Russia’s reliance on foreign recruits to sustain its war against Ukraine is accelerating, according to figures released by Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. In the first nine months of 2026, more foreigners signed contracts with the Russian armed forces than in all of 2025.
The figures were presented by Brigadier General Dmytro Usov, secretary of the Coordination Headquarters, at the international conference “Crimea Global. Understanding Ukraine through the South,” and reported on 20 October 2026 by Oleksiy Leonov of Militarnyi. As of 1 October 2026, the “I Want to Live” project run by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence had identified 45,959 foreign nationals, from 151 countries and unrecognized territories, who signed contracts with the Russian armed forces since the full-scale invasion began.
A Steep Annual Climb
The year-by-year count shows how quickly the recruitment has grown (Militarnyi):
- 2022: 94
- 2023: 4,067
- 2024: 8,877
- 2025: 16,085
- January–September 2026: 16,168
The Coordination Headquarters estimates that Russia is now signing about 1,800 foreigners a month. The Russian military leadership’s target for 2026 is reported as 18,500; at the current pace, the year could close at around 21,500 new foreign contract soldiers.
Where the Recruits Come From
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Belarus supply the largest numbers, though no country totals were given for them. The fastest growth is in Africa and Latin America. In the first nine months of 2026, contracts were signed by 1,449 Colombians, 699 citizens of Burundi, 530 Zimbabweans and 503 Peruvians. Ukraine has taken prisoner citizens of 59 countries who fought on Russia’s side (Militarnyi).
Recruitment methods described in the report include schemes aimed at tourists and migrant workers, promises of jobs and high pay, and, in some cases, intermediaries who take new arrivals’ passports and offer a choice between deportation, prison or a contract with the Russian army.
What Prisoners Say
A survey of captured foreigners by the “I Want to Live” project found that 46.7 percent signed to obtain Russian citizenship, 41.4 percent were recruited through enlistment offices and recruitment centers, and 28 percent did not know they would be sent to fight against Ukraine. Almost half (48.8 percent) were captured after being wounded. Notably, 79 percent said they want to return to Russia in a prisoner exchange (Militarnyi).
Why It Matters
The numbers come from Ukrainian intelligence and should be read as a count of identified contracts, not a complete or independently verified total. Even so, the trend is clear: Russia is turning a global labor market into a manpower reserve, so it can keep up its war of attrition while limiting how many of its own citizens it has to mobilize.
That has consequences well beyond Ukraine. Recruitment pipelines now reach into Latin America and Africa, drawing countries such as Colombia, Peru, Burundi and Zimbabwe into the war through their citizens, whether or not their governments want that. For Western planners, the lesson is that Russian manpower should not be judged by Russian demographics alone. Moscow’s ability to buy soldiers abroad, with money and citizenship, is part of its staying power. And the 79 percent of prisoners who want to go back to Russia suggest that for many recruits, citizenship and pay matter more than how they were drawn in.