Marine Aircraft Group 12 Trains with the ADF

10/05/2022

U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lighting II aircraft assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121 and Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 242 arrive at Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal, Australia, Aug. 10, 2022.

U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 12 are conducting unit level training in Australia to maintain readiness, test expeditionary capabilities, and increase interoperability with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

RAAF BASE TINDAL, NT
08.10.2022
Video by Cpl. Evan Jones
AFN Iwakuni

UH-1Y Venom Maintenance

10/03/2022

U.S. Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 167 inspect and perform maintenance on a UH-1Y Venom after landing at Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, Michigan, Aug. 6, 2022. HML

A-167 trained with U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Air National Guard units during joint exercise Northern Strike 22-2.

HMLA-167 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force.

08.06.2022
Video by Sgt. Servante Coba
2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

The Scene Setting for the Next Phase of ADF Development: The Williams Foundation Seminar, September 2022

10/01/2022

By Robbin Laird

Research Fellow, The Williams Foundation

Sydney, Australia

The most recent Williams Foundation Seminar was held in Canberra, Australia on September 28, 2022. The seminar was entitled, “Enhancing the Lethality and Survivability of the Integrated Force.”

The seminar in effect provided a scene setting for discussing the next evolution of the ADF generated by the evolving strategic environment and the much wider demand side of dealing with security and defense that really requires a whole of nation approach.

Since 2018, the Williams Foundation seminars have turned towards the major transition facing Australia and its partners and allies namely, the global confrontation between the 21st century authoritarian states and the liberal democracies. Rather than simply maintaining a “rules-based order,” the ADF and its allies and partners are now contesting the clear efforts of the major authoritarian powers to displace this order and replace it for a world safe for the authoritarians.

And we have seen the Russians move from “hybrid warfare” to open industrial age warfare with some new aspects of the conduct of war introduced into the war as well.

We have entered a new historical epoch, and determining how to deter, defect, contest and defeat major powers becomes part of the new context facing the ADF and the Australian nation.

There are obviously no quick fixes for such challenges, but a major re-orientation for the ADF and Australia is required.

As has been noted by a sage former senior U.S. defence official: “We have 80% of our force now which we will have in 20 years.” This means that reworking and reorienting the force you have but introducing new elements to make your force more lethal and survivable is a major part of the challenge from a force building perspective.

The seminar speakers highlighted various aspects of what needs to be done to provide for rethinking the way ahead for the force but in the context of what is realistic to do as well as what needs to change to get the job of deterrence done effectively.

At the heart of the shift is focusing on the direct defense of Australia, and working Australian geography to advantage.

This means that the joint force needs to focus on how to work together to defend the continent and project relevant power into the region.

The Australian Service Chiefs attending the Williams Foundation Seminar.

This means as well that the new power projection instruments – those represented by cyber and space – neither of which is geographically limited are now part of the deterrence and warfighting efforts.

If we can consider there is a return to a core focus on the direct defense of Australia and shaping an understanding of the strategic space defining Australia’s defense perimeter, how might the current ADF force be restructured in a template which allows for the kind of innovation going forward that will enhance ADF direct defense capabilities?

How might new capabilities be added over the near to mid to longer term that enhance this defense restructuring to extend Australia’s direct defense capabilities?

In other words, if one focuses on the priority of the direct defense to Australia, what kinds of force restructuring might be necessary for the current ADF?

And then ask what new capabilities are coming into the force or could be integrated into the force in the near to midterm, what would that ADF look like as an integrated combat grid over the extended area of operations?

If one re-shifts the focus of your force, one has to ask what is most relevant and what is not in such a strategic shift; and then determine what one needs to form the relevant concepts of operations for that force,

It is crucial as well to find cost effective ways to enhance that forces capabilities and train appropriately to shape the most lethal and survivable force possible within the various constraints facing the nation.

But that raises another key point. If indeed the priority of the defense of Australia is from the continent to the first island chain, then the resources necessary to do so are much greater than the ADF will possess.

What kinds of infrastructure can be built in the relevant areas of sustained operations?

How to enhance force mobility throughout the region?

How to shape mobile basing options and capabilities?

These challenges obviously require key innovative efforts for reshaping the joint force and requires government to consider investments and approaches beyond that which would be considered narrowly considered for a defence budget.

The September 28, 2022 seminar provided a significant look at the reframing challenges and to how to think about the way ahead.

This is how the Foundation invitation highlighted the seminar:

Aim

The aim of the September 2022 seminar is to examine specific measures which enhance both the lethality and survivability of an integrated Australian Defence Force. It will examine gaps and opportunities in the 5th generation force and identify priorities which accelerate preparedness for complex, sustained, high intensity operations.

Background

Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminars have focused on building an integrated 5th generation force. Recent seminars have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which the integrated force will prepare and operate. Moreover, they have highlighted the challenges of acting independently at an accelerated tempo and in sustained, high intensity, complex operations across all domains.

Almost a decade later, the 2022 seminars reflect on the journey towards a 5th generation force and identify gaps, opportunities, and priorities for the development of next generation capability in the face of new threats and new risks, paving the way for the 2023 seminars.

Despite the operational challenges, the framework and apparatus of the 5th generation force is substantially in place. And while there is still plenty of work to be done, the shift from a focus on platforms to a broader appreciation of an integrated 5th generation system of systems represents an important milestone.

As identified in the March 2022 seminar, there is a shared understanding of the scale of the challenges ahead for both defence and industry, and across coalition partners, too. However, the strategic circumstances continue to deteriorate at an alarming rate, driving the need for prioritisation in both what and how we acquire new capabilities.

On top of that, there is the challenge of progressing integration with the force-in-being as well as the future force. The need to balance the requirement to ‘fight tonight’ with the ability to meet future threats is vitally important, noting that the force we will have in 20 years’ time will contain 80% of what we have today based upon a series of major systems with an upgradeable software core.

Towards a Lethal, Survivable, and Affordable Force

The September seminar will develop the ideas identified in March and expand on the theme of an increasingly sophisticated and time-sensitive ‘lethality-survivability-affordability’ trade-off necessary to build a balanced and relevant force. A trade-off which is set within the context of a need for increased deterrence, decision-making advantage, and a commercial reality that we no longer have the time to establish the competitive tension the acquisition system has traditionally demanded to demonstrate best value for money.

The seminar will focus on the gaps and opportunities as they relate to the broader requirements of the Australian Defence Force, notably in terms of enablers and integration priorities. Above all, it will focus on preparedness and the need to focus on outcomes which improve training throughput and performance at the force level, backed up by enhanced fuel, infrastructure, weapons, basing, and supply chain resilience.

A core consideration will be the need for an increasingly integrated relationship between Defence and system providers to develop the industrial depth and responsiveness necessary for future operations. A relationship which works towards a better understanding of our industrial production capability needs, while recognising that competition in some areas has the unintended consequence of reducing overall sovereign production capability and capacity.

Another area of interest is the need for greater exploitation of technology to enhance human performance and decision making at the force level to complement training systems associated with individual platforms and weapon systems. Improving training system effectiveness and efficiency, described in terms of ‘Mission Rehearsal’ at the March seminar, not only increases throughput but also ensures the enterprise is ready to operate across the spectrum of conflict while being disrupted, deceived, and degraded.

To introduce different perspectives from elite, high performance sport, the Seminar also includes former Australian test umpire Mr Simon Taufel. For five years he was formally recognised as the world’s best cricket umpire based upon his consistent ability to make accurate decisions under pressure and his ability to integrate technology into real time decision-making.

In the final session, Service chiefs will provide insight into their thoughts about the future operating environment and key observations and lessons from the transition to a networked integrated force.

In later articles, I will highlight the presentations, as well as insights from interviews conducted in September 2022 with service chiefs, industrialists and analysts to expand the discussion of the challenges and opportunities to meet the challenges discussed at the seminar.

See also, the following:

Shaping a Way Ahead for the ADF: Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown Provides His Perspective

And for my book which brings together The Williams Foundation seminar discussions and assessments from 2014 through 2019 see the following:

 

 

 

 

 

 

Shaping a Way Ahead for the ADF: Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown Provides His Perspective

09/30/2022

On September 28, 2022, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation held its latest seminar. The title of the seminar was “enhancing the lethality and survivability of the integrated force.”

At the seminar, the three service chiefs as well as the head of defence design provided key contributions to framing answers to these questions.

They were joined by a distinguished group of presenters from the analytical world, defence industry and government. And next month, I will publish a report on the seminar itself.

The ADF faces a double challenge.

First, there is the transition away from land wars to preparing forces for higher intensity operations against global authoritarian powers. I have written several books which address how challenging this shift is for a whole generation of warriors and policy makers who have only known the land wars as a core focus for their defense forces and efforts.

But Australia faces a second challenge affecting the future of the ADF as well: where is the ADF going to operate primarily in the direct defense of Australia? What exactly is the defense perimeter for Australia? How best to operate within that defense perimeter? And how to sustain the force for the time needed to prevail in conflict or crisis management?

After the seminar, I had a chance to talk with the Chairman of the Williams Foundation, Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, to get his perspectives on the seminar and the way ahead for the ADF to deal with these challenges. He also provided a preview of the next seminar to be held in the first quarter of 2023.

Having written the reports on the seminars since 2014, it was clear to me that the ADF was changing focus from 2018 on with regard to how to deal with the high-end fight. Seminars dealing with long range strike and on shaping a fifth-generation manoeuvre force especially underscored the nature of the shift.

According to Brown, “it is becoming apparent that the timeframe for getting it right has shortened up significantly. This means that the normal pace of acquisition to shape the way ahead for the ADF is too slow. Accelerating acquisition for major platforms is very difficult, so we need to look at other elements of the force to do so.

“We need to focus on the low hanging fruit to increase more rapidly our defence capabilities. At the seminar, several aspects of such an approach were highlighted, such as rapidly closing the gaps in the communications infrastructure. We need to do the tasks which we can more rapidly bulk up the force. Increasing crewing ratios by looking for ways to shorten the training process. You bulk up the force by leveraging commercial solutions that are available now.

“Accelerating the procurement of unmanned systems that can be developed quickly is one way we can get a much better deterrent posture than we have now.”

I noted that the entire shift to building out a kill web force provided a solid foundation for doing so as the focus in building out the kill web is focusing payloads to missions, not platforms to missions. And in the robotic areas AI areas there are a number of low hanging fruit, there a number of missions to payload capabilities which can bulk up the force.

Brown noted; “We are seeing in the Ukraine conflict a number of examples of the Ukrainians using Western weapons and various gap fillers to do in a month what Western forces would need three to four years to do if we stay in the business-as-usual approach.

“We can no longer afford two and a half years of staring at our navels while we decide which path we’re going to go on; we’ve actually got to make procurement to operations decisions in a much timelier manner.”

He then highlighted the example which came from a presentation of how umpires made decisions at cricket matches. The core point of that presentation was simply that the initial umpire decisions have a high probability of getting it right; an extended review process added greater accuracy but delays as well. As the presenter put it: “The gut feelings if the umpires were almost always right.”

Brown underscored that we need more rapid procurement to operations decision making and lengthy reviews on procurement choices really impeded combat innovation rather than enabling it.

And given the compressed time line of dealing with the threats facing Australia meant that time was of the essence in accelerating the ADF’s combat capability.

What comes next in terms of the Williams seminar series?

Brown: “That is a good question and we are in preliminary stages of sorting that out.  I think we will revisit, maybe reinforce, what our priorities need to be going forward. In this seminar, we’ve looked at the challenge of enhancing the lethality and survivability of the force.

“I’d like to focus the next one on how to speed up our processes to get enhanced capabilities for that twin challenge in the next three to five years.”

F-22 Deployments to Poland: August 2022

U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III assigned to the 437th Airlift Wing arrived at the 32nd Tactical Air Base in Łask, Poland to deliver personnel and equipment for the F-22 deployment in support of NATO Air Shielding in the European Theater August 4, 2022.

The NATO Shielding mission is a joint integrated mission to increase the air and missile defense posture along the Eastern flank of the Alliance.

ŁASK, POLAND
08.04.2022
Video by Staff Sgt. Danielle Sukhlall
U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa Public Affairs

An Early Look at the 2023 French Defence Budget

09/29/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France will next year order 42 Rafale fighter jets, worth some €4 billion ($4 billion), and take delivery of 13 units, major line items in the draft 2023 defense budget which will total €43.9 billion, up €3 billion from this year’s arms spending.

The government presented Sept.26 the draft 2023 national budget, which requires parliamentary approval. The defense budget is the second-biggest item in the overall budget, after €60.2 billion earmarked for education.

The order for 42 Rafales was around €4 billion, an armed forces ministry official said, following a Sept. 27 telephone press conference.

The aircraft builder, Dassault Aviation, had said in July that a French 42-strong order might well be made next year, comprising a batch of 30 Rafales in tranche 5 and 12 to replace French air force units sold to Croatia.

Next year’s delivery of the 13 fighters to the French air force will mark the end of a four year drought for the service, as the government had set priority to delivering Rafales to export client nations including Egypt, India, and Qatar.

That shipment of Rafales to the French service reflected Dassault having increased annual production of the fighter, said Jean-Pierre Maulny, deputy director of Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégique, a think tank.

The domestic orders and a large number of export deals for the Rafale marked a “conjunction of events” for Dassault, he said.

The 2023 budget included funding for projects for a future combat air system (FCAS) and the main ground combat system (MGCS), a second ministry official said.

On the FCAS, and MGCS project for a new tank and unmanned vehicles, there will be a Franco-German council of ministers meeting at the end of October, giving “a few weeks” to draw up a demanding timetable, the defense ministry said following a Sept. 22 meeting of the French and German defense ministers in Berlin.

Work on FCAS could start in two years’ time, the ministry said after the Berlin ministerial meeting, and the companies were “converging on a statement of work.”

The FCAS program is the very symbol of a “strategic convergence” between France and Germany, the ministry said.

“This is a priority project because we need this innovation,” French defense minister Sébastien Lecornu said in a statement.

Dassault and Airbus Defence and Space have yet to reach agreement on management of the FCAS project, with the latter seeking effectively a joint prime contractorship on the new generation fighter at the heart of the FCAS. Dassault insists on a sole program leadership.

The French air force will also receive next year 13 upgraded Mirage 2000D fighters, part of a long-delayed program which saw the modernization cut to 55 units from 71.

A previous air chief of staff, Jean-Paul Palomeros, previously said that upgrade cost some €10 million per unit, seen as a modest amount, and should have been adopted some time ago.

Macron Upholds Spending Pledge

President Emmanuel Macron said July 14, the Bastille day national holiday, the government would observe the 2019-25 military budget law, signalling the planned €3 billion increase would be observed.

The 2019-2025 military budget law set out a €3 billion rise in 2023, followed by similar annual increases to hit a target of €50 billion in 2025.

There had been doubt in 2018, when parliament adopted the multi-year budget law, on whether the spending pledge would be observed, as that required re-election of Macron in 2022, Maulny said.

Macron won the presidential election this year, which meant the budget law would be observed, he said. Macron’s losing a parliamentary majority was unlikely to thwart the pledge to boost military spending.

An industry executive said it was one thing to have announced the 2019-25 military budget law, but quite another to see it executed, as there was doubt hanging over  the 2022 election.

Macron’s victory effectively secured €3 billion, “a significant amount,” the executive said, all the more so with the heavy cost of the Covid crisis.

That €3 billion marked a 36 percent gain over military spending in 2017, and a large rise compared to an annual increase of €1.7-€1.8 billion in previous years, a  ministry official said.

Macron’s administration had set the €50 billion target for 2025 before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That incursion has sparked inflation, raising concern whether the spending increase will go as far as had been hoped.

Contracts have standard clauses addressing inflation, the industry executive said.

Moscow’s attack on Ukraine, billed as “special military operation” by Russian president Vladimir Putin, led Macron to say France was now in a “war economy,” and called on French companies to speed up arms production.

There are, however, concerns over the supply chain, energy prices, and access to essential raw material.

Macron has called for drawing up a 2024-30 military budget plan in the wake of the Russian invasion, bringing forward the spending review.

Rebuild Stocks

A major concern has been a low level of French stocks of ammunition.

The 2023 budget earmarked €2 billion to place orders and €1.1 billion to pay for all  types of munitions, including ammunition, missiles and bombs, with the aim of replenishing and increasing stocks.

The €2 billion of munitions orders next year was almost an 18 percent increase on an average €1.7 billion over the period 2019-2022, the ministry said.

On munitions, the briefing document of the 2023 budget refers to the first firing of a new generation Mica air-to-air missile and delivery of a new one-ton bomb next year, and there are pictures of shells and rounds, and truck-mounted Caesar artillery firing canon shells.  The document makes clear the new bomb will be built by French industry.

The restocking of French weapons can be seen with the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office ordering July 13 18 Caesar truck-mounted artillery pieces from Nexter, replacing those sent to Ukraine as part of weapons support.

A swift delivery to the French army meant those guns will be the Mk1 version, with  shipments due in summer 2024 at the latest, the company said in a July 29 statement. The Caesar Mk2 version is due to be delivered to the army in 2026.

Lecornu told French senators in July that buying the 18 Caesars for the army would cost some €85 million. The then prime minister, Jean Castex, signed in February a contract worth €600 million for Nexter to develop and build an armored and updated version of the Caesar, with an order for 33 units and delivery in 2026, AFP reported.

Orders and Deliveries Next Year

Next year’s orders include unspecified batches of MBDA MMP anti-tank missiles, Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles for frigates, Exocet naval missile, and Aster Block 1 new technology missile.

Some of those orders could be the DGA taking up options included in an order for an initial batch of weapons, an industry executive said.

There will also be orders for 420 Serval light armored vehicles, and work on the Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

In deliveries next year, the army is due to receive nine tactical drones, namely the long awaited Safran Patroller unmanned aerial vehicle, 18 upgraded Leclerc tanks, upgrades for five Tiger attack helicopters, five NH90 transport helicopters, and 200 MMP missiles.

The navy will take delivery of a nuclear-powered attack submarine – the second in the Suffren class, an upgraded Lafayette frigate, a new fleet auxiliary ship, and three upgraded Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft. There will also be delivery of Exocet anti-ship missiles and a vessel in an unmanned mine countermeasure system, dubbed SLAM-F.

The air force will receive three Airbus A330 MRTT multi-role tanker transport jets, two A400M airlifters, nine Pilatus PC-21 training aircraft, and upgraded Scalp EG cruise missiles, Mica missiles with new engines, and a Syracuse IV secure military telecommunications satellite.

Some €14.2 billion has been set aside for procurement of major weapons, while €5 billion will go to service support, a rise of 12 percent, reflecting an attempt to boost availability of weapons.

That hefty amount for maintenance reflected a relatively low availability of modern  helicopters and the A400M fleet, a defense specialist said.

Exports allowed Dassault to double its production rate of the Rafale to two units a month. The company previously built 11 per year, the minimum rate seen as needed to keep the assembly line open at the Merignac factory, near Bordeaux, southwest France. The factory closes for the month of August for summer holiday.

Featured Graphic: Photo 242250644 / 2023 © James Vallee | Dreamstime.com

COVID-19 Disrupts but Does Not Block CIVMEC From Supporting Australia’s OPV Project

09/28/2022

When I was last in Australia in March 2020, I was working on a report on the new Australian OPV program which was the initial effort to shape a continuous shipbuilding approach.

That report can be found in Chapter Eight (“Building a New Offshore Patrol Vessel: A Case Study in Strategic Change”) in my book, Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy.

I was in Western Australia visiting the Henderson shipyard and discussing the launch of the program with Jim Fitzgerald and Mark Clay of CIVMEC, the engineering company whose role in the program is to build the 27 key modules (blocks) that make up the hull and superstructure of the OPV’s.

This is what I wrote in my case study about the role of CIVMEC in the program:

Civmec’s Henderson facility, is the physical site of the vessels from the third OPV build onward. It is clear from visiting the yard, and looking at the build-out since they started the effort in 2008, that the company made a significant investment in shipbuilding prior to being awarded the OPV contract. But the build of the first two Arafura Class OPVs at the BAE/ASC yard in Adelaide does not take away from the effort of Civmec for the overall program or its preparation to build the remaining ships in the program at Henderson.

The material cutting for the ship is being done at one facility, not two, the one that I visited in Henderson. The material is shipped from Henderson to Adelaide by road and rail, and given that the cost of transport from West to East is significantly less than the other way around, the cost factor of having the initial assembly in Adelaide rather than in Henderson is very manageable.

This also allows the Henderson yard to have a two-ship run-through prior to launching full production at Henderson. This is a digital production facility, which is clearly evident when you visit the cutting facilities at the yard, where precision is the name of the game and where the production workers and staff manage a digital production process.

This includes having a control room for monitoring the parts flow into the yard and working schedules that are designed such that production materials arrive just in time for the production process. When visiting the yard, and walking into the large main assembly and sustainment hall, it is clear that it can accommodate accommodates the Royal Australian Navy’s ship up to the size of the Air Warfare destroyer.

Having to flee Western Australia to get to Sydney to get to back to the United States just before the pandemic lockdown happened meant that I did not get a chance to watch the program evolve over the past nearly three years.

It felt like I have just come back on the 3rd fleet (not quite as long as it took the first and second fleets but felt a bit like that). I felt a bit like the folks who came from the old country by ship but did not have direct communications for several years. Not quite the First Fleet experience but from a communications point of view, it was a bit like it.

Here is what greeted me day of departure from Sydney in March 2020:

Upon my return to Australia in September 2022, I had a chance to talk with both Jim Fitzgerald, Executive Chairman of Civmec, and with Mark Clay, Project Manager, to get an update on the progress in their side of the program.

Although not a heritage shipbuilder, they had relevant experience which they leveraged for the program and made significant investments to launch the program prior to full on construction.

This is what I wrote at the time of my March 2020 visit: “It is clear that in my initial read of the Civmec choice, I had missed one major area in which they work which is central to shipbuilding; they are players in the oil and gas offshore platform business. These are certainly sea bases and of relevance more generally to managing a shipbuilding enterprise.”

My expectation prior to my discussion with Fitzgerald and Clay was to hear a narrative explaining how the lockdown in Western Australia which cut WA from the rest of an Australia which itself was cut off from the world had slowed the program significantly.

But that was not what I heard.

Obviously, the pandemic created chaos and key disruptions to the workforce and supply chain.

Because the company had stockpiled enough material prior to the pandemic in anticipation of starting the program, they could continue the program. But clearly, resource constraints have been a key challenge to overcome.

As Clay noted: “We had already set up our core supply chain in 2018, so we did have a good start prior to the pandemic. We had ordered enough material to get us through that difficult time.

“And a number of our suppliers had ramped up supplies in anticipation of the program start and had done that prior to the Covid pandemic.”

Fitzgerald reinforced this point.

They also leveraged what they could find in Western Australia to fit in workforce pieces to the effort.

And it must be remembered that this is a digital production process which meant that they could leverage non-Australian expertise in building the program through “remote working” as well.

Obviously, they worked methods for ensuring worker safety required for curb COVID risks as well.

For example, they had to organize lunch breaks for the work force, by groups and would sanitize the area as lunch groups would come in a staggered schedule.

According to Fitzgerald: “We actually found that doing so increased productivity.”

According to Clay, “there are four ships on the go in WA at the moment. In Adelaide Ship 1 is in the water and due to commence builder trials, Ship 2 is progressing to launch and in WA Ships 3, 4 , 5 and 6 are in various stages of construction.”

Vessel consolidation is done in Civmec’s state of the art Assembly Hall by the prime contractor Luerssen and their various subcontractors.. They work with their subcontractors to achieve a finishing process as part of the consolidation, outfit and commissioning process.

Given that conflict in crises with adversaries will certainly disrupt, perhaps the pandemic provided a real-world preparation for the future.

In any case, at least this part of the continuous shipbuilding approach seems “battle tested” so to speak.

And they had to find more innovative ways to find ways to deal with shortfalls as well. This in turn provides a benefit going forward with the program.

And as one can see in the featured photos, the not yet completed assembly hall was clearly finished during the pandemic. By picking an engineering company to shape a new capability for shipbuilding has proven already successful.

The view of the yard in 2019:

The view now:

As Fitzgerald proudly underscored: “If you look at the completed facility now, at what we have achieved, and when you explain that to people, most people struggle to believe what we achieved through the height of the Covid pandemic.”