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10/19/2011 – Historically, the Aegis missile defense system was inextricably intertwined with the Carrier Battle Group. It remains a key element of the CBG, but now deploys separate from the CBG in its missile defense mission. Its permanent deployment at sea in the Pacific to deal with ever present danger of missile threats to the US and its forces is a key element for re-thinking the Pacific strategy.
With permanent deployment on the Pacific, the inclusion of Aegis sensors, missiles and capabilities within the honeycomb becomes a key element for the permanent presence, scalable force approach.
A key element for the Pacific force rethink is re-considering offense and defense. With a scalable force, the force is both able to do offensive or defensive missions. The circumstance dictates the task; not the limitations of the force. By providing for the defense of a deployed force, Aegis allows that force to deal with a wider spectrum of threats and engagement options. SM-3 missiles aboard the Aegis ships can be used to defend, or to support a strike force.
And the Aegis ship has become a coalition ship. Many Pacific allies are Aegis operators and as such the ability to develop coordinated operations enables the US and its Aegis partners to spread a defensive punch to the Pacific ISR grid.
Background
The Aegis program has evolved since its beginnings in the 1970s. The program was designed to provide enhanced fleet defense for the US Navy in confronting a challenging Soviet Navy. Here is one of those Cold War relics everyone likes to bash as irrelevant to the 21st century. But it isn’t.
The program has evolved over 40 years and has morphed in several distinct ways.
First, the capabilities of the core program have been exponentially increased, by among other things the software and microelectronics revolution.
Second, the evolution of targeting precision, C4ISR and missile technologies has enabled the Aegis system to become a key element in global missile defense. And such capabilities are essential to the ability to project power in the 21st century against global proliferation of missiles and other capabilities possessed by potential adversaries.
Third, the core US national program has evolved over time into a global enterprise. Not only are there several partners who have purchased and developed Aegis capabilities, but those partners have put those capabilities onto a variety of ships. Indeed, every partner who has bought the system has put it onto its own preferred hull solution.
The Aegis effort is the premier global program underwriting joint US and allied high end defense capabilities. As such, the program has several lessons to be learned which underscore how to succeed in the face of 40 years of threat evolution, multiple Administrations, and changing global partners.
It is a success, which should be understood as significant to the future. When many defense commentators underscore the need for 80% solutions or criticize new programs, one should not that if the same perspective were taken in the 1970s and 1980s, we would not have had Aegis. And we would not have the core foundation for 21st century maritime power projection in place.
And a final consideration, which is central to the future: the Aegis coupled with the F-35 will provide unprecedented modular flexibility at sea for the national command authority and allies to shape responses to crises.
The Heinz Variety Solution
The SPY-1 radar/Aegis system has been successfully installed aboard 7 different ship classes at 7 shipyards worldwide.
Just to review the current status of the Aegis deployment is to underscore the diversity of platforms on which one finds the Aegis system.
First, there are 22 Ticonderoga cruisers in service with the USN. The USN has engaged in a cruiser modernization program in which it is outfitting the Ticonderoga class with the latest Aegis baseline.
Second, there are the 58 Arleigh Burke class destroyers in service with the USN through multiple Aegis baselines.
Third, the Japanese are the originally foreign purchaser of the Aegis system. They have six Aegis systems for the Atago and Kongo destroyer classes. The Japanese program is in a lifetime support phase; with completion of mid-life systems upgrades of the 1990s Kongo class ships, which includes a BMD capability.
Fourth, the Spanish then entered the program and provide a key turning point. The Spanish shipyards have been major innovators in shaping a global Aegis product, in Spain, in Norway and in Australia. The initial 4 Aegis equipped F-100 ships have an original configuration radar (SPY-1D). The 5th F-100 ship will have an Aegis system with SPY-1D (V) radar with an indigenous combat management system (CMS).
Fifth, the Norwegians leveraged the Spanish program and have five Aegis equipped F-310 ships with a SPY-1F radar. They were able to leverage the SPY-1Y radar technology to shape a smaller antenna to fit a 5000-ton ship.
Sixth, South Korea has three Aegis destroyers with SPY-1D(V) radar on the world’s largest Aegis-equipped ships. The first ship will be in service with the remaining two ships to be completed by 2012.
Seventh, the Australians have also leveraged the Spanish program. There will have three Hobart class destroyers. This is t5he newest non-US Aegis program and leverages the Spanish F-100 ship design and the Aegis SPY-1D(V) system. The Australians picked the combat system prior to picking the shipbuilder.
Eighth, there are a number of other countries that have expressed interest in the Aegis solution. Those countries include Saudi Arabia, India, Canada, Brazil, and Turkey.
Currently, this means that more than 20% of the global Aegis fleet is non-American.
(Credit: SLD)
Shaping Modular Flexibility
Aegis provides significant capability to mix and match US and allied maritime capabilities to provide for regional defense, power projection, fleet defense or support for joint or coalition non-maritime forces. This mix and match capacity will be enhanced as many of the Aegis nations are looking to add the F-35 to the mix. And overtime, integration of the Aegis with F-35 sensor suites will help both to shape a more effective capability over time.
The Obama Administration has placed significant emphasis on continuing the upgrade path for the Aegis BMD program. By cancelling the Bush missile defense program in Europe, de facto, the Administration highlighted its commitment to Aegis as a key element for global missile defense.
But the evolution of the program depends upon a continuing significant commitment of increasingly scarce resources to testing and using test results to shape the concurrent development and manufacturing program.
And as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter comes on line, the integration of Aegis with F-35 will provide a powerful capability for the US and its allies. It must always be remembered how significant numbers of allied partners are in the Aegis deployed fleet, and that there are several joint Aegis and F-35 allies in prospect.
An upcoming tests will support a launch/engage-on-remote concept is that links the Aegis ship to remote sensor data to increase the coverage area and responsiveness. Once this capability is fully developed, the SM-3 missiles––no longer constrained by the range of the Aegis radar to detect an incoming missile––can be launched sooner and therefore fly farther in order to defeat the threat.
Imagine this capability linked to an F-35, which can see more than 800 miles throughout a 360-degree approach. US allies are excited about the linkage prospects and the joint evolution of two highly upgradeable weapon systems.
A further set of evolutionary upgrades is planned. Notably, the Administration is focusing upon an “Aegis Ashore” in 2015. “This new approach will provide capabilities sooner,” the President stated in September 2009, “build on proven systems and offer greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defense program.”
The first phase of the new approach focuses on existing sea-based Aegis missile defense ships and radars will be deployed in southern Europe to defend against short/medium-range ballistic missiles. Future decisions might also see Aegis Ashore in the Middle East and East Asia. Because of the inherent multi-mission qualities of the ABMD warships and their strategic and tactical mobility, they are highly survivable against a broad spectrum of threats, not just ballistic missiles.The focus of FTM-16 is on the SM-3 Block IB, the next-generation sea-based missile spiral upgrade. The seeker, signal processor, and propulsion system of the SM-3 Block IB missile kinetic warhead are improved versions of the Block IA missile and will result in increased missile effectiveness against longer-range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles.
These engineering upgrades have already undergone laboratory and ground tests, and flight-testing of the SM-3 Block IB missile is scheduled for this year. Fleet deployment could begin soon thereafter––roughly 18-24 months ahead of the test/deploy schedule defined by the Phased Adaptive Approach. Aegis BMD in 2010 began sea trials Aegis BMD 4.0.1, the next-generation system that will fire the SM-3 Block IB missile. The 4.0.1 signal processing capability greatly improves Aegis BMD performance and will enable Aegis BMD to remain well ahead of the threat. In short, Aegis BDM continues to “press the envelopes” of national and global BMD capabilities against a growing threat. It is already deployed and is being upgraded over time. It is a high-value system and a high-value capability.
In other words, the Aegis global enterprise lays a foundation for a global capability in sea-based missile defenses and the protection of deployed forces as well as the projection of force. And this capability, in turn, becomes increasingly central to the freedom of action necessary for the global operation of U.S. forces and its Pacific.
This article is a contribution to the Strategic Whiteboard
10/17/2011 – One problem created by Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency is that it might make it harder to negotiate an agreement to reduce Russia’s large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs).
No bilateral treaty limits the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Russian or U.S. arsenals. The most important measure of control on TNWs dates back to the 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI). President George Bush became worried that the chaos in the Soviet Union was loosening controls over thousands of Soviet-era nuclear warheads. Bush therefore announced major reductions in the number of U.S. deployed TNWs and invited Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to reciprocate, which he did. When Boris Yeltsin became president of the newly independent Russian Federation, he expanded on Gorbachev’s initiative. As a result, Russia destroyed many of its TNWs and moved others from field units to central storage facilities inside Russia.
These parallel and reciprocal TNW measures were relatively easy to implement since they did not require parliamentary ratification, as a treaty would have. Following their adoption, Russia and the United States eliminated thousands of their TNWs and removed others from operational deployment.
But the fact these reductions occurred outside a treaty framework has certain drawbacks. The PNI do not have provisions—such as mandatory on-site inspections or data exchanges—to verify their enforcement. The only formal joint exchanges on the subject occurred at some NATO-Russia meetings, when the parties have reported to each other the percentage (not numbers) of PNI-applicable warheads that they have destroyed. U.S. officials have complained on several occasions that Moscow was not supplying adequate data to confirm their TNW reductions.
Despite these verification problems, the Russian government has apparently cut back their TNW holdings since the PNIs were adopted, and probably even earlier given the requirement to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear forces (with ranges of between 300 and 3400 miles) under the 1987 INF Treaty.
Nonetheless, Russian officials have taken steps to retain thousands of TNWs. The Russian military possesses hundreds of nuclear warheads on short-range tactical surface-to-surface and air-to-ground strike missiles as well as systems designed for anti-air and anti-ship defense.
Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen regularly publish annual surveys of the nuclear weapons holdings of the major nuclear powers. They calculate that, as of late 2009, Russia had some 2,000 TNWs in their operational arsenal and approximately 5,400 TNWs in reserve. Some 2,000 TNWs are used as AS-4 air-to-surface missiles and gravity bombs by tactical aircraft, 1,120 tactical warheads are employed by Russian air and missile defense units, and the Russian Navy has more than 2,000 TNWs. Norris and Kristensen estimate that the Russian ground forces also have some TNWs, though they hesitate to offer specific numbers. (http://csis.org/blog/bulletin-atomic-scientists-releases-new-nuclear-weapons-inventory)
Russian leaders see their tactical nuclear weapons as performing important defense missions that they are loathe to relinquish.
First, the TNWs reinforce the deterrence provided by Russia’s long-range strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Fundamentally, Russian nuclear forces aim to prevent the United States or any other country from launching a major attack against Russian territory. Russian strategists most likely concentrate their planning and resources on surviving a war with the United States because such a capability should provide the assets Russia would need to defeat weaker nuclear adversaries (e.g., Britain, China, France, or Pakistan).
Russian strategists most fear a U.S. attempt to decapitate the Russian leadership through a surprise attack involving U.S. nuclear and conventional attacks against Russia’s centralized command-and-control networks and against its nuclear forces when they are on their lower peacetime alert status.
Russia has had difficulty maintaining a large number of effective strategic nuclear weapons systems such as nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and strategic long-range bombers. Russia’s TNWs stockpile is several times larger than its strategic nuclear force totals. In some cases, their use can be seen as more credible due to their lower yields. The deployment of TNWs with Russian field units in wartime also means that they are more likely to be used inadvertently, since they could more easily fall out of operational control in the heat of battle.
Second, should deterrence fail, Russia’s nuclear weapons could seek to limit the damage inflicted on Russian people, industry, and forces by its adversaries. Russian nuclear strikes against an adversary’s military offensive potential might weaken that country’s ability to strike Russian targets. Russian TNWs might perform missions that would otherwise require using Russia’s more limited supply of strategic nuclear weapons.
A related function of Russia’s TNWs would be “escalation control.” Russian policy makers could seek to use, or threaten to use, TNWs to prevent other countries from escalating a conventional conflict to a nuclear war. In such a scenario, Russia could threaten to retaliate disproportionately should an adversary employ nuclear weapons to try to alter a conventional conflict that it was losing. Even after one party has initiated a limited nuclear exchange, Russian commanders might attempt to control further intra-war escalation by issuing nuclear threats, demonstrating restraint, or pursuing other “nuclear signaling.”
Russian strategists have also indicated they might detonate a limited number of nuclear weapons to induce an adversary to end (“de-escalate” in Russian terminology) a conventional military conflict with Russia. The selective strike would seek to exploit the inevitable “shock and awe” effect associated with nuclear use to cause the targeted decision makers to weigh the risks of nuclear devastation more heavily.
This strategy exploits the fear that, after one nuclear explosion, the prospects of further detonations increase considerably. Initiating nuclear use would underscore the gravity with which the Russian government viewed the situation and might encourage the other side to de-escalate the conflict to avert further nuclear escalation.
The most commonly discussed contingency for a “de-escalation” mission in Russian discourse is a NATO decision to intervene against a Russian military ally (e.g., Belarus) or on behalf of a non-member country (e.g., Georgia) that was engaged in a military conflict with Russia.
In its 1993 Military Doctrine, the Russian government abandoned its declared pledge not to employ nuclear weapons first in a conflict, effectively establishing a justification in Russian doctrine for initiating nuclear use.
TNWs can more effectively perform these missions than can strategic nuclear forces. In conducting a nuclear strike for a “de-escalation” mission, for instance, Russian commanders could try to minimize its opponent’s civilian and perhaps even military casualties to discourage further nuclear use.
Russian nucs are used to deal with deterrence of multiple threat contigencies at once. (Credit image: Bigstock)
For example, they could employ a low-yield tactical nuclear warhead against an adversary’s military base, warship, or armored formation operating in a scarcely populated area. Alternately, Russian forces could detonate a high-altitude nuclear burst near an adversary’s warships with the expectation that the explosion would not produce casualties or nuclear fallout, but would still devastate the fleet’s sensors and communications due to its electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) and other effects.
Since Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are needed to deter adversaries from resorting to major nuclear war, detonating a TNW might provide the optimal balance between signaling Moscow’s seriousness and avoiding an action that might actually provoke more escalation than the Russian government is actually seeking.
Third, Russia’s TNWs can help compensate for weaknesses in Russian conventional forces. Russian strategists have long considered using limited nuclear strikes to alter the course of a conventional conflict that Russia risked losing.
The January 2000 National Security Concept, for example, implied that Russia could employ TNWs to resist a conventional attack without engendering a full-scale nuclear exchange. In theory, they could be used against a range of battlefield targets. If they were detonated on the territory of the Russian Federation to stop an invasion, they would be unlikely to lead the attacker to respond with a full-scale nuclear attack the way a nuclear strike using longer-range strategic nuclear forces might. They are also less expensive to produce and maintain than an equivalent quantity of conventional firepower.
Russia’s TNWs could help Russian troops compensate for China’s much larger ground forces in the event of a Russia-China war, though this perspective is rarely discussed in public given the official line that Russia does not consider China a military threat.
The value of Russia’s TNW in negating NATO’s superior conventional forces is more openly debated given that the weaknesses of Russia’s conventional forces are widely recognized. Moreover, they understand that upgrading Russia’s conventional forces to American standards would entail considerably greater expenditures than maintaining even a large TNW arsenal.
Moreover, several Russian strategists have expressed concern that agreeing to limit Russia’s TNW stockpile could weaken efforts to reform Russia’s conventional forces. They believe that Russia will most likely undertake a comprehensive reform program, which would temporary degrade its conventional forces and expose Russian military vulnerabilities during the unstable transition period between the old and new force structures, if Russians retained robust nuclear forces.
In his 2006 address to the Federal Assembly, Putin stressed that Russia could not afford to wage a quantitative arms race with the United States, but instead had to rely on less costly, asymmetric means in designing Russia’s strategic deterrent. In this same address, Putin reaffirmed that Russia’s armed forces must be “able to simultaneously fight in global, regional and—if necessary—also in several local conflicts.” Given Russia’s weak conventional forces, the country needs TNWs ad other nuclear weapons to meet such demanding criteria.
Fourth, Russia could use TNWs to overwhelm NATO’s expanding ballistic missile defense (BMD) network. For whatever reason, Russian leaders have become obsessed by a possible threat to Russia’s nuclear-armed ICBMs from U.S. missile defense programs. Russia’s large number of nuclear weapons makes it unlikely that any BMD architecture could negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent.
Finally, Russian leaders believe that their enormous nuclear arsenal bolsters Moscow’s diplomatic influence. Russia’s enormous nuclear arsenal represents one of reasons Russia is considered a great power. Russia’s nuclear weapons also play an important role in ensuring Moscow’s status as an important global player.
During the 1990s, Russian strategists vigorously debated the importance of maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. A minority argued that, in the post-Cold War world, nuclear weapons had lost much of their military utility and hence Russia should concentrate on developing its conventional forces. The majority, however, continued to view Russia’s nuclear arsenal as an essential instrument for preserving its status as a great power, especially since the other nuclear powers showed little inclination to relinquish their own arsenals.
In addition, Russian leaders have issued more frequent and more explicit nuclear threats than the heads of any other country during the past decade in the context of trying to discourage former Soviet bloc states from joining the NATO alliance or hosting U.S. BMD systems on their territory by warning that such actions could make them legitimate targets for Russian nuclear strikes. Furthermore, TNWs represent one of the few military categories in which Moscow enjoys superiority over the United States or NATO, which enhances Russia’s bargaining position in certain arms control negotiations.
When asked why Russia deserved to be in the G-8, Russian President Vladimir Putin told a January 31, 2006, press conference that, “the G-8 is a club which addresses global problems and, first and foremost, security problems. Can someone in this hall imagine resolving, shall we say, problems concerning global nuclear security without the participation of the largest nuclear power in the world, the Russian Federation? Of course not.” Later that year, Putin told leading defense sector managers that, “The reliability of our ‘nuclear shield’ and the state of our nuclear weapons complex are a crucial component of Russia’s world power status.”
Putin clearly represents the mainstream Russian view that Moscow’s needs to maintain a robust nuclear arsenal that includes TNWs as well as strategic nuclear forces. This stance makes it unlikely that the United States and NATO will achieve a near-term agreement limiting the number and location of such systems.
Putin’s return also makes it less likely that the Congress will ratify another nuclear arms control agreement any time soon. The U.S. Congress is not anti-Russian, but it is anti-Putin, and selling agreements with the Russian government has become a lot harder.
10/17/2011 – A new approach to Pacific strategy would be built around presence assets, linked together to provide for scalable force. Building presence is not just about what the US does and can do. It is as well about working with allies and partners. But do so requires presence, linkages and connectivity. By shaping a connectivity enterprise, a honeycombed force can be built around scalable forces.
This approach is not built simply to deal with high-end threats but to operate across the spectrum of tasks necessary to provide for security and defense in the Pacific. In effect, one would look at a recent set of developments between the 12th USAF and the Dominican Republic and apply lessons learned to the Pacific.
Shaping a Grid to Shape a Hi-Low Mix (Credit Image: Bigstock)
A tremendous and unnoticed US Air Force victory is being won right off the shores of America. And this victory highlights the impact of a Hi-Lo mix of technology.
The mere presence of the Brazilian-made intercept planes and alerts by U.S. air surveillance on radar blips over the airspace have virtually halted all drug airdrops in Dominican Republic.
Traditionally, the concept of a “Hi-Lo” mix is in reference to Aircraft—but the 12th Air Force is rewriting that idea and showing the world new and successful con-ops.
The 12th Air Force is known as the “Doolittle Raiders” and just like the great “30 Seconds over Tokyo” raid by Col Doolittle’s legacy, it is in capable hands.
However, this time they are supporting U.S. national security objectives much closer to home. The “Doolittle Raiders” are part of the mission espoused in the vision statement made by the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).
We are a joint and interagency organization supporting U.S. national security interests, and with our partners, fostering security, stability and prosperity in the Americas.
The 12th is supporting nations just off our shore and recently held a U.S. Air Power demonstration in celebration of 100 years of aviation in the Dominican Republic.
Unheralded success has just been achieved by this partnership between SOUTHCOM and the Dominican Republic Air Force flying the Embraer Air Super Tucano. This remarkable and replicable success is made possible by U.S. “Hi” ISR technology in partnership with the Dominican Republic “Lo” technology the Super Tucano.
It has not been widely reported that this war against drug barons is being won in the sky.
Although drug money is unrelenting in finding ways to supply their corrosive product for now in the war against narco-criminials and terrorist this is a huge accomplishment, and the opening headline from Dominican Today quoted above says it all.
Along with the success in Dom Rep, the Colombian AF is wining the fight against the FARC with sensors and shooters—again the Super Tucano.
Consequently, this “Hi-Lo” mix is beginning to look like a winning formula for world wide partnerships between the U.S. and other nations by using American C4ISR that can give hot vectors in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground mission to a Light Armed Attack Aircraft (LAAR) like the Super Tucano. (See also https://www.sldinfo.com/guns-guns-guns/.)
Worldwide possibilities are abundant: Indonesia, Afghanistan and hopefully some day back to the Philippines. There is no need for “Hi” U.S. tactical aircraft — just “Hi” American platform censors — and the “Lo” capabilities of the Super Tucano which is battle tested and perfect for the mission.
When thinking about the way ahead in the Pacific, we should consider that shaping a hi-low mix for the spectrum of operations can be facilitated by shaping a much more collaborative ISR enterprise in the Pacific. As the US re-shapes its military space capabilities, by leveraging in part the revolution in use of commercial hoisted payloads, we can take forward the capability of sharing information.
In other words, re-shaping the global ISR enterprise towards collaboration and coalition capability can facilitate COIN and security operations in the Pacific. And as the US deploys new aircraft aboard the amphibious ready group (ARG), another new capability displayed by the F-35B, namely 360 degree ISR over hundreds of miles, makes the F-35B its own high-low mix available to support allies across the spectrum of operations.
Indeed, in thinking about an ISR enterprise across the Pacific, land-based and sea-based air is a key facilitator. And dependent upon the situation, space-based and other air breathing assets can be key contributors as well. The challenge will be to ensure that data can flow but not be excessively constrained by intelligence limitations inappropriate to getting joint action.
This article is a contribution to the Strategic Whiteboard
10/15/2011 –By Dr. Robbin Laird and Dr. Alain Dupas
The Libyan military operation in Libya is not yet over. It is too early for scholarly and learned lessons. But it is not too early to look at the tactical experiences and how those experiences presage changes to come. We have done an initial look at the overlap between the experience of the French and of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Libyan operations and have discovered some significant overlaps in experience.
If we look at the congruence of the French with the USMC Marine experiences, several things can be highlighted.
First, the centrality of leveraging multiple bases in a littoral operation is significant. The French used several land bases and incorporated the sea base — whether the carrier or their amphibious ships — to work with land-based aircraft. The Marines used their land base largely to supply the sea-based air ops via Osprey transport.
Second, having the C4ISR — command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance — forward deployed with the pilot as the key decision maker is crucial to mission success. The classic USAF U.S. Air Force CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center) is challenged by what the Marines demonstrated in the operation; the French experience also challenges it.
If you have a long C4ISR chain, the information in a fluid and dynamic situation must be provided in a more timely fashion than a system built for 1991 air operations permits.
Third, new air capabilities make a significant difference. For the USMC, the Osprey was the game changer in this operation. For the French, it was the new recce reconnaissance pods off of the Rafale fighters.
Fourth, the dynamic targeting problem experienced by the French was also highlighted by the USMC Marines’ experience. Getting accurate information from the ground is central to operations. The USN-USMC Navy-Marine team has a number of new capabilities being deployed or acquired which that will enhance its ability to do such operations. The F-35B fighter will give the USMC Marine Corps an integrated electronic warfare and C4ISR capability. The new LPDs have significant command and control capabilities. For the French, acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which that could become wingmen for the Rafales would be important, and the role of the C2 command and control capabilities of the new amphibious ships were was underscored as well.
Fifth, the pickup quality of this operation may be more a norm than an aberration moving forward. If it is, then the old paradigm (significant planning and roll out of a fleet of C4ISR aircraft and capabilities) may be challenged by a new one: Deploying air assets that can be tapped by the sea base to shape an operation may become one of the key requirements moving forward.
Let us now hover over the C4ISR aspect a bit more. The French officers in charge of the operation were keenly aware of how little time they had to plan for the it, and putting UAVs and combat aircraft over Libya prior to a U.N. authorization was not a great idea. President Nicolas Sarkozy decided considerably before the U.N. resolution that France would operate in Libya, but to the French military leaders, this meant that the political roll out did not mesh with what their planning requirements.
This discussion about the comparative U.S.-France experiences in the Libyan intervention raises the question about space systems: Could they be used, in the future, to provide a much more operationally reactive and efficient role, in the spirit of what is called in the U.S. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)?
For instance, if such ORS systems had been available in Europe, France could have used the insertion of a small constellation of LEO small satellites into low Earth orbit by quick launch to allow a couple-of-months cushion for planning, and then to provide efficient tactical support to the intervention.
Not only would such an ORS capability be essential to operations where the political dynamic is determinant, but the military capability decisive, it would also enable significant manpower savings compared to with UAVs. Contrary to the common wisdom, UAVs are not cheap; they are vulnerable to ground fire and cyber-attacks,; they require significant manpower to support an “unmanned” asset,; and of course they cannot be used before an official green light since they operate in the airspace of a sovereign country. Once the satellites are launched, the manpower support is minimal to deliver the capability. And their intelligence information can be downloaded directly to the cockpits of the pilots, who then, after initial destruction of enemy capabilities, can transition to dynamic targeting.
Does such an approach make sense in Europe? Responsive space has up to now been just a nice concept, inspired by the (slow) progress of the United States in this direction, (exemplified by the launching of TacSat-4 on September. 27)? Are not the existing European space reconnaissance assets sufficient to prepare an intervention like the one in Libya?
An ORS capability would be a very valuable complement because the main issue is not the strategic intelligence but the tactical input to the commanders and pilots in the field, which has to be put in place, tested and exploited before the beginning of the operations. A constellation of a few small satellites, launched on- demand, and injected in very low altitude orbits tailored to provide the best coverage of the countries of operations, would add enormously to the efficiency of the combat system.
We think that, considering the new geopolitical landscape, ORS space systems deserve to become a new priority in Europe. The technical and industrial capabilities are there: A company like SSTL small satellite specialist Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. could certainly could build what could be called “Satellites on the Shelf (SOTS),” ready for on-demand launches; and concepts of the Airborne Micro Launcher (MLA), already considered by CNES, DLR and CDTI to be validated by a technological demonstrator called Aldebaran, using a Rafale), could pave the way to a European responsive small launcher.
One also may wonder also, at a time when the issue of low-cost space systems is crucial, if ORS could not be a great opportunity for Europe to put in place new approaches to develop rapidly and cheaply small responsive space launchers and satellites rapidly and cheaply?.
The world is changing in an accelerated way. New military challenges like the Libyan intervention call for new ways to operate, with focus on local C2command and control, and tailored tactical means. ORS systems could be one of such means, which Europe could develop with or without the U.S.
This op-ed appeared in Space News on October 10,2011
10/13/2011 – In August 2011, Second Line of Defense sat down with Vice Admiral Parker in his office Portsmouth, VA to discuss the challenges facing the USCG in the Atlantic Area.
Vice Admiral Parker During the SLD Interview (Credit: SLD)
Vice Admiral Robert C. Parker assumed the duties as Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area (LANTAREA) in April 2010, where he serves as the operational commander for all U.S. Coast Guard missions within a geographic region that ranges from the Rocky Mountains to the Arabian Gulf and spans across five Coast Guard Districts and 40 states. He concurrently serves as Commander, Defense Force East and provides Coast Guard mission support to the Department of Defense (DOD) and Combatant Commanders.
Before assuming command of LANTAREA, he served as the U.S. Southern Command’s Director of Security and Intelligence in Miami, Florida. As the first Coast Guard officer to serve as a Director in any DOD command, he directed U.S. military operations and intelligence efforts, and coordinated interagency operations in the Caribbean, and Central and South America.
SLD: The USCG divides the world into the Pacific command and the Atlantic command. We have recently spoken to your counterpart, Vice Admiral Manson Brown and now we are talking with you. Generally, folks don’t realize that the Coast Guard is not a glorified harbor patrol, and actually operates worldwide.
Vice Admiral Parker: A lot of people including some folks in our own government think Coast Guard and the word “coast” really jumps out at them. So they expect us all to be right here standing on the beach or within sight of land. And a lot of people are surprised, including some of us when we came into the service, to find out just how worldwide the organization is and what all of our maritime operations are in the real world.
If you look at the issue in terms of protecting the marine transportation system, the flow of commerce, the big pieces we do inside our ports and in our inland waterways and along the coastal routes, that’s a big deal. And that’s a lot of daily activity that sort of goes under the radar of 99 percent of the American public but it’s 95 percent of the stuff that we do.
SLD: How do you and Vice Admiral Manson Brown divide the world so to speak?
Vice Admiral Parker: What Manson doesn’t have I do. While some would choose a river as a boundary, that is a transportation system for us, so we split at the Rocky Mountains and watch over the waters on either side of Central and South America, and then I go around and we meet on the other side of Africa and the Northern Arabian Gulf. And the way it’s split up in DOD’s Unified Command Plan, I work with five of the six geographic combatant commanders in terms of their areas of responsibility.
“At any given time we’re in about 42 different countries with either training operations or liaisons in this part of the world.” (Credit Graphic: Bigstock)
So I have closer involvement with our overseas operations and then port and waterway operations are done by our districts and sectors. We oversee their roles and look at trends and risk analysis and balancing missions and resources there.
We spend a lot more time on migration, drug trafficking and counter piracy operations in Atlantic Area. Right now we have ships off of the coast of Africa and in the Northern Arabian Gulf. I’ve got six patrol boats and seven crews and a port security unit helping out my US Navy brethren and the Fifth Fleet over there.
I spoke with two of the fleet commanders yesterday, one here in Norfolk and the other one over in Naples who is AFRICOM’s naval component and the Sixth Fleet commander. So I deal with these guys pretty regularly. It involves a fair amount of my time to work with that one partner (DoD). Because they’re in places that we care about and most of our missions are global, their partnership is very important.
We have cryptologists who are over in Afghanistan and some other interesting places as well, supporting another mission. And then we have liaison officers all over the world. But at any given time we’re in about 42 different countries with either training operations or liaisons in this part of the world.
SLD: What would you say to our readers who ask, “Why is our Coast Guard doing things all over the world”?
Vice Admiral Parker: In a nutshell, I would say we protect people from the oceans and the oceans from people and this worldwide reach is necessary to protect the United States from threats delivered by the sea; the oceans are world-wide, and they enable our economic system; so we can’t view the oceans as moats that protect or delay threats anymore. The oceans also present vulnerabilities to our economy and our nation. Let’s look at one international organization as an example. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) based in London has about 170 states as members. They set standards for maritime safety, maritime security and pollution prevention. These three areas are vital to our success as a nation, and we must be active participants in all these programs. We must ensure that ships arriving here or sailing near our coasts are safe, secure and environmentally responsible. Success in these areas requires informed participation with dozens of organizations and administrations.
Our vessels must comply with the same requirements as the safe, secure and environmentally responsible vessels calling here. Absent this framework, international commerce would falter, and our economy would collapse with the consequential loss of millions of jobs. Providing all this framework requires us to participate around the globe with knowledgeable people. Also, it requires fully responsive training delivered here and in host countries when they don’t have the resources or experience to do it yet. Additionally, most navies throughout the world are much more like our Coast Guard than our Navy; they do much of what we do—save lives, enforce laws, guard against illegal migration, protect fisheries and execute environmental prevention and recovery programs.
SLD: Could you explain the difference among the command levels?
Vice Admiral Parker: The districts are more tactical and at the lower operational level of things. And clearly at the sector they are very tactical and very hands-on in mission execution. And then by the time you get up here, we’re very much in the operational world (balancing risk across missions). So most of what we do is plan for contingencies and crisis and then figure out how have the best effect across the various regions and missions with the resources we have. So I have a lot of oversight. But I have some operational things our staff works directly as I discussed above.
SLD: In a period of financial constraints and strategic re-definition what does the USCG bring to the table?
Vice Admiral Parker: When times get tough, people tend to retrench into a more defensive posture which makes it tougher sometimes to get in the national collaborative mode. Such collaboration is in our DNA. This may also explain why we wind up in leadership positions in these large operations– when things go bad we look around to see who we have and who can be helpful and then get after it as a team.
And whether that’s presence, authorities or capabilities or capacity, whatever it is, if it works we want it. We’re sort of agnostic about those things.
We have our own moments where we want to do it ourselves, but we just live in a world where we simply must collaborate whether it’s in the ports, or off shore, or whatever. And we are eager to tap into national systems. So we’re naturally curious to go around and see who else can help there. The other thing that is often undervalued is the vast portfolio of authorities that we bring to the table.
SLD: Could you discuss the challenges of maintenance and keeping the older fleet operational?
Vice Admiral Parker: The sustainment challenge across the board is evident everywhere I go. When I travel, I see the same thing. I see old stuff, sometimes relieved to find new stuff, but still see the herculean challenge faced by the individuals trying to maintain those older platforms.
We need to do a service life extension program on the 140s. (Note this is the Ice Breaking Tug Class vessel; there are nine vessels in the class; most are stationed in the Great Lakes.) The inland waterways assets need replacement—river tenders and construction tenders that mark our dynamic marine highways in the heartland. There’s no relief on the horizon for those and I just don’t know how you squeeze that in with the priorities here right now and the fiscal realities.
The Coast Guard Cutter Forward sits moored at Base Support Unit Portsmouth just before sunrise Wednesday, Dec. 30, 2009. Behind the Forward are two other 270-foot Medium Endurance Cutters homeported at the base, the cutters Legare and Bear. In total there are six of these cutters sharing the same responsibilities, allowing their crews to enjoy a two-month inport period and a two-month deployment period. Some of those responsibilities include: Search and Rescue; Enforcement of Laws and Treaties; Maritime Defense; and Protection of the Marine Environment. They most often deploy between the Coasts of Maine and Florida and throughout the Caribbean, but at times cross the Atlantic or visit the Pacific Ocean. (Credit: USCG Atlantic Area, 12/30/09)
SLD: How do you think we need to shape an ability to get the different players on the same page in a crisis? How do we leverage IT and other systems to get the decision making focus on the right page? You really need a collaborative knowledge system to shape a proper C4ISR D response? For us the point of C4ISR is to enable better decision making not to just collect information for maritime domain awareness in and of itself?
Vice Admiral Parker: I was afraid you were going fall in that regular trap that I have to face all the time. And I was afraid you were going to stop at the IT thing because that’s where everybody runs to …that the IT is the solution, and it really isn’t.
You don’t want the IT guy to be the one that does your knowledge management. It’s like giving over control of the architecture of your house to the plumber; you have all the toilets right inside the front door and it’s locked. Completely un-useful to the person in the house but very convenient for the plumber who wants easy access and wants to keep that part of the house secure. so in the knowledge/information/data world the IT may actually work in day to day activity but you know what happens in a crisis? We can’t pull what we need in a way that is helpful under stress and compressed decision cycles or it is so secure we can’t get it in the hands of our first responders on scene.
You’re going to make decisions anyway, and if they’re ill-informed, or worse they’re informed by bad data, you’re really in difficulty when these events unfold on flash media on a national or world stage.
The importance of getting the right information quickly has been illustrated by the recent Gulf oil spill. The national response center command center is supposed to keep track of all the boom we have in order to respond. There are lot of different types of boom as it turns out.
But we needed to know specifics such astell me where all my 18-inch hard ocean boom is, because that was the big thing in demand. That was the coin of the realm in the decision making center. How many miles of this do we have, you know, pick a number. Didn’t matter, the number was wrong because it was an aggregate of going to every oil spill response organization in the country saying “how much boom do you have?” And they’re obligated to have on-call for an operation ”Y” amount of boom.
So they would go out and contract with contractor “X” and say, “I am obligated to get 10,000 feet of boom within 24 hours, can you meet that so I don’t have to warehouse it?” And they would all say, “yes.”
So seven different organizations all go to the same guy, so when we get done, “okay I need 200,000 feet of boom,” and you get 10,000 because it was all the same guy counted 20 times.
OK. We have got a real problem here: how fast can you make this stuff?
But when you think back through the IT approach, it violated the first rule of information: data management. Where is the authoritative source for that data and how do you manage that?
This was similar to the same thing I had down in SOUTHCOM during Haiti. We just could not tell the chairman how that bottle of water got from Keokuk, Iowa all the way down to that Haitian’s hand.
Seemed irrelevant to me but he wanted to know this information. But I had no way to track that.
So we went to folks like FedEx and DHL and UPS and said, “How do you guys do this?”
And that’s where I learned about authoritative source. Authoritative source for every bit of data is hugely important. So how many authoritative sources do you think roughly we would have in a Coast Guard? So I asked this question. The answer I got: 362. There is absolutely nothing authoritative about that number.
And what we haven’t done as operators is put an operational requirement demand on information to make decisions in crisis. The core need is to aggregate information during crisis. This is a huge issue for us and is mind numbingly hard to get under control, especially in times of tight budgets.
SLD: Your focus is upon building proper knowledge management tools. Could you explain your thinking about the way ahead?
Vice Admiral Parker: To repeat, the knowledge management piece really gets confused often times with the IT, the technology side of things. And that’s just the tool.
You have to design with the focus upon having to make decisions during contingency and crises as your center point before you go into the design of all these systems. Everything we have, whether it’s personnel or logistics, all these systems are built for day-to-day operations, and activities and they tend to fail us during contingency and crisis.
So the first thought you have to get into people’s brains is what are the decisions that I’m going to have make during crisis, what contingencies, and what information do I need to have and then how do I feed that information and catalogue that on a regular basis in a way that I can retrieve that easily and with great veracity and repeatability?
Which was a real problem for us during the DeepWater Horizon response because if you have more than one source the data doesn’t upgrade at the same pace; you’ve automatically got a problem in terms of whether people believe you or not.
I think the first thing we must do is change the mindset to get way from just letting every individual program run where their information goes and figure out what it is that serves the mission. The best way to test that I think is to stress test that and put it in a contingency and crisis.
Whether we’re doing it during exercises or lessons learned from actual events and operations, I think we really have to go back and look at what decisions we need to make and where that information resides and then how we collect that as a whole service.
SLD: And there is obviously a cyber-security part of this problem as well?
Vice Admiral Parker: The Marine Transportation System vulnerabilities are just unknown in the cyber world. So I’m teasing that out.
I’m doing a number of different speeches and a couple of different articles between now and November. I’m trying to excite the nerve in different places. I’ve gone around and I’ve talked to the Houston Port partners and I’ve talked to New York port partners at length and what is clear is that everybody has become accomplished in thinking of security in terms of what’s inside my fence line and my facility. Or, you know, ships, or the places they go. And then what the external physical threats are.
Cyber is very different, and it doesn’t takesomebody doing a malicious act to break up systems now. With the automatic control systems you have at container terminals or locks, and dams, or any number of things, a loss of power, phone line or computing capability can have acascading effect through this system.
So we don’t fully understand what their accidental interdependence is in the cyber world in ports. So just understanding that, exploring that a little bit to understand what the vulnerabilities are, never mind what threats might be, but just knowing where the vulnerabilities are I think will be helpful.
We’re trying to pick a few ports that are interested in doing this. Houston certainly was interested and it’s a place where the port partners have already worked past the competitive thing to understand that if one falls, all fall. They have clearly figured this out. And it’s very impressive to see.
SLD: You recently co-authored a piece with Vice Admiral Manson Brown on the need for the National Security Cutter. Could you address how the NSC fits into the Atlantic area strategy? Or put a different way, if you received three NSCs tomorrow, what would you do with them.
Vice Admiral Parker: Well they’d be welcome and immediate helpful. Both because we have a shortage of ships because things are getting old, and we have serious sustainment issues for the current fleet. The youngest ones are over 20 years old, and that’s not young.
When I give change of command speeches, to give perspective I talk about what life was like when these ships were built. And the cheapest gas from the newest platform when they were built was a dollar twelve and the cost ranges down to 32 CENTS a gallon. Many of the ships were built before the legislation that impacts the bulk of their current mission.
No question our ships are all getting old. But beyond that, the National Security Cutters certainly represent more than just a replacement for high endurance cutters in the USCG. It can and will have capabilities when it’s finally flushed out that will create a much larger impact and effect to coordinate operations, not just be a point in the ocean from which you operate, but from which we can control sizable pieces of the ocean on waters that we regulate.
SLD: If you had them for the Haiti events, how would you have used them?
Vice Admiral Parker: That would have been huge. The Coast Guard of course was first in due to our regular presence there, but we couldn’t sustain it. Certainly DOD brought a lot of muscle to the operation.
If I’d had an NSC at the front end of Haiti, the USCG could have controlled the Air Space in there as well for the critical first days. They would have had a full appreciation for what was going on in and around the littorals and you could have done a lot of command and control for all the little different parties we were putting on the beach because Comms were gone.
They were just completely out down there. Best thing I had when that happened as the J3 down in SOUTHCOM was we had a cell phone with the aide to the deputy commander who was in the earthquake that lasted about 36 hours and then it went dark.
That was kind of an awkward period there where the ship down there was the best way I had information, but what they didn’t have was connectivity back to different people.
With the NSC you will have a significant bubble around the ship for C4ISR D and with the bigger bubble you have a much greater ability to control things. And that is true whether that’s further down range or in a place where you’ve stripped out communications and command and control architecture that normally exists. Whether it’s a Katrina, or a Haiti, or any other calamity where you lose comms and related capabilities.
Another key piece is to understand the aviation and related assets, which you can fly off of the ship, which gives you greater range and operational capability. A ship deployed forward without a helicopter or without a maritime patrol asset overhead, really controls only 12 mile radius of ocean. With the helo, you can get that out to about 75 miles pretty cleanly and then you put the over-the- horizon boat in the mix you’re actionable radius goes out to about 100 miles.
The speed and endurance of the NSC operating within a much larger C4ISR D bubble allows the USCG to increase significantly its operational area and its ability to anchor the AOR whether sea-oriented or land-oriented.
10/11/2011 – The approach we are building is from the ground up – quite literally. The US to protect its economic interests and sovereignty needs to deploy forward throughout the Pacific.
We started with the USCG and its everyday forward deployments in the North and South Pacific. And our interview with the senior USCG commander for the Pacific underscored the centrality of forward presence, including in the Artic, although the US is not engaging with significant assets in the Arctic acting as a “reluctant” Arctic power in the face of all the other powers who are not.
At the heart of our approach to the Pacific is leveraging all deployed forces through systems of connectivity but do so in a scalable manner. Rather than thinking of low and high end operations, we are thinking of a spiral of capabilities which allow one to leverage forces engaged initially on lower end operations to be part of a scalable capability which can go to the high end relatively quickly.
The key in this strategy is that any adversary will look at lower end assets such as the LCS or the NSC and see then as connected in a honeycomb whereby that platform represents a rapidly scalable force. No platform fights alone. An adversary who attacks an LCS cannot assume that he will be facing air assets off of an ARG, and CVN or off a land-base.
(Credit: SLD)
A forward deployed LCS is the next key element for building enduring presence and engagement. By forward deploying a significant number of LCSs to the Pacific, one can engage in operations while operating from the ports of core allies and partners.
Gaining geographical knowledge and cooperative capabilities with a variety of allies and partners in the region is a sine qua non of LCS success. By operating in the littorals, the LCSs will provide a core competence in working with allies and partners in dealing with various threats, piracy, counter mining, counter-narcotics, espionage from the sea, etc.
With the very significant decline in US naval and USCG ships, the shortage of assets to play a role in resolving such crises has fallen below the red line. Building the LCS and FORWARD DEPLOYING these assets to be available to have networked with allies and partners is crucial.
No platform; no presence; no capability to play a role protecting your interests. No platform fights alone, so the LCS’s forward deployed can work with others, become fully networked with its C4ISR D capabilities to work in a crisis situation with local forces.
The LCS can operate in shallow waters and move to a crisis with speed. As the recently retired CNO put it: The speed, the shallow draft allows us to get into places we haven’t been able to get into before, allows us to respond in ways haven’t been able to respond before.
Choke points involve green and brown water operational conditions. The LCS is optimized for such conditions and can protect against or resolve threats to the choke points to keep US commerce flowing. The US needs assets, which can into small operational spaces to find and root out the forces threatening economic interests.
And the LCS is well configured to deal with the mining threats, which can be posed to the choke points as well. According to a recent article on the LCS, “The back of the ship is currently equipped with a big, black submarine-type vessel from a room deep inside the ship. If they come across what they think is a mine, they can attach a camera that’s powerful enough to capture an image of a quarter on the sea floor.”
The ability of the LCS to link with other assets – US, allied, and partner – is a key quality of how the ship can work to provide for success in security operations.
The LCS would become the C2 focus platform as well as the launch platform for H-60s, Firescouts, etc. The maritime patrol aircrafts, working with the High Altitude Airship and the PTDS would be able to provide widespread overlapping ISR coverage. With regard to the PTDS, as I pointed out earlier, one would be deployed ashore, and the other three would be mounted on unused offshore oil platforms. Also, the LCS can be linked to other maritime assets to execute the mission as required leveraging this ISR information.
The LCS goes from security to lower-end defense missions. When connected to the newly enabled ARG the LCS becomes a key element of littoral operations which are truly scaleable.
These two forces – the LCS and the newly configured ARG – can be conjoined and forged into an enlarged littoral combat capability. But without the newly configured ARG, and the core asset, the F-35B, such potential is undercut.
A newly configured USMC ARG is emerging from several new assets:
The new ARG built around the LPD 17 has a larger deck to operate from, with modern C2 capabilities.
The F-35B can be launched as a 360 degree presence asset to do electronic warfare, C4ISR and preparation for kinetic or non-kinetic strike.
The CH-53K can take off from the amphibious ships and carry three times the cargo of a CH-53E, to include 463L pallets (normally used in KC-130s).
The USMC Ospreys can support insertion operations with speed and range.
What the newly equipped ARG does is provide a significant shaping function for the President. And this shaping function allows significant flexibility, any hard 3000 foot surface is available for the Navy/Marine amphibious forces to seize and hold. This world class uniquely American battle capability is a redefinition of the dichotomy between hard and soft power.
Question: When you put that data out there about air dropping trends, it’s impressive in and of itself, but when you think of the CONOPS implications they are significant as well. I don’t even need to use roads to actually start inserting a force. Interestingly for the Marines when they’re looking at the amphibious ready group (ARG) and what they could do with the future ARG, with their MC-130Js that can land in 3,000 feet or less, the Ospreys and the B’s that they could put basically on almost any paved highway worldwide. They could be anywhere in the world, and then people say, “Well how would you supply them,” and I would say, “Well what do you think we’ve been doing in the last ten years?” So if we marry up this revolutionary air dropping capability with projection of force from the sea, we could have a much more flexible and powerful insertion force if we wanted to.
General Allardice: I agree. Our new air dropping capabilities can be used to support our global operations in new and innovative ways. And honestly, innovation is really the essential takeaway. Through collaboration we are able to optimize the performance of the global mobility enterprise and orient it toward the effect we need. There will always be a tension between capacity and requirements, but we have found a way to manage it that allows us to respond rapidly and address those tensions in ways that would be much more difficult without the processes we have in place.
The USN-USMC amphibious team can provide for a wide-range of options for the President simply by being offshore, with 5th generation aircraft capability on board which provides 360 situational awareness, deep visibility over the air and ground space, and carrying significant capability on board to empower a full spectrum force as needed.
Now add the LCS. The LCS provides a tip of the spear, presence mission capability. The speed of the ship allows it to provide forward presence more rapidly than any other ship in the USN-USMC inventory.
It was said in fighter aviation “speed is life” and in certain situations the LCS can be paid the same complement. The key is not only the ships agility and speed but it can carry helicopters and arrive on station with state-of-the art C4ISR capabilities to meld into the F-35B combat umbrella.
Inserting an LCS into the Maersk Alabama incident can see an example of the impact of speed. As one naval analyst put it, the impact would have been as follows:
LCS at 45kts would have been on scene in less than 7 hours (6.7), or 37% sooner than a ship transiting at 28 kts.
LCS fuel consumption for such a sprint 40% less than the 28 kt sprint.
LCS would consume less than 23% of her fuel capacity in such a sprint.
A helo launch within 150 nautical miles from Maersk Alabama puts helo overhead within four hours (4.3) from the time of the initial tasking.
Two H-60’s permits LCS to maintained a helo overhead Maersk Alabama for a sustained period of time.
With a response time of four hours the probability of thwarting a piracy attack is increased—especially if the naval ship is called upon the first realization of the targeted ship’s entry into piracy-infested waters.
If an LCS was tasked to respond when Maersk Alabama encountered the first group of pirates craft on 7 April 2009, it would have arrived on scene well in advance of the attack on 8 April and may well have prevented it.
And if you add the LCS to the USN-USMC amphibious team you have even more capability and more options. As a senior USMC MEU commander has put it:
You’re sitting off the coast, pick your country, doesn’t matter, you’re told okay, we’ve got to do some shaping operations, we want to take and put some assets into shore, their going to do some shaping work over here. LCS comes in, very low profile platform. Operating off the shore, inserts these guys in small boats that night. They infill, they go in, their doing their mission.
The LCS now sets up — it’s a gun platform. It’s a resupply, refuel point for my Hueys and Cobras. Now, these guys get in here, okay. High value targets been picked out, there is an F-35 that’s doing some other operations. These guys only came with him and said hey, we have got a high value target, but if we take him out, we will compromise our position. The F-35 goes roger, got it painted, got it seen. This is what you’re seeing, this is what I’m seeing. Okay. Kill the target. The guys on the ground never even know what hit them.
In World War II the Imperial Japanese Navy Admirals were said to call the US PT, or Patrol Torpedo Boats—“Devil Boats”—The LCS is not a PT boat but the LCS ocean presence with 21st Century capabilities may make it a modern “Devil Boat” to vex any enemy combat action.
Similar to the PT boats of WWII the LCS by itself has limited staying power; connected to the ARG, the LCS announces presence and is connected to significant full spectrum combat capability.
Several LCS’s could be deployed with Osprey and F-35B cover. The F-35B provides the 360 degree multiple of hundreds of miles coverage. The LCS becomes a node in the combat system of the F-35 and any weapons on the LCS can be cued up by the F-35B.
With the new aviation assets, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) can be split at sea allowing it to cover hundreds of miles more than historical operations with unexpended speed and maneuverability.. And adding an LCS to each of the disaggregated elements can further enhance the presence and combat functions of the MEU.
The recent operation of the Osprey in Libyan operations demonstrated how this game-changing asset allows for significant logistics support for deployed LCSs and ARGs.
It completely changes the game for the ARG/MEU, it changes the game for how the Marine Corps does business. I didn’t fully realize, nor appreciate this until I was operating in some of these locations during our deployment.
Once we got into the Med for the Libyan operations during Operation ODESSEY DAWN, Naval Air Station Sigonella was our only forward support base.
The Osprey functioned as a force multiplier in these circumstances. I could fly 300 miles plus from the USS Kearsarge to Naval Air Station Sigonella, land, get a quick hit of gas if needed, put five, six, seven thousand pounds of gear, equipment, troops, parts, and be back quickly to the ship within 2.5 hours.
Half of our MV-22s were conducting combat operations in Afghanistan while we were conducting combat operations off the coast of Libya aboard the USS Kearsarge. So you can do the math: Half of the Osprey’s conducting combat operation in Afghanistan and the other half performing combat resupply, and TRAP operations off the coast of Libya.
I wouldn’t have even fathomed this expeditionary and amphibious capability 10 years ago. Also, the Ospreys from Afghanistan flew directly to Souda Bay, Crete and then onto Naval Air Station Signalla, Italy. This trip is a 3500 NM transit. This has been the longest in our short history, and they did it in one day. You can’t even begin to argue or compare and contrast these facts with the CH-46E.
The glue which generates LCS-ARG synergy are the aviation assets on the two entities, notably the Osprey and F-35B which have the speed and range to create a moving 360 degree combat and presence bubble over an operation. Without that glue, these platforms become disaggregated and vulnerable. Linked together, the resulting synergy creates a force multiplier effect.
I’m Muammar Gaddafi. I’m whoever, and I’ve got an ARG with this new gear embarked – and I can’t help but think its going to change the way I view that force. That ARG can reach out and touch me from long range, landing high-end infantry forces deep inside my territory, and do so with a speed that twice as fast as anyone else can. Our MEUs have never been used as effectively as they are today. These new capabilities are going to make them exponentially more potent and useful to our nation’s leadership.
The F-35Bs give the new ARG a very high-end air superiority fighter, that’s low observable if I want it to be. I can roll from Air to Air to Air to Ground quickly and be superior to all comers in both missions. That’s bad news for our adversaries. I can use the F-35s to escort the V-22s deep into enemy territory. With those V-22s we can range out to a 400-500-mile radius from the ship without air refueling. I can go deliver Marines deep in the enemy territory or wherever and do it at 250 miles an hour, so my speed of action, my agility is exponentially increased, and I think if you’re a bad guy, that would probably give you a reason to pause. It’s a very different animal that’s out there. We are good now, but will be even more so (by more than a factor of two in the future).
I also have significant mix and match capability. And this capability can change the impact of the ARG on the evolving situation. It is a forcing function enabled by variant mixes of capability. If I wanted to strip some V-22s off the deck, to accommodate more F-35s – I could do so easily. Their long legs allow them to lily pad for a limited period of time — off a much large array of shore FOBs – while still supporting the MEU. It’s much easier to do that in a V-22 than it is a traditional helicopter.
I open up that flight deck, or I can TRANSLANT or PAC additional F-35s. If I had six on the deck and I want to fly over another six or another four, we could do it rather quickly. Now the MEU has ten strike platforms. So if I need to have a TACAIR surge for a period of time, that deck provides a great platform for us. We’ve got the maintenance onboard that ship, so we can actually turn that Amphib very quickly from being a heliocentric Amphib to a fast jet Amphib. Conversely, I could also take the F-35s off, send them to a FOB and load it up with V-22s, 53Ks, or AH-1Zs and UH-1Ys.
Flexible machines and flexible ships. The combination is exceptional.
We will have a very configurable, agile ship to reconfigure almost on a dime based on the situation at hand. I think the enemy would look at the ARG as something completely different from what we have now. I think we have to change the way we do things a bit in order to allow for that, but I think we will once we get the new air assets. The newly enabled ARG, or newly whichever the term you’re using, will force our opponents to look at things very differently. We will use it differently, and our opponents are going to look at it differently.
Finally, being connected to the newly enabled ARG can intelligently facilitate LCS modernization. The LCS can carry a range of assets, from missiles, to helos, to unmanned assets, to a complement of distributed “cyber warriors” all of which can much more potency by being part of the ARG team. The F-35B can perform the function of the battle manager, without the presence of large USAF aircraft, or a carrier presence. This is truly a combat revolution in the making.
We will next like at an aspect of crafting the honeycomb over the Pacific, namely creating an ISR grid over the Pacific built in part on the 12th AF model of working with the Dominican Republic.
This is a contribution to the strategic whiteboard.
During my current visit to Europe, I have had the chance to talk with French military decision makers about the Libyan operation. I have also talked with USMC officers involved in the operation. I will first look at the French experience, then at the USMC experience and then compare the two to understand some of the tactical commonalities and perhaps some insights in the way ahead in shaping capabilities for littoral operations.
The French Experience
A main point underscored by the French military was the impact of the political process on military planning. The French President clearly saw the need for the operation and had worked closely with the British Prime Minister to put in place a political process, which would facilitate a Libyan support operation for the rebels. But until the UN Mandate was obtained, now military action could be authorized. This meant that there was little or no planning for military operations with the result that, in the words of one French military officer, “we were forced to craft operations on the fly with little or no pre-planning or pre-coordination. We did some on our own but until the authorization for action was in place, we could not mobilize assets.”
An impact of the slow roll out was that French weapons will not fully available at the start of the operation. Another officer indicated “the elements of French weapons were in various depots. We had to bring those elements together and to assemble them at the initial operational air base.”
The French ran surveillance operations prior to the air operation, but several officers indicated that they were concerned with the quality of the intelligence they had to work with. As an officer commented: “I was reasonably confident with regard to what we knew about the state of Libyan operations, but would have liked greater certainty before launching my aircraft.”
A key aspect of the French operation was the use of virtually the full gamut of their air combat capability, AWACS, tankers, Mirages, Rafales, and various helos engaged in the operation. This represented a series commitment by the French leadership to the operation and to mission success.
French Amphibious Ship and Helos Played a Key Role in the Operation (Credit: http://convenientflags.blogspot.com/2011/05/tonnere-helicopter-carrier-to-libya.html)
Clearly one key element which emerged from the operation was the strategic significance of multiple basing to conduct operations. The French used multiple bases to operate their air capability. They operated from bases inside France at the beginning of the operation. They then used bases in Corsica (Solenzara was a crucial air base for the operation) as well as in Italy, notably Sigonella (which is supposed to be closed this year). They used two key sea bases, the aircraft carrier (Charles De Gaulle) and their helicopter carrier (the Mistral) for combat strike, recce operations, helo operations as well as processing intelligence from joint French air assets and sending targeting information back up to the strike force. They used Souda in Greece to work with the Omanis who were using their Mirage 2000s for the first time in combat, and the French and Omanis worked together in using the French and Omani 2000s for strike operations.
There were a number of firsts for the French in the operation. This was the first large-scale operation by France working with NATO since rejoining NATO. This was the first use of the Tiger combat helicopter off of the Mistral. This was the first use of a new precision-guided weapon in operations to destroy Libyan armor and other ground equipment (the Air-to-Ground Modular Weapon). This was the first time the French flew in combat with an Arab partner using an advanced version of the Mirage 2000 for ground strike missions. This was the first use of the new reconnaissance pod on the Rafale, which played a major role in the operation.
The Mistral featured prominently in the operations as well. This helicopter carrier has proven to be a very versatile asset. It has a deck, which can support six helos operating in combat operations. It has hanger space for 16 helicopters. And the Tiger helicopter operated off of the Mistral in night operations. The helos operated in the words of one French officer as “vampires” able to operate at night to lower the capabilities of the Libyan forces.
An aspect of the operation of the helos off of the Mistral is noteworthy as well. The guns of the frigate with which it was deployed used its guns to support the helo deployment. The guns provided the fire suppression enhancing the security of the insertion of the helos off of the Mistral.
The C2 on the ship is first rate and was part of the link to the air fleet in receiving and processing information to shape an intelligence picture to support strike operations. What this demonstrated that integrating maritime with land-based air can provide a powerful littoral operations capability, one which may prove very relevant to the United States as it rethinks the relationship between the USAF and the USN-USMC team in shaping 21st century operations.
Mirage 2000s were a key part of the French and Arab Nations participating in the operations (Credit: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-03-18/military-strikes-on-libya-within-hours-france/2649834)
Two additional aspects of operations as they moved forward were highlighted from the French point of view. First, the limitations placed on the operation curtailed the ability to succeed and enhanced the ability of Ghadafi to survive. And second, after the initial air operations, dynamic targeting was a central objective, and various problems in executing such targeting became evident.
The limitations were three fold.
First, rules of engagement were being proposed by the partners of France in NATO that were “ridiculous” to quote one French officer. “We received from NATO sources the directive that there were to be NO civilian casualties from our air strikes. My view was “why not just not do airstrikes.” We pushed back and insisted on something sane: “No excessive civilian casualties from NATO air strikes.”
And the second limitation was allowing Gadaffi to operate in a sanctuary in Libya. As one officer put it: “We wanted to destroy an airfield being used by Gadaffi to bring in mercenaries. We should have destroyed this airfield.” Third, the American contribution was much more limited than it needed to be. Another officer added “We had 4-5 areas to cover for the air operation; the Americans provided only two UAVs – Predators—which operated for only part of the day. We need to augment our own capabilities to be sure, but……”
And finally the operation underscored the challenge of “dynamic targeting.” The shift from destroying identifiable military equipment being used by the Libyan forces supporting Gadaffi to engaging forces on the ground countering the rebels required “dynamic targeting.” And this can only be done by situational awareness which allows aircraft to target elements blended with the population and this requires aircraft flying low, with close proximity weapons, with forces on the ground able to identify targets in a fluid situation. As a French officer put it: “We had difficulty getting authorization to fly low, we had limited close proximity weapons and we had severe limitations of forces on the ground able to identify accurate targets.”
For one senior officer the problem was clear: “Going forward we have to augment our capability to do dynamic targeting. If we are going to intervene in situations where we are supporting contested space and need to support either local or our own forces, we need better capabilities to influence the situation on the ground. Air systems can clearly do this, but in coordination with ground targeting elements. And the pilots need to be granted more authority. We have to stop believing that some far away command authority has better SA or moral authority than the pilot over the target. And the notion that unmanned systems are going to replace the pilot is ludicrous in a dynamic targeting situation. We are reluctant to give a guy with SA in the pilot’s seat authority, why are we going to give some guy in Nevada or Paris looking through a soda straw the authority to do dynamic targeting.”
The USMC Experience
With the decision of the US national command authority to “lead from behind,” the USMC almost inadvertently was given a leading role. What “lead from behind” meant operationally was that the US was not going to commit significant combat air capabilities to the fight, so the F-22 returned from Middle East exercises to not be used in the battle and the Aircraft Carrier which was in the Mediterranean was sent to support US ground troops in Afghanistan. The US was to provide a C2 package to support the operation as well as ground attack capabilities such as A-10s and C-130 gun ships. And most importantly, the US provided tanking and related air support to the allied operations.
The point here is NOT that the US did not provide significant support to the operation, it is what happened which was really not expected. And what this really is all about is the performance of the USMC and the USN-USMC amphibious ready group team. What the ARG ended up doing was re-shaping the next phase of operational history. The recent Secretary of Defense confused amphibious with Inchon, whereas in reality the ARG is a seabase from which one can conduct a variety of operations across the spectrum of warfare.
And the ARG is in the throes of fundamental change, with new ships, and new planes providing new capabilities. And these new capabilities are nicely congruent with the operational experiences off of the Libyan coast. Given the USMC battle hymn, it seems that off the shores of Tripoli can have a whole new meaning for the evolution of the US force structure.
The ARG was used in several unprecedented ways in the Libyan operation.
The Osprey Transformed ARG Operations Off of Libya (Credit: SLD)
First, the Osprey was a key element of changing how the US forces operated. The Osprey provided a logistical lynchpin, which allowed the ARG to stay on station and to allow the Harriers to have greater sortie generation rates and ops tempo. The use of the Osprey in the operation underscored the game changing possibilities of the ARG in littoral operations of the future.
A complete transformation to how we are doing business has been involved. In order for the USS Kearsarge, the ARG and the 26th MEU to stay in their operational box during Operation ODESSEY DAWN, and enable the Harriers to continue their strike mission, we were reliant on other assets to supply us. For many supply items, the Osprey provided the logistical link to allow the ARG to stay on station and not have to move towards at sea re-supply points and meet re-supply ships.
Without the Osprey you would have to pull the USS Kearsarge out of its operational box and send it somewhere where it can get close enough to land or get close enough to resupply ships to actually do the replenishment at sea. Or you would be forced to remain where you are at and increase the time you’re going to wait for this part by three, four days or even a week.
The ARG ships are only moving at 14-15 knots. At best, let’s just say they move an average of 13 knots per hour, and add that up for the 300 miles that you have to sail. Now you’re looking at least a day to get the needed folks, parts or equipment and then the transit time back to the operational box. The V22 will do that in a couple hours and allow the ARG/MEU to keep executing its mission.
Second, the current operation of the ARG is to be disaggregated. For the MEU, the combat elements might be on the ship, might be ashore, or might be in transit. The challenge for the MEU commander is to be able to concentrate force upon the task at hand. Prior to the Libyan operations, Col. Dessens, the 26th MEU commander, faced the challenge of assembling his capability to fight the battle and then to be able to flexibly alter the force mix on the sea base. What this meant was that some of his Ospreys were in Afghanistan, and not on his ARG ships. And after the initial operations, the Marines assembled ground forces if they were to be needed. The key point here is that the sea base, which in effect the ARG is, can provide a very flexible strike package. And the ability of the ARG to operate off of the coast of Libya meant that the air element would be able to generate significant sortie rates.
The logistics of the situation made it clear that the maritime operational bases were clearly critical to the operations. The nearest non-naval attack aircraft are coming out of Aviano, Italy. That’s about 1,000 miles north of Benghazi. For a fixed wing guy, that’s at least one tank (aerial refueling) just to get to work, one tank to get back, and probably a tank in between. Whereas, with a big deck amphib in the Gulf of Sidra, the average commute was 100 miles.
Harriers figured prominently in the Libyan Air Operations. This Harrier is landing during an exercise in late August in North Carolina. (Credit: SLD)
Third, given the close proximity, now the Harriers could operate with significant sortie rates against enemy forces. Not only could the Harriers come and go rapidly, but also the information, which they obtained with their litening pods, could then be delivered ABOARD the ship and processed and used to inform the next strike package out. One did not need a long C2 or C4ISR chain to inform combat. This meant as well that the ground forces of Gadaffi would not have moved far from what the last Harriers saw before the new Harriers moved into attack positions. The combination of compressed C4ISR and sortie rates created a deadly combination for enemy forces and underscored that using sea bases in a compressed strike package had clear advantages over land based aircraft several hours from the fight and managed by C4ISR operating over several hundreds and even thousands of miles.
As Col. Dessens further elaborates:
On the 19th, we get the first air strikes. As the ATO [Air Tasking Order] shook out, the Marines ended up being the last ones to fly that night. However, there’s a silver lining in every cloud. The litening pod, integrated on the AV-8B Harrier II, is one of the best things ever invented.
The beauty of us coming in towards the end of the night is we were able to go do a complete run with a litening pod up and down the roads south of Benghazi, record everything in that battlespace, and do all the processing in quick order aboard the Kearsarge. We shared everything we had with the JFACC (Joint Forces Air Component Commander) who didn’t have UAVs available until a few weeks later. We were able to do a complete analysis from the systems on the Harriers, turn it back around, and start getting ready for the next day.
This is where you start to see the advantages we had by being close to the target area, if I’m coming from Aviano, my data’s at least two and a half hours old. Things may well have moved. So now I have to reacquire to do the things I need to do. On the other hand, if you are only 100 miles away, the intelligence update you walked to the aircraft with is only fifteen minutes old as you enter the target area – and your target is right there waiting for you. We enjoyed a very high target to sortie rate because of tactical intelligence advantage.
Many further points could be made about the USMC operation but I will add a fourth and then move to the implications moving forward. The Osprey and the Harrier worked closely together to enhance combat capabilities. An aspect of this simply the ability of the Osprey to bring parts and support elements to the Harriers. Rather than waiting for ships to bring parts, or for much slower legacy rotorcraft, the Osprey at more than 300 miles an hour could bring parts from land bases to keep the ops temp up of the Harriers.
And the TRAP or rescue mission certainly highlighted how a vertically launched aircraft working with the Osprey off of the ARG can create new capabilities. From the time of authorization to the recovery of the pilot and his return to the USS Kearsarge was 43 minutes.
And how this happened also shows significant developments. The US Air Force had a rescue helo aboard the USS Ponce, but it was not used for this operation. In my view, having discussed this with the relevant personnel, it was not used for two reasons. It would have gotten to the pilot much later than an Osprey team and secondly the command and control would have been much slower than what the USMC could deliver. The key to the USMC C2 was that the pilots of the Ospreys and Harriers planned the operation together in the ready room of the USS Kearsarge. They did not meet in virtual space. The Harriers were informed by fresh intelligence ABOARD the USS Kearsarge. The sea base brought together the assets and intelligence to execute the mission.
We immediately started talking to the Harrier operating above us. And he starts talking with the pilot and we can hear one side of the conversation and I can tell that things are getting worse on the ground.
We made the judgment that we had to accelerate the mission. We moved towards our top speed as the pilot was moving to a new location on the ground.
The pilot on the ground indicated that “they’re still going at us, and things are getting worse.” And he is clearly on the move.
We had the grid of the plane crash site and we got a new grid and realized that it was much further away from where the original crash site was. So he’d been on the move the whole time.
If I had been flying a SEA KNIGHT, by the time I had gotten the new information with regard to the shift in the grid, and flown for the 40 minutes under those conditions, I would have been relatively exhausted by the time I got there because you’re holding the controls, and you’re getting shaken the whole time.
Convergences and the Way Ahead in Littoral Operations
By an almost accidental set of events, the French operational experience dovetailed with that of the USMC and suggested a way forward, certainly for US thinking about littoral operations.
If we look at the congruence of the French with the USMC experience several things can be highlighted.
First, the centrality of leveraging multiple bases in a littoral operation is significant. The French used several land bases and incorporated the sea base –whether the carrier of their amphibious ships – to work with land based aircraft. The USMC used their land base largely to supply the sea based air ops via Osprey transport.
Second, having the C4ISR forward deployed with the pilot as the key decision maker is crucial to mission success. The classic USAF CAOC system is challenged by what the USMC demonstrated in the operation; the French experience also challenges it. In a recent piece on AOL Defense, the point was made that some French pilots felt that the release authority from Predator information was too slow. The interpretation was unhappiness with the US but I would argue that is more in the nature of the problem than the nationality in charge. If you have a long C4ISR chain, the information in a fluid and dynamic situation must be provided in a more timely fashion than a system built for 1991 air operations permits.
Third, new air capabilities make a significant difference. For the USMC, the Osprey was the game changer in this operation. For the French, it was the new recce pods off of the Rafales.
Fourth, the dynamic targeting problem discussed in the first article was also highlighted by the USMC experience. Getting accurate information from the ground is central to operations. The USN-USMC team has a number of new capabilities being deployed or acquired which will enhance their ability to do such operations. The F-35B will give the USMC an integrated electronic warfare and C4ISR capability. The new LPDs have significant command and control capabilities. The new LCS could provide along with the Osprey significant combat insertion capability for ground forces and rapid withdrawal capability. For the French, acquiring UAVs, which could become wingmen for the Rafaels would be important and the role of the C2 capabilities of the new amphibious ships were underscored as well.
Fifth, the pick up quality of this operation may be more a norm than an aberration moving forward. If it is the old paradigm of significant planning and roll out of a fleet of C4ISR aircraft and capabilities may be challenged by a new one. Deploying air assets that can be tapped by the sea base to shape an operation may become one of the key requirements moving forward.
As with any operation, the characteristics are unique and not determinate for the future. The limited capabilities of the Libyan forces are important in assessing lessons learned. But what the USMC and the French forces have demonstrated is that 2011 is not Iraq 1991 or Bosnia 1996.
10/10/2011 – By shifting from the China focused Pacific globe to the Hawaii centered globe, the nature of the US defense and security approach to Pacific strategy similarly becomes re-focused. For the PRC truly to shift the situation, they must reach the US, its allies and partners, and not the other way around. The PRC landmass becomes salient in a major conflict, and Chinese modernization and power projection forces and their bases provide discernible targets, again if a major confrontation is in the cards. And classic conundrums such as the defense of Taiwan can be significantly re-thought.
But the place to start is the strategic need to have maritime assets deployed to provide support for US economic interests, and sovereignty. Indeed, the intersection of the capabilities is at the heart of rethinking Pacific strategy. A capability triangle can be conceptualized: one side are platforms available and deployed; the second side the ability to connect these platforms, and the third the capability to operate with allies and partners through the systems which connect US platforms in the first place.
(Credit: SLD)
In this piece we will start the discussion on platforms and presence.
The basic point is that simply to protect US economic interests there will need to be significant US maritime presence in the Pacific. And air power provides the significant force enabling the ships to have much greater coverage and effectiveness in their operations. Too often in the inside the beltway conversation about air power this discussion is confused with the fate of the US Air Force or the ability of earlier air power thinking to continue forward into the 21st century. Rather, air power is what you need if you want something other than binoculars to see or to weaponize something like a 21st century spear carrier.
Another way to look at the argument we are developing is that the Hawaii centered globe is the canvas onto which one moves various forward presence assets to shape a connected capability to protect American interests. We will then focus on how to shape this into a honeycomb structure, far more resilient than thinking of a centralized networked structure.
Platforms Provide the Presence; Connectivity the Honeycomb and Scalability of Capabilities (Credit: SLD)
In this piece we will start with the USCG and its role in the Pacific, and how their baseline capability provides a fundamental building block in building an effective Pacific strategy.
If we start with the USCG, we can underscore how the C4ISR associated with air power – helos, MPAs, and other assets – can allow the USCG ships to operate in a domain as large as the Pacific and to be effective.
Let’s talk about just the Eastern Pacific drug mission. Let’s just use that as an example. In the old days, we literally went down there and bored holes in the water, and if we came across a drug vessel, it was by sheer luck. It might be on a lookout list, and we might happen to see it. Let’s fast-forward now to the 2000s and what we’ve started being able to do. By being able to fuse actionable intelligence, and not only that, but intelligence communicated at light speed. So now, we’re to the point where we’re telling a Cutter to go point A, pick up smuggler B with load C. And we’re doing that in real time with delivery of a common operational picture, which has been fused with intelligence. That was unheard of 10 years ago.
Rear Admiral Day has had many years of operational experience in the Pacific and underscored that the new helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft are crucial in giving the USCG ships range and effectiveness in their operations.
And the new National Security Cutter being deployed in the Pacific provides a command post, not just a ship, to provide area coverage and comprehensive presence. A key element of the operational capability of the National Security Cutter is its endurance. And it can operate up to three fast boats as well as having a large deck for handling helos.
Most people don’t realize that 85 percent of the US exclusive economic zones (EEZs) are in the Pacific, mostly in the Central and Western Pacific. There are a lot of economies in that region that are driven by the fishing industry.
One of the things that I realized is that even with good enforcement in US EEZ’s, the fish know no boundaries. So they will shift from our EEZ’s to those of other nations and potentially be overfished there.
We formed partnerships with adjoining countries who are working their EEZs to try to manage the illegal fishing beyond our EEZ. We developed a joint strategy, a ship rider program where essentially we use Coast Guard assets and put enforcement officials from six nations that have signed ship rider agreements.
The Central and Western Pacific is significant distance away from the continental US. Most people don’t know that sovereign American territory is located as well in the Central and Western Pacific.
To deploy a Cutter from here (Alameda, California) to American Samoa requires ten or more days. And the thing you have to realize in the Pacific, you don’t have the infrastructure that you do in the Atlantic
So in terms of pier space, fuel, engineering support, food and other logistics, you have to take it with you. When you’re down in a place like American Samoa, you better have most of what you need to operate.
And for the Arctic the Vice Admiral underscored he has authority but no assets. It is useful to hover for a moment with regard to the need for maritime assets even to be a player in the Arctic.
A good look at what this means for the USCG and the nation is the look at the Arctic problem by a leading expert with 30 years of operational experience in ice conditions.
The Arctic is centered on a large ocean basin….(and while other nations are investing) the U.S. is in the process of divesting its Arctic capability. The nation’s multi-mission polar icebreaker fleet is being downsized by a third with the imminent decommissioning of USCGC Polar Sea. This will leave only the Polar Star, 35 years old and half-way through an expensive 2 ½-year refit, and the 11-year old Healy.
Unanticipated engine problems in Polar Sea forced the cancellation of two Arctic deployments in late 2010 and early 2011, the result of attempting to keep complex 1960s-era technology in use beyond its reasonable service life.
The icebreaker is a key asset of presence. Garrett explained in another piece why this is so.
In an icebreaker, you are not up in the Arctic to break ice per se; you are there to permit mobility to accomplish missions of national importance. You are an enabler for transit and related operations. It’s really about mobility and being able to get to point A to point B or to wherever you want to go to do; whatever it is you’re out there to do. So what you need, is a ship with a lot of power, a very strong hull, and which has been designed to get through ice efficiently. In addition, people often overlook that you need significant endurance; there are no gas stations in the polar regions.
When you look ahead to what the Coast Guard needs to do its missions in evolving Arctic conditions, you see that there’s more open water, there’s more human activity, and there’s more maritime traffic. But the ice is still there, and its movements are becoming more unpredictable. You really need a ship that can operate in dynamic ice conditions to allow mobility and has the long legs to be there unreplenished for a reasonable length of time.
Protecting US economic and security interests in the North and South Atlantic requires the presence of USCG cutters and icebreakers. And these ships can be integrated as well into USN, USN-USMC and other defense operations. In a recent deployment of the Bertholf Cutter, US Special Forces used the deck of the new NSC as part of an exercise. The USN-USMC plan to work with the NSC in Pacific operations where appropriate as well.
The strategic point here is that the presence of maritime assets are required to protect US economic interests, provide for security, and protect US sovereignty. No presence; no assurance of the protection.
Two other examples from the recent operations of the Bertholf highlight the way ahead.
First, the Bertholf operates with a C4ISR D capability which can allow the commander of the Bertholf to leverage US, allied and partner’s assets.
A key way to think of the NSC is a command post afloat with self-contained assets, and because of C4ISR, reachback and reachout capabilities to national assets and partner capabilities. It is an operational bubble at sea able to control and operate over significant areas of land or sea to execute its various missions. Much like one can conceptualize the revolution inherent in the F-35 cockpit, the bridge and its various tool sets represent the “cockpit” for the command team of the Bertholf.
Rather than thinking of the NSC as a new cutter and simply as a replacement for the Hamilton class, one should think of the ship’s entry into the 21st century world of C4ISR enablement, and the bridge as where C4ISR D (i.e, C4ISR enabled decision making) is executed.
While standing on the bridge with Captain Prince and Commander Ramassini, Second Line of Defense discussed the correlation between missions conducted on their recently completed patrol and the command assets on board the ship.
Secondly, the Executive Officer of the Bertholf underscored the impact of presence on protecting sovereignty. As Commander Ramassini emphasized:
We also offer great flexibility and adaptability for Homeland Defense and Security; and even serving abroad in support of U.S. Combatant Commander’s global maritime partnerships. The transit ability and the sea legs in this ship are remarkable – we offer outstanding partnership and persistent presence wherever we go.
Up in the Bering Sea where we’d cover a 300,000 square mile area, steaming all the way up to the Maritime Boundary Line, and back down to the Aleutian Chain, and cover that area in a very efficient manner waving our flag, protecting our exclusive economic and projecting U.S. national interests in the Arctic along the Maritime Boundary Line, the U.S./Russia Border. So we have that presence.
And just be able to show our peer competitors that we’re still concerned about this area, and we have a presence with remarkable helicopter launch and land capabilities up in the harsh Bering Sea with a ship like this is important to our nation and ultimately our sovereignty.
And the USCG example provides an understanding that no platform fights alone. By the USCG doing its job, other US forces can leverage what they do, provide scalable capabilities and provide for a significant expansion of impact with virtually no added cost.
James Carafano has rather forcefully put the proposition about sovereignty and his concern about the slow go on funding, building and deploying the new National Security Cutters.
The National Security Cutter’s capability really matters. Presence at sea is what ensures the sovereignty of American territory at sea. Sacrificing capability means sacrificing sovereignty.
Abandoning the National Security Cutter as a budget-cutting drill makes about as much sense as dispensing with a security alarm, putting up “no trespassing” sign and telling yourself you are more safe at less cost.
We will turn next to various USN platforms and then to the USN-USMC team.
For a special report on the National Security Cutter see
(Credit: SLD)
