Taiwan’s top intelligence official has described China’s maritime gray-zone pressure around Taiwan as a pattern, not a string of separate incidents. The key change, he says, is a tactic first seen in the South China Sea: militia fishing boats working together with China Coast Guard ships. That tactic is now showing up off Taiwan’s eastern and south-western coasts.
What the NSB Director Said
According to Taiwan’s Central News Agency, National Security Bureau (NSB) Director Tsai Ming-yen spoke to reporters on 22 October before presenting the bureau’s national intelligence report for the second half of 2026 to the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee. He said Beijing’s gray-zone harassment at sea is becoming “increasingly active,” especially in the waters around Taiwan, and he named three trends:
- Routine coast guard patrols in the east. China Coast Guard activity east of Taiwan and in the Western Pacific is becoming normal practice.
- Coast guard support for research. These coast guard deployments also support “marine scientific research.”
- Militia boats alongside coast guard ships. Militia fishing boats are increasingly operating with coast guard ships, in waters off eastern and south-western Taiwan. Tsai said the militia boats used to operate mainly in the South China Sea, but similar harassment patterns are now appearing around Taiwan.
Tsai also explained how the work is divided. The NSB and Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration have a close liaison arrangement. The coast guard handles reporting and response for each incident, while the NSB analyzes the overall pattern and exchanges intelligence with international partners.
CNA adds that Chinese militia vessels appeared in waters east of Taiwan in August. At the time, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said Beijing was using law enforcement and scientific research as cover for harassment. It said the aim was to widen China’s area of operations without open conflict and create the “illusion of de facto jurisdiction,” and that the ministry would coordinate its response with the coast guard.
Why It Matters
This analysis is ours, not CNA’s.
Tsai has given official form to a pattern that recent incidents already suggested, including the coordinated multi-ship pressure and the Chinese coast guard ship that turned off its AIS transponder near Dongsha. His three trends point to one approach. A law-enforcement ship provides the claim of authority. A research mission provides the civilian justification. Militia boats provide numbers and the ability to deny involvement. The South China Sea showed how well this combination wears down a smaller defender. Bringing it to Taiwan’s east coast matters most because that coast faces the Western Pacific, the area Taiwan has treated as its strategic rear and its route to allied support.
The division of labor Tsai described also points to a capability gap. A coast guard that answers one case at a time is always reacting. Pattern analysis that partners can trust needs a continuous record: tracks held on ships that go dark, timestamped evidence, and data good enough to share with allies. That is the argument for persistent uncrewed sensing. The sensors keep the record, and the crewed cutter remains the visible sign of Taiwan’s authority. In short, the mesh watches and the cutter governs. When the opponent mixes enforcement, research and militia roles, the side with the better record of what happened has the stronger claim to be governing the water.