By Robbin Laird
The contemporary Indo-Pacific security environment presents a fundamental challenge to traditional alliance structures: how can middle powers maintain strategic autonomy while deepening military cooperation with major power partners?
This dilemma is particularly acute for Australia, which faces the competing imperatives of economic integration with China, security dependence on the United States, and growing regional leadership responsibilities. The intersection of these pressures reveals broader tensions about the future of alliance partnerships in an era of major power competition.
During my trip to Australia in September 2025, I discussed the dynamics of Australian defence and alliance issues with my colleague Stephan Frühling from the Australian National University.
The Erosion of Alliance Certainties
The comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era are dissolving. Australia’s traditional model of alliance partnership, providing ‘joint facilities’ and political support in exchange for American security guarantees, is proving inadequate for contemporary challenges. As Stephan Frühling observes, “despite the progress made since 2020, U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation remains limited by the lack of alliance institutionalization and political agreement, especially domestically in Australia, on its aims and objectives.”
This institutional gap reflects a deeper problem: alliance cooperation is proceeding faster than political consensus. Recent force posture initiatives, including submarine rotational deployments, bomber base upgrades, and combined logistics enterprises, represent significant operational progress. However, as Frühling notes, “there is no sign that this will bring U.S. and Australian national defense postures into closer alignment.” The disconnect between tactical cooperation and strategic integration reveals fundamental tensions in contemporary alliance management.
The experiences of Ukraine and Israel, where American support came with significant operational constraints and political interference, have reinforced Australian concerns about maintaining decision-making autonomy in potential conflicts. As one Australian strategic analyst observed to me, “we can’t rule out the possibility that we might actually have to conduct some operations, major operations, to deter and demonstrate capability to deter even China, but also cause enormous damage to the baddies if the United States decides it’s going to sit on its hands.”
This stark assessment reflects growing recognition that the reliability of any single patron, even the United States, cannot be taken for granted in an era of domestic political volatility and competing global priorities. The challenge lies not in abandoning alliance relationships but in restructuring them to account for new realities.
The Strategic Independence Imperative
Australia’s response to this challenge involves moving from alliance dependence toward what can be characterized as strategic independence or developing sufficient autonomous capability to deter aggression while maintaining productive partnerships. This transformation requires abandoning traditional military thinking focused on capital ships and large platforms in favor of what Australian analysts call “high-leverage capabilities.”
With a population of 25 million and constrained defense budgets, Australia cannot compete through numerical superiority. Instead, it must invest in systems that can “stop even a major aggressor in its tracks” through technological sophistication. The recently announced $1.7 billion investment in Ghost Shark autonomous underwater vehicles exemplifies this approach. Unlike traditional submarine programs that deliver small numbers of expensive platforms over decades, the Ghost Shark program is designed for rapid scaling and continuous technological evolution.
This modular, rapidly deployable approach creates multiple, simultaneous threats that complicate adversary decision-making while avoiding catastrophic loss scenarios associated with traditional platform-centric strategies. The difference between deploying 15 Ghost Shark systems versus 180 represents a qualitative shift in deterrent capability that potential adversaries must factor into their planning.
However, strategic independence requires more than advanced weapons systems. It demands industrial capacity to sustain those systems independently of vulnerable supply chains. The Ghost Shark program’s emphasis on domestic battery production illustrates this broader requirement. Producing sophisticated autonomous systems while importing all critical components from potentially hostile nations represents a fundamental strategic vulnerability.
Deliberate Incrementalism as Strategic Framework
Frühling proposes “deliberate incrementalism” as a framework for managing the tension between deepening cooperation and preserving autonomy. This approach acknowledges that alliance cooperation driven by “bottom-up, practical cooperation has a tendency to overstep political bounds, leading to tensions if such boundaries are then reestablished.”
The solution involves carefully managed steps toward greater cooperation that respect political realities and sovereignty concerns. Frühling recommends that allies “try to say a little more each time” in their strategic dialogues, gradually building shared understanding without rushing toward comprehensive integration that may prove politically unsustainable.
This approach requires several key elements: gradual development of shared strategic understanding without forcing perfect alignment; focus on overlapping operational needs rather than abstract strategic coordination; and development of graduated response mechanisms that provide decision-making flexibility during crises.
For the U.S.-Australia relationship specifically, deliberate incrementalism means focusing on “areas that reflect overlapping national interests in operations closer to Australia, and on strengthening deterrence by facilitating horizontal rather than vertical escalation.” This acknowledges that Australia’s primary strategic concerns center on its immediate region rather than broader global competition with China.
The Economics of Strategic Independence
Strategic independence cannot be divorced from economic considerations. The concept of “embedded logistics” offers a framework for addressing supply chain vulnerabilities while serving broader alliance interests. Rather than relying on expensive, vulnerable supply lines stretching from Hawaii to forward deployment areas, the United States could dramatically reduce Pacific logistics costs by supporting Australian industrial capacity development.
This approach serves multiple strategic purposes. It reduces Australian dependence on any single supplier, including traditional allies whose domestic politics might disrupt supply relationships. It provides the foundation for supporting regional partners who lack sophisticated defense industries. Most importantly, it enables Australia to maintain military operations during extended periods when great power politics might limit access to traditional suppliers.
The Chinese economic coercion playbook, demonstrated globally over the past decade, reinforces the importance of economic resilience. Australia’s experience of Chinese trade restrictions in 2020-2021 illustrates both the vulnerability and the potential for adaptation. Despite Chinese restrictions on coal, wine, and other exports, Australia’s economy proved more resilient than anticipated, finding alternative markets and strengthening partnerships with countries like India and Japan.
Operational Integration Without Strategic Subordination
Strategic independence does not mean strategic isolation. Australia’s future security depends on deepening operational integration with trusted partners while maintaining decision-making autonomy. The level of operational integration already achieved between Australian and American forces extends far beyond traditional alliance cooperation.
Current systems integration means, as one Australian strategic analyst noted to me, “if you’ve got a sensor saying, here’s a PLA task group here, what’s the best asset for actually striking that in 15 minutes time, if it’s an Australian F-35 flight… it’s a joint thing.” This represents genuine operational integration where tactical decisions are made based on capability and positioning rather than national boundaries.
Similar integration is developing with other regional partners. Australia’s expanding training relationships, from long-standing arrangements with Singapore to new partnerships with Germany, reflect a diversification strategy that reduces dependence on any single relationship while building interoperability across multiple partnerships.
The key insight is that operational integration can coexist with strategic independence when partners maintain genuine capabilities rather than depending solely on a dominant ally’s systems. Australia’s ability to contribute meaningfully to integrated operations depends on having independent capabilities to contribute, not just political willingness to follow American leadership.
Regional Leadership and Multi-Alignment Strategies
Australia’s evolving strategic role extends beyond self-defense to regional leadership through capability sharing and operational cooperation. The expanding relationship with the Philippines illustrates this potential. Australia’s new treaty arrangements and joint exercises with Manila represent more than bilateral cooperation for they demonstrate how middle powers can create alternative security networks that complement rather than compete with traditional alliance structures.
The autonomous systems focus provides particular opportunities for regional leadership. Maritime autonomous systems offer an ideal platform for sharing operational information and coordinating responses to gray-zone activities without requiring massive infrastructure investments associated with traditional military cooperation. Australia could position itself as a regional hub for autonomous systems development and deployment.
This regional role serves broader strategic purposes by creating multiple decision-making centers that complicate adversary planning. Rather than focusing solely on potential American responses to regional aggression, potential adversaries must account for Australian capabilities, Philippine responses, Japanese actions, and other variables that cannot be controlled through bilateral pressure on Washington.
The Challenge of Institutional Innovation
The limitations of traditional alliance structures have encouraged institutional innovation. Frühling points to NATO’s Graduated Response Plans as a model for developing alliance-level operational planning that respects sovereignty concerns while building collective capabilities. These plans identify “what reinforcements might be necessary given the geographic and strategic situations in different parts of the alliance, the logistics of how they could be deployed, the political and military decision points and their timing.”
For the U.S.-Australia relationship, this might involve developing contingency plans that outline decision points and operational requirements without predetermining political responses. By identifying when and where decisions must be made, allies can build collective capabilities while preserving decision-making autonomy.
However, institutional innovation must account for the reality that “the vast majority of Australian staff officers, defense planners, and public servants who must make myriad practical decisions that collectively shape Australian force posture and structure outcomes do so with less of an explicit policy framework on how Australia’s national objectives align with alliance cooperation than their predecessors had two decades ago.”
This institutional gap reflects broader challenges facing middle powers: maintaining the bureaucratic and political capacity for independent strategic thinking while deepening operational ties with major power partners. The risk is that tactical cooperation proceeds faster than political consensus, potentially creating vulnerabilities or misunderstandings during crises.
Managing Resource Asymmetries
Middle powers face stark resource asymmetries when competing with major powers for influence. China has more than doubled its ballistic and cruise missile arsenal in recent years and possesses the world’s largest shipbuilding capacity. These disparities create fundamental constraints on middle power strategic options, particularly when attempting to balance relationships with competing major powers.
However, resource limitations also create opportunities for middle powers to focus on areas where they possess comparative advantages. Rather than attempting comprehensive balancing strategies, countries like Australia can concentrate on specific domains such as technology standards, environmental governance, critical minerals, or regional stability mechanisms where their contributions carry disproportionate weight.
Australia’s approach to critical minerals illustrates this strategy. By leveraging natural resource advantages while building processing and value-added capabilities, middle powers can maintain strategic relevance despite overall resource constraints. This requires patient investment in research and development capabilities but provides the foundation for genuine strategic autonomy.
The Deterrent Effect of Uncertainty
The deterrent effect of strategic independence capabilities depends not only on their technical performance but on adversary uncertainty about their capabilities and employment concepts. The psychological impact of facing an unknown number of sophisticated autonomous systems operating in contested waters may exceed their direct military effect.
This uncertainty principle applies more broadly to strategic independence. Adversaries who could previously predict Australian responses based on American decision-making patterns now face genuine uncertainty about Australian capabilities and intentions. This uncertainty serves deterrent purposes regardless of the specific capabilities involved.
The Pacific Island “fingerprinting” campaigns by Chinese forces illustrate the importance of distributed response capability. Australia’s ability to respond independently to such provocations, without requiring American approval or support, provides options for graduated responses that might be impossible within traditional alliance frameworks where every action requires extensive coordination.
Implications for Alliance Architecture
The Australian experience suggests several principles that may guide successful alliance evolution in an increasingly multipolar world. First, economic diversification remains crucial for maintaining strategic autonomy. Countries that become too dependent on single major power relationships risk losing freedom of maneuver during crises.
Second, institutional flexibility proves more valuable than rigid alliance commitments. Middle powers benefit from arrangements that allow them to contribute to collective security without compromising their ability to make sovereign decisions about force deployment and strategic priorities.
Third, regional focus and comparative advantage strategies offer more sustainable approaches than attempts at comprehensive great power balancing. Countries that identify specific domains where their contributions carry disproportionate weight can maintain influence despite resource constraints.
The solution requires reframing alliance cooperation from patron-client relationships toward genuine strategic partnerships. This means American acceptance that capable allies will make independent decisions about capability employment, while Australian recognition that strategic independence requires genuine capability development rather than political posturing.
Conclusion: The Future of Strategic Partnership
Australia’s movement toward more strategic independence represents neither abandonment of alliance relationships nor pursuit of complete autonomy. Instead, it reflects adaptation to a strategic environment where traditional security guarantees are no longer sufficient for national survival. The goal is developing sufficient independent capability to deter aggression while maintaining the partnerships necessary for broader regional stability.
This transition requires sustained political commitment to capability development, industrial investment, and regional engagement. It demands American acceptance that genuine partners exercise genuine autonomy in strategic decision-making. Most importantly, it requires recognition that strategic independence and alliance partnership can reinforce rather than contradict each other when properly structured.
The stakes extend beyond Australian security to the broader question of whether democratic middle powers can maintain autonomy in an era of great power competition. Australia’s success or failure in developing genuine strategic independence while maintaining productive partnerships will influence similar efforts across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
The path forward involves deliberate incrementalism, carefully managed cooperation that builds collective capabilities while respecting sovereignty concerns and political realities. This approach acknowledges that the comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era offered the illusion of permanent security through alliance dependence.
The emerging strategic environment demands the reality of security through capability and partnership. Australia’s challenge is managing this transition successfully while contributing to broader regional stability, a transition that is not only possible but essential for long-term security in an increasingly contested world.