Final Report: Australia and Shaping a Sovereign Space Strategy

01/17/2022

On 1 December 2021, the Williams Foundation held its second 2021 seminar, this one focused on shaping a way ahead for a sovereign Australian space strategy.

That report can be found on the Williams Foundation website as well as on Second Line of Defense and Defense.info.

Since 2018, the focus of the seminars has been increasingly with regard to how to extend the reach of the ADF given the changing nature of the challenges facing Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. The discussions really began with a 2018 seminar which focused on the importance of long-range strike and was followed by seminars which focused on ways to enhance Australian resilience and sovereign capabilities.

The first seminar of 2021 focused on next generation autonomous systems, and the December 1, 2021, seminar on where autonomous systems, namely satellites, have been a regular feature for both military and commercial purposes for many decades.

The first point made throughout the presentations by speakers was that Australia has a long involvement in space activities through its working relationships with its core allies, first Britain, and then the United States. The Australians have been engaged in several support activities for the American space enterprise and that domain knowledge and engagement will continue to be critical in shaping Australia’s own efforts for enhanced sovereignty In space.

The second point is the need to indeed enhance Australian independent space capabilities.

As AIRCDRE Phil Gordon, Director General Air Defence and Space put it: “I would compare our position in space with being a frequent flyer who uses that service. And as we in defense are on the journey from being a consumer of other people’s space products to a contributor owner and operator in our own right.”

The need for shaping sovereign capabilities comes not only from the enhanced importance of space payloads for both commercial and military activities, but from the nature of crises and the nature of allies. Gordon put it succinctly: “It’s relatively easy to have access to space capabilities from allies when there’s plenty to go around.

“But if times are tough, if assets are under attack, if bandwidth is reduced, if satellites and ground stations are targeted and there’s just not enough capacity to do all the things we want to do, then where are those priorities going to lie?” This then means for Gordon: “we have to be able to have control and access of our space capabilities without needing to ask someone else’s permission.”

The third point was embedded in various presentations but put most directly by BRIG Ian Langford. Director General Future Land Warfare. Even though space clearly has its own specific requirements, skill sets and capabilities, it is part of the overall transformation of the ADF and of the next round of the revolution in military affairs, or perhaps we could go back to the term used throughout the Williams Foundation Seminars, namely, a fifth-generation force but now with greater reach.

Langford put it this way: “ Two years ago, I was talking to a US Air Force retired four-star general, and we were talking about the revolution of military affairs, which was demonstrated in 1991 during the first Gulf War. And that was demonstrated in that context through the effectiveness of GPS and the use in application of precision strike and advanced munitions, as it related to the ability of US-led coalition forces to be so effective and so profound in the context of that capability overmatch. Now we are on the edge of a significant defence recapitalization are we now on the edge of the next round of the RMA? And what are we to do about it?”

The fourth point is that shaping of a new Australian space enterprise which started with the 2018 standup of the Australian Space Agency and will see a new ADF command to be stood up in January 2022 is occurring in the context of evolving strategic environment.

And that environment as I noted in a recent discussion with Dr. Paul Bracken, the well-known strategist, is characterized by ongoing limited war with the authoritarian powers and the challenge of escalation control and management.

Space assets are crucial to be able for Australia to shape effective crisis management in the ongoing conflicts with the authoritarian powers. Several speakers spoke about the militarization of space and space war. The challenge is to know when it starts. Both the cyber and space domains are domains within which conflict is ongoing, signaling difficult, but the need to be resilient crucial.

Dougal Robertson of the Williams Foundation highlighted the interaction between space and the various dimensions of the evolving strategic environment. And he underscored this crucial point: “Gray-zone traditionally means we are not at war, but we’re not at peace. The gray-zone actor might be pursuing national objectives, certainly in relation to nation states, and when we talk about gray-zone activity, they’re often pursuing objectives that are linked to military advantage or political or strategic advantage.” If this is the case then, Australia certainly needs space capability which can give the ADF and the government decision making tools to evolute conflicts and crisis management options, occurring in space and cascading out to the entire combat force.

The fifth point, and a major part of the day’s discussion, was on the nature of the space eco-system which Australia needs to shape going forward to have enough sovereignty to have decision making capabilities for both security and defense needs.

Space is expensive and payloads are dynamically changing under the impacts of new initiative sand capabilities generated by the major space powers.

So, what can Australia realistically do and how best to do it?

One approach is to leverage the dynamics of change with regard to new versus old space, which means new ways to launch space payloads, and to leverage the various ways to shape new satellite payloads and constellations.

That effort will be generated as the major space powers refigure how they are working GEO, MEO and LEO payloads, and as they shape various kinetic and non-kinetic ways to shape warfare in space capabilities.

That is why working with the United States and enhancing working relationship with the UK as they have launched a new space command, or with India, or Japan or ESA all will become parts of shaping the space ecosystem for the Australian space enterprise going forward.

Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute provided a particularly robust and clear discussion of what Australia’s way ahead in space might look like.

“We need to think about space resilience, and we need to think about space deterrence, and they should complement the existing projects in space. Sovereign launch is clearly going to happen, and I’ve always been an advocate for a high, low mix, where Australia contributes a low end in terms of small satellites that can complement the large geo birds. These small satellite systems could contribute new types of capability and new missions for the Australian defense force.”

The sixth point is the central role which Australia’s geography has and will play going forward.

The cooperation between the United States and Australia in part is based on Australia’s location and its extensive geography. The establishment of Pine Gap is a case in point. This location is strategically significant because of the ability of the facilitates there to work various high value satellites as they pass over one-third of the globe, including China, the Asian parts of Russia and the Middle East. And going forward launch locations and ground-based space capabilities will grow in importance as Australia builds out its own capabilities and works with partners and allies in the liberal democratic world going forward.

In the panel, the former air attaché to the United States, Terry Van Herren noted: “If I was a Chinese general, I’d be worried about three things from Australia. First, I would be worried about nuclear powered submarines. Second, I would be quite concerned about long range replenishable strike. The third thing that would worry me would be a robust counter space capability developed and supported in Australia. Why? Because Perth and Beijing are on the same longitude. They would hate to see us develop real space power in this country.”

The report can be read in e-book format below:

France and Indian Defense Cooperation: Perspectives from Parly’s December 2021 Visit

01/14/2022

By India Strategic

“France, more than any other country, understands the necessity of the Indian content. And we are fully committed to the Make in India initiative, as well as to the further integration of Indian manufacturers into our global supply chains. Make in India has been a reality for French industry for several years, particularly for defence equipment such as submarines,” Parly said during a virtual session at the Ananta Centre think tank.

“And if I am here today, it is to say how precious is the friendship between France and India. It is based on historical and dense relations. This friendship, this trust that we have in each other, has developed and blossomed considerably in recent years, to such an extent that the distance between the Ganges and the Seine sometimes seems to be lessened.

“Our relationship is not only one of state to state; it is a friendship between two peoples. Two peoples who strongly cherish their diversity and share universal values: the French Enlightenment is one of the inventors of modern democracy while India has imposed it as a reference model in Asia. This is the strength of our partnership,” she added.

The relations between the two countries, she said, were predicated on five pillars.

“First, France and India are both viscerally committed to national sovereignty and independence: and I think that our industrial partnership is proof of that.

“Second, we both promote multilateralism and the defence of a rules-based international order. When the world and the region experience such upheavals, it is good to refer to rock-solid principles.

“Third, we are both very involved in building international security: India is one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, and France contributes to international security in many parts of the world – yesterday in Afghanistan, today in the Sahel and in the Middle East.

“We also share the ability to mobilize international partners on major issues and global challenges, starting with the fight against climate change: I believe that armed forces have a lot to contribute to the fight against climate change: this is the meaning of an initiative we took at the Paris Peace Forum in November. I think we have a lot to learn from India, which is very determined to meeting the commitments of the Paris Agreement and is actively working on it.

“Finally, we want to preserve the Indo-Pacific as an open and inclusive area. It must be free from any coercion and based on compliance with international law and multilateralism,” Parly said.

To France, the Minister said, the Indo-Pacific in not an “artificial juxtaposition” of the Indian and Pacific oceans but “should be understood as a wide geographical continuum facing common challenges”.

“So, we have developed an exceptional partnership. And it is more necessary than ever to reinforce it. As you well know, we face both global and regional challenges,” she said.

The first challenge is terrorism.

“Terror has struck France and Europe repeatedly over the last few years and has not spared the Indo-Pacific, including India. This fight is not over and will continue for many years to come. The threat of attacks on our countries has not disappeared. I am thinking in particular of the situation in Afghanistan, which is a matter of concern for both France and India,” she said.

The second challenge is the respect of international maritime law.

“Everyone knows that some of the waterways are crucial for the economic security of a number of states in the region. They are actually essential for the economic security of many states outside the region, as well. No one should consider themselves as entitled to bypass international maritime law.

“We particularly insist on two principles of the rule-based international order: disputes should be resolved by legal means and negotiation, not by fait accompli. And freedom of navigation must be upheld. More generally, we need to work together to preserve access to global commons such as cyber, space, maritime and air domains. We can see that these are areas of strategic competition and we must ensure that they do not become the new Far West,” the Minister said.

These objectives have driven France to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific.

“The French deployments were very large and unprecedented in 2021: France has deployed an attack submarine, the Emeraude, for eight months and up to over 15,000 kilometres from its mainland territory, across the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and the China Sea.

“This mission is part of a larger spectrum of operational activities such as the air mission Skyros (February 2021) or the deployment of the Jeanne d’Arc amphibious Task Group which both made stopovers in India. We also took part to multilateral exercises like La Pérouse in the Gulf of Bengal or ARC 2021 in the Japanese waters,” Parly said.

Noting that both exercises involved Japanese, Australian, American, Indian and French navies, she said: “We do not see France and India as the two poles of an exclusive partnership but rather as the core of a network of cooperation. We are already working together with the countries of the Indian Ocean, for example, to respond to environmental disasters and, if possible, to address them.”

The two ministers, during their Defence Dialogue, discussed a wide range of bilateral, regional, defence and defence industrial cooperation issues.

“The Ministers reviewed the existing military-to-military cooperation, which has increased in spite of pandemic challenges. They discussed ways to increase defence cooperation in all domains. India and France have recently concluded their annual bilateral Army Exercise, Shakti, with focus on counter-terrorist operations, in France in November 2021. Defence industrial cooperation was discussed with focus on future collaborations and co-production between the two countries,” the Defence Ministry said.

“The Ministers acknowledged their convergences on number of strategic and defence issues. They expressed commitment to work together to enhance cooperation in bilateral, regional and multilateral forums. France is the current chair of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and shall take over the Presidency of European Union from January 01, 2022.  The two Ministers decided to work closely on a number of issues during the French Presidency,” the Ministry added.

This article was published by India Strategic in December 2021.

Featured Photo: French Minister for the Armed Forces Ms Florence Parly inspecting the Tri-Service Guard of Honour in New Delhi on December 17.

MAG-24 and EABO

U.S. Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 367, conduct live-fire training off the coast of Hawaii, Nov. 4, 2021.

HMLA-367 conducted this training to demonstrate readiness and combat proficiency in austere, expeditionary evironments within the Indo-Pacific.

11.04.2021

Video by Cpl. Dalton Payne

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

VMFA-115 Deploys to the Middle East, December 2021

01/12/2022

According to a story written by Senior Airman Jacob B. Wrightsman and published by CENTCOM on December 31, 2021:

PRINCE SULTAN AIR BASE, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia   –

Marines from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 deployed to Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in late December, bringing a full squadron of F/A-18 Hornets.

Serving as a strategic operating location, PSAB and the VMFA-115 Silver Eagles fill a mutually beneficial role of countering destabilizing regional activity.

“Strategically from this location, we enhance the Combined Forces Air Component Commander’s flexibility and available assets to fluidly move around the theatre,” said Lt. Col. Tim Miller, VMFA-115 commander. “We bring a long and short range strike and defensive counter air capability that bolsters the credible combat power that we look to project in concert with our partners and allies to further stabilize this region.”

The key addition of the unit prepares and postures U.S. and coalition forces to span the full range of combat effectiveness while maximizing regional capabilities in regards to mutual security concerns.

“This sends a clear and unequivocal message to the region,” said Col. Jason Smith, 378th Expeditionary Operations Group commander. “Our resolve remains very strong about the peace and security of the Middle East. We are willing to defend it if needed.”

The Silver Eagles have been fully immersed in the day-to-day operations here at PSAB, building partnerships with both the U.S. Air Force and partner nations.

“From day one, interoperability has been outstanding, we’ve had the ability to fully integrate into combat operations,” Miller said. “Our interoperability is everything, as a joint force and as a coalition. We are absolutely in sync with the joint forces here as well as our partner and allied nations in theatre.”

By continuously working with joint and coalition forces, the unit endeavors to forge resolute partnerships necessary to enable peace and stability in the region.

“We are a joint force through and through, we don’t do any major operations without our joint force,” Smith said. “It’s imperative that we work together and train together because we will undoubtedly fight together.”

Ultimately, the arrival of the VMFA-115 provides a significant asset that enhances the global security and credible combat power of the region.

“Our presence here underscores the United States’ desire to be an indispensable partner in the region,” Miller said. “We are here to enhance the deterrence, enhance the training opportunities with our partner nations and if required we are 100% ready to fight.”

Marines Work a Forward Refueling Point in MCAS Iwakuni Exericise, 2019

U.S. Marines with Marine Air Control Squadron 4 Detachment Bravo (MACS-4 DET B) and Marine Wing Support Squadron 171 (MWSS-171) conduct a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) exercise at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, Japan. Dec. 13, 2019.

FARP training offers MCAS Iwakuni the capability of forward deploying a helicopter and fixed wing arming and refueling point anywhere in Japan.

IWAKUNI, YAMAGUCHI, JAPAN

12.13.2019

Video by Cpl. Christian Castro

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni

Resolute Dragon

Marines with Marine Wing Support Squadron 172 provide fuel and are resupplied by two MV-22B Ospreys at Ojojihara Training Area during exercise Resolute Dragon 21, Dec. 4, 2021.

RD21 is the largest bilateral training exercise between the U.S. Marine Corps and Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in 2021.

RD21 is designed to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the U.S.-Japan Alliance by exercising integrated command and control, targeting, combined arms, and maneuver across multiple domains.

OJOJIHARA TRAINING AREA, JAPAN

12.04.2021

Video by Sgt. Kirstin Spanu

3rd Marine Division

Counter Drone: NATO Actions

01/10/2022

The misuse of small, widely available drones represents a significant and growing risk to NATO operations and day-to-day defence activity.

NATO is working with industry to develop capabilities to counter this threat. A trial of various counter-drone technologies and systems was undertaken at an airbase in the Netherlands. The exercise, C-UAS TIE 21 (Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technical Interoperability Exercise) brought together specialists from across the civilian, military, scientific and industry world in order to test emerging technologies and integrate systems that will counter small drones.

The goals of the testing were to identify a minimum set of standards relevant for the NATO C-UAS domain; facilitate the implementation of these standards in a collaborative environment; demonstrate interoperability between C-UAS components and fully integrated systems in NATO-relevant scenarios; and evaluate C-UAS technical architectures and identify standardization gaps.

The achievement of so-called ‘zero-second integration’ was also an objective; the ability to link various sensor and detection systems together instantly without the need for software or hardware adaptations.

August 12, 2011

NATO Channel

The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability

01/08/2022

Recently, the Williams Foundation held its latest bi-annual seminar, this one focused on the way ahead for the Australian space enterprise.  Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held bi-annual seminars on the transformation of the ADF as it embraced fifth generation warfare and working joint force integration.

Since 2018, the focus has been increasingly with regard to how to extend the reach of the ADF given the changing nature of the challenges facing Australia in the Indo-Pacific region. The discussions really began with a 2018 seminar which focused on the importance of long-range strike and was followed by seminars which focused on ways to enhance Australian resilience and sovereign capabilities.

The first seminar of 2021 focused on next generation autonomous systems, and the 1 December 2021, seminar on where autonomous systems, namely satellites, have been a regular feature for both military and commercial purposes for many decades.

As AIRCDRE Phil Gordon, Director General Air Defence and Space put it: “I would compare our position in space with being a frequent flyer who uses that service. And as we in defence are on the journey from being a consumer of other people’s space products to a contributor owner and operator in our own right.”

The need for shaping sovereign capabilities comes not only from the enhanced importance of space payloads for both commercial and military activities, but from the nature of crises and the nature of allies. Gordon put it succinctly: “It’s relatively easy to have access to space capabilities from allies when there’s plenty to go around. But if times are tough, if assets are under attack, if bandwidth is reduced, if satellites and ground stations are targeted and there’s just not enough capacity to do all the things we want to do, then where are those priorities going to lie?” This then means for Gordon: “we have to be able to have control and access of our space capabilities without needing to ask someone else’s permission.”