The shipyards had their hull gap. The makers of cheap long-range weapons now appear to have an engine gap, and the evidence is stronger on the supply side than on any collapse in output.
What the Geran line is actually made of
Russia’s jet-powered Gerans are a lesson in how little of the weapon is the weapon. Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) says Moscow stopped building the Geran-3 and now makes roughly 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month at Alabuga. The airframe, the warhead and much of the electronics are things a large industrial state can multiply. The engine is the exception. HUR’s deputy chief, Vadym Skibitskyi, has said Russia remains fully dependent on Chinese turbojets for both models, at a price of about $35,000 to $40,000 each. Reporting on the Geran-4 teardown identifies the powerplant as a Telefly LX-WP-160, of the class sold to model-aircraft and sport flyers.
That is a remarkable fact about a weapon built to be expended. The thing that makes the jet Geran dangerous to Ukraine’s cheap propeller-driven interceptors, its speed, comes from a part Russia has not shown it can make at scale.
The signs of strain
The strain is real but it is not a collapse. In September, RBC-Ukraine reported that China had delivered only about 3,000 of these engines, one-sixth of what Moscow needed, and that the Kremlin was looking to build its own. Skibitskyi said in mid-September that Russia was having difficulty obtaining the engines, and Ukrainska Pravda has reported that Russian industry is learning to produce Telefly’s TF-TJ2000A.
And yet output has held. Serhii Beskrestnov, the adviser known as Flash, said this week that Russia is producing up to about 3,000 jet-powered Shahed-type drones a month plus around 700 Geran-5, and is building stocks for winter strikes on western Ukraine. The honest reading is a constrained but adaptive system: the engine is the binding input, and Moscow is working the problem through stockpiles, gray-market shipments and the early stages of indigenization.
Beijing’s licensing decision
On October 19 China’s Ministry of Commerce, customs authority and the Central Military Commission’s equipment department announced revised drone export controls that take effect November 18. They cover specially designed engines, autopilots, communications gear, high-power motors and propellers. Ukraine’s sanctions commissioner, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, said the rules reach the engines used in Gerans and the turbojets for the jet variants.
Two cautions belong here. Licensing is not a ban, and Vlasiuk himself noted that general permits of up to three years are envisaged for exporters judged reliable. And China has required permits for some drone engines since September 2023, yet engines kept reaching Russian plants, in some cases shipped as refrigeration units, according to Reuters. The change matters because it hands Beijing a dial. Whether it turns the dial is a political choice, not an industrial one.
The other side of the ledger
The same constraint binds the democracies. In April, Reuters quoted a Ukrainian defence industry source calling the mini-engine shortage probably the main factor limiting missile-drone numbers. Since then the response has been broad:
- Ukraine and Poland. Ivchenko-Progress and Poland’s PZL Defence signed a memorandum in late June to develop and build small turbojets. Brave1 now counts six Ukrainian companies in serial production of miniature turbojets.
- Czech Republic and the United States. PBS Group signed a memorandum with Ukraine’s Airlogix in July to localize small turbine production in Ukraine, and is reported to be investing another $100 million at its Roswell plant to reach 10,000 engines a year for drones and cruise missiles by 2028.
- United Kingdom. The Ministry of Defence announced in September a family of British turbojets from 30 to 2,000 newtons built with the start-up Alloyed. A 300-newton engine is in serial production and an 1,100-newton engine went from concept to flight-ready in under seven months, with more than 40 suppliers involved.
- Azad Engineering delivered India’s first indigenous expendable turbojet to GTRE and the Ministry of Defence on July 22, with a first lot of 20 engines being prepared.
Why the numbers matter more than the headlines
Set these against Russian demand. At about 3,000 jet drones a month, Russia consumes on the order of 36,000 turbojets a year. PBS’s 2028 target for its entire US line is 10,000 a year, under a third of that, and a first lot of 20 engines in India is a proof of capability, not a production rate. By my arithmetic, the allied programmes are building the ability to make engines, not yet the quantity to match a mass adversary. That is the same pattern as the hull gap: a design and production base sized for peacetime volumes meeting a wartime demand curve.
The kill-web implication is that the engine is a node worth mapping. Casting, machining, balancing and test-stand time are the scarce steps, and they sit in a small number of firms. For Russia that means a Chinese chokepoint it cannot easily route around. For Ukraine and its partners it means the first allied advantage may come from the unglamorous work of qualifying suppliers and test capacity rather than from a better airframe.
What to watch
- Whether China issues general permits or denies licences after November 18.
- Whether Russian output of the Geran-4 and Geran-5 dips once winter stockpiles are drawn down.
- Whether any of the allied lines reports monthly, not annual, production in the thousands.
- Whether Russia’s own turbojet effort moves from learning to serial production.
Sources: HUR via Euromaidan Press (Aug 12), bne IntelliNews, RBC-Ukraine (Sept), Pravda.com.ua (Sept 14 and Oct 27), UNN/United24 (late Oct), MLex and Quwa on China’s October 19 announcement, Euromaidan Press (Oct 28), Reuters (Apr 7), Defense Post (Jun 30), Armádní noviny/Mezha (Oct 31), UK Defence Journal and Forces News (Sept), Value Educator on Azad Engineering, DroneXL on the Geran-4 teardown.