state groups. It is probably the most important reason to keep a sufficient stockpile of weapons.
Myth #8: Nuclear weapons are a huge drain on our budget. Actually, the entire nuclear force – from the infrastructure, labs, delivery vehicles, weapons, and the people to operate them is a very small percentage of the DOD and Energy Department budgets – less than 5-6%. If we reduce the number of warheads, we save very little because we have already made the necessary investments. Do we really want to get rid of capabilities for which we have already paid? What we get in return cannot be overstated – it is literally our national survival. It is also very expensive to decrease our stockpiles because we would need to dismantle and dispose of them in a responsible way.
If we get this wrong, our very existence will be threatened. This is not an area where the President should announce a goal, which is rubber-stamped by Congress. We need to be cautious, take our time, and hear the judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our field commanders.
The central question, which ought to be asked, is not: “Can we live with this treaty and force structure?” The central question should be: “Does this treaty and force structure make us safer?”
A Coast Guard 270-foot medium-endurance cutter sits offshore of Haiti as a Coast Guard MH-65 Dolphin helicopter crew patrols Haiti’s coastline Jan. 13. Coast Guard personnel from across the eastern United States have deployed on Coast Guard vessels and aircraft for the earthquake relief mission in Haiti (courtesy photo: U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area, 01-13-2010)
A Growing Upcoming Mismatch Between Assets and Needs: Haiti As a Case In Point As the USCG faces the safety and security challenges of the nation, the continuing gap between resources, modernization and missions will inevitably lead to growing security and safety deficits. With aging assets, a slow down in procurement, and budget shortfalls, the inability of the USCG to respond to security and safety missions will clearly go up. The ethos of the Service is such that they would not say this publically; but the reality is that the mismatch between assets and needs is growing, not decreasing.
In addition, the very effective tools, which the Deepwater and other acquisition approaches have generated, are not widely understood. For example, the dramatic rescue off of Hatteras would not have happened without the C4ISR modernization for the C-130s. Now the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) wants to slow down the acquisition of new maritime patrol aircraft, which are necessary for surveillance, security and safety missions. The ongoing crisis in Haiti certainly can use significant lift assets, which are in short supply because of the Afghanistan and Iraqi missions. USCG MPAs and C-130s are very useful in providing lift and support capabilities in a crisis such as the Haiti event.
On January 13th, 2010, outgoing Commandant Thad Allen provided an overview of the current challenges facing the USCG at the Surface Navy Association meeting. His address focused on the following:
Much of it was about what’s happening in Haiti: he had been up all night working with the Secretary and others about responding to the large earthquake there;
A USCG vessel was first on scene; two more in area quickly; another deployed to GITMO to await cargo coming for transport.
A title 10 requirement for USCG to transfer to SECNAV when ordered requires CG/NAVY/DOD interoperability;
USCG helos, C-130s and other assets flowing into the area quickly.
USCG is the first responder here; developing situation awareness and providing early assistance; others such as Navy must follow quickly with larger assets, and all will need in terms of staying power;
Execution of Anti-Drug, Law enforcement and Human Migrant Interdiction Operations missions allowed the necessary presence of capable assets;
USCG has demonstrated capability to surge quickly, but it is stretched to the limit;
USCG has response plans in place for mass migrations; started with Mariel and has been improved and exercised. Lots of interagency, state and local governments and organizations such as FEMA & Red Cross involved.
An injured American arrives at U.S. Naval Hospital Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by U.S. Coast Guard helicopter at approximately 10:37 a.m., Jan.13. He is one of four Americans from the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, brought to the Naval Station to receive medical care for traumatic injuries sustained in the earthquake that struck the region Jan. 12. The victims were evaluated and stabilized by hospital personnel before they were medically evacuated to the U.S. for further treatment. (credit: Navy photo/Chief Petty Officer Bill Mesta)
He moved on to stress much CG involvement around the world because most navies are like USCG; strong support for Department of State, training, ship rider programs, joint ops.
Commandant Allen then discussed anti-piracy efforts, which in his view require two different evolutions:
Stop the incidents
Punish the perpetrators—this requires evidence preservation, and place for trial (agreement negotiated with Kenya for this and other law enforcement activities.
Recapitalization, a Must: The Arctic Mission As a Case In Point Although budget pressures will be significant, recapitalization must continue. He fears the possibility of having a hollow force.
The Commandant then discussed the Arctic mission. There is growing joint and international cooperative emphasis on Arctic. Except for underwater ops, mostly all the Arctic missions are USCG missions vice DOD—EEZ and continental shelf enforcement, navigation, pollution prevention and response, etc. North Pacific and Atlantic CG forums have been useful models for cooperation in safety, security, resource protection and working Arctic issues.
In short, the USCG activity discussed by the Commandant underscores importance of presence in the regional areas of operation, having capable assets in the AORS, and having a surge capacity to deal with crises, and robust C4ISR to work across the USCG, with the USN and with other nations. There’s simply no substitute for having capable assets on scene with knowledge of the areas and highly trained crews; this requires a force in being—we must have effective presence in our AORs with the right equipment and fully interoperable to leverage what the nation and partners can bring to core safety and security missions.
The Coast Guard Cutter HEALY (WAGB – 20) is United States’ newest and most technologically advanced polar icebreaker (Photo:http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/cgcHealy/)
But the positive contribution, which the USCG brings to the table, is not fully resourced. For example, with regard to the Arctic mission, the USCG has but three polar capable icebreakers, and two of them are in dire need of replacement.
History will look back at the Copenhagen Summit as the moment at the beginning of the 21st century when the power structure of the world fundamentally changed.
Towards a De-Facto G-2: The Chinese Emergence and the European Re-Alignment During the run-up to the summit, President Obama and most European leaders believed they were in their customary role of guiding the rest of the world. Without fanfare, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao quietly formed a Chinese-led core group of emerging market economic powerhouses: India, Brazil, and South Africa – a group eventually given the acronym “BASIC.” Most governments, including that of the US, could not accept the EU’s proposal which relied heavily on regulatory mechanisms and targets. By the closing day of the conference, the arduously crafted European regime, which focused on regulating and taxing carbon emissions, had been ignored or dismissed by the other attendees, including by President Obama himself.
Arriving near the end of the conference, President Obama found himself in need of some “souvenir” to show for his transatlantic trip. His advisers warned him that even a hint of support for the EU’s proposed carbon controls would be unacceptable to Congress. The Chinese Premier offered him an opportunity to align the US with the Chinese-drafted BASIC declaration. Given the choice of returning to the US with nothing, or joining in a new statement of “good intentions,” Obama accepted co-sponsorship of the Chinese draft.
European leaders were shocked that their heavy political investment in a “European” post-Kyoto regime had been sidelined. Worse, they were angered that President Obama not only ignored their initiatives but also declined direct negotiations with them. Instead, he chose to give primary personal attention to Premier Wen Jiabao and ultimately joined with China in what was effectively seen by Europeans as an initiative of the new “G-2.”
During the Presidency of George W. Bush there had been growing complaints from Europeans that the US had forsaken multilateralism in favor of unilateral assertion of American hegemony. Bush was perceived as a bully, uninterested in consultations with cautious Europeans and uncommitted to the long process of transatlantic coordination of economic and security initiatives which was born during WWII.
Since that time, the primary model for multilateral negotiation had been close diplomatic interaction between the US and Europe in pursuit of consensus, followed by joint efforts to draw the rest of the world into a process of collegial decision making. Transatlantic cooperation was the foundation of the Bretton Woods framework of institutions and rules for managing liberalization of trade and financial flows. This framework successfully brought about globalization of the world economy, enabling a vast array of nations to rise up from bleak origins and to participate in rapid development of economic, technological, social, and even political advances.
Copenhagen revealed to us that the success of globalization has also realigned the power structure, which underlies international cooperation, rivalries, and conflict. At Copenhagen, the US-EU basis for establishing international consensus failed, and was replaced by newly improvised collaborative efforts of a handful of countries led by China, and joined by the US.
The Strategic Meaning of Copenhagen Copenhagen was about the economic dynamics of the next several decades: what costs would be borne, and by whom. From that perspective, the Europeans were perceived as the relatively prosperous and well-intentioned intellectuals who believed they held the right answers for the rest of humankind. Politicians from other capitals, primarily concerned with domestic economic and social consequences of potential de-carbonization, emission cuts, and technology transfers, did not assign credence to what was perceived as a self-serving European agenda.
But even beyond this reluctance, most governments were not ready to accept the huge costs and limitations of economic growth that would be imposed on their industries and peoples. A degree of international political cooperation was called for on a scale that has been proven again and again to be unachievable. The majority of governments, and especially their politicians and legislatures, still cannot find significant domestic support to yield sovereignty over jobs and resources to “foreign” authorities.
China’s leaders had recognized early on that they would be blamed if Copenhagen failed unless they offered something positive. In the past, China might have remained in the background while another nation or group of nations stepped forward to block international consensus. For example, when the Doha Round of international trade negotiations broke down in 2008, it was the Indian representative who effectively stood in the way of further progress, while a reluctant China was hidden in the background.
It should be remembered that the Kyoto Accord taught President Clinton and the rest of the world that no US President has the power to negotiate and approve an agreement that would effectively change US laws and circumscribe the authority of Congress. When Vice President Gore flew to Kyoto to consummate an environmental agreement the initial news throughout the world was that an historic breakthrough in global cooperation had been achieved. Instead, Congress reacted by advising President Clinton that he should not seek Senate approval of the Kyoto Accord.
At the time of Congressional inaction on the Kyoto Accord, much blame was assigned to the reluctance of countries like China and India to participate. Congressional politicians argued that the US could not limit its own economy when other major world polluters were free to continue without restraint.
Frankly, this was a convenient excuse for Congress’s reluctance to act, but it was not the only reason for inaction. Political rejection was not simply a matter of Republican reluctance. The accord was rejected by the “Blue” Democratic states of the US industrial heartland and Democrats representing states that mined coal and produced and processed oil and gas. An open vote would have been a huge political embarrassment to President Clinton and Vice President Gore. In subsequent years, President George W. Bush received the same advice from Senate leaders, so he simply avoided addressing the Kyoto Accord as his predecessor had done: by ignoring it.
Now that China and India appear to be party to some political commitment to limit environmental contamination, White House aides valiantly argue that President Obama can use this apparent breakthrough to help garner support for the Waxman-Markey “cap and trade” carbon bill before Congress.
It is doubtful that the Chinese and Indian recognition of their responsibilities will dramatically change the outlook for the President’s domestic carbon initiative. He would still face objections from Republicans and members of his own party who represent industrial, mining, and oil and gas sectors. In the midst of rising unemployment, anticipated tax increases, and the underlying costs of the President’s health care reforms, Congress will likely prove reluctant in 2010 to impose dramatic new costs on the American economy. Considering present polls indicate substantial losses of Democratic Congressional seats in the mid-term election, Democrats determined to keep their own seats are unlikely to defy popular opinion against increased restrictions on and costs of energy use.
The dynamics of the Copenhagen conference raise fundamental questions about the power structure of the world of the 21st century. Even before Copenhagen it was becoming evident that the transatlantic power structure of preceding decades had less influence. Instead, an array of newly emerging powers was asserting themselves.
In the struggle for broader acceptance of their initiatives, both the Europeans and the US increasingly found themselves engaged in a competition for influence with other nations around the world. The functioning and voting structure of the IMF came into question. New regional arrangements for economic and political cooperation began to proliferate. These took the form of free trade arrangements (FTAs) and less legally binding but enhanced forms of cooperation. The structure of the UN Security Council and other UN bodies came into question.
The Way Ahead The Doha Round (which had been under way for almost a decade under the framework of the WTO) has now come to the point that a US-EU accord, even if it could be reached, would have only minor influence. The primary trade interests of both the EU and the US are now focused on emerging markets, and particularly on China, India, and the Asian Tigers. The objectives of these emerging markets must be reconciled with those of the advanced industrial world in order for a new international agreement to be achieved. Unfortunately, there is little possibility of a breakthrough on that basis any time soon.
The decision of world leaders to enlarge the G-8 to a new G-20 framework gives the appearance of comprehensiveness. However, the underlying reality is that this group is far too large to facilitate formulation of new initiatives. Instead, ad hoc collaboration of individual governments will take place within the G-20. These ad hoc arrangements will vary according to the issues being addressed and the relative power of participants to affect the outcome. International financial reform will be of primary interest to some but not all of the members; food supplies will take primacy for some but not others; relative emphasis will vary on economic growth versus the distribution of the gains from growth; environmental issues will continue to “be of interest” but without enthusiastic pursuit of solutions by all members; geopolitical disruptions will from time to time interrupt and divert attention.
Separately, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) established by the G-20 will grind out an array of important proposed reforms of the functioning of international financial markets, giving the appearance of multilateral cooperation. Behind the curtain, politicians in national governments will intervene to impede or delay implementation of reforms that might inflict damage on domestic interests. Already, the EU and Eurozone governments, led by Germany, have been applying the brakes to reforms that would have painful consequences for European banks and insurers. The US and the Europeans can sometimes find common ground, but for the most part they are on different trajectories reflecting the national interests of the participants and the relative pace of adjustments to the Great Recession of the last few years.
At the heart of Copenhagen was President Obama’s apparent acceptance of the importance of the emerging “G-2” relationship between the US and China. From China’s point of view, the G-2 is collaboration between the receding, but still relevant, dominance of the US in world affairs and the emerging power of China on the world stage. Given President Obama’s evident emphasis on the primacy of China in his recent trip to Asia, it seems natural that these two rivals would find an array of common interests.
Recognizing that the G-2 is a new reality, it may be asked whether China is really ready for such a potent role in world affairs. The Chinese economy has suffered grievously from the deepest downturn in world trade since the 1930s. The Chinese leadership has levitated its economy with a combination of fiscal and lending stimulants that exceed half of China’s GDP. This artificially levitated economy is unstable and will require continuous and obsessive attention to avert collapsing bubbles, growing unemployment, industrial stockpiling, and growing overcapacity of industries for which there is inadequate world demand. China’s present leaders, and those to take over in 2012, will have their hands full just keeping the Chinese economy functioning without disruption. There can be doubt whether this China is now ready to take on a role of global leadership.
In the meantime, the world’s geopolitical power structure will remain in flux, with the power structures of the past decreasing in importance for the future. This change poses big questions for how the US can project global or regional power and influence in coming decades. US power projection will not only be constrained by government budgets and limitations on American borrowing from world capital markets, but also by constraints posed by continuously shifting allegiances of other nations and groups of nations.
“Ne sutor ultra crepidam”
(Apelles the Painter to a shoemaker criticizing his picture, as Quoted by Pliny the Elder)
Overload Alert Are recent events regarding US intelligence efforts indications that the intelligence agencies might be overloaded with work? The first-draft answer is Yes, and that a re-balancing of cyberspace duties seems to be in order. Certainly this question is a subject for examination by defense planners, Congress, and the National Security Council. Current hearings and the travails of standing up USCYBERCOM afford a window to examine the issue.
Factors for consideration include:
A significant amount of warfighting is done by intelligence agencies. This capability seems largely to overlap with the military services. For example, both dedicate resources to extensive flying, targeting, and evaluating air-borne ISR sorties.
A heavy amount of cyber warfighting tasks are assigned either formally or de facto to the intelligence agencies. For example, USCYBERCOM HQ is located in Ft Meade, Maryland. Housing USCYBERCOM HQ in the heart of US intelligence naturally and powerfully attracts the attention of intelligence resources away from the core tasks of intelligence, on which our country has long relied and which are currently the subject of significant Congressional and DoD reviews for effectiveness.
Law enforcement professional skill sets, warfighting professional skill sets, and intel professional skill sets differ significantly from each other. Moving core warfighting and law enforcement functions either de facto or formally into the intelligence ambit may perhaps run counter to the conventional wisdom of the private and government sector about the difficulty of successfully merging differing corporate and institutional cultures. In any event, as the merger goes on, and USCYBERCOM stands up, the best practices from the field of mergers could assist the effort.
Recent articles and testimony make references to the overload of the intel agencies. Is it possible that the core intelligence functions may deteriorate as intelligence work assignments extend into the realms of law enforcement and warfighting? This question relates to task overload and a lack of expertise in warfghting arising due to three recent cases:
the Fort Hood shootings;
the attempted bombing of a Delta Flight on Christmas Day;
and the loss of seven CIA Intelligence professionals in a warfighting situation.
The federal government will have spent $7.9 billion in 2009 securing its computers against hackers and other cybersecurity threats. With the number and complexity of cyberattacks on the rise, government analyst Input predicts that the government's cybersecurity spending will increase to $11.7 billion in 2014, a compound annual growth rate of 8.1 percent. That's a lot of antivirus software (credit:http://www.fcw.com/Articles/2009/11/02/WEEK-cybersecurity-infographic.aspx; posted November 2nd, 2009)
Cyberspace More of a Warfighting Domain With difficulties emerging in the core intelligence functions of data gathering and sharing, is the foreseeable task load of cyber responsibility an overload for intel personnel and agencies?
As a historical comparison, the British, German, French, and US defense institutions did not assign undersea warfighting to their intelligence agencies when the field emerged as a warfighting domain. Indeed, in the case of the air domain, the warfighting and law enforcement forces of each nation applied their history and knowledge to the new domain.
Notably, as in the case of cyberspace, air operations started in the signals and comm lanes. In the early 1900s it was the US Army Signal Corps that developed the early technology and methods for US air operations. But as a warfighting and law enforcement domain, air was in due course overseen by the warfighting and law enforcement institutions because it fell within the ambit of the professional warfighting professional skill set — as typified by the principles of war — and the law enforcement professional skill set.
It may be that once cyberspace moves into the warfighting and law enforcement realm, there would be some improvement in privacy concerns. Indeed the public may see the warfighting and law enforcement institutions as less of a threat to personal privacy than the intelligence institutions.
In any event, the warfighting and law enforcement institutions of the US have successfully balanced the Constitution’s guarantees of personal liberty and the duty to provide for the common defense — as with FAA registration of commercial and airline flights; tracking nautical traffic approaching the continental shelf; tracking aircraft at the Air Defense Identification Zone boundary — all using private data.
Most notably, the National Guard, Reserves, active military, and law enforcers have a historic and traditional duty to rescue, comfort, and even feed and provide medical care for citizens in times of earthquakes, floods, fires, and other disasters. The citizen bond of trust to warfighters and to law enforcers is of a different and more benevolent character than to the intelligence agencies.
In Search of the Right Balance In light of the above considerations, what is the right balance of activity in cyberspace between US warfighters, law enforcers, and the intelligence agencies?
Pliny the Elder may speak to this: Ne sutor ultra crepidam (i.e. “Shoemaker, Stick to your last”). In a nutshell, the intelligence agencies are the “shoemakers” of data gathering and warning. Do recent breakdowns say that intelligence professionals should stick closer to their last?
The burden of proof seems to be upon those who argue that intelligence agencies, though overstretched, can swallow such a huge part of the new cyberspace mission set. Wisdom and history say warfighters and law enforcers are the teams distinctively competent to manage the cyberspace domain in the common defense, as with each domain of air, space, sea, undersea, and land.
Best to learn from wisdom in the present than pain in the future.
Considering the relative decline of the United States, the rise of Asia, the shift in power to the commodity-producing states, and the continued inability of Europe to become a global military power, multi-polarity is inevitable. Many analysts assume that multi-polarity facilitates multi-national governance. Thus, the decline of the US, and with it the post-war Western system, is believed to lead to a new multi-national governance system.
The EU in a Multipolar World: Trying to Lead by Example An example of this assumption is a recent publication of the European commission, entitled The World in 2025. In the report, the authors describe how the rise of Asia and other multi-polar players will impact global governance. The report underscores the following key trends that will create a multi-polar world.
First, Asia will rise. By 2025, the report states that two-thirds of the world will live in Asia. This change will allow Asia to be the first exporter and importer within the global trade system. “The USA-EU-Japan triad will not longer dominate the world, even if the United States preserve their leadership” (page 9). Indeed before 2025, China could become a global economic power second to the US: “if the recent trends continue, in 2025, the United States and Europe will have lost their scientific and technological supremacy for the benefit of Asia” ( page 10). This development would turn Asia the “main location of business R and D” (page 11).
India: A nation develops, Joe Leahy, The Financial Times, 01-10-2010
Second, global migration patterns will continue the decline of Europe’s importance. Indeed after 2012, the European population will start to decrease.
Third, there are considerable health and ecological challenges facing the world as it moves towards 2025. “Although the global health situation is improving, new threats are emerging… and non traditional security issues like pandemics are coming up” (page 13). These developments which cross national boundaries will cause states to further establish a multi-national governance system to attempt to deal with these challenges with a global reach.
Fourth, a new geopolitics of energy will emerge in which resources of Russia and the Caucuses balances the role of the Middle East. Notably missing from the EU analysis is the role of the Arctic in this shift in geopolitics.
Fifth, other commodities will become significant as shortages occur, and many of these resources are in poor regions. This will lead to shifts in power among states and regions. “More than 50% of the major ore reserves are located in the countries having a per capita income of 10 dollars or less per day” (page 13). “Many countries that are rich in resources apply protectionist measures which stop or slow down exports of raw materials to Europe in order to support their downstream industries” (page 15).
Having sketched a realistic view of global trends, the report goes on to argue that the EU will serve as a model for multi-national governance in 2025. It forecasts that the US will preserve its military power and be able to play an important role with Europe in shaping the multi-national system of governance to cope with the emerging challenges of multi-polarity.
The report sketches growing tensions accompanying “increasing global economic interdependence between the principal poles of the world and their peripheries”. Among the tensions highlighted are the following (page 19):
Different political approaches concerning global governance including human rights and the place of emerging countries (cf. “G20”), the need to manage global goods, to initiate projects of common interest, to encourage democracy and to fight totalitarianism and populism;
Different economic approaches: after a period where world capitalism seemed to model itself gradually on the model of market finance, the latest report of the National Intelligence Council in the United States (“Global Trends 2025”) foresees, for the coming decades, at economic level, a coexistence and competition between several types of capitalism, some of the emerging and oil producing countries promoting state capitalism; to illustrate that, one can mention, for example, that the number of sovereign funds increased from three in 2005 to more than forty today, and the amounts that they mobilise increased from 700 million to 3 trillions of dollars over the same period (page 17);
Territorial or cultural claims within the world’s growth poles or at their periphery, if the political, economic and social cohesion of these poles is not ensured or increased;
The non-inclusion in the operation of the world’s “inter-poles” of the marginalized countries: fifty-six countries count for less than 0.01 % of world trade; a third of the world population lives in a state of poverty; if nothing is done to reverse this tendency in the next 20 years, 38 % of the African population risks finding itself in a state of extreme poverty; in other words, even if poverty regresses considerably overall, the wealth differential between the rich and the poor will progress, within nations as well as between nations.
A Multi-National System of Governance or a Recipe for Global Conflict? Having provided this overview, the report goes on to argue that such a multi-polar system will lead to a multi-national system of governance. In a conclusion worthy of Erasmus himself, the report argues that
“the new geopolitical situation which takes shape with the rise to power of emerging countries will probably have as a counterpart a new organization of international relations. The EU aims at leading by example. A common governance system on a world level is likely to emerge (transition from the nation state to new legal-political entities) but one does not know how it will evolve. The creation of an economic level playing field at world level will perhaps lead to a democratisation of (authoritarian) regimes of state capitalism countries but one cannot exclude upheavals in the process” (page 21).
The assumption of a similitude between multi-polarity and multi-nationality is so strong that the report asserts that simply by taking the moral high ground Europe will have a key leadership role.
“Europe can prove that it is relatively independent of any other region of the world and that it struggles for the independence of the others and for their cooperation for the common good. To this end it can rest on the fact that it promotes a “constructivist” logic of a projected common future (“community of destiny”) with an opening to the world….The multi-polarity of the world to come could have as an effect a transition towards a new “widened and diversified cohesion” perspective involving the European Union and its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. This could even imply to enlarge the model of today’s cohesion policy” (page 22).
If such a view were confined to EU researchers, the problem would be contained. But members of the Obama Administration also act on such assumptions. For example, the frequent assertion that the US should re-cast its military policy to engage in support of the global commons is similar in character. It is dangerous to simply assume that the global regions will somehow, with the alchemy of common interest, shape common capabilities to pursue common solutions.
An assumption throughout the EU report is that somehow the US maintains a significant military position, and presumably because the US is capable of doing so, the EU does not need to worry about this problem. This analysis is clearly an assumption on stilts. The future that the EU analysts are forecasting is one in which US military power would inevitably decline, placing into question the global military and security relationships.
The multi-polarity laid out in the EU report is a recipe for significant global conflict. Tools to assert national or regional objectives will certainly accompany this conflict. Not simply classic military tools, but diplomatic and security tools can be used in conjunction with military tools to re-shape the world.
It may well be that emerging states like Iran and China will not build global military intervention tools. However, military means will be part of a state’s exercise of power. One of the many flaws of asserting the primacy of soft power in the analysis of the next decade of the 21st century is rather simple: US hard power dominated the last decade and virtually all assumptions about the role of soft power exercised by others, such as the Chinese, operated within a distinct historical epoch. Unless one is a primative Marxist believing in universal laws operating outside of historical periods, then virtually all assumptions about the future – for example, of Chinese behavior based on the last decade – are just that: assumptions.
The history of the modern period has seen multi-national governance only in the presence of a dominant state or a balance of power between two dominant states. The EU report provides a forecast of significant flux and indeterminate futures. It is difficult to see how multi-national governance emerges like some 12th century alchemy from such a situation. Unfortunately, conflict among states aspiring to dominance is more likely. In any case, the “poles” of the multi-polar world will certainly be trying to leverage their relative strengths to re-enforce their power positions. Perhaps the “poles” will bargain out from conflict a “multi-national bargain”. But this is not guaranteed.
It is more likely that we will see something akin to asymmetric warfare. In this “asymmetric geo-politics” each pole of the global landscape seeks to maximize the value of its core competence or capabilities. We will see something like a diplomatic poker game in which the various players try to define the game to their advantage. Rather than a contest of soft versus hard power, states will try to combine their assets and press their advantage to gain ascendancy. Although a game of diplomacy, it will be characterized by the success of states who are able to combine diverse assets of power into an effective combination of strategy. The multi-national system managed by the EU and the US over the past twenty years is likely to be replaced by a game of multi-power poker, rather than a new system of judicious checks and balances of multi-national governance.
In short, it is difficult to believe that multi-polarity leads inevitably to multi-national governance. Indeed, the EU forecast is ripe with the seeds for forecasting significant global conflict among the “poles” of the next phase of global development. It is weaker on its proof that multi-national governance will magically take hold.
This is the first article of a new dossier on “Outlook for the Future”, which will assess among other themes the next generations’ perception and vision of the defense and security environment.
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BOSTON — Marines from 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, stand under an American Flag draped over the Green Monster, Fenway Park’s unique 37 foot tall left field wall, before marching off the field after a pre-game ceremony for the 2010 Bridgestone NHL Winter Classic (credit: Sgt Randall A. Clinton, 01/01/10)
A New Generation of Vets is Coming It has been reported that the most dangerous rank in Iraq and Afghanistan combat is a USMC Lance Corporal (E-3). Those wearing that stripe on their Marine Dress Blues have the highest probability of being killed or wounded. A Marine Lance Corporal makes around $1,300 per month.
The Marines’ brothers and sisters in arms serving with the Army, Navy, and Air Force are also paying a heavy price. In the opening engagement the US Naval Academy had the most graduates killed on 9/11 of any institution. West Point graduates have paid the highest price of all US officers serving in combat today.
It is not my intention to dwell on just the sacrifice of all but to send a message to America that a new generation of veterans is coming. This generation of veterans has truly earned the right to lead America into the future.
A few soldiers raising their hands today to support and defend the Constitution will still be making national security decisions in 2060. However, not just for our national security, but throughout America there is now a tremendous force for good in our society. A new generation is with us who believes despite the risk of their own life that their service in a Nation at war is bigger than just a sense of self.
The attributes of this cadre run deep. Student bodies cheering their team at the football games for the Commander in Chief trophy have dedicated four years to get an excellent education following a rigorous honor code – to not lie, cheat, or steal. When they graduate a war is calling them.
Fellow officers will join Service Academy grads. These officers come from the great land grant colleges of America. They make a commitment knowing their ROTC courses will require time and attention away from their chosen degree path. A few Ivy League ROTC Graduates will appear along with other private colleges. State Military institutions like VMI and the Citadel will add to the mix. Let’s not forget that some students after spending their own money on an education volunteer for Officers Candidate School.
They all meld together with unity of purpose to be leaders in a nation at war.
The men and women they lead in the ranks are volunteers out of high school from cities large and small, off farms, and out of factories, office cubicles, and the service industry. Ultimately when bullets are flying and people are dying it comes down to a fundamental truth: no one is in it for the money.
Building a Post 9/11 Safety Net Since 9/11 a touchstone of service has been forged and a generation bonded. Some will stay in uniform; others will leave; but all have imprinted memories for a lifetime.
However, the biggest surprise I suggest is this generation is not monolithic in thought or deed. They will be Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. They will be deeply religious or not and some will have very significant problems readjusting. More than we suspect.
Family and friends will be the best help for those with combat wounds, physical disables, mental issues like PTSD, and sickness from the environmental factors on the battlefield. There is also a safety net woven by previous generations of warriors and strong VA programs. But the most important safety net will be support from their fellow warriors.
In getting on with their lives, because of decisions made beyond their control they will be facing huge problems. The American economy is in deep recession with significant issues still to come. In these veterans’ future there is an economic tsunami they didn’t create. Raising a family in these hard economic times will be a major challenge.
Nevertheless regardless of significant problems this generation can really drive the entire moral tone of America. At one bright moment these veterans were not greedy. They didn’t posture, or make excuses. These men and women didn’t whine or complain. They just – to use an infantry phrase – put one foot in front of the other and soldiered on to get the mission accomplished.
A lot of shallow posers – individuals who hint that they wished they could have served but didn’t – can be very smart and manipulate ideologues across the left-right political spectrum. These hucksters will reach out to harness this generation’s energy for their own purpose. However, whatever a veteran does, big or small, every American should know that these men and women have a well developed instinct for the truth. They are untouchable on that front.
So unscrupulous politicians, scam artists, hustlers, and parasites be on notice. If a man or a woman can face down the Taliban, come at them at your peril. Same advice goes to criminals and street thugs.
America, as once reported in the great space race, is “A-OK”.***
Ed Timperlake, was the first Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Public Affairs at the Department of Veterans Affairs, he was also Assistant Secretary for Public and Intergovernmental Affairs.
As we discussed in an earlier article, the new C4ISR systems allow the USCG to connect their assets and work with other agencies to force multiply. Unfortunately, you cannot break a bottle over a C4ISR system (without destroying it) to celebrate its introduction, like you can with a new cutter. As a result, the funding agencies and Congress are less enthusiastic about supporting connectivity than platforms. Yet the electrons matter in delivering results.
A recent example is seen in a dramatic rescue done by the USCG. The twin missions of the USCG are safety and security. This safety mission was enabled by the coordinated operation of USCG and USN assets. The services worked together on January 3 to return a rescued man to shore after his sailboat sank about 250 nautical miles east of Cape Hatteras, N.C. The video was shot by the night camera of the USCG C130 which itself is an innovative insertion of technology. The video includes an aerial shot of the sailboat of Dennis Clements before it sank.
An HC-130J, deployed from the Coast Guard Air Station Elizabeth City, NC used newly installed mission systems to locate a sailboat in distress just before it sank. The crew was able to drop a raft to the sole occupant, saving his life. It also acted as on scene commander for a Navy H-60 dispatched from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower to hoist the survivor from the raft. During this nighttime search and rescue mission, weather conditions were extremely poor with gale winds blowing ice and snow; visibility was near zero. The HC-130J’s mission system was essential in finding the sinking vessel during the winter storm and providing critical communications with the Navy rescue helicopter.
The HC-130J’s radio direction finder system was used to detect the search and rescue beacon from the distressed vessel. This system provides line of bearing for particular radio frequencies including those of an EPIRB (Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon). The ocean is a vast expanse and the ability quickly to establish the location of distress beacon is extremely important, even during the day, in favorable weather conditions.
As the HC-130J approached the general location of the distress beacon, the day/night, all weather electro-optical infra-red system was used for identification and tracking of the sinking vessel. This system provided a visual picture of the distressed vessel and an accurate picture of deployed rescue raft. In the pitch dark of a winter storm, so severe the sailboat was literally being torn apart, the crew aboard the HC-130J was able to see that the man in the water was able to locate and climb into the life raft.
The mission system suite provided the local tactical picture enabling the Coast Guard aircraft to be the onsite coordinator of the rescue. Advanced radio systems aboard the HC-130J were used for communication with the USS Eisenhower and the deployed rescue helicopter. A rescue in such brutal conditions was surprising even to the survivor who said, “…man, it was an almost unbelievable experience to realize that I wasn’t going to die.” A great success, made possible by the tremendous bravery and skills of well trained and properly equipped Coast Guard and Navy personnel.
In last November’s Strategic Assessment of the Tel-Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Yiftah S. Shapir wrote an article entitled “Israel’s Arms Sales to India”. Shapir comments on the recent developments that put Israel as the number one arms supplier to India and looks at where this relationship is heading.
From Kargil to Mumbai In the first section of his survey, the author talks about the beginning of the relation between the two countries. He writes that after four decades of frozen diplomatic relations, in which New Delhi preferred to foster ties with the Arab world, India’s strategy “changed dramatically in 1991 as part of a comprehensive shift in [its] perception of itself, its economy, and relations with the world.” As early as 1992, the defense cooperation between the two countries soared.
Shapir describes the two events which contributed over the years to bring the two countries to deepen their ties.
The first one is the Kargil conflict of 1999, which heavily changed “the strategic thinking of the Indian military establishment and on the other hand proved to India that Israel is an arm supplier that can be relied on during a crisis,” as Israel was prompt to deliver weapons which New Delhi needed for the conduct of the war.
The second event is more recent: November 2008’s Mumbai terror attack was again followed by a review of the Indian defense posture and “led to a sharp rise in defense expenditure in general,” the author notes. As a result, deeper cooperation in the area of intelligence and “counter-terror operations” between the two countries were developed.
Harop UAV (credit: www.satnews.com, 23 February 2009)
While Shapir notes that much of the elements of cooperation remain classified, “the scale of the defense ties can only be assessed through the weapons transactions, which naturally attract for wider coverage”. Such recent deals include the sale of three Phalcon AEW for a deal worth $1.1 billion (India is said to be interested in the acquisition of three more), the $1.4 billion sale of Barak-8 missiles and according to media report the Indian purchase of HAROP attack UAVs.
Shapir notes that the Indian “industry has achieved some significant successes (…) in the field of ballistic missiles and space”. As such, there is some reciprocity in the defense acquisitions between the two countries as India sold to the Israelis the launch of the TechSAR satellite. But commercial exchanges in that direction remain minimal as Israel remains a fervent buyer of US products as it beneficiates from US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid. Commenting on the Indian industry, Shapir says that “the Indian government does not hide its intention to increase its local acquisitions over the years in place of purchases from foreign sources”. But in order to enhance its local defense industry, India still needs to expand its technological know-how, as such “India asks that technology be transferred with every large arms deal, and usually transfer of production.”
A Niche Strategy Israel has managed to comfortably penetrate the Indian defense industry thanks to several parameters which are raised by the author:
First, Shapir notes that “the specialization of the Israeli defense industry has earned its several key niches that give Israel important edges in the areas of electronics and optronics: radar and aerial deterrent systems (…), UAV systems; antitank missiles, advanced air to land arms; and avionics systems for planes…”;
Secondly, unlike some countries, Israel has shown willingness to transfer technology.
Looking towards the future, Shapir however predicts that Israel’s achievements in its defense ties with India will be met by several key challenges in the years to come:
First, the Israeli transfer of technology could prove detrimental in the long run, as India could develop its own know-how, thanks to these technology transfers and the many joint ventures established by companies from both countries.
Second, despite the process of rapprochement undertaken since the early 90’s, Israel position in India still remains fragile. Shapir estimates that New Delhi still holds “the desire not to provoke the Muslims countries, particularly the Arab world (…) this attitude is reflected in public and political opposition to defense ties with Israel.”
Third, Israel’s worthy position in India might be affected because of recent reports that covered the alleged reception of bribes of Indian defense officials from Israeli companies. Shapir states that the sale of Barak missiles is among the contract currently being reviewed by Indian investigators.
The Washington Factor The author lists another obstacle facing the Israeli defense establishment in its dealing with India, i.e. America. As Shapir observes, “another more important limitation is Israel’s dependence on the United States, and conversely, American interests in South Asia”. He explains that the “US has a strong position on all aspects of Israeli arms sales to India”, and as such “Israel cannot sell equipment that contains US-made components without obtaining clear permission.” Israel could lose its credibility as a weapons seller, as New Delhi is fully aware that Washington could interfere at any stages of a deal and impose a veto on its implementation.
Moreover, the United States and India are on the verge of deepening their defense cooperation. To this day, Indian ardors for collaboration with the US were cooled down because of Washington’s strict legislation on defense exports. Indeed, this desire for collaboration often clashed with India’s request that any defense deal include the participation of one of its own company trough the creation of a joint venture. But change may be on the way, as following this year’s visit of US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, “understandings were reached to pave the way for more extensive defense sales in India,” Shapir reports.
On the other hand, the author suggests that prospects are not all gloomy for Israeli defense sales in India, as it has the advantage of being familiar with the local market, “which is very different from Western markets”. Moreover, in the short run, the author says that thanks to the joint already in place, Israel enjoys a comfortable position in India, due to the many interests the Indian government and companies have in these joint ventures. Still, in the longer run, Shapir predicts that Israel’s position is at risk: because of the scale of the American industries and the support they enjoy from the administration, Shapir Believes that [Israel’s] “advantage will gradually decline over the years.”
The Teheran Factor Another area of concern for Israel is India’s relationship with Iran. There is a great deal of collaboration between Teheran and Delhi stemming from a relationship “which has hundreds of years of history.” This collaboration, Shapir writes, is multi-folded:
Economically, India attaches importance to Iran because of the latter’s resource in oil and also because India needs access to Iranian ports such as Bandar Abbas or Chahbahar for its own commerce with Russia and former Soviet republics.
Strategically, close defense ties exist as is shown by the frequent military exercises held by both countries. Moreover, India and Iran share a border with Pakistan, which in the former’s view, Shapir writes: “Iran acts as a base on the other side of Pakistan.”
As far as Israel is concerned, these ties between Teheran and New Delhi could be detrimental as there is “a risk of leakage of information, technical information about Israeli systems, tactical information about modes of operation, and operational tactics…”
The Outcome of a Window of Opportunity In concluding his report, Yiftah Shapir believes that while Israel achievements in the Indian market are “a source of pride” it “must not rest on its laurels”. Shapir repeats its warnings that with the ongoing technology transfer, Israel runs the risk of seeing India being able to develop its own technology as it is a clear Indian objective “to achieve independence in the field of arms”. Moreover, Shapir estimates that the recent past of frozen diplomatic relations with Israel still has an echo in Indian politics and “it may hasten the processes of detachment,” he warns.
Lastly, the author puts forward the question of whether it is possible to qualify the Indo-Israeli relation as a strategic one. While a close defense relation is part of it, he says it does not suffice to qualify this collaboration as a “strategic relation”. Indeed, he argues that “it must include a convergent outlook on processes in the world, and the knowledge that the partner can be relied on in times of trouble”. In this respect, both countries do not see eye-to-eye on many issues. India is a close Iranian ally and has often a pro-Arab stance on many issues affecting the region. Moreover, both countries enjoy a different relationship with the United States. Israel, on the one hand, is a strong ally of Washington, while India, on the other hand, Shapir says, also has a good relation with the United States, but “it has not given up on its non-aligned identity”.
Overall, the author believes that the two countries do not have a strategic relationship. Rather, he estimates that Israel’s collaboration with India “is an achievement of a window of opportunity” and that in the long run, this relationship will fade away.
