Pacific Strategy XIV: Battle of the Bulge-in a Pacific Campaign

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10/27/2011

10/27/2011 – by Ed Timperlake

Ever since the evacuation of the Chinese Nationalist Forces to Taiwan after their defeat on the mainland by Mao’s Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has quested for a complete victory by establishing sovereignty over that island fortress.

(Credit Image: Bigstock)(Credit Image: Bigstock)

Taiwan is an island 89 miles across and 245 miles long, and approximately the same distance from mainland China as the US island of Key West is from Cuba. Taiwan is 99 miles from the mainland and Key West is 94 from Cuba.

The post WW II history of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) vs. the Republic of China (ROC) has been an on again off again quasi hot war.  PLA shelling of the much closer ROC Islands of Quemoy and Matsu, was a real flash point in Cold War brinkmanship

It got so contentious that in 1954 the use of nukes against mainland China was advocated by the JCS but was resisted by Ike.  Instead treaty commitments were made for defense of the Island in the event of an attack.

Consequently, the flash point of ensuring the survivability of a free democracy of 23 million Chinese in the Republic of China moved to US deterrence by Navy Carrier Battle Groups in the nineties. The PRC livid on so many levels about the ROC returned the 1954 US JCS recommendation about using nukes in a very public way. A PLA general said to an American diplomat as a CBG was showing presence in the Taiwan Straights– is the US prepared to trade Taipei for L.A?

The practical issue below nuke bluster is that the real battle for Taiwan has always been looked at in conventional terms.

It is very fair to say after the Clinton administration executed an effective, and insulting to PRC, show of force with USN Carrier Battle Groups in the nineties one of the principal raison d’etats of PLA military forces (PLA.PLAAF, PLAN and 2nd Artillery, Special Forces and seaborne infantry) is to modernize and train to conquer ROC by force.

Being smart the PRC has two additional strategies. One makes enough bluster so that the ROC surrenders peacefully into reunification, or, two essentially buy them so the Taiwan Democracy votes for unification.

However, if the PRC makes a military move a well designed and executed Air/Sea/Land Battle US battle plan leveraging presence, scalability and multiple access can make such an attack become the PLA’s equivalent of the US WWII Battle of the Bulge.

The U.S. goal if the PLA goes “feet wet” to cross the Straight, if we continue to build out our current technology in sufficient numbers, will be to make all their strike forces and their entire surface fleet die.

This boldness can be grasped with U.S. emerging military strategy of “‘No platform fight alone and make a Mao legacy centric force fight individually in the dark and die.” This strategic and tactical mindset will have the same effect the Bulge had on the German Forces as General Patton said: “Hell let’s have the guts to let those son-of-a-bitches go all the way to Paris. Then we’ll cut ‘em off and chew ‘em up.”

It will just take the fighting Navy/Marine/AF team with allied assistance to really “chew ‘em up”.

Unfortunately, the ‘Thinking Navy” isn’t.

In a July 11, 2011 story about the improving military capability of the Peoples Republic of China—“China’s ‘eye in the sky’ nears par with US” —A professor at the US Naval War College symbolically rowed ashore and surrendered her sword to the PLA forces.

Another cubicle commander articulates the way ahead.

“The United States has always felt that if there was a crisis in Taiwan, we could get our naval forces there before China could act and before they would know we were there. This basically takes that off the table,” said Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor at the US Naval War College in Rhode Island.

History shows the fighting Navy/Marine/AF team with modern 21st Century weapons and systems might think and prove otherwise.

Rick Fisher, a Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, nails it on the need for strong capable 21st century technology in the Pacific to deter war.

Washington gains nothing by delaying the sale of new F-16s to Taiwan. Selling new F-16s with modern subsystems will more quickly prepare the Taiwan Air Force for what it really needs, a version of the fifth-generation F-35. Depending upon the equipment package, upgrading Taiwan’s early model F-16s can sustain a low level of parity, but that will not keep pace with a Chinese threat that grows every day.

The statement in a global newspaper from the Naval War College by Professor Johnson-Freese sends the exact opposite signal.

First a history lesson for Professor Johnson-Freese.

Less then a year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the “Doolittle Raiders” had their “30 Seconds Over Tokyo” bombing raid. In doing so the Navy-Army Air Corp team gave the Japanese leaders a real wake up call that they would ultimately lose WWII. B-25 Army Air Force crews made their heroic flight launching from the deck of the CV-8, USS Hornet.

(Credit: http://www.doolittleraider.com/)
(Credit: http://www.doolittleraider.com/)

After the Doolittle Raid, the USS Hornet continued to fight the Imperial Japanese Fleet. At the Battle Of Midway the entire complement, save one pilot, of Torpedo Squadron 8 from the Hornet were all killed, but the great miracle at Midway victory was achieved.

Finally, the heroic ship was sunk at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Island. Quoting various reports about the battle proved that it was a hard ship to kill.

From various sources compiled by Wikipedia:

  • In a 15-minute period, Hornet took three bomb hits from “Val” dive bombers, another bomb hit compounded by the “Val” itself crashing into the deck, two torpedo hits from “Kates”, and another “Val” crashing into the deck. Because of the damage the Hornet was taken undertow when another Japanese plane scored a hit.
  • The order was given to abandon ship. U.S. forces then attempted to scuttle Hornet, which absorbed nine torpedoes and more than 400 5 in (130 mm) rounds from the destroyers Mustin and Anderson. Mustin and Anderson moved off when a Japanese surface force appeared in the area.
  • Japanese destroyers Makigumo and Akigumo then finished Hornet with four torpedoes. At 01:35 on 27 October, she finally sank with the loss of 140 of her crew
  • It was the last US fleet Carrier to be sunk in WW II.

And another history lesson this time from a class in naval history over four decades ago at the US Naval Academy. I have tried to find the original source but just remember the professor’s narrative.

As the war in the Pacific got closer to the main Islands of Japan, Kamikaze – the “unmanned” vehicles of the day — were used to attack the American battle fleet—at that time the aircraft carrier was the primary ship leading the attack. So killing carriers was the goal. The Navy knowing this screened the fleet carriers with radar picket Destroyers to both give warning and provide anti-aircraft fire at incoming Kamikazes.

During a lull in after a wave of deadly Kamikaze attacks a voice was heard skipping across the waves-by sailors of the main fleet — sound can do this at sea. As told it was an ensign on a radar picket ship and he was telling the crew that all the officers were killed but he was in command and they would continue to fight the ship—the Destroyer was lost.

There is a fundamental rule in tactical battles that all technology is relative against a reactive enemy. With that said, it is most often the intangibles of training, tactics, and quickly reacting to develop newer and more capable technology that can win the final battle.

Now to the 21st Century–apparently the professor missed a recent event.

If PLA satellites are a problem and it is a choice between putting a carrier battle group at risk or fighting a space war, I think the fighting Navy is capable and ultimately ruthless enough to blind the PRC military.

After the PLA shot down a satellite from a land based launch pad the US Navy demonstrated our at sea capability – from a Department of Defense report:

“At approximately 10:26 p.m. EST, Feb. 20, (2008) a U.S. Navy AEGIS warship, USS Lake Erie (CG-70), fired a single modified tactical Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) hitting the satellite approximately 133 nautical miles over the Pacific Ocean as it traveled in space at more than 17,000 mph. USS Decatur (DDG-73) and USS Russell (DDG-59) were also part of the task force.”

F-35C in Flight (Credit: Lockheed Martin)
F-35C in Flight (Credit: Lockheed Martin)

So to make it simple for the PLA, PLAN. PLAAF and 2nd Artillery: the US Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps are battle tested, currently with ten years of real, but different, combat experience.  When provoked the US has a legacy of carrying the fight to any enemy.

But wait, Professor, it gets even better.

In the 21st century it will be important that no platform fight alone. USN satellite killing Aegis ships will soon be joined by F-35s flying from the Navy/Marine Amphibious Readiness Group “Gator” Navy-the USMC F-35B V/Stol. This is a huge at sea multiplier in capability.

Carrier Battle Group Air Wings with the F-35C will give Naval Forces afloat both situational awareness and the ability to fight a 3 Dimensional War. Add in attack subs and SSGN’s with cruise missiles and a hidden US vigilant on station offense punch remains silent but deadly.

Finally, like the radar picket ships of WWII, current Destroyers, frigates and perhaps even the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) can add a huge defensive element against CHICOM incoming missiles. The capability to spoof and jam incoming guided weapons is an art of “tron” war practiced by Navy forces for decades. One can imagine the targeting frustration trying to hit a 50+ knot LCS that an incoming warhead thinks is an aircraft carrier.

It gets even better, by pure accident during a test flight over Pax River an F-35 system picked up a launch in Florida over 800 miles away. So the second a missile is launched against the fleet the Commander can light up the launch pad using a combination of B-2s and F-22s, especially in a their emerging Suppression of Enemy Air Defensive  (SEAD) role along with at sea and sub launched cruise missiles.

Eventually UAS systems with combat firepower guided by F-35s and the robot revolution can take out any threat, launch be seen and die. This F-35 ability has been further validated in the exercise “Northern Edge.” It was reported one F-35 capable test bed aircraft using F-35 current sensor/radar systems could sweep over 50,000 square miles of ocean.

So rather then unilaterally as suggested in print “take our forces off the table,” the 21st century Navy can blind them and blast them-and that is real deterrence and should give the PRC pause before starting a hostile action.

American just needs the political will to continue to commit the resources to keep the US Navy/Marine/AF the number one fighting force in the Pacific.

A USMC General David Shoup, the Commandant pointed out how hard crossing 94 miles of Ocean can be to invade an Island. Commandant Shoup, Congressional Medal of Honor, for action on Tarawa pointed out the relative size of Tarawa to Cuba when a lot of bluster was being raised about invading Cuba. He took a map of Cuba and then put a dot on the map. When some asked what was that he said “That Gentlemen is the island of Tarawa it took us three days and eighteen thousand Marines to take it”

(Taken from David Halberstam’s great book “The Best and the Brightest”).

Turkey and Tehran: Cooperation and Conflict

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10/25/2011
Turkey lives in the neighborhood which means that its role in Afghanistan is more constant than the Western players currently deploying force in the country. (Credit Image: Bigstock)

10/25/2011 – By Dr. Richard Weitz During our time in Turkey, a key issue of interest was getting an update on their relationship with Iran. Although we were in Turkey for only one week, it was evident that Turkey’s relationship with Iran is complex. The two countries cooperate in some areas and conflict in others.

For example, when pressed, the Turkish policy makers we met acknowledged that Iran and Turkey see one another as rivals for influence in the Middle East. Turkish academics and business people more readily confirmed this competition, though all our interlocutors made clear that Turkey would seek to avoid a direct confrontation with Iran because it would undermine the progress Ankara and Tehran had made in resolving their historic tensions.

Turkey's role as a crossroads power has been enhanced by the Arab Spring and the challenges posed by Iran. (Credit image: Bigstock)
Turkey's role as a crossroads power has been enhanced by the Arab Spring and the challenges posed by Iran. (Credit image: Bigstock)

Turkey and Iran share some regional security interests. Turkish foreign policy experts emphasize that, while the United States and other NATO countries appear to want to withdraw their military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan as soon as possible, Turkey cannot escape the geographic imperative of dealing directly with the security issues involving these neighboring countries.

The Turkish national security elite therefore wants to see a strong Iraqi government that could enforce control over the Kurdish region bordering Turkey, especially to prevent the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which still conducts guerrilla and terrorist attacks against Turkey, from strengthening its presence in the region. Turkey has also sent troops to Afghanistan and sought to reduce tensions between the Kabul government and Pakistan.

In light of these objectives, Turkish officials naturally want Tehran’s help in keeping Afghanistan, Iraq, and other neighboring regions stable. Turkish experts do not consider Iran a disruptive force in Afghanistan given all the other problems facing that country as well as the large number of other countries active in Afghanistan, which dilutes Tehran’s influence and options.

With regard to Iraq, some Turkish analysts foresee the possible advent of a pro-Iranian Shiite government in Baghdad. In this case, they would try to work with Tehran to exert influence on Iran’s policies towards turkey, Kurdistan, and other regional security issues.

With regard to Iran’s relations with Western countries, Turkish experts fear that isolating and threatening Tehran could further radicalize Iran’s foreign policy, which at least with regards to Turkey has been generally non-confrontational. An alienated Iranian government might deepen its ties with international terrorist organizations, intervene more aggressively in Iraq and Afghanistan, and pursue other retaliatory actions against NATO countries that would invariably harm Turkish interests.

Turks have already seen this process at work. Since 1990, they have suffered considerable economic costs, regional security setbacks, and other losses from Western sanctions and military actions against Iraq.

During its most recent two-year rotating term on the UN Security Council (UNSC), which ended in 2010, Turkey joined with Brazil as the most vocal opponent of imposing additional sanctions on Iran for its controversial nuclear activities. Turkish officials consider the “dual-track” approach adopted by the UNSC and other countries toward Iran—combining offers of cooperation with threats of retaliation—counterproductive.

Instead, they argue that the best way to prevent Tehran from seeking nuclear weapons is to address the underlying sources of insecurity that might induce Iran to seek them. Rather than rely on threats and sanctions, they want to offer Iran security pledges in return for reciprocal Iranian guarantees that Tehran will not misuse nuclear technology for military purposes.

Economic and energy considerations have also motivated Turkish opposition to applying more sanctions against Iran. The two countries have also seen a surge in bilateral commerce, thanks in part to Iran’s subsidizing energy sales to Turkey. Bilateral trade already exceeded $11 billion last year and the two governments have set the goal of tripling that figure to $30 billion by 2015.

Each day Turkey imports some 20-25 million cubic meters of Iranian gas at discounted prices through a direct pipeline connecting the two neighboring states. This equates to approximately 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year, which amounts to almost one-third of Turkey’s yearly gas consumption and has made Iran Turkey’s second largest supplier of gas after Russia.

There are numerous media reports that Turkey has not fully enforced the international economic sanctions imposed on Iran. But Turks worry that new sanctions on Iran will make circumvention more costly and further harm Turkey’s economic interests. International sanctions already contributed to last year’s decision of Turkish Petroleum International Co. to withdraw from a $7 billion deal to develop a part of Iran’s enormous South Pars field.

Another factor drawing Turkey and Iran together has been the decreasing strength of Turkey’s secular political parties and national security establishment. Before 2002, Turkish secularists pointed to Iran as a potential nightmare model that might occur should an avowedly religious party gain control of the Turkish government. But the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has governed Turkey since 2002, has discredited this claim.

Furthermore, whereas Turkish politicians and military leaders used to see Turkey’s Islamic neighbors Iran and Syria as potential threats, and sought to develop security ties with Israel, the other important non-Muslim state in the Middle East, Turkish and Iranian leaders now share a common animus towards Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.

At times, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Ahmadinejad appear to compete for Arab mass support through their public attacks on Israel and their endorsement of various pro-Palestinian initiatives such as the controversial “freedom flotillas” seeking to defy Israel’s blockade of Gaza. While the previously robust intelligence cooperation between Turkey and Israel has largely ended, Turkey now shares intelligence with Iran about the PKK insurgents in Iraq and other mutual threats.

Despite these economic, energy, and security ties, sources of bilateral tension are growing. Turkish officials do not object to Iran’s pursuit of limited nuclear energy activities under appropriate international monitoring. In addition, Turkey wants to prevent other countries, such as Israel or the United States, from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities using military force. (They do not comment on the more exotic cyber attacks.)

Nonetheless, while Turkish officials profess to believe that Iran’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, they clearly do not want Tehran to obtain nuclear weapons. They fear that such a development would set off a wave of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and would also embolden Iran to behave more aggressively.

Members of Turkey’s still influential national security establishment have suggested that, if Iran ever acquired nuclear weapons, Turkey would rapidly do likewise for reasons of security and prestige.

Turkish leaders have sought to mediate the nuclear dispute between Tehran and Western countries, seeking a deal that would permit Iran to conduct peaceful nuclear activities but not nuclear weapons. Most notably, last May Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Lula Inacio da Silva of Brazil even announced an agreement in Tehran on May 17 whereby Iran would deposit 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) in Turkey in return for the delivery within one year of 120 kilograms of uranium enriched to the higher level needed for Tehran’s medical research reactor. The previous year, the Obama administration unsuccessfully tried to construct a package deal whereby Iran would receive additional fuel for this reactor from a foreign supplier in return for accepting various temporary constraints on Iran’s nuclear program as a confidence-building measure.

The Turkey-Brazil-Iran agreement differed in crucial respects from the deal the United States and its allied had offered at a 2009 meeting with Iranian representatives in Vienna. For example, whereas the Vienna Group sought to secure a suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities as part of the deal, the trilateral declaration explicitly affirms Tehran’s right to research, develop, produce, and use all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment. After the declaration, the Iranian government affirmed that it would continue to enrich uranium to the 20 percent level, which the original Vienna deal was explicitly designed to prevent.

Another problem was that, as a result of the time that has elapsed since last October, Iran has continued to enrich much more uranium, making the 1,200 kilograms of LEU Iran would exchange under the new trilateral proposal a much smaller share of its total stockpile.

The immediate reason Iranian government accepted the trilateral agreement was to avert new UN sanctions, which were nonetheless approved by the Security Council the following month. As in the past, Iranian diplomats sought to make some concessions in order to keep the focus on the negotiation track, especially by giving a justification to governments that were looking for a plausible excuse to delay adopting new sanctions. Until then, Iranian officials had ignored Turkish officers to mediate the dispute, including a Turkish offer the previous year to allow the proposed nuclear fuel exchange to occur on Iranian territory, one of Tehran’s core demands.

Iran’s gambit failed to break the great power unity. Years of frustrating negotiations have led European governments, the Obama administration, and now Russia and China to discount Tehran’s present willingness to negotiate acceptable constraints on its nuclear program. Middle-ranking powers like Turkey have been drawn into this vacuum, but their mediation efforts have proven equally unsuccessful, and they still lack the power to block further sanctions.

Turkey voted against UNSC Resolution 1929,adopted on June 9, 2010, since it imposed additional sanctions on Iran rather than accept the Turkish-Brazil-Iran agreement as a means to reconcile Tehran with its nuclear critics. Turkish officials have said they will respect the resolution, which is binding on all UN members, but not enforce the supplementary sanctions adopted by the United States, EU members, or other countries unless they are also adopted by the UNSC, which would make them legally obligatory for all UN members. Some nonproliferation allege that certain Turkish firms have been aiding Iran’s nuclear program by providing dual-use goods and services (e.g., banking) that could have military as well as peaceful applications.

Although Turkey still does not oppose Iran’s nuclear activities, new sources of tension have disrupted their relations. The Iranians complain about Ankara’s decision to host a missile defense radar on Turkish territory that, despite NATO’s denials, is clearly designed against Iran’s growing fleet of ballistic missiles which could easily reach Turkey, Furthermore, they object to Turkish leaders’ seeking to export their version of Islamic democracy to the new regimes of the Middle East that came to power with the Arab Spring, which Iran generally opposes.

But the most divisive issue between Ankara and Tehran is their contrasting approach toward Syria.

The preservation of a friendly regime in Damascus is a vital national interest for Iran. The Syrian government represents one of Iran’s few genuine allies, having resisted strong U.S. efforts to wean it away from Tehran. In addition, Iran’s ability to “unleash” Hamas and Hezbollah is seen in Tehran as an important means of deterring, through threats of retaliation, Israeli or U.S. military action against Iran. And Syria provides the territory, intelligence, and other essential enablers that Iranians need to keep these two proxies militarily powerful.

Given these interests, it is unsurprising that the Iranian media, and some Iranian officials, have criticized the Turkish government for acting as a proxy for the West in these conflicts. Nonetheless, Turkish officials have calculated that the Iranian government, which is regionally isolated and potentially vulnerable to its own Arab Spring, cannot risk a break with Turkey.

Pacific Strategy X: ISR Services to the Honeycomb

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10/24/2011

10/24/2011 – As the presence forces operate in the Pacific from the Arctic to Australia, a key enabler will be the ISR inputs or services which support and enhance deployed decision-making centers, whether in the combat aircraft of the 5th generation or by the ships and longer-range strike assets.

The service structure should be understood as a function of capabilities deployed permanently or deployed in areas of interest when appropriate to various insertions or augmentation of force.  The ISR service structure  is a key element of the scalability of capabilities, and shaping of both US and allied concepts of operations. We are using the term service structure to highlight that the structure is platform agnostic.  The ISR service structure is very dynamic as well and can come from commercially leased systems, large aircraft, dirigibles, or robotic systems whether air-breathing or not. The key is to feed the ISR services into the decision making system and to support deployed presence platforms, capabilities and warfighters.

Space-based systems shape the “permanent” presence foundation for ISR in the Pacific.  Given the weather conditions and the vast expanse of the Pacific, an ability to tap into space systems is a crucial foundation for situational awareness and guidance for deployment decisions.

 

A comprehensive C4ISR service structure can be built based on parterning with commercial and allied offerings pursued in a realistic policy enviornment and a distributed architecture shaped whereby capabilities emerge from the elements of a deployed capability, rather than trying for a costly comprehensive architecture which requires solely proprietary funding to support the end to end effort.

Leveraging other people’s money, whether commercial or foreign space, or other Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence and Decision Making Support or C4ISR D platforms is essential for an affordable, capable military space strategy.

The mix can well drive innovation and match quality of shaping a de facto distributed space architecture. Overcoming stove piped programs, and challenging DOD and the intelligence community to OPERATE outside the box is crucial.  Simply contemplating change is not adequate.

Engaging in organizational innovation is at the heart of today’s technological innovation. Money can be freed up to support needs revealed by organizational innovation and core needs, which emerge at the edge of overlapping capabilities.

Space provides a significant contribution to C4ISR D or data for decision-making.  Yet the unmanned revolution as well as the fifth generation aircraft is game changers in providing data for deployed decision makers.  And the role of hoisted payloads in supporting UAVs has become evident in the Afghanistan operation.  The new capabilities can provide a re-think about how to leverage commercial space, notably hoisted payloads, in supporting air-breathing C4ISR D assets.

The role of proprietary military space becomes a default capability: what CAN NOT be provided by the powerful conjunction of air breathing assets and commercial satellite capabilities?  The relatively un-agile DOD structure would then be put on notice to identify programs that are needed which can interact with such a conjunctive capability, but provide unique and core capabilities UNABLE to be generated either by air breathing military assets of the commercial space, notably hoisted payloads structure.

Savings would come from both sources.

First, DOD would have to ACT outside the box in leveraging its investments in unmanned and manned aerospace assets.  The deployment of the F-35 will provide game-changing ISR capabilities, which can be harvested to reshape the C4ISR D structure.

Second, the evolution of satellite capabilities in the commercial sector provides significant cost investments, which DOD does NOT need to make.  DOD by shaping long-term contractual service relationships can save scarce investment capital.  But this requires DOD to think and contract long term, not one of its core competencies.

Such an approach facilitates a strategic re-think, which parallels what we are doing with fifth generation aircraft.  The focus is upon distributed operations and shaping a honeycomb of decision-making supporting the deployed warfighter.  Such a focus allows one to tap into the emerging thinking about shaping a disaggregated strategy whereby space policy makers look to focus on overall capabilities from the enterprise rather than concentration of capabilities on single point of failure platforms.

Disaggregation and distributed operations further highlights the opportunity to build smaller payloads and to operate across a variety of launch platforms.  By reducing the cost impact of a launch failure and its impact on expensive and complicated satellites, innovation is enhanced as well.  With a diversity of assets distributed across the space enterprise, and leveraging commercial space and air-breathing assets, innovation and cost effectiveness are enabled.

At the same time, various air-breathing assets are key elements of a presence force with an ability to become scalable and tailored to specific situations. The potential of the fifth generation aircraft and their associated robotic systems can be exploited to shape C4ISR capabilities very scalable for the presence forces.

Here the onboard processing capabilities of the F-22 and F-35 would be recognized for what they are, namely, breakthrough capabilities to process data for their own use, for the network of air combat systems and to integrate their capabilities with maritime and ground forces.

As the manned systems are deployed and their capabilities better understood and exploited, the role of robotic vehicles in the air network will go up dramatically.  A wolfpack concept is likely to emerge within which the manned systems direct and are embedded within airborne robotic networks which, in turn, work closely with maritime and ground forces.

The capability of providing for collaborative decision-making among maritime, ground, and air commanders becomes possible as the interactive network shapes options and provides choices to the joint commanders.

The role of space in this world has the potential to become radically redefined.  The propriety U.S. military space network is most significant when the U.S. seeks to establish air superiority and conducts joint and combined maritime and air strikes against adversaries, either nation state or discrete adversary targets located on foreign territory.  Here the interaction among US military systems must be carefully protected and highly integrated for a successful insertion of force.  In a way, given the key role of the evolution of the F-22 and F-35, the military space network would be sized to support this initial air superiority and air dominance effort.

And as the fleets of 5th generation aircraft increase, the relationship between large manned aircraft, AWACS, bombers, tankers and lifters will change.  Some of these assets may well go away, such as the AWACS.  The tankers and airlifters can have key ISR systems and routers emplaced on them to be part of the honeycomb.  And the next generation bomber will become a core additive element whose requirements and capabilities may well be determined what it contributes from what is lacking from a forward deployed presence force – namely, a 5th generation aircraft and Aegis enabled force.

Cybersecurity challenges and the threats from some powers who are developing abilities to disrupt US-specific military systems simply re-enforce the advantages of a multi-layered architecture encompassing commercial, air-breathing, allied, and US military systems. The US cannot afford to build a proprietary Pentagon-funded layered and diverse architecture, which deal with Cybersecurity threats all by itself.

A diversified architecture in which commercial and allied elements are part of the foundation makes the task of disruption much harder and certainly for states not terribly desirable politically.

The augmentation of capability WHEN necessary is facilitated by a diversified architecture.  If a joint and coalition force is operating in an area of interest and needs shared data in an air permissive environment, the deployment of dirigibles as a system to provide persistent situational awareness can be provided.  And the ISR systems put upon on the dirigible can allow information sharing in such an environment.

If a Black Swan pops up and planning needs to be facilitated in an area of interest an operationally responsive space capability can deployed to up the tactical information necessary to insert a force or to re-inforce if an when necessary an already deployed presence asset or group of assets.

An example of a littoral operation where such a need was underscored was in Libya.  The Libyan military operation in Libya is not yet over. It is too early for scholarly and learned lessons. But it is not too early to look at the tactical experiences and how those experiences presage changes to come. We have done an initial look at the overlap between the experience of the French and of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Libyan operations and have discovered some significant overlaps in experience.

If we look at the congruence of the French with the USMC Marine experiences, several things can be highlighted.

First, the centrality of leveraging multiple bases in a littoral operation is significant. The French used several land bases and incorporated the sea base — whether the carrier or their amphibious ships — to work with land-based aircraft. The Marines used their land base largely to supply the sea-based air ops via Osprey transport.

Second, having the C4ISR — command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance — forward deployed with the pilot as the key decision maker is crucial to mission success. The classic USAF U.S. Air Force CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center) is challenged by what the Marines demonstrated in the operation; the French experience also challenges it.

If you have a long C4ISR chain, the information in a fluid and dynamic situation must be provided in a more timely fashion than a system built for 1991 air operations permits.

Third, new air capabilities make a significant difference. For the USMC, the Osprey was the game changer in this operation. For the French, it was the new recce reconnaissance pods off of the Rafale fighters.

Fourth, the dynamic targeting problem experienced by the French was also highlighted by the USMC Marines’ experience. Getting accurate information from the ground is central to operations. The USN-USMC Navy-Marine team has a number of new capabilities being deployed or acquired which that will enhance its ability to do such operations. The F-35B fighter will give the USMC Marine Corps an integrated electronic warfare and C4ISR capability. The new LPDs have significant command and control capabilities. For the French, acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which that could become wingmen for the Rafales would be important, and the role of the C2 command and control capabilities of the new amphibious ships were was underscored as well.

Fifth, the pickup quality of this operation may be more a norm than an aberration moving forward. If it is, then the old paradigm (significant planning and roll out of a fleet of C4ISR aircraft and capabilities) may be challenged by a new one: Deploying air assets that can be tapped by the sea base to shape an operation may become one of the key requirements moving forward.

Let us now hover over the C4ISR aspect a bit more. The French officers in charge of the operation were keenly aware of how little time they had to plan for the it, and putting UAVs and combat aircraft over Libya prior to a U.N. authorization was not a great idea. President Nicolas Sarkozy decided considerably before the U.N. resolution that France would operate in Libya, but to the French military leaders, this meant that the political roll out did not mesh with what their planning requirements.

This discussion about the comparative U.S.-France experiences in the Libyan intervention raises the question about space systems: Could they be used, in the future, to provide a much more operationally reactive and efficient role, in the spirit of what is called in the U.S. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)?

For instance, if such ORS systems had been available in Europe, France could have used the insertion of a small constellation of LEO small satellites into low Earth orbit by quick launch to allow a couple-of-months cushion for planning, and then to provide efficient tactical support to the intervention.

Not only would such an ORS capability be essential to operations where the political dynamic is determinant, but the military capability decisive, it would also enable significant manpower savings compared to with UAVs. Contrary to the common wisdom, UAVs are not cheap; they are vulnerable to ground fire and cyber-attacks,; they require significant manpower to support an “unmanned” asset,; and of course they cannot be used before an official green light since they operate in the airspace of a sovereign country. Once the satellites are launched, the manpower support is minimal to deliver the capability. And their intelligence information can be downloaded directly to the cockpits of the pilots, who then, after initial destruction of enemy capabilities, can transition to dynamic targeting.

An ORS capability would be a very valuable complement because the main issue is not the strategic intelligence but the tactical input to the commanders and pilots in the field, which has to be put in place, tested and exploited before the beginning of the operations. A constellation of a few small satellites, launched on- demand, and injected in very low altitude orbits tailored to provide the best coverage of the countries of operations, would add enormously to the efficiency of the combat syste

The world is changing in an accelerated way. New military challenges like the Libyan intervention call for new ways to operate, with focus on local C2command and control, and tailored tactical means.

In effect, the middle layer of the ISR service structure will grow and with it the ability to push decision making down to level of the deployed forces.  With the emergence of the F-35, a true revolution in ISR capabilities will be available to US and allied forces. The F35 has significantly greater processing power than current aircraft and has an open-chip architecture. With this level of processing power available, the F35 will be capable of simultaneous multi-mission operations, rather than current combat aircraft’s approach to sequential multi-tasking.

Additionally, remotely piloted aircraft developments part of the future of shaping high-mid-low altitude C2 and ISR capabilities. Additional introduction of dirigibles and other assets will contribute as well to an expanded mid-layer role in the C4ISR or C4ISR D (shared decision-making) enterprise.

All of this depends on how permissive the air environment is in an operation and the scope and nature of the strategic objectives and the tactical conditions.  But the core point is rather simple: by shaping a distributed and diversified structure, the National Command Authority can leverage normal presence capabilities and scale up or down dependent upon the situation.

(To read further, please see: https://www.sldinfo.com/building-blocks-for-a-new-us-military-space-policy/ ; https://www.sldinfo.com/new-u-s-national-security-space-strategy-proposes-new-partnerships/ ; https://www.sldinfo.com/the-evolving-u-s-space-paradigm-lynchpin-for-a-global-c4isrd-enterprise/ ; https://www.sldinfo.com/leveraging-austerity-recrafting-military-space/)

This article is a contribution to the Strategic Whiteboard

https://www.sldinfo.com/resources/strategic_whiteboard/

 


Pacific Strategy IX: Inserting the UCAS Into Maritime Operations

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Pacific Strategy IX: Inserting the UCAS Into Maritime Operations
10/23/2011
The X-47B UCAS flew with its landing gear up for the first time on September 7

10/23/2011 – A key development for the evolution of U.S. Pacific operations will be the use of new remotely piloted vehicles as part of the C4ISR capabilities.  So called-unmanned systems are clearly not that; but are an important part of extending the reach and persistence of the strike and reconnaissance capabilities of the sea-based forces.

All of the RPAs suffer from vulnerabilities in their data links and no RPA has flown in Northern Edge into the teeth of hostile jamming and electronic warfare.  And a robust jamming or cyber environment is something that those who believe unmanned systems are the only future of airpower would soon see in combat demonstrations that they are not.

Rather than a key element of the future it would be wise to grasp that UAS have not been tested in a contested air combat environment nor their accident rate really discussed.

The X-47B UCAS flew with its landing gear up for the first time on September 7, 2011 during a test flight at Edwards AFB, California. (Credit: Northrop Grumann)The X-47B UCAS flew with its landing gear up for the first time on September 7, 2011 during a test flight at Edwards AFB, California.  (Credit: Northrop Grumann)

If someone figures out what happens when Cyber Warriors fight UAS Drivers then maybe it will be time for some speculation. But early hard budgeting decisions to substitute reliance on UAS as a direct trade off for fighter pilots is yet to be validated in a demanding combat environment.

UAS primacy advocates have yet to produce a robust test in which the entire mission profile for a UAS was pitted against dedicated Cyber Warriors. A cyber team that was allowed to employ all of their techniques available-from jamming, spoofing, malware, denial of service, Trojans, backdoors, viruses, worms and even finding a deliberate saboteur (there are some evolving CI programs that look for such action) think PFC Manning and Wiki-leaks.

Additionally, UAS accident rates have not been addressed. As Col. (retired) Bill Buckey, a Marine F/A-18 Combat Pilot, LSO and the officer who directed the surge build out at Kandahar Afghanistan points out; “The accident rate for UAS ops at Kandahar was noticeable and that harsh environment is less demanding than a pitching Carrier Deck–an operational environment that includes CV ops is as of yet uncharted territory for UAVs.”

Nonetheless, RPAs will be an important part of the evolving wolfpack con-ops of air operations over Areas of Interest.  The F-22s and F-35s can work interactively with RPAs to establish a new concept of operations to leverage, and control deployed assets to shape effective strike and reconnaissance operations in Areas of Interest.

(See further our series on this topic: https://www.sldinfo.com/leveraging-5th-generation-aircraft/ ; https://www.sldinfo.com/managing-non-linear-battlespace/ ; https://www.sldinfo.com/re-norming-the-asymmetric-advantage-in-air-dominance/ ; and https://www.sldinfo.com/the-emergence-of-a-21st-century-concept-of-air-and-military-operations-the-impact-of-the-“forcing-function”-of-the-5th-generation-aircraft-2/)

A key capability which the USN is developing to provide such an RPA system is the X47B.

The X-47B is a tailless, strike fighter-sized unmanned aircraft currently under development by Northrop Grumman as part of the U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D) program. Under a contract awarded in 2007, the company designed, produced and is currently flight testing two X-47B aircraft. In 2013, these aircraft will be used to demonstrate the first carrier-based launches and recoveries by an autonomous, low-observable-relevant unmanned aircraft. The UCAS-D program will also mature relevant carrier landing and integration technologies, and demonstrate, in 2014, autonomous aerial refueling by the X-47B aircraft. (Northrop Grumman)

The program brings a number of key enhancements to the sea-based force to the table.

First, it extends the strike range of an already funded core capability, namely, the carrier task force. Tactical aircraft have limited range; the UCAS has much greater range and reach. This makes it valuable in and of itself, but extending the reach of the new tactical aviation asset to be deployed to the fleet, namely the F-35, enhances its value. The sensor and communication capabilities of the F-35 are significant, but the reach of the aircraft remains within tactical ranges; the UCAS has forward strategic strike reach as well as ISR and communications reach-back to the tactical assets.

The UCAS can spearhead the entire sensor and strike grid put up by the carrier task force.

Second, the UCAS will be the first unmanned system developed in the wake of the deployment of the new F-35. The F-35 as a “flying combat system” should be a generator of change in the unmanned fleet.

The development and then deployment of the UCAS will be integrally interconnected with the F-35, and as such can take advantage of commonality in sensors and communications with the new manned aircraft. Shaping a common concept of operations between the F-35 and the UCAS can provide an important stimulus for change for the US Air Force as well.

Third, it is highly likely that the US Air Force new bomber program will be shifted to the right in funding priorities. This provides a significant opportunity for the US Air Force to learn from the US Navy’s experience in deploying the UCAS with the F-35 to shape a possible unmanned successor for the manned bomber.

A template could be shaped by the Navy, which could provide important lessons learned in shaping the US Air Force’s strategy to work the future of its unmanned programs with manned aircraft.

Fourth, the company building the UCAS demonstrator, Northrop Grumman, can draw on significant lessons learned in their other unmanned programs, such as Global Hawk, and on their core contributions in sensors and communications to the F-35 to provide a realistic development to production program for the new UCAS aircraft.

The UCAS will provide a multi-mission capability for the joint and coalition force structure. It should not be understood as a stand-alone platform, which is of value only in the most extreme warfighting conditions. It is NOT a specialized asset, rather it is a multi-mission asset useful across the spectrum of conflict and in the diverse concepts of operations which the U.S. Navy, and the joint and coalition forces are likely engage in against the most likely threats of the next two decades.

The UCAS will be a significant asset in the formation of the new concepts of operations for distribution aerospace forces. Among the forward deployed stealth assets, a significant sharing of ISR, C2 and strike functions will be shared, and communicated to other assets in supporting roles.

The UCAS with its distinctive stealth capabilities will become an important node in the new air operations network which can be used in command and control functions, as a forward air controller identifying targets for either stealth or legacy aircraft, as strike platforms leading an attack or supporting an attack by providing more weapons on targets needed by the manned stealth aircraft.

The UCAS will an important contributor to fighting the hybrid wars facing America and its allies. With the diffusion of advanced technologies, both commercial and military, U.S. and allied militaries cannot count on a clearly defined spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity of operations; Low intensity can become mid-intensity rapidly. You do not want to bring a knife to a gunfight, especially when you are not certain of who is defining the nature of the conflict or its tactical or strategic reach.

A modular UCAS brings a diversity of capabilities to the battlespace, ranging from command and control support, situational awareness, providing crucial links in a distributed electronic or cyber war attack, initial strike weapons, additional support strike weapons. In addition, these capabilities are launched from an alternative airfield at sea with a different set of trajectories than land-based facilities, which further enhance the capability of the joint or coalition force.

The UCAS also can provide an important tool in support of insertion forces. The USMC focuses on the need for a new approach to sea basing. As the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force and the USMC augment their Special Forces capabilities, and in the case of the U.S. Air Force and USMC the Osprey is seen as a key tool for rapid force insertion, the UCAS can provide a crucial support element for rapidly inserted ground-air forces.

The introduction of a stealthy UAV provides the top cover for the insertion of Special Forces for raiding or counter-terrorism operations. Insertion forces by definition can be rapidly withdrawn as well. The U.S. after long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan might well consider the advantage of rapidly inserted forces to deal with the suppression of local threats creating global consequences.

The USMC for certain, and several allies as well will deploy the F-35B. And perhaps the U.S. Air Force as it reconsiders its position within the re-set of power projection forces might acquire this aircraft as well. The STOVL aircraft has many advantages for concepts of operations, including deploying ashore on rugged “airfields” and operating from support structures at sea or on the air.

Dependent upon the amount of time ashore and where operating the USMC has developed an effective plan for support of the dispersed force ashore. The advantage of “airfields” not known ahead of actual deployment is significant; a UCAS as providing for early and continuing ISR or defensive support for forward deployed STOVL airfields is compelling.

And finally, the UCAS can provide a significant contribution to an “enduring littoral presence” mission for the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy has struggled to define its littoral mission. When the service operated “from the sea” construct, the littoral were simply space through which strike and sea control was exercised. In the world of today and the next decades, engagement in the littorals for relatively long duration is a crucial mission.

As the U.S. Navy considers acquisition of the littoral combat ship (LCS), the question of how to sustain the operation of these ships or how to combine them with other littoral assets such as an engaged USMC will become significant. The UCAS will provide a significant airborne asset to support the LCS in its initial engagement and provide sustained support as desired.

(To read further: https://www.sldinfo.com/x-47b-unmanned-combat-air-system-demonstrator/ and https://www.sldinfo.com/the-case-for-new-programs-in-a-period-of-defense-transition-the-naval-ucas-case/)

This is a contribution to the strategic whiteboard.

https://www.sldinfo.com/resources/strategic_whiteboard/


The Turkish Re-Set: A Cause for Concern in the West?

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on The Turkish Re-Set: A Cause for Concern in the West?
Is the Western Image of Turkey Increasingly Out of Date? (Credit Image: Bigstock)

10/22/2011 – By Franck Znaty The current US administration sees Turkey as a model to be replicated for Arab and Muslim countries.  It is viewed as a Muslim majority country within secular institutions, western ally and NATO member, with a strong economy and pro-market policies, a newly-found tight control of the military, friendly relations with the Muslim world, as well as a country which once had a strong collaboration with another key US ally in the region- Israel.

The desire to see Turkey act as template for other countries in the region has often been demonstrated by the Obama administration.

Is the Western Image of Turkey Increasingly Out of Date? (Credit Image: Bigstock)
Is the Western Image of Turkey Increasingly Out of Date? (Credit Image: Bigstock)

As the recent meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan in the margins of the UN General Assembly showed, in which the former lauded the latter with praises of displaying “great leadership” in the pursuit of democracy in the Middle East.

Furthermore, this American desire to see Turkey take on an important role in the region was manifested by the recent establishment of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). This new institution is meant, according to the US State Department, to “address the evolving terrorist threat in a way that would bring enduring benefits by helping frontline countries and affected regions acquire the means to deal with threats they face.”

This forum was officially launched during a meeting between the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, where Turkey was offered by the US to co-direct this new venue.

But this Administration view of Turkey may be increasingly out of date in light of Turkish domestic and foreign policy developments.

In order to understand Turkish Foreign Policy actions and changes since the ‘Justice and Development Party’ (AKP, in its Turkish acronym) came to power in 2002, one needs to look at the writings of current Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, who outlines his vision for the future of his country’s foreign policy prior to his entry into politics.[1] In his book entitled The Strategic Depth: The Turkish International Location[2], the author argues that Turkey’s strategic depth is based on the country’s geographical and historical depths. Turkey, he explains, is located at the center of “several geo-cultural basins”, and as such, this geographical location “places Turkey right at the center of many geographical areas of influence”.

Turkey must be actively engaged, he argues, on several fronts of the world order: the West (Europe and the United States), the Middle East, Africa and the Caucasus. This policy of active engagement in several different regions resonates even further when one considers the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, which places Turkey “at the epicenter of  [historical] events” [3].

Furthermore, Davutoglu, in previous writings[4], takes a shot at the Kemalist establishment, which ruled on Turkey’s foreign policy almost uninterrupted since the Republic’s creation in 1923. He argues that the Kemalist put too much efforts in locking Turkey with the West and Europe, and thus failed to recognize Turkey’s great opportunities in the Muslim world, and with most of its immediate neighbors.

According to his vision, the Muslim world should be a main focus of the Turkish re-set in the conduct of foreign policy.  This world he claims, “becomes the focal point in international relations”[5].

The theoretical concepts gave rise to the much debated “zero problems ” policy whereby Turkey would seek to entertain good relations with all of its neighbors, assert its presence in several international systems and regions (NATO, EU, Middle East, Caucasus) and engage with actors with whom it had stormy relations in the past under Kemalist rule: Iran, Syria, Russia, Armenia.

When the AKP first came to power in 2002, their electoral victory was met by a good reaction from the then-US administration.  The AKP party did not initially deviate from the pillars of the Kemalist foreign policy as it maintained a close relationship with the West as well as made an entry into the European Union a priority. Furthermore, fears that its Islamist-roots would dictate a reversal in Turkey’s positive inclinations towards Israel were not met, as Ankara and Jerusalem maintained, despite ups and downs due mostly to the meanders of the Intifada, a close defense and strategic collaboration.

In the last few years however, Turkey’s “zero problems” has turned into a more aggressive and controversial conduct of foreign affairs, which some have dubbed Neo-Ottomanism, whereby Turkey sees itself as the leader and engine of the Muslim world.

While it is very hard to predict where this new role in the region will lead Turkey, I propose to look at the following recent developments, which should be the cause of concern for Western policy planners in the region:

Turkey’s NATO commitment:

Turkey’s commitment to the North Atlantic Alliance has been put under question in recent years in the face of several developments. Let us consider the case of the war in Georgia in 2008, in which out of concern not to anger Moscow, the Turkish Prime Minister ceded until the very last moment to the NATO request to support Georgia’s case in its war against Russia.  This foot dragging was showed by the reluctance of Turkey to let European and American warships go through the Black Sea in assistance to Tbilisi, on the pretext that these warships were too big.

Turkey’s hesitancy with the NATO’s request has been repeated very recently on two occasions.

First, NATO has been pressing with the installment of an early warning radar system within Turkish territory meant to detect possible missiles coming from Iran. In order not to harm its fragile relationship with Teheran, Turkey showed great hesitation in complying with NATO’s request but in the end receded.

Second, Turkey has showed initial reticence at the idea of NATO’s intervention in Libya, in order that its $15 billion investment in Libya would remain unharmed.

Turkey’s growing strategic collaboration with China has also been seen as a worrying development. This growing relationship became apparent in the wake of Turkey’s Air Force’s exercise, “Anatolian Eagle”. Turkey has been hosting this event, where many NATO members plus Israel were invited to participate since 2001.

However, following the Cast Lead war in Gaza and in light of Turkey’s growing dissatisfaction with Israel, Jerusalem was excluded from the participation in the exercise in 2009. As a result, the US and some NATO members withdrew their participation in protest.

Ankara then decided to replace the Israeli Air Force with that of China. Chinese’s Sukhoi SU-27 were subsequently sent to train with the Western-equipped Turkish Air Force. This strategic relationship was cemented later that year with a number of strategic agreements signed during the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, to Ankara.

This relationship also took the form of the joint development of a surface-to-surface rocket-launching system, as well as an increased collaboration in the fight against terrorism and extremism.

Tensions in the Mediterranean :

In June 2010, an important discovery of gas field in Israeli waters was revealed along the fact that these gas fields may well extend to Cyprus waters.  Estimates put these fields at 300 trillion cubic feet which could be worth a tally of US$4 trillion.

Cyprus’s intentions to start drilling for oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean have been met by a fierce Turkish reaction.  Turkish “Frigates, gunboats and [its] air force will constantly monitor developments in the area”, was Erdogan’s response to the Cypriot move.

According to media reports, these threats have been followed by acts, as Turkey has already sent a fleet of warships, submarines and fighter jets to the area. Moreover, in response to the Cypriot exploration, Turkey signed its own agreement with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, to have a Turkish seismic vessel explore the area. Erdogan said that this agreement was meant to show Turkey’s determination in the face of Cyprus’ actions and that sending its own vessel was a signal “to show our presence there”.

While the EU and the US have criticized Turkish moves and have called Turkey to resume the island’s reunification talks, the threat of confrontation over Cyprus needs to be taken seriously, especially in the face of continued Turkish inflammatory rhetoric on the issue.  Speaking to Turkish media the Turkish minister for the European Union, Egemen Bagis, said : “It is for this (reason) that countries have warships. It is for this (reason) that we have equipment and we train our navies.” Furthermore, following on this development, Turkey has announced that it would freeze relations with the European Union if rotating presidency would indeed be given to Cyprus in July 2012 as planned.

Moreover, Turkish’s intentions in the Mediterranean do not end over the Cyprus issue as Israel has also been on the receiving end of Turkey’s  “activism” in the region.

First, it argues that Cyprus does not have the authority to sign deals with Israel on the issue of oil and gas exploration.  As a response to the Cyrpus-Israeli accords, Turkey has announced a bigger presence of its Navy in the Mediterranean for surveillance purposes. Speaking about the Israeli naval presence in the Sea, Erdogan said that “until now, they were running wild in (the eastern Mediterranean). From now on, we will see Turkish ships more often especially in our exclusive economic zones”.

Second, in light of Israel’s refusal to apologize over the deaths of 9 Turkish citizens who were aboard the Mavi Marmara that attempted to break the Gaza blockade, Turkey has threatened to send its own Navy to escort Turkish ships that would again attempt to reach the Gaza shores thus pitting these vessels against that of the Israeli Navy. Turkey claims that it acted with “great patience” following the Israeli takeover of the ship, and they viewed the Israeli action against the boat as “grounds of war”.

As it stands today, Turkey has dramatically downgraded its bilateral relationship with Israel, and has announced a suspension of the defense trade as well as an end to the military-to-military relations.

Turkey’s Relationship with Muslim States:

The ‘zero problem’ policy has been leading Turkey to take on the role of leader in the Middle East. This policy meant that Turkey had to mend ties with previous enemies in the region.

However, these attempts were only partially successful, and today we see that they did not pass the test of time.

Turkey’s growing activism in the region has not been well received by Teheran as the two countries have a history of rivalry. Turkey’s acceptance of the installation of the NATO radar that we evoked earlier aroused anger among the Iranian government.

Iranian Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, was quoted as saying that “The West claims the radar system (in Turkey) is to confront Iranian missiles, but they should be aware that we will not tolerate any aggression against our national interests”.

Moreover, NATO’s radar ordeal comes in a context of growing tension between Ankara and Teheran, as the latter accuses the former of backing away from its support of Assad in the face of the Syrian people’s revolt against the Alawi rule.

In addition, the Turkish decision to host the NATO radar could prompt the Iranian leadership to renew the connections it once had with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party),  and use this as a leverage to influence the course of its relationship against Turkey.

Turning to Syria, while it is true that Turkey did respond to Assad’s violent crackdown out of fear that a collapsed Syria would threaten Turkey, Ankara has joined the West in its critique of the Syrian regime actions thus ending the growing relationship it enjoyed with Damascus throughout the first decade of the century. This break in the relation has been manifested by the Turkish’s decision to enforce an arm embargo on Syria, following two Iranian attempts to smuggle arms to Damascus, which were intercepted by Turkish authorities earlier this year.

Turkish relations with the post-Mubarak Egypt is also a cause for concern for Turkish ambitions of friendly relations with the Muslim world. Turkish involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the coziness it has displayed with Hamas does not sit well with Egypt’s military authority.

Indeed, the current ruler of Egypt, the military council, is wary of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood in its country, and its offshoot in the Gaza Strip. As an example, in anticipation of his last visit to Egypt last September, Erdogan announced its intention to visit the Gaza Strip, but was later forced to backtrack in the face of Cairo’s refusal. To be sure, Egypt does not favorably view a Turkish meddling with affairs close to Egyptians borders, as well as acts that could embolden Hamas.

A Coming Economic Crisis?

Erdogan’s AKP reelection earlier this year was mostly explained thanks to his government solid performance on the economy and the implementation of market-friendly policies, which managed to leave the country for the most part unscathed from the consequences of the world economic crisis.

Leaving aside foreign policy, Omer Taspinar, an expert on Turkey at the Brookings Institution, explains that ” this is a very impressive victory for AKP, but perhaps because I’m more of an economic determinist, I really think the big story in Turkey is the economy and that people essentially do not vote when they go to the ballot box thinking about foreign policy.”

However, Turkey’s economic success may come to an end. As recent news have reported: “Turkey’s current account deficit is out of control. It exceeds 10% of gross domestic product (GDP), about the same as crisis-ridden Greece and Portugal. Turkey’s central bank has let the currency slide in a belated effort to correct the imbalance, but the lira’s depreciation has backfired”, writes David Goldman.

Other news report agree with the analysis put forward by Goldman, and explain that Turkey under the AKP has been very generous in handing out loans and mortgages with low interest rate.  This generosity was financed by loans made by the country’s Central Bank.

These loans are now deepening the country’s deficit, which has doubled in the past year and half.  Goldman compares Turkey’s coming economic situation to that of “Argentina in 2000 or Mexico in 1994”.

Time will tell if these prophecies of coming economic collapse will materialize, and how they might affect Turkey’s activism on the regional stage.

 

[1] See most notably: Stratejik Derinlik/ Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu (Istanbul: Küre Yayinlari: 2000) & A. Davutoglu, ‘The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order’, Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2 N°4 (Dec. 1997-Feb. 1998).

[2] Original title Stratejik Derinlik/ Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu (Istanbul: Küre Yayinlari: 2000).

[3] A. Murinson, ‘The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 42, N°6, (Nov. 2006), 945-964, p.951.

[4] A. Davutoglu, ‘The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order’, Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2 N°4 (Dec. 1997-Feb. 1998).

[5] A. Murinson, ‘The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 42, N°6, (Nov. 2006), 945-964, p.948-49.

The Libyan Air Operation: A French Perspective

Posted on | by SysAdmin
10/21/2011

10/22/2011 – Second Line of Defense sat down with recently retired Lt. General Desclaux.  Desclaux’s last command was as French Commander of Air Defense and Air Operations for the French Air Force.  The General has a distinguished and comprehensive background in air operations, with significant NATO experience as well.

An overview of his background and experience can be seen below.

(Credit: Lt. Gen. Desclaux)(Credit: Lt. Gen. Desclaux)

SLD: Could you describe what was unique about this operation for the French Air Force?  And I believe this is first combat other than Afghanistan in which the French Air Force has been involved in a major NATO operation with France a fully integrated military member.

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: Most of the French air forces were involved in the operation, whether land-based or sea-based, including use of attack helos. The French General Staff was extensively involved in shaping the tactics and strategy of the NATO operation as well.  In the Gulf War and in Bosnia, we were mostly following what the Americans were planning; this time, because of less intensive US commitment, it was clearly different.

We involved all Air Force capabilities, with the exception of some GBAD (Ground Based Air Defense) capabilities.

But what was indeed unique, was the initial entry we have performed on the first day of the operation, on Saturday the 19th of March. The game plan was to be ready to follow the political tempo and to react to the very fast evolving situation on the ground. Thanks to our very flexible and reactive C2 organization, we were able to achieve Air superiority over the Benghazi area during the Paris heads of state conference and finally, around 1745 local time, to stop the Gaddafi tanks column, 10 km south of Benghazi.

SLD: With regard to command and control, prior to the operation, it was not clear who or how this would be done.  What were your expectations?

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: At the beginning of the discussions, I thought we might lead the operation.  We worked closely with the British to stand up very good C2 for the operation and there was the possibility that this joint capability might have operated from Lyon, where the French AF main C2 capability is located.

Two Mirage 2000s are seen preparing to depart the main airbase in Dijon for a Libyan strike. (Credit: http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/2/actualite/une-quinzaine-d-avions-francais-deployes-dimanche-en-libye_974323.html)
Two Mirage 2000s are seen preparing to depart the main airbase in Dijon for a Libyan strike. (Credit: http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/2/actualite/une-quinzaine-d-avions-francais-deployes-dimanche-en-libye_974323.html)

SLD: There is a history here of French and British cooperation in C2.

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: Yes. For example, we organized a combined C2, JFACC (Joint Force Air Component Commander) and associated capabilities in 2005 with the British; 60 percent French, 40 percent British for the first rotation in NATO Response Force 5.  And for the following rotation, the sixth, NRF-6, it was the reverse; 60 percent British, 40 percent French.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Force_Air_Component_Commander

Then we have a long experience of sharing and working together, mixing our capabilities, especially our C2 capabilities.

President Sarkozy and the British prime minister were in favor of a French-UK C2 because the appetite of the other nations was not obvious at the beginning of March. At this time, we were preparing to assume the command of the NATO Response Force 17, and my JFACC was ready to conduct the certification exercise Noble Ardent 11. My JFACC was fully equipped with 300 positions in Lyon.

SLD: A particularly interesting aspect of the operation was the use of the naval assets in coordination with the land based air assets.

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: The Air Force assets, the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, the amphibious ships and the frigates were involved in combined strike operations.  On one hand, the frigates provided gunfire support with their 100-mm guns for the operation of the helos off of the amphibious ships. On the other hand, the air assets whether land based or from the carrier supported the various helos, the Tigers, the Gazelles and the Caracals, providing C2, recce, air superiority (wild weasel) or close air support if needed.

SLD: Another important aspect of the operational experience was that the sea base was being used for your recce assets to dump information for processing as well.

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: They were being used for both relay and engagement.

(For a look at Rafael operations aboard the Charless De Gaulle see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lhpe8TCLX4.)

The initial ops were from France. One can easily see why multiple bases closer to the operation were critical to mission success. (Credit: http://bit.ly/qto2MY)The initial ops were from France.  One can easily see why multiple bases closer to the operation were critical to mission success. (Credit: http://bit.ly/qto2MY)

SLD: Another aspect of the operation was that you used multiple bases from which to operate your aircraft.

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: The first two days we operated from Saint-Dizier, Dijon, Nancy and Istres and Avord.  Because since the first day, our objective was to base nearly all the assets in Solenzara (Corsica), we needed to build a robust logistical support during these first two days and to bring many capabilities to Solenzara.  Basing in Solenzara was very relevant for this operation; we have a big ammunition depot; the runway is fully equipped and ready to host at least three squadrons of 15-20 aircraft. This is a base much closer to the Libyan coast line.

Souda Bay was also important operating off of Crete. We operated here with the Qatari Mirage 2000-5s. And it has been a nice progression because at the beginning, they were performing only air-to-air, and at the end, we were able to help them doing some air-to-ground missions.

Later on we were able to operate our Rafale out of Sigonella as well.

SLD: Most of the bombing runs were done from Souda after the initial operations?

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: Yes. It was easier to put all the bombing assets in a single place.  Supporting was easier because after three months of operations, you are looking for cost-effective solutions because you don’t know how long this operation will last and costs are always a major issue.

SLD: Did you use UAVs in the operation as well?

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: We did.  We operated the Harfang (“Eagle”) UAVs from Sigonella.  Harfang is a UAV provided by EADS.  It is an Israeli airframe with EADS electronics.

Rafale loaded with Reco-NG pod (Credit: http://rafalenews.blogspot.com/2011/03/first-pictures-of-rafale-which-were.html)
Rafale loaded with Reco-NG pod (Credit: http://rafalenews.blogspot.com/2011/03/first-pictures-of-rafale-which-were.html)

SLD: What were the advantages to operate the Rafale from the Charles de Gaulle?

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: Basically, in the AOR, whether the Rafale was air or navy, it was conducting the same type of mission; 70 percent dynamic targeting, and 30 percent deliberate targeting. Obviously the advantage of being on an aircraft carrier is you’re closer from the theater of operation.  The disadvantage when you take off from a French carrier is that your Rafale brings less ammunition than when taking off from a runway.

For example, with the Rafale from land, you can take off with two cruise missiles, as from the carrier it’s only one.  The air force Rafale can take off from the land with six 250 kilos bombs – from the carrier, it only was four.  You’re closer but you bring less ammunitions and you need gas anyway because in the dynamic targeting operation loiter time is important to mission success.

SLD: The amphibious ships were an important part of the air operation.

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: They were. On the Mistral, it was very interesting because when we are conducting the night assault with the helicopters, a few hours before the helicopter runs, we were sending Rafale, downloading the imagery on the Mistral or on the Charles De Gaulle, and then the intel officers were preparing the targets for the helicopters and they were taking off with very fresh information on their targets.

SLD: C2 was crucial to the dynamic targeting phase.

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: Central. To be effective in such an operation, when you have a cap of aircraft operating over the targets, you need a good C2, able to analyze the Intel material very quickly and task the aircraft in-flight before the target disappeared.  And for that, you need very good C2 skilled and experienced people.  You need also good leaders in your combat floor, well trained to quick decision-making process and very motivated.  That’s key.  C2 is major in such operation.

Rafale loaded with AASM weapons (Credit: http://rafalenews.blogspot.com/2011/03/first-pictures-of-rafale-which-were.html)Rafale loaded with AASM weapons (Credit: http://rafalenews.blogspot.com/2011/03/first-pictures-of-rafale-which-were.html)

SLD: Could you describe the operational plan a bit further?

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: On the first day the tactical plan basically was to minimize the number of aircraft on land and then to use only the Mirage 2000 at a reasonable height to avoid surface to air missiles.  In the Cyrenaica area, we knew that only a very limited number of SA-24, the latest version of the SA-7, and a few SA-8 were present.

The Mirage 2000 with their targeting pods were not only dropping bombs but also extracting the coordinates for the Rafale. Then the Rafale used their magic weapon, the AASM.  They dropped their weapon at 50 kilometers from the target.  It’s a boosted weapon inertial/GPS-guided and the Rafale can deliver 6 of them in a single run on 6 different DMPIs.

We have used some in Afghanistan, of course, but not at this distance. In Afghanistan, we drop this air bomb without using the booster because you are in the vicinity of the target. Libya was the first employment using fully the range of the booster, 50 kilometers or 60 kilometers when you drop them at reasonable height

SLD: Obviously, rules of engagement were important with the need to avoid civilian casualties and in this situation avoiding casualties was very difficult.

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: Absolutely, the guidance was to avoid at the maximum extent civilian casualties.  There are two ways to do that.  Either you have ammunition able to destroy targets with a very low CDE, with minimum collateral damage estimate possible or you have to really understand what is going on the ground, where are the civilians, where are the bad guys, how they are operating and to be very selective in your targets.

And that’s the problem.  That means whether you have nice ammunitions to do it or you have to have a very good awareness. You have to rely on full-motion video, for example, to really understand the pattern of life around your target, to be able to assess that you will not kill civilians.

Just to give you an example, we had the idea, which is not a brilliant idea, but to employ inert bombs to destroy the vehicles in urban areas.  We were using Paveway III guidance kits associated with inert bombs and we had some success.

But the only way to be effective is to hit directly the target.  If you drop your bomb at one meter, you get no effect.  Then we dropped a few of them but we had a limited success, less than 50 percent of direct hits. We did that for two weeks and then we decided to stop because the GBU-22 kit is a bit expensive and to have a success rate of 50 percent is not very cost-effective.

SLD: You used UAVs in the operation some provided by the US.  What was your experience here?

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: We had too limited a capability.  We could cover only two operational areas and for a limited period of time. The war was developing in four different areas, and the minimum for such an operation should have been for 24/7

In fact at the beginning we had the duty to act as firefighters and to stabilize the situation what we have done well. But the “what’s next” phase was not well anticipated. We had no real plan, no real good end state; we should have had a more forward-looking approach when moving beyond the initial Benghazi and Misratha operations.

After this first containment phase we needed a plan that did not simply react to Gaddafi tactics but able to regain initiative and to put a strong pressure on him and his supporters.  We needed a better understanding of what are the center of gravity of Gaddafi, its critical capabilities and resources, to better target them and force him to stop and resign. I think we have spent too much time reacting to Gaddafi’s strategy.

Other limiting factors slowing down the success of the coalition were the constraints of the mandate and the necessity to maintain the cohesion of the Alliance where different views on this crisis had to be managed.

To cut Gaddafi forces’ supply and target the south part of Libya where he was relaxing and was gaining support from outsiders, were critical to success. You cannot make a war with your opponent having a safe haven where he can bring more forces, bring more capabilities.

SLD: Going forward what would you recommend for the future?

Lt. Gen. Desclaux: To be able to face an agile and adaptive enemy, first you definitively need a robust persistent ISR capability. Second, we need to give more authority to the pilots, to the cockpit. No matter how good your centralized C2 might be, it should not be always in full control of the weapon delivery. In the Libyan operation decision making-process was in many cases slowed down excessively. Doing that, C2 leaders will be better focused on the strategic or broader tactical coordination issues. Micromanagement of what the pilots can do by themselves will not create good outcomes. And finally this operation showed us clearly once again that “planning is everything”!

Pacific Strategy VIII: Re-Thinking the CVN

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(Credit: SLD)

10/21/2011 – The presence and scalable force structure for the Pacific, which we are laying out here, is intended to be suggestive and not completely comprehensive.  Every weapon system and platform will not be discussed, but the key categories of platforms and weapon systems are discussed as a means of laying out an approach whereby a comprehensive capability can be deployed which leverages best value solutions, through deploying C4ISR enabled platforms which can be connected, converged and surged as necessary in an economy of force approach.

(Credit: SLD)(Credit: SLD)

By re-thinking strategy along these lines, the CVN will remain significant but re-thought significantly.  The CVN has been deployed throughout its modern life in the Carrier Battle Group.  With the strategy outlined here, many elements of the CBG are already deployed in advance of any carrier showing up, as the surface fleet and subsurface fleet is forward deployed and operating in a distributed manner in areas of interest.  The core air assets, built around the F-35 fleet, provide the honeycomb linking assets.

The deployment of the F-35C is of particular significance for the CVN. Currently, the F-18 enabled carrier is carrying an aircraft with all the limitations of a 4th generation aircraft, in terms of survivability and range.  The Indians did not pick the F-18 in large part of its perceived and analyzed limitations.

The current limitations of the F-18 strike capability means that the current CVN trades distance for greater security.  And the F-18 is simply not a survivable aircraft in a number of threat scenarios.  And the recent exercise in Northern Edge 2011, which is a Pacific exercise, highlights the need to transition to the F-35 systems as rapidly as possible.

As Secretary Wynne has warned with regard to the inherent limitations of a carrier enabled solely by 4th generation aircraft:

Does the Air Power from a Carrier match up to the Integrated Air Defenses of a potential rival?  This too can be well modeled at Northern Edge and examined, rather than simply experienced by force of combat.  With all the exercise capability that is available; the Command Authorities can know with some certainty outcomes; as we have progressed far from the simpler times of the Lanchester Equations; though as one wag put it.  With the projected age of the fleet; it portends a future where instead of the Missouri pounding the Vietnamese Coast; it would have been the Maine; is the same true for Air Power?

From the outset, the F-35C will bring to the carrier a more survivable asset able to operate much deeper within an area of interest.  The F-35C will allow a restructuring and better use of the other assets on the carrier deck, shaping a more effective economy of force. (https://www.sldinfo.com/a-usmc-f-18-pilot-looks-to-the-future-shaping-an-economy-of-force/)

The F-35C provides a convergence asset than can work in an integrated fashion with the F-35Bs off of the amphibs and the US and coalition F-35As.  The aircraft can work with the new Aegis Global Enterprise to provide significant offensive and defensive reach.

And innovation in the use of the new Gerald Ford Carrier can be generated.  Significant innovations associated with the new carrier in providing greater ops temp and surge capacity now becomes a significant addition to any US or coalition force operating in an Area of Interest.

The entire F-35 family will have the “Z-axis” and both the Pax River data point -picking up a missile launch at 800 miles, along with Northern Edge sea surface search success — the F-35C provides a significant change in the punch carried by the CVN.

It is simple a CBG can maneuver at 35+ knots, with a combined and reach back tactical punch that can hit any target it sees using all types of platforms both surface sub-surface along with launching the CAW on the deck–so combine CBG maneuver speed with a 1600 mile F-35C “bubble” or umbrella and THEN add in legacy tanking from F/A-18s and the CVN enabled strike and defense force can cover additional thousands of miles air and land to identify and kill all threats.

The CVN can operate as the Body Guard of forces being inserted or present in an Area of Interest.

The evolution of the CVN with the F-35 enabled Pacific force, allows innovation to be generated with the new Carrier or recasting the old.  Rather than retiring the oldest CVN, this ship can be sent to Norfolk and rebuilt to become a large Amphibious support element.  The deck can be used to carry additional rotor wing and F-35B assets, along with making good use of the assets being moved from Afghanistan, such as the Apaches and the Predators to support insertion of force.

And the future is then cleared for driving innovation in determing how best to use the carrier decks of the future.  Secretary Wynne has laid out a strategic vision for such a way ahead:

The concept of 4.5 Acres of sovereign airfield was from a great advertisement.  The fact as presented was the freedom of movement across the 60 percent of the globe that is water.  The concept of re-norming defense is about rethinking the original purpose of the invented and available platforms given the modern invented technologies; and applying these in favor of doing more with less.

In the case of the carrier platform; we must thank the inventor of the Doolittle raid that took the concept of ‘4.5 Acres’ and changed the dynamic of a nation.  Look no further than the Tsunami relief to find an inventive admiral who thought about the functional capabilities of the carrier and repurposed it as a floating power plant, water purification system, Helicopter pad and hospital.

This re-purposement was fraught with risk; with the Doolittle Carrier now carrying the nations hope for a better outcome; and the Tsunami relief done against a backdrop of an uncertain world and concern for ‘taking one of the nations premier systems off line for a mission beneath its optimal.

It is a good time to address repurposing for a part of the total Aircraft Carrier System, namely Aviation. From a systems perspective; one should consider all of the system.

So; return to the 1920’s when the concept of ship borne aviation was introduced and look to how to re-create this original purpose but with an eye to modern and maybe future technologies to enhance the original desired capabilities.

From a perspective of a air and sea space that was considered benign at the time; the purpose seemed simple enough, which was to bring Airborne firepower forward to wreak havoc on the ports and nearby airfields, essentially moving sovereign borders close to an enemies, via the open water.

This concept was a complex extension of the large man of war gunships that pummeled with big guns the shore batteries and ports, until driven off by counter fire or enemy fleets.  The rest of the platform design came about by mission demands for protection from enemy air, from enemy sea; and to best use the ‘Big’ Ocean for longevity of an operating mission.

The Navy began to introduce the concept of last on first off for its aviation units by allowing the aviation unit to come aboard after they had some sea time to shake off any refit problems; and allowing them to depart early so they could dedicate the remaining voyage to cataloguing repairs; and supplies.  This simple act of smart logistics can easily be extended by asking the question of why the aircraft are ever on the carrier except to prep for a mission.  This is the essence of re-norming, starting from the bare deck and asking what else is needed to achieve the mission.

The Carrier platform began to swell to the carrier battle group; and there is tremendous military evidence that in a similar vein as the Doolittle mission; protection of the Carrier Platform began to consume the entirety of the mission status for all of the surrounding ships and submarines, many of the on board aircraft and left essentially a squadron size strike capable A-6 aircraft to accomplish the original mission, of bringing havoc to the enemy.  The upgrade to the A-6 was the F-18.

Better still; the upgrade to the carrier protection air system was the F-14; which had sufficient speed and agility to be a carrier protector; as well as strike inland targets; sometimes deep with support of the Air Force Tankers scattered around the air space.

Unfortunately; the Navy pursued the ill-fated A-12. Without this replacement; and fortunately flying from protected Air and Sea Space; the F-18 performed all of the mission required; and some in the Navy seem to think that past is prologue.

But we note that the emergence of Exocet missiles, arrayed in unfriendly territory have placed the carrier far enough off shore that to stay in the Afghan conflict; a refueling with a tanker is a requirement; and that some of the F-18 carrier aircraft operationally flew from Bagram Airfield to help with Northern strikes.

This is an adaptive Navy that is placing risk in the operational plan.

Unfortunately; the Strategic Navy; by dedicating significant resources to purchase the 1970’s designed F-18 airframe; is trying its best to convince itself that the modern F-18 can carry out all assigned missions while the planning Navy sees trouble ahead for any Navy Airmen sent into an Air Space defended with Integrated Air Defenses, and puts the Carriers further out to sea.  A true conundrum; but all of the selected electronic games that young men play have already taken technology into account; and these young game players see that the senior officials are in a losing strategy.

So what to do?

First return to the original mission and try to maximize the opportunity to effect it.

Second; minimize the deck space required to protect the ship by turning to modern technology; as the Navy has with the counter missile Phalanx System; and can as well with AUVS systems to accomplish submarine hunting, and counter torpedo technologies; and for Air use high Flying Air to Air missile armed Remotely piloted vehicles; with the pilots flying remotely; or on-board.

Further; this would allow multi mission, outlying picket ships with AEGIS systems to be far removed from the Carrier, actually performing other missions yet able to fire from a distance in support of the carrier.


Pacific Strategy VII: “Aegis is My Wingman”

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10/20/2011

10/20/2011 – In a phrase, this is how the remaining core naval assets are integrated into a scalable Pacific capability.  The F-35s, whether land or sea-based as a Z axis C4ISR D force can bring the entire surface and subsurface fleet into a scalable operation.  An economy of force capability is deployed every day with the permanent presence forces.  By making all of these forces C4ISR enabled, their individual strengths are combined into a honeycomb across the Pacific by a flying decision-making and decision directing asset.

With the combination of Aegis with F-35, the sensors are combined into wide area coverage.  With a new generation of weapons on the F-35, and the ability to operate a broad wolfpack of air and sea capabilities, the F-35 can perform as the directing point for combat action.  With the Aegis and its new SM-3 missiles, the F-35s can leverage a sea-based missile to expand its area of strike.  With a combination of the F-35 and the Aegis, the defense of land-bases and sea-bases is expanded significantly.

The commonality across the combat systems of the three variants of the F-35 provides a significant advantage.  When one talks about the Aegis as my wingman, this can be true for F-35As, Bs, or Cs.  80% of the F-35s in the Pacific are likely to be A’s and many of these coalition aircraft.  Building an F-35 and Aegis global enterprise provides significant coverage and capability across the Pacific.

As the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter comes on line, the integration of Aegis with F-35 will provide a powerful capability for the US and its allies.  It must always be remembered how significant numbers of allied partners are in the Aegis deployed fleet, and that there are several joint Aegis and F-35 allies in prospect.

During exercise Stellar Avenger, the Aegis-class destroyer USS Hopper launches a standard missile 3 Blk IA, successfully intercepting a sub-scale short range ballistic missile, launched from the Kauai Test Facility, Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sans, Kauai. (Credit: USN Visual Service, 7/31/09)During exercise Stellar Avenger, the Aegis-class destroyer USS Hopper launches a standard missile 3 Blk IA, successfully intercepting a sub-scale short range ballistic missile, launched from the Kauai Test Facility, Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sans, Kauai.  (Credit: USN Visual Service, 7/31/09)

And by combining the F-35B with Aegis a whole new capability to defend land based air in the Pacific opens up.  No longer should the F-35B be considered a boutique niche aircraft only essential for Marine combat con-ops. With vision and commitment on numbers it can become a tactical aircraft that sends a strategic signal.

The reason is simple, an F-35B can stand strip alert on any long runway, US or Allied. From a strategic point of view think of Guam, South Korea or in the Middle East on all long runways. As a crisis situation develops, the F-35Bs can be remotely placed in hardened bunkers and revetments and thus become a significant deterrence asset that can instantly sortie into combat and return to gas and go again and again. (https://www.sldinfo.com/the-f-35b-has-a-unique-war-winning-capability/)

By using a detachment of F-35Bs the issue of enemy runway area denial and need for rapid runway repair does not become a show stopper to ops-tempo both offensively and defensively.

Tie an F-35B to the Aegis and the entire “wasting argument” about asymmetric IRBM and enemy strike against our hard fixed land targets becomes moot. This is because Guam for example will still have air power in its defense. This principal can be applied globally.

Folding the subsurface assets into the presence and scalable force structure exponentially expands the strike force quality of the deployed force.  We have deployed the NSC, the LCS, the ARG, the F-35A, B, and C, and now add an integrated strike and surveillance capability of the SSGNs, and SSNs.

The SSN assets are expensive to buy, efficient to operate and own, and provide a multi-mission capability when their strike and other capabilities are included into the Pacific operational concept.  Subs versus subs are an important part of ASW activity and for dealing with many at sea threats.  But there are also a long at sea deployment capability, which can provide strike and other support to surface and air assets operating in an area of interest.  The SSNs can provide such support to littoral engagement assets such as LCS as well as ARGs.

The guided-missile submarine USS Ohio arrives at Fleet Activities Yokosuka for a routine port visit. The visit to Yokosuka marks the beginning of a one-year deployment to U.S. 7th Fleet for Ohio. Ohio is home ported at Naval Base Kitsap, Bangor, Wash., and currently serves under Commander Submarine Group 7 at Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan. (Credit: USN Visual Service, 8/29/09)The guided-missile submarine USS Ohio arrives at Fleet Activities Yokosuka for a routine port visit. The visit to Yokosuka marks the beginning of a one-year deployment to U.S. 7th Fleet for Ohio. Ohio is home ported at Naval Base Kitsap, Bangor, Wash., and currently serves under Commander Submarine Group 7 at Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan. (Credit: USN Visual Service, 8/29/09)

The SSGNs are even more interesting. Sporting very large tubes, which could be enabled with new robotic or strike capabilities, the SSGN could well become the new wingman for the F-35Bs coming off of the ARG. Chris Cavas of Defense News has written from time to time highlighting the nature of the real estate onboard the SSGN which could be used creatively in supporting littoral assets such as the Agile Response Group.

The real value of the undersea strike capacity is in its ability to be delivered with surprise from close-in against particular high-priority targets. This “little or no notice” context greatly increases the military value of power projection and may serve an essential role in permitting general-purpose forces to gain subsequent access to the theater of operations.

(Undersea Warfighting, Command Submarine Forces, July 2011).

These SSN and SSGN capabilities will be supplemented over time as the robotic revolution unfolds.  In a recent interview, which we conducted with General Heinz of I Robot, and the former F-35 PEO, the role of robotics in the littoral engagement was underscored:

SLD: We are working on a Pacific strategy, which highlights the centrality of the C4ISR D grid, and clearly some of the tools you are developing are very important for such a capability. We have had much verbiage about the Coast Guard/Navy/Marine Corps relationship, which is just verbiage, but we really need to make it real.  And one way you could make it real is put that kind of ISR grid together and lay it down in this part of the world, and robotics would be certainly a key part of that.

Heinz: And you could start to develop that grid to be a little bit more persistent and mobile versus a stationary underwater grid, and it would be at a fraction of the price.

SLD: I would like to look back at your experience with the F-35 and forward with evolving work on maritime robotics.  We’re building littoral combat ships. We’re building new LPD-17s, all of which can deploy news robotic vehicles, and I think the missing factor in the conversation about how we’re going to manage the thousand nautical miles into the littorals is the whole robotic contribution that an LCS can deliver that you can drop by tactical aircraft, that you can manage data.

I think that the 360-degree bubble deliverable by the F-35, and how I manage it and working with a robotic front end, all of this is not really been focused on in the national conversation.

Heinz: This is important and doable for the future.  The environment in under water is as difficult as it is in space and compounded further by the fact that you don’t get the same bandwidth in terms of trans activity/communications protocols when you’re in water as you do when you’re in space. So the vehicles themselves actually have to be more autonomous in terms of their smarts that they employ and their ability to operate remotely by themselves without human intervention.

The bandwidth that you’re going to be able to provide under water as well as the ranges that you’ll achieve are much smaller and so you’re not going to be able to send high resolution video movies from station to station through water without some kind of tether.

But having said that, what I also think is a fallacy of the current thinking is that most of it in terms of underwater robots is centered almost entirely around duration or ability to move covertly to a location.  So the large diameter UUV program and others are building these very large vehicles that have separate power systems and lots of storage for batteries simply because it’s believed you’re going to drop these things in waters and they’re going to have to travel 200 miles by themselves covertly in order to begin to be able to perform the mission that you’re looking for.

And I would simply propose that either that concept or an air deployable one, but the reality is we want to start moving to a number of smaller robots that can populate that grid and do so by delivering them near the site and then allowing the persistence of the mission to fill in those gaps and whether that’s an air deployable system or it’s a mother ship that then carries them a number of smaller robots that are deployed at intervals, but we have to start thinking about what those smaller robots are going to do for us and what persistence that they want to have.

So the simplest mission or challenge might actually be: How you going to blow up mines in the surf, and what’s the means that you’re going to do to deliver those and dolphins probably is not the answer.

The challenge will be:  What is the communications protocols that you’re going to have to have those robots do because again that is the number one issue relative to water operations is that I want to be under water most of the time. I still want to be able to communicate my data back to some platform and I also have to have better obstacle avoidance than we have today.

What the F35 will bring to the party is a much more robust and wide-ranging capability to leverage the full range of maritime and air capabilities, which can be brought to bear on an area of interest.

(For a look at the Norwegian F-35 and Aegis context see https://www.sldinfo.com/emerging-strategic-challenges-the-case-of-arctic-co-opetition/.)

This is a contribution to the strategic whiteboard.

https://www.sldinfo.com/resources/strategic_whiteboard/

Addendum: Chris Cavas alerted us to the SSGN possibilities when he wrote this story in 2008 and filed it with Navy Times March 11, 2008.

Part of the story follows and we thank Chris Cava for providing.

The Navy’s new submarines have unprecedented flexibility to carry and operate a variety of payloads.

The four Ohio-class guided-missile submarines, converted from Trident ballistic missile subs, have 24 payload tubes, each 7 feet in diameter — more carrying room than any previous submarine. New Virginia-class attack submarines have a nine-man lockout chamber; future versions will feature two payload tubes nearly as large as those in the subs.

Submariners are excited about the prospect of filling those tubes with new generations of manned and unmanned vehicles, weapons, sensors and a variety of gear to handle an ever-expanding range of missions. But they also acknowledge a problem: Not enough people in other warfare communities know about the new capabilities. They worry that if the new submarines aren’t used to their full potential, follow-on programs could be in jeopardy.

To flesh out the possibilities, a group of experienced submarine officers met in mid-February with analysts, academics and industry representatives.

“The goal,” said Rear Adm. William Hilarides, the Navy’s program executive officer for submarines, “is to generate buzz and energy so we can get going on this.”

Some of those in attendance during the two-day unclassified meeting, sponsored here by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, came from warfare communities outside the “bubblehead” sphere.

“I can’t tell you how excited we are,” said Mike Cleary of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The subs’ ability to carry large payloads close to shore means access, he said.

“It gets me there, brings endurance,” he said. “It can be a robust package without expending a lot of funds.”

Rear Adm. Mark Kenny, commander of Navy counterterrorism operations, was equally enthusiastic as he pointed to the large Virginia Payload Tubes that will be installed in the submarine class’ Block 3 ships.

“This is huge. This gets us lined up for the next 30 to 40 years,” said Kenny, who commanded an attack sub. The new capabilities “give us the ability to make these investments and leverage them for years to come.”

The money spent to rebuild the former ballistic missile submarines “is pennies on the dollar,” he said.

Navy officials realized that experimentation would play a key role in developing the new subs’ capabilities, so one payload tube aboard each Ohio-class sub is dedicated on every deployment to experimental use…..

But Vice Adm. Jay Donnelly, Submarine Force commander, noted a number of hurdles. Scheduling experiments is a challenge, for example, because the subs have only about three months between deployments.

Other issues include bandwidth and technology problems. Donnelly said a submarine recently fed 30 seconds of video of an experiment but needed about three hours to transmit the video file from periscope depth.

More ideas

Other ideas include installation of surface-to-air missiles. The Missile Defense Agency recently identified the submarine as the ideal delivery platform for the Kinetic Energy Interceptor under development for ballistic missile defense.

But setting up reliable communications below periscope depth remains a challenge.

“Communication difficulties need to be addressed before [BMD from submarines] can become a reality,” Donnelly said.

He also pointed to efforts to operate UAVs from submarines, saying the attack submarine Montpelier flew its first Buster UAV in early February while operating in the Persian Gulf. The small UAV — launched slingshot fashion from the submarine’s cramped bridge — operated for about four hours at ranges up to about 10 miles and fed surveillance video to the submarine.

In future experiments, a submerged sub will try to launch a UAV. Donnelly said the submarine force hopes to experiment next year with UAVs that can be launched through the trash disposal unit and feed data directly into the submarine’s combat system.

But no one envisions a near-term way to stealthily recover them.

“For now, launching a UAV from periscope depth may be good enough as a first step,” Donnelly said. “We can add additional bells and whistles later.”

Development of a disposable, cost-effective UAV is a challenge, other speakers noted. Tim Devane, a special projects manager with Northrop Grumman’s KEI effort, described missions and capabilities required for a submarine-launched UAV, including instant video, communications and data relay, precision targeting, signals intelligence, mine detection and chemical-biological detection.

Encapsulated UAVs capable of being launched underwater are under development, he said, with designers hoping to achieve 15-hour endurance and six-hour loiter time.

Kenny noted the submarine Florida will try out UAV ideas on its spring deployment.

“We have another wave of Buster-like aircraft that will deploy on the Florida,” he said, adding that Montpelier’s aircraft might be “in combat in the next couple of months.”

Larger UAVs flown from shore also are being tested from submarines. An assessment of the Predator B/SSGN combination will begin this year and “last about a year,” Kenny said, and other experiments will be conducted with satellite links with large aircraft.

While technological testing is necessary, so is work to develop capabilities for other purposes…..