Poland After the Elections: What Happens Next?

10/21/2023

By Robert Czulda

Last Sunday, millions of Poles voted for a new parliament for a four-year term.

These elections had record-breaking turnout (74.38%) and attracted the attention of global media like no other recent election.

Although Western liberal media immediately declared a great victory for the opposition in Poland, the new political landscape is more complicated than such judgements would suggest.

A new distribution of seats in the Polish bicameral parliament creates an almost deadlock situation, which will practically make governance more difficult. It’s not even known who will become the prime minister.

PiS (Law and Justice), which has been the ruling party since 2015, and is ideologically right-wing but economically left-leaning, won the election. In total, PiS received 35.38% of the votes (in 2019, they got 43.59%), which gives them 42.17% of all Sejm mandates (194). The second is KO (Citizens’ Coalition) with 157 mandates, while the third, Trzecia Droga (Third Road), obtained 65 mandates.

PiS has the most votes, but it no longer has a parliamentary majority, and its ability to form a coalition with other parties is very limited.

However, PiS does not want to lose power and is offering the PSL (Polish People’s Party), which is an agrarian party, a coalition.

However, the PSL, at least for now, remains on the opposition side. If the PSL changes its stance and accepts the offer, the current government will retain power.

It is also legally possible to form a minority government, but its effectiveness would be minimal.

Currently, this is the most likely scenario.

An alternative option is the formation of a coalition government of opposition parties that have already begun negotiating a potential division of power.

However, such a government would be constrained by a power of the President.

Until August 2025, the right-wing President Andrzej Duda will remain in office, but he cannot run for re-election.

Duda has closely collaborated with the PiS government. Thus it is expected that he would be willing to veto any laws that deviate from the previous government’s program.

This also applies to military matters, as Duda has emphasized a crucial role of military modernization since the beginning of his term. Overriding a presidential veto in Poland requires a 3/5 majority vote.

This means that Poland is expected to face months of political chaos and severe struggle for power.

More elections  – in early 2024 – cannot be ruled out.

The final distribution of mandates has created an impasse in that no one party has a stable majority that would enable effective governance.

However, what if re-elections do not ultimately take place, and the opposition assumes power?

Fundamental problems remain in obtaining a clear majority which means there will be an ongoing need to consider opinions and interests of coalition partners and face the risk of the President’s veto.

The President will no longer be required to be loyal to PiS and can act more independently to pursue his individual goals.

For now, the opposition pledged not to abandon arms procurements made by the PiS government.

Currently, Poland is undertaking significant investments in its armed forces.

From 2021 to 2035, the state budget is expected to include USD 154 billion on defense, with additional off-budget expenditures expected to reach up to USD 75 billion between 2021 and 2027.

This entails increasing expenditures (3% of GDP) and a planned rise in debt up to USD 19 billion annually between 2025 and 2027.

However, many of these planned purchases have not yet been financed, and there are no executive agreements, which raises questions about their future.

The opposition, particularly left-wing coalition partners, may be tempted to reduce defense spending.

It is speculated that the new (opposition) government could try to cancel some agreements with South Korea, including civil ones (a future of the Polish nuclear energy program, which also involves the U.S. companies, is in serious doubt).

The most controversial modernization projects include an agreed purchase of 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft and up to 672 K9 155 mm self-propelled howitzers.

Poland is almost certain to abandon a plan to establish armed forces with a size of 300,000 personnel. This was one of the flagship programs of the PiS government.

The new government (if formed by the current opposition) will seek to improve relations with the European Union, primarily with Germany.

Therefore, one can expect a return to arms deals with European suppliers and certain reductions in orders from the United States, although Polish commentators generally agree that the new government in Warsaw will not want to spoil its relationship with the Americans.

One should anticipate reduced procurements of the AH-64E assault helicopters and a cancellation of a plan to buy the S-70i helicopters.

Even without such radical moves, the United States will no longer have such a loyal and a steadfast ally.

“New” Poland under the opposition’s rule will speak more often with a European (German) voice than an American one.

There is a widespread awareness in Poland that the armed forces have to be further strengthened.

This impression is a result of two fundamental factors.

Firstly, Russia has not been defeated in Ukraine and continues to present aggressive intentions. Particularly concerning are recent announcements of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian parliament, who stated that in 2024, military expenditures are supposed to increase by 68% to roughly USD 110 billion (6% of Russian GDP).

Secondly, the situation in the Middle East is becoming increasingly unstable. At some point, this may necessitate direct involvement by the United States. In the event of a deteriorating situation in the Indo-Pacific region (where China might attempt to exploit the issue), Poland may be compelled to defend itself independently.

Although there are many open questions in post-election Poland, two things are certain.

Firstly, even with a change of government, Poland will not undergo any abrupt changes in its foreign and security policy. The friendly stance towards NATO and the West will be maintained.

Secondly, Poland continues to be a strong and healthy democracy.

Despite the opposition’s hysterical claims in recent years that PiS is an authoritarian regime that will not relinquish power and might attempt a military coup in case of an electoral defeat (sic!), none of such scenarios have materialized.

Photo Credit: Poland’s President Andrzej Duda during a press statement after meetings with European Council and Commissions presidents in Brussels, Belgium, 07 February 2022.

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