Keeping USMC H-1s Ready and Relevant for Today’s Crisis Management Response

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Keeping USMC H-1s Ready and Relevant for Today’s Crisis Management Response
05/13/2025

The Marine Corps Aviation Association (MCAA) 2025 Symposium is going on this week from May 12 through the 15h in Dallas Texas.

We are publishing a piece highlighting the role of one of the somewhat undervalued aviation capabilities which the Marine Corps operates today, namely the H-1 helicopters.

By Allen Grinalds

In the opening hours of Operation Iraqi Freedom, one of the first enemy targets was an Iraqi command and control site at Safwan Hill, near the Line of Departure. Armed with unguided rockets, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters closed to within 800 meters.

At 3:00 AM on a moonless night, the operation carried substantial risk of our Cobras taking both hostile and friendly fire—with multiple ground and air units from U.S. and allied forces all maneuvering and shooting at the same time. Despite the considerable hazards, we accomplished the mission unscathed.

Fast forward to today, and the capabilities of those same H-1 rotorcraft—the AH-1Z Viper and the UH-1Y Venom—are continually being transformed to the point that someday soon we will be able to take out a target like the one at Safwan Hill from over 150 miles away with a single precision-guided missile.

That ability to “reach out and touch someone” becomes even more important when considering the vast distances involved in the Indo-Pacific theater. The 2025 Marine Aviation Plan underscores the importance of delivering sustained fires with the extended reach and lethality that Combatant Commanders need on the battlefield today.

An essential contributor to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and its Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is its complement of H-1 helicopters, which perform all six functions of Marine Aviation to include Offensive Air Support (OAS), Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Assault Support, Air Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Control of Aircraft and Missiles.

In the early 2000s, investments were made to ensure the H-1s kept pace with the evolving threats on a modern battlefield. Now, over two decades later, we again need to make investments in the Structural Improvement Electrical Power Upgrade (SIEPU) to keep USMC H-1s ready and relevant across the full range of operations for the next decade.

The H-1 Today

The H-1 is fully integrated into the Marine Corps concepts of operation, but like any aircraft, it has limitations that prevent a more lethal pairing with evolving technologies throughout the force.

In some cases, fifth generation fixed-wing aircraft cannot engage certain target types without exposure to the enemy’s radar-guided anti-air assets. Current H-1 aircraft could compensate for this shortfall through exploitation of the low-altitude deficiencies of enemy radar systems. However, today’s H-1 rotorcraft must maneuver dangerously close to enemy forces to be able to do so.

The H-1’s shortfalls in state-of-the-art electronic warfare protection, sensor capabilities, advanced self-defense capabilities, and weapon system integration expose H-1s to both radar-guided and advanced infra-red (IR) surface-to-air missiles; preclude the use of net-enabled weapons; and as a result place H-1s at risk as they must close within enemy weapon engage zones to detect, recognize, and identify enemy targets. These vulnerabilities prevent operational commanders from integrating H-1s into high-threat operations and allow our adversaries additional room to impede the Combatant Commander’s operational plans.

Increased Electrical Power Generation Enhances Survivability and Lethality

The Marine Corps is turning to SIEPU to upgrade Venom and Viper combat performance, address shortfalls in electrical power generation, and make needed structural improvements to the Venom’s cabin. The components of SIEPU include:

  • Improved electronic warfare systems;
  • More capable and reliable communication sharing of information, voice, and data across networks;
  • Integration of advanced weapon systems and data links; and
  • Improved defensive systems.

These SIEPU improvements will directly address many of the H-1’s current limitations by providing advanced protection against both radar-guided and IR-guided missiles, allow H-1s to receive enemy target locations from third-party platforms such as the F-35, and enable the use of precision weapons with ranges up to ten times greater than those currently employed. With SIEPU improvements, H-1s can be safely integrated into high-threat operations with the ability to engage enemy targets from locations undetectable to the enemy.

The SIEPU program will not only increase H-1 lethality and survivability but will also provide a synergistic improvement to U.S. warfighting capabilities by allowing both our Fixed Wing and H-1 assets to operate from tactical sanctuaries where our enemies are either unable to detect, or unable to engage, our aviation strike packages. In essence, the SIEPU program will allow Combatant Commanders to overcome tactical advantages currently enjoyed by our adversaries. To that end, the Marine Corps has incorporated SIEPU into its recently released Aviation Plan, which notes:

“Every investment in H-1s over the next two FYDPs is essential to maintaining a ready crisis response force, pivotal to reduce risk in the development of H-1 Next, and critical to bridge the gap for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as it transforms into a fully modernized fleet.”

SIEPU in Action

Imagine a SIEPU-equipped force scenario: fifth generation fixed-wing assets find, fix, and track enemy weapons systems while remaining outside the range of adversary anti-aircraft weapons systems.

At the same time, SIEPU-equipped AH-1Zs and UH-1Ys take up long-range firing points while remaining undetected, flying under enemy radar resolution cells. Fixed-wing aircraft target the enemy weapon systems and digitally pass the target locations to Venom and Viper helicopters poised to provide fires on unsuspecting enemy forces from an unanticipated vector.

Enabled by the SIEPU program’s upgraded electrical power generation, improved processing capabilities and enhanced weapons carriage, the Vipers and Venoms will be capable of engaging land-based enemy positions from extremely long distances with missiles that can track moving targets and simultaneously engage enemy unmanned aerial systems and other kinetic munitions that threaten U.S. forces with net-enabled air-to-air weapons.

This type of platform pairing will present a thorny problem for the enemy: they can “see” but cannot target fixed-wing aircraft while undetected H-1 aircraft at standoff range launch devastating effects.

H-1 Upgrades Will Maintain Overmatch

The H-1s were outfitted from inception with advanced sensors and weapons, and fully integrated cockpits, but they were not equipped with digital communications or network capabilities to fully realize their capabilities.

SIEPU is not the only upgrade program underway for the H-1. Other initiatives like Digital Interoperability and MAGTF Agile Network Gateway Link integration, combined with the employment of net-enabled precision munitions, will further allow the Marine Corps to fill mission and capability gaps.

These H-1 upgrades provide essential increases in survivability, lethality, and situational awareness. More importantly, they provide Combatant Commanders with an asymmetric advantage that our adversaries can neither duplicate nor counter.

An investment in the SIEPU program will send a clear message to our adversaries that America is serious about preserving our warfighting advantage and remains committed to deterring conflict in a complex global environment. And, if conflict comes, we will prevail.

LtCol Allen Grinalds, USMC (ret.) served as an AH-1 Cobra pilot with tours including MAWTS-1 in Yuma, AZ, H-1 Plans Officer at the Pentagon, commanding officer of HMLA-269 in New River, NC, and combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

U.S. Marine Maj. Gen. Glenn M. Walters, commanding general, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, presents a Bronze Star to Lt. Col. Allen D. Grinalds, aviation training standardization officer, Marine Wing Headquarter Squadron 2, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point N.C., August 21, 2012. Grinalds was presented a Bronze Star, the 9th highest military award, for his performance as commanding officer of Marine Light Attack Squadron 269 while in a combat environment. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Yosselyn A. Munnerlyn/Released)

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.

First published April 3, 2025 in The MOC, Center for Maritime Strategy

Featured image: U.S. Marine Corps UH-1Y Venoms attached to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 165 (Reinforced), 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, fly in formation before embarking the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) in the Pacific Ocean April 1, 2024. Elements of the 15th MEU are currently embarked aboard the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group conducting routine operations in U.S. 3rd Fleet. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Amelia Kang)

This article is republished with the author’s permission.

Earlier, we published a piece highlighting the ahead with the H-1 and its contribution to the evolving kill web capabilities of the USMC as they evolve their concepts of operations within the joint force.

Shaping a Way Ahead for the USMC Light Attack Helicopter

Lula in Moscow and Beijing: Coming to Terms with the Multi-Polar Authoritarian World?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Lula in Moscow and Beijing: Coming to Terms with the Multi-Polar Authoritarian World?

By Kenneth Maxwell

The three major Brazilian newspapers in their editorials had nothing good to say about Lula’s presence in Moscow for the 80th anniversary parade on Red Square celebrating the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in WW2.

The Brazilian President and his wife, Rosângela (Janja) Lula da Silva, joined Vladimir Putin, President Xi Jinping of China, and Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso, clad in his army uniform, the 35-year-old victor of a military coup in 2022, among other autocrats on the viewing stand in front of Lenin’s mausoleum.

Vladimir Putin praised his “special military operation,” that is his war against Ukraine. Afterwards at the gala dinner in the Kremlin he praised the role of the BRICS, with Dilma Rousseff, the former (and the impeached ) president of Brazil, in attendance. She is now the head of the BRICS’s development Bank, re-elected with the support of Putin, which is based in Shanghai, China.

The Estado da São Paulo said in an editorial that Lula in Moscow was a “day of infamy”.

The Folha de São Paulo said in its editorial that Lula in Moscow was “not pragmatism, only a diplomatic error .. and that in consorting with autocrats ..  Lula was not only attending the just celebration of the end of the most lethal conflict in the history of humanity, but yes, the glorification of the another actual conflict condemned by the majority of the democracies of their world, with the exception of Brazil. A war of more than three years imposed by a nuclear giant on a ex-soviet republic which has already caused a million deaths according to estimates difficult to verify.”

O Globo of Rio de Janeiro said in its editorial: “Lula in Moscow: The wrong side of history.”

Brazil had indeed participated in WW2,

But not on the eastern Front and not with the Russians. A Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) had fought in Italy, as part of the U.S. military command. Brazil had provided a critical base for the United States in Natal, in the north-east of Brazil, which was absolutely critical to the supply of U.S. armed forces in North Africa, and to the support of the Soviet Union via shipments of war supplies and crated aircraft around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa and through Iran into the Soviet Union.

This despite the fascist overtones of the Brazilian dictatorial regime of Getulio Vargas and the fact that Brazil had the largest Nazi party outside of Germany, and that the chief of Vargas’s powerful secret police was a fervent German sympathizer.

Lula could well have celebrated Brazil’s participation in WW2 in Rio de Janeiro at the “Monumento aos Pracinhas” which commemorated the Brazilian war dead:  948 men killed in action. 25,900 men, including a full infantry division, liaison flight and fighter squadron was involved.

The FEB saw heavy combat at the arduous Gothic Line and during the final offensive in Europe. By the end of the war, the FEB had taken 20,573 Axis prisoners, including two generals, and almost 900 officers. The FEB served with distinction in several battles including Collecchio, Camaiore, Monte Plano, and Serchio Valley.

It would no doubt have pleased the Brazilian military, and at a time when the Supreme Court in Brasilia is considering the case of the riots in Brasilia on January 8th, 2023, when supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro (who was in Orlando, Florida at the time) had ransacked the Palácio do Planalto, the president of Brazil’s official headquarters, as well as the supreme court building, and the Congress building, in an attempt  to prevent Lula from taking office after his election to a third term, and after Lula’s lengthy imprisonment (April 2018 to November 2019) on changes of money laundering and corruption.

The Brazilian military had after all played a large role during the presidency of his predecessor, former Army captain, Jair Messias Bolsonaro. Army Generals had ruled Brazil for 21 years during the military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985. It could have been symbolic moment of national reconciliation. After all, Celso Furtado, the famous Brazilian exile, economist, and public servant, also fraught in Italy. His participation in the war against fascism was also well worth remembering.

But instead, Lula chose to be in Moscow.

The symbol of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy was a green snake smoking a pipe. Known as the “Smoking Snakes.” It became a symbol of defiance and pride for the Brazilian soldiers who proved their doubters wrong on the battlefield.

Lula received a Doutor Honorius Causa from the State University of Saint Petersburg, Vladimir Putin’s home town It is the University where Vladimir Lenin and Vladimir Putin studied. Lula’s Janja, wife went to Saint Petersburg and gave a speech on “hunger and poverty.” She is 21 years Lula’s junior and was a functionary of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam between 2005 and 2020. She famously told Elon Musk to “f..k” off.”

It is a pity Janja Lula da Silva did not have time in Saint Petersburg to look up the archives of the USSR Academy of Sciences (now the Saint Petersburg Ethnological Museum and the Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg) which holds the records of  George von Langsdorff (Grigori Ivanovich Langsdorff) and his expeditions in Brazil. Langsdorff was the consul general of the Russian Imperial Court in Rio de Janeiro during the time the Portuguese Court, fleeing Napoleon’s  troops, had removed to Rio de Janeiro, where it remained for almost 21 years after 1808.

Langsdorff  is reported to have 1,500 decedents in Brazil, including Luma de Oliveira, a Carnaval Queen. He was evidently busily impregnating Brazilian women in addition to his duties as the  consul-general of Imperial Russia in Rio. There is a venomous coral snake named in his honor. Lula should have remembered this snake (and the emblem of the FEB) before he embarked on his visit to Putin land.

The Micrurus Langsdorffi is a very nasty reptile.

The Micrurus Langsdorffi; A venomous South American Coral Snake.

President Lula, however, was on his way to Beijing for a four-day state visit to China and to attend the fourth

Forum China-Celac, the meeting between the leaders of several major South American countries (The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States [Celac]) and Chinese representatives.

Lula has eleven ministers, top politicians, and a delegation of 150 business leaders with him in Beijing. He said on arrival that Brazil’s link with China was “indestructible.”

Colombia’s President, Gustavo Petro, said that they were not “only looking one way’ by which meant toward the U.S. Chile’s President Gabriel Boric is also in Beijing. Lula added that he could not accept “that the president of the U.S. tried to impose on the planet earth, from one day to the next.”

While he enjoys the militarily parade in Red Square and the bromides of Xi Jinping on Beijing, Lula should perhaps remember that Brazil is a democracy, and that Russia and China are decidedly not.

The meeting of BRICSs in Rio de Janeiro between 6-7 of July and the COP30 meeting in  Belém,  Pará , between 10th and 21 of November, guarantees that Lula and Brazil are set to remain center stage.

But in Rio and in Belém, Lula should remember, that the Micrurus Langsdorffi lurks in the tropical undergrowth.

The featured image is of President Lula in Moscow listening to Putin and is a screenshot from the official video of the event.

This is the follow up to an earlier article:

Brazil at the Crossroads

Middle Powers in a Changing World: How Australia and Brazil Navigate the China Dynamic

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Middle Powers in a Changing World: How Australia and Brazil Navigate the China Dynamic
05/12/2025

By Robbin Laird and Kenneth Maxwell

In today’s rapidly evolving global order, middle powers find themselves in an increasingly complex position as they balance economic opportunity against strategic independence. Two nations, Australia and Brazil, offer a fascinating case study in how different countries are responding to China’s rise while pursuing their own national interests.

A Tale of Two Middle Powers

Despite being on opposite sides of the Southern Hemisphere, Australia and Brazil share remarkable similarities. Both are resource-rich middle powers with significant economic ties to China. However, their geographic, political, and historical contexts have led to distinct approaches in managing this crucial relationship.

Brazil is actually slightly larger than Australia in terms of landmass (by about 10%), yet their terrains couldn’t be more different. While Australia is dominated by desert and semi-arid land (approximately 70%), Brazil features nearly 60% rainforest cover. These natural endowments shape not only their resource bases but also their climate vulnerabilities and economic structures.

The China Connection: Trade and Dependence

Australia’s China Relationship

The Australia-China economic relationship is truly massive, with two-way trade reaching $325 billion in 2023-24. Australian exports to China exceeded $212 billion, forming the bedrock of Australia’s global trade. This relationship is dominated by resources, with iron ore alone accounting for over 150% of goods exports to China.

The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), in effect since 2015, has been progressively eliminating tariffs. By 2029, most resources and energy exports will be duty-free, with tariffs already reduced or eliminated on products like barley, beef, wine, and wool.

Beyond commodities, services trade has grown significantly, with tourism and international education seeing a 40% increase in 2023-24. The trade pattern is clear: resources and food flow from Australia to China, while manufactured goods move in the opposite direction.

Brazil’s China Relationship

Brazil’s trade with China is similarly substantial, exceeding $181 billion in 2023. However, Brazil’s export mix is even more concentrated on raw materials than Australia’s, dominated by what analysts call the “soy and steel connection.”

Soybeans represent Brazil’s top agricultural export to China, worth nearly $32 billion in 2022 – more than two-thirds of Brazil’s total soy exports. China sources approximately 60% of its soybean imports from Brazil. Iron ore forms the second pillar, with Brazil sending about $18 billion worth in 2022, roughly 63% of its total iron ore exports. Oil is the third major export, with nearly 40% of Brazil’s oil exports headed to China.

Chinese investment in Brazil is growing beyond resources, particularly in energy (especially renewables), electricity transmission, and increasingly, electric vehicles. Since 2021, all new Chinese automotive investment in Brazil has focused on electric or hybrid vehicles, with companies like BYD and Great Wall Motors establishing operations.

Manufacturing Decline and Economic Transformation

Both countries have experienced significant drops in manufacturing as a share of GDP over recent decades. Australia’s manufacturing peaked in the 1960s and fell below 10% by 2020, while Brazil’s high point came in the mid-1980s before dropping to around 11% recently.

The timing differs notably: Australia’s decline began earlier (1970s-80s), often linked to domestic trade liberalization policies before China became a major global player. Brazil’s more intense deindustrialization period coincides more directly with China’s economic surge in the 2000s.

Australia reportedly lost between 53,000 and 80,000 manufacturing jobs due to Chinese imports between 1991 and 2006. Brazil may have experienced an even more direct impact, as its manufacturers often produced similar goods to Chinese factories, facing tougher competition both domestically and internationally.

This has led to what economists call “primarization” – an increased focus on commodity exports at the expense of manufacturing – which has reportedly affected wages and formal employment in Brazil’s manufacturing sector.

Public Perception and Political Responses

Australia’s Balancing Act

In Australia, the China relationship represents a constant balancing act between enormous economic benefits and legitimate security concerns, particularly regarding China’s military presence in the region.

This tension played out in Australia’s 2025 election, with the Labor government highlighting improved relations and the lifting of some Chinese trade restrictions after 2022. The opposition Coalition employed tougher security rhetoric while simultaneously softening their tone on trade, recognizing the economic importance of the relationship.

The complexity of managing the U.S. alliance alongside the China relationship adds another layer of difficulty, especially with concerns about being caught in potential U.S.-China trade conflicts.

Brazil’s Approach

Brazil’s view of China reflects different dynamics, with clearer divisions based on economic interests. Manufacturing sectors tend to be critical of Chinese competition, while the agricultural sector generally embraces the China connection due to massive purchases of soy and beef.

Political attitudes have varied significantly. Former President Bolsonaro adopted an anti-China stance at times, while current President Lula has prioritized the relationship, visiting China in late 2024 and discussing a “community with a shared future.” Lula views China as a key strategic partner crucial for Brazil’s development and global standing, while still attempting to maintain good relations with the United States – a pragmatic form of non-alignment.

Unlike Australia, Brazil has been more cautious about directly confronting China on sensitive issues, though concerns about economic dependence, deindustrialization, and controversies around Chinese investment persist.

Diversification Strategies

Australia’s Urgent Pivot

Australia’s diversification strategy appears driven by greater urgency, spurred by geopolitical tensions and past trade disputes. Key elements include:

  • Focusing on Asia, particularly India (through the ECTA trade deal, roadmap, and investment funds) and ASEAN countries
  • Expanding globally through trade pacts like CPTPP and negotiations with the EU and UK
  • Developing domestic manufacturing and critical minerals through the Critical Minerals Strategy 2023-2030 and tax incentives
  • Reducing vulnerability in supply chains, often partnering with “like-minded” countries
  • Growing the service sector with more diverse student sources, specialized tourism, and financial hub ambitions

Brazil’s Regional Focus

Brazil’s diversification efforts appear more regionally oriented:

  • Emphasizing Mercosur, the South American trade bloc, especially regarding the potential EU-Mercosur trade deal.
  • Exploring a possible Mercosur-China FTA in the longer term.
  • Boosting manufacturing and innovation through tech parks and the “New Industry Brazil” initiative.
  • Leveraging their clean energy mix for competitive advantage.
  • Using e-commerce to sell directly to Chinese consumers.
  • Attempting to benefit geopolitically from US-China tensions.
  • Focusing on critical materials like lithium and rare earths to build higher-value green tech industries.
  • Using Chinese investment strategically for technology transfer.

Comparative Approaches

While both countries share the common challenge of asymmetrical trade dependence on China, their responses differ significantly.

Australia’s strategy appears more explicitly oriented toward the Indo-Pacific region and traditional Western allies, with a clearer goal of reducing China dependency. The focus on critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and “friend-shoring” supply chains reflects geopolitical calculations.

Brazil’s approach seems more regionally focused and less explicitly concerned with reducing Chinese influence. The emphasis on Mercosur, the potential EU deal, and even exploring a Mercosur-China possibility suggests a strategy of geopolitical balancing rather than decoupling.

Both nations aim to climb the value chain by developing more sophisticated products and capturing more value domestically, though they face different obstacles. Australia contends with the entrenched economic complementarity with China and China’s dominance in mineral processing, while Brazil struggles with innovation coordination, energy costs, political stability, and private R&D investment.

Conclusion: Lessons for a Multipolar World

The contrasting approaches of Australia and Brazil offer valuable insights into how middle powers can navigate the complex challenges of the emerging global order. Their strategies reflect the specific constraints and opportunities they face, suggesting there is no one-size-fits-all solution for balancing economic engagement with China while maintaining strategic independence.

As the global system continues to evolve, other middle powers will likely look to these examples to inform their own approaches. The key question remains: which principles work best for protecting national interests while participating in an increasingly interconnected global economy? The answers may well determine how successfully countries navigate the shifting tides of global power in the coming decades.

Note: in 2026, the authors are publishing their book entitled: The Australian, Brazilian and Chinese Dynamic: An Inquiry into the Evolving Global Order.

Sea Strike: Exploring Future Naval Operations

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Sea Strike: Exploring Future Naval Operations

A collaborative effort between Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific and Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Sea Strike is a future-oriented film designed to showcase the U.S. Navy’s ability to conduct distributed maritime operations in a high-end, contested environment.

This video showcases a future naval battle and how emerging technologies may be incorporated at every level of the warfighting domain; by testing innovative strategies, leveraging advanced technologies, and real-time intelligence, the Navy is able to project power and maintain freedom of the seas in a rapidly evolving global security landscape.

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

01.01.2025

Video by Aaron Lebsack 

Naval Information Warfare Center (NIWC) Pacific

An Update on French Defense: May 2025

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on An Update on French Defense: May 2025
05/09/2025

By Pierre Tran

Paris – There have been few national orders for French military aircraft and space systems since the start of the year, following a drop of a third in domestic defense aerospace orders last year from 2023, Guillaume Faury, chair of Groupement des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales (GIFAS), a trade association, said May 6.

The sale overseas of Airbus airliners and Rafale fighter jets underpin the sales and order books of the French aerospace industry, represented by GIFAS.
Asked about military orders, Faury said there had been a big gain in exports last year, with a rise of 77 pct, but there had been a 33 pct drop for domestic defense orders from 2023. He was speaking at a breakfast news conference on 2024 results for the trade body.

“There have been very few orders since the beginning of 2025 for our (aeronautics and space) sector,” he said, leaving aside orders for equipment for the French army and navy.
“A subject of attention and a cause for concern,” he said.

The Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) procurement office said in response to those remarks, “It should be noted that orders placed are in line with the terms set out in the military budget law 2024-2030, and the difference in the volume of orders from one year to the next does not mean a weakening of effort for defense over the time period.”

In combat missions, there were media reports May 7 of Pakistan’s claim of downing five fighters flown by the Indian air force, including Rafale, MiG, and Sukhoi jets. Those French headlines – and a BBC Radio 4 interview with a Pakistani diplomat – pointing up the loss of the Rafale could be seen as the perceived importance of the French-built fighters in the  deadly territorial dispute over the Kashmir region.

On the home front, French Prime Minister François Bayroux is under pressure to cut the public sector deficit to 5.4 pct this year from 5.8 pct, to bring it down to 3 pct of gross domestic product by 2029.

His efforts to slash spending are opposed by opposition political parties, which forced out his predecessor who also sought to reduce state expenditure.

Weak domestic growth and U.S. tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump weigh on  Bayroux’s efforts to rescue a public purse weighed by debt, while seeking to win support from the public and the far-right and far-left parties in a deeply divided parliament.
Bercy, the finance ministry, is seen as clamping down on arms orders, financial website La Tribune reported May 7, with industry talk of “economies” rather than the “war economy.”

GIFAS Recovers

Meanwhile, the French aerospace sector beat in 2024 the level of sales last seen before the Covid crisis, which slashed airline travel, and made it hard for suppliers and subcontractors to secure raw materials, components, and working capital.

The total 2024 orders for aeronautics and space were worth €74.8 billion ($84.4 billion), up 5 pct from the previous year, the association said.
Foreign sales delivered growth for the aerospace industry, for the civil and military sectors.

“Exports are indispensable today,” the association said, as foreign deals made up 82 pct of overall 2024 sales, worth €77.7 billion, up 10 percent.

Reliance on foreign sales left the sector open to uncertainty from geopolitics, and trade conflict over tariffs and technology transfer, GIFAS said. That 2024 recovery was “fragile” on a constant currency basis, with inflation of close to 18 pct over the last five years.

The association called on the French government to place orders to help support the aerospace sector.

“GIFAS calls for a boost from government orders, particularly for space and defense, to support a resilient business model capable of absorbing external shocks,” the trade body said.

The European space sector is under pressure to consolidate, with Airbus, Leonardo, and Thales seeking approval from the European Commission for a prospective merger, in response to U.S. companies such as SpaceX and its Starlink satellite system.

Faury is also chief executive of Airbus, builder of airliners, military aircraft and satellites, based in Toulouse, southwest France.

French Budget

Asked about the French military budget in the light of British and German plans to boost spending, Faury told the news conference the military budget law was welcome, but much depended on plans for future capabilities, with Nato due to unveil a project this summer.

Berlin and London have pledged to increase military spending beyond the two percent of gross domestic product in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

“It is very important to define the targets,” he said. “We have the defense system as it is today. There is a military budget law which is a significant increase.

“Execution of this budget law will bring France to a higher level of capability, unseen for decades,” he said. “But there is a further level of spending which should be defined by military objectives.”

There would be a “time horizon” for specific capabilities, which would need to be built, delivered, operated, and maintained overseas over the long term, he said.

“That calls for an architecture of security and defense different from the one today, and in particular for European partners and Nato,” he said. Nato is due to unveil a plan in the middle of the year, which will inform member states what they will need to do and the budgets they will need to bridge the gap.

Nato is pitching Force Model as a deployment of a larger, faster, and more capable military, the alliance says on its website. That force model will replace the NATO Response Force.

The force model will more than triple the number of high-readiness forces, increasing its ability to respond to crisis or conflict at greater scale and at higher readiness, the alliance said. There will be a “three-tiered readiness system,” with Tier 1 comprising forces of 0-10 days of readiness; tier 2 forces 10-30 days of readiness; and tier 3 forces at 30-180 days of readiness.

The Nato summit is due to meet June 24-25 at The Hague.

Rafale Hits Headlines

The Rafale fighter has been much in the news lately.

France and India signed April 28 an agreement which allowed Dassault Aviation to sign a contract for New Delhi’s order for 26 Rafale in the naval version, the company said.

“The Inter-Governmental Agreement between India and France has been signed today allowing the signature, in the presence of the Chairman and CEO of Dassault Aviation, Éric Trappier, of the contract for

India’s acquisition of 26 Rafale Marine to equip the Indian Navy,” the company said in an April 28 statement. The deal with India was the first export order for the naval version.

That Indian procurement of the naval Rafale was worth 630 billion rupees ($7.4 billion), Reuters reported.

The Indian navy is reported to be seeking to order a further 50 or so Rafale for its fleet of two aircraft carriers, the Vikrant and Vikramaditya. The latter is a refurbished Russian vessel.

“This new acquisition testifies to the importance of the strategic relationship between India and France and the recognition of the Rafale as an essential vector of national sovereignty,” the company said.

That strategic relationship between New Delhi and Paris could be seen in the French statement in support of the Indian strikes against Pakistan.

“France condemned the Pahalgam terrorist attack on 22 April and expressed its wholehearted solidarity with India. France supports India in its fight against terrorist groups,” the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs said in a May 7 statement.

“France is deeply concerned about the latest developments between India and Pakistan. It calls for de-escalation and for civilians to be protected.”

The Rafale for the Indian navy will replace an aging fleet of MiG-29 fighters, and follows New Delhi’s 2016 order for 36 Rafale for the air force. That deal for the air force was worth some €7.89 billion, of which €3.42 billion was for cost of the aircraft, and €1.7 billion for changes specific to the Indian air force.

Rafale and Disinformation

A wide media coverage of Pakistan downing the Rafale follows India’s May 7 missile strike against targets in Pakistan and the part of Kashmir under Pakistani control.

“New Delhi has begun to acknowledge the loss of several fighter jets in the Sindoor operation,” daily Le Monde reported. “At least one Rafale could have been among the aircraft destroyed.

“It would be the first time that one of these Dassault aircraft would have been lost in a combat situation.”

A Pakistan military spokesman, Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, said the Pakistan forces downed five fighters, namely three Rafale, a MiG 29 and a Sukhoi, and a combat drone, financial daily Les Echos reported. It was not possible to verify this information, the media report said,
which went out on social platforms with pictures of crashed aircraft claimed to be the Rafale.

Pictures of aircraft claimed to be downed Rafale on social platforms were fake, in what was a “real information war,” Radio France Internationale, a radio station, reported.

“In the continuous flow of disinformation which currently circulates on social networks in India and Pakistan, one word often crops up: Rafale,” the RFI report said May 6.

The RFI report on its website showed pictures from a video of the Rafale and a blazing crash site, claimed to be where the downed French-built fighter came down.

The pictures can be traced back to a video appearing on the internet from June 2024, RFI reported, and relate to the crash of an Indian air force Sukhoi 30, which crashed into a farm in the Nashik district, western India. The Indian pilot and co-pilot ejected safely, the report said.

Those supporting New Delhi showed that same video of a plane crash, claiming the Indian air force had shot down an F-16 flown by the Pakistani air force, RFI reported.

Featured image: ID 11409365 | French Defense © Derek Gordon | Dreamstime.com

Modernization and Innovation at the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing: A Conversation with Major General Swan

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Modernization and Innovation at the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing: A Conversation with Major General Swan
05/07/2025

By Robbin Laird

During my latest visit to 2nd Marine Wing, I had a chance to talk with Major General Swan, Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (2nd MAW), on 29 April 2025.

He offered insights into how the wing is navigating modernization while maintaining readiness for global operations. With a focus on integrating new aircraft systems, enhancing maintenance capabilities, and fostering a culture of innovation, the 2nd MAW is positioning itself to meet the challenges of modern warfare.

Aircraft Modernization: Building the Future Force

Major General Swan highlighted significant progress in modernizing the wing’s aircraft inventory. The F-35 squadrons are “coming faster now thanks to improved delivery timelines,” with VMFA-542 “up on step and ready to go.”

The squadron participated last year in Exercise Nordic Response 24, during which it operated the first U.S. F-35’s in Sweden and rehearsed distributed aviation operations in the high north. Swan also noted the reactivation and first F-35C deliveries to VMFA-251 in late 2024, and the first F-35B deliveries to VMFA-533 in October.  Each were important milestones in 2nd MAW’s tactical aircraft modernization efforts.

The CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter program is also advancing, bringing transformative capabilities to the Marine Corps. Major General Swan emphasized the helicopter’s impressive lift capacity and fly-by-wire technology, which enables precise hovering over loads. At a recent Service Level Training Exercise (SLTE), the CH-53K lifted a fully combat loaded Light Armored Vehicle for the first time, demonstrating its capabilities to Marines in the ground combat element and allowing them to experience those capabilities firsthand.

“I think the future ACE [Aviation Combat Element], if you will, is going to be more connected, more capable, more lethal,” Swan noted. This modernization extends to attack helicopters, which are receiving Link 16 data links to enhance connectivity with F-35s and other platforms.

Maintaining Readiness During Transition

While advancing modernization efforts, the 2nd MAW must maintain operational readiness for global force management commitments in the Pacific, Europe and Africa. As the Marine Corps’ service-retained ACE, it is also tasked to be ready to respond to crisis or contingencies globally, in any geographic combatant command, as opposed to singularly focusing on one theater or another. This creates a complex challenge for leadership.

Swan described 2nd MAW’s force generation cycle, noting that while some units are deployed, others are either preparing for deployment or recently returned. He noted that the wing pays close attention to ensuring that readiness to deploy is managed appropriately, while also balancing modernization efforts across squadrons that are transitioning to new aircraft.

Swan’s priorities for the wing are straightforward: “Be ready. Take care of our people. Find more cowbell.” He emphasizes that Marines must be trained to execute their assigned missions, whether for global force management or crisis response. However, he acknowledges the challenges posed by program delays, noting that new capabilities are sometimes delayed.

Innovation: Finding “More Cowbell”

Perhaps most revealing is Major General Swan’s approach to innovation, which he calls “more cowbell” – a reference to the famous Saturday Night Live skit. He distributes actual cowbells to Marines who develop innovative solutions to persistent problems.  Since implementing the cowbell award program last summer, Swan has handed out more than forty cowbells to deserving Marines who innovated or improved capabilities at the unit level.

“The Marines want to do a great job, and they want to be better. They want to win,” Swan explained. This philosophy encourages personnel to constantly “improve your position” and find better ways to accomplish the mission.

One of the wing’s most promising innovation areas is predictive maintenance. Swan described efforts to leverage aircraft sensor data and artificial intelligence to predict component failures before they occur. This approach aims to shift from unscheduled to scheduled maintenance – fixing parts before they fail during critical missions.

“How do we do scheduled maintenance? Meaning, hey, I know that at two more hours, this generator, this servo cylinder, this radio is going to break, and I need to fix it now so I can send it on a 10-hour mission,” Swan explained. This capability would be particularly valuable in contested logistics environments, allowing maintenance to occur “at a time and a place of your choosing, vice an inopportune time where you put people at risk and the mission at risk.”

Swan believes combining government data resources with AI algorithms could revolutionize maintenance and supply chains, creating “a better, more capable force that can iterate and turn and decide inside the OODA loop of the enemy.”

Personnel Retention Through Team Building

While the broader military faces recruitment and retention challenges, Major General Swan reports that the Marine Corps is “nailing retention.” He attributes this success to the Corps’ commitment to maintaining high standards.

“We haven’t lowered our standards, and are proud of that, in fact, unapologetic about maintaining our standards and our people,” Swan said.

The 2nd MAW’s approach to retention focuses on team building and mastering fundamentals. “My philosophy… we build a team of teams, and we take care of our Marines. We are brilliant at the basics,” Swan explained. This leadership philosophy creates an environment where Marines feel valued and part of a winning organization.

The ACE as the MAGTF’s Center of Gravity

When discussing the Aviation Combat Element’s importance to Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations, Swan offered a thought-provoking perspective: “The ACE, the air wing, is the center of gravity for the MAGTF, for the ability to maneuver, the ability to [deliver] long-range fires and provide combined arms effects for the maneuver element.”

This view positions aviation as the essential enabler for ground operations, particularly in distributed operations across contested environments. Swan emphasized that each echelon has its own center of gravity – for aircraft groups, it’s the maintenance logistics squadrons; for the wing, it’s the command-and-control group.

Looking Ahead

As the 2nd MAW continues its modernization journey, the integration of digital systems, predictive maintenance, and advanced platforms like the F-35 and CH-53K will reshape Marine aviation capabilities. Major General Swan’s leadership approach, combining readiness with innovation, provides a framework for managing this complex transition.

The challenges remain significant – from maintaining readiness with limited amphibious shipping to accelerating the integration of new technologies. However, the focus on building teams, empowering innovation, and leveraging emerging technologies positions the 2nd MAW to meet these challenges while delivering combat power when and where it’s needed.

As Swan succinctly put it: “How do we go faster and get better and more lethal?”

Finding answers to this question will shape the future of Marine aviation for years to come.

Featured image: U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. William Swan, the commanding general of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, adjusts his uniform before climbing into an F/A-18D Hornet aircraft with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312, Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st MAW during exercise Cope North 25 at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Feb. 11, 2025. VMFA-312 is temporarily augmenting MAG-12, 1st MAW under the Unit Deployment Program, which aims to provide squadrons stationed in the continental United States with experience training in the Indo-Pacific. CN25 provides an optimal environment to enhance and understand the possible opportunities to continue the advancement of shared interests between allies and partners. Swan is a native of Wisconsin. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Dahkareo Pritchett)