A Danish Navy Memo Says Frigates Alone Are Not Enough

11/19/2026

By Robbin Laird

On 13 November the Danish public broadcaster DR reported on an internal Navy document titled “The Fleet of the Future.” DR has seen the memo, which is signed by Rear Admiral Søren Kjeldsen, chief of the Navy’s Naval Command. Several sources in the Armed Forces confirmed to DR that it exists and described what it says. The text has not been published, and Defence Command told DR that the memo is not the Armed Forces’ recommendation for a future fleet.

Those caveats matter, and I return to them below. But for the first time the public can see what the Navy itself says it needs, and the picture follows a line I have been tracing in my work on the capital ship in the autonomous era: the frigate as a node in a larger web, not as the whole of the fleet.

What DR reports the memo says

The memo reportedly calls for a “hybrid fleet” built around frigates that act as floating command centers. Around them would operate uncrewed systems of several sizes, on the water, under it and in the air, some armed and some not. DR describes the new frigates as the heart and brain of that fleet.

The Navy also reportedly wants an entirely new type of smaller warship, which it sees as central to the fleet and to the defense of Denmark. DR’s account gives no detail beyond that.

On numbers, the memo judges that six frigates are needed to meet NATO’s force goals. DR reports that this does not necessarily mean six new ships. One option is to extend the lives of the three Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates and give them the anti-submarine task now held by the older Absalon class, which entered service in 2007 and will be the first to reach retirement age. That would leave perhaps three new frigates to buy.

The memo reportedly draws on two sets of lessons: Ukrainian drones against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, and Western naval operations in the Red Sea. And it recommends a rapid as well as substantial upgrade of Danish maritime combat power. DR cites Denmark’s Defence Intelligence Service for the judgment that Russia could, under certain conditions, be ready for large-scale war within five years.

The frigate as node

On 16 September, in a speech titled “Battle for the Atlantic,” Britain’s First Sea Lord, General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, described a Danish frigate that could “seamlessly takeover from a British warship” in the Atlantic and take control of a British flotilla of uncrewed ships and sensors left on station for months. The Royal Navy’s own Defence Investment Plan calls its planned Common Combat Vessel the “central brain” of the network.

The Danish memo, as reported, reaches the same architecture from the other end. A crewed frigate is valued for what it commands and connects, not only for what it carries. I have argued that the capital asset in this kind of fleet is the web, and that the hull is where the web is hosted and directed. A Navy that puts its frigates at the center of a hybrid fleet is saying much the same thing, in the plain language of a service that has to buy ships with limited money.

Denmark has some standing to say it. Its Iver Huitfeldt class was built with container positions and a Mark 41 launcher installed before the missiles to fill them were affordable, so that the infrastructure was waiting when the requirement arrived. Denmark’s own naval leaders, Admiral Nils Wang and Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen among them, have talked to me for years about treating the ship as a payload-carrying frame.

Four details that matter more than the headline

Autonomy under jamming. The memo reportedly says drones in the Baltic must be able to operate on their own, because Ukrainian experience shows that Russia can cut the link between an operator and a remotely controlled vehicle. This changes what it means to “take control” of a flotilla. If the vehicles must keep working when the link fails, command is exercised mostly before the link is lost, through tasking, constraints and rules of engagement set in advance. The frigate supervises more than it steers. The questions of who may task another nation’s uncrewed systems, and what they may do when no one can reach them, move closer together.

Size in the north. For the North Atlantic and Arctic waters, the drones must be of “considerable size” to survive the weather. That is a sharper requirement than the Baltic evidence Denmark has accumulated. Four Saildrone Voyagers operated for the Royal Danish Navy for six months, sailing more than 20,000 nautical miles with 92 percent uptime, and in September they became the first Saildrones to fly a national flag. That is real persistence under national command, but the vehicles are small wind-driven surveillance craft. The Navy’s own requirement for its northern waters is for something larger, which that record does not yet cover.

Maintain, not just build. Danish politicians want the new frigates built wholly or partly in Denmark, and DR notes that this ambition is one reason the procurement has dragged. The memo reportedly takes no position on where they are built. What matters to the Navy, a source who has read it told DR, is that Denmark can itself maintain and repair the ships over time. That moves the weight from the shipyard’s order book to the sustainment base. It is a test every bidder should face, including Babcock and its Danish partners, who say their joint approach could support around 2,000 jobs, and Naval Group, which has signed agreements with Danish companies of its own.

Six is a count of hulls. Whether a NATO force goal measured in hulls can credit a frigate for what it commands, and not only for what it carries, is a question the reporting does not say the memo addresses. If it cannot, a navy that builds a node-centered fleet may find that its contribution is counted as if it had built a conventional one.

The clock and the ledger

The memo’s urgency collides with a procurement calendar that has already slipped. A snap election in March froze the frigate schedule, and Bloomberg reported on 30 September that the supplier decision is likely to move into 2027, possibly in the spring. Copenhagen has not fixed the number of ships or the funding, and a decision on new Arctic patrol vessels is reported to be due ahead of the frigates. Shephard has described Naval Group’s FDI as the favorite, with no formal competition yet under way, while Babcock offers an Arrowhead 140 that descends from Denmark’s own Iver Huitfeldt design. Naval Group has said it could deliver a first FDI in 2030 if parliament decides quickly, according to Ingeniøren.

The life-extension option in the memo also has to answer a record. In April 2025 the defense minister said the existing frigates had another ten good years in them. In June 2025 the Chief of Defence recommended abandoning the planned sensor and fire-control upgrade for the three Iver Huitfeldt ships, after faults in that system during a Red Sea deployment. A plan that leans on those hulls for the anti-submarine mission will have to show that the combat system problems are behind them.

The part of a hybrid fleet that can exist inside a five-year window is the part Denmark has already begun. DALO’s Saildrones, the December 2025 purchase of the 85-meter Norwind Helm to carry underwater drones and sensors, and NATO’s Task Force X-Baltic, which tested seventy air and maritime drones with allied ships in 2025, are all building the institutional habit of running uncrewed systems under national command before the new frigates arrive. That is the sequencing argument I made about Britain, and Denmark is ahead of it on the surveillance layer.

So here is the honest ledger.

Demonstrated: months of Danish-controlled uncrewed surveillance in the Baltic, and allied testing of uncrewed vessels off Denmark.

Reported but not decided: a Navy memo wanting six frigates, a layered fleet of drones and a new smaller warship, which Defence Command says is not the Armed Forces’ recommendation.

Undecided: the number of frigates, the supplier, the funding, and the partner.

Sources