U.S. Marines with Logistics Operations School conduct helicopter support team training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, March 18, 2025. The HST training is designed to prepare Marines to manage activities at landing zones and to facilitate the pickup, movement, and landing of helicopter-borne troops, equipment, and supplies.
CAMP JOHNSON, NORTH CAROLINA,
03.18.2025
Video by Lance Cpl. Brant Cushman
Marine Corps Combat Service Support Schools
By Debalina Ghoshal
Modern warfare operates in an increasingly contested environment where adversaries possess not only advanced weapon systems but also sophisticated cyber capabilities that can disrupt critical defense technologies.
The complexity of contemporary missile defense systems requires seamless integration between multiple subsystems and the main weapon platform.
As demonstrated during Operation Sindoor, the transition from weapon induction through deployment to active employment demands robust networking capabilities that can maintain operational integrity under hostile conditions.
Blockchain technology emerges as a promising solution to enhance the reliability and security of missile defense systems.
This article examines how blockchain can strengthen missile defense capabilities by improving data integrity, securing communications, and creating resilient command structures.
Blockchain technology provides missile defense systems with two critical capabilities: maintaining data integrity and securing communications during crisis operations. By implementing a controlled blockchain mechanism, military forces can ensure that essential operational data remains accessible across multiple domains while enabling efficient networking between subsystems and primary weapon platforms.
Traditional centralized command and communication structures present significant vulnerabilities in contested environments. A centralized system creates single points of failure that adversaries can exploit through cyber attacks, potentially compromising entire missile defense networks.
Blockchain addresses this vulnerability by enabling decentralized command and communication architectures. This distributed approach makes it substantially more difficult for adversaries to disrupt missile defense operations, as they would need to compromise multiple nodes throughout the network rather than attacking a single central point. The implementation of strong cryptographic algorithms further protects sensitive information and restricts unauthorized access during critical operational periods.
This decentralized structure supports a “defense by denial” strategy, preventing adversaries from neutralizing defensive capabilities to enable their own offensive operations.
Missile defense systems undergo distinct operational phases from initial fielding through deployment to active employment. Blockchain technology facilitates smooth transitions between these phases by preventing data tampering and maintaining comprehensive integrity records throughout the system lifecycle.
One of blockchain’s significant advantages lies in its ability to maintain complete maintenance records within the distributed ledger system. These comprehensive records prove invaluable during system upgrades, technological modifications, and eventual decommissioning processes. When acquiring new missile defense capabilities, historical maintenance data helps military planners understand existing system limitations and specify requirements that address these shortcomings.
During peacetime, missile defense systems require frequent testing to ensure operational readiness. Blockchain-enabled data management systems can effectively capture, store, and analyze test data, providing insights that enhance system performance and reliability.
In crisis situations, blockchain systems enable rapid data coordination by sharing minimal but critical information packets that support split-second decision-making processes. Post-engagement data analysis helps military commanders assess mission success or failure and refine future operational strategies.
Blockchain technology offers significant potential for arms control verification processes. The technology can provide transparent, tamper-proof records of launch platforms and interceptor systems, facilitating effective verification mechanisms. This capability supports both crisis management and peacetime monitoring requirements.
The United States Navy is actively developing blockchain integration for its missile defense systems. The Simba Chain project focuses on supply chain security and data management for the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, ensuring secure supply lines and robust data handling capabilities.
Additionally, the Powerful Authentication Regime Applicable to Naval Operational Flight Program Integrated Development (PARANOID) program represents another blockchain initiative designed to secure weapon system software throughout development and deployment phases.
Despite its advantages, blockchain technology faces inherent limitations that create potential vulnerabilities in missile defense applications. The most significant concern involves the possibility of adversaries compromising a substantial portion of the blockchain network, which could disrupt the operational effectiveness of the entire missile defense system.
Other challenges include the computational overhead required for blockchain operations, potential latency issues in time-critical scenarios, and the need for robust cybersecurity measures to protect the blockchain infrastructure itself.
Blockchain technology offers compelling advantages for enhancing missile defense system security, reliability, and effectiveness. Its ability to provide decentralized command structures, maintain data integrity, and secure communications addresses many vulnerabilities inherent in traditional centralized systems. However, successful implementation requires careful consideration of the technology’s limitations and the development of appropriate safeguards to mitigate potential vulnerabilities.
As military forces continue to operate in increasingly contested environments, blockchain technology represents a valuable tool for maintaining defensive superiority and ensuring mission success in critical scenarios.
Debalina Ghoshal is Non Resident Fellow, Council on International Policy, Advisor, Indian Aerospace and Defence News and the of the book, “Role of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in International Security.”
U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, fly in a CH-53K King Stallion during the air assault portion of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Distributed Maneuver Exercise 1-25 at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, Feb. 11, 2025.
MDMX prepares Marines for future conflicts by combining constructed virtual training with offensive and defensive live-fire and maneuver training scenarios. Service Level Training Exercise 1-25 is designed to enhance readiness across core Mission Essential Tasks and prepares the MAGTF to execute distributed operations across vast, diverse environments by emphasizing decentralized command and control.
TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA
02.11.2025
Video by Sgt. Makayla Elizalde
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center
While Taiwan tensions are often viewed through a U.S.-China lens, the gravest strategic consequences would fall on Japan and the Philippines. Chinese control of Taiwan would fundamentally alter the regional balance, potentially isolating both nations and forcing them into accommodation with Chinese regional dominance regardless of U.S. positions.
Taiwan’s location at the center of the “First Island Chain” makes it a natural geographic chokepoint. The island sits at the midpoint between Japan’s Southwest Islands to the north and the Philippines’ Luzon archipelago to the south, creating what military strategists call the First Island Chain — a natural barrier that currently contains Chinese naval power within the South and East China Seas. This geographic position gives Taiwan outsized strategic importance far beyond its size.
Located opposite Fujian Province off the Asian continent, Taiwan is nearly the same size as Kyushu, measuring almost 36,000 square kilometers. It sits at the midpoint of the first island chain, the transnational archipelago running south from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. The loss of this central link would fundamentally reshape regional security dynamics.
Japan’s dependence on Taiwan Strait shipping routes creates an acute vulnerability that Chinese control would immediately exploit. CSIS estimates that 32 percent of Japan’s imports and 25 percent of its exports transit the Taiwan Strait, with over 95% of Japan’s crude oil coming from Middle Eastern countries and much of it transported through this route.
About 6 trillion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas, or more than half of global LNG trade, passed through the South China Sea in 2011. Half of this amount continued on to Japan, with the rest going to South Korea, China, Taiwan, and other regional countries. The geographic reality means that for Japan, roughly $13 billion of its imports also pass through the Luzon Strait, yet this is just a fraction of its imports through the Taiwan Strait.
The PRC views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as part of “Taiwan province” and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. If the PLA Navy were to occupy Taiwan, Japan would struggle to defend its westernmost islands, as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and even Okinawa. This connection transforms Taiwan from a distant concern into an immediate threat to Japanese territory.
The PLA’s shortest passages from China’s mainland to the Pacific Ocean are on the north and south sides of Taiwan. The former is through Japan’s Southwest Islands between Japan’s mainland and Taiwan, and the latter is through the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines. Chinese control of Taiwan would breach this natural defensive barrier, fundamentally altering Japan’s strategic environment.
Any major armed contingency on or around Taiwan would present an economic and humanitarian crisis for the Philippines. As the nearest potential safe harbor, the volume of refugees escaping the conflict would be likely to quickly overwhelm Philippine capacity. The Marcos administration has acknowledged this reality, with the president noting that Taiwan’s proximity to Luzon makes it “hard to imagine” that the country could avoid conflict.
The strategic importance of the Luzon Strait cannot be overstated. Other straits bordering the South China Sea like the Malacca, Sunda and Balabac Straits are too narrow and shallow for submarines to pass through undetected. The Taiwan Strait is adjacent to and heavily monitored by China as well as by Taipei and the US. This makes Luzon Strait critical in all-out war because the nuclear submarines of both China and the US have a better chance of passing through it undetected.
The Luzon Strait is a choke point for access between the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea, and China’s navy uses it to move carrier strike groups and destroyers out to the open Pacific. Access to the strait is necessary for Chinese interests in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict.
Chinese control of Taiwan would essentially bracket the Philippines between Chinese-dominated waters. The Philippines depends on the strait to transport about one-fifth of its global imports and one-seventh of its exports, but its geography allows it to send much of its trade through the Luzon Strait and Western Pacific Ocean. However, Chinese control of Taiwan would compromise even these alternative routes.
Chinese strategic thinkers explicitly view Taiwan as key to regional domination. Control over Taiwan would transform the Taiwan Strait into China’s “strategic inner lake.” Conversely, so long as the island remained out of China’s hands, it would expose the mainland’s coastal metropolises, seaborne commercial traffic, and the movement of air and naval forces to hostile forces located on Taiwan.
Beijing has long feared that a maritime coalition led by Washington might seek to choke off Chinese access to the seas in a war over Taiwan. Control of the island would thus “shatter the semi-sealed predicament of China’s sea areas” while transforming Taiwan, the central segment of the first island chain, from a barrier into a “portal” to the Pacific.
Chinese forces on the island would be able to radiate power along the first island chain and beyond. From air bases and airports on Taiwan, Chinese aircraft with combat radii of 2,000 kilometers would be able to cover the Yellow and East China Seas, the various straits from Bohai to the north to Bashi to the south, and the Ryukyus, Kyushu, Shikoku, and much of the Philippine archipelago.
The Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships passing from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to points west, carrying goods from Asian factory hubs to markets in Europe, the US and all points in between. Almost half of the global container fleet and 88% of the world’s largest ships by tonnage passed through the waterway.
If cross-strait tensions become especially dire, cautious shipping companies may avoid routes near Taiwan altogether. That same vessel departing from Singapore may choose to sail south of the Philippines before heading north through the Miyako Strait to reach South Korea. This would extend the journey by roughly 1,000 miles, adding significant costs and delays.
Even alternative shipping routes would face Chinese pressure. Many countries would feel the effects of these disruptions, but two key U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, would be among those most impacted. It would also likely make it infeasible to stop at Chinese ports while en route, which could have significant ripple effects on supply chains given China’s central role in maritime shipping.
Recent remarks from Japanese leaders do not mean Tokyo has pledged to defend Taiwan if China attacks, or that it necessarily commits to supporting the United States militarily if Washington chooses to get involved. Tokyo’s answer would ultimately depend on top-level political judgments about the conflict’s cause, specific nature, and implications for Japan’s peace and security.
However, Current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has pledged to double Japan’s defense spending in response to the tense security climate, indicating growing recognition of the stakes involved.
The Philippines has a special economic relationship with Taiwan, but acknowledges the People’s Republic of China (PRC), rather than the Republic of China (Taiwan), as the sole political government of China, and has consistently affirmed the “One China Policy”. However, the Philippine government is now paying more attention to developments in the Taiwan Strait. With the Marcos Jr. Administration, a China policy will likely always be two-pronged: with one prong oriented to Beijing, and another toward Taipei.
Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said that the region is the “spearhead of the Philippines as far as the northern baseline is concerned,” and that its garrison would be strengthened, reflecting growing awareness of the Luzon Strait’s strategic importance.
Both countries are deepening security ties with the United States. U.S. Marine Corps anti-ship missiles will deploy to the Luzon Strait, a strategic first island chain chokepoint between the Philippines and Taiwan, during Balikatan 2025. The 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment’s Medium-Range Missile Battery will send Naval Strike Missile-equipped systems to the Luzon Strait.
The fourth Taiwan Strait crisis also further motivated Washington to strengthen its alliance with regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines.
Beyond the strategic calculations, the fundamental issue is a question of values. Taiwan is a democratic state and has proven that Chinese culture can embrace democratic values. This is an affront to President Xi and his ideology of authoritarian control and global expansion.
Without any question to assault of Putin and Xi would have a similar motivation, namely, to expand their empires and to recover what is “rightfully theirs.” This is of course true if you are working to create a new global order where middle power democratic states like Australia and Brazil are consider merely commodity providers to the expanding Chinese empire.
In short, while U.S.-China competition dominates headlines about Taiwan, the most profound strategic consequences would fall on Japan and the Philippines. Both nations face the prospect of being isolated from each other and from broader alliance networks, potentially forcing accommodation with Chinese regional dominance regardless of US positions.
China is engaged in a geopolitical competition with the United States and a widening array of allies and partners — Japan and the Philippines most of all — who see their national interests directly threatened by Beijing’s choices. The geographic reality of Taiwan’s central position in the First Island Chain means that its fate will determine whether Japan and the Philippines remain sovereign actors in an open regional order or become subordinated to Chinese regional hegemony.
Understanding Taiwan through this regional lens — rather than purely as a U.S.-China issue —reveals why both Japan and the Philippines are quietly but significantly building defensive capabilities and strengthening security partnerships. For them, Taiwan is not just about U.S-Chinese competition; it is about their fundamental security and sovereignty in the decades ahead.
And for some earlier thoughts during Trump’s first term:
https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/taiwan-trump-a-pacific-defense-grid-towards-deterrence-in-depth/
And more recently:
Taiwan, U.S. Defense Industry, and the Evolving Strategy for Indo-Pac Defense
By Robbin Laird
In late 2020, Murielle Delaporte and I published our book entitled: The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the Challenge of XXIst Century Authoritarian Powers. A major emphasis in that book was that the broad challenge was inclusive of European infrastructure and the clear need for the European Union to focus on defense of infrastructure as a core mission rather than being future military force planners.
Recently, The Wall Street Journal published an insightful piece on Europe and the question of their maritime ports in an age when authoritarian powers are engaged and threaten at the same time those ports.
So what would you get if you combined our earlier analysis with this WSJ analysis of the current situation?
I decided to do just that and this is the result of doing a juxtaposition of the two analytical efforts.
How the continent is racing to secure its ports, supply chains, and strategic assets against dual challenges from authoritarian powers
Europe finds itself confronting an unprecedented dual challenge to its critical infrastructure: immediate military threats from Russia requiring urgent port and transportation upgrades, while simultaneously grappling with long-term strategic vulnerabilities created by decades of Chinese and Russian investment in European infrastructure.
The Immediate Crisis: Militarizing Europe’s Ports
The urgency of Europe’s infrastructure challenge became starkly apparent in recent NATO planning discussions. At the upcoming NATO summit, alliance members are targeting a dramatic increase in military spending from 2% to 5% of GDP, with 1.5% specifically allocated to what officials term “nonlethal domains” – cybersecurity, infrastructure, roads, railroads, and critically, ports.
The European Union has proposed an unprecedented €75 billion ($86 billion) investment over five years to upgrade transport infrastructure for military use, representing a massive leap from the current €1.7 billion military mobility budget. This reflects a sobering recognition that Europe’s ports have become potential chokepoints in any future conflict with Russia.
European officials and NATO planners have identified 500 critical locations across the continent requiring immediate upgrades to ensure rapid troop movement to eastern borders. The challenge extends beyond mere logistics – it encompasses the fundamental question of whether Europe’s commercial infrastructure can serve dual civilian and military purposes without compromising either function.
As Apostolos Tzitzikostas, the EU’s transportation commissioner, explains: “The ability to move troops and military equipment quickly across Europe is a military priority, but it is not just that. It is also essential for crisis response but also for making our transport systems smarter and stronger.”
The Convergence Challenge
The infrastructure crisis reveals what defense analysts call the convergence of cyber and physical vulnerabilities. As one expert noted, “Critical infrastructure is an area where the cyber and physical worlds are converging – the operation of digital systems affects our physical world, and so a cyber incident can have direct and serious physical impacts on property and people.”
This convergence is evident in Europe’s current port security initiatives. The European Maritime Safety Agency is working to identify cyber vulnerabilities in port systems, while the Nordic Maritime Cyber Resilience Center has specifically identified Russian hackers as a significant threat to European infrastructure and defense capabilities.
European officials suspect Russia is behind multiple incidents involving damaged or severed cables and pipelines under the Baltic Sea, part of what they see as a broader campaign to test and potentially compromise European infrastructure resilience.
The Long-Term Vulnerability: Foreign Investment in Strategic Assets
While Europe races to address immediate military infrastructure needs, a parallel challenge has been building for over a decade through Chinese and Russian exploitation of European free market mechanisms. Authoritarian states have systematically invested in and gained control over key European infrastructure, creating dependencies that could be leveraged during future crises.
The scope of this challenge is staggering. Chinese companies now control 29 ports and 47 terminals across more than a dozen European countries, including a 67% stake in Greece’s strategically crucial Port of Piraeus. In France, a Chinese consortium owns nearly 50% of Toulouse airport, located at the heart of the country’s aerospace industry.
The European Union’s belated recognition of this vulnerability led to the adoption in March 2019 of a new “framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union.” This mechanism, comparable to the US CFIUS system, aims to monitor foreign investments that could affect security or public order.
The Nordic Model: Hardened Infrastructure as Standard
Some European nations are pioneering approaches that address both immediate military needs and long-term infrastructure security. Norway’s reconstruction of its F-35 air base at Ørland provides a template for how infrastructure development can prioritize security from the ground up.
The Norwegian approach emphasizes hardened facilities, secure supply chains, and workforce security. As Lt. Col. Eirik Guldvog explains: “The Armed Forces Estate Agency has built camps on the base to house workers to work on the base. Because of classifications, only Norwegian workers are being used.”
This model of “security by design” in infrastructure development contrasts sharply with the ad hoc approach of retrofitting existing commercial infrastructure for military use – the challenge now facing most European ports.
Balancing Security and Competitiveness
The tension between security requirements and commercial viability remains acute. Shipping executives fear that militarizing ports could undermine their competitiveness and deter private investment, particularly in facilities that might become targets during any future conflict.
As Katarzyna Gruszecka-Spychala, vice president of finance at Poland’s Port of Gdynia, notes: “We understand it’s needed, but still, we need to achieve competitiveness. Private investors could hesitate to put money into businesses that may be targeted by Russia.”
This concern reflects a broader European challenge: how to maintain the open, competitive markets that have driven European prosperity while protecting against authoritarian exploitation of those same market mechanisms.
The Path Forward: Integration of Security and Commerce
European officials argue that security and commercial interests can be complementary rather than competing priorities. NATO and EU planners believe that infrastructure upgrades designed for military logistics can simultaneously improve civilian traffic flows and economic efficiency.
The key lies in recognizing that robust, secure infrastructure has become a prerequisite for sustained economic competitiveness, not an obstacle to it. As the EU’s Tzitzikostas emphasizes: “These assets need to be competitive in peacetime and ready to defend European citizens when it matters most.”
A Continental Awakening
Europe’s current infrastructure crisis represents more than a response to immediate military threats – it reflects a fundamental awakening to the intersection of economic openness and national security. The continent that pioneered free trade and open markets is learning to defend these achievements against authoritarian powers that view economic integration as a vulnerability to exploit rather than a mutual benefit to preserve.
The success of Europe’s infrastructure security initiative will depend on its ability to maintain the delicate balance between openness and security, competitiveness and resilience. The stakes extend far beyond military logistics – they encompass the fundamental question of whether democratic societies can maintain their openness while defending against authoritarian manipulation.
As European leaders prepare for the NATO summit and finalize their massive infrastructure investments, they are essentially placing a bet on the possibility of “secure openness” – the idea that democratic values and market principles can coexist with the hard realities of 21st-century strategic competition.
U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 364, Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, extract U.S. Marines with 3d Littoral Combat Team, 3d Littoral Regiment, 3rd Marine Division from Calayan, Babuyan Islands, Philippines, during KAMANDAG 9, June 1, 2025.
KAMANDAG is an annual Philippine Marine Corps and U.S. Marine Corps-led exercise aimed at enhancing the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ defense and humanitarian capabilities by providing valuable training in combined operations with foreign militaries in the advancement of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
CALAYAN ISLAND, PHILIPPINES
06.01.2025
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
Ambassador Kenneth Moorefield’s offers a first-person account of his experiences during the Vietnam War as both a soldier and a diplomat, culminating in his evacuation from the Saigon Embassy in 1975.
The article then describes his post-war efforts to aid Vietnamese refugees and American veterans, followed by his return to Vietnam in 1995 to establish diplomatic and economic ties.
Ambassador Moorfield on the Vietnam WarFor a podcast discussing this piece by Ambassador Moorefield, see the following:
Midnight on the Roof of the American Embassy: April 30, 1975
Featured image: The image is set at midnight on the roof of the American Embassy on April 30, 1975. It captures the intense and tense atmosphere during the Fall of Saigon, with a silhouette of a helicopter against the night sky. Evacuees are gathered with their emergency bags, showing anxious and tense expressions, under dim lighting that adds to the dramatic scene. The image was generated by an AI program.
The 2025 iteration of Exercise Iron Fist represents a significant milestone in U.S.-Japan military cooperation, with American Marines and Japanese forces conducting their largest bilateral amphibious training exercise in Japan’s strategically vital southwest islands region.
Running from February 19 through March 7, 2025, this exercise showcased the evolving partnership between the two nations amid growing regional security challenges.
At the heart of Iron Fist 2025 stands the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), serving as the primary American force in the exercise.
The 31st MEU holds a unique position as the Marine Corps’ only permanently forward-deployed MEU, maintaining a continuous presence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Based at Camp Hansen on Okinawa, this force of approximately 2,200 Marines and sailors serves as America’s premier crisis response capability in one of the world’s most strategically important regions³.
The 31st MEU’s current ground combat element centers on Battalion Landing Team 2/4 (BLT 2/4), built around the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines. This reinforced infantry battalion brings substantial amphibious assault capabilities to the exercise, supported by Combat Logistics Battalion 31, which provides essential sustainment and logistics operations.
The integration of these elements creates a complete Marine Air-Ground Task Force capable of rapid deployment and sustained operations across the diverse terrain of Japan’s southwest islands.
A notable component of the Marine participation involved aviation assets from Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36), based at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa. Four MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft from MAG-36 relocated to Camp Ainoura on Kyushu for the duration of the exercise. This movement represented part of a broader 2016 U.S.-Japan agreement designed to reduce training activities around Okinawa while maintaining operational readiness.
MAG-36’s participation underscored the critical role of aviation in modern amphibious operations.
The unit, which forms part of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and III Marine Expeditionary Force, specializes in providing assault support aircraft for Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations.
The Osprey’s unique capabilities — combining the vertical lift of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft — make it particularly valuable for operations across the scattered islands of Japan’s southwest region.
Iron Fist 2025 emphasized practical, realistic training scenarios designed to enhance interoperability between American and Japanese forces. The exercise focused specifically on amphibious operations while working to improve the working relationship between U.S. and Japanese ground forces. Training activities spaned multiple domains, including advanced marksmanship, amphibious reconnaissance, fire and maneuver assaults, bilateral logistics coordination, medical support operations, and comprehensive fire support including mortars, artillery, and close-air support.
Recent training events have demonstrated the exercise’s hands-on approach to building partnership capabilities. Marines from BLT 2/4 have conducted live-fire exercises alongside soldiers from Japan’s 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment. These bilateral marksmanship sessions enable forces from both nations to improve their lethality and readiness while learning from each other’s techniques and procedures.
Logistics cooperation represents another crucial element of the training. U.S. Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 31 have worked directly with Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force personnel on helicopter support team operations, including complex external lift procedures.
In a significant milestone, American Marines successfully conducted the first-ever external lift of a Japanese tactical vehicle, demonstrating growing interoperability in logistics support operations.
The shift of Iron Fist from its traditional California location to Japan’s southwest islands reflects the changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Until 2023, the exercise was conducted at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton in California before moving to its current location in response to regional security concerns.
Japan’s southwest islands have become increasingly important due to China’s territorial claims on the disputed Senkaku Islands and Beijing’s focus on conducting military exercises simulating a blockade of Taiwan. Chinese military forces, including People’s Liberation Army Navy ships and aircraft, routinely transit through international waters and airspace around Japan’s southwest region, highlighting the strategic significance of this area.
The exercise locations themselves tell the story of this strategic focus. Training areas include multiple sites across the region: Camp Hansen and Kin Blue Beach Training Area on Okinawa, Camp Ainoura in Sasebo and Camp Takayubaru in Kumamoto on Kyushu, and the southwest island of Okinoerabu. This geographic spread allows forces to train across the diverse terrain types they might encounter in real-world operations while demonstrating allied commitment to regional security.
The exercise benefited from significant naval support, with multiple U.S. Navy vessels providing the maritime foundation for amphibious operations. The amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) served as the primary platform, supported by the amphibious dock landing ship USS Rushmore (LSD-47) and amphibious transport dock USS San Diego (LPD-22). This naval component provided the Marines with realistic ship-to-shore movement capabilities essential for amphibious operations.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force contributed its own vessels, including the tank landing ship JS Kunisaki (LST-4003) and minesweepers JS Awaji (MSO-304) and JS Chichijima (MSC-605). This combined fleet provided a comprehensive maritime training environment that mirrors the complex, multi-national nature of potential real-world operations in the region.
Beyond its immediate training value, Iron Fist 2025 serves as a cornerstone of the broader U.S.-Japan security relationship. The exercise, now in its 19th iteration, has evolved from its origins as a California-based training event to become a symbol of alliance cooperation in the face of regional challenges. The annual nature of the exercise allows both forces to build institutional knowledge and develop lasting professional relationships that extend far beyond the formal training period.
The participation of Japan’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB), 1st Helicopter Brigade, and units from the Western Army alongside their American counterparts demonstrates Japan’s commitment to developing its own amphibious capabilities.
This parallel development of capabilities on both sides strengthens the overall alliance while ensuring that both nations can contribute meaningfully to regional security.
Iron Fist 2025 represented more than a training exercise — it serves as a demonstration of allied resolve and capability in one of the world’s most strategically contested regions. The Marines of the 31st MEU, working alongside their Japanese counterparts, are developing the skills, relationships, and interoperability necessary to respond to future challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
As regional tensions continue to evolve, exercises like Iron Fist become increasingly important for maintaining the delicate balance of power that has ensured stability in the region for decades.
The professional relationships built during these training events, the tactical and operational lessons learned, and the demonstrated commitment to partnership serve as powerful deterrents to potential aggression while reassuring allies and partners throughout the region.
The success of Iron Fist 2025 will likely influence future iterations of the exercise and similar bilateral training events.
As both nations continue to adapt their forces to meet emerging challenges, the lessons learned from this exercise will inform military planning, force structure decisions, and alliance coordination for the evolving “fight tonight” force.
Sources:
DVIDS notes associated with the photos used in this article.
