By Robbin Laird
The AUKUS partnership stands at a critical juncture. Born from the vision of three leaders who have since left the political stage, this ambitious trilateral alliance centers on one of the most complex defense undertakings in modern history: enabling Australia, a non-nuclear nation, to operate nuclear-powered attack submarines.
While the submarine program captures headlines, AUKUS represents something far more significant than a single procurement initiative. The partnership has evolved into a comprehensive framework for unprecedented technology sharing and joint manufacturing between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This expansion reflects a strategic necessity born from the realities of our changing world order.
Beijing’s approach to global competition demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of asymmetric warfare. As Henry Kissinger observed about guerrilla conflict, “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” China embodies this principle through strategic patience, resource conservation, and tactical flexibility.
This patient strategy manifests across multiple domains. Economically, China has avoided the Soviet Union’s fatal mistake of concentrating solely on heavy industry. Instead, Beijing pursues comprehensive manufacturing capabilities, insulating the Chinese economy against trade restrictions and technological limitations. Geopolitically, China promotes “multi-alignment,” encouraging nations to engage with multiple powers rather than committing to singular partnerships.
China appears positioned to exploit Australia’s apparent hesitation to engage constructively with the Trump administration. While this reluctance may be understandable given political dynamics, it risks undermining Australia’s strategic interests. Advancing Australian security and influence requires pragmatic engagement with AUKUS and charting a realistic path forward with American leadership.
The current AUKUS submarine program faces a fundamental challenge: it cannot be sustained within existing budget constraints while maintaining the Australian Defence Force’s broader modernization needs. Defense analyst Peter Jennings has articulated this starkly: Australia can have either the new submarines or a properly equipped ADF, but not both under current funding levels.
The path forward requires decisive action on two fronts. First, Australia must significantly increase defense spending to enable simultaneous ADF modernization and submarine program development. This includes funding for the fourth F-35 squadron and the nuclear submarine enterprise and both investments demand substantially more resources than current government allocations provide.
Second, the Trump administration must position AUKUS as the cornerstone of American Indo-Pacific strategy, championing democratic interests in the region. Any Pentagon skepticism or diplomatic pique regarding Australian leadership undermines broader strategic objectives. The same President Trump who articulated a compelling strategic vision in Saudi Arabia and demonstrated decisive action regarding Iran possesses the capability to reset AUKUS on a realistic trajectory toward success.
The consequences of failure extend far beyond the three AUKUS nations. In a multipolar world increasingly dominated by authoritarian powers, the inability of democratic allies to execute ambitious collaborative programs sends a dangerous signal. Only China benefits from any breakdown in Australian-American cooperation or the failure to adequately fund and realistically structure the AUKUS partnership.
The Australian-American relationship transcends any single program, but AUKUS has become a test case for democratic nations’ ability to adapt and cooperate in the face of authoritarian challenges. Success requires political will, adequate funding, and strategic clarity from all partners. The alternative or the failure to deliver on these ambitious commitments serves only to advance Beijing’s patient strategy for global influence.
The moment demands leadership equal to the challenge. The future of Indo-Pacific security may well depend on whether democratic allies can transform AUKUS from an ambitious concept into operational reality.
Also, see the following:
The Australian Defence Force: Meeting the Modernization Challenges