The Taiwan Triangle

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on The Taiwan Triangle
09/28/2011
There are many ways to manage this "gap" militarily for the United States. One way would be to focus on any PRC action on the model of the Battle of the Bulge

By Dr. Richard Weitz

09/28/2011 – The current flap over the planned U.S. armed sales to Taiwan was entirely predictable. As long as Beijing insists on exercising control over Taiwan, the Taiwanese people insist on their right to exercise their political autonomy, and Washington insists on providing Taiwan with weapons to reassure Taipei and deter a PRC attack, the Taiwan situation will remain an insuperable obstacle to better Sino-American ties. This Taiwan triangle almost obliges the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the U.S. Department of Defense to perceive one another as potential military adversaries.

There are many ways to manage this "gap" militarily for the United States. One way would be to focus on any PRC action on the model of the Battle of the Bulge, a concept to be developed in a forthcoming piece from Ed Timperlake. (Credit Graphic: Bigstock)There are many ways to manage this “gap” militarily for the United States.  One way would be to focus on any PRC action on the model of the Battle of the Bulge, a concept to be developed in a forthcoming piece from Ed Timperlake. (Credit Graphic: Bigstock)

According to the Pentagon’s latest Chinese military power report, the PLA’s modernization drive is shifting the military balance between the mainland and Taiwan further in the PRC’s favor.

Although tensions between Beijing and Taipei have decreased following the March 2008 election of a new Taiwanese government led by President Ma Ying-jeou more committed to improving cross-Strait relations, the PLA is still seeking through its military build-up to deter Taiwan from declaring independence as well as to acquire the means to coerce Taipei to accept Beijing’s terms for the resolution of any cross-Strait dispute. To this end, the PLA is pursuing capabilities both to defeat Taiwan in any military confrontation and to “deter, delay, or deny” potential U.S. military intervention on Taipei’s behalf.

Although the United States severed its formal defense alliance with Taipei when it recognized the PRC in 1979, the American government has continued to sell arms to Taipei under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8, 1979). Denying any attempt to contain China, U.S. officials have justified these weapons sales on the grounds that they help sustain the peaceful status quo in the Straits by balancing the PLA’s growing capabilities and thereby discouraging any PLA attempt to conquer Taiwan by force.

Ironically, after Washington decided to reorient relations from Taipei to Beijing, Taiwan has become a more attractive partner for many Americans. Its previously authoritarian government has instituted many political and economic reforms, including transitioning to a completely democratic political system in which multiple parties compete and win free and fair elections. Washington has feared that declining to assist the Taiwanese military would encourage Beijing to adopt more aggressive policies toward Taipei, increasing the risks of a Sino-American confrontation through miscalculation and inflicting a major economic shock on the PRC, Taiwan, the United States, and other countries. Less publicly, they also feared, particularly during the 1980s, that stopping arms sales or breaking additional security ties with Taiwan could have the unwelcome effect of prompting a panicky Taipei to pursue nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, or other destabilizing strategic weapons.

In contrast, PRC officials believe that the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan encourage the growth of pro-independence sentiment on the island and thereby increase international tensions and the risks of war. Chinese government white papers warn that U.S.-Taiwan relations remain a continuing obstacle to better Sino-American defense ties. They accuse the United States of stoking cross-Strait tensions by continuing “to sell arms to Taiwan in violation of the principles established in the three Sino-US joint communiqués, causing serious harm to Sino-US relations as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.”

In fact, one of the prime drivers of the PLAN’s sustained military modernization program is to improve its ability to fight the U.S.-supplied Taiwanese defense forces if necessary. Due to the U.S. defense commitment to assist Taiwan, the PRC has been preparing to fight not only Taiwan, but also the United States, in any cross-Strait conflict.

The most prominent objective of the PRC’s military buildup appears to be developing “access denial” capabilities to inhibit U.S. intervention in the event of conflict with Taiwan. Such a strategy involves deterring through threats or disrupting by attack any U.S. naval force coming to Taiwan’s immediate aid. The PLAN’s emphasis on attack submarines, long-range missiles, and improved fighter planes all increase the risks to any U.S. naval task force sent to defend Taiwan.

The major obstacle impeding cross-Strait relations is the different interpretation by each side of the “One China Principle.” For PRC leaders, “One China” means that Taiwan is a province of China and the PRC is the sole legitimate government representing all of China.

In this construct, while Taiwan can enjoy some autonomy in local affairs, as a province of the PRC, it can participate in the international arena only as a local government and not as a full-fledged political entity in international organizations such as the United Nations. For many Taiwanese, one China simply refers to the considerable cultural and historical ties binding their island to the mainland, but does not mandate Taiwan’s political subordination to a physically and politically distant regime in Beijing.

Although PRC leaders have tenaciously adhered to the principles of cross-Strait reunification and one-China, the content of the specific policies the PRC has employed to achieve them have varied somewhat over time.

As a general trend, the PRC has been making fewer military threats in recent years. Whereas Beijing used to constantly warn Taiwan’s political leaders not to take some controversial action at the risk of precipitating some violent confrontation, PRC officials now try to offer more positive inducements to influence Taiwan’s policies. Most recently, these carrots have included agreeing to the three direct links (direct flights, post service, and shipping) and negotiating a free trade agreement with Taiwan.

In addition, the PRC has never proposed a rigid timetable for unification. Nonetheless, on March 14, 2005, the National People’s Congress (the PRC’s highest legislative body) adopted a controversial Anti-Secession Law that authorizes the use of military force if necessary to prevent the “Taiwan independence secessionist forces” from undermining the territorial integrity of the one China.  At the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, President Hu supplemented the three major principles – the one China principle, the “one country two systems” formula, and peaceful national reunification – that were inherited from Jiang Zemin-era with Hu’s “four nevers” in his political report to the Congress: “We will never waver in our commitment to the one-China principle, never abandon our efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, never change the policy of placing our hopes on the people in Taiwan and never compromise in our opposition to the secessionist activities aimed at Taiwan independence.”

Sino-American differences over Taiwan have precipitated several downturns in U.S.-PRC military relations. Chinese officials have repeatedly suspended various military exchanges and other defense contacts with the DoD in retaliation for major U.S. arms exports to Taiwan. Even when these bilateral defense dialogues do occur, PRC representatives have consistently berated their U.S. counterparts for their security ties to Taiwan.

The PLA has also conducted major military exercises after Taiwan or the United States has taken some action that Beijing strongly objects to, such as selling sophisticated weapons to Taiwan. These recurring confrontations over Taiwan arms sales and other Taiwan-U.S. political and defense ties have in turn proved problematic for the limited range of confidence-building and security mechanisms that China and the United States have established.

Further defense exchanges or confidence-building measures cannot by themselves overcome what both sides view as fundamentally issues of principle—preserving regional security and Taiwanese civil liberties for the Americans, and defending their national sovereignty and rights as an emerging great power for the Chinese.

Perhaps the most serious crisis occurred after the U.S. government reluctantly, due to congressional pressure, permitted Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui to make a private visit to speak at Cornell University, his alma mater, in June 1995. PLA authorities claimed the U.S. action gravely damaged their bilateral relations and recalled its U.S. ambassador, Li Daoyu, from Washington.

More seriously, from July 1995 to March 1996, the PLA staged six massive military exercises in the Straits, including firing ballistic missiles close to Taiwan’s major seaports. Whatever its reservations about Lee, the Clinton administration by March 1996 felt compelled to react more vigorously after the PLA conducted an escalating series of missile launches, amphibious operations, and live-fire demonstrations near Taiwan. Washington deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups around Taiwan. The purpose was both to affirm U.S. support for the island as well as to demonstrate Washington’s readiness to use limited military force when necessary to uphold American interests. While PRC authorities denounced the American actions, the PLA soon ceased their threatening activities toward Taiwan.

Shortly thereafter, the Taiwanese reelected Lee as president. Even so, Chinese officials continued to complain that the administration had precipitated the Taiwan crisis by allowing President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States. They also objected to growing Japanese-American security cooperation, which Chinese analysts feared might affect a Taiwan scenario, with Japan indirectly supporting American military intervention on Taipei’s behalf.

The PRC again froze U.S.-Chinese defense relations after the Bush administration notified Congress in the fall of 2008 of its plans to sell Taiwan $6.5 billion in military equipment, the largest U.S. arms sale to Taiwan in history. Chinese authorities refused to allow U.S. Navy ships to call at Chinese ports. They also suspended high-level exchanges between the PLA and the DoD and froze official China-U.S. meetings on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and WMD nonproliferation—effectively canceling or suspending almost a dozen Sino-American defense exchanges.  PRC-U.S. military ties remained largely frozen for the remainder of the Bush administration, which otherwise saw tolerably good overall relations between the PRC and the United States and improved ties between Beijing and Taipei following the March 2008 election of a new Taiwanese government led by President Ma Ying-jeou more committed to improving cross-Strait relations.

The Obama administration has correctly decided to risk another temporary freezing of high-level Sino-U.S. military ties rather than being held hostage by Chinese threats.

PRC policy makers clearly see the bilateral defense relationship as something that Washington wants more than Beijing.

For military engagement between China and the United States to be successful, the PRC leadership must understand that the exchanges are not a source of leverage that China can employ to pry U.S. concessions.

These Guys are in the Fight

Posted on | by SysAdmin

By David Smith

09/28/2011 – For a week last month, US Marines of the 2nd Combat Engineering Battalion and Georgian soldiers of the 33rd Infantry Battalion joined forces in Operation Black Sand in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.  Deployed to Combat Outpost (COP) Shukvani, they cleared the Ladar Bazaar of improvised explosive devices—bombs.  Insurgents had taken over the bazaar, depriving local people of a real market in which to buy and sell everyday goods.  Now, Americans and Georgians are building a new market for the people.  Operation Black Sand is just one example of how Georgian forces are ready, willing and able to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with US Marines in one of the toughest areas of Afghanistan.

SHUKVANI, Helmand province, Afghanistan - Illumination rounds light up the night sky around the Ladar Bazaar helping the Marines to pinpoint enemy positions. The Marines and sailors of 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, partnered with the Republic of Georgia’s 33rd Light Infantry Battalion, leveled the marketplace to ensure the security of area for local residents. (Credit: 2nd Marine Division, 8/6/2011)SHUKVANI, Helmand province, Afghanistan – Illumination rounds light up the night sky around the Ladar Bazaar helping the Marines to pinpoint enemy positions. The Marines and sailors of 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, partnered with the Republic of Georgia’s 33rd Light Infantry Battalion, leveled the marketplace to ensure the security of area for local residents. (Credit: 2nd Marine Division, 8/6/2011)

The flags of Afghanistan, America and Georgia fly over COP Shukvani.  The remote, spartan base is named for First Lieutenant Mukhran Shukvani of the Georgian 31st Infantry Battalion, whose story is told in the September issue of Marine Corps Gazette, a professional journal of the US Marines.

It was September 5, 2010.  “In the hot, dry hills northwest of Sangin,” writes the Gazette, “1Lt Shukvani was pushing a small team of Georgian soldiers forward from their dismount position in search of a future patrol base…As 1Lt Shukvani and his team crested one ridge line, they came under small arms fire from well concealed enemy positions…As the company commander rose to determine exactly where the enemy was located, a well-aimed round caught him just above his body armor.”  COP Shukvani is the small base that American Marines and Georgian soldiers staked out later that day.

The Gazette asks, “How did 1Lt Shukvani and his soldiers come to be in the treacherous hills of Helmand Province?”  A year before Shukvani’s death, Georgia volunteered to do more than its fair share as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  “The Georgian Government had a small number of ‘national caveats’ that had to be honored” if it was to participate in ISAF.  Usually, “national caveats” are restrictions on the use of forces from various countries—cannot leave a certain geographic area, cannot conduct offensive operations, cannot operate at night, etc.—that hobble commanders on the ground.

In contrast, writes the Gazette, “The Georgians wanted to train for, and execute, a counterinsurgency (COIN) mission in a full-spectrum operational environment.”  In other words, Georgia insisted on taking a full (and dangerous) combat role.  Furthermore, Georgia insisted that its units would operate under command of the US Marine Corps.  They wanted to serve at the side of the world’s finest fighting force.

SHUKVANI, Helmand province, Afghanistan - The Republic of Georgia’s 33rd Light Infantry Battalion provides a security cordon around the Ladar Bazaar as an assault breaching vehicle with 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion moves into position. Second CEB cleared the marketplace of the IED threat that plagued the local residents. (Credit: 2nd Marine Division)
SHUKVANI, Helmand province, Afghanistan - The Republic of Georgia’s 33rd Light Infantry Battalion provides a security cordon around the Ladar Bazaar as an assault breaching vehicle with 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion moves into position. Second CEB cleared the marketplace of the IED threat that plagued the local residents. (Credit: 2nd Marine Division)

The Marine Georgia Training Team arrived in Georgia to train the 31st Battalion at the Krtsanisi Training Area and the Vaziani base, both near Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital.  Their objectives were to train Georgian infantry units in complex operations and full operational capabilities and to develop the professionalism of Georgian sergeants.  Moreover, the Marines set out to transition the training from American to Georgian hands.  Today, writes the Gazette, “Georgians actually provide the training in many of these cases with Marines only providing quality control or sharing the latest tactics, techniques and procedures from Afghanistan.”

 

After training in Georgia, each Afghanistan-bound Georgian battalion completes the cycle with a mission rehearsal exercise in Hohenfels, Germany.  In an environment in which all politics must be laid aside, the US Marine Corps takes responsibility to certify that the Georgian unit is deployment ready.  You can bet that the Marines undertake this task very seriously—if they are wrong, Marines could die.

In training and in real wartime experience in Afghanistan, the Marines have come to respect their Georgian allies—and Marines are not people to give idle praise.

“These guys are in the fight, they want to fight and they want us to teach them how to fight, which is the beauty of it,” Major Andrew Del Gaudio, then top Marine trainer in Georgia, said in the April 6 edition of another publication, the Marine Corps Times.

“They’re really good troops,” Major General Richard Mills, former Marine commander in Afghanistan, told the Marine Corps Times. “Their officers tend to lead from the front and tend to expose themselves often to danger. They’ve taken some casualties, and yet they have remained focused and remained on task and bounced back very, very quickly.”

General Mills could have been referring to Lt Shukvani.

“They are not afraid to fight and they know their tactics,” said Carlton Kent the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. “They’re side by side with us over there, and the Marines who are over there with them say positive things about them.  They are sacrificing just like everyone else.  They are pulling their load.”

That is big stuff coming from the top Marine sergeant!

Of course, there are problems also.  Mills points to deficiencies in communications and logistics.  However, writes the Gazette, “The most significant issue has been equipping Georgian battalions for full-spectrum COIN operations in a manner commensurate with their tactical tasks.”

That is a problem that ought to be fixed for a force that is ready, willing and able—or so say the US Marines!

And may God bless Mukhran Shukvani.

David J. Smith is Director, Georgian Security Analysis Center, Tbilisi, and Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington.

http://www.gfsis.org/media/download/GSAC/Articles/These_Guys_Are_in_the_Fight.pdf

Rear Admiral Lee: The Sound Side of Things

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Rear Admiral Lee: The Sound Side of Things
09/27/2011
Rear Admiral Lee During the SLD Interview (Credit: SLD)

09/27/2011 – The Second Line of Defense team sat down with Rear Admiral Lee to discuss his district, which runs from New Jersey through North Carolina.  We met with him shortly before Hurricane Irene hammered the East Coast and many of the areas affected were in his district.

Rear Admiral Lee During the SLD Interview (Credit: SLD)
Rear Admiral Lee During the SLD Interview (Credit: SLD)

Rear Admiral Lee was very visible on the media during this storm and for those of us affected badly by this storm, his leadership was deeply appreciated.  While media were seen standing on the wrong side of where the storm did damage, Rear Admiral Lee and his team understood the sound-side flooding impacts of such a storm.

Rear Admiral Lee became Commander of the 5th District earlier this year.  Rear Admiral Lee’s prior operational assignments include: Commander, Deployable Operations Group (2009-2010); Commander, Sector North Carolina (2005-2007); Commander, Coast Guard Group Fort Macon (2000-2003); Commander, Group Monterey, California (1995-1997); Commanding Officer, Station Atlantic City, New Jersey (1988-1991); and Assistant Operations Officer at Group St. Petersburg, Florida (1981-1984).

His most noteworthy and personally satisfying staff assignment was as the Chief, Office of Boat Forces at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC from 2003 to 2005. His responsibilities included program management and oversight of the Coast Guard’s 1,800 boats, including the development of operational doctrine, training requirements, and safety parameters related thereto. His duties also included oversight of the National Motor Lifeboat School, the only training facility in the nation specifically dedicated to Heavy Weather boat operations and Surf Training.

http://www.uscg.mil/d5/commander.asp

SLD: Could you give us a sense of the area covered by the District and some of the challenges faced in the district?

Rear Admiral Lee: My AOR (Area Of Responsibility) is from New Jersey down through and including North Carolina. I have the mid-Atlantic region of the East Coast including 1.5 million square miles of the Atlantic Ocean. Unlike some other Districts which you have already visited, I don’t contend with the significant alien migration and drug trafficking issues common to my counterparts on the southeastern and southwestern borders.

That said, I do however have a unique mission up in the National Capital Region; a mission which none of the others have – Rotary Wing Air Intercept. In this capacity, I play a supporting role to the Northern Command (Northcom) by providing our MH-65D helos to intercept low and slow airborne intruders in the restricted air space around Washington DC. In short, we are part of the layered defense in the region, and we are extremely proud to be part of the interagency team that makes this all happen.

SLD: Could you talk about the challenges off of North Carolina?

Rear Admiral Lee: It is called the “graveyard of the Atlantic” and for good reason. The outer banks of North Carolina are notoriously treacherous given the shoals extending miles into the sea off Cape Hatteras, Cape Lookout, and Cape Fear. There are few places to seek refuge for deep draft vessels when things go bad – particularly in the area between Cape Lookout and Cape Hatteras; leading to a considerable number of high-end search and rescue cases. Some of these cases push our people and our assets to the limits.

Upgrades in rescue equipment and sensors have improved our Search and Rescue efforts in the AOR. Our helicopters are more powerful and have better sensors (MH-65D). Our radio towers have better coverage, overlap, redundancy and can “hear” further off the coast (R-21). Our rescue boats are bigger and more capable (47’s & RBMs). The Fishing Vessel SHEILA RENEA case on January 2nd, 2010 is an example of our sensors, equipment and personnel working together near Oregon Inlet to save the lives of 3 fishermen last winter.

(For a discussion of the impact of new assets on USCG operations in the East Coast see

https://www.sldinfo.com/the-role-of-the-c130s-for-the-uscg/

https://www.sldinfo.com/uscg-rescue-off-of-cape-hatteras/

https://www.sldinfo.com/dramatic-uscg-rescue-shows-impact-of-new-c4isr-systems/).

SLD: To do the missions in your District what new capabilities would you like to have available?

Rear Admiral Lee: There are many needs; too many to address off the cuff. The first that comes to mind involves the mission in the National Capital Region. I need to provide my pilots in the NCR with the technology used by fighter jets to intercept aircraft who have intruded into the restricted air space. The current method of vectoring them in by radio is archaic, outdated, and I submit – dangerous.

As for surface vessels, we are currently looking ahead at the next generation of response boats to replace the aging fleet of 25 footers currently running nationwide.

SLD: What about the fisheries challenges in the District?

Rear Admiral Lee: We are an integral part of the East Coast fishing consortium; we work closely with NOAA, NMFS, and the commercial fleet to ensure, as best we can, that the regulations are appropriately enforced, while not crossing the line into what some would call “excessive enforcement”. We are always mindful of the fact that the men and women engaged in this dangerous trade are working hard to make a living in an industry that has taken some hard hits over the years – fuel prices and dwindling stocks notwithstanding.

However, without Coast Guard enforcement efforts, certain species would likely be over-fished to the point that the entire industry could collapse, and the American public would no longer enjoy access to plentiful seafood. It’s a delicate balance.

SLD: Could you talk about your role in tending the waterways?

Rear Admiral Lee: We mark the nation’s waterways much like the highway department marks our highways. This is what keeps commerce flowing in and out of our major ports. Without access to the ports, the economic engine of our country would soon come to a grinding halt. We exist, by and large, on trade and more goods are carried by ship than any other mode of transportation. We accomplish this mission with an aging fleet of buoy tenders, constructions tenders, and small boats. It is an un-sexy, under-recognized, and under-promoted mission that we do everyday — day in and day out. I simply can’t overemphasize the impact that this critical mission has on the nation’s commerce.

(For an earlier posting of the economic impact of these USCG activities see

https://www.sldinfo.com/the-economic-impact-of-the-uscg-an-interview-with-rear-admiral-lee/.

SLD: And this is a constant activity, one requiring monitoring and re-setting the buoys when, for example, storms come through?

Rear Admiral Lee: Yes, it is definitely not a “one-of” activity. When we have a hurricane come through, it does two things. It can blow your aids to navigation away, or change the channels so those aids that remain no longer are accurate.

We can’t allow ships to start coming into port and off-loading their cargo until we have verified that there is in fact a shipping lane for them to safely transit through.

As you know, Wal-Mart and most of America has now shifted to a new business model which relies on “just-in-time” delivery. For every day we hold a ship offshore at anchorage waiting for the waterway to open; it costs the shipper tens of thousands of dollars. It quickly adds up as more and more ships arrive off the coast waiting for the channel to open. As the line backs up, people ashore quickly start to feel the effects.

For example, you have the local contractor waiting for the Italian tile that he needs to finish the house down the street. No tile, no work for his crew. You can replicate this example across the spectrum of commodities. You see? The impact can be global when the supply chain is interrupted. That’s how critical our ports are; and that’s why the aids to navigation mission is so critical to the nation.

SLD: Could you discuss some of your environmental enforcement activities?

Rear Admiral Lee: Part of our job is protecting people from the ocean, and the ocean from the people. To that end, we do a lot of things, some of which are little known and seldom publicized. An example is the prosecution of “magic pipes.” I hate magic pipes. A magic pipe is an implement devised by certain unscrupulous operators that is used for the specific purpose of bypassing machinery designed to separate oil and other waste in the bilges from what they pump into the ocean.

By using a magic pipe, the operator is seeking to by-pass a functioning oily-water separator (to save time and money). The magic pipe shoots the oily waste directly overboard into the ocean. We catch a number of folks doing this each year. Last year we had 4 or 5 successful prosecutions. And the fines can be in the millions. Nothing to sneeze at.

SLD: It sounds like you enjoy your job a lot.

Rear Admiral Lee: I absolutely do, we are doing vital missions very well with great people; it’s a joy coming to work every day. Being on duty around the clock would be a chore in some jobs, but not this one. This is pure privilege.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Second Line of Defense team sat down with Rear Admiral Lee to discuss his district, which runs from New Jersey through North Carolina. We met with him shortly before Hurricane Irene hammered the East Coast and many of the areas affected were in his district.

Rear Admiral Lee was very visible on the media during this storm and for those of us affected badly by this storm, his leadership was deeply appreciated. While media were seen standing on the wrong side of where the storm did damage, Rear Admiral Lee and his team understood the sound-side flooding impacts of such a storm. Figure 1 Rear Admiral Lee During the SLD Interview Credit: SLD

Rear Admiral Lee became Commander of the 5th District earlier this year. Rear Admiral Lee’s prior operational assignments include: Commander, Deployable Operations Group (2009-2010); Commander, Sector North Carolina (2005-2007); Commander, Coast Guard Group Fort Macon (2000-2003); Commander, Group Monterey, California (1995-1997); Commanding Officer, Station Atlantic City, New Jersey (1988-1991); and Assistant Operations Officer at Group St. Petersburg, Florida (1981-1984).

His most noteworthy and personally satisfying staff assignment was as the Chief, Office of Boat Forces at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC from 2003 to 2005. His responsibilities included program management and oversight of the Coast Guard’s 1,800 boats, including the development of operational doctrine, training requirements, and safety parameters related thereto. His duties also included oversight of the National Motor Lifeboat School, the only training facility in the nation specifically dedicated to Heavy Weather boat operations and Surf Training.

http://www.uscg.mil/d5/commander.asp

SLD: Could you give us a sense of the area covered by the District and some of the challenges faced in the district?

Rear Admiral Lee: My AOR (Area Of Responsibility) is from New Jersey down through and including North Carolina. I have the mid-Atlantic region of the East Coast including 1.5 million square miles of the Atlantic Ocean. Unlike some other Districts which you have already visited, I don’t have to contend with the alien migration and drug trafficking issues common to my counterparts on the southeastern and southwestern borders.

That said, I do however have a unique mission up in the National Capital Region; a mission which none of the others have – Rotary Wing Air Intercept. In this capacity, I play a supporting role to the Northern Command (Northcom) by providing our MH-65D helos to intercept low and slow airborne intruders in the restricted air space around Washington DC. In short, we are part of the layered defense in the region.

 

SLD: Could you talk about the challenges off of North Carolina?

Rear Admiral Lee: It is called the “graveyard of the Atlantic” and for good reason. The outer banks of North Carolina are notoriously treacherous given the shoals extending miles into the sea off Cape Hatteras, Cape Lookout, and Cape Fear. There are few places to seek refuge for deep draft vessels when things go bad – particularly in the area between Cape Lookout and Cape Hatteras; leading to a considerable number of high-end search and rescue cases. Some of these cases push our people and our assets to the limits.

Upgrades in rescue equipment and sensors have improved our Search and Rescue efforts in the AOR. Our helicopters are more powerful and have better sensors (MH-65D). Our radio towers have better coverage, overlap, redundancy and can “hear” further off the coast (R-21). Our rescue boats are bigger and more capable (47’s & RBMs). The Fishing Vessel SHEILA RENEA case on January 2nd, 2010 is an example of our sensors, equipment and personnel working together near Oregon Inlet to save the lives of 3 fishermen last winter.

(For a discussion of the impact of new assets on USCG operations in the East Coast see

https://www.sldinfo.com/the-role-of-the-c130s-for-the-uscg/

https://www.sldinfo.com/uscg-rescue-off-of-cape-hatteras/

https://www.sldinfo.com/dramatic-uscg-rescue-shows-impact-of-new-c4isr-systems/).

SLD: To do the missions in your District what new capabilities would you like to have available?

Rear Admiral Lee: I need to provide my pilots in the NCR with the technology used by fighter jets to intercept aircraft who have intruded into the restricted air space. The current method of vectoring them in by radio is archaic, outdated, and I submit – dangerous.

As for surface vessels, we are currently looking ahead at the next generation of response boats to replace the aging fleet of 25 footers currently running nationwide.

SLD: What about the fisheries challenges in the District?

Rear Admiral Lee: We are an integral part of the East Coast fishing consortium; we work closely with NOAA, NMFS, and the commercial fleet to ensure, as best we can, that the regulations are appropriately enforced, while not crossing the line into what some would call “excessive enforcement”. We are always mindful of the fact that the men and women engaged in this dangerous trade are working hard to make a living in an industry that has taken some hard hits over the years – fuel prices and dwindling stocks notwithstanding.

However, without Coast Guard enforcement efforts, certain species would likely be over-fished to the point that the entire industry could collapse, and the American public would no longer enjoy access to plentiful seafood. It’s a delicate balance.

SLD: Could you talk about your role in tending the waterways?

Rear Admiral Lee: We mark the nation’s waterways with buoys and day boards much like the highway department marks our highways. This is what keeps commerce flowing in and out of our major ports. Without access to the ports, the economic engine of our country would soon come to a grinding halt. We exist, by and large, on trade … and more goods are carried by ship than any other mode of transportation. We accomplish this mission with an aging fleet of buoy tenders, constructions tenders, and small boats. In short, it is one of those un-sexy, under-recognized, and under-promoted missions that we do everyday — day in and day out. It is critical to our nation’s commerce.

SLD: And this is a constant activity, one requiring monitoring and re-setting the buoys when, for example, storms come through?

Rear Admiral Lee: Yes, it is definitely not a one-off activity. When we have a hurricane come through, it does two things. It can blow your aids to navigation away, or change the channels so those aids that remain no longer are accurate.

We can’t allow ships to start coming into port and off-loading their cargo until we have verified that there is in fact a shipping lane for them to safely transit through.

As you know, Wal-Mart and most of America has now shifted to a new business model whereby it’s “just-in-time” delivery. For every day we hold a ship offshore at anchorage waiting for the waterway to open; it costs the shipper tens of thousands of dollars depending on what the cargo is. It quickly adds up as more and more ships arrive off the coast waiting for the channel to open.

For example, you have the local guy waiting for tile that he needs to build the house down the street because it’s just-in-time delivery for that particular kind of tile coming from Italy. No tile, no work for his crew. You can replicate this example across the spectrum of commodities. You see? The impact can be global when the supply chain is interrupted. That’s how critical our ports are; and that’s why the aids to navigation mission are very important to us.

SLD: Could you discuss some of your environmental enforcement activities?

Rear Admiral Lee: Part of our job is protecting people from the ocean, and the ocean from the people. To that end, we do a lot of things, some of which are little known and seldom publicized. An example is what we prosecution of “magic pipes.” I hate magic pipes. A magic pipe is an implement devised by certain unscrupulous operators that is used for the specific purpose of bypassing machinery designed to separate oil and other waste in the bilges from what they pump into the ocean.

By using a magic pipe, the operator is seeking to by-pass a functioning oily-water separator (to save time and money). The magic pipe shoots the oily waste directly overboard into the ocean. We catch a number of folks doing this each year. Last year we had 4 or 5 successful prosecutions. And the fines can be in the millions. Nothing to sneeze at.

SLD: It sounds like you enjoy your job a lot.

Rear Admiral Lee: I absolutely do, we are doing vital missions very well with great people; it’s a joy coming to work every day. Being on duty around the clock would be a chore in some jobs, but not this one. This is pure privilege.

Leveraging New Platforms During the Strategic Transition

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Leveraging New Platforms During the Strategic Transition
09/26/2011

By Dr. Robbin Laird

09/26/2011 – The United States is facing twin pressures of fiscal constraints and a drawdown and withdrawal from Afghanistan.  The first highlights the need to reduce budgets; the second focuses upon the re-configuration of US forces.

The need to reduce budgets in the context of a significant drawdown can be met in significant part by removing the two billion dollar a week cost to operate in Afghanistan.  The logistics costs in Afghanistan alone have diverted money from investment accounts and have frozen US forces into a force in being to manage territory.  Cost savings from withdrawal need to be conjoined with a significant re-configuration of forces as withdrawal unfolds.  Indeed, one could argue that the withdrawal and the re-configuration of Big Army are closely connected.  Indeed if Secretary Panetta can manage it, the withdrawal, downsizing and reconfiguration of Big Army is really at the heart of structural redesign of US forces.

(Credit: SLD)(Credit: SLD)

US forces need to become more agile, flexible, and global in order to work with allies and partners to deal with evolving global realities.  Protecting access points, the global conveyer of goods and services, ensuring an ability to work with global partners in having access to commodities, shaping insertion forces which can pursue terrorist elements wherever necessary, and partnering support with global players all require a re-enforced maritime and air capability.  This means a priority for the USCG, USN, USMC and the US Air Force in the re-configuring effort.  Balanced force structure reduction makes no sense because the force structure was re-designed for land wars that the US will not engage in the decade ahead.  The US Army can be recast by the overall effort to shape new power projection capabilities and competencies in the decade ahead.

Retiring older USN, USMC, and USAF systems, which are logistical money hogs and high maintenance, can shape affordability.  Core new systems can be leveraged to shape a pull rather than a push transition strategy. Fortunately, the country is already building these new systems and is in a position to shape an effective transition to a more affordable power projection capability.

At the heart of the approach is to move from the platform-centric focus where the cost of a new product is considered the debate point; rather the value of new systems and their ability to be conjoined is the focal point.  No platform fights alone is the mantra; and core recognition of how the new platforms work with one another to shape collaborative con-ops and capabilities is central to a strategic re-design of US forces.

A good illustration of this approach can be seen with regard to crafting 21st century air capabilities. 21st century air capabilities are built around the three “M”s.  The aircraft need to be multi-mission and manufactured to be significantly more maintainable than 20th century aircraft.

In today’s world, the acquisition of aircraft in financially stringent environments favors multi-mission platforms.  The U.S. and allied air forces are buying less aircraft and a smaller variety of aircraft.  The expectation is that the aircraft purchased will do more than their core specialty.

There is an expectation that if I buy an airlifter it will do more than airlift.  It will be able to refuel, it will be able to deliver in the air lethal and non-lethal weapons out of the back of the aircraft, it will be able to become a C2 aircraft if needed, etc.

The second M is maintainability.  New platforms are built with a significant amount of attention to how to enhance their ability to be maintained over time.  When platforms were built thirty years ago, logistics support was an afterthought.  No it is a core element of determining successful outcomes to the manufacturing process.

Sustainability is a core requirement for 21st century air forces and air operations. Sustainability is a combination of logistics and maintainability considerations combined.  Designing a more sustainable product, which can operate fleet wide, should be one of the very core procurement principles.

But it does not even exist on the playing field.  The questionable notion of life-cycle costs is used but has little or nor real meaning as key drivers of life cycle costs are often outside of the domain of a platform considered by itself or fleet wide.

Additionally, one needs to buy Fleetwide.  Savings will come from pooling resources, something that cannot happen if you buy a gaggle of aircraft, rather than operating a common fleet.  Just ask Fed Ex what commonality for their fleet delivers in terms of performance and savings.

The final M is manufacturability.  Briefing slides and simulations are not the same thing as a finished good of high quality and of high reliability.  Here you need a trained workforce, good engineering practices and an ability to deliver a product of high quality and standards.  It is challenging to build new systems and not every manufacturer is created equal.

A core element of today’s manufacturing systems is the challenge of managing extended supply chains.  And these supply chains are subject to disruptions and the need to manage those disruptions.

An excellent example of how to leverage what you are buying for the evolution of overall maritime security and defense capabilities are the intersections between the USCG’s National Security Cutter, the USMC’s F-35B and the Osprey.

Shaping a collaborative approach for these systems via the aviation assets and C4ISR systems is suggestive of a leveraging strategy.

The National Security Cutter is already deployed in the Pacific and provides a significant enduring presence in the Pacific.  Any US strategy for the Pacific – which is clearly one of the key definitional areas for the next decades for US strategy – needs to operate from the Arctic to Australia.  And here the USCG’s core endurance asset is a key player.  The ship is currently being bought on a fixed priced contract, but the Congress is certainly not rewarding the Service for good behavior, but in any case the USCG needs more than 8 NSCs with 3-4 available in the Pacific.

As Admiral Currier, the Deputy Commandant  (Mission Support) of the USCG, recently noted:

The National Security Cutter, in addition to being able to operate at high sea states, can launch and recover aircraft under those conditions.  You have to understand the cutter’s utility as a weapon system.

It’s a platform for multiple, fast, small interceptor boats, surface craft, and also air assets, whether it be a helicopter, or unmanned aerial vehicle, which really extends the reach of the cutter significantly. We have a larger capacity for the small, fast boats, the interceptor boats.  We can carry three vice one or two on a 378.  The NSC is a sea base for fast response small boats and helicopters or virtually any specialized force for dealing with a wide spectrum of threats.

We’ve proven this concept repeatedly with interdiction of narcotic go-fasts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.  With a Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), or with the use of non-USCG national assets, the ship is able to detect, monitor, and be in position to launch its helicopters, which will stop the suspect vessel, followed by the small boat boarding team.

It is a complete package. It capitalizes on external cues, intelligence, and airborne maritime patrols to develop a picture of the area.  With the available maritime domain awareness, it can prosecute threats using its fast, armed, small boats, and its armed helicopters.

This asset provides an enduring presence asset globally, which can work with other USN, USMC or USAF assets in delivering global security solutions essential to 21st century operations.

And the NSC can fit into the puzzle of managing security and defense threats along with the other new assets being shaped by the USMC and the USN.  The USMC intends to deploy the F-35B and the Osprey on its Amphibious Ready Group and these new assets significantly change the capabilities of the ARG and the ability of the ARG to work with other USN and USCG and USAF assets.

Yet the F-35B “debate” focuses on the IOC cost of the plane, not the value it brings to maritime transformation and the enablement of the joint force.  The F-35B brings electronic warfare and cyber operations capability to the ARG; it provides C4ISR to command aviation and maritime assets; and it can redeploy to austere airfields to support ground operations across the spectrum of security and defense operations. And oh by the way can get places fast with its supersonic capabilities.

And coupled with the Osprey, which has only barely begun to be fully connected to a networked force, a newly enabled ARG is emerging.  As General “Dog” Davis, currently the Commander of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing at Cherry Point, North Carolina, has argued:

Our MEUs have never been used as effectively as they are today.  These new capabilities are going to make them exponentially more potent and useful to our nation’s leadership.

The F-35Bs give the new ARG a very high-end air superiority fighter, that’s low observable if I want it to be.  I can roll from Air to Air to Air to Ground quickly and be superior to all comers in both missions.  That’s bad news for our adversaries.  I can use the F-35s to escort the V-22s deep into enemy territory.  With those V-22s we can range out to a 400-500-mile radius from the ship without air refueling.  I can go deliver Marines deep in the enemy territory or wherever and do it at 250 miles an hour, so my speed of action, my agility is exponentially increased, and I think if you’re a bad guy, that would probably give you a reason to pause.  It’s a very different animal that’s out there.    We are good now, but will be even more so (by more than a factor of two in the future).

I also have significant mix and match capability.  And this capability can change the impact of the ARG on the evolving situation.  It is a forcing function enabled by variant mixes of capability. If I wanted to strip some V-22s off the deck, to accommodate more F-35s – I could do so easily.  Their long legs allow them to lily pad for a limited period of time — off a much large array of shore FOBs – while still supporting the MEU.   It’s much easier to do that in a V-22 than it is a traditional helicopter.

I open up that flight deck, or I can TRANSLANT or PAC additional F-35s.  If I had six on the deck and I want to fly over another six or another four, we could do it rather quickly.  Now the MEU has ten strike platforms.  So if I need to have a TACAIR surge for a period of time, that deck provides a great platform for us.  We’ve got the maintenance onboard that ship, so we can actually turn that Amphib very quickly from being a heliocentric Amphib to a fast jet Amphib. Conversely, I could also take the F-35s off, send them to a FOB and load it up with V-22s, 53Ks, or AH-1Zs and UH-1Ys.    Flexible machines and flexible ships.  The combination is exceptional.

We will have a very configurable, agile ship to reconfigure almost on a dime based on the situation at hand.  I think the enemy would look at the ARG as something completely different from what we have now. I think we have to change the way we do things a bit in order to allow for that, but I think we will once we get the new air assets. The newly enabled ARG, or newly whichever the term you’re using, will force our opponents to look at things very differently.  We will use it differently, and our opponents are going to look at it differently.

And of course, the USMC helos can land on the NSCs and support the higher end operations and needs for the NSCs as DoD assets.  And narco and terrorist elements are using higher end capabilities such as mini-subs and fast planes, for which an overlap in ARG and NSC operations can provide a potent mix.

Now let us add the new Littoral Combat Ship to the mix.  Again, no platform fights alone and in the new fiscally constrained environment driving maximum values from any new platform purchase is a sound idea.  And as one builds collaborative con-ops across the joint force, a more effective power projection force can be shaped.

These two forces – the LCS and the newly configured ARG – can be conjoined and forged into an enlarged littoral combat capability.  But without the newly configured ARG, and the core asset, the F-35B, such potential is undercut.

This is a good example of how buying the right platform – the F-35B – is part of a leveraging strategy whereby greater value is provided for the fleet through the acquisition of that platform.

(Credit: SLD)(Credit: SLD)

In a time of fiscal stringency, good value acquisitions need to be prioritized.  Such acquisitions are able to leverage already acquired or in the process of being acquired capabilities and provide significant enhancement of capabilities.

They are high value assets, both in terms of warfighting and best value from an overall fleet perspective.

The USN-USMC amphibious team can provide for a wide-range of options for the President simply by being offshore, with 5th generation aircraft capability on board which provides 360 situational awareness, deep visibility over the air and ground space, and carrying significant capability on board to empower a full spectrum force as needed.

Now add the LCS.  The LCS provides a tip of the spear, presence mission capability.  The speed of the ship allows it to provide forward presence more rapidly than any other ship in the USN-USMC inventory.

It was said in fighter aviation “speed is life” and in certain situations the LCS can be paid the same complement.  The key is not only the ships agility and speed but it can carry helicopters and arrive on station with state-of-the art C4ISR capabilities to meld into the F-35B combat umbrella. Visualize a 40+ knot Iron Dome asset linking to Aegis ships and the ARG air assets.

By shaping a pull rather than push transition strategy, these new platforms WHICH ARE ALREADY BEING bought can provide for new capabilities by shaping collaborative con-ops.  Significant savings come after having made the transition for older less fuel efficient and environmentally unfriendly 40-50 platforms, which suck up sustainment dollars.

To provide simply one example would be the impact of the F-35 on logs bills. Shifting from the legacy air fleet to the F-35 fleet will save trillions of dollars in operational support.  Although the headlines were generated on the more than 1 trillion support costs of the F-35 fleet in 2065 dollars, what was missed that the legacy fleet in those very 2065 dollars would cost more than 4 trillion dollars.

The plane has been designed to optimize maintainability and to reduce the amount of touch labor on the plane by at least 30%.  And the fleet commonality will lead to significant ability to operate, deploy and sustain fleets of aircraft.

Recently, retired head of Marine Corps Aviation General Trautman hammered the first point home.

Affordability is the balance of cost and capabilities required to accomplish assigned missions. For over a decade the Marine Corps has avoided the cost of new procurement during a time when the service lives of our legacy aircraft were sufficient to meet the missions assigned. However, in the near future, our investment in the capabilities of the F-35B will outweigh the unavoidable legacy aircraft operations and sustainment (O&S) cost increases we will incur with the F/A-18, AV-8B, and EA-6B.

The O&S costs of legacy aircraft across DoD have been increasing at an average rate of 7.8% per year since 2000. The operational lifetimes of legacy aircraft are being extended well beyond their original design limits. As a result, we have been continually engaged in a struggle to maintain operational readiness of our legacy aircraft due largely to the increasing age of the aircraft fleet. Early in an aircraft’s life cycle, the principal challenge is primarily attributed to the aging proprietary avionics systems upon which the user depends for warfighting relevance; later it is maintenance of the airframe and hardware components that are become the O&S cost drivers.

The Marine Corps strategy for the last eleven years has been to forego the procurement new variants of legacy aircraft and continuing a process of trying to sustain old designs that inherit the obsolescence and fatigue life issues of their predecessors. Instead, we opted to transition to a new 5th generation aircraft that takes advantage of technology improvements, which generate substantial savings in ownership cost. The capabilities of the F-35B enable the Marine Corps to replace three legacy aircraft types and retain the capability of executing all our missions.

This results in tangible O&S cost savings.

A common platform produces a common support and sustainment base. By necking down to one type of aircraft we eliminate a threefold redundancy in manpower, operating materiel, support services, training, maintenance competencies, technical systems management, tools, and aircraft upgrades. For example:

Direct military manpower will be reduced by 30%; approximately 340 officers and 2600 enlisted.

  • Within the Naval Aviation Enterprise we will reduce the technical management requirements the systems requiring support by 60%.
  • Peculiar Support Equipment will be reduced by 60%; down from 1,400 to 400 line items.
  • Simulators and training support systems will be reduced by 80%; five different training systems will neck down to one.
  • Electronic Attack WRA’s will be reduced by 40% and replaced with easier to support state of the art digital electronics.
  • The Performance Based Logistics construct will nearly eliminate macro and micro avionics repair, and intermediate propulsion support functions.
  • Airborne Armament Equipment (AAE) will be reduced by over 80% with the incorporation of a multi-use bomb rack.

Compared to historical parametrics we expect our overall O&S costs to decrease by 30%.

The key to enabling these reductions is to evolve our supportability concepts, processes and procedures instead of shackling ourselves to a support infrastructure built for legacy aircraft. We need to be innovative and ensure our sustainment posture keeps pace with technology advancements and global partnering synergies. Working together with industry, the Marine Corps is intently focused on the future as we seek innovative cost effective sustainment strategies that match the game changing operational capabilities resident in the F-35 Lightning II.

The impact of fleet operations was highlighted by retired General Cameron, now working on the F-35 program with Lockheed Martin. Cameron as a retired USAF general in charge of maintenance highlighted the fleet consequences of shifting form F-16s to F-35As for the USAF.

The real beauty of the F-35 program is the fact that you can look out across the entire fleet, all the international partners, all the domestic partners, and tell immediately if there are systemic fleet wide issues.  The program can share assets to ensure a surge capability to wherever it’s needed and can share the robust supply chain that’s already established on the F-35 production line. Our experiences with the F-16 highlight another major advantage of the F-35 approach.   The F-16 has been a highly successful program.  However, configuration management has been a challenge because it has been handled at the individual service level. Therefore, there are roughly 130 configurations of the F-16.  The operators, when prosecuting the air battle, have to know the precise configuration of each F-16 in order to know what capabilities it brings to the fight.  The sustainment of the F-16 is even more challenging with spares not being interchangeable among F-16 variants. The F-35 is a common configuration so interoperability is the key in both operations and sustainment.

One could simply note that the views of such warfighters are simply bypassed in making wild assumptions about future life-cycle costs.  An alternative approach would be to examine how the F-35 as manufactured leads to significant REDUCTIONS in touch labor time and to ENHANCED operational tempo, which in turn lead to COMBINED reduction in maintenance costs with enhanced, combat efficiencies.

In conclusion, the combining of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, the sizing down of Big Army, and leveraging the new platforms already being built, the retirement of older platforms and systems can together form an acquisition strategy to shape the new US power projection capabilities for the 21st century.  If one simply downsizes a skewed force structure of the last 10 years, an historic opportunity would be missed.

First published in Common Defense Quarterly, Fall 2011

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By Dr. Robbin Laird

09/19/2011 – The United States is facing twin pressures of fiscal constraints and a drawdown and withdrawal from Afghanistan.The first highlights the need to reduce budgets; the second focuses upon the re-configuration of US forces.

The need to reduce budgets in the context of a significant drawdown can be met in significant part by removing the two billion dollar a week cost to operate in Afghanistan. The logistics costs in Afghanistan alone have diverted money from investment accounts and have frozen US forces into a force in being to manage territory. Cost savings from withdrawal need to be conjoined with a significant re-configuration of forces as withdrawal unfolds. Indeed, one could argue that the withdrawal and the re-configuration of Big Army are closely connected. Indeed if Secretary Panetta can manage it, the withdrawal, downsizing and reconfiguration of Big Army is really at the heart of structural redesign of US forces. strategic

US forces need to become more agile, flexible, and global in order to work with allies and partners to deal with evolving global realities. Protecting access points, the global conveyer of goods and services, ensuring an ability to work with global partners in having access to commodities, shaping insertion forces which can pursue terrorist elements wherever necessary, and partnering support with global players all require a re-enforced maritime and air capability. This means a priority for the USCG, USN, USMC and the US Air Force in the re-configuring effort. Balanced force structure reduction makes no sense because the force structure was re-designed for land wars that the US will not engage in the decade ahead. The US Army can be recast by the overall effort to shape new power projection capabilities and competencies in the decade ahead.

Retiring older USN, USMC, and USAF systems, which are logistical money hogs and high maintenance, can shape affordability. Core new systems can be leveraged to shape a pull rather than a push transition strategy. Fortunately, the country is already building these new systems and is in a position to shape an effective transition to a more affordable power projection capability.

At the heart of the approach is to move from the platform-centric focus where the cost of a new product is considered the debate point; rather the value of new systems and their ability to be conjoined is the focal point. No platform fights alone is the mantra; and core recognition of how the new platforms work with one another to shape collaborative con-ops and capabilities is central to a strategic re-design of US forces.

A good illustration of this approach can be seen with regard to crafting 21st century air capabilities. 21st century air capabilities are built around the three “M”s.  The aircraft need to be multi-mission and manufactured to be significantly more maintainable than 20th century aircraft.

In today’s world, the acquisition of aircraft in financially stringent environments favors multi-mission platforms.  The U.S. and allied air forces are buying less aircraft and a smaller variety of aircraft.  The expectation is that the aircraft purchased will do more than their core specialty.

There is an expectation that if I buy an airlifter it will do more than airlift.  It will be able to refuel, it will be able to deliver in the air lethal and non-lethal weapons out of the back of the aircraft, it will be able to become a C2 aircraft if needed, etc.

The second M is maintainability.  New platforms are built with a significant amount of attention to how to enhance their ability to be maintained over time.  When platforms were built thirty years ago, logistics support was an afterthought.  No it is a core element of determining successful outcomes to the manufacturing process.

Sustainability is a core requirement for 21st century air forces and air operations. Sustainability is a combination of logistics and maintainability considerations combined.  Designing a more sustainable product, which can operate fleet wide, should be one of the very core procurement principles.

But it does not even exist on the playing field.  The questionable notion of life-cycle costs is used but has little or nor real meaning as key drivers of life cycle costs are often outside of the domain of a platform considered by itself or fleet wide.

Additionally, one needs to buy Fleetwide.  Savings will come from pooling resources, something that cannot happen if you buy a gaggle of aircraft, rather than operating a common fleet.  Just ask Fed Ex what commonality for their fleet delivers in terms of performance and savings.

The final M is manufacturability.  Briefing slides and simulations are not the same thing as a finished good of high quality and of high reliability.  Here you need a trained workforce, good engineering practices and an ability to deliver a product of high quality and standards.  It is challenging to build new systems and not every manufacturer is created equal.

A core element of today’s manufacturing systems is the challenge of managing extended supply chains.  And these supply chains are subject to disruptions and the need to manage those disruptions.

(For a further look at the 3 Ms see 21st Century Air Capabilities https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=20246)

An excellent example of how to leverage what you are buying for the evolution of overall maritime security and defense capabilities are the intersections between the USCG’s National Security Cutter, the USMC’s F-35B and Osprey, and the USN’s LCS.

Shaping a collaborative approach for these three systems via the aviation assets and C4ISR systems is suggestive of a leveraging strategy.

The National Security Cutter is already deployed in the Pacific and provides a significant enduring presence in the Pacific. Any US strategy for the Pacific – which is clearly one of the key definitional areas for the next decades for US strategy – needs to operate from the Arctic to Australia. And here the USCG’s core endurance asset is a key player. The ship is currently being bought on a fixed priced contract, but the Congress is certainly not rewarding the Service for good behavior, but in any case the USCG needs more than 8 NSCs with 3-4 available in the Pacific.

As Admiral Currier, the Deputy Commandant  (Mission Support) of the USCG, recently noted:

The National Security Cutter, in addition to being able to operate at high sea states, can launch and recover aircraft under those conditions.  You have to understand the cutter’s utility as a weapon system.

It’s a platform for multiple, fast, small interceptor boats, surface craft, and also air assets, whether it be a helicopter, or unmanned aerial vehicle, which really extends the reach of the cutter significantly. We have a larger capacity for the small, fast boats, the interceptor boats.  We can carry three vice one or two on a 378.  The NSC is a sea base for fast response small boats and helicopters or virtually any specialized force for dealing with a wide spectrum of threats.

We’ve proven this concept repeatedly with interdiction of narcotic go-fasts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.  With a Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), or with the use of non-USCG national assets, the ship is able to detect, monitor, and be in position to launch its helicopters, which will stop the suspect vessel, followed by the small boat boarding team.

It is a complete package. It capitalizes on external cues, intelligence, and airborne maritime patrols to develop a picture of the area.  With the available maritime domain awareness, it can prosecute threats using its fast, armed, small boats, and its armed helicopters.

https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=22060

This asset provides an enduring presence asset globally, which can work with other USN, USMC or USAF assets in delivering global security solutions essential to 21st century operations.

And the NSC can fit into the puzzle of managing security and defense threats along with the other new assets being shaped by the USMC and the USN. The USMC intends to deploy the F-35B and the Osprey on its Amphibious Ready Group and these new assets significantly change the capabilities of the ARG and the ability of the ARG to work with other USN and USCG and USAF assets.

Yet the F-35B “debate” focuses on the IOC cost of the plane, not the value it brings to maritime transformation and the enablement of the joint force.The F-35B brings electronic warfare and cyber operations capability to the ARG; it provides C4ISR to command aviation and maritime assets; and it can redeploy to austere airfields to support ground operations across the spectrum of security and defense operations. And oh by the way can get places fast with its supersonic capabilities.

And coupled with the Osprey, which has only barely begun to be fully connected to a networked force, a newly enabled ARG is emerging. As General “Dog” Davis, currently the Commander of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing at Cherry Point, North Carolina, has argued:

Our MEUs have never been used as effectively as they are today.  These new capabilities are going to make them exponentially more potent and useful to our nation’s leadership.

The F-35Bs give the new ARG a very high-end air superiority fighter, that’s low observable if I want it to be.  I can roll from Air to Air to Air to Ground quickly and be superior to all comers in both missions.  That’s bad news for our adversaries.  I can use the F-35s to escort the V-22s deep into enemy territory.  With those V-22s we can range out to a 400-500-mile radius from the ship without air refueling.  I can go deliver Marines deep in the enemy territory or wherever and do it at 250 miles an hour, so my speed of action, my agility is exponentially increased, and I think if you’re a bad guy, that would probably give you a reason to pause.  It’s a very different animal that’s out there.    We are good now, but will be even more so (by more than a factor of two in the future).

I also have significant mix and match capability.  And this capability can change the impact of the ARG on the evolving situation.  It is a forcing function enabled by variant mixes of capability. If I wanted to strip some V-22s off the deck, to accommodate more F-35s – I could do so easily.  Their long legs allow them to lily pad for a limited period of time — off a much large array of shore FOBs – while still supporting the MEU.   It’s much easier to do that in a V-22 than it is a traditional helicopter.

I open up that flight deck, or I can TRANSLANT or PAC additional F-35s.  If I had six on the deck and I want to fly over another six or another four, we could do it rather quickly.  Now the MEU has ten strike platforms.  So if I need to have a TACAIR surge for a period of time, that deck provides a great platform for us.  We’ve got the maintenance onboard that ship, so we can actually turn that Amphib very quickly from being a heliocentric Amphib to a fast jet Amphib. Conversely, I could also take the F-35s off, send them to a FOB and load it up with V-22s, 53Ks, or AH-1Zs and UH-1Ys.    Flexible machines and flexible ships.  The combination is exceptional.

We will have a very configurable, agile ship to reconfigure almost on a dime based on the situation at hand.  I think the enemy would look at the ARG as something completely different from what we have now. I think we have to change the way we do things a bit in order to allow for that, but I think we will once we get the new air assets. The newly enabled ARG, or newly whichever the term you’re using, will force our opponents to look at things very differently.  We will use it differently, and our opponents are going to look at it differently.

https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=17319

And of course, the USMC helos can land on the NSCs and support the higher end operations and needs for the NSCs as DoD assets. And narco and terrorist elements are using higher end capabilities such as mini-subs and fast planes, for which an overlap in ARG and NSC operations can provide a potent mix.

Now let us add the new Littoral Combat Ship to the mix. Again, no platform fights alone and in the new fiscally constrained environment driving maximum values from any new platform purchase is a sound idea. And as one builds collaborative con-ops across the joint force, a more effective power projection force can be shaped.

These two forces – the LCS and the newly configured ARG – can be conjoined and forged into an enlarged littoral combat capability.  But without the newly configured ARG, and the core asset, the F-35B, such potential is undercut.

This is a good example of how buying the right platform – the F-35B – is part of a leveraging strategy whereby greater value is provided for the fleet through the acquisition of that platform. building blocks

In a time of fiscal stringency, good value acquisitions need to be prioritized.  Such acquisitions are able to leverage already acquired or in the process of being acquired capabilities and provide significant enhancement of capabilities.

They are high value assets, both in terms of warfighting and best value from an overall fleet perspective.

The USN-USMC amphibious team can provide for a wide-range of options for the President simply by being offshore, with 5th generation aircraft capability on board which provides 360 situational awareness, deep visibility over the air and ground space, and carrying significant capability on board to empower a full spectrum force as needed.

Now add the LCS.  The LCS provides a tip of the spear, presence mission capability.  The speed of the ship allows it to provide forward presence more rapidly than any other ship in the USN-USMC inventory.

It was said in fighter aviation “speed is life” and in certain situations the LCS can be paid the same complement.  The key is not only the ships agility and speed but it can carry helicopters and arrive on station with state-of-the art C4ISR capabilities to meld into the F-35B combat umbrella. Visualize a 40+ knot Iron Dome asset linking to Aegis ships and the ARG air assets.

Inserting an LCS into the Maersk Alabama incident can see an example of the impact of speed.  As one naval analyst put it, the impact would have been as follows:

· LCS at 45kts would have been on scene in less than 7 hours (6.7), or 37% sooner than a ship transiting at 28 kts.

· LCS fuel consumption for such a sprint 40% less than the 28 kt sprint.

· LCS would consume less than 23% of her fuel capacity in such a sprint.

· A helo launch within 150 nautical miles from Maersk Alabama puts helo overhead within four hours (4.3) from the time of the initial tasking.

· Two H-60’s permits LCS to maintained a helo overhead Maersk Alabama for a sustained period of time.

With a response time of four hours the probability of thwarting a piracy attack is increased—especially if the naval ship is called upon the first realization of the targeted ship’s entry into piracy infested waters.

If an LCS was tasked to respond when Maersk Alabama encountered the first group of pirates craft on 7 April 2009, it would have arrived on scene well in advance of the attack on 8 April and may well have prevented it.

And if you add the LCS to the USN-USMC amphibious team you have even more capability and more options.  As a senior USMC MEU commander has put it:

You’re sitting off the coast, pick your country, doesn’t matter, you’re told okay, we’ve got to do some shaping operations, we want to take and put some assets into shore, they’re going to do some shaping work over here.  LCS comes in, very low profile platform.  Operating off the shore, inserts these guys in small boats that night.  They infill, they go in, their doing their mission.

The LCS now sets up — it’s a gun platform.  It’s a resupply, refuel point for my Hueys and Cobras. 
Now, these guys get in here, okay.  High value targets been picked out, there is an F-35 that’s doing some other operations.  These guys only came with him and said hey, we have got a high value target, but if we take him out, we will compromise our position. The F-35 goes roger, got it painted, got it seen.  This is what you’re seeing, this is what I’m seeing.  Okay.  Kill the target.  The guys on the ground never even know what hit them.

https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=21129

By shaping a pull rather than push transition strategy, these new platforms WHICH ARE ALREADY BEING bought can provide for new capabilities by shaping collaborative con-ops.Significant savings come after having made the transition for older less fuel efficient and environmentally unfriendly 40-50 platforms, which suck up sustainment dollars.

To provide simply one example would be the impact of the F-35 on logs bills. Shifting from the legacy air fleet to the F-35 fleet will save trillions of dollars in operational support. Although the headlines were generated on the more than 1 trillion support costs of the F-35 fleet in 2065 dollars, what was missed that the legacy fleet in those very 2065 dollars would cost more than 4 trillion dollars.

The plane has been designed to optimize maintainability and to reduce the amount of touch labor on the plane by at least 30%.  And the fleet commonality will lead to significant ability to operate, deploy and sustain fleets of aircraft.

Recently, retired head of Marine Corps Aviation General Trautman hammered the first point home.

Affordability is the balance of cost and capabilities required to accomplish assigned missions. For over a decade the Marine Corps has avoided the cost of new procurement during a time when the service lives of our legacy aircraft were sufficient to meet the missions assigned. However, in the near future, our investment in the capabilities of the F-35B will outweigh the unavoidable legacy aircraft operations and sustainment (O&S) cost increases we will incur with the F/A-18, AV-8B, and EA-6B.

The O&S costs of legacy aircraft across DoD have been increasing at an average rate of 7.8% per year since 2000. The operational lifetimes of legacy aircraft are being extended well beyond their original design limits. As a result, we have been continually engaged in a struggle to maintain operational readiness of our legacy aircraft due largely to the increasing age of the aircraft fleet. Early in an aircraft’s life cycle, the principal challenge is primarily attributed to the aging proprietary avionics systems upon which the user depends for warfighting relevance; later it is maintenance of the airframe and hardware components that are become the O&S cost drivers.

The Marine Corps strategy for the last eleven years has been to forego the procurement new variants of legacy aircraft and continuing a process of trying to sustain old designs that inherit the obsolescence and fatigue life issues of their predecessors. Instead, we opted to transition to a new 5th generation aircraft that takes advantage of technology improvements, which generate substantial savings in ownership cost. The capabilities of the F-35B enable the Marine Corps to replace three legacy aircraft types and retain the capability of executing all our missions.

This results in tangible O&S cost savings.

A common platform produces a common support and sustainment base. By necking down to one type of aircraft we eliminate a threefold redundancy in manpower, operating materiel, support services, training, maintenance competencies, technical systems management, tools, and aircraft upgrades. For example:

Direct military manpower will be reduced by 30%; approximately 340 officers and 2600 enlisted.

· Within the Naval Aviation Enterprise we will reduce the technical management requirements the systems requiring support by 60%.

· Peculiar Support Equipment will be reduced by 60%; down from 1,400 to 400 line items.

· Simulators and training support systems will be reduced by 80%; five different training systems will neck down to one.

· Electronic Attack WRA’s will be reduced by 40% and replaced with easier to support state of the art digital electronics.

· The Performance Based Logistics construct will nearly eliminate macro and micro avionics repair, and intermediate propulsion support functions.

· Airborne Armament Equipment (AAE) will be reduced by over 80% with the incorporation of a multi-use bomb rack.

Compared to historical parametrics we expect our overall O&S costs to decrease by 30%.

The key to enabling these reductions is to evolve our supportability concepts, processes and procedures instead of shackling ourselves to a support infrastructure built for legacy aircraft. We need to be innovative and ensure our sustainment posture keeps pace with technology advancements and global partnering synergies. Working together with industry, the Marine Corps is intently focused on the future as we seek innovative cost effective sustainment strategies that match the game changing operational capabilities resident in the F-35 Lightning II.

https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=10063

The impact of fleet operations was highlighted by retired General Cameron, now working on the F-35 program with Lockheed Martin. Cameron as a retired USAF general in charge of maintenance highlighted the fleet consequences of shifting form F-16s to F-35As for the USAF.

The real beauty of the F-35 program is the fact that you can look out across the entire fleet, all the international partners, all the domestic partners, and tell immediately if there are systemic fleet wide issues.  The program can share assets to ensure a surge capability to wherever it’s needed and can share the robust supply chain that’s already established on the F-35 production line. Our experiences with the F-16 highlight another major advantage of the F-35 approach.   The F-16 has been a highly successful program.  However, configuration management has been a challenge because it has been handled at the individual service level. Therefore, there are roughly 130 configurations of the F-16.  The operators, when prosecuting the air battle, have to know the precise configuration of each F-16 in order to know what capabilities it brings to the fight.  The sustainment of the F-16 is even more challenging with spares not being interchangeable among F-16 variants. The F-35 is a common configuration so interoperability is the key in both operations and sustainment.

https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=12899

One could simply note that the views of such warfighters are simply bypassed in making wild assumptions about future life-cycle costs.  An alternative approach would be to examine how the F-35 as manufactured leads to significant REDUCTIONS in touch labor time and to ENHANCED operational tempo, which in turn lead to COMBINED reduction in maintenance costs with enhanced, combat efficiencies.

In conclusion, the combining of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, the sizing down of Big Army, and leveraging the new platforms already being built, the retirement of older platforms and systems can together form an acquisition strategy to shape the new US power projection capabilities for the 21st century.If one simply downsizes a skewed force structure of the last 10 years, an historic opportunity would be missed.

First published in Common Defense Quarterly, Fall 2011

http://commondefensequarterly.com/

Living the Transition: Shaping the F-35 Maintenance Approach at Eglin

Posted on | by SysAdmin
09/25/2011
Tech. Sgt. Matthew Burch and Staff Sgt. Jason Westberry, from the 58th Aircraft Maintenance Unit, review post operations tasks on their Portable Maintenance Aid after the fourth F-35 Lightning II taxied into its new home at Eglin. The Airmen are among the first Department of Defense maintainers trained by Lockheed Martin logistics support personnel in the joint strike fighter's recovery and inspection procedures. Both aircraft in the photo arrived here Aug. 31 in a four-ship formation with Lockheed Martin pilots flying the F-35As and F-16 escorts piloted by the wing. (Credit: USAF)

09/25/2011 – In early August 2011, Second Line of Defense sat down with Col. Sampsel and Secretary Wynne to discuss the transition in maintenance culture and its challenges for the F-35.  Col. Sampsel is living through the transition and Secretary Wynne was one of the architects of the F-35 and its maintenance approach.  It was unusual to have an architect and a key implementer in a dialogue about transitional dynamics.  This article summarizes some of those interactions and ways to understand the transitional dynamics and challenges.

Col. Laura Sampsel, 33rd Maintenance Group commander, is responsible for the bed-down and operational readiness of the three variants of the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 aircraft. The primary mission is to enable the production of pilots and maintainers for future training and combat units. (Credit: USAF)
Col. Laura Sampsel, 33rd Maintenance Group commander, is responsible for the bed-down and operational readiness of the three variants of the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 aircraft. The primary mission is to enable the production of pilots and maintainers for future training and combat units. (Credit: USAF)

Second Line of Defense sat down with Col. Laura Sampsel shortly after her departure from Eglin and retirement from the USMC. During her time at Eglin, Col. Laura Sampsel, 33rd Maintenance Group commander, was responsible for the bed-down and operational readiness of the three variants of the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 aircraft. The primary mission is to enable the production of pilots and maintainers for future training and combat units.

Secretary Wynne with his years of industrial, and acquisition experience was the dialogue partner with Sampsel during this interview and provides an interesting look inside the transition ahead for maintenance practices for the three services moving ahead with the new airplane.

The F-35 is the first combat aircraft designed with maintainability as part of the con-ops of the airplane.  Increased ability to share maintenance practices across the services and the partners, as well as common parts provisions, are at the heart of allowing the aircraft to operate globally more efficiently and effectively.  In light of the financial stringencies facing the allies and the services, if such a plane and approach were not available, air power capabilities would be reduced even more.

If one took the report which projected more than a trillion dollars to support the F-35 over its lifetime in 2065 dollars, and if one used those same 2065 dollars the figure for support would be north of 4 trillion dollars.  We are not fans of using hypothetical 2065 dollars to do any analysis, but using the terms of the projected 1T in support, the maintenance revolution if fully realized can save more than 3 trillion dollars in hypothetical 2065 dollars.

At the heart of the maintenance approach is the digital capability built into the aircraft. As we argued earlier:

Digital systems allow many changes to occur throughout the military.  We have already seen these changes in the commercial sector, and it is difficult to believe that the military cannot mimic such changes.

First, there is a significant reduction in the touch labor required to maintain modern vehicles or planes.  The computer chips provide sensors and information, which allows a significant migration of knowledge to the machine, rather than relying upon armies of maintainers.

Second, the machines can tell when maintenance needs to be done.  Rather than having a manpower intense scheduled maintenance regime, the platform tells you when it needs to be maintained.

Third, firms like Fed Ex manage fleets.  They buy with a fleet in mind and with as much commonality as possible.  This allows them to drive down cost by supporting more assets with common maintenance procedures and operations.

Fourth, commercial aerospace firms build their products with maintainability as a key driver.  And they can use incentivized-based systems such as fly by hour to gain savings, which they can then invest in evolving the systems, which they build to optimize operational savings.

Fifth, the commercial standard is clearly to manage a supply chain to build and sustain a fleet.  The global supply chain to produce modern products is assembled by manufacturers to deliver a viable and cost effective product.  The same supply chain is used to deliver support.  Having a core firm to manage both is a cost driver both for support as well as gaining information about planned product improvements.

SLD is a group populated by realists.  The ability to realize the advantages rooted in the new aircraft will not happen overnight or without significant cultural shifts.  In an interview with Master Gunnery Sergeant McKay, shortly before his retirement, the challenge was highlighted:

When I first got into the program a couple of years ago, the Nirvana was a USMC jet can land in an Air Force-Navy Base that has F-35s and be repaired, and fly home.  The reality is that nobody else wants to play in that world; the Air Force and the Navy have no desire to play the game that way.  Even the Marines at some point along the way have a real problem with somebody else fixing their toys and calling it good.

There is no standardization of maintenance practices among the services, let alone internationally. You’re talking an entirely different nightmare of, “I’m over-flying some other country, you need to land for whatever emergency, and need to get fixed.”  Traditionally, you send a maintenance crew from very far away to fix that one aircraft, takes days, and then you fly home.  Where if it was already resident on the base, why couldn’t you fix it right there with what you’ve got?

Tech. Sgt. Matthew Burch and Staff Sgt. Jason Westberry, from the 58th Aircraft Maintenance Unit, review post operations tasks on their Portable Maintenance Aid after the fourth F-35 Lightning II taxied into its new home at Eglin. The Airmen are among the first Department of Defense maintainers trained by Lockheed Martin logistics support personnel in the joint strike fighter's recovery and inspection procedures. Both aircraft in the photo arrived here Aug. 31 in a four-ship formation with Lockheed Martin pilots flying the F-35As and F-16 escorts piloted by the wing. (Credit: USAF)Tech. Sgt. Matthew Burch and Staff Sgt. Jason Westberry, from the 58th Aircraft Maintenance Unit, review post operations tasks on their Portable Maintenance Aid after the fourth F-35 Lightning II taxied into its new home at Eglin. The Airmen are among the first Department of Defense maintainers trained by Lockheed Martin logistics support personnel in the joint strike fighter’s recovery and inspection procedures. Both aircraft in the photo arrived here Aug. 31 in a four-ship formation with Lockheed Martin pilots flying the F-35As and F-16 escorts piloted by the wing. (Credit: USAF)

And the interview went on to discuss the challenge of transition:

SLD: But clearly the technology can drive change. The problem with maintaining the maintenance stovepipes, as they exist now, is that the technology and the plane doesn’t require them.  It is as if Southwest Airlines with a common fleet of 737s would have three different maintenance cultures.  This makes no sense. Deployment differences among the services are real and adjustments to the culture needs to be made to provide for such differences but simply to ignore commonality is costly, ineffective and reduces core combat capability significantly going forward.

MGySgt McKay: Absolutely. If we can have the services drive towards even common terminology, this would be good.  For example, the USAF and the USMC do not have a common understanding of what being expeditionary means, and the maintenance challenges associated with expeditionary are different for the two services.

If we could get the services to agree on common terms and explanations of exactly what those mean.  Differences in services, absolutely, there should be were appropriate but working through expeditionary logistics is a good place to start, at least, so we’re talking on the same sheet of music.

SLD: Why not use the common maintenance training facility at the JSF training compound at Eglin? One could build a cadre of cross-service folks who could shape that dictionary or build that language because you’re trying to do the cross-service training, cross-service maintenance.

Maybe one should be thinking about adding a core-competence to that schoolhouse of an elite corps of instructors who are actually bargaining through some of the language.  And of course, you have the advantage of having the maintainers from the different nations there and the different pilots, which are actually informed by some cultural reality as opposed to just making it up.  Does that make sense?

MGySgt McKay: It absolutely does.  And I believe the pilot portion is much more integrated than the maintainer side.  Because the core structure is broken out into modules, you can insert modules as you see fit for you service.

They can rebuild or they can build that courseware to fit a service need.  The pilots like combat integration.  USMC pilots like the fact that they fly with the Navy and will fly with the Air Force; maintainers, not so much.  You haven’t broken that paradigm at all. And breaking that paradigm will be crucial to taking advantage of what the F-35 program offers.

The dialogue between Sampsel and Wynne focused on the core challenges of transition. Sampsel has shaped and lived through the beginnings of the revolution; Wynne was one of the architects in setting the revolution afoot.

It was a complex and varied discussion.  In this article we will breakdown the conversation into several key elements around which the transition is evolving.  The following chart summarizes some of those key themes and each will be discussed separately.

Breaking Glass

Shaping the Cultural Revolution with Regard to People, Processes and Training

Shape and Leverage the Joint Experience

Shape and Leverage the Joint Experience

Re-Alignment of Maintainers and Maintenance Process with the Airplane

Re-Shape Grades and Skill Sets of Maintainers and Shape Appropriate Transition Metrics

Shape a Service-Contractor Relationship or PBL For Effective Sustainment

Focus on Mission Effectiveness and Proper Roles for Government and the Contractors in Maintenance and Supply Chain Management

Management of the ALIS Upgrade Process

ALIS will Evolve Through Block Upgrades; Manage the Process and Expectations with Realistic Block Upgrades in Overall Maintenance Practice

Alignment of F-35 ALIS Information Systems With Other Maintenance Information Systems

Build Migration Strategy and Tactical Realignment to Get Most Effective Outcomes for Mission Effectiveness

Sampsel started the conversation by underscoring the core strategic opportunity offered by shaping a new maintenance approach.

Col. Sampsel: If we can align processes and policies within the services, I have full confidence that in the future decades, there will be two significant positive outcomes.

One, deploying fewer airman, marines, or sailors into harm’s way, quite honestly, which would be a key objective, especially for me.  I’ve got a marine lieutenant who’s going out there.  So the fewer that need to be deployed the better.

Second, you can shift your operational paradigm. It would give you untold flexibility when you’re doing your operational planning. You are no longer bounded by any of the basing or sustainment things that can, today, limit your capability. You can potentially launch, recover or divert anywhere, anywhere where there are F-35 deployments. The entire battle space grows exponentially.

And for me, I want Eglin to be the proof of principle for integration and jointness because this is what the F-35 program really is all about.

Breaking glass is how Sampsel described the paradigm shift.  She argued that a cultural revolution in the maintenance and supply culture would be affected as one changed the approach of personnel, the processes to govern maintenance and logistics, and the training necessary to do joint and coalition maintenance and logistics.

Sampsel indicated that at Eglin they had put together a process among the services to both reflect and generate change.

Col. Sampsel: A key driver in getting the cultural shift was shaping and then leveraging the joint experience.

I had to figure out a way to force the Air Force and the Marine Core to stop talking past each other. My Deputy, now the Commander, was Col Mark Fluker.  He and I started by realigning people and structure.  The F-35 and the Eglin opportunity were new and unique.  Neither a USMC nor USAF cookie cutter was going to work. We looked at what was best from each of our services and then decided to build an organization within the Maintenance Operations Squadron called the Joint Integration Division.  It is “affectionately” referred to as the “JID” at the 33 MXG.  It is actually quite simple.   For every Air Force Maintenance Specialty that was built you had to have a buddy from another service.  That’s your buddy.  You, Mr. Air Force, are going to come in and tell me everything I never wanted to know about the NAMP (Naval Aviation Maintenance Program).  How does an Air Force maintainer do it? You Mr. Marine are going to tell me everything you loathingly never wanted to know about the Air Force approach.  I’m talking about in terms of their competency. Then they each had to come back in.  All briefed me independently.  Then they had to come back together, and put a piece of paper together to tell me that where were the significant differences between what they did.

Almost across the board, they together decided that really, there weren’t that many differences.  Not only did this structure change and process build an increased technical competence; yet, equally important, it brought about, and continues to drive, a significant amount of respect and trust among the service members.  That was the only way we were ever able to get a set of common maintenance operating instructions within the 33rd Maintenance Crew.

The shaping of a joint experience of providing what Sampsel referred to as commonalities appropriate to the task is central to the transition. And Sampsel indicted that the services have already swapped personnel to help with cross testing.

Col. Sampsel: One way you do it is you do exactly like what we did, which is you send Airmen to Pax, and you send Marines to Edwards!  That’s one way to do it. Pax River needed qualified individuals to support some activity.  The reality is the Air Force, in my opinion as a Commander, had the singular most hands on time with the aircraft. So after collaborating with my Air Force Deputy, Col Mark Fluker, we said, “Send the Air Force.”  I didn’t care what color their uniform was because they didn’t have to deal with uniform paradigm, they had to deal with a plane.

Secretary Wynne added that as this gains strength the application of commonality where appropriate can shape an allied approach as well.

Secretary Wynne: The approach she is discussing can be extended into the international arena as an operating baseline. And as you shape in effect a maintenance Top Gun, why can’t you invite the partners WHO ARE ALREADY training there. This can be extended to an international Top Gun for maintenance, because the maintenance activities are across the board the same.

Marine Col. Laura Sampsel gives her final salute to her squadrons during the 33rd Maintenance Group change of command ceremony July 22 at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. Col. Mark Fluker took command of the group from Sampsel. (Credit: USAF)
Marine Col. Laura Sampsel gives her final salute to her squadrons during the 33rd Maintenance Group change of command ceremony July 22 at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. Col. Mark Fluker took command of the group from Sampsel. (Credit: USAF)

The third way to understand the transition is shaping the maintenance structure with the capabilities of the aircraft.  You will need different skill sets for the F-35 than for legacy aircraft; and you will need to shape the grade structure differently.

Col. Sampsel: We need to figure out what are the core competencies required to actually fix the aircraft, and align our personnel to those core competencies versus persistently taking round holes and trying to shove them into square pegs.

If you do that, everything, a huge amount of the current inefficiencies start falling apart because now I can have Air Men, Marines, and Sailors in the same classroom learning the same core competencies.

Right now we have three separate service training tracks, we have different training curriculums and that’s driven by the fact that we’re all just different enough to warrant having to do that.

You’re really only different at the very micro levels based upon your operating paradigm.  But technically you have significant commonalities.

With shaping common training, a lot of the inefficiencies start falling apart if you can get as far ahead of the game in terms of the man-power management, and really necking down to what are the core competencies required to correct the aircraft, to fix the jet.

And you need to focus on those core competencies.

Sampsel and her colleagues have made significant progress in shaping a correlation of the different service approaches and the ability to bring about core commonalities.  It is important to respect service differences, but the commonality inherent in the plane drives significant change.

As Secretary Wynne put it: “Operational tempos and rhythms will shape differences.  But those differences should not be used to block the commonality inherent in the aircraft or the weapon systems.”

The fourth key element to understand transition revolves upon re-shaping the contractor-services relationship in evolving the maintenance approach.  The current structure is for contract services, but the goal is to evolve into a Performance Based Logistics Program.

Secretary Wynne argued that the key challenge is to focus on mission effectiveness and aircraft availability, rather than the government simply spending its time on oversight of contractors, or the contractors seeking to use government metrics to shape profit structures.  The point of a common supply chain and support structure is to enhance significantly mission effectiveness and to seek optimization of the working relationship between the services and the contractors.

The fifth key element is managing the transition through the various block upgrades of the core software for the digital management systems for the aircraft.  The Autonomic Logistics Information System or ALIS is at the heart of the revolution.

https://sldinfo.com/crafting-the-f-35-sustainment-approach-a-central-element-of-the-con-ops-of-the-new-aircraft-system/

Col. Sampsel: ALIS is a true paradigm shift.  It is not just an enhancement of current technology. But, and this is key, its full capabilities will not show up Day 1.  We are in the very early blocks of ALIS’s software, and we are doing things with this software we have NEVER done before with an aircraft.  We will transition through many blocks of the software as capability is rolled out.  This part of the transition is without doubt, in my opinion, the most difficult to execute and manage.

We need as we do the rollout to have effective and realistic transition plans for each phase.  We should have realistic expectations of what we can achieve at each phase.  We have not done enough in this area.

Secretary Wynne underscored that a key challenge was gaining confidence in the reliability of the data as one moved forward with the new maintenance regime.

Col. Sampsel: I agree. .  You have to mitigate it by getting service and industry experts aligned and putting them in the “right” place.  Cut out all the middle men between the tactical unit and ground truth.  Get people the information they need quickly.  That ensures that you build that level of confidence. I remember when ATM’s first started.  I remember my mother saved every single little piece of paper printed by the ATM, and checked her bank statement. Tell me how many Americans do that today? If you start demonstrating capability, you can gain people’s confidence.

Secretary Wynne: Except for one thing, and that is that safety is paramount.  And I think you need to say that. And safety drives you to strong configuration control. Especially when it comes to expected maintenance activities. And until you get, frankly, reliability of presentation, you can’t get to reliability of expectations In other words, if you’re told you’re going to be presented with your bank statement then and there, and you don’t, there is a confidence problem.

A final element of the transition, which was discussed, is making sure that ALIS does not end up being a stove-piped information system. Sampsel emphasized that the USN and USMC have worked hard and long to shape an IT system for maintenance in which they had confidence to determine aircraft reliability and availability.  That system required massive amounts of manpower to generate the data up to the Navy Aviation Enterprise, but is was considered reliable.  How will this system be modified to work with ALIS and how would ALIS evolve to play a similar function?

Col. Sampsel: The Naval Aviation Enterprise has for the last 20 years, 15 years, evolved to one of the most significant and effective forums for Navy and Marine Corps deliberate logistic decision making.  . Once something makes it to the top of the NAE, the F18’s are doing great, but this commodity is under performing, decisions are mad to reallocate focus or resources. . Decisions that you never ever have seen happen in the past are now capable of happening because the NAE is very powerful.

Within an NAE you have an IT system, which has been put together to report to the NAE. And the IT system is called Marine Commanders’ Current Readiness Assessment Tool (MACCRAT.). The cockpit charts, if you’ve ever seen them, they’re genius.  Once you learn how to read it, unfortunately they’re not intuitive, but once you learn how to read it, it is one stop shopping at the General Officer level to truly be able to make permanent decisions.  The key to that is they have absolutely confidence that the data they’re looking at is accurate and there is integrity from the sources.

There are very significant manpower costs to generate the verification of data. How much benefit do you get out of those and how much man-power are you willing to spend to keep it?

Final conclusions were provided by both participants about the challenges facing the transition process.

Secretary Wynne: We have effectively subscribed to and paid for a culture shift in capabilities that we now need to take advantage.

And your frustration is two-fold.

Number one, you see the cultural transformation that can happen.  And you’re faced with a system that at West Point we call it 200 years of tradition unhampered by progress. So we, what you see, a system that doesn’t want to move forward.

Second, the things that you see that can really lead to breakthroughs are having berthing problems. So you are afraid to, frankly, risk your credibility by asking people to change this cultural phenomenon and bring those two systems together because the system might not work fully as expected, and indeed won’t.

Col. Sampsel: I agree.  A key challenge is to figure out what are the core competencies required actually to fix the aircraft, and align our personnel to those core competencies.  I.

If you do that a huge amount of the current inefficiencies start falling apart and you can shape the Cultural Revolution.  Quite honestly, Eglin is the place to do it!

The Execution of the TRAP Mission Over Libya

Posted on | by SysAdmin
Major Debardeleben during the Interview (Credit: SLD)

An Interview with Major Debardeleben

09/27/2011 – During the annual Second Line of Defense visit to New River to discuss Osprey operations and experiences with the Osprey Nation, we had a chance to discuss the TRAP mission over Libya with the ACE commander and with one of the Osprey operators involved in the mission. Earlier we discussed this mission with the MEU commander.

In this interview Maj. B.J. Debardeleben discussed the mission after take off from the ship off of the coast of Libya.

Major Debardeleben during the Interview (Credit: SLD)
Major Debardeleben during the Interview (Credit: SLD)

After we took off, the autopilot took over.  That is one of the great things on this plane versus the SEA KNIGHT is that it can fly itself through part of the operation. In a car, if you can set speed control, you can now be able to use your mind and do something else and focus on the road. And it’s exactly what we did on the plane and you’re monitoring the flying, but now you’re able to manage the mission better.

We were focusing on shaping our way to the moving recovery zone.  We compared the mission plan to the unfolding operation. Let’s look at this, figure out some more things, and to make sure everything’s right that we did with our mission planning before we left the boat. So it gave us time to assess everything with the radio, talk to people we needed to, and build our situational awareness.

We immediately started talking to the Harrier operating above us. And he starts talking with the pilot and we can hear one side of the conversation and I can tell that things are getting worse on the ground.

We made the judgment that we had to accelerate the mission. We moved towards our top speed as the pilot was moving to a new location on the ground.

The pilot on the ground indicated that “they’re still going at us, and things are getting worse.” And he is clearly on the move.

We had the grid of the plane crash site and we got a new grid and realized that it was much further away from where the original crash site was. So he’d been on the move the whole time.

If I had been flying a SEA KNIGHT, by the time I had gotten the new information with regard to the shift in the grid, and flown for the 40 minutes under those conditions, I would have been relatively exhausted by the time I got there because you’re holding the controls, and you’re getting shaken the whole time.

On the Osprey, I am on autopilot. So I can take a sip of water, I’m assessing everything, and I’m listening to what’s going on very clearly. The V22s very quiet in airplane mode so we can hear the radios very well, but if I was in a SEA KNIGHT the noise would make it difficult to hear. The grunts in the back were able to look at a moving map that they can look at to have both SAs when we’re getting closer and closer to coast line.

And so in that flight task now they’re relaxed and comfortable instead of them shaking in the back because usually with all the shaking makes you groggy you sleep, so you have to wake them up when you land. So they’re in the back at least relaxed and calm before we drop them off.

We zoom all the way in, we get about ten miles off the coast, I drop down from 500 feet to about 200, 300, feet just to stabilize radars. Looking at the coastline, and I was expecting Libya to look Djibouti which presents a very dark profile. But it was light up, with the electricity grid.

And so we just picked a dark spot. We also had a visual map. So now I’m looking at where I’m going to fly, I look at it on the map and I say, “I’m going through there.”

Another thing I didn’t have in the SEA KNIGHT was that actual navigation. I had been holding a map with a flashlight trying to figure stuff out while the other person’s flying and shaking and you got to be able to do this without knowing where you’re going.  With the terrain guidance you can make a rapid assessment of the terrain and how you are going to fly over that terrain.

Where you’re in a V22 you look at it and you get all the data right in front of you. It’s basically like having a smart phone versus using a dial telephone. All these things are helping you out in a difficult situation.

So they give me a new grid, and I’m looking for my needle, to where I’m supposed to go, a large town, and then I’ll look outside and I see a large town full of lights and probably that was an area the downed pilot was running from.

So I adjust my course a little bit to the left, go through the dark area, and then come through. I’m seeing pilot lines; I can mark all sorts of things on my map.

I’m flying inbound, the Harrier has built a picture for me, and he’s talking to me, telling me what I’m going to see, what the road looks like, where he is. Gives me that updated grid.

The F15 and F16 are now back on station and they start talking. They’re doing a good job of talking to the downed pilot and they know who he is, you know, they’re friends with him. They encourage him to have a drink of water and to calm down and to just stay where we was now.

Earlier, there was commotion going on at the response station, there’s people chasing him, and there’s cars chasing him.  The Harrier used various means to kind of scare people away from him. That’s when he said,” say good bye to my wife”. I could hear in my guy’s voice that things were getting more serious.

One nice thing also about having people overhead is that they are in calmer environment able to look at the situation and give you more information. “Hey Ospreys, you guys have DF?” They said “ we have DF,” so they put it up, and cue somebody one, two, three, four, five, that other needle swings over on top of my navigation needle, now saying that he’s generally in that area that you’re headed towards.

The joint quality of the operation is important. One of the best things I think about it is, that we are joint enough in terminology and techniques and everything all relatively the same. You know, we may have differences that are minute, but our terminology is all the same and we can interop wherever we have to in such a situation

In fact, I learned later that we went to introductory aviation school together in Pensacola. When I went down to visit him in the hospital, we realized that we went to school together at Pensacola. You just never get how small the world’s going to get when somebody comes back from 11 years ago.

So we’re coming in. One of the other best things about the Osprey is so, besides it being comfortable for us, it is quiet on the outside in airplane mode. Nobody’s going to hear us until we’ve gone past them. And it just sounds like a whisper rush. And at night you’re not going to know anything about it.  The SEA KNIGHT or any helicopter, you are hearing it from 10 to 15 miles away, you’re not going to hear anything from us until we’re at least beyond you.

But as I’m coming in, I hear him, he’s very quiet at this point, and I can hear the dogs barking in the background starting in my mind to envision where he is and what’s going on. And they’re talking about the vehicles pushing northwest and nobody knows where he is at that point, so it’s looking good. And so we’re all starting out thinking about where we’re going to land. And that zone wasn’t described as to what the surface was. He just said land it by this road.

We have an inertial navigation system, so get when I say plot of our plane in time and space. And so if we set up to land, we get a velocity vector that shows our movement on the earth and you don’t have to look outside to land.

And it’s an awesome capability because when the helo goes up, if you look at it and you look at gusts and the way it flows, it looks like it’s moving. Your helo is going backwards and it becomes very confusing for the helicopter pilot. And it’s always been one of the hardest things for us to do is land in the desert safely.

And in the Osprey they have fixed it. We can do this manually looking at the system, or the plane can fly itself to hover, and land directly down, you know, no questions asked, and it is amazing; both ways work 100 percent of the time.

As we’re coming to land we start to turn into a helicopter and we’re setting up to land. And as soon as we speed the motor blades up and then started bringing out, the noise comes on. And it is loud.

And as soon as I do that, the downed pilot starts yelling on the radio, he’s like “Don’t leave me, I hear you.” And I was like, “Hey we got it, we know where you are, we’re coming, you know, send your flare up.”

So he sends his signal early, it’s a high light night, very bright, a few clouds in the sky; it was just really not good for such a mission to go down. I get over him as he’s starting to talk as my crew chief finally says, you know, “I see him.”

We get a sparkle of the F16 and marks the spot. My guy comes in and lands right beside him, we’re pretty much about 20 feet away from him. He jumps up, hands up, you know, no sign of radio or pistol or anything, he said he never even pulled his pistol out of his holster the whole time.

He runs to the plane, pretty much jumps on, and sits down and puts on his seat belt and he’s like, “I’m ready to go.” The grunts spread out, to secure the zone for a second. Crew chief runs out there and grabs him, says everybody get back on the plane.

As I’m coming around I ask, “Do you have him on board?” I am told “Yup, my guy’s on.”

Because I am the second Osprey accompanying the one, which landed, I don’t even land I kind of come up beside him, I keep going, they pick up and then all together we leave.

The success of the mission was due in part to significant training. We trained for seven months as a team to do this. And then every time we had a chance on a boat in Djibouti or wherever we were, we trained to TRAP also. Because it’s the one way we can get the grunts on the back of the plane where we can use the jets overhead to work together and then land in the zone.

The Role of the Osprey in Operation Odyssey Dawn

Posted on | by SysAdmin
09/22/2011
Lt. Col. Boniface during the SLD interview August, 22 2011 (Credit: SLD)

09/22/2011 – During our annual visit to New River to get caught up on Osprey developments, Second Line of Defense sat down with Lt. Col. Boniface who was the XO for the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) for the 26th MEU.

We have published recently an interview with Col. Desens, the 26th MEU commander.

https://sldinfo.com/the-amphibious-ready-group-arg-and-libya/

Here the conversation focused upon the aviation assets used in the operation off of the MEU and notably the Osprey.

Lt. Col. Boniface during the SLD interview August, 22 2011 (Credit: SLD)
Lt. Col. Boniface during the SLD interview August, 22 2011 (Credit: SLD)

Lt. Col Boniface. has a wide range of experience, and having done many deployments on a MEU.  His background has been with CH-46 program and has been flying Ospreys for the last three years.  He is now Commanding Officer, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 266, MCAS New River. His personal decorations include the Air Medal Strike/Flight (12), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Combat Action Ribbon and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement medal.

SLD: Some folks consider the Osprey as the replacement for the CH-46 much like some folks consider the F-35B as a replacement for the Harrier.  But I believe that this actually distorts the discussion because bringing both planes to the MEU is a gamechanger.  What are your thoughts about the process of transition?

Lt. Col. Boniface: The Osprey is clearly not a CH-46.  It is an aircraft that can fly like an airplane, but land and takeoff like a helicopter, but it is not defined by its essential ability to operate as a rotorcraft.

In comparison to the legacy CH-46E, I can carry twice as much, twice as fast and twice as long.  Actually, in many cases I can almost triple the capability.  Finally, it is a more reliable aircraft and ultimately a safer aircraft.

It provides the ability for the PHIBRON/MEU to keep the ARG farther out to sea if needed, thus increasing the element of surprise and keeping us safer too. With the CH-46E, you are typically operating 25-50 nautical miles (NM) from shore.  As of today, I can operate 250 NM or greater from shore and I can close this 250 NMs from ARG shipping in just about an hour with 7,000 pounds of Marines, or cargo in the back.

I can actually launch at approximately 52,000 pounds due to the MV-22’s ability to perform a rolling short takeoff (STO) from the flight deck as opposed to the vertical takeoff required by a traditional helicopter.

Bottom line, I can carry more Marines, cargo and equipment, and I can close an objective area twice as fast while staying outside of most enemy weapon engagement zones.

It is a completely different animal.  It is a true “game changer.”

SLD: The Osprey is significant in logistics support for the fleet as well which was demonstrated during recent operations off of Libya.

Lt. Col. Boniface: I need to be very clear, the Osprey is not only supporting the USMC, but also supporting the USN-USMC team.  During this deployment the USS Kearsarge suffered a mechanical loss of a propulsion screw.  We were only able to do four knots through the water; at that point we were 300 miles from land.  The only thing we could do was to get tech reps and parts out to the ship to allow us to make a best speed of 11 knots to get back into the fight. Remember you can’t really launch aircraft if you can’t make the correct wind across a flight deck, and you can’t effectively launch Harriers to continue their strike mission with four knots of wind either.

The Osprey was the only bird we could use to close this gap, fix the ship and continue the mission we were executing off the coast of Libya.

The V22 is like driving a Cadillac Escalade compared to your dad’s old truck.  I’m traveling better; I’m able to carry more It’s more reliable, and efficient. It’s smoother. It’s safer.

Really comparing the CH-46E to the Osprey is like comparing apples and oranges.  With the CH-46E, I am typically flying 300 feet at 110 knots.  With the Osprey, I can be at 13,000 feet and flying at 250 knots, all with Marines and equipment in the back.  I am flying an airplane, not a helicopter.

SLD: When we were talking earlier, you emphasized that the Osprey’s capabilities compared to the FROG was gamechanging in character.  Could you elaborate?

Lt. Col. Boniface: It completely changes the game for the ARG/MEU, it changes the game for how the Marine Corps does business. I didn’t fully realize, nor appreciate this until I was operating in some of these locations during our deployment.

Once we got into the Med for the Libyan operations during Operation ODESSEY DAWN, Naval Air Station Sigonella was our only forward support base.

The Osprey functioned as a force multiplier in these circumstances. I could fly 300 miles plus from the USS Kearsarge to Naval Air Station Sigonella, land, get a quick hit of gas if needed, put five, six, seven thousand pounds of gear, equipment, troops, parts, and be back quickly to the ship within 2.5 hours.

Half of our MV-22s were conducting combat operations in Afghanistan while we were conducting combat operations off the coast of Libya aboard the USS Kearsarge.  So you can do the math:  Half of the Osprey’s conducting combat operation in Afghanistan and the other half performing combat resupply, and TRAP operations off the coast of Libya.

I wouldn’t have even fathomed this expeditionary and amphibious capability 10 years ago. Also, the Ospreys from Afghanistan flew directly to Souda Bay, Crete and then onto Naval Air Station Signalla, Italy.  This trip is a 3500 NM transit.  This has been the longest in our short history, and they did it in one day.  You can’t even begin to argue or compare and contrast these facts with the CH-46E.

SLD: How important to the operation was it to break the CH-46 tether?

Lt. Col. Boniface: A complete transformation to how we are doing business has been involved.  In order for the USS Kearsarge, the ARG and the 26th MEU to stay in their operational box during Operation ODESSEY DAWN, and enable the Harriers to continue their strike mission, we were reliant on other assets to supply us.  For many supply items, the Osprey provided the logistical link to allow the ARG to stay on station and not have to move towards at sea re-supply points and meet re-supply ships.

Without the Osprey you would have to pull the USS Kearsarge out of its operational box and send it somewhere where it can get close enough to land or get close enough to resupply ships to actually do the replenishment at sea.  Or you would be forced to remain where you are at and increase the time you’re going to wait for this part by three, four days or even a week.

The ARG ships are only moving at 14-15 knots. At best, let’s just say they move an average of 13 knots per hour, and add that up for the 300 miles that you have to sail.  Now you’re looking at least a day to get the needed folks, parts or equipment and then the transit time back to the operational box. The V22 will do that in a couple hours and allow the ARG/MEU to keep executing its mission.

SLD: So part of your gamechanging argument is something people do not usually focus on, the use of the Osprey as a backbone of rapid resupply and logistics support?

Lt. Col. Boniface: It was a key performance element.  It facilitated the ARG’s strike missions over Libya by allowing the Osprey to perform a combat resupply mission.  And it did the other items crucial to the operations such as the TRAP mission and bringing in supplies to keep the Harriers operating.  By keeping us within a suitable striking distance, the Osprey helped reduce the AV8-B pilots overall fatigue factor, increase that safety margin and ultimately kill bad guys.

And if the collapse had been more rapid, and we would have needed to put Marines on the ground (for example, a possible humanitarian assistance, disaster relief mission), there is no question that the Osprey would have been central to that effort as well.

ROTC and Harvard: How Goes It?

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on ROTC and Harvard: How Goes It?

09/12/2011 – Editor’s Note: We received an article presented to the Military Order of the World Wars in Boston on 7 September 2011 from the author, Captain Paul E. Mawn USN (Ret) Harvard ‘63, who is the Chairman of the “Advocates for Harvard ROTC”. The article provides an important update on an important subject.

The Advocates for Harvard ROTC mission is to promote diversity of opinion at Harvard and a climate of tolerance, acceptance and support for those Harvard undergraduates who believe in duty, honor and country as evidenced by their participation in the Army, Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force ROTC Programs now based at MIT.

Harvard president A. Lawrence Lowell stated in 1916: “The aim of a country which desires to remain at peace must be ready to defend itself, should train a large body of junior offices who can look forward to no career in the army, and can have no wish for war, yet who will be able to take their places in the field when needed”.

ROTC cadets lined up at the sideline of the 50-yard-line of a football field. They bear the flags of the united states, of the commonwealth of Virginia, and of the various armed services. (Credit: Bigstock)ROTC cadets lined up at the sideline of the 50-yard-line of a football field. They bear the flags of the united states, of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and of the various armed services. (Credit: Bigstock)

Harvard and ROTC

A Current Sitrep from Captain Mawn

For 20 years after 1972, Harvard students, who were so motivated, could continue to officially participate in various ROTC programs which were then based at host school MIT serving only MIT & Harvard but also Tufts as well as other local colleges depending on the military service. Despite being thrown off campus, ROTC participation was never “banned” at Harvard.

However in 1992, a Democrat completely controlled congress and a Democrat president passed the “Don’t ask, Don’t tell” law which caused many left leaning faculty at the College of Arts & Sciences to pressure the Harvard administration for de-recognition of the ROTC units at MIT serving Harvard cadets and midshipmen, which is analogous to derecognizing a fraternity.

As a result, Harvard Cadets and Midshipman were not allowed to indicate an ROTC affiliation in their yearbooks or official records. The denial of credits for ROTC courses continued of course and no Harvard facilities could be used for ROTC related activities, military uniforms were strongly discouraged from being worn on the Harvard campus. Although, Harvard kept all of the ROTC scholarship money from DOD for ROTC scholarship cadets and NROTC Midshipman but refused to pay any allocation of ROTC related overhead costs borne by MIT.

This situation between Harvard and ROTC gave birth to the Advocates for Harvard ROTC in 1993. About 5 years ago under the leadership President Larry Summers and efforts of the Advocates, consequently many of the above noted petty restrictions were removed. This contributed in part to the eventual firing of President Summers. While the “ball” was moved forward during this time, official recognition of the various ROTC programs for Harvard students remained elusive purely due to politics and the low level of participation in ROTC among Harvard students remained challenging.

Under the new administration of Harvard President Faust, short term goals of the Advocates was to not to lose any ground continue to maintain an on going dialogue with the Harvard administration as well as a conducting a pro active media campaign for official recognition of ROTC at Harvard.  Part of this effort involved promulgating the long tradition of Harvard grads serving our country and Harvard’s support for the military which was defined as the “Long Crimson Line”, with full honor to West Point for their wonderful description of their cadet tradition.

After months of negotiating with the Harvard administration, Advocates activities eventually resulted in a formal ceremony in Memorial Church to unveil the MOH plaque for the 17 Harvard alumni MOH recipients.  The event featured Gen. George Casey USA, Chief of Staff as the keynote speaker. In attendance were also President Faust and a Church full of Harvard alumni, many in their service dress military uniform.

On 3 March 2011, an important beachhead was established relative to struggle between Harvard and NROTC. However, the mission of the Advocates is far from being accomplished. The proposed tentative agreement with the Navy was laced with politics.

Unfortunately, the headlines of the Boston Globe and Herald as well as many other print and TV media noted: “Harvard opens the door to ROTC” which is incorrect and misleading for the following reasons:

  1. The decision for Harvard to again host a ROTC unit or multiple units on the Harvard campus is not a decision that can be made unilaterally by President Faust or the Harvard Corporation.
  2. The military is currently under a severe budget crunch and is not looking for added places to spend money such as new ROTC facilities and related overhead costs. During the 1970’s and continuing to the present time, there was a significant shift of ROTC units from the North to the South.  For example from 1968 to 1974, the Army closed 30 units at Eastern colleges and opened up 33 in the South resulting in Southern college ROTC units outnumbering Eastern colleges by 180 to 93.
  3. All of our military services are currently making all their officer candidate quotas and the need for more junior officers has decrease dramatically with the severe shrinkage of platforms and units in the last two decades since Desert Storm.
  4. Some (but not all) senior flag officers in the Pentagon view Harvard as well some other Ivy Schools as snobby elites with a detectable left wing tilt who personally insulted the military during  a time of war in the 1960-1970’s. Some of these senior flags with no Ivy connections are not chopping at the bit to spend more money on schools that have insulted their very existence.  Furthermore in a time of budget constraints, financially it is a lot cheaper to pay for students at an existing ROTC program at a land-grant institution rather then Harvard or Yale.
  5. Due to supply & demand, students desiring to AFROTC and the NROTC programs (excluding the USMC option) currently are required to have an engineering major. Unless a rare waiver could be obtained, all liberal arts majors will be left out in the cold.
  6. Finally, a total population of only 20 cadets and midshipmen from all 4 Harvard undergraduate classes serving in the 3 ROTC units based at MIT do not provide a sufficient critical mass in to justify a ROTC unit hosted by Harvard in the near to mid term.

So far nothing has changed to date at Harvard relative to ROTC since the well publicized announcement of 3 March 2011, which was contingent on the ultimate certification by JCS and Sec Def that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” will not affect our military recruiting, retention and readiness in a time of war.

On 22 July, this certification for DADT was stamped by the Obama administration and is effective on 20 September 2011. It is a done deal but the agreement of 3 March only involved NROTC and so far has left Army and USAF out in the cold.

So to summarize: it is still a challenging and ongoing work in progress for the “Advocates for Harvard ROTC”.

Needed next steps: Harvard, DOD & US government

ROTC at Harvard: In a Tough Patch? (Credit: Bigstock)
ROTC at Harvard: In a Tough Patch? (Credit: Bigstock)

Prior to Harvard’s hosting an ROTC unit, there are more than a dozen other steps that are required by Harvard in the short, mid & long term beyond  the current tentative policy of 3 March 2011 relating only to NROTC. In addition, other steps need to be addressed in the long term by DOD, the Congress and even the White House.

Short term – Harvard – keep promises among them: To follow up on promise to provide an official ROTC space on campus; to provide official recognition of AROTC & AFROTC as well as NROTC; and to pay the promised ROTC overhead allocation to MIT since Harvard has been keeping the entire $40M + of tuition scholarship $ from DOD paid for Harvard ROTC scholarship students

Mid Term – Harvard attitude adjustment: Proactive outreach/ “quotas” for 2 classes of students who are most likely prospects for ROTC participation. For Example: Applicants with an ROTC scholarship in hand. Veterans, especially those  with combat experience as does Columbia and Dartmouth of which some percentage  may desire a commission or would at least be mostly pro- military.

Such a step would greatly add to true undergraduate diversity at Harvard, most Harvard Cadets and Midshipman  have direct military family members.  Furthermore, the majority of Harvard undergrads have no clue about the military which is typically not on their “radar scopes” as a service option and they would more like consider joining the  French foreign Legion or even Roman Legions before signing up for the US military.

In addition, the awareness of military service has negatively suffered in the long term US cultural war; especially Hollywood and other media have generally been anti military for four decades. In addition, a significant part of this problem originates in the US public education system where children no longer  say pledge of allegiance in many high schools, lack discipline,  are often exposed to left wing revisionist, anti military history teachers and a minimization or abandonment of any positive military history. Harvard motto is “Veritas” (i.e. truth) which should be pursued and taught relative to the sacrifices, nobility and achievement of the US military where “Some gave all and all gave some.”

For the Harvard class of 2013, 5 out of 20+ applicants with Army scholarship were positively vetted by the Army for admission. The end result were: two rejected, two wait listed but did not get in and one  was admitted but was significantly hassled by Harvard financial aid office for room & board help that he went to West Point. For 2014, only one of 5 Army vetted applicants were admitted to Harvard

Another key objective would be to promote a climate of tolerance and acceptance for the US military at Harvard  College. For example, the Center for Public Interest Careers at Harvard College does not consider US military as a Public Interest career.

The Harvard Alumni Association had a recent colloquium on “Reflection on careers in government service” – the good, the bad & the ugly” – no mention was made of the military as government service! However, several but not all of the Harvard graduate schools have maintained a positive relationship with the military for many decades, especially HBS and Kennedy School with annual program for national security fellow under the leadership of Advocate member, Lt. Gen. Tad J. Oelstrom USAF (Ret.)

An additional objective would be to stress and help market unique benefits of military service to Harvard students, the college and USA— teach real military history & leadership. There is no greater crucible for leadership, experiencing the unique “Band of Brothers” phenomenon , doing something beyond self, seeing  the world, be a patriot , living with real diversity and  multi-culturism as a shipmate or part of a battalion  and preserve freedom & national security

Longer Term – Harvard

  • Course credits for some or all ROTC courses – currently none are provided
  • Vetting and professors of Military and/ naval science as faculty members as well as junior officers as associate adjunct professors – a future battle if  Harvard becomes a ROTC host school
  • Implement effective actions striving to ensure Harvard has the best ROTC units in the country
  • Continue to appropriately honor Harvard military heroes and veterans.
  • Return of military history geopolitical courses and professors (al la the  current black history bureaucracy). “Those who do nor remember the past are doomed to repeat it” – George Santayana (H-1886).
  • Pro actively help ROTC to build up Harvard undergrad participation in ROTC.
The Harvard View of the Future of ROTC? (Credit: Bigstock)
The Harvard View of the Future of ROTC? (Credit: Bigstock)

Beyond Harvard: DOD and Congress need to provide a budget to expand ROTC activities at Harvard. There is a need to approve an eventual Harvard request to host one or more ROTC units, when qualified. There is a need to provide liberal waivers for non- engineering major participation in AFROTC & NROTC units

In conclusion, the glass is half full vice half empty relative to Harvard and the US military. In the mid term and hopefully in my life time, I am confident that the mostly patriotic support of our country & military by Harvard University over the last 375 years will be fully restored and the shameful stain of intolerance or indifference to our military and national security projected by Harvard over the last 4 decades will be neutralized.

Coda:

History of the Long Crimson Line with a nod to West Point’s Long Gray Line

Harvard which is the oldest university in the USA was voted into existence by the General Court of the Mass Bay Colony in 1636 as New College. This name was changed to Harvard College in 1639 to honor the deceased John Harvard, a minister from Charlestown, whose will had bequeathed his entire library and a sum of money equal to half his estate to the College. Since the first Harvard graduation class in 1642, numerous Harvard alumni have served in the military of their country from the King Phillip’s War in 1675 through operations in Afghanistan.

Harvard now has more Medal of Honor recipients than any other university or college in the Universe, except for Military & the Naval Academies, Harvard, 17, 82 at West Point and 74 from Annapolis. The next closet MOH count among colleges is the University of Washington with 8 MOH recipient alumni (inc. Pappy Boyington).

Harvard grads served on both sides of the American Revolution when Patriots outnumber Loyalists by 7 to 1. During this conflict, 7 Harvard alumni were KIA.

During the Civil War 1,813 Harvard alumni reportedly served on active duty. Among the 1,195 names of Civil War veterans from Harvard documented by the Harvard Alumni Association, most people are amazed to learn that 22% were Confederates. An even further interesting related static is the Rebels represented 43% of all Harvard warriors who were killed in action and 32 % of those who died from disease or accidents.

On the Union side, 7.4% of Harvard alumni who served in the civil War were killed in action, another 2.8% died from accidents and disease with 20.2% of the Crimson Confederates KIA and another 4.7% killed from other accidents and diseases. It should be noted that the Rebs served for the duration of the war, while many union officers and enlisted only had short term service unless they re-upped. It would also seem that did not have the same quality and quantity of medical care as well.

Despite the availability of draft avoidance techniques such as foreign travel and the $300 exemption, chump change to most of these Yankee Brahmin families,  when war came many willingly Harvard families sacrificed their most precious assets—their children—to the Federal cause.The best indication of Harvard’s commitment to the war is found in the percentages of the eve-of-war graduating classes that served in the Federal army and navy: 42% of the Class of 1859, 55% of the Class of 1860, and 68% of the Class of 1861.

The 117 Harvard Union casualties are forever memorialized by picture and a brief bio on a plaque in Memorial Hall near the Harvard Yard which includes Major General James Wadsworth (H-28), the colonel son of Senator Daniel Webster (H-33), the 2 grandsons of Paul Revere, the grandfather of the architect, Buckminster Fuller (H-47) and Col. Robert Gould Shaw (H-60) of the famed 54th Mass Volunteer black infantry regiment. Furthermore, the 20th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment was known as the Harvard regiment since most of the officers were Harvard graduates such as; Major Paul Revere (H-52), Surgeon Edward Revere (H-47, Major Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. (H-61) and several others. These battle scarred warriors fought at Ball’s Bluff, Yorktown, Fair Oaks, Antietum, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.

Other notable Harvard alumni union Army veterans include 7 Medal of Honor recipients noted above as well as: Brig. General Charles Francis Adams (H-56) of the 1st Mass Calvary & great, grandson of John Adams and the grandfather of the Navy vet founder of Raytheon, Captain Robert Todd Lincoln (H-64), Major General & later President Rutherford B. Hayes Co of the 23rd Ohio Infantry Division (HLS-45).

However, nowhere on the Harvard Campus is there any recognition of the 64 Harvard warriors who died for their country which happened to be the Confederacy in which were their home states including: the Brig. General Ben Helm, brother in law of Abraham Lincoln of the 1st KY Calvary (HLS-53), BG States Rights Gist from SC commanding the 27th TN division (HLS-51) and Sgt. George Washington (H-64) of the 2nd VA Infantry who was the great, great grandson of President George Washington’s younger brother John.

In addition other Harvard rebels not killed in action included; Maj. General W.H.  Rooney Lee (H-57), 2nd in command of the Confederate Calvary who was the 2nd son of General Robert E. Lee CSA and Lt. General Richard Taylor (H-45), CO- 9th LA Infantry, the son of President Zachary Taylor, who after his sophomore year at Harvard made the foolish mistake of transferring to and graduating from Yale.

As mentioned Harvard has 17 Medal of Honor recipients among which include a father and son with combatants from every major US war since the Civil War. They are General Leonard Wood (HMS-84 & LLD-99), Col. & President Teddy Roosevelt (H-80) from Spanish American War, a Marine from the Mexican War at Vera Cruz in 1914, three from WWI, including the two CO’s of the Lost Battalions in the Argonne Forest.  Two are from WWII, including Teddy Roosevelt II (H-09) who received a DSC during WWI and was the senior flag on Utah Beach during the Normandy Invasion. Maj. General Pierpont Morgan Hamilton USAF a former WWI pilot (H-20) who as a wounded POW during WWII convinced an enemy general to surrender his division before an allied invasion in North Africa. He was the grandson of JP Morgan and the great, great grandson of Alexander Hamilton.  There are MOH recipients from both the Korean and Vietnam Wars who both jumped on grenades to save their platoon mates. Except for the latter two Harvard MOH recipients, none of the Harvard MOH recipients were killed in action for their heroics.

This pantheon of Harvard heroes included: Flag officers in the USMC, Navy and USAF, eight Army flag officers, four field grade Army officers, a Marine 2nd Lt. and an Army staff sergeant. Another perspective on the MOH recipients from Harvard, 29% were career military, 24% were lawyers, 18% were businessmen and 18% were politicians and 12% were recent graduates who were KIA with no other post graduate experience. Based on the Harvard Alumni Association, at least 11,319 men from Harvard served in the US military during WWI and many others were in the French Foreign Legion, French Army Aviation units, as well as the British and Canadian Armies.

I have also so far identified to date over 130 Harvard alumni recipients of the DSC and Navy Cross including the 2nd highest ace in WWI, Captain Doug Campbell- H-17). Among other notable Harvard military veterans include: President FDR (H-04), LT USN & President JFK (H-40), Captain USAF & President George W. Bush (MBA-75), 2nd LT Norman Prince AF – Founder of the Lafayette Escadrille Squadron (H-08 & HLS-11) who was killed in action, Captain Kermit Roosevelt USA who received the UK Military Cross (H-12), 1st Quentin Roosevelt USA (H-19)- killed in action, Lt. Gen Hanford MacRider USA- 3 Silver Stars (H-11), Capt. Leroy Anderson USA (H-29), Brig. General James Roosevelt USMC (H-30) the son of FDR – Navy Cross & Silver Star, Lt. Joseph Kennedy USN w ho received a Navy Cross and was killed in action  (H-38).  LCDR Charles Francis Adams USN (H-32) was the great, great, great grandson of President John Adams and founder, former CEO of Raytheon, Capt. Casper Weinberger USA- Bronze Star (H-38), Lt. Ben Bradlee USN (H-43) who is the former Editor in Chief of the Washington Post – NCM, Sgt. Henry Kissinger USA- Bronze Star (H-50), Lt. Ted Roosevelt IV (H-65) USNR – NCM who was SEAL in Vietnam and now is a senior partner of a major NYC investment bank, Lt. James Roosevelt (H-68) the grandson of FDR & currently CEO of Tufts Health Plan.

In addition to Memorial Hall noted above for the Union Civil War casualties, the only other military related memorial at Harvard is Memorial Church in the Harvard Yard which was dedicated in 1932 to initially honor Harvard alumni killed in the War to end of all Wars — WWI). However, subsequent wars through the Vietnam have necessitate the addition of more names on the walls of the Church which not totals 1,086 Harvard heroes who made the supreme sacrifice during WWII, 671, WWI (376 – including 4 who were in the German Army and 3 Cliffies), 17 names from the Korean War and 22 from Vietnam including the colonel father of the recent Army Chief of Staff – General George Casey USA.

Excluding the public Land Grant colleges, the blueprint for current ROTC programs at civilian colleges was initiated in 1913 under the leadership of General Leonard Wood USA with the active support of Harvard president A. Lawrence Lowell who stated in 1916: “ The aim of a country which desires to remain at peace must be ready to defend itself, should train a large body of junior offices who can look forward to no career in the army, and can have no wish for war, yet who will be able to take their places in the field when needed”. This effort joint military / Harvard effort was know as the “Plattsburgh movement” since an officer training camp was initially established at Plattsburgh in upstate NY in 1913. Until mid 1916, the Army officer candidates spent 4 weeks each summer at these camps where they paid for their own uniforms, transportation and subsistence with the US War Department just providing tents, rifles, bayonets, belts, ammunition and instructors. However, these regiments had no official standing as part of the military establishment until June 1916 when the US congress passed the Reserve Officers Training Corps directing the War Department to take over this training and activated all officer candidates into the Army.

During WWI, about 90% of the all the Army line officers were trained at Plattsburg or at similar facilities that later cropped up in other locations. Under the direction of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt (H-04), similar Naval Plattsburg training facilities for Naval officers were establish on select US battleships. During WWI, Harvard in effect became a government military school until the end of hostilities when the military training at Harvard was scaled back significantly. However, the Harvard Army ROTC was reconfigured to be what was intended to be a permanent training unit. Harvard later welcomed one of the first 6 Navy ROTC units in the country in 1926. Harvard continued this crucial and patriotic service of training future junior officers until all of the ROTC units were thrown off the campus in 1971 due to the myopic and divisive politics relating to the Vietnam War. Although few in number relative to the past, many junior officers from Harvard have served proudly and honorably in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as elsewhere around the world  over the last decade. The prime mission of the Advocates of Harvard ROTC is to help ensure that the Long Crimson Line of military service is enhance and continues for the decades to come.

Note: (H = Harvard College, HLS = Harvard Law School & HMS = Harvard Medical School  which are followed by class or abbreviated year of graduation)