How to Develop Airpower Strategists for The Fifth Generation Integrated Force?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
09/06/2019

By Ulas Yildirim

“[A]lthough one would clearly want to have superior technology, the most important competition is not in the technological but the intellectual one. The main task is to find the most innovative concept of operations and organisations, and to fully exploit the existing and the emerging technologies”

Dima Adamsky1

What is a profession?

What does it mean to be in the profession of arms?

What is professional mastery?

Is professional mastery in the military a concept that is applicable to combat arms only?

Within this context, how should the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) as the most technical branch of the military view itself within the profession of arms?

More importantly, how should the RAAF develop future air power strategists capable of operating in an integrated and joint force to meet the Australian governments’ needs?

Introduction

Such questions have occupied the minds of scholars and practitioners since at least Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State, published in 1957.2

While Huntington’s proposed model was aimed at providing a broad framework for civil-military relations, his narrow interpretation of Carl von Clausewitz ignored the dynamic nature of professions in general which are continually competing for jurisdiction. This struggle for the link between a profession and its work requires professions to evolve and find ways to remain relevant.3

In this light, the RAAF participates in the jurisdictional competition of protecting the nation’s interests through the use of complex air materiel, operated by a specialised workforce in which exposure to combat risks is typically confined to a very small proportion of the force.

The RAAF has won its jurisdictional competition of protecting the nation’s interests by training, educating and promoting specialists. This investment in specialists has enabled the RAAF to remain efficient by using a smaller workforce and retain its position as a policy device of choice for the civil executive.

However, this approach has seen workforce disengagement from the military profession due to strong connections with their specialisation. A symptom of this is the lack of importance RAAF personnel place on professional military education (PME) outside their specialisation.

To articulate this argument requires an overview of the debates surrounding the military profession to show that an analysis of ‘the system of professions as a whole’ through the lens of jurisdictions provides a more accurate interpretation of the military profession, within which the RAAF adapts to remain effective and relevant.

Second, a discussion of the RAAF’s training, education, promotion and employment continuum reveals that in its efforts to maintain its jurisdiction through the aerospace domain, the RAAF is developing specialists disconnected from the military profession.

Finally, the rapidly changing Indo-Pacific region is shown to mean that the RAAF and its workforce concurrently must re-prioritise PME to remain effective and relevant.

The Military Profession: From Characterisation to Jurisdiction

Huntington began Part I of The Soldier and the State with the assertion that ‘[t]he professional officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man.”4Huntington then compared military officers to physicians and lawyers, while contrasting them from the warriors of the past through his model of professions.5

In this model, Huntington argued that “[t]he distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility and corporateness.”6

Huntington argued that officership is fundamentally a profession, despite acknowledging that no vocation meets the ideal, and officership falls shorter than most.7

Huntington stated that the central expertise of officership is ‘management of violence’ with responsibility beyond gaining personal advantage, and corporateness defined as a sense of unity with its members and distinction from the laymen. 8

Huntington was attempting to frame civil-military relations for a military profession based on his perceptions of an idealised Prussian military and a narrow interpretation of Clausewitz’s principle that war as an extension of policy is the only means to exert one’s will over another.9

He was responding to the US’s political and military context during the Cold War and arguing for an idealised objective civilian control of the military.10

In doing so, he used Harold Lasswell’s definition of the role of the military to be the management of violence viewed through the lens of the United States’ military’s experiences during the First and Second World Wars.11

Christopher Gibson explained that despite the idiosyncrasies and flaws of Huntington’s model, it was widely accepted and shaped the way several militaries saw themselves, even to this day.12

In 1960, Morris Janowitz published The Professional Soldier as a response to Huntington’s objective civilian control of the military and characterisation of the military professional.13

In his book, Janowitz argues for a subjective civilian control of the military while describing the military establishment as “a struggle between heroic leaders, who embody traditionalism and glory, and military “managers,” who are concerned with scientific and rational conduct of war.”14

He argued that the increased complexity of military materiel led to the rise of military technologists and engineers.However,”[n]either heroic leaders nor military managers perform as military engineers or technologists.”15

Akin to Huntington, Janowitz provided a characterisation of military professionals based on their expertise, lengthy education, group identity, ethics and standards of performance.16

However, a stark difference from Huntington is Janowitz’s recognition of the evolving nature of the military profession ‘as a dynamic bureaucratic organisation which changes over time in response to changing conditions’ beyond the management of violence.17

Extending Janowitz’s observations on the dynamic nature of the military profession, Charles Moskos suggested a pluralistic model to define the military profession encompassing a variety of units that exhibit divergence and convergence from civilian society.18

Moskos argued that divergence from civil society was apparent in parts of the military that value traditional military roles and emphasised the heroic leader, such as combat units. Conversely, convergence with civil society would be observed in military roles such as education and medicine, where the task is not unique to the military.19

The observations of Janowitz and Moskos were in response to the effects of the Cold War and the Vietnam War during a time of great upheaval within the American political and military cadre. This led to criticism that their models created two militaries in response to a crisis unique to the US, and potentially diluted the professionalism of the military.20

In response, Moskos suggested a redefinition of the military profession representative of the current context may be required while recognising that any such definition faced a similar fate as Huntington’s due to the profession’s dynamic nature.21

Arguably the models developed by Huntington, Janowitz and Moskos represented snapshots of the military’s role and position within society observed through the perceived characteristics of professions. These have led to considerable disagreement and misperceptions due to a lack of a consistent approach in assessing the military profession, further complicating debate.

Recognising this problem within the study of professions in general, Andrew Abbott proposed an analysis of ‘the system of professions as a whole.’22

Abbot provided a more compelling interpretation of an ever-changing nature of the military profession, continually adapting to new contexts and demands to remain effective and relevant, akin to any other profession.23

Abbott’s analysis focused on the work performed by professions rather than their characteristics and demonstrated that professions evolve in similar fashions for acceptance by society or become obsolete.24

He argued that by developing an abstract knowledge system, professions could redefine their ‘problems and tasks, defend them from interlopers, and seize new problems’ because professions conducting similar work are in constant competition over what he terms jurisdictions —‘the link between a profession and its work.’ 25

Abbott argued that:

“[P]rofessions develop when jurisdictions become vacant, which may happen because they are newly created or because an earlier tenant has left them altogether or lost its firm grip on them. If an already existing profession takes over a vacant jurisdiction, it may in turn vacate another of its jurisdictions or retain merely supervisory control of it.”26

The creation of the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force (RAF) is a case in point. The RAF partially won its post-First World War jurisdictional competition of defending the nation and its interests by arguing that it was able to conduct various roles including strategic bombing and colonial policing better and cheaper than the British Army and Royal Navy.27

The RAF’s jurisdictional control and role within the military and society were reinforced at the start of the Second World War when the fear of German bomber aircraft redefined the problem of defending the nation.28

Operational Impacts

Post-war debates over the efficacy of air power during the war and the validity of air power theories did not affect the RAF’s jurisdictional control, as its role was redefined again with the introduction of nuclear and precision bombs.

The RAAF’s operations since World War Two fit well with Abbott’s observations that it is in continuous jurisdictional competitions. Furthermore, it can be seen that the RAAF has evolved beyond the management of violence to remain relevant due to the military profession’s changing context as identified by Beatrice Heuser, who stated:

“[C]onflict management is not enough, and it is not sufficient to impose one’s will on the enemy merely temporarily, through a successful military campaign… in order to be effective and lasting, a victory has to be built on military success, but has to contain a very large admixture of politics.”29

For example, the RAAF’s participation in Operations Catalyst and Slipper highlighted the RAAF’s response to this changing context.

The RAAF provided two C-130 Hercules aircraft for air mobility support as part of these operations during the period between 2003 and 2008.30

Although these aircraft represented only 3 per cent of the Coalition Hercules fleet, they had carried 16 per cent of the cargo lifted by all Hercules in theatre.’31

During this period, the RAAF was not engaged in the direct application of violence, indicating that the RAAF has evolved beyond the management of violence.Furthermore, this evidence also highlighted that the RAAF’s efforts during this period ensured it was able to extend its jurisdiction over the air mobility domain.

Air mobility support could have been obtained from coalition partners, but at least two RAAF C-130 aircraft was in theatre for an extended period of time.Nevertheless, the RAAF’s small commitment demonstrated its evolution to maintain its jurisdiction and remain a trusted policy device for the government.

The Government’s subsequent decisions to expand the RAAF’s air mobility fleet through the acquisition of C-17A Globemaster and C-27J Spartan aircraft highlighted the RAAF’s success.

Transforming the RAAF into a Fifth-Generation Force

Multiple initiatives are currently in motion to transform the RAAF into a fifth-generation force able to apply air and space effects as part of an integrated joint force.32

Several of these initiatives focus on people and promote professional and technical mastery within the RAAF.33

These initiatives assert the importance of positive leadership, PME and the study of history while promoting the RAAF’s technologically-advanced capabilities and the need for innovation.34

The RAAF routinely provides courses and seminars to its workforce on both the military profession, and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Further education and professional development within specialist trades appear to be enthusiastically pursued.

Well established funding and education programs support personnel in gaining specialist training, which is deemed to provide tangible benefits to the RAAF and the individual’s promotion prospects. These programs include overseas opportunities, Australian Defence Force Academy post-graduate courses and professional development programs that allow personnel to access specialist training and education easily.

Moreover, multiple specialisations incorporate specialist education and development into career continuums from an early stage, so the link between professional development and individual progression is clear and compelling.

In contrast, the workforce as a whole appears indifferent towards more general PME. Since 2009, RAAF PME has been delivered as part of promotion courses with a relatively less clear articulation of the benefits to the broader workforce in enabling the RAAF to conduct its everyday role. PME has been something individuals have to do to be promoted, not something people want to do because it will make them better at their job.

This is evidenced by communication from multiple senior leaders that large numbers of personnel remain deficient in meeting their mandatory PME requirements.

Accordingly, a policy of ‘no PME, no promotion’ was implemented but has reinforced the perception that PME is a compliance requirement rather than a value-adding activity.

The disconnect from PME is an outcome of the RAAF’s use of a small workforce to employ complex hardware in the air domain and to prevail in its jurisdictional competition as an instrument of government.

High levels of efficiency are generated through specialist-focused training, education, promotion, and employment continuums. After initial entry training, personnel are employed and managed within their specialist trades, including officers until promoted into the General List as Group Captains.

A small number of officers and warrant officers are selected to attend command and staff courses or capability management courses. A still smaller number of Group Captains are also selected to attend the Defence and Strategic Studies Course and gain the necessary knowledge and skills to operate at the strategic level. Before and following these courses, personnel continue to be employed within their specialist categorisations.

The value of specialist knowledge is reinforced by individual promotions (up to the rank of group captain) being determined within specialisations, rather than across the RAAF workforce as a whole.

Officers promoted into the General List as Group Captains are selected from across the officer corps but continue to be employed in roles associated with their specialisations. This process has considerable strengths but creates inherent weaknesses which will be discussed in the next paragraphs.

The RAAF’s emphasis on specialisation has enabled it to reliably and efficiently operate highly complex hardware in the air domain despite numerous challenges.

For example, in 1991, when the Australian Government implemented the Commercial Support Program (CSP), the RAAF’s workforce was reduced from approximately 22,000 to below 13,500 personnel by 2001.35

During the same period, the workforce was undergoing other changes due to a spate of fatal aircraft accidents attributed to operational and technical errors.[7] Despite an almost 40% workforce reduction, the RAAF continued to perform reliably, contributing to domestic and global operations while improving its safety and technical performance to establish a world-class aviation safety management framework.

Hence, through the use of a highly-specialised workforce, the RAAF absorbed CSP personnel reductions, implemented an aviation safety management system, and contributed to government-directed activities – preserving and enhancing its reputation as a trusted policy device.36

When faced with similar workforce reduction pressures, the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force (RAF) adopted an approach with less emphasis on specialisation, which has been cited as contributing to adverse outcomes. The investigation into the loss of an RAF Nimrod aircraft and 14 crew over Afghanistan in 2006 illustrated the apparent costs of a less specialised model.

The report judged the principal factors at work included the creation of a larger ‘purple’ and ‘through life’ structures as well as ‘the imposition of unending cuts and change” from 1998-2006 which ‘led to a dilution of its safety and airworthiness regime and culture.’37

Furthermore, the report identified the RAAF’s airworthiness framework as an exemplar airworthiness management model.38

Notably, a result of the accident and subsequent report was the establishment of the British Ministry of Defence Military Aviation Authority. This single regulatory authority is headed by a three-star Director-General responsible for the oversight of British Defence aviation activities akin to the role conducted by Australia’s Defence Aviation Safety Authority.

The RAF’s experience highlighted the benefits offered by a highly-specialised workforce in technical areas, including maintaining the trust of governments as a safe and reliable operator of complex equipment.

While there are strengths associated with a highly-specialised workforce, there are also weaknesses. In a study of the United States Air Force officer corps, Frank Wood argued convincingly that air force personnel associate with their specialisation more than the military profession.39

Charles Moskos’s work on the military profession in the United States also argued that due to the nature of complex hardware they employ, air forces are becoming more civilianised to attract those with specialised training. Moskos argued that those personnel ‘will be attracted to the service in a civilian rather than a military capacity and will gauge military employment in terms of marketplace standards’ within which factors such as remuneration and location stability play a bigger role.40

Applying Mosko’s theory, the RAAF’s culture of specialisation attracts personnel inclined towards specialisation and then reinforces linkages to similar civilian specialists throughout a member’s military career, enabling ready disengagement from the military profession.

The workforce efficiencies created through specialisation further reinforce this trend as a smaller workforce lacks the depth to address specialisation and broader PME. The perceived low priority afforded to PME by the RAAF personnel appears to be a symptom of their disconnection from the military profession.

However, this disconnect arises from the Service’s preference for a highly-specialised workforce as a means of prevailing in its jurisdictional competition.

Effects of a highly specialised but disengaged military workforce

Australia’s strategic circumstances and choices have become more difficult.41

Emerging challenges include traditional state on state threats due to the continued rise of China, Sino-Indian power competition and the re-balancing of American priorities within the Indo-Pacific. 42

The rise of non-traditional threats adds another layer of complexity to Australia’s strategic choices. The impacts of globalisation, energy security, minority group extremism, terrorism and the effects of climate change mean that Australia’s national security is no longer bounded simply by the need to defend Australia’s geographical sovereignty but also ‘the security of Australia’s society and its citizens.’43

As highlighted in the 2016 Defence White Paper, Australia’s technological edge is diminishing.44

This suggests that the RAAF’s historical preference for a highly-specialised workforce to maximise its technological edge may not be appropriate for future challenges.

Of note, the Chief of Air Force’s 2017 commander’s intent and intent for learning explicitly recognised the importance of effective employment of technology by personnel who combine their technical expertise with a good understanding of the profession of arms.

This can only be achieved through the marriage of engaging PME and a thorough knowledge of specialist skills. This has been a consistent message from senior leaders for several years and appears to underpin recent PME reform efforts.

The RAAF’s highly-specialised approach has performed well during its operations since the Second World War. However, these operations have been relatively limited in scale and intensity, with other partners bearing the burden of higher-levels of strategy and operational planning. As a result, the RAAF’s specialised workforce was able to operate in its comfort zone and was not stretched to the point of being exposed.

During these operations, the RAAF’s technological edge over its adversaries enabled its workforce to remain within its specialist stovepipes without needing to consider the impact of tactical decisions in the strategic arena which could be necessary against a possible near-peer enemy.

Hence, a need arises to look externally to judge the effects of a highly specialised but professionally disengaged military workforce in other contexts, including high-intensity conflicts. Dima Adamsky’s observations on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are a useful starting point due to the IDF’s size, alliance with the United States, strong focus on workforce specialisation, and ongoing exposure to conflicts.[19]

Adamsky observed that following its successes of 1949, 1956, and 1967, the IDF developed ‘a total disinterest in the art of war.’ The effects of this were that ‘[p]roblems were resolved in an isolated and sequential manner as if they were not interconnected.’  Further, Adamsky observed that the IDF General Staff continually chose to provide pragmatic but technically narrow solutions to problems because ‘[w]ith no formal professional education IDF officers thought and operated in tactical terms concentrating on giving ad hoc piecemeal solutions to immediate problems.’45

Israel’s Iron Dome defence system is a case in point. RAND Corporation analyst Elizabeth M. Bartels argued that while the Iron Dome achieved tactical success by mitigating the risks from missiles, it was a strategic failure changing “strategic and political prosecution of the campaign in ways that may have denied Israel decisive victories.”

Although these observations should be qualified, noting that the IDF uses a conscription model and their conflicts have arguably been against enemies not as professional, a strong focus on specialists within the general staff has demonstrably resulted in a lack of strategic perspective.

Adamsky’s observations highlight that a disengaged workforce, such as the RAAF’s, is less able to grasp the complexities of problems at the strategic level and will instead opt to focus on generating tactical solutions to immediate problems.

Adamsky’s analysis of the IDF indicates that without greater emphasis on PME, the RAAF’s current focus on specialisation is likely to adversely affect its jurisdictional competitiveness as Australia confronts a more challenging environment. This logic underpins current initiatives such as Plan Wirraway, The Runway professional development portal, and a new PME continuum. There is clear top-down direction to balance technical and professional mastery as part of transforming the RAAF into a fifth-generation force.

These PME initiatives must be complemented by adjustments to the RAAF’s promotion and employment continuum in order to emphasise the importance of PME in enabling the Air Force to conduct its roles and missions, with links to everyday duties.

Without this immediate and tangible reinforcement of PME’s value, inertia will see RAAF personnel drift towards perfecting their specialisation and remain disinterested in air power and the military profession in broad terms. More importantly, it must be recognised that compliance-centric attempts to change the workforce’s behaviour through methods such as ‘no PME, no promotion’ will not address the root cause.

While the organisation can reorient PME incentives, RAAF personnel also have a personal responsibility to seek a philosophical understanding of airpower. Despite the hierarchical nature of military organisations, Elliot Cohen’s analysis of military transformation demonstrated that assuming that change will happen following senior leader direction is false and outdated. Cohen stated “[t]hroughout most of military history, to include the current period, change tends to come more from below, from the spontaneous interactions between military people, technology and particular tactical circumstances.” 46

It is naïve to assume that initiatives implemented from the top with sporadic injections of PME throughout RAAF personnel’s careers will enable them to fully exploit the benefits offered by the study of air power.

Therefore, unless the workforce positively engages with their profession beyond top-down direction, the changes required are unlikely to succeed during crises.

While a great deal of responsibility rests with the implementation of top-down initiatives, without positive engagement by RAAF personnel and an equal focus on PME, they will not be successful.

Conclusion

Professions, including the military profession, continually evolve and are in constant jurisdictional competitions with others. This forces them to adapt to new contexts to ensure their survival.

The RAAF has successfully participated in a jurisdictional competition of protecting the nation’s interests by using a highly-specialised workforce to operate complex hardware in the air domain. The RAAF’s emphasis on training, educating and promoting specialists comes with considerable strengths, including high levels of proficiency and efficiency.

However, it has come at the cost of widespread disengagement from the military profession, including disengagement from broad PME.

This highly-specialised approach appears to be ill-suited to a world undergoing profound changes and presenting serious challenges to Australia’s security. Accordingly, the RAAF must prioritise PME to maintain its effectiveness and relevance as a policy device.

This will require changes to the RAAF’s training, education, promotion and employment continuum to emphasise and value PME. Top-down direction is necessary, but genuine change also requires a cultural shift in the workforce to value PME and professional development. In a rapidly changing world, the RAAF must adapt lest its historically successful methods become its undoing.

Squadron Leader Ulas ‘Ulie’ Yildirim is an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force.

The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect the views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.

This article was published by Central Blue in two parts.

The first one on July 21, 2019  and the second one on August 4th, 2019.

The original title of the two part article was “First class people for a fifth generation Air Force.”

 

 

Footnotes

  1. The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S. And Israel (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 68.
  2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Charles C. Moskos, ‘The Military Professional and the Military Organization,’ Current Sociology 29:3 (1981).
  3. The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 2, 20.
  4. The Soldier and the State, p. 7.
  5. Ibid..
  6. Ibid., p. 8. 
  7. Ibid., p. 11.
  8. Ibid., pp. 10-4.
  9. Ibid., p. 1, pp. 28-56; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated and Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976)..
  10. Nadia Schadlow and Richard A. Lacquement Jr., ‘Winning Wars, Not Just Battles-Expanding the Military Profession to Incorporate Stability Operations’ in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (eds.),  American Civil-Military Relations-the Soldier and the State in a New Era (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 116; Christopher P. Gibson, ‘Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military – a Madisonian Approach’ in Ibid., pp. 241-3.
  11. The Soldier and the State, p. 11.
  12. Gibson, ‘Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military – a Madisonian Approach,’ pp. 241-3; Eliot A Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Anchor Books), p. 245.
  13. The Professional Soldier..
  14. Ibid., p. 21.
  15. Ibid.
  16. Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, ‘The Military Professional and the Military Organization,’ p. 10.
  17. Ibid
  18. Charles Moskos, ‘The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural,’ The Pacific Sociological Review 16:2 (1973), pp. 255-80.
  19. Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, ‘The Military Professional and the Military Organization,’ p. 17.
  20. Ibid., pp. 17-8; Gibson, ‘Enhancing National Security and Civilian Control of the Military – a Madisonian Approach,’ p. 246.
  21. Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, ‘The Military Professional and the Military Organization,’ p. 21.
  22. The System of Professions..
  23. Ibid., p. 2.
  24. Ibid., pp. 2-3,19.
  25. Ibid., p. 2, 20.
  26. Ibid., p. 3.
  27. lAir Power in the Age of Total War (London: UCL Press, 1999), pp. 101-4.
  28. The War in the Air (Tuggeranong: Air Power Development Centre, 2009), pp. 27-39..
  29. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 162.
  30. The Governor General, ‘Royal Australian Air Force to Be Awarded the Meritorious Unit Citation Queen’s Birthday 2016 Numbers 36 and 37 Squadrons,’ Australian Honours and Awards (Canberra, Australia, 2016).
  31. Australia. Royal Australian Air Force. Air Power Development Centre, Australian Air Publication 1000-H: The Australian Experience of Air Power (Canberra. Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2013).
  32. Royal Australian Air Force, ‘Air Force Strategy 2017-2027’ (Canberra. Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2017), pp. 1-7.
  33. These include New Horizon, Air Force Adaptive Culture and active engagement by the Air Power Development Centre
  34. Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Air Publication 1000D – The Air Power Manual, Sixth Edition (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2013); Sanu Kainikara, ‘Professional Mastery and Air Power Education,’ Working Paper No. 33 (Canberra: Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Development Centre, 2011); Air Power Development Centre, ‘Domain-Centric Professional Mastery: The Foundation of an Integrated Military Force’ in Pathfinder (Canberra, Air Power Development Centre, 2018); ‘Air Warfare Innovation and Integration’ in Pathfinder(Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2016); ‘5th Generation Air Force’ in Pathfinder(Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2016); ‘Translating Technology and Innovation into Capability-Some Lessons from between the Wars’ in Pathfinder (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2016); ‘The Future Air Force’ in Pathfinder (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2017); Royal Australian Air Force, ‘Plan Jericho’ (Canberra: Royal Australian Air Force, 2015); ‘Air Force Plan 2019-2024: ‘First Class People for a Fifth-Generation Air Force” (Canberra: Royal Australian Air Force, 2018).
  35. Australian National Audit Office, ‘Commercial Support Program. Department of Defence’ (Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 1998), p. 27; Air Power Development Centre, Australian Air Publication 1000-H – The Australian Experience of Air Power, Second Edition (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2013), p. 183; Kevin G. Barnes, Retention versus Attrition: Does the RAAF have the correct target in its sight? (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2005), p. 2.
  36. Air Power Development Centre, ‘Defence Airworthiness,’ (Canberra, Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2013).
  37. Charles Haddon-Cave, ‘The Nimrod Review’ (London: Stationery Office Limited, 2009), p. 339.
  38. Ibid., p. 485.
  39. Frank R. Wood, ‘At the Cutting Edge of Institutional and Occupational Trends: The U.S. Air Force Officer Corps’ in Charles Moskos and Frank Wood (eds.), The Military More Than Just a Job? (Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey, 1988).
  40. Charles Moskos, ‘The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural?,’ Pacific Sociological Review, 16:2 (1973), pp. 255–80; Idem., ‘What Ails the All-Volunteer Force: An Institutional Perspective,’ Parameters, 31:2 (2001), p. 23.
  41. Paul Kelly, ‘Punching above Our Weight,’ Policy, 20:2 (2004), p. 29; Paul Dibb, ‘Why Australia Needs a Radically New Defence Policy,’ Centre of Gravity Series No. 44 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centres, 2018); Brendan Sargeant, ‘Why Australia Needs a Radically New Defence Policy,’ Centre of Gravity Series No. 44 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centres, 2018).
  42. Shiro Armstrong, ‘A New Deal in Asia,’ Foreign Affairs  (March 17), p. 2; Christopher K Johnson et al., Decoding China’s Emerging “Great Power” Strategy in Asia (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), pp. 1-32; Zhang Yunling, ‘China and Its Neighbourhood: Transformation, Challenges and Grand Strategy,’ International Affairs, 92:4 (2016), pp. 835-48; David Brewster, ‘India’s Defense Strategy and the India-Asean Relationship,’ India Review, 12:3 (2013), pp. 151-64; Rory Medcalf, ‘In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia’s New Strategic Map,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68:4 (2014), pp. 470-83; David Brewster, ‘India and China at Sea: A Contest of Status and Legitimacy in the Indian Ocean,’ Asia Policy, 22 (2016), pp. 4-10; Sithara Fernando (ed.), United States-China-India Strategic Triangle in the Indian Ocean Region (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pty Ltd, 2015); David Brewster, ‘Australia and India: The Indian Ocean and the Limits of Strategic Convergence,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, 64:5 (2010), 549-65; Robert Kaplan, ‘Centre Stage for the 21st Century, Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,’ Foreign Affairs (2009).
  43. Andrew O’Neil, ‘Conceptualising Future Threats to Australia’s Security,’ Australian Journal of Political Science, 46:1 (2011), pp. 26-32; Michael Evans, ‘Towards an Australian National Security Strategy a Conceptual Analysis,’ Security Challenges, 3:4 (2007), pp.113-30.
  44. Commonwealth of Australia, The Defence White Paper 2016 (Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service, 2016), pp. 49-50.
  45. Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S. And Israel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
  46. Elliot A. Cohen, ‘Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 27:3 (2004), p. 400.