Could the United States Have Done Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Could the United States Have Done Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web?
06/29/2025

Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web stands as one of the most audacious military operations of the 21st century. It estimated that 117 drones were coordinated across 4,300 kilometers, destroying $7 billion in Russian aircraft for under $120,000 in equipment costs

The operation’s success raises a provocative question: Could the world’s most technologically advanced military have pulled off the same feat?

The answer reveals a fundamental paradox at the heart of American defense capabilities.

Despite possessing vastly superior technology, resources, and global reach, the U.S. military likely could not have executed Operation Spider Web as Ukraine did.

This limitation stems not from technical inadequacy, but from the very institutional frameworks that make America’s military powerful in conventional warfare.

From a purely technical perspective, the United States possesses capabilities that dwarf what Ukraine demonstrated in Spider Web.

American military technology represents the pinnacle of defense innovation:

  • Advanced Autonomous Systems: The U.S. military operates sophisticated platforms like the MQ-9 Reaper with its ability to loiter for 14 hours at 50,000 feet, and the RQ-4 Global Hawk capable of 34-hour flights across intercontinental distances. These systems far exceed the 150-kilometer range and basic payload capacity of Ukraine’s Osa drones.
  • Artificial Intelligence Integration: Programs like Project Maven have developed AI systems capable of processing millions of hours of video footage to identify targets with precision that makes Ukraine’s museum-trained algorithms appear rudimentary.The Pentagon’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center coordinates AI development across all service branches with budgets exceeding Ukraine’s entire defense expenditure.
  • Global Logistics Networks: American military logistics capabilities can position assets anywhere on Earth within hours. The U.S. maintains over 800 military installations across 80 countries, providing staging areas that Ukraine could only dream of accessing through covert operations.
  • Precision Strike Capabilities: U.S. forces routinely achieve the kind of targeting precision Ukraine celebrated in Spider Web. Tomahawk missiles can strike targets with sub-meter accuracy from thousands of kilometers away, while platforms like the B-2 Spirit can deliver precision munitions globally with near-impunity.

Yet despite these overwhelming technical advantages, the U.S. military system would struggle to replicate Spider Web’s innovative approach, cost-effectiveness, and operational agility.

The U.S. defense acquisition system, designed to ensure accountability and minimize risk, creates barriers that would make a Spider Web-style operation nearly impossible within existing frameworks.

Cost Multiplication Effect: What Ukraine accomplished for $120,000 would likely cost the U.S. military tens of millions of dollars. The Pentagon’s acquisition process would demand military-grade components, extensive testing protocols, contractor oversight, and compliance reviews that inflate costs exponentially. A simple commercial drone becomes a complex military system requiring years of development and validation.

Timeline Paralysis: Ukraine planned and executed Spider Web in 18 months. A comparable U.S. operation would require 5-10 years moving through standard acquisition phases: initial requirements definition, market research, request for proposals, contractor selection, development, testing, evaluation, and deployment. Each phase includes review boards, congressional oversight, and bureaucratic approvals that prioritize process over speed.

Risk Aversion Culture: The U.S. military-industrial complex gravitates toward proven, expensive solutions rather than innovative approaches that carry inherent risks. The careers of military officers and defense contractors depend on avoiding failures rather than achieving breakthrough successes, creating institutional incentives that discourage the kind of bold experimentation that characterized Ukrainian drone development.

Consider the contrast: Ukraine’s engineers trained AI targeting systems using museum aircraft displays and achieved 90-centimeter precision targeting. A U.S. military equivalent would require extensive modeling and simulation, live-fire testing ranges, safety reviews, and validation protocols that would take years and cost millions. Ultimately a system would be produced that might be marginally better but orders of magnitude more expensive.

America’s global leadership role creates legal and operational constraints that fundamentally limit the military’s operational flexibility compared to Ukraine’s desperate circumstances.

  • Congressional Oversight Requirements: Covert operations require extensive legal frameworks, congressional notification, and ongoing oversight that would compromise the operational security essential to a Spider Web-style operation. Ukraine’s Security Service could plan for 18 months in complete secrecy with only five people initially aware of the operation’s existence. The U.S. equivalent would require briefings to multiple congressional committees, legal reviews, and approval processes that would expand the circle of knowledge exponentially.
  • International Law Compliance: The U.S. military operates under strict rules of engagement and international law constraints that Ukraine, fighting for national survival, could set aside. American operations must consider diplomatic consequences, alliance relationships, and long-term strategic implications that complicate rapid, aggressive action.
  • Attribution Concerns: The United States faces different consequences for military operations than Ukraine. While Ukraine could openly claim credit for Spider Web as legitimate self-defense, similar U.S. operations might be viewed as aggressive acts requiring careful consideration of escalation dynamics and international response.
  • Command Structure Rigidity: The U.S. military’s hierarchical command structure, designed for large-scale conventional operations, lacks the flexibility that enabled Ukraine’s “islands of forces” approach. American military culture emphasizes following established procedures and chains of command, while Spider Web required rapid improvisation and decentralized decision-making.

The most significant barrier to U.S. replication of Spider Web lies in what might be called the “innovation paradox.” The same institutional strengths that make the U.S. military dominant in conventional warfare create weaknesses in asymmetric, innovative operations.

  • Contractor Dependence: The U.S. military relies heavily on established defense contractors who excel at producing sophisticated, expensive systems but may lack the agility for rapid, low-cost innovation. Ukraine’s success came from direct military-industry cooperation with hundreds of small manufacturers, from major defense companies to garage workshops. The U.S. equivalent would channel through established contractors adding layers of bureaucracy and cost.
  • Success Definition Differences: The U.S. military measures success through complex metrics including casualty minimization, international law compliance, strategic objectives, and long-term consequences. Ukraine could focus purely on immediate tactical effectiveness and cost efficiency. These different success criteria fundamentally shape operational planning and execution.
  • Resource Abundance Problems: Paradoxically, the U.S. military’s vast resources can inhibit innovation. When budgets are measured in hundreds of billions, there’s less pressure to develop the kind of creative, low-cost solutions that necessity forced upon Ukraine. American military culture often equates expensive with effective, while Ukraine proved that innovation and resourcefulness could achieve strategic effects at minimal cost.
  • Institutional Memory vs. Adaptation: The U.S. military’s institutional knowledge and established doctrines, while valuable for conventional operations, can create resistance to radical innovation. Ukraine’s military, essentially rebuilt during wartime, could embrace new approaches without fighting existing institutional biases.

Rather than attempting to replicate Spider Web directly, the U.S. military would likely pursue different approaches that leverage American conventional advantages:

  • Precision Strike Integration: Instead of 117 small drones, the U.S. might use a handful of sophisticated cruise missiles or stealth bomber sorties to achieve similar destruction with greater certainty and less operational complexity.
  • Cyber-Kinetic Fusion: American cyber capabilities could disable enemy air defense systems, communications, or even aircraft systems directly, potentially achieving Spider Web’s objectives without kinetic strikes.
  • Special Operations Coordination: U.S. special forces could conduct sabotage operations or coordinate with local assets to achieve similar strategic effects while maintaining plausible deniability.
  • Alliance Leverage: The U.S. could work through NATO allies or regional partners who might have greater operational flexibility for conducting Spider Web-style operations.

Nonetheless, Ukraine’s drone warfare revolution highlights critical vulnerabilities in American military thinking and acquisition processes that extend far beyond the Spider Web operation itself.

  • Speed vs. Perfection Trade-offs: The U.S. military’s pursuit of perfect solutions may sacrifice the tactical advantages of rapid deployment and iteration. Ukraine’s willingness to deploy “good enough” solutions quickly proved more effective than pursuing optimal solutions slowly.
  • Cost-Effectiveness Blindness: American defense planning often ignores cost-effectiveness ratios that proved decisive in Ukrainian operations. When $1,000 drones can destroy $250 million bombers, traditional military investment priorities require fundamental reconsideration.
  • Innovation Ecosystem Gaps: Ukraine’s success came from integrating civilian technology, military application, and rapid iteration cycles. The U.S. military-industrial complex may lack equivalent innovation ecosystems that can rapidly translate commercial technology into military capability.
  • Asymmetric Thinking Deficits: American military doctrine excels at conventional operations but may struggle with the kind of asymmetric thinking that enabled Spider Web’s success. The operation succeeded through creative rule-breaking rather than superior resources or technology.

The Spider Web case study suggests several reforms that could help the U.S. military capture some advantages of Ukrainian-style innovation while maintaining institutional strengths:

  • Acquisition Fast-Tracks: Creating parallel acquisition pathways for low-cost, high-risk innovation projects that bypass traditional bureaucratic requirements for rapid deployment and iteration. And notably, give the systems to the war fighters and let them work directly with the software/AI company behind the drones to drive iterative evolution of deployed systems.
  • Innovation Incubators: Establishing military innovation centers that can rapidly prototype and test new concepts without full acquisition process requirements, similar to Ukraine’s direct military-industry cooperation.
  • Cultural Shifts: Rewarding successful innovation and calculated risk-taking rather than process compliance and risk avoidance, encouraging the kind of creative thinking that enabled Spider Web. Prioritizing acquisition processes over effective use by the warfighters is a major obstacle to change when it comes with software/AI driven autonomous systems, rather than platforms.
  • Commercial Integration: Developing frameworks for rapidly integrating commercial technology into military applications, reducing dependence on traditional defense contractors for innovative solutions.

In short, Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web reveals a fundamental tension in modern military affairs: the institutional frameworks that make the U.S. military the world’s most powerful conventional force may simultaneously constrain its ability to conduct the kind of innovative, asymmetric operations that proved devastatingly effective against Russian forces.

This is not an indictment of American military capability, but rather recognition that different strategic circumstances require different institutional approaches.

The U.S. military’s strength lies in its ability to project conventional power globally with unmatched precision and effectiveness.

Ukraine’s strength emerged from necessity-driven innovation and institutional flexibility born of existential threat.

The challenge for American defense leaders is not to abandon the institutional strengths that make the U.S. military globally dominant, but to create pathways for the kind of rapid innovation and asymmetric thinking that Operation Spider Web demonstrated.

This might require accepting higher risks, tolerating failures, and embracing the kind of creative chaos that produced Ukraine’s drone warfare revolution.

Ultimately, Operation Spider Web offers the U.S. military not a template to copy, but a mirror reflecting both the strengths and limitations of American institutional approaches to warfare.

The question is whether American defense institutions can evolve to capture the advantages of Ukrainian-style innovation while maintaining the conventional superiority that underpins global security.

In an era where $120,000 operations can achieve strategic effects previously requiring billions in military investment, the nation that masters this balance may hold decisive advantages in future conflicts.

Ukraine has shown what’s possible when institutional constraints are swept away by existential necessity.

The challenge for America is achieving similar innovation without requiring similar desperation.

The featued image was generated by an AI program.

The Convergence of Strategic Vision and Operational Reality: From GBU-57 Development to Modern Air Supremacy

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Convergence of Strategic Vision and Operational Reality: From GBU-57 Development to Modern Air Supremacy
06/28/2025

By Robbin Laird

The recent operations Midnight Hammer and Rising Lion represent the culmination of decades of strategic airpower investment, demonstrating how prescient weapons development from the early 2000s enabled decisive military options in 2025.

However, these successes have exposed critical capacity limitations that require immediate attention to maintain credible deterrence in an increasingly multipolar world.

The Strategic Genesis: Anticipating Iran’s Nuclear Challenge (2004-2010)

The development of the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) began in 2004 as a direct response to Iran’s strategic decision to bury its nuclear infrastructure deep underground.

By 2010, the strategic calculus driving MOP development had crystallized around a specific challenge. Iran, learning from Israel’s successful strikes on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s nuclear facility in 2007, had embarked on a different approach to nuclear development.

Rather than building vulnerable above-ground facilities, Iran was constructing its most critical nuclear infrastructure deep underground, protected by hundreds of feet of rock and reinforced concrete.

Major General C.R. Davis, who led weapons development at Eglin Air Force Base, exemplified the forward-thinking approach needed for this challenge. This created what Major General Davis described in 2010 as a fundamental challenge in weapons development: “This process must start with future target set playing a key role in leading the design process. The process must not start with a set of constraints defined by specific legacy platform dimensions.”

The MOP’s development timeline reveals the prescient nature of this investment:

  • 2004: Defense Threat Reduction Agency launched the MOP project
  • 2005-2007: Boeing completed concept refinement specifically targeting Iranian-type facilities
  • 2007: First static detonation test validated explosive capabilities
  • 2008-2010: Flight testing phase, concurrent with Iran’s Fordow facility construction

In the case of the MOP, the anticipation was exactly right. The weapon system was developed specifically with Iran’s nuclear program in mind, and when diplomatic efforts failed to prevent Iran’s nuclear advancement, the military option was ready.

Israeli Strategic Vision: The F-35 as Revolutionary Capability (2011)

Paralleling U.S. weapons development, Israeli defense leaders recognized the transformational potential of fifth-generation aircraft. In a prescient 2010 interview, retired General Herzl Bodinger, former Chief of the Israeli Air Force, articulated the need for revolutionary rather than evolutionary capabilities.

General Bodinger: “There comes a time that you have to make a leap forward in combat capability which we plan to do with the F-35.”

His insights about the changing threat environment proved remarkably accurate:

“The effort is to provide new capabilities against our aircraft and to do so by using various means including, ground-to-air missiles of different kinds. And against the ability of Israel to retaliate, and to attack this very small country, a country with no strategic depth. Our adversaries are relying on the proliferation of missiles, both surface-to-air and the ground-to-ground to prevail… So, the correct way to go, which we watched very carefully, was what the F-117 introduced at first. The idea of low observable and low radar cross section, and it really looks a newer way to go.”

“For us, this will be the F-35. Because it can lead the way, and it can reach the targets. It can fly over any point over the Middle East, and strike any target.”

Operation Rising Lion: Validation of Israeli Investment (June 13, 2025)

Israel’s Operation Rising Lion demonstrated the strategic value of its F-35 investment.

Just after midnight on June 13, 2025, an Israeli operation codenamed Rising Lion unfolded in two distinct but mutually reinforcing acts.

First came swarms of small explosive drones that Israeli commandos had reportedly pre-positioned inside Iran months earlier, striking air-defense radars and communications nodes, while decoying attention toward Tehran’s western approaches.

Minutes later, over 200 Israeli fighter aircraft — many of them F-35 Adirs carrying standoff munitions — conducted precision strikes against more than 100 nuclear and military targets across Iran, including senior military leaders.

The operation showcased several technological advances:

  • Israeli F-35 Modifications: Reports about the F-35I indicate Israel modified them to reach Iran without refueling and without sacrificing their stealth capabilities. Israel identified this capability back in 2022, but there is still no indication of what it means exactly.
  • Operational Results: The operation involved approximately 200 Israeli aircraft conducting coordinated strikes across multiple Iranian targets, with F-35I fighters spearheading the initial penetration missions into heavily defended Iranian airspace. This marks the largest combat deployment of F-35 aircraft in history and validates Israel’s unique modifications to the platform for long-range precision operations.
  • Strategic Deception and Intelligence: Israeli intelligence had pre-positioned precision-guided drones and explosive systems across Iranian territory, including near Tehran. These assets were concealed and dormant, bypassing Iran’s air defenses. The lack of external flight paths meant Iran’s alarm systems did not activate.

Operation Midnight Hammer: U.S. Strategic Capability Demonstration (June 22, 2025)

Nine days after Rising Lion, the United States launched Operation Midnight Hammer, demonstrating the maturation of capabilities developed over two decades.

The operation included more than 125 US aircraft, “dozens” of aerial refueling tankers, a guided missile submarine and approximately 75 precision guided weapons… Caine said the mission, dubbed Operation Midnight Hammer, included seven B-2 Spirit bombers that flew east from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to Iran.

At about 6:40 p.m. ET, or 2:10 a.m. in Iran, the lead B-2 dropped two “bunker-buster” bombs known as the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators, or MOPs, on the site at Fordo… Over the next 25 minutes, Caine said, a total of 14 MOPs would be dropped on targets at Fordo and Natanz.

More than 125 aircraft, including 7 B-2 stealth bombers, snuck into Iran while other B-2s were sent to Guam as decoys… In fact, two flights of B-2 Spirits, callsigns MYTEE 11 flight and MYTEE 21 flight, each comprising four aircraft, departed from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, in the early hours of Jun. 21, 2025. Their destination was confirmed as Andersen Air Force Base, located on the Pacific island of Guam.

The Sobering Reality: Capacity Constraints and Strategic Implications

Despite the operational success, both operations reveal critical limitations that threaten future deterrence credibility.

Yet what the American public didn’t see was this: That one-day operation maxed out our available long-range stealth strike capability. The U.S. Air Force only fields 19 B-2 bombers, and they are more than 30 years old. Although the B-52 fleet remains a workhorse, it just turned 73 years old. Also, a good percentage of our GBU-57 bunker-buster stockpile was used in a single night.

Today, the U.S. Air Force is the oldest, the smallest and the least ready in its history. That’s not an opinion — it’s a fact and a strategic liability. Over 30 years of underinvestment in Air Force modernization and spares has left us dangerously thin in aircraft, munitions and trained crews.

The contrast in readiness rates highlights the importance of sustained investment: Israeli F-35 fleet: Nearly 90% readiness rate with the U.S. F-35 fleet: Slightly above 50% readiness rate.

Strategic Requirements

According to a recent essay by my friend General Deptula and Rep. August Pfluger (R-Texas), there is a clear need to accelerate and scale the B-21 Raider program. We need to dramatically grow our F-35 inventory — aircraft that proved pivotal in gaining air superiority over Iran. New types like Collaborative Combat Aircraft will also prove crucial. We need to build munitions stockpiles that can support more than a one-night raid.

Operation Midnight Hammer proved what American airmen can do. Now it’s time for Congress to prove that it understands what’s at stake. America must not let this stunning success become a historical footnote because we failed to prepare for what comes next.

The convergence of strategic vision from the 2000s with operational reality in 2025 demonstrates both the power of prescient defense investment and the critical need for sustained modernization. While Operations Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer showcased unparalleled technological superiority, they also revealed capacity constraints that threaten future deterrence credibility.

The path forward requires recognizing these operations not as the culmination of past investments, but as the foundation for an essential expansion of airpower capabilities in an increasingly dangerous multipolar world. The president needs options, and airpower provides those options—but only if the capacity exists to sustain them beyond a single night of operations.

Featured image of an historical moment: Weapon specialists gather in front of a mock up of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator and the B-2 weapons load trainer Dec. 18 at Whitman Air Force Base, Mo. U.S. Air Force photo.

Also, see the following:

Israel and the F-35: 2011

From Development to Deployment: The GBU-57 MOP’s Journey from Eglin AFB to Iran

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/5372479-air-force-funding-dollars/

The Paris Air Show 2025 and Tales of FCAS

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Paris Air Show 2025 and Tales of FCAS
06/25/2025

By Pierre Tran

Le Bourget, France – A long-simmering dispute between Airbus and Dassault Aviation on the share of high-value work on a planned European fighter jet boiled over at the 2025 Paris air show, which opened June 16 with a summer heatwave warming the tarmac.

The June 21 U.S. strike with bunker busting bombs of three nuclear related targets in Iran underscored the significance of the military aircraft and weapons displayed at the 55th edition of the air show, held in the northern suburbs of the capital.

An aerobatic display of a Dassault Rafale fighter jet in the red, white, and blue of the French flag opened the show, reflecting national pride in the aerospace sector. The show organizer, Gifas, told a June 5 press conference the U.S. was the second-largest national exhibitor after France at the showcase for aeronautics and space technology.

Beneath the glitter of the show, which closed June 22, industry executives bore in mind the loss of more than 240 lives in the June 12 crash of a Boeing 787 Dreamliner flown by Air India. In the military world, there was Israel’s extended air and missile attack on Iran, pointing up Israeli dominance of the Iranian skies, while Teheran fired ballistic missiles in retaliation.

In other theaters of conflict, India has yet to give a detailed account in response to Pakistan’s claim of downing the Rafale in combat, while Dassault has said what counted was accomplishing the mission, not the aircraft.

Corporate Clash

Dassault executive chairman Eric Trappier told June 17 Bloomberg TV that Airbus posed governance problems on the European fighter project.

Airbus Defence and Space, based in Germany, is the industrial partner of Dassault, the French prime contractor, on the new generation fighter (NGF) at the heart of the ambitious European future combat air system (FCAS).

“We may go it alone,” Trappier said at the show, with the mercury rising on troubled corporate ties.

If there was good cooperation, then it made sense to stay in the partnership on the fighter, he said, but added that he was “not happy with the governing system.”

The governance rules on FCAS meant Dassault sat at the table negotiating with the German and Spanish Airbus units, with the latter two entitled to two thirds of the work share, he said. The work share reflected the three nations backing the project rather than the companies’ technological skills.

France, Germany, and Spain were financing the project, with Belgium keen to enter the deal.

It could be argued that rising costs and the call for shareholders’ return have made it harder for manufacturers to go it alone. That raises the need for government funding, making it a political decision rather than purely corporate on whether to pull out.

A senior Airbus executive, Jean-Brice Dumont, told reporters June 17 Dassault was clearly the prime, adding there was also a claim for a work for based on the equal share of the three nations backing FCAS.

“What we don’t challenge is that there is an appointed leader for the fighter program,” he said. “That leader is named Dassault Aviation.

Dumont, head of air power at Airbus Defence and Space, spoke calmly, perhaps attempting to pour oil over troubled waters.

“Dassault has the lead of the so-called pillar one – NGWS (new generation weapon system).

There has to be an even share corresponding to the share of our governments. That doesn’t have to become toxic in the programme,” he said.

“We have to aim for something that is simple enough. Cooperation meant there would be interdependency, which had to be ‘healthy,’” he said, pointing up the need for government support to advance the FCAS project.

Airbus was not planning to move to the global combat air programme (GCAP) and leave FCAS, he said.

Airbus DS is a unit of Airbus, an airliner builder based in Toulouse, southern France.

Dumont previously worked in the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office on the Franco-German Tiger attack helicopter before moving on to work on the NH90 military transport helicopter at Eurocopter, renamed Airbus Helicopters.

Strategic Solidarity

Jean-Pierre Maulny, deputy director of the Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, a think tank, told June 11 the Anglo-American Press Association that European allies needed to share technology, to pursue a “strategic solidarity. This was in preference to the “best athlete” approach.

The DGA backed the latter, which secured a leading position for Dassault in building fighters. France has the “competence,” while Germany has the money, he said.

“It’s very difficult,” he said.

France is in financial dire straits, with a 2024 public sector budget deficit of 5.8 pct, up from 5.4 pct in the previous year, national statistics agency INSEE has said. That calls for big government spending cuts to meet a European Union target of 3 pct by 2029.

Meanwhile, there was a perceived need for European allies to replace key U.S. capabilities – known as “enablers — as Washington was seen as withdrawing from the European theatre.

Europe has a problem with “enablers,” he said, referring to the lack of European built  satellites, deep-strike weapons, defense against air and missile attacks, spy planes, intelligence gathering, air-to-air refueling, and strategic air transport.

The 27 E.U. member states, and the U.K. and Norway had much to do, and should act collectively, he said. European allies had five to 10 years to build up the defence industrial and technology base in Europe.

Dassault has a history of building its own aircraft and delivering the flight control technology, said Sash Tusa, analyst at Agency Partners, an equities research house.

If there is cooperation,  there will be technology flying for 40-50 years, paid for by the partner governments, he said. Alternatively, Dassault has work in the pipeline for the F5 and eventual F6 of the Rafale and a planned unmanned combat air vehicle based on the Neuron demonstrator.

Meanwhile, Germany clearly has a nearer-term priority to fund, and bring into service, the F-35, he said.

An industry source said Dassault was working on F5, and there was nothing planned for an F6 version.

FCAS appears to be lagging further behind the global combat air program, which seems to be on its third design iteration, Tusa said.

Italy, Japan, and the U.K. are the three nations backing GCAP, based on the Tempest, a British-led fighter project. The aim is to fly that new generation fighter in 2035.

Saudi Arabia is keen to join that fighter project, and Italy backs Riyadh’s entry to that consortium, Reuters reported Jan. 27.

Dassault tucked its life-size model of the new generation fighter on the side of its outdoor stand, while its Neuron prototype for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) and a Rafale, complete with a spread of weapons, took pride of place in the front.

That layout was seen by some as relegating the new fighter to second place, while pointing up the perceived importance of the Rafale and its accompanying collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), or combat drone.

No Surprise

Trappier’s remarks to Bloomberg did not surprise one French executive, who said those sentiments had appeared in the French press, and perhaps the high media impact stemmed from being expressed in English.

The Dassault executive told June 16 Le Figaro, a daily, the French company’s minority position on the fighter made it “particularly complicated to exercise leadership. If the states want us to go ahead, governance needs to be changed.”

The Dassault family owns Le Figaro.

The aim was to build and fly a plane by 2029/30, he said. “To do that, a leader is needed, not endless discussion on the work share for the nations. This geographic return is not efficient.

That was fine when the work was all on paper, but when it came to ‘cutting steel,’ things had to change,” he said.

The Dassault top executive made it clear April 9 to the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly, when he told parliamentarians “the task is extremely difficult,” but the company had no intention of pulling out.

There was permanent negotiation, he said, with a long and complex path.

“I am not sure this is the model of efficiency, but we will meet the wishes of the states,” he said.

There were delays due to the geographic return approach, he said, when the priority should be on the level of expertise to develop an ambitious industrial product. That product should be competitive, not only with the enemy but also what the allies were building.

Dassault could not build everything, but the company did work with Thales, the electronics company, he said.

The family-controlled plane maker holds 26.6 pct of Thales.

The fighter project lay in finding the best compromise between stealth and maneuverability, while meeting requirements of the chiefs of staff, he told parliamentarians. Tests should be launched as soon as possible, and he favored speeding up the project by a revised share of “responsibilities.”

“It is up to the states to discuss, to define the best way to manage this ambitious program,” he said.

“I do not want to appear arrogant,” he said in answer to whether Dassault could build the FCAS on its own. “I am ready to cooperate and share, but Dassault and its partners Thales and Safran have the capability to build a fighter jet on a national basis.

“The president strongly wishes to see cooperation on FCAS,” he said, as the three partner nations allowed increased funding and the fighter would signify a more united Europe.

“The state is committed, but the situation is more complex when one plunges into the reality of contracts,” he said. “I say again – with three, the situation is necessarily more complex, and should evolve.”

President Emmanuel Macron and the then German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, announced in 2017 the determination to launch the FCAS project, soon after a U.K. referendum delivered a vote, with narrow margin, to leave the E.U.

The FCAS budget for the present phase 1B and upcoming phase 2 was worth almost €8 billion ($9.2 billion), the armed forces ministry has said. Phase 1B was worth €3.2 billion, ran 2023-2025, and allowed air force officers to select the aircraft architecture this year.

Phase 2 calls on the partner companies to build and fly a fighter technology demonstrator and two classes of remote carriers, or drones, in 2028/29. That appears to have slipped to 2029/30.

Belgium, an observer on FCAS, is keen to join as a partner nation when phase 2 is launched, opening up the prospect for work for Belgian aerospace companies.

The FCAS budget shared between the three partner nations has been estimated at some €80 billion, and that appears to have been rounded up to €100 billion.

The new fighter would replace the Eurofighter Typhoon for Germany and Spain, and the Rafale for France. The FCAS project includes a combat cloud for extended command and control, as well as the swarm of drones.

Featured image: The Paris Air Show 2025 as seen from the Dassault Pavilion. Credit: Dassault.

The King Stallion and Helicopter Support Team Training

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The King Stallion and Helicopter Support Team Training

U.S. Marines with Logistics Operations School conduct helicopter support team training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, March 18, 2025. The HST training is designed to prepare Marines to manage activities at landing zones and to facilitate the pickup, movement, and landing of helicopter-borne troops, equipment, and supplies.

CAMP JOHNSON, NORTH CAROLINA,

03.18.2025

Video by Lance Cpl. Brant Cushman 

Marine Corps Combat Service Support Schools

Blockchain in Missile Defense Technology

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Blockchain in Missile Defense Technology
06/23/2025

By Debalina Ghoshal

Modern warfare operates in an increasingly contested environment where adversaries possess not only advanced weapon systems but also sophisticated cyber capabilities that can disrupt critical defense technologies.

The complexity of contemporary missile defense systems requires seamless integration between multiple subsystems and the main weapon platform.

As demonstrated during Operation Sindoor, the transition from weapon induction through deployment to active employment demands robust networking capabilities that can maintain operational integrity under hostile conditions.

Blockchain technology emerges as a promising solution to enhance the reliability and security of missile defense systems.

This article examines how blockchain can strengthen missile defense capabilities by improving data integrity, securing communications, and creating resilient command structures.

How Blockchain Enhances Missile Defense Systems

Blockchain technology provides missile defense systems with two critical capabilities: maintaining data integrity and securing communications during crisis operations. By implementing a controlled blockchain mechanism, military forces can ensure that essential operational data remains accessible across multiple domains while enabling efficient networking between subsystems and primary weapon platforms.

Traditional centralized command and communication structures present significant vulnerabilities in contested environments. A centralized system creates single points of failure that adversaries can exploit through cyber attacks, potentially compromising entire missile defense networks.

Blockchain addresses this vulnerability by enabling decentralized command and communication architectures. This distributed approach makes it substantially more difficult for adversaries to disrupt missile defense operations, as they would need to compromise multiple nodes throughout the network rather than attacking a single central point. The implementation of strong cryptographic algorithms further protects sensitive information and restricts unauthorized access during critical operational periods.

This decentralized structure supports a “defense by denial” strategy, preventing adversaries from neutralizing defensive capabilities to enable their own offensive operations.

Operational Advantages Throughout the System Lifecycle

Missile defense systems undergo distinct operational phases from initial fielding through deployment to active employment. Blockchain technology facilitates smooth transitions between these phases by preventing data tampering and maintaining comprehensive integrity records throughout the system lifecycle.

One of blockchain’s significant advantages lies in its ability to maintain complete maintenance records within the distributed ledger system. These comprehensive records prove invaluable during system upgrades, technological modifications, and eventual decommissioning processes. When acquiring new missile defense capabilities, historical maintenance data helps military planners understand existing system limitations and specify requirements that address these shortcomings.

During peacetime, missile defense systems require frequent testing to ensure operational readiness. Blockchain-enabled data management systems can effectively capture, store, and analyze test data, providing insights that enhance system performance and reliability.

In crisis situations, blockchain systems enable rapid data coordination by sharing minimal but critical information packets that support split-second decision-making processes. Post-engagement data analysis helps military commanders assess mission success or failure and refine future operational strategies.

Blockchain technology offers significant potential for arms control verification processes. The technology can provide transparent, tamper-proof records of launch platforms and interceptor systems, facilitating effective verification mechanisms. This capability supports both crisis management and peacetime monitoring requirements.

The United States Navy is actively developing blockchain integration for its missile defense systems. The Simba Chain project focuses on supply chain security and data management for the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, ensuring secure supply lines and robust data handling capabilities.

Additionally, the Powerful Authentication Regime Applicable to Naval Operational Flight Program Integrated Development (PARANOID) program represents another blockchain initiative designed to secure weapon system software throughout development and deployment phases.

Conclusion

Despite its advantages, blockchain technology faces inherent limitations that create potential vulnerabilities in missile defense applications. The most significant concern involves the possibility of adversaries compromising a substantial portion of the blockchain network, which could disrupt the operational effectiveness of the entire missile defense system.

Other challenges include the computational overhead required for blockchain operations, potential latency issues in time-critical scenarios, and the need for robust cybersecurity measures to protect the blockchain infrastructure itself.

Blockchain technology offers compelling advantages for enhancing missile defense system security, reliability, and effectiveness. Its ability to provide decentralized command structures, maintain data integrity, and secure communications addresses many vulnerabilities inherent in traditional centralized systems. However, successful implementation requires careful consideration of the technology’s limitations and the development of appropriate safeguards to mitigate potential vulnerabilities.

As military forces continue to operate in increasingly contested environments, blockchain technology represents a valuable tool for maintaining defensive superiority and ensuring mission success in critical scenarios.

Debalina Ghoshal is Non Resident Fellow, Council on International Policy, Advisor, Indian Aerospace and Defence News and the of the book, “Role of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in International Security.”

HMH-461 Air Assault Training

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on HMH-461 Air Assault Training

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, fly in a CH-53K King Stallion during the air assault portion of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Distributed Maneuver Exercise 1-25 at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, Feb. 11, 2025.

MDMX prepares Marines for future conflicts by combining constructed virtual training with offensive and defensive live-fire and maneuver training scenarios. Service Level Training Exercise 1-25 is designed to enhance readiness across core Mission Essential Tasks and prepares the MAGTF to execute distributed operations across vast, diverse environments by emphasizing decentralized command and control.

TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA

02.11.2025

Video by Sgt. Makayla Elizalde 

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center

The Taiwan-Phillipines-Japan Strategic Triangle

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Taiwan-Phillipines-Japan Strategic Triangle
06/22/2025

While Taiwan tensions are often viewed through a U.S.-China lens, the gravest strategic consequences would fall on Japan and the Philippines. Chinese control of Taiwan would fundamentally alter the regional balance, potentially isolating both nations and forcing them into accommodation with Chinese regional dominance regardless of U.S. positions.

Taiwan’s location at the center of the “First Island Chain” makes it a natural geographic chokepoint. The island sits at the midpoint between Japan’s Southwest Islands to the north and the Philippines’ Luzon archipelago to the south, creating what military strategists call the First Island Chain — a natural barrier that currently contains Chinese naval power within the South and East China Seas. This geographic position gives Taiwan outsized strategic importance far beyond its size.

Located opposite Fujian Province off the Asian continent, Taiwan is nearly the same size as Kyushu, measuring almost 36,000 square kilometers. It sits at the midpoint of the first island chain, the transnational archipelago running south from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. The loss of this central link would fundamentally reshape regional security dynamics.

Japan’s Critical Vulnerabilities

Japan’s dependence on Taiwan Strait shipping routes creates an acute vulnerability that Chinese control would immediately exploit. CSIS estimates that 32 percent of Japan’s imports and 25 percent of its exports transit the Taiwan Strait, with over 95% of Japan’s crude oil coming from Middle Eastern countries and much of it transported through this route.

About 6 trillion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas, or more than half of global LNG trade, passed through the South China Sea in 2011. Half of this amount continued on to Japan, with the rest going to South Korea, China, Taiwan, and other regional countries. The geographic reality means that for Japan, roughly $13 billion of its imports also pass through the Luzon Strait, yet this is just a fraction of its imports through the Taiwan Strait.

The PRC views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as part of “Taiwan province” and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. If the PLA Navy were to occupy Taiwan, Japan would struggle to defend its westernmost islands, as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and even Okinawa. This connection transforms Taiwan from a distant concern into an immediate threat to Japanese territory.

The PLA’s shortest passages from China’s mainland to the Pacific Ocean are on the north and south sides of Taiwan. The former is through Japan’s Southwest Islands between Japan’s mainland and Taiwan, and the latter is through the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines. Chinese control of Taiwan would breach this natural defensive barrier, fundamentally altering Japan’s strategic environment.

The Philippines’ Dilemma

Any major armed contingency on or around Taiwan would present an economic and humanitarian crisis for the Philippines. As the nearest potential safe harbor, the volume of refugees escaping the conflict would be likely to quickly overwhelm Philippine capacity. The Marcos administration has acknowledged this reality, with the president noting that Taiwan’s proximity to Luzon makes it “hard to imagine” that the country could avoid conflict.

The strategic importance of the Luzon Strait cannot be overstated. Other straits bordering the South China Sea like the Malacca, Sunda and Balabac Straits are too narrow and shallow for submarines to pass through undetected. The Taiwan Strait is adjacent to and heavily monitored by China as well as by Taipei and the US. This makes Luzon Strait critical in all-out war because the nuclear submarines of both China and the US have a better chance of passing through it undetected.

The Luzon Strait is a choke point for access between the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea, and China’s navy uses it to move carrier strike groups and destroyers out to the open Pacific. Access to the strait is necessary for Chinese interests in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict.

Chinese control of Taiwan would essentially bracket the Philippines between Chinese-dominated waters. The Philippines depends on the strait to transport about one-fifth of its global imports and one-seventh of its exports, but its geography allows it to send much of its trade through the Luzon Strait and Western Pacific Ocean. However, Chinese control of Taiwan would compromise even these alternative routes.

The PRC Perspective

Chinese strategic thinkers explicitly view Taiwan as key to regional domination. Control over Taiwan would transform the Taiwan Strait into China’s “strategic inner lake.” Conversely, so long as the island remained out of China’s hands, it would expose the mainland’s coastal metropolises, seaborne commercial traffic, and the movement of air and naval forces to hostile forces located on Taiwan.

Beijing has long feared that a maritime coalition led by Washington might seek to choke off Chinese access to the seas in a war over Taiwan. Control of the island would thus “shatter the semi-sealed predicament of China’s sea areas” while transforming Taiwan, the central segment of the first island chain, from a barrier into a “portal” to the Pacific.

Chinese forces on the island would be able to radiate power along the first island chain and beyond. From air bases and airports on Taiwan, Chinese aircraft with combat radii of 2,000 kilometers would be able to cover the Yellow and East China Seas, the various straits from Bohai to the north to Bashi to the south, and the Ryukyus, Kyushu, Shikoku, and much of the Philippine archipelago.

Economic and Trade Implications

The Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships passing from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to points west, carrying goods from Asian factory hubs to markets in Europe, the US and all points in between. Almost half of the global container fleet and 88% of the world’s largest ships by tonnage passed through the waterway.

If cross-strait tensions become especially dire, cautious shipping companies may avoid routes near Taiwan altogether. That same vessel departing from Singapore may choose to sail south of the Philippines before heading north through the Miyako Strait to reach South Korea. This would extend the journey by roughly 1,000 miles, adding significant costs and delays.

Even alternative shipping routes would face Chinese pressure. Many countries would feel the effects of these disruptions, but two key U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, would be among those most impacted. It would also likely make it infeasible to stop at Chinese ports while en route, which could have significant ripple effects on supply chains given China’s central role in maritime shipping.

Japan’s Evolving Position

Recent remarks from Japanese leaders do not mean Tokyo has pledged to defend Taiwan if China attacks, or that it necessarily commits to supporting the United States militarily if Washington chooses to get involved. Tokyo’s answer would ultimately depend on top-level political judgments about the conflict’s cause, specific nature, and implications for Japan’s peace and security.

However, Current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has pledged to double Japan’s defense spending in response to the tense security climate, indicating growing recognition of the stakes involved.

Philippines’ Strategic Balancing

The Philippines has a special economic relationship with Taiwan, but acknowledges the People’s Republic of China (PRC), rather than the Republic of China (Taiwan), as the sole political government of China, and has consistently affirmed the “One China Policy”. However, the Philippine government is now paying more attention to developments in the Taiwan Strait. With the Marcos Jr. Administration, a China policy will likely always be two-pronged: with one prong oriented to Beijing, and another toward Taipei.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said that the region is the “spearhead of the Philippines as far as the northern baseline is concerned,” and that its garrison would be strengthened, reflecting growing awareness of the Luzon Strait’s strategic importance.

Both countries are deepening security ties with the United States. U.S. Marine Corps anti-ship missiles will deploy to the Luzon Strait, a strategic first island chain chokepoint between the Philippines and Taiwan, during Balikatan 2025. The 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment’s Medium-Range Missile Battery will send Naval Strike Missile-equipped systems to the Luzon Strait.

The fourth Taiwan Strait crisis also further motivated Washington to strengthen its alliance with regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines.

The Multi-Polar Authoritarian World on the March

Beyond the strategic calculations, the fundamental issue is a question of values. Taiwan is a democratic state and has proven that Chinese culture can embrace democratic values. This is an affront to President Xi and his ideology of authoritarian control and global expansion.

Without any question to assault of Putin and Xi would have a similar motivation, namely, to expand their empires and to recover what is “rightfully theirs.” This is of course true if you are working to create a new global order where middle power democratic states like Australia and Brazil are consider merely commodity providers to the expanding Chinese empire.

In short, while U.S.-China competition dominates headlines about Taiwan, the most profound strategic consequences would fall on Japan and the Philippines. Both nations face the prospect of being isolated from each other and from broader alliance networks, potentially forcing accommodation with Chinese regional dominance regardless of US positions.

China is engaged in a geopolitical competition with the United States and a widening array of allies and partners — Japan and the Philippines most of all — who see their national interests directly threatened by Beijing’s choices. The geographic reality of Taiwan’s central position in the First Island Chain means that its fate will determine whether Japan and the Philippines remain sovereign actors in an open regional order or become subordinated to Chinese regional hegemony.

Understanding Taiwan through this regional lens — rather than purely as a U.S.-China issue —reveals why both Japan and the Philippines are quietly but significantly building defensive capabilities and strengthening security partnerships. For them, Taiwan is not just about U.S-Chinese competition; it is about their fundamental security and sovereignty in the decades ahead.

And for some earlier thoughts during Trump’s first term:

https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/taiwan-trump-a-pacific-defense-grid-towards-deterrence-in-depth/

Taiwan in Pacific Defense: Turning a New Page

And more recently:

Taiwan, U.S. Defense Industry, and the Evolving Strategy for Indo-Pac Defense