Urgent Steps Needed to Strengthen U.S. Space Security

By Richard Weitz

Maintaining access to space is critical for advancing U.S. sovereignty, prosperity, and security. Americans rely on space for navigation, reconnaissance, communications, weather forecasting, and other essential economic and security functions.

Space capabilities are inherently “dual use.” They can support military as well as civilian missions. Commercial space firms now possess capabilities previously available only to national governments. Year after year, they launch larger payloads at lower costs. Whereas a decade ago governments executed most space missions, now only effective public-private partnerships can preserve U.S. space security.

But the United States is facing a more threatening space environment. Russia and China continue to expand, modernize, diversify their space and counterspace capabilities. They possess advanced anti-satellite capabilities designed to disrupt, degrade, or destroy U.S. space networks. Their direct-ascent kill vehicles destroy targets through force of impact, while their “co-orbital” systems maneuver near objects to grab, hack, stalk, or smash them. Though both systems require rockets to propel them into space, Russia and China are developing directed energy, electronic warfare, and cyber weapons. These can attack targets above the atmosphere while still on Earth.

The Kremlin aspires to dominate the strategic high ground and exploit the U.S. military’s dependence on space. The Defense Department has confirmed that Russia is developing the capacity to deploy nuclear-armed space weapons. In exchange for abetting its aggression against Ukraine, Moscow has also advanced the military space programs of Iran and North Korea.

The Chinese Communist Party plans to make the PRC preeminent in space to achieve economic and military dominance on Earth. China now has more satellites in orbit than Russia, second only to the United States. Their number increases as the PRC develops larger carrier rockets to send heavier payloads deeper into space. Like Moscow, Beijing aims to build space-enabled kill chains to paralyze the United States in a conflict.

Although Russian and Chinese counterspace capabilities present independent challenges to the United States, the threat increases as they combine their resources, experience, and technologies. Russia and China have purchased important space technologies from each other, linked their space navigation systems to better compete with the U.S. GPS network, and coordinated planetary exploration missions. Further Sino-Russian collaboration could potentially leverage Russia’s extended experience in space with China’s enormous resources to forge a formidable anti-Western partnership.

In the face of these threats, the United States needs enhanced space awareness to avert operational surprise, build more rapid launch capacity to restore critical missions even when attacked, and develop better tools to degrade adversaries’ counterspace capabilities.

Further efforts are needed to achieve tactically responsive space capabilities to execute urgent requirements. The Ukraine war offers insights for improving resilience of satellite constellations and their ground networks. Satellites have been critical for surveillance and dynamic targeting but have proven vulnerable to cyber and electronic assault.

Combining the Pentagon’s capabilities with commercial and allied systems yields superior results. Through frequent exercises, the Defense Department can bolster readiness and interoperability. Conversely, the United States should press allies to eschew projects with Russia and China that could have military space applications.

One essential advantage the United States enjoys over Russia and China is its robust space private sector. U.S. commercial companies have proven particularly useful for enhancing domain awareness, achieving technological breakthroughs, and responding to novel conditions.

However, the United States needs to diversify space suppliers. Presently, one contractor, SpaceX, conducts approximately four out of five U.S. space launches. Whatever its technical achievements, the company has experienced frequent setbacks. Its management is under investigation for alleged labor and regulatory violations, loose security procedures, and unreported contacts with foreign governments.

The United States needs assurance that its commercial partners are ready and willy to render support in conflicts and other crises. Following the example of U.S. Civil Reserve Air Fleet and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement in the air and sea domains, respectively, the planned Commercial Augmented Space Reserve could empower the military to quickly access private sector satellites in an emergency.

Prudence warrants that the Defense Department prevent its major contractors from maintaining links with potential U.S. adversaries and expand its portfolio of national security launchers. Though overclassification remains a problem, the government must insist that allpartners adhere to security best practices. The Pentagon must also scrutinize space supply chains to ensure that its contractors do not rely on the same vendors for critical components.