SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

A new Civil War Is Brewing Over Aircraft Production

Posted on December 21, 2009 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/21/2009

By George Talbot, Political Editor for the Mobile Press Register

The economic battle for jobs and capital investment pits the Pacific Northwest against a rising challenger in the Southeast. The regional fight is fiercest over the U.S. Air Force tanker contract, a potential 179-plane order that could deliver thousands of aircraft assembly jobs either to Mobile, Alabama, or Everett, Washington. Coupled with Boeing Co.’s recent decision to assemble 787 aircraft in Charleston, S.C., the high-profile tanker contest could be the tipping point in a larger trend that has seen aerospace firms shifting production to the low-cost South.

A Little-Known Success Story

In so doing, they’re following a trail already blazed by automotive manufacturers. The Deep South has become a magnet for automakers, landing six of the last seven assembly plants announced in the past 10 years and helping to spell the end of Detroit.

source: www.slcatlanta.org/Publications/EconDev/drivingtheeconomy.pdf

Fields that once produced cotton and peanuts are now home to some of the world’s most advanced and efficient auto plants. The list includes BMW in South Carolina, Kia in Georgia, Nissan and Toyota in Mississippi and Honda, Hyundai and Mercedes Benz in Alabama, collectively representing nearly $10 billion in new investment. “You can look back over the last 10-12 years with regard to the automobile industry in the South and you are about to see the same thing with regard to aviation and aerospace,” said Alabama Governor Bob Riley.

The difference for aircraft and defense firms is that they’re entering a region where the aerospace industry is already well-established, and where there is a long tradition of supporting the military. The industry today accounts for nearly 900,000 jobs across the South, with tens of thousands more in the pipeline under projects announced by Airbus, Boeing, Northrop Grumman Corp. and Spirit Aerosystems.

The industry’s growth is a little-known story, even south of the Mason-Dixon line. But Southern political leaders, eager to seize momentum, are banding together to promote the region as an emerging market for aerospace investment. The marketing campaign is centered on the Aerospace Alliance, a four-state coalition whose goal is to establish the Gulf Coast region as a world class aviation, aerospace and defense corridor. “This alliance will go far in promoting our region for what it is – one of the largest aerospace corridors in the world and a great place for companies in this sector to do business,” said Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour. “The Gulf Coast states share geographic proximity, a long tradition of aerospace and aviation activities and a skilled and experienced workforce, and by joining together, we will be well-positioned to take advantage of opportunities to grow this sector in our region.”

The 150-mile corridor, stretching from Pensacola to New Orleans, already is home to a string of leading aerospace manufacturers, key NASA facilities and military aviation bases operated by the Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard.

A business-friendly environment attractive to Boeing, EADS and Northrop and already home to more than 700 aviation and aerospace companies

riley350 — credit: Press-Register/Bill Starling

Supporters of the initiative — led by Riley, Barbour and Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal — say South also offers strong right-to-work laws that have discouraged labor unions. “You don’t have to worry about workers being out on strike when America needs them,” Barbour said at a news conference announcing the alliance in October.

It’s that business-friendly climate that recently led Boeing, much to the disappointment of political and labor leaders in the Northwest, to select South Carolina as the site of a second assembly line for its 787 Dreamliner. The decision to spurn the Seattle area, its longtime production home, for Charleston was met with outrage in Washington state, which fought hard for the $730 million project. “Our decision to come to South Carolina will be good for our competitiveness, for our customers, and for our country,” said Boeing chief executive Jim McNerney. “My impression was that the people here are hard working, dedicated, willing to learn and anxious to be a part of aerospace history.”

allianceaerospace1-300 — http://www.aerospacealliance.com/

Boeing’s move is seen as a crowning achievement for the industry in the South because it could draw thousands of additional jobs at supplier plants, creating critical mass for future investments. It’s also helped undercut criticism from Puget Sound that Southerners aren’t capable of complex manufacturing.

The blows have been sharpest over the Air Force tanker contract. Boeing is battling a trans-Atlantic team led by Northrop Grumman Corp. and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Co. in a contest with broad implications for the global aerospace industry. EADS, parent company of Airbus, views the competition as an opportunity to gain a long-sought foothold on U.S. soil. If it can land a piece of the tanker contract, Airbus would add production of A330 freighters at its proposed $600 million production center in Mobile.

That would give the U.S. a second center of commercial aircraft production to balance Boeing’s traditional hub in the northwest. Analysts speculate that Airbus eventually could shift production of its full A330 line to Mobile from Toulouse, France, dramatically expanding its U.S. footprint. The move would establish a state-of-the-art production facility and create a new generation of aerospace workers at a time when top military officials are expressing deep concerns about the American defense industrial base.

Los Angeles-based Northrop has projected that its KC-45 tanker program would create 1,500 direct jobs in Mobile and 48,000 jobs nationwide. Boeing has said the contract would secure a similar number of jobs on its existing assembly lines in Everett and at its modification center in Wichita, Kansas.

Southern political leaders said the alliance’s first priority is to help win the tanker contract, establishing Mobile as a cornerstone for the industry’s growth along the Gulf Coast. But they said the tanker isn’t their only priority. “Our region is already a major player – home to over 700 aviation and aerospace companies,” Riley said, adding that “now it is up to us, that any time anyone anywhere in the country talks about aviation, about space … to make them understand there is an aerospace corridor here that will rival any you’ll find anywhere in the world.” (see: Governor Riley’s interview with Talbot and Laird).

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***Posted December 21st, 2009

General Dunn on: Why weapons cost so much? (Part One)

Posted on December 20, 2009 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/20/2009

tooc500 — Steve Geary, Performance-Based Logistics: Buying Performance, Not Parts, The University of Tennessee, College of Business Administration, Supply Chain World Conference and Exposition, March 28, 2006

In this week’s contributions to understanding the challenge of providing capability to the warfighter, we have two assessments of the problem of cost. Cost is not an independent variable. It is contextual and depends on how you buy, what you buy, and for what purpose you buy.

– One of the issues which seems to have gotten lost in the loose Washington debate about weapons is that one buys weapons in order to prevail in war. And in wars in which there are tools available to adversaries where the good guys might not prevail. Every war will not be dominated by so-called 80% solutions; and an air and naval power like the US can provide protection for itself and its allies largely by having capabilities to project power.

– Also lost too often from the debate is the value of multi-mission weapons versus single purpose weapons. Multi-mission weapons provide capabilities in a variety of scenarios; single purpose weapons do not. Multi-mission weapons are where one wants to put ones core Research and Development as well as investments; single purpose weapons are specialized to tasks which may be necessary whether they are strategic deterrence or counter-IEDs. But without multi-mission capabilities you are reduced to a specialized power, which in Europe is often the case. The US should strategically reflect on whether the Western system as we have known it will prevail if the US goes down the 80% solution, single purpose weapon route.

***

The first contribution is by Lt. General (Retired) Michael Dunn, President of the Air Force Association and the second is by General Richard E. Hawley, (Retired), USAF. The second piece will appear next week. General Hawley served as the Commander, Air Combat Command and Commander US Air Forces in Europe. Additionally he was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.

***

PART ONE

Lt. General (Retired) Michael Dunn, President of the Air Force Association

This is not an easy question to answer. There are a number of factors which go into the cost of a new system.

Number of systems purchased
Every new system has a Research and Development (R&D) component and a procurement component. The R&D costs are spread over the number of systems to be purchased. Thus if the AF only buys 20 B-2s, then the R&D costs are spread over only 20 aircraft and added to the flyaway cost of the aircraft. However, if the AF buys 1700+ F-35s, a much smaller percentage of R&D is assigned to each aircraft.

Technology/risk
Many weapon systems push the envelope of technology. When aerospace companies are challenged to build something that has never been done before, there is a chance that they cannot do it within the funds allotted. Many times companies will estimate a path to succeed, only to stumble over major, unexpected hurdles which then increase the cost. The general term that refers to this is risk. The more risk there is in a program, the more likely it is the cost will grow. And even low tech programs – with known technology – face cost growth. The example I use is the Springfield bypass in the Washington area. The project came in 10 years late and 500% over budget. Another example could be “The Big Dig” in Boston.

Use of “Off-the-Shelf Technology
This can reduce risk because usually a prime contractor knows what items with a known technology will cost. However, it is not a panacea – in that some off-the-shelf items don’t meet military requirements (e.g. can’t stand the 150 degree heat or the minus 70 degree cold or is not rugged enough to put into the dust and chaos of the field). Additionally, off-the-shelf technology today may be obsolete when the system is finally fielded. Successful systems allow for the insertion of new technologies as the system is developed.

Management Reserve
One of the ways firms help attenuate the risk – and one that is done in the commercial sector — is with a management reserve. Studies have shown that $1 spent early to solve an impending problem, reduces cost by $5 if it is spent later in the program. Unfortunately, the government process – at the Air Force, DOD, OMB, and Congressional levels wrings out “excess” funding to each program – leaving little for a program manager to address program risk.

Number of changes to the Design
Changes, like changes to a construction project cost money and cause “overruns.” This is a major driver of cost, especially if the requirements shift/change as the system goes through development. One example of this is what has happened to the Presidential helicopter – which has been hit with thousands of changes… to include a requirement to withstand Electromagnetic Pulse.

Source: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08674t.pdf

Unstable Funding
This is probably the largest cause of increases to weapons systems. A company is told to produce X many aircraft per year over Y many years for a total of Z many aircraft. The firm determines the most efficient way to manufacture the system, addressing literally thousands of issues (such as: how many work shifts to have, how much tooling to buy, the level of automation of the line, how many people to hire, and in what specialities, which subprimes, third tier, even fourth tier manufacturers to use, how much work to bring in-house, etc, etc). If the Congress or DOD determines there is a change in the requirement or there is insufficient funding to continue the planned buy, this has a huge impact on the cost. And built into every DOD contract are government liabilities for termination costs. Sometimes these costs are so high, there could be little savings the year a production line is terminated.

source: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09431t.pdf

Schedule
AF program managers are often told to buy a system at the minimum cost to the taxpayer. This may mean a production rate that is ideal for both the AF and the manufacturer … but which does not fit into the budget constraints of … say a new Administration. When a schedule is changed, costs grow.

Source: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09501t.pdf

Learning Curve
The first aircraft to roll off a production line is the most expensive. That’s because the workers and the line supervisors are doing this for the first time. As they become more skilled, they get more efficient. This efficiency is called a learning curve. The Air Force has seen reductions as much as 35% of the cost over time. This is important because systems are usually curtailed when the line is the most efficient.

Multi-Year Procurement.
A multi-year contract will save taxpayers money. That’s because the manufacturer can plan for longer than one year, can buy in economic quantities the items it needs for the future, can tell its sub-primes to do the same, can keep the right number of workers on the production line. Average cost savings for a multi-year procurement is about 15%. Congress rarely permits multi-year – because it removes their ability to provide oversight on a program on a yearly basis.

Weight of a System
Surprisingly, for a given level of technology, cost and cost growth closely approximates weight. Perhaps more than any other factor, this correlation predicts programs in trouble. If the weight of a system grows, so will the cost. The most famous example is the Navy A-12 – which grew so heavy that it could not take off on a land runway in less than 10,000 feet.

Type of Contract
In order to hold cost growth down, in the past, DOD has tried to use a variety of contracts (firm-fixed price, cost plus incentive fee, etc). One would naturally assume that a firm fixed price contract would be the best, because the price could not go up. However, depending on the risk, most companies will not bid on a FFP contract, especially if they are trying to develop and build a new system with lots of uncertainty.

Concurrent Test/Buy
If you think about how a manufacturer has to build a production line, he first has to build a few articles/aircraft. While he does this, he has to train the workers/engineers. After he turns over the planes to the government, the most efficient way to proceed is to continue production ,making the changes the AF needs as the line continues. Many Congressional critics maintain the AF/aerospace industry should stop the line, while the AF embarks on a 2+ year set of tests to ensure the aircraft “works.” This is both inefficient and detrimental to keeping the cost of a system low.

Proposals
One reason why systems cost so much is the government does not reimburse companies for the cost of their bids. While there are no data, indications are that the two primes who bid for the KC-X spent upwards of $50M of their own money. The effect of this is that many firms have decided it is too costly to try to sell to the government. They have focused solely on the commercial market. This hurts competition in the long term and increases cost.

Inflation
Inflation in the aerospace industry is not the same as the CPI. It hinges on numerous factors. Several of these factors are:

The price of raw materials. When the price of titanium shot up last year, it added big dollars to many systems under procurement.
The cost of engineers. The nation has a shortage in engineers – we are not producing enough. Many are foreign born … and either have to wait for a long time to get a security clearance … or go home after getting their degree. Over the past 3 years, wage inflation among aerospace engineers is almost 3 times the rate of inflation in the economy.
The requirement for a “green” plant. I visited a sub-prime plant in Los Angeles where the firm (which made landing gear out of big chunks of metal) was required to make sure the air they put out of their furnace/press was cleaner than the outside air they used as input air to the press.

The rising cost of weapons systems often gets confusing, because there are many different types of costs. On balance, the aerospace industry does a great job in providing the tools, technology, and machines to keep us safe. Yes there are occasional problems, but it behooves us all to consider the industry – which accounts for a positive $40B per year to our trade balance – as our partners rather than our enemies.

***

N.B.: For an explanation of the different types of costs, see: http://www.afa.org/PresidentsCorner/Notes/Note-2-29-08.pdf.

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***Posted December 20th, 2009

A Comment on the President’s Asian Journey

Posted on December 19, 2009 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/19/2009

Harald Malmgren provided an overview of the President’s Asian trip, which placed that trip into a global macro-economic strategic context. H. Malmgren underscored that Barack Obama’s trip could be interpreted as the Administration placing a China-centric Asia at the center of the “world of the future.” Centrally, the trip can be seen as the Obama Administration’s definition of how to look at the Asian dynamic at the center of their global strategy.

Trade and the job creation triggered from trade is clearly one pillar of such a strategy. Re-assuring China and Japan about the continued viability of the US economy as the US government expands its debt portfolio is clearly another. And coming to terms with the manufacturing juggernaut of China seems prudent, although the US needs to seek to more closely align strategic and defense policy with the economic independence around which Chinese manufacturing and the developed world seemed to have forged. Another element is the clear desire by the Administration to engage China and Asia in dealing with the “new security issues” of climate change and countering environmental pollution.

But, as Harold Malmgren points out, the way the President presented these issues seemed less global and more Chinese centric and, as such, will lead in the author’s words, to the President needing “to spend time reassuring other friends of the US that they still matter.” He adds that “the economic dynamic being set in motion by Washington with Asia will likely alter the security dynamics of much of the rest of the world (…)”.

Fitting the two pieces of strategy together, macroeconomics and defense, has long been a problem for Washington. It certainly is not unique to the Obama Administration. But the Chinese dynamic poses special problems for strategic coherence. The Chinese clearly have seen a significant growth in their global economic role, and with it enhanced uncertainties about the ability of their authoritarian government to manage the consequences of that growth.

source: http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html

A Twin Dynamics

The twin dynamics of significant macro economic growth with the adaptation of an authoritarian state to that growth has created a unique challenge to US power. It is a country both central to manufacturing, trade and economic growth and a challenge to US management of global affairs. The economics suggest interdependence; the politics suggest a zero-sum approach to shifting global trends to Chinese advantage.

This twin reality – interdependence and positioning for advantage – does not fit well into either Washington ideology of liberal democracy or conservativism.

For a liberal such as President Obama, economic interdependence must carry with it a basic reality of multiple-sum politics and agreement upon global management. Hence, “China is not a threat.”

Yet the Chinese leadership is clearly trying to leverage the current economic crisis to their advantage. They seek to manage their access and control over global commodities to enhance their growth after the recession. And they don’t seem to environmentally green in doing so.

They seek geo-political advantage where the US is not well positioned (Africa) or in the process of withdrawing (Iraq). They are investing in military technologies, which well position them in competition with advanced powers, whether it be computers, communications, nano-technology or missiles.

source: OSD Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009

They are investing in the aerospace business to build up a capability to export planes and to participate in space. They are exporting missiles and planes in recognition that there is a very significant global arms market that will NOT be dominated by the West over the next twenty years.

The Chinese military seeks to project power from the mainland to “protect” China deep into the sea-lanes and airspace of their adjacent waters. This may not be a “threat” but the actions certainly provide a statement (see on this issue: CNN News Video; You Tube video).

Although difficult for Washington conceptually to trade economically and compete in the military-political domain, the political consensus in Washington must learn to live with this if the US is to be successful in dealing with China.

source: Japan’s MoD, Japan’s BMD , September 2008

A Balancing Act

The other major power with which the President dealt with was Japan on this visit. The new Japanese government is seeking to re-define its global role and, notably, to do so by re-balancing its relationships with the United States and China. Here the challenge for the Administration is to ensure that the Japanese remain engaged as one of the key global allies for the United States without pushing the Japanese further towards China.

Key tools, which are hand for the Administration, are core military capabilities for which the Administration seems itself an uncertain partner. Cancelling the F-22 without seriously considering exports for Japan and Asia are good manifestation of strategic agnosticism. The continued inability to execute export reforms is a singular display by the Congress and the Administration of an inability to understand that the US will be building multi-mission power projection weapons which required complex agreements with allies to ensure exportablility and compatibility as we collectively shape coalition capabilities. For example, getting Aegis and F-35 to function together as coalition capable and interchangeable systems will be crucial to a viable Pacific strategy.

Yet Washington made a commitment to build a new missile defense system in Europe around the SM-3 missile without clear consideration of what the Japanese would do. The missile is a joint Japanese-US missile not simply a US product.

The Japanese are significant investors in the US and the builders of the most successful automobile companies in the US, which export globally from the United States. Of course, these companies are in the South and not the beneficiaries of the US bailout of the “US auto industry,” an auto industry defined as dominated by Detroit. The strategic consequences of emphasizing a declining Detroit over an ascendant South in the auto industry was never publically discussed by the Obama Administration.

In short, shaping an effective strategy towards Asia and beyond requires leveraging the remaining US power projection capabilities within an overall macro-economic strategy. Pursuing one without the other will leave the US a global power beholden to its Asian bankers and to the global players building the 21^st century military technological revolution. Not every global player is betting its future on the MRAP.

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***Posted December 19th, 2009

Admiral Pierre Sabatié-Garat on: Can the EU Rebuild Failing States?

Posted on December 14, 2009 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/14/2009

This is the first contribution from one of regular contributors Admiral (retired) Pierre Sabatié-Garat. The author has extensive military, industrial and diplomatic experience in dealing with both European and American militaries. Here he provides a commentary on the interesting recent publication of the European Council on Foreign Relations on the subject of the civilian capacities to be provided in nation building efforts.

***

Time to rethink ESPD

“It is time for a rethink of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The 27 EU member states need to make a serious effort to improve their civilian capabilities if their words of support for the ‘comprehensive approach’ are to sound anything other than hollow.” Clearly, the authors of the last pamphlet[1] issued by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) are not very impressed by EU’s usual self-satisfaction about the success of its overseas interventions.

For Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, the efficiency of these interventions is at least questionable: “Most EU missions remain small, lacking in ambition and strategically irrelevant”. And here is a first point: the lack of European strategy. Despite a fairly long and cumbersome decision making process, overseas operations are too often the result of a convergence of impressions, limited by budgetary considerations, rather than the rational application of a well established strategy aiming at promoting European interests and values. Despite Javier Solana’s (the head of the ESDP effort) impressive and continuous efforts, such a common strategy is still to be written.

Korski and Gowan are not convinced by the reality of the European “civilian power” as too many member states are not serious about it: “Some countries appear to take their ESDP responsibilities extremely seriously; others barely make the effort.” A comparison after a dozen or criteria allows the authors for distributing the EU countries into four categories: the professionals, the strivers, the agnostics and the indifferents. This observation derives from the former one: without a common strategy, it is difficult to convince the member states to make important efforts to select, train, and fund civilian capabilities ready to be deployed.

Both these points should be rapidly taken in consideration in application of the Lisbon treaty. If they are not, there is no chance for Europe to stay a credible player in the settlement of hard crises.

Korski and Gowan see no fundamental reason for such a lack of results: “while the EU is a long way from delivering a joined-up ESDP approach that combines diplomatic, developmental, commercial and military instruments, there is no doubting its potential to do so considering the size of the EU’s economy, the attractiveness of its consumer market, its role as a pre-eminent provider of foreign aid and its considerable military capabilities.”

To improve EU’s “civilian power” efficiency the authors propose several axis of effort.

A new mission concept is needed as the methods that allowed a relative success in Bosnia are much less pertinent for the type of interventions the EU is presently involved in. The need is now for swift deployment, with enough security measures in hostile environments and a large autonomy for the civilians deployed.

Nevertheless, the measures proposed by the authors still describe the civilian operations as following the military ones. It is now recognized that there must be a total interlinking of both aspects of one and the same operation.

Hans Binnendijk of the American National Defense University was among the very first strategic thinkers to draw this important lesson from the Iraq campaign . For him, in this kind of operation there is a fairly short window of opportunity for winning the “hearts and minds”. The high tempo of military operations and the avoiding of in-cities fighting leave the population hesitant on its behavior vis-à-vis the intervention. For several days, as long as the existing local administration is left in place, the population is ready to accept anything positive coming from the intervening forces. Here, to re-establish as soon as possible the water and electricity networks together with the food supply becomes of strategic importance.

Hence the necessity to insert such civilian actions at the very beginning of operational planning. To have at disposal the necessary civilian means within hours, and not within months, implies to dedicate enough air and ground lift to this part of the operation. Clearly such a decision has to be taken at the highest level of command. This modus operandi is seen as the best way to preempt insurrections and, as a result, to reduce the need for further military actions.

Prevention should be played as much as possible. Operation “Concordia” in Macedonia, where NATO and EU set up an efficient cooperation, was a great success by avoiding the extension of the Kosovo conflict to the whole region.

The political guidance and the chain of command of the EU’s civilian operations should be less bureaucratic and give a wider autonomy to the EU Special Representative (EUSR): “Delegation is key, Korski and Gowan say, the EUSRs will be in charge of all facets of any EU intervention, and will refer back to resident EU ambassadors rather than to Brussels.” They advocate for a greater cooperation between the EUSR and the local governments. They even recommend an early positioning of EUSRs in countries “at greater risk of instability”. Such an anticipation is always difficult. Nevertheless, to gather a hundred or so out of the existing 40 000 national diplomats in a crisis prevention cell and to keep at disposal two dozen of potential EUSRs should be within reach of the future EU External Action Service, the new European diplomatic corps.

Comparison with the UN intervention is not fully pertinent as both organizations usually act in a complementary manner. UN track record in Bosnia is controversial, as it is in Congo or in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, explains that the temptation of micromanagement from Brussels too often kills EUSR initiative on the field. He advocates for greater integration of the military and civilian chains of command, under the authority of an autonomous EUSR.

Time to rethink Nation-building

In their analysis of the EU missions during the last decade, the authors pick out several structural weaknesses:

Justice reforms and police training can simply not been undertaken in countries where basic security is not ensured, like Iraq, Afghanistan and Congo. Such civilian missions should be part of military operations. It is too difficult to ask other organizations to protect a large amount of civilian personnel engaged in a different framework. Therefore task sharing between NATO for military and the EU for civilian missions is not an option as long as robust military actions are needed. The Iraq example shows that despite the active presence of 120 000 US troops and a considerable civilian aid, Iraq still don’t have an electoral law and the civilian power is very weak.
The pool of police officers who volunteer to serve in peace operations is not so large, and the number of missions is regularly increasing. Therefore the periods of rest between two missions shorten, and people are overstretched.
The EU’s planning process for civilian operations lacks of experienced civilian planners, and relies on military planning methods. Those methods are not always suitable for this kind of operations. The Commission and the Council often produce their own plan, both being not always compatible, or at least not producing the best synergies. The authors speak in favor of a “single, integrated plan.” Clearly this will be one among the first tasks Lady Ashton will have to undertake in setting up its new External Action Service.

The pamphlet paves the way for this new European organization: “With its extensive network of embassies and diplomatic missions, the access it enjoys to both civil and military instruments and its broadly favourable global reputation, the EU should be uniquely well placed among global foreign policy actors to deal with the challenges posed by fragile and failed states.”

In a recent interview to the French newspaper Le Monde, Javier Solana points his finger towards the main and perhaps the greatest difficulty for setting up an effective organization for crisis management. He calls for a really shared responsibility between the EU nations: “ It’s necessary that all member states accept to play their role, especially those with a long international tradition. Everyone understands that efficiency in action derives from collective structures producing added value.”

However the authors don’t tackle the core paradigm of civilian operations. The success of those interventions is not simply a question of organization, proper manning or command structure. The political aim should be properly assessed in the local context.

It is necessary to completely re-think the very notion of nation building, which shouldn’t be to impose western-like models of governance. Freedom and justice can be perceived differently in other parts of the world with different cultures. Feudal and tribal organization of the society will prevail for long time, even with a so-called “democratic” varnish, as it is the case in Pakistan, even in the educated part of the population. The EU External Action Service should lead such a reflection and find genuine solutions.

[1] « Can the EU Rebuild Failing States ? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities », Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan (European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2009)

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***Posted December 14th, 2009

An American Perspective on the Defense Aerospace Industrial Base

Posted on December 14, 2009 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

In a recent study published by the Mitchell Institute for Airpower studies, Rebecca Grant examines the challenges facing the future of the defense aerospace industrial base. Grant underscores the challenge of maintaining a viable defense aerospace industrial base over the next decades in the presence largely of simply one major fixed wing program, namely the F-35.

Among the challenges facing the industry which she cites are the following:

By 2012, the United States will have in operation just one fifth-generation fighter line—the Lockheed Martin F-35 facility in Fort Worth, Tex.
Pratt & Whitney could be the only US engine house producing advanced fighter engines.
When the C-17 line in Long Beach, Calif., closes—and that appears to be a matter of a few years, at best—the Lockheed Martin C-130J facility in Marietta, Ga., will be the sole US military airlifter plant.
If the US is lucky and finally gets an aerial tanker program off the ground, the nation will have a production line for these vital types of airplanes.
Medium- and high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, used for combat and sensor operations, will be built by a relative handful of specialized firms. A few will manufacture small UAVs.

firstflights400 — The Vanishing Arsenal of Airpower, page 7

The end of an era

In effect, we are reaching the end of an era. The question is whether we are ready to shape a new one. Grant recommends that the Air Force should be encouraged to resume an active role in assessing the status of the aerospace industrial base and determining how to sustain it. Industry profits, the number of firms, and even the overall level of investment are not sufficient metrics for evaluating whether the raw core needed for progress and to meet future emergencies is in good shape or not.

employment500 — The Vanishing Arsenal of airpower, page 9

A broader requirement is clearly to shape an industry that is able to provide for US and allied needs in the years ahead, to drive innovation and to work with global industry shaping collaboration necessary for allied capabilities as well. This means that there are a number of key elements which are necessary to shape the future.

First, an intelligent policy leveraging the opportunities inherent in the F-35 program needs to be defined and aggressively pursued. The F-35 will provide the baseline for 21^st century air operations and air and ground integration. This means that the challenge is to leverage this opportunity.
Second, to leverage requires a more robust allied engagement policy. Export policy not only needs to be reformed but radically changed. It is difficult to see why allies in NATO and Asia who are central to global military and security efforts continue to be treated on a case-by-case basis. The F-35 requires and open engagement technology policy, not a restrictive export control policy. Put the export control bureaucracy to work dealing with the Libya’s of the world.
Third, recognize the role of the mega primes in shaping global allied policies. The Lockheed’s, Boeings, EADS, and Northrop’s of the world know how to work together. The US Government needs to stop acting like the case-by-case technology-piece by piece model makes any sense in today’s world.
Fourth, global suppliers are the lifeblood of the industry. A supply chain policy needs to shape the technology control policy and to drive it; not the other way around.

The Administration needs to leverage not de-leverage the programs which are already funded in large part. The F-35 needs capability, which operates higher than 40,000 feet. Leverage what we have and build on; instead of a new bomber, we need to think about long-range strike and reconnaissance assets. We need to build next generation UAVs which leverage the IT and C4ISR capabilities of the F-35. We need to build upon the successes in hypersonic research.

In short, we need to craft an industrial policy, which builds future capabilities leveraging what we are already funding, notably within the F-35 and related programs. And we need as well to shape an export policy, which allows US industry to engage globally and to partner effectively. If the US fails to play a major role in Indian defense aerospace, it will almost certainly be due to export policies. If the UAE buys a Saab product rather than a Northrop Grumman product for air surveillance, certainly export belligerence, or I am sorry, export controls can almost certainly to found as part of the problem.

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***Posted December 14th, 2009

A European Perspective on the Military Aerospace Industrial Base

Posted on December 14, 2009 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

In June 2009, the Aircraft Sectoral Group (ASG) within the AeroSpace and Defense Industries Association of Europe (ASD) issued a thought piece on the future of European Air Power Systems entitled “European Future Air Power Systems in the 2035 Perspective “. The ASG represents Alenia Aeronautica, BAE Systems, Dassault-Aviation, EADS Military Air Systems, EADS-CASA and Saab AB and the paper outlines a perspective on the future of air power and its industrial base within Europe looking ahead for the next twenty years.

Air power, a key enabler for European security and political weight

The working group reviewed a number of scenarios forecasting future European security within the global context and argued that air power remains a key element for Europe’s future in the world: Air Power Systems have historically proved to be an efficient and cost-effective means of providing, with relatively few assets, a wide spectrum of defense and security functionality. Our analysis shows that Air Power Systems will continue to be one of the most important elements enabling Europe to play a major role in the global political arena. Therefore the ASG view is that a robust plan for the future needs to include significant Air Power capability.

But to provide for this capability, European governments would need to address the health of the defense industrial base, and to ensure that basic technological and manufacturing realities would be maintained. According the working group, the major challenges facing the evolution of the goals to achieve an effective future for Euorpean Air Power Systems (EFAPS) are the following:

Security of supply of key capabilities for the customers;
Access to state of the art industrial capabilities (e.g. technologies);
Long term investment in FAS and its underpinning intellectual / people base;
Coordination of efforts to maximise benefit to nations compared to their investment.

The Group also underscored that the major consequences of not being able to meet these challenges will be:

Failure to affordably meet customer capability aspirations when required, and/or greater dependence on non-European solutions;
Failure to build and capitalize on the existing strengths and benefits already achieved;
Little or no gearing from joint development of technologies and systems with a tendency for each nation to revert back to national strategic imperatives;
With the Future European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) capability is placed at risk.

An evolutionary approach tailored to EU needs

The Group then argued that the further evolution of European air power systems and the industrial base serving those systems would need to be evolutionary in nature but required steady and continued financial commitments from governments: The development of the European Future Air Power Systems (EFAPS) is perceived to be evolutionary. This will be comprised of upgrades and spiral improvement of legacy air power components complemented by new systems where increased performance or affordability is required. It will be done through an exploration of both new and innovative systems as well as systems similar to those of today.

Among the key trends, which will shape the future of evolution of European air power and its industrial base according to the Group, are the following:

Network Enabled Capability (NEC), which will be essential to ensure information exploitation and situational awareness;
Extensive use of multirole capabilities and commonality of subsystems;
Longer reach and endurance to cope with broader operational scenarios;
Increased Interoperability within national air systems, between national forces and with civilian actors;
Increased Survivability where appropriate;
Increased Reliability, Maintainability, Sustainability to support the Customer along the extended life cycle.

To ensure that Europe can provide for a solid military aerospace base for the future requires the industrial base to be able to operate within a global context as well. And indeed, one of the key elements necessary for the industrial base to develop is for European governments to acquire equipment on an ongoing basis, but provide for steady support for the activities its industry on a global basis.

According to the Group, European industry would have to have the “collective power of world class capabilities, a Best Athlete based supply chain, new methods of collaboration and bind political agreements between nations” in support of its industry.

And finally the Group characterized the character of the evolving industry necessary to provide for European air power needs as follows:

Develop and produce world class, efficient, through-life affordable European Air Power Systems, with high gearing of benefit to nations compared to their investment;
Have freedom to act autonomously without reliance on other countries;
Have security of supply;
Tailor affordable solutions to the specific needs of EU users;
Provide timely upgrades and through life support;
Have a strong position to strategically exchange technologies with non-European actors.
Have a healthy, vibrant and highly skilled Industrial Base (primes, supply chain, SMEs).

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***Posted December 14th, 2009

Michael W. Wynne On How to Lead With Shrinking Manufacturing Capabilities?

Posted on December 13, 2009 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/13/2009

The Defense Industrial Base Under Pressure: How to Lead With Shrinking Manufacturing Capabilities?

Schumpeter, in his classic approach to creative economic destruction, watched consolidation in technologies and industries driven by natural forces until a secondary or new technology essentially destroyed the hold of one and created another set of competitive forces. The aerospace industry is barely one hundred plus years old, and here we have seen wave upon wave of consolidation, because of, and sometimes in spite of the Two World Wars, both in the area of commercial and military aircraft.

The impact of the cost as well as the convenience of electronics introduced into the Aerospace marketplace have extended the maturity curve for some products with modifications and enhancements, but had such a clear cost that one of Norm Augustine’s Laws has it that, at some point, Airplanes will be 100 percent electronic and cost as much for one as the whole Air Forces cost in his day. He then produced charts and graphs to prove same.

Towards an Aerospace Caucus?

Though well known, it bears repeating that asthe French are fond of saying, and doing, Great Nations produce Tanks, Ships and Aircraft; America is putting this to the test. We stopped producing Main Battle Tanks in the early 1990’s and are now modifying the ones we have left. We have turned from Blue Water Ships to Brown Water ships, expanding the number of yards, as we add at the low end, which the US Navy must support while at the same time cutting the number of total ships we buy annually. We now have a single yard that produces Aircraft Carriers and periodically wonder whether we should consolidate from the two producers of Submarines to one and consolidating that yard with the Carrier producer. Certainly the expected future volume of submarines will not solve this dilemma.

In aerospace, we look longingly at international producers, hoping that they will assist the United States by participating in losing bids while we apparently and periodically act to protect our remaining base; and our producers periodically sue international producers demonstrating to all the National Character of the remaining competitors. The world is watching as the United States commences the third round of selecting the future Tanker, and many push for one or the other, some for both.

One thing is clear: the issue of the industrial Aerospace Base is coming into clear focus, even if driven by this near commercial contest. As we have a ship building caucus in the Congress, will we now develop an Aerospace Caucus, or stay with the present ad hoc and losing strategy.

The United States holds back on the quantity of heavy lifters, while simultaneously leasing internationally produced Heavy Lift Aircraft from international Charter carriers, but would not hear of them competing in a head to head buy off. Were we to do a flow of funds in support of new construction, we would find that leasing actually results in new construction, responding to reliability needs. The plan is of course, to cut off any leases when peace arrives; but peace is relative; and the usual outcries of self reliance for military use are muted in the globalization arguments.

In Space, we used to hear outcries about escaping technologies. Now, one of our potent Rockets is powered by an imported engine, our commercial satellites get shopped across the globe in search of a cheaper launch into space, and we search for a breakthrough in the laws of physics which would put heavy satellites in orbit using light launch vehicles.

Our national Space competitor, China, is moving through our dance to the moon and stars with clear intentions to replicate our achievements, but likely combined with colonization and economic activity to demonstrate more than our achievements.

This now is considered by us as a frivolous pursuit, sort of like the discovery of America, because we now know what is out there, and are sending unmanned probes to scout for the competition. The Chinese have to be pleased with this approach, this sharing of scientific findings.

There has been complete consolidation in the launch business, as we move to stand down the Shuttle, and continue to work on the Laws of Physics relative to gravity, weight and mass. It is good to see the emergence of the ARES rocket, and hope for its success: one can only hope it is not just back to the future, but the restart of a Lunar Exploration before the Chinese simply lay claim to the moon and mail back our flags.

Limping Ahead

With recent decisions made, we now find ourselves with the following situation in the Aircraft industry:

We have one large lifter, the C-5, being modified and aging. There remains one medium lifter, the C-17, produced in Long Beach, and limping along without support from the defense department, and no commercial support. There are two small lifters, the C-130, which unfortunately shares manufacturing facilities with the F-22, and therefore is anticipating a crushing increase in cost, which will likely erode its shaky support it currently enjoys; and the C-27 which is a derivative of the C-130 and needs the companion program to hold its costs to reasonable numbers. Not a pretty picture, and a tough period for industrial base planners to do other than limp ahead.
At present we have no Bombers in design or production, and modification programs, as good as they are, are not a substitute for design and build.
In the Tactical Fighter space, we have two surviving manufacturers, at Saint Louis and Fort Worth: competent factories, but separated by at least one generation of technology and the Manufacturing Technologies as well. With the Joint Strike Fighter planning completion of testing in the 2014-2015 timeframe and the pressure on the fighting force to move to this new technology, albeit with a smaller fleet size, there will be real pressure on the industrial base planners and the base itself as to whether this should be sustained. Here as well, there are significant international competitions and competitors, even with the apparent penetration of the market by the F-35, that may present themselves as very competitive in the future. For the very first time, it will appear that America will have no new designs in this space coming forward. This will complete the design consolidation started almost from the invention of flight in the early 1900’s. And a measure of the lack of concern about defense industrial base issues turns around the F-22. Although the F-22 could have been exported to Japan and Australia, when termination became the dance, exports were not considered. And not a thought of the opening this gave to European producers of the Eurofighter apparently entered the heads of DOD decision-makers.
The era of misnamed Unmanned Air Vehicles is being heralded as the future, although they are actually all remotely piloted, and the issue being the quantity and capability of the Remote pilot. It is hard to say where this is leading, but seems similar to the era of the self guided car was forecast during the 1964 worlds fair; so in any event we should forecast some maturation ahead. The UAV business was generated by a foreign power – Israel – and many foreign competitors will occupy this industrial space.

With a decline in acquisition budgets and investments in defense aerospace, and with the consolidation of the US manufacturers,
the challenge will be to produce, to innovate, and to export in a competitive global environment

Figure taken from Stephen Daggett, Congressional Testimony,
“Resourcing the National Defense Strategy: Implications of Long-Term Defense Budget Trends”
before the House Committee on the Armed Services (November 18, 2009)
(see: “See Stephen Daggett’s testimony)

But is this the Schumpeter technology pushing all of Aerospace off stage center, now that the array is down to nearly single producers in each functional class? And what is the governments’ role to maintain the United States as a great nation? Conversely, what is the role of commercial players in answering this same question? Asking the converse seems to highlight the role of government in satisfying the preamble to the constitution, which asserts we formed this Union to provide for the common defense. This is the difficult balancing role of the industrial base planner: as we near the end of the trail for the Eisenhower Industrial Base Complex, we wonder what is next?

***

Secretary Wynne will be writing a follow-on assessment of whether exports will be providing the remedy to industrial base pressures in the United States. Secretary Wynne was the 21st Secretary of the USAF; before this he served in the Bush Administration and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and then as the Under Secretary. Mr. Wynne has extensive industrial experience, including with the F-16, M-1 tank and military space programs.

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***Posted December 13th, 2009

A European Union focus on Maritime Surveillance

Posted on December 8, 2009 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/08/2009

The European Union has for a number of years been focusing on ways to enhance what the US calls “Maritime Domain Awareness” via increased collaboration among relevant stakeholders. As European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Joe Borg commented: “For maritime surveillance to work as well as it can, it needs to be comprehensive, cross border and cross-sectoral. We need systems which can draw on all available means.. The existing obligations in this area at EU level are many and varied, and our vessel monitoring systems are increasingly sophisticated. However, they tend to monitor a specific area focusing on one single activity instead of having a overall view on the many activities that are simultaneously carried out at sea. . We need to work towards the full interoperability of the various systems, and this new working document identifies precisely what needs to be done next in order to realise that vision.”

In a report published in October 2009, the European Commission underscored the importance of enhanced information sharing in shaping joint decision making in the maritime security area. The Commission underscored that “the aim of integrated maritime surveillance is to generate a situational awareness of activities at sea impacting on maritime safety and security, border control, the marine environment, fisheries control, trade and economic interests of the European Union, as well as general law enforcement and defence so as to facilitate sound decision making. Maritime situational awareness is the effective understanding of activity associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the European Union and its Member States. On the basis of clearly defined user needs and rights, it assists the authorities responsible for monitoring and surveillance activities in preventing and managing in a comprehensive way all such situations, events and actions related to the EU maritime domain.”

IBEU1 — Towards a Common Information Sharing Environment for the EU Maritime Domain

This publication has since been followed up with a European Council decision on November 17 2009 to push the conclusions of the report. The Council decision underscored that “the potential for further interoperability, and where relevant, of assessing the need for sharing of information for maritime surveillance – civilian as well as military –, to attain an efficient and cost-effective way to achieve a comprehensive maritime situational awareness, and that a well coordinated, cross-sector approach based on the lawful exchange of maritime surveillance data – with full respect of applicable rules of data and information sharing – is necessary in order to make Europe safer, more secure, more environmentally friendly, more attractive, more efficient and more competitive.”

As the Obama Administration re-affirms its support for maritime security efforts initiated under the last Administration, these European developments provide an important contribution to building an effective maritime security regime. Current USCG role and efforts both reinforce and draw upon such European efforts.

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***Posted December 8th, 2009