Trends in DHS Contract Spending

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Trends in DHS Contract Spending
10/09/2011
(Credit: DHS)

By Dr. Richard Weitz

10/09/2011 – Using public data, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington DC think tank, analyzed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) federal prime contracts from 2004 to 2010. The analysts note that the quality of this data has improved consistently over time, especially since the Barack Obama administration began using the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), the primary source of information for this report, as a management tool for judging agency performance. DHS reviewed the CSIS data and offered some corrections, some of which CSIS adopted.

http://csis.org/event/us-department-homeland-security-contract-spending-and-supporting-industrial-base

Although the CSIS report only considers DHS spending, the authors note that DHS typically accounts for only half of all federal spending on homeland security. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) accounts for about one-quarter of the total federal total. The Departments of State, Energy, Justice, and Health and Human Services also regularly spend billions of dollars each year on homeland security. Almost all federal departments and agencies have some spending that fall into the homeland security category.

All dollar figures are in FY 2010 constant dollars unless otherwise indicated. Both regular appropriations and supplementary appropriations are included. The information and analysis only covers prime contracts, excluding sub-contracts and state and local contracts. Information regarding classified contracts is also not include since reporting regulations only require that unclassified contracts be included in FPDS.

(Credit: DHS)
(Credit: DHS)

As a service to readers interests in where DHS dollars have gone in the past and might go in this new Fiscal Year, SLD is presenting this information in several ways. We have also highlighted certain key interesting trends and issues:

 

DHS Contract Spending for Products, Services, and R&D

Looking at DHS spending on products, services, and research and development (R&D), the data suggests that the DHS is primarily a services contracting agency. From 2004 to 2010, contracts for service-based programs make up 70% of DHS federal contract spending on products, services, and R&D. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security spent $10 billion on service-based contracts, while it spent only $3.2 billion on products and $0.4 billion on R&D.

The highest yearly spending on service contracts was in 2006. That year DHS spent $13.2 billion due primarily to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. This incident shows that DHS spending often surges following natural disasters and other domestic disasters or threats. In 2006 (the fiscal year in which Hurricane Katrina impacted DHS spending), total DHS federal contract spending was at its highest at $17 billion.

DHS Contract Spending by its Components

The Department of Homeland Security has six main components:

  • Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
  • Coast Guard,
  • Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
  • Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
  • Office of the Secretary (OSEC), and
  • Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

Spending on contracts for each component does not vary much from year-to-year. FEMA is an exception due to its responsiveness to natural disasters. The OSEC has also been gradually increasing its share of contract spending.

Contract spending by the CBP range from $1.7 billion in 2004 to $2.9 billion in 2010, with the greatest sum spent in 2008 ($3.3 billion) and fewest in 2005 ($1.5 billion).

Contract spending by the Coast Guard ranged from $2.3 billion in 2004 to $2.8 billion in 2010.

The TSA spent an average of just over $1.8 billion from 2004 to 2010, with contract spending ranging from $1.7 billion to $2.0 billion.

FEMA spent $1.1 billion in 2004 and then saw its contract spending drastically increase as a result of Hurricane Katrina — in 2005 and 2006, FEMA spent $5.2 billion and $7.2 billion respectively. In 2007, FEMA’s contract spending fell to $1.7 billion and by 2010, FEMA was spending only $0.5 billion.

The OSEC saw its spending rise at a steady rate each year from $0.3 billion in 2004 to $3.0 billion in 2010.

DHS components’ spending on products is also consistent over time, with the exception again of FEMA:

From 2004 to 2010, DHS contract spending by the CBP on products averaged $0.61 billion; contract spending by the Coast Guard on products averaged $1.1 billion; contract spending by the TSA on products averaged $0.49 billion; contract spending by FEMA on products average $0.60 billion; and contract spending by the ICE on products averaged $0.14 billion.

FEMA experienced a sharp increase in contract spending on products in 2005 and 2006, spending $2.2 billion and $0.8 billion. In each other year from 2004 to 2010, there was not a single year in which FEMA spent more than $0.5 billion in contract funds on products.

DHS contract spending on services by its main components indicates several trends.

From 2004 to 2010, DHS contract spending on services rose from $4.9 billion to $9 billion, with a peak in service contract spending in 2006 at $12.5 billion. As a result, all of the key components saw a growth in service contract spending from 2004 to 2010 with the lone exception of FEMA. For example, the OSEC saw its service contract spending increase from $0.2 in 2004 to $2.5 billion in 2010 and the CBP saw an increase of $0.9 billion from 2005 to 2010.

FEMA on the other hand, reduced contract spending on services from $0.7 billion in 2004 to $.0.5 billion in 2010; however, in 2005 FEMA contract spending on services jumped up to $2.8 billion and rose to $6.1 billion in 2006, then declined each year after that leaving FEMA with the lowest contract spending on services of all components by 2010.

DHS contract spending on R&D by its main components does not show trends similar to products and services spending. Since R&D is the area in which the least contract spending occurs, it is hard to determine any distinct patterns in spending.

Contract spending on R&D reached over $1 billion only in 2006, again a product of Katrina. Based on the data, from 2004 to 2007 both the Coast Guard and TSA spent the most on R&D contracts; however, these numbers fall off after 2007 and from 2007 to 2010, the OSEC spent the most on R&D contracts. FEMA spent the most on R&D contracts in 2006 at $0.7 billion, which consequently was the most spent on R&D contracts by any component in any single year.

OSEC Contract Spending

The report looks at contract spending by the OSEC individually as it is the DHS component in which the greatest increase in contract spending has occurred. In 2004, OSEC contract spending was $0.3 billion dollars. This was the lowest of any component that year and made up less than 5% of DHS contract spending. By 2010, OSEC contract spending had risen to $3.0 billion dollars. Within seven years, the OSEC went from being the component spending the least on federal prime contracts to becoming the component spending the most on these contracts. In that seven year period (2004-2010), the OSEC went from less than 5% of DHS contract spending to nearly 22% of DHS contract spending.

DHS Contract Spending based on Competition

CSIS identifies four different types of competition in contract spending:

  • competition with multiple offers,
  • competition with a single offer,
  • no competition,
  • and finally unlabeled or unknown.

The main trend is that competition for DHS contracts has been increasing over time, with fewer sole source contracts in recent years and multiple companies bidding on more contracts. This may result from the fact that the administration has been using competition as one criterion in assessing the performance of DHS managers.

The DHS spent the most on contracts that had competition with multiple offers. From 2004 to 2010, DHS spending on contracts that had completion with multiple offers rose from $3.3 billion to $6.2 billion, with an average of $4.6 billion over the seven year period.

Contracts based on competition with a single offer received an average $3.3 billion dollars from 2004 to 2010, with yearly totals consistently between $2.0 billion and $4.0 billion.

From 2004 to 2010, contracts based on no completion received an average of $3.4 billion in DHS contract funding; however, taking out the $7.0 billion in DHS contract funding from 2006 (an outlier year due to Katrina), this average falls to $2.8 billion. DHS contract funds spent on unlabeled or unknown contracts averaged $2.3 billion over the seven years.

DHS Contract Spending by Funding Mechanism

The report tracks six types of funding mechanisms:

  • fixed price,
  • cost reimbursement,
  • time and materials,
  • combination,
  • unlabeled, and
  • other.

The majority of DHS contracts are funded through fixed price agreements, which in each of the seven years (2004-2010) drew over $5 billion. In 2004, fixed price agreements accounted for 61.6% of all contracts, and in 2010, nearly 56% of all contracts were fixed price agreements. Over the seven years, approximately 52% of DHS contracts were fixed price agreements.

In 2006 (again Katrina), cost reimbursement contracts jumped to $5.0 billion, but in all other years, cost reimbursement programs only were consistently between $2-$3 billion. A time and materials agreement, in which the DHS provide materials and pay for workers time, was the third most prevalent type of agreement, growing steadily from $0.6 billion in 2004 to $2.5 billion in 2010.

DHS Contract Spending by Contract Type

DHS uses seven types of contracts:

  • definite contracts,
  • purchase order contracts,
  • single award IDC (indefinite delivery contract),
  • multiple award IDC,
  • FSS (Federal Supply Schedules) or other IDV (indefinite delivery vehicle), or
  • blanket purchase contracts.

DHS most often grant single award IDCs. From 2004 to 2010, an average of almost $4.8 billion was spent on single award IDCs, accounting for more than 35% of all DHS contracting spending over that period.

The second most prominent contract type used by DHS is definite contracts, with an average of $2.3 billion per year. From 2004 to 2010, DHS spent $2 billion per year on FSS contracts and $1.9 billion on multiple award IDC’s. During the same period of time, DHS spent an average of $1.6 billion on blanket purchase contracts and just under $1 billion on purchase order contracts.

Number of Firms in DHS Market and Share of DHS Market based on Firm-size

The report divides firm size into three categories: large, medium, and small.

In each category, the number of firms receiving DHS prime contracts has risen substantially from 2004 to 2009, though the shares among each category has remained fairly constant over time, with small companies receiving some 30% of the contracts by value. In contrast, the data for the Department of Defense shows that the largest companies have been increasing their share of DoD prime contracts over time.

The CSIS analysts noted in their briefing that many of the prime contractors sub-contract tasks to other firms. For example, many large companies sub-contract to smaller firms to meet various federal and company objectives or to access their unique skills and technologies. Conversely, many medium and small firms will sub-contract to larger companies to exploit their more comprehensive assets. They were uncertain whether these flows favored one category or another but speculated that the flows probably cancelled each other out to a large extent.

Small firms comprise the majority of the firms receiving contracts from the DHS. The total number of small firms in the DHS market rose from 2,934 in 2004 to 12,212 in 2009. The number of medium firms in the DHS market rose from 1,192 in 2004 to 3,803 in 2009, reaching a peak in 2006 with 4,104 firms contracted through the DHS. In 2004, the number of large firms in the DHS market was 68. This number rose to 90 by 2009.

Despite the growth in number of firms from 2004 to 2009, the percentage of firms by size remains consistent over the six years. In 2004, the percentage of small firms making-up the DHS market was 70% and in 2009, the percentage had risen to 75%. The percentage of medium-sized firms in 2004 was 28% and in 2009 the average was 24%. The percentage of large firms in the DHS market was 2% in both 2004 and 2009.

Despite the disparity in number of firms for each size, the share in the DHS market by each of the three firm sizes is relatively even. From 2004 to 2009, small firms received an average of $4.15 billion in DHS contract dollars. Medium firms, over the same time period, received $4.10 billion in DHS contract funding. Large firms obtained the most DHS contract funding, receiving $5.35 billion dollars from 2004 to 2009.

Despite the limited number of large firms in the DHS market, these large firms receive the most DHS contract dollars. In 2005, the top five contractors of the DHS received $3.29 billion in DHS contract dollars. This accounts for 24% percent of all DHS contracting funds. In 2005, the top twenty contractors of the DHS received $6.01 billion, approximately 43% of all DHS contracting dollars. In 2009, the top five contractors of the DHS received $1.9 billion, only 13% of all DHS contract dollars. And, the top twenty contractors received $4.84 billion from the DHS, approximately 34% of all DHS contract spending.

In most years, the large firms receiving the most DHS prime contracts include the same companies that obtain the most DoD contracts by value. These include IBM, Lockheed Martin, Unisys, and Accenture. But during natural disasters, a different set of companies will typically rise to the surface. In 2005, the top 20 DHS contractors included Fairmont Homes, Clearbrook, and Circle B.

Conclusion

In their briefing, the CSIS analysts stressed the following key points:

  • DHS contract spending is relatively stable, with the most instability relating to FEMA, whose spending typically surged for a year or two following natural disasters
  • DHS contract spending on services has grown the fastest over time; spending on products has grown much more slowly; and DHS contract spending on R&D has decreased over time
  • DHS contracting is very competitive, more so than those for DoD
  • DHS contract managers have increased their use of fixed price contracts and definitive contracts over time, while reducing their use of purchase orders
  • DHS contract spending is not well-positioned to survive major budget cuts, which look likely for the next few years.

Shaping a Pacific Strategy II

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Shaping a Pacific Strategy II

Taking Another Look

10/09/2011 – The Pacific is a big place.  As the Father of the American Navy John Paul Jones said about the quality of a Naval Officer —“It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.”

Being a capable mariner is thus a given by any Naval Force to simply survive to fight in the Pacific

The Pacific is nothing like the name  –“Pacificum” or peaceful in Latin.   It is a violent and expansive Ocean. Rounding the tip of South America. Ferdinand Magellan, in perhaps one of the more significant “name branding” mistakes in history pronounced the body of water he saw as peaceful

The answer to the question how large is the Pacific is very simple — it is huge.

“The Size of the Pacific Ocean is Massive; it covers more than one-third of the earth’s surface, which is approximately 165 million square kilometers (about 65 million square miles). It extends about 15,000 kilometers (9,600 miles)”

The question of how dangerous and violent is the Pacific was answered by Sir Francis Beaufort in the 19th Century in his code measuring storms at sea “The Beaufort Scale.”

After being wounded several times and commanding a Royal Navy ship of war Beaufort became Hydrographer of the Royal Navy for twenty-five years. In fact some of his charts are still used to this day.  Sir Francis was a visionary who specifically recognized the strategic importance of the entire Pacific and he also focused on the strategic importance of the Arctic.

His  “Beaufort Scale” runs from 1 to 12 with a Force 12 being “Hurricane Winds.” –“Huge waves and sea is completely white with foam and driving spray greatly reduces visibility”.

However, in 2006 the Peoples Republic of China adopted a scale that goes to a high of 17 to acknowledge what they saw as the power of a tropical cyclone off their shore known as a “Chinese Typhoon.”

Consequently, all ocean going mariners, from early explores on war canoes, to Chinese Junks, to European sailing vessels to modern battle fleets must have a very healthy respect for the pure raw power and also extremely significant distances involved with the Pacific Ocean.

It is still very true that even a 21st Century maritime force can only venture forth with ships and planes that are rugged, survivable and have the range to go up against both nature and in combat against a reactive enemy — it is not as easy as the US Navy makes it look.

A famous World War Pacific Typhoon makes that startling point. Historians have debated the number of USN Ships sunk by Japanese Kamikaze attacks during all of WW II in the Pacific. Their counts vary from a low of 34 to a high of 47.

Compare that Kamikaze fight against a reactive enemy over a almost a four year war with a US Task Force caught in a Pacific Typhoon in one 24 hour period.

In the Pacific Typhoon of December 18, 1944 three Destroyers capsized; the USS Spence, USS Hull, USS Monaghan, with the loss of most of their crew–over 700 hundred sailors perished. Additionally, 146 aircraft on Fleet Carriers were struck from the rolls because of damage. So yes being capable mariners along with rugged ships and planes makes a huge difference.

The Pacific from the Arctic to Australia Credit Image: Bigstock

Now let us look at the Pacific from the perspective of the Pacific seen from the American perspective.  This Pacific begins in the Arctic and arcs down through Australia.  The 50th state – Hawaii – is in the middle of this perspective.  And as the senior Senator from Hawaii often reminds folks who come to testify about missile defense in the Pacific: “Is Hawaii a state in the United States?”

If one looks at the Pacific from this perspective and builds from an understanding of economic interests and protection of sovereignty, several brush strokes can be placed on this canvas.

The first brush stroke would start at the right of the picture.  From Seattle to San Diego, the US has many key cities in the Pacific Basin.  And the economic impact of the Asian relationship is evident everywhere in the region.  The impact of maritime trade is central.  And these cities and their ports are part of the conveyer belt of goods transferred from Asia to the United States and beyond.

The conveyer belt underscores the key role, which the West Coast container ports play in the US economy.  As the 11th District USCG Commander has noted:

Another key challenge, which the Rear Admiral discussed, was managing the conveyer belt of goods coming into the United States. Rear Admiral Castillon noted that: Almost half of all US containerized cargo comes through the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach. And if something were to shut that port down, the remaining ports on the west coast would not be able to handle the volume that one port complex handles.  We work very closely with all of our partners in LA/LB, and in all our ports, to ensure the safety, security and efficiency of the port complex. And the process currently in place throughout the country requiring an Advance Notice of Arrival 96 hours prior to entering a U.S. port is critical to our efficient management of this “conveyer belt”.

You never know for certain what’s in a given container, and you’ve got to be able to reach back overseas, and make sure that they’ve got the security in place where that container’s first getting loaded on a vessel. To enhance the probability that a container will not be a Trojan Horse you need to work with foreign authorities to reduce the risk inherent in the conveyer belt of global trade.

With the establishment of international standards, being able to be confidently determine what’s getting loaded onto vessels in foreign ports, and securing the cargo that’s being brought into our port long before it gets here, that’s a big part of risk management and defense in depth.

With next stroke of the brush, one would highlight the trade routes for the conveyer belt, which follow the Great Circle Route from the Asian ports south of Alaska and then down the West Coast of the United States.

With the next stroke of the brush, one would highlight the Arctic and its growing impact on the global economy.  As Prime Minister Putin has put it, in addition to the vast resources in the Arctic, the coming Arctic trade route will one day rival that of Suez.

Unfortunately, the US is a very reluctant Arctic power, and not crafting the capabilities to be a player, but the Arctic is drawing the 5 signatory powers to the Arctic as well as others like China, who are building icebreakers. (See https://www.sldinfo.com/ending-reluctance/, https://www.sldinfo.com/the-non-reluctant-arctic-power-russia-and-the-artic/, and https://www.sldinfo.com/the-arctic-sea-competition-strategic-competition/)

With the next stroke of the brush, one would highlight Hawaii at the center of the Pacific.  Here is the base for much of US maritime power projection, coupled with that of Alaska.  Ironically, the 49th and 50th states are the anchors for forward deployment of US forces in the Pacific.  Last in, but now of front-line significance to the future of the US economy and protection of sovereignty in the Pacific.  In the debate on missile defense, many miss the point of why protecting the US through Alaska and Hawaii is foundational.

With the next stroke of the pen, one would highlight core allies of the US, ranging from Japan, to the Philippines, to South Korea, to Singapore, to Australia, etc.  These major Asian players are building forces and shaping their interests in the competition with China.  One could call it co-opetition which would underline the need for a power balance in order to work with China in a strategic direction acceptable to the US and its allies.

With the next stroke, one could paint the key states along the global trade choke points that are clearly areas of concern in the counter-terrorism business.  Indonesia and Malaysia certainly come to mind as well as the Malaccan straits.

The final brush stroke might highlight Australia all by itself.  Australia is at the heart of China engagement, deterrence of China and deflection of pressure upon a central US ally.  The growing concern, which the Aussies have expressed in many forums, notably their most recent defense white paper, about US capabilities and intentions, is an anchor point of the entire sweep of the US pacific strategy.

The White Paper notes about China that

China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin. Its military modernization will be increasingly characterized by the development of power projection capabilities. A major power of China’s stature can be expected to develop a globally significant military capability befitting its size.

But the pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans.

China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernization appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan (page 34).

The White Paper comments as well on Aussie concerns about the US role in the Pacific:

Will the United States continue to play over the very long term the strategic role that it has undertaken since the end of World War II? It remains the case that no other power will have the military, economic or strategic capacity to challenge US global primacy over the period covered by this White Paper.

But the United States might find itself preoccupied and stretched in some parts of the world such that its ability to shift attention and project power into other regions, when it needs to, is constrained. This is likely to cause the United States to seek active assistance from regional allies and partners, including Australia, in crises, or more generally in the maintenance of stable regional security arrangements (page 32).

In the next contribution to a proposed Pacific strategy, we will look at how one might work with this canvas and to shape credible capabilities in order to craft effective security and defense regimes able to protect US economic interests and sovereignty.

This is a contribution to the strategic whiteboard.

https://www.sldinfo.com/resources/strategic_whiteboard/

Striking at Sunrise

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Striking at Sunrise
10/07/2011

10/07/2011: Striking at Sunrise

[slidepress gallery=’striking-at-sunrise’]

Credit:Marine Corps Base Hawaii – Kaneohe Bay:09/08/2011

  • In photo 1, a blanket of green smoke sweeps by as an instructor watches infantrymen with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, provide fire suppression during a platoon attack at Range 410A on Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., Aug. 8, 2011.The platoon-level attacks were part of the battalion’s 35-day Enhanced Mojave Viper training exercise. During EMV, the Marines of ‘America’s Battalion’ are training to kill enemy fighters by polishing infantry skills and practicing counterinsurgency operations. They are preparing for a fall deployment to Afghanistan’s Helmand province in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
  • In photo 2, Infantrymen with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, wait for the command to bound forward during a platoon attack at Range 410A on Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., Aug. 8, 2011.
  • In photo 3, Second Lt. Adam Staff, a platoon commander with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, communicates with his Marines during a platoon attack at Range 410A on Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., Aug. 8, 2011.
  • In the final photo, infantrymen with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, bound through a cloud of yellow smoke during a platoon attack at Range 410A on Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., Aug. 8, 2011.

Shaping a Pacific Strategy I

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Shaping a Pacific Strategy I
10/05/2011
“At any given time we’re in about 42 different countries with either training operations or liaisons in this part of the world.” (Credit Graphic: Bigstock)

The Conventional Wisdom

10/05/2011 – Clearly China is a central aspect of any US Pacific strategy.  China is building up its forces, studies the US and its ups and downs very carefully, and are funding innovative technologies and shaping asymmetrical strategies to deal with US legacy forces and strategies.  For example, the legacy approach to airpower as opposed to the new distributed operational approach, which is enabled by 5th generation aircraft, is widely understood and a benchmark against the PRC would seek to defeat US forces in the Pacific if needed.

https://www.sldinfo.com/renorming-air-operations/

US forces have formed the lynchpin of an Asian alliance, which has been central to deterrence of North Korea and the PRC who remain de facto partners.  As US power projection capabilities have rapidly declined over the past 20 years, American allies have noted the REALITY of US capabilities and are making their own decisions about what they need to deal with the PRC and what kinds of policies are necessary as the US forces become smaller and with no clear US strategy towards the Pacific over the next 20 years.  Even if forces are robust, the absence of strategy and of an ability to provide for coalition operations will lead to the perception of decline or defeat in battle. It is not just the forces; it is the strategy and the ability to implement the strategy, which matters as well.

https://www.sldinfo.com/lessons-from-dunkirk/

When looking at the challenge, which the PRC poses now and into the future, a key element will be the perceptions of core allies about the ABILITY of the US to do what is needed in the decades ahead.  It will not be about a photo opportunity with the US Secretary of State at one of the many international conferences in Asia.

When one thinks of directly confronting China the following view of the globe is what is operating in most people’s minds.

(Credit: Bigstock)(Credit: Bigstock)

If we look at this view, what do we see?  We see a giant landmass where China can swallow its enemies.  It is the “sea” within which the PRC forces can operate.  We see the Taiwan straits and the Dragon standing astride the narrow straits.  We see a key zone of maritime transit, which provides for a significant conveyer belt of goods to the US and beyond.  We see an exposed island continent Australia, which looks like it does not have a lot of independent options in dealing with the Dragon. We see the Koreas, with the divided Koreas remaining a festering point, but at some time in the period ahead perhaps the Koreas will decide to unite.  Perhaps Taiwan will vote its way into the PRC.  This is an area where the US forces intrude, not naturally live, operate and exist.

Such views raise the magnitude of the challenge for US forces to confront the PRC land mass and close in operational areas.  The entire ordinance of the US Navy could probably be used with the PRC able to function quite nicely afterwards.  In the current financial crisis, and absence of a significant effort to rebuild US power projection forces, this snap of the globe is quite discouraging for future of deterrence.

Such a view can lead to such amazing pieces as this one published in the US Naval Institute Proceedings.  Entitled “Chinese Missiles and the Walmart Factor,” we learn that Scenarios of a military conflict with a rising China are pointless if they leave out a glaring detail—the global economy.

Multiple news outlets recently carried stories about a Chinese antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) that could target U.S. aircraft carriers at sea.1 It was just the latest in a long-running stream of news coverage and concerned dialogue over China’s expanding military capabilities and influence. As China’s growing strength gains greater global attention, more and more time, energy, and money will be spent asking how the United States will counter an increasingly capable Chinese military.

For some within defense circles, this is a routine question and a question the U.S. Navy (particularly Pacific Command) is expected to answer.

But fear of China’s perceived martial intentions is both overblown and unproductive for the United States and its military. Focusing solely on Chinese military capabilities clouds the critical challenge of preventing a catastrophic Sino-American conflict. Furthermore, this distraction obscures the real work of guiding China’s rise as an open, self-confident, fully integrated member of the world community.

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-07/chinese-missiles-and-walmart-factor

One could ask this enthusiastic naval analyst why an assertive global power like China building military capabilities to influence events in the Pacific and abroad is going to ask him to “guide” the Chinese on anything. Influencing one can understand and part of this “teaching” effort requires a real US Pacific strategy, which works seamlessly with allies and convinces the Chinese that they have no easy options to push the world around.  We do not need the next Tiananmen Square to be a regional or global event.  If all we have are “guidance options” rather than deterrence options, the likelihood of a global or regional Tiananmen Square is very high indeed. And our Asian allies are very clear both on their fears as well as the need for the US to move out of the lemming like strategic debate inside the Beltway and into an approach to provide the assets, the fortitude and vision to provide real capabilities to provide the glue for the Asian alliance.  When the Chinese are building icebreakers and we are not is a metaphor for not getting it in Washington.

The Chinese have built hundreds of warships since 1991; we have a one hundred year recapitalization for tactical aircraft.  Allies, partners, and not friends will draw their own conclusions.

It is also important to underscore developments within this global picture, which provide some options and opportunities for the deterrence effort.  As China has modernized, they are no longer the primitive country with space being able to overcome strikes.  Building major cities, highways, and infrastructure, coupled with building air and naval bases for their power projection capabilities is exposing the PRC to strikes which can undercut their operational capability.  It means there is no free ride for their maritime forces operating in the Pacific, because there is a vulnerable backside.

It is also the case that as the PRC develops weapons and capabilities, most of these are untested and their reliability unknown.  The press and many strategists give the PRC weapons and systems effectiveness upon the mere appearance of the weapon or platform.  Whereas the same folks would not allow Western weapons such a space in which to be effective merely by appearing.

The Chinese are entering a period of moving their capabilities to sea.  They have done this operationally in global counter piracy operations and other operational opportunities.  The last time the Chinese moved to see was a long time ago.  The Admiral Zheng He sailed the globe with as many as 70 ships and 30,000 sailors.  After learning a great deal, the Emperor rewarded him by burning his ships out of fear of contamination of foreign ideas and cultures. Zheng He died in 1433 so there is a bit of an operation gap here.

The point of this little historical excursion is to remember that the US and its allies have considerable operational experience, and only a deliberate lemming like approach to throwing this experience away can guarantee Chinese hegemony in Pacific waters.

To better understand how the US and its allies can work together to deal with China and other Pacific challenges we need to start with a different view of the globe and then organize our capability around this alternative view.

This is a contribution to the Strategic Whiteboard

 

https://www.sldinfo.com/resources/strategic_whiteboard/

 

 

Defense Capabilities and US Economic Interests

Posted on | by SysAdmin
10/04/2011

10/04/2011 – by Robbin Laird

In the rush towards an election, a withdrawal from Afghanistan and budget cuts, which would undercut the ability of the US to replace its “geriatric forces, ” a key consideration is to ensure that the US can defend its economic interest in the period ahead.  The US will end up with a smaller force structure, but it is important to ensure that by leveraging new platforms, transformation takes place capable of protecting US sovereignty and economic interests.

A phrase often bandied about is the need to protect the “global commons.”  The problem with this phase it assumes that there is some mystical “global” “even-handed” force at the service of globalization, which yields protection to the economic interests, associated with globalization.  Unfortunately, or fortunately, this is not the case.  Sovereign nations protect their interests, and the tools that global powers posses or develop can be used for national purposes or be combined in innovative ways to provide for a collective global reach for the “coalition of the willing.”

But a brutal point is that without platforms, without an ability to link platforms, with out scalable forces, a nation’s ability to protect its interests are severely curtailed. One of the challenges faced in the United States is the assumption of the power which we have had by investments in defense systems in the time of Reagan somehow mysteriously empower old platforms to protect the nation.  Nothing could be further from the truth.

It is important in these challenging and difficult times to connect the re-building of the US force structure with understandings of the relationships between sovereignty and economic interests.  Recently James Carafano provided an important perspective on these relationships when discussing the significance of the national security cutter to the USCG and to the nation.

The National Security Cutter’s capability really matters. Presence at sea is what ensures the sovereignty of American territory at sea. Sacrificing capability means sacrificing sovereignty.

Abandoning the National Security Cutter as a budget-cutting drill makes about as much sense as dispensing with a security alarm, putting up “no trespassing” sign and telling yourself you are more safe at less cost.

The new platforms being purchased by the services are important elements in protecting US sovereignty and economic interests.  Indeed, I would argue that the new platforms are even more closely connected to performing their functions than the platforms they are replacing or supplementing.

A case in point would the relationship between the new Littoral Combat ship and the ability to deal with at sea threats to US maritime commerce and protection of the conveyer belt of goods and services.  Piracy, maritime terrorism, threats from rouge nations and the ability to protect the flow of energy resources are closely connected.

For example, there are a number of critical chokepoints in the flow of oil globally.  These chokepoints are clearly vulnerable to piracy and mining actions worldwide.

As one study put it: “Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes, some so narrow that restrictions are placed on the size of the vessel that can navigate through them.  They are a critical part of global energy security due to the high volume of oil trade through their narrow straits.”

A Lehman Brothers assessment of January 2008 provided a comprehensive look at the Global Oil Choke Points challenge and laid out a clear case for why this problem posed significant economic threats and consequences for the US and other oil dependent states.

The report identified ten vulnerable points along the supply chain or “choke” points where disruption could interrupt a substantial volume of oil flow.

The choke points discussed in the report are seen in the two graphics below.

Choke points (Credit: http://www.deepgreencrystals.com/images/GlobalOilChokePoints.pdf)

Choke points (Credit: http://www.deepgreencrystals.com/images/GlobalOilChokePoints.pdf)Choke points (Credit: http://www.deepgreencrystals.com/images/GlobalOilChokePoints.pdf)

Protecting these choke points and responding to attacks or disruptions of these choke points is a fundamental task for US forces and those of its partners and allies.  One could simply sit back and hope for the best, or one can have forces appropriate to the task which work with partners and allies to deal with such challenges.

With the very significant decline in US naval and USCG ships, the shortage of assets to play a role in resolving such crises has fallen below the red line.  Building the LCS and FORWARD DEPLOYING these assets to be available to have networked with allies and partners is crucial.  No platform; no presence; no capability to play a role protecting your interests.  No platform fights alone, so the LCS’s forward deployed can work with others, become fully networked with its C4ISR D capabilities to work in a crisis situation with local forces.

The LCS can operate in shallow waters and move to a crisis with speed.  As the recently retired CNO put it: The speed, the shallow draft allows us to get into places we haven’t been able to get into before, allows us to respond in ways haven’t been able to respond before.

Choke points involve green and brown water operational conditions.  The LCS is optimized for such conditions and can protect against or resolve threats to the choke points to keep US commerce flowing.  The US needs assets which can into small operational spaces to find and root out the forces threatening economic interests.

And the LCS is well configured to deal with the mining threats, which can be posed to the choke points as well.  According to a recent article on the LCS, “The back of the ship is currently equipped with a big, black submarine-type vessel from a room deep inside the ship.  If they come across what they think is a mine, they can attach a camera that’s powerful enough to capture an image of a quarter on the sea floor.”

The ability of the LCS to link with other assets – US, allied, and partner – is a key quality of how the ship can work to provide for success in security operations.

As one observer has put it:

The LCS would become the C2 focus platform as well as the launch platform for H-60s, Firescouts, etc.  The maritime patrol aircrafts, working with the High Altitude Airship and the PTDS would be able to provide widespread overlapping ISR coverage. With regard to the PTDS, as I pointed out earlier, one would be deployed ashore, and the other three would be mounted on unused offshore oil platforms. Also, the LCS can be linked to other maritime assets to execute the mission as required leveraging this ISR information.

In other words, we can follow the Carafano model of building assets to protect our sovereignty and economic interests or we can suffer the economic consequences of being “choked” by significant disruptions to global maritime commerce through vulnerabilities exploited such as oil choke points.

“The Future is Now”: Clearing the Decks for the “iPad Generation Pilots”

Posted on | by SysAdmin
General "DoDavis During the SLD Interview in his office in Cherry Point (Credit: SLD)

10/04/2011 – During an interview at Cherry Point Air Station, the Commanding General of the 2nd MAW continued an earlier conversation on the evolution of the Amphibious Ready Group.  We had discussed earlier the emergence of the “newly enabled ARG” and its impact on the nation.  Here the CG discussed the ground being prepared for the new USMC pilots, or the “iPad generation pilots,” as we have referred to them.

General Davis During the SLD Interview in his office in Cherry Point (Credit: SLD)
General Davis During the SLD Interview in his office in Cherry Point (Credit: SLD)

General Davis discussed the flexibility and significance of the Amphibious Ready Group and the MEU structure to the Marine Corps and the Nation.  The General referred to the MEUs has having a “job jar” for each deployment and that “job jar” has of late turned out to be very different each time they set sail.

But because of the inherent flexibility of the ARG, they like no other combat structure are ready to handle the wide variety of mission sets the Combatant Commanders have asked them to take on.  In many ways the MEU’s “job jars” can be shaped on the fly (vice being stuck with a preset and rigid mission structure).

The CG of the 2nd MAW has significant experience with the aviation elements, which are helping shape a newly enabled ARG, and he discussed the impact of these new systems — today. The capability of the ARG is being reshaped under the influence of the Osprey now, and will be even more so with the F-35B in the near future.

The Marine Corps, whether we’re maneuvering (from) forward operating bases ashore or maneuvering (from) sea bases afloat is an immensely valuable force.    The Combatant Commanders keep asking for more of what we produce for deterrence and combat operations – in every corner of the globe.   Marine Forces are so utilitarian, offer such strategic agility, and can be very readily tailored to be right sized for the task at hand – that our demand signal is way up.  From my vantage point, it seems like we need more of what we deliver – and will need even more in the future … and we’re procuring the kind of equipment that allows us to sustain and exponentially improve upon our capability to do that in the future, and I would contend deliver a lot of bang for the buck.

General Davis discussed the impact of the Osprey in terms of speed and range and the operational flexibility of the Osprey for current operations.

The Osprey allows the warfighter to influence operations over a vast chunk of real estate at speeds and ranges twice that of conventional helicopters – the operational and strategic significance of this capability should not be unappreciated.   Your ability to influence from a sea base or to maneuver ashore is expanded significantly with this plane.  And when you team the Osprey with the F-35B, you will be able to provide significantly greater combat capabilities – and options – to the Combatant Commanders.

For example, the bad guys could look at Libya and conclude: Look at what the V-22s did to us in Libya; we are going to develop air defense systems that will deny the Marines the ability to use that plane to the strategic and operational advantage they displayed in 2011.  But with the F-35 escorting that airplane, it will be able to expand where it the Osprey goes and under what conditions.  I will be able to go after an air threat, ground threat – and provide air-ground fires deep in the enemies  battlespace in support of MV-22 operations – and do all that from a large deck amphibious ship.   We are just scratching the surface of what the MV-22 can do and when we can combine them with the F-35 –its the envelope will only expand….

Another aspect of the impact of the MV-22 on operations was underscored in the recent 26th MEU operations.

We were able to use the Osprey as a logistical enabler for the MEU at sea.  This will allow you to leverage the value of the deployed fleet because you can actually leverage a distributed fleet to move critical material around the fleet in operation.

Just two days ago we saw a MV-22 deliver a Harrier engine from the supply ship over to a big deck and that hadn’t been done before.  We have always done it with CH-53s but our CH-53s have pulled off of that ship to do another mission.

During the Libyan mission we flew the Ospreys to get parts and supplies which allowed us to sustain the ARG at longer ranges (four times what we were able to with a 46) – and at twice the speed – you can’t understate the operational impact of using this bird in a logistics role like that.  In the end it makes deployed MAGTFs that much more agile and effective – and valuable to a Combatant Commander.

Another illustration of the flexibility, which the Osprey provides, is the ability to move the plane from one location to another rapidly to augment capability.  For example:

When we moved the Ospreys from Afghanistan to rejoin the ARG, they flew directly from Afghanistan to Kuwait to Souda Bay, being tanked along the way, and did the flight in one day (in under 13 hours of flight time).

The Osprey allows provides significantly greater survivability for the Marines.  I can fly to and from my objective area above the threat the primary threat.  It’s very hard for the bad guys to predict exactly where the airplane is going or when it is going to come down on them.  It is very quiet in plane operating mode – allowing us to move Marines and material quickly, quietly and operationally effectively.

Due to the speed, range, low noise signature and cruise altitudes – the bad guys have a hard time telegraphing where the airplane’s going to land.   There is a capability that is hard to put a quantitative value on – but to me a lot of folks talk about game changers – this is a no bull — bonafide one.

The CG then discussed the shift associated with the F-35B.

My son is a Harrier pilot and the way we are operating our AV-8Bs off of the MEUs is a sea change from what we used before.  In fact, there is absolutely no comparison to what we do today – and what we deliver for the Combatant Commander with our AV-8Bs as compared to what I could do in my AV-8B as a young attack pilot.  I look at what they did during the 26th MEU and I am immensely proud of the capability we have developed and delivered to the Combatant Commanders.

The improvements in capability we have put into the AV-8B has changed the way the combatant commanders looks at the jet and more importantly, changed the way they look at Marine Expeditionary Units and the capabilities that they bring to bear.  Deep, responsive precision strike capability – now we are getting ready to deploy them with AMRAAM….

And what we have coming in the F-35B as compared to an AV8-B is absolutely no comparison.  It is absolutely, positively no comparison.  This airplane is going to change the capability of the ARG exponentially – in a very significant and positive direction.   It is going to change again how the combatant commanders look at the MEU, the efficacy and utility of amphibious ships, the overall benefit of the MAGTFs embarked aboard amphibious ships and the strategic importance of this capability as it relates to our national security strategy.

And we will be able to bring an electronic warfare capability off of the ARG with the F-35B.  We have driven home the importance of electronic warfare for the USN-USMC team and not just at the high-end of the fight.

The CG emphasized the importance of the EW culture within the USMC, and to the Prowler community within the USMC.

The Prowler guys are some of the brightest guys in the USMC.

But the F-35B was going to provide the USMC aviator cultures in our Harriers, Hornets and Prowlers to coalesce and I think to shape an innovative new launch point for the USMC aviation community.

We are going to blend three outstanding communities.  Each community has a slightly different approach to problem solving.  You’ve got the expeditionary basing that the Harrier guys are bringing to you.  You have the electronic warfare side of the equation and the high-end fight that the Prowler guys thing about and the coms and jamming side of the equation, which the Prowler guys think about.  And you have the multi-role approach of the F-18 guys.

I think it is going to be a fantastic blending of not only perspectives but also attitudes.  And what I really look forward to is not the old guys like me, but the very young guys who will fly this fantastic new capability.  The older generation may have a harder time unleashing the power and potential of the new gear – the new capabilities.  We might say “why don’t you do it this way” when that approach might be exactly the wrong thing to do from a capabilities standpoint.

My sense is the young guys will blend. We’ve already picked the first Prowler pilot to go be an F35 guy.  He’s going to do great and he’s going to add perspective and attitude to the tribe down at Eglin getting ready to fly the jet that’s going to make a big impact on the F35 community.

I think it’s going to be the new generation, the newbies that are in the training command right now that are getting ready to go fly the F35, who are going to unleash the capabilities of this jet.  They will say, “Hey, this is what the system will give me.  Don’t cap me; don’t box me.   This is what this thing can do, this is how we can best employ the machine, its agility its sensors to support the guy on the ground, our MEU Commanders and our Combatant Commanders and this is what we should do with it to make it effective.”

Building Blocks for a New US Military Space Policy

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Building Blocks for a New US Military Space Policy
10/03/2011

By Dr. Robbin Laird

10/03/2011 – The Administration has issued a thoughtful new military space policy.  At the heart of the new national security strategy is a stated objective of providing for improved U.S. space capabilities.  Although articulate, looking for achievements, which actually implement the new strategy, are a bit hard to find.

Leveraging new military platforms and capabilities in the commercial space sector can put in play building blocks for a new military space policy (Credit for image: Bigstock)
Leveraging new military platforms and capabilities in the commercial space sector can put in play building blocks for a new military space policy (Credit for image: Bigstock)

Innovation in a constricted financial environment is especially challenging.  Yet it can be done, if hard decisions are made to terminate what can no longer be afforded, if other military platforms are leveraged in a comprehensive C4ISR D strategy, partnering with commercial and allied offerings pursued in a realistic policy environment, and a distributed architecture pursued whereby capabilities emerge from the elements of a deployed capability, rather than trying for a costly comprehensive architecture which requires proprietary funding to support the end to end effort.  Leveraging other people’s money, whether commercial or foreign space, or other Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence and Decision Making Support or C4ISR D platforms is essential for an affordable, capable military space strategy.

The mix can well drive innovation and match quality of shaping a de factor distributed space architecture. Overcoming stove piped programs, and challenging DOD and the intelligence community to OPERATE outside the box is crucial.  Simply contemplating change is not adequate.  Engaging in organizational innovation is at the heart of today’s technological innovation. Money can be freed up to support needs revealed by organizational innovation and core needs, which emerge at the edge of overlapping capabilities.

First, hard decisions need to be made concerning termination.  The EELV program is unaffordable, and the notion of two launch families being supported in a diminishing demand driven environment makes no sense.  United Launch Alliance needs to become Un-united Launch Alliance and single vendor chosen.  The backup launcher for national security space is clearly at hand as well, namely the Ariane V.  Arianespace can provide a backup capability to DOD to ensure reliable launch after one of the two launch families is eliminated from the EELV program.

Second, the Space X revolution needs to be put into context.  Although DOD seems willing to use undeveloped and untested Space X products, the reality is that when DOD takes its unique satellites to a launch customer, the Department spends a great deal of time regulating the relationship to ensure reliability.  This requirement will make it hard for Space X to become easily the next EELV launcher, but if this can happen then Arianespace can still remain the service providing a backup capability whilst the Administration engages in innovation with Space X or other vendors able to deliver lower launch costs.

Third, money needs to be saved in part to continue support for a core robotic vehicle, which can provide top end capability for the C4ISR D enterprise.  The X-34B promises some core breakthrough capabilities for the deployed warfighter and the insertion of force.  The X-34B as an operating robotic vehicle provides capabialities not available with fixed launchers.  But if savings are not found from the fixed launcher programs, it will be difficult to fund this breakthrough capability.

Fourth, space provides a significant contribution to C4ISR D or data for decision-making.  Yet the unmanned revolution as well as the fifth generation aircraft is game changers in providing data for deployed decision makers.  And the role of hoisted payloads in supporting UAVs has become evident in the Afghanistan operation.  The new capabilities can provide a re-think about how to leverage commercial space, notably hoisted payloads, in supporting air-breathing C4ISR D assets.

The role of proprietary military space becomes a default capability: what CAN NOT be provided by the powerful conjunction of air breathing assets and commercial satellite capabilities?  The relatively un-agile DOD structure would then be put on notice to identify programs that are needed which can interact with such a conjunctive capability, but provide unique and core capabilities UNABLE to be generated either by air breathing military assets of the commercial space, notably hoisted payloads structure.

Savings would come from both sources.

First, DOD would have to ACT outside the box in leveraging its investments in unmanned and manned aerospace assets.  The deployment of the F-35 will provide game-changing ISR capabilities, which can be harvested to reshape the C4ISR D structure.

Second, the evolution of satellite capabilities in the commercial sector provides significant cost investments, which DOD does NOT need to make.  DOD by shaping long-term contractual service relationships can save scarce investment capital.  But this requires DOD to think and contract long term, not one of its core competencies.

Such an approach facilitates a strategic re-think, which parallels what we are doing with fifth generation aircraft.  The focus is upon distributed operations and shaping a honeycomb of decision-making supporting the deployed warfighter.  Such a focus allows one to tap into the emerging thinking about shaping a disaggregated strategy whereby space policy makers look to focus on overall capabilities from the enterprise rather than concentration of capabilities on single point of failure platforms.

Disaggregation and distributed operations further highlights the opportunity to build smaller payloads and to operate across a variety of launch platforms.  By reducing the cost impact of a launch failure and its impact on expensive and complicated satellites, innovation is enhanced as well.  With a diversity of assets distributed across the space enterprise, and leveraging commercial space and air-breathing assets, innovation and cost effectiveness are enabled.

Without such an entrepreneurial quality to managing the space enterprise, DOD will remain stuck in the last century with diminishing assets and capabilities.  Such an outcome cannot be in the national interest.

This piece first appeared in Space News (August 8, 2011).

This is a contribution to the Strategic Whiteboard.